Gonzales vs. GJH Land, Inc. (Formerly S.J. Land, Inc.)

G.R. No. 202664. November 10, 2015.
*

MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES and FRANCIS MARTIN
D. GONZALES, petitioners, vs. GJH LAND, INC. (formerly
known as S.J. LAND, INC.), CHANG HWAN JANG a.k.a.
STEVE JANG, SANG RAK KIM, MARIECHU N. YAP, and
ATTY. ROBERTO P. MALLARI II, respondents.
Mercantile Law; Corporations; Intra-Corporate Controversies;

Special Commercial Courts; Jurisdiction; Applying the
relationship test and the nature of the controversy test, the suit
between the parties is clearly rooted in the existence of an intra-
corporate relationship and pertains to the enforcement of their
correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and
the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the
corporation, hence, intra-corporate, which should be heard by the
designated Special Commercial Court as provided under A.M. No.
03-03-03-SC dated June 17, 2003 in relation to Item 5.2, Section 5
of Republic Act (RA) No. 8799.—Applying the relationship test and
the nature of the controversy test, the suit between the parties is
clearly rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship
and pertains to the enforcement of their correlative rights and
obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and
intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation,
_______________
* EN BANC.

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Gonzales vs. GJH Land, Inc. (formerly S.J. Land, Inc.)
hence, intra-corporate, which should be heard by the

designated Special Commercial Court as provided under A.M. No.
03-03-03-SC dated June 17, 2003 in relation to Item 5.2, Section 5
of RA 8799.
Same; Same; Same; Same; By virtue of Republic Act (RA) No.
8799, jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 902-A was transferred from the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the Regional Trial
Courts (RTCs), being courts of general jurisdiction.—As a basic
premise, let it be emphasized that a court’s acquisition of
jurisdiction over a particular case’s subject matter is different
from incidents pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law, whereas a court’s exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided
by the law itself, is governed by the Rules of Court or by the
orders issued from time to time by the Court. In Lozada v.
Bracewell, 720 SCRA 371 (2014), it was recently held that the
matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of
procedure and has nothing to do with the question of
jurisdiction. Pertinent to this case is RA 8799 which took effect
on August 8, 2000. By virtue of said law, jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A was
transferred from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
to the RTCs, being courts of general jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; On June 17, 2003, the Supreme
Court (SC) issued A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC consolidating the
commercial Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) courts
and the intellectual property courts in one (1) Regional Trial Court
(RTC) branch in a particular locality, i.e., the Special Commercial
Court, to streamline the court structure and to promote expediency.
—It was only on November 21, 2000 that the Court designated
certain RTC branches to try and decide said SEC cases without,
however, providing for the transfer of the cases already
distributed to or filed with the regular branches thereof. Thus, on
January 23, 2001, the Court issued SC Administrative Circular
No. 08-2001 directing the transfer of said cases to the designated
courts (commercial SEC courts). Later, or on June 17, 2003, the
Court issued A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC consolidating the commercial
SEC courts and the intellectual property courts in one RTC
branch in a particular locality, i.e., the

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244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Special Commercial Court, to streamline the court
structure and to promote expediency. Accordingly, the RTC
branch so designated was mandated to try and decide SEC cases,
as well as those involving violations of intellectual property
rights, which were, thereupon, required to be filed in the Office of
the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated
Special Commercial Courts.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; So as to avert any future
confusion, the Supreme Court (SC) requires henceforth, that all
initiatory pleadings state the action’s nature both in its caption
and the body.—According to jurisprudence, “it is not the caption
but the allegations in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
which give meaning to the pleading and on the basis of which
such pleading may be legally characterized.” However, so as to
avert any future confusion, the Court requires henceforth, that all
initiatory pleadings state the action’s nature both in its caption
and the body, which parameters are defined in the dispositive
portion of this Decision.
Raffle of Cases; Regional Trial Courts; Special Commercial
Courts; The erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a
Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure — that is,
an incident related to the exercise of jurisdiction — and, thus,
should not negate the jurisdiction which the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Muntinlupa City had already acquired. In such a
scenario, the proper course of action was not for the commercial
case to be dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have first
referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a
commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then
assign said case to the only designated Special Commercial Court
in the station, i.e., Branch 256.—The Court nonetheless deems
that the erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a
Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure — that is,
an incident related to the exercise of jurisdiction — and, thus,
should not negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa
City had already acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course of
action was not for the commercial case to be dismissed; instead,
Branch 276 should have first referred the case to the
Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case;
thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said
case to the only designated Special Commercial Court in
the station, i.e., Branch 256. Note that the procedure would be
different

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where the RTC acquiring jurisdiction over the case has

multiple special commercial court branches; in such a
scenario, the Executive Judge, after re-docketing the same as a
commercial case, should proceed to order its re-raffling among
the said special branches.
Same; Same; Same; If the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
acquiring jurisdiction has no branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, then it should refer the case to the nearest RTC
with a designated Special Commercial Court branch within the
judicial region.—If the RTC acquiring jurisdiction has no branch
designated as a Special Commercial Court, then it should
refer the case to the nearest RTC with a designated Special
Commercial Court branch within the judicial region. Upon
referral, the RTC to which the case was referred to should re-
docket the case as a commercial case, and then: (a) if the said
RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial
Court, assign the case to the sole special branch; or (b) if the said
RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial
Courts, raffle off the case among those special branches.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The designation of Special
Commercial Courts was merely intended as a procedural tool to
expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line with the court’s
exercise of jurisdiction.—The Court finds it apt to point out that
the same principles apply to the inverse situation of
ordinary civil cases filed before the proper RTCs but
wrongly raffled to its branches designated as Special
Commercial Courts. In such a scenario, the ordinary civil
case should then be referred to the Executive Judge for re-
docketing as an ordinary civil case; thereafter, the
Executive Judge should then order the raffling of the case
to all branches of the same RTC, subject to limitations
under existing internal rules, and the payment of the
correct docket fees in case of any difference. Unlike the
limited assignment/raffling of a commercial case only to branches
designated as Special Commercial Courts in the scenarios stated
above, the re-raffling of an ordinary civil case in this instance to
all courts is permissible due to the fact that a particular branch
which has been designated as a Special Commercial Court does
not shed the RTC’s general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases
under the imprimatur of statutory law, i.e., Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP) 129. To restate, the designation of Special
Commercial Courts was merely

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intended as a procedural tool to expedite the resolution of

commercial cases in line with the court’s exercise of
jurisdiction. This designation was not made by statute but only
by an internal Supreme Court rule under its authority to
promulgate rules governing matters of procedure and its
constitutional mandate to supervise the administration of all
courts and the personnel thereof. Certainly, an internal rule
promulgated by the Court cannot go beyond the commanding
statute. But as a more fundamental reason, the designation of
Special Commercial Courts is, to stress, merely an incident
related to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction, which, as first
discussed, is distinct from the concept of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. The RTC’s general jurisdiction over ordinary civil
cases is therefore not abdicated by an internal rule streamlining
court procedure.

PEREZ, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Regional Trial Courts;
Jurisdictions; View that the ponencia proceeds from the wrong
premise that the law vested jurisdiction over transferred Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) cases on all the Regional Trial
Courts (RTCs) and that the designation by the Supreme Court
(SC) of Special Commercial Courts concern only an “exercise of
jurisdiction.”—With all due respect, the ponencia proceeds from
the wrong premise that the law vested jurisdiction over
transferred SEC cases on all the Regional Trial Courts and that
the designation by the Supreme Court of Special Commercial
Courts concern only an “exercise of jurisdiction.”
Statutory Construction; View that it is first axiom in legal
hermeneutics that a statutory provision is read as a whole and not
in disjointed parts.—It is first axiom in legal hermeneutics that a
statutory provision is read as a whole and not in disjointed parts.
The rule is as respected as it is ancient. Its sum and substance
has not been diluted no matter how frequent the free paraphrases
have been.
Jurisdiction; View that Section 5, Item 5.2 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 8799 did not transfer the cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 902-A to all the Regional Trial
Courts (RTCs).—Section 5, Item 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 did not
transfer the cases enu-

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merated under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A to all the RTCs. If

that was the legislative intention, then the provision should have
simply stated that such cases are “hereby transferred to the
Regional Trial Courts.” The complete investiture is, however, on
“the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional
Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court, in the exercise of
its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches
that shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases.” If the law is a
general conferment of jurisdiction on all RTC, then the phrase “or
the appropriate Regional Trial Court” is an inutile surplusage and
the proviso that “the Supreme Court in the exercise of its
authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that
shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases” is a purposeless
appendage and wasted words. A general grant to all RTCs
renders irrelevant the “Supreme Court’s exercise of authority” on
the matter. Such a general grant renders meaningless the
designation by the Supreme Court of the RTC branches that shall
exercise jurisdiction over the cases.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Section 5, Item 5.2 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 8799 should therefore be read to mean that
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) jurisdiction over
all cases under Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 902-A is
transferred to the specific Regional Trial Court (RTC) branch
designated by the Supreme Court (SC) in the exercise of its
authority.—Section 5, Item 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 should therefore
be read to mean that SEC’s jurisdiction over all cases under
Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A is transferred to the specific RTC
branch designated by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its
authority. This is the reading of the Supreme Court as expressed
with precision in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC dated 21 November 2000
which is aptly titled “Resolution Designating Certain Branches of
Regional Trial Courts To Try and Decide Cases Formerly
Cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission” “arising
within their respective territorial jurisdictions with respect to the
National Capital Region and within the respective provinces in
the First to the Twelfth Judicial Regions.” This En Banc
Resolution opened with a purpose clause reading “to implement
the provisions of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 (The Securities
Regulation Code). This is an unequivocal statement that the
Court interprets the provision to mean that only the RTC
Branches that it shall designate to hear and decide Special
Commercial Court cases can exercise jurisdiction over such cases.

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Same; Same; Same; Same; View that absent such jurisdiction,

the non-Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Regional
Trial Court (RTC) cannot direct the case to the “proper” court.—
There has been, as just enumerated, as many iterations by the
court itself of its reading of Section 5, Item 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799
i.e., that the law transferred the SEC jurisdiction over the cases
listed in Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A to the particular branches of the
RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as such. Unavoidable,
therefore, is the conclusion that all other Branches of the RTCs
without the Supreme Court designation are without jurisdiction
over SEC cases. And following unreversed rulings the other
Branches of the RTC before whom a SEC case is filed must
dismiss such case for want of jurisdiction. Furthermore, absent
such jurisdiction, the non-SEC RTC cannot direct the case to the
“proper” court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Commercial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over
commercial cases and can still exercise jurisdiction over regular
cases if, as determined by the Supreme Court (SC), the caseloads
necessitate such exercise.—Palpably, RTC caseloads and the need
to equalize the caseloads among all branches determine the need
for the Court to issue regulations regarding the Commercial
Courts’ exercise of jurisdiction over noncommercial cases. In all,
the RTC Commercial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over
commercial cases and can still exercise jurisdiction over regular
cases if, as determined by the Supreme Court, the caseloads
necessitate such exercise. While there may be arguments in favor
of a simpler arrangement whereby all the RTCs in all the Judicial
Districts are made Commercial Courts, such arguments cannot be
submitted for resolution by the Court. The settlement is in the
legislature.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the designation of
Special Commercial Courts, as implemented by the Supreme Court
(SC) through its various rules, pertains to the statutorily conferred
jurisdiction and not merely an incident related to the court’s
exercise of jurisdiction.—Plainly, the designation of Special
Commercial Courts, as implemented by the Supreme Court
through its various rules, pertains to the statutorily conferred
jurisdiction and not merely an incident related to the court’s
exercise of jurisdiction. The ponencia fails to address an equally
important precept on subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., jurisdiction
is determined by the averments and

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allegations of the complaint which in this instance is

inarguably a commercial case concerning subscription of shares in
a corporation. From the onset, petitioners, by the filing of
their Complaint, supplied the occasion for the exercise of
jurisdiction vested by law in a particular court. In short,
petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC (not as a court of
general jurisdiction), and with the allegations in their Complaint,
specifically invoked the RTC designated as a Special Commercial
Court under Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, implemented under
A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. Petitioners cannot just simply file
their Complaint before the RTC without any specificity,
given the allegations contained therein and the reliefs
they prayed for.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Branch 276 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), to which the Complaint was
consequently raffled, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction,
cannot order the transfer of the Complaint to Branch 256, the
designated Special Commercial Court. Branch 276 cannot do so on
the basis of authority over the case which it did not have. Neither
does it have authority over a coequal court.—With the incorrect
labeling of their Complaint and the wrong invocation of the RTC’s
regular jurisdiction, the designated Special Commercial Court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the Complaint by the mere filing
thereof with the multi sala RTC. Since petitioners had filed what
they labeled as a Civil Case, they knowingly filed it pursuant to
the general jurisdiction of the RTC under Sec. 19 of B.P. Blg. 129.
The mere filing of the Complaint before the Office of the Clerk of
Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, in the official station of the
designated Special Commercial Court as what occurred herein, is
not equivalent to the correct and proper filing of the Complaint
before the appropriate Regional Trial Court specially designated
by the Supreme Court to hear and decide cases enumerated under
Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A. Branch 276 of the RTC, to which the
Complaint was consequently raffled, in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction, cannot order the transfer of the Complaint to Branch
256, the designated Special Commercial Court. Branch 276
cannot do so on the basis of authority over the case which it did
not have. Neither does it have authority over a coequal court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that courts should not
themselves correct the procedural mistakes of pleaders.—Indeed,
We

250

should, as warranted, require from counsels disciplined

knowledge of procedure. Courts should not themselves correct the
procedural mistakes of pleaders. I cannot overemphasize, and
ultimately revert to the fact, that subject matter jurisdiction was
conferred by law (Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799) to the appropriate
RTC as determined thru the designation by the Supreme Court.

LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:

Jurisdiction; View that the designation of certain Regional Trial
Court (RTC) branches as Special Commercial Courts does not
work to confer jurisdiction over the branches designated as such.—
I concur with the ponencia’s conclusion that the designation of
certain Regional Trial Court branches as Special Commercial
Courts does not work to confer jurisdiction over the branches
designated as such. It was an error for the Muntinlupa City
Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, to dismiss the Complaint filed
by petitioners. As the ponencia underscores, Branch 276 should
have instead transferred the case to the Muntinlupa City
Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, the branch duly designated to
perform the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court’s functions as
a Special Commercial Court. The present Petition must, thus, be
granted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that jurisdiction over what
the ponencia collectively refers to as Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Cases was vested by Republic Act (RA) No.
8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code (SRC), in
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) and is not limited to the RTC
branches designated by the Supreme Court (SC) as Special
Commercial Courts.—Jurisdiction over what the ponencia
collectively refers to as SEC Cases was vested by Republic Act No.
8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, in
Regional Trial Courts and is not limited to the Regional Trial
Court branches designated by this court as Special Commercial
Courts. It is only the legislature that has the power “to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts[.]” As
Congress does not share this power with this court, in relation
with these issues, this court’s competence is limited to
“administrative supervision over all courts[,]” as well as the
“[p]romulgat[ion of] rules concerning . . . pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts[.]” It was purely in the exercise of these
powers, and not

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for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction where previously there

was none, that this court designated certain Regional Trial Court
branches as Special Commercial Courts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that jurisdiction over all
cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
902-A, which were previously under the jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), was vested in
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) by Section 5.2 of the Securities
Regulation Code (SRC).—Jurisdiction over all cases enumerated
under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, which were
previously under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, was vested in Regional Trial Courts by Section 5.2 of
the Securities Regulation Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
did not work to confer jurisdiction independently of Section 5.2 of
the Securities Regulation Code (SRC). A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC itself
declares that it was adopted merely “[t]o implement the provisions
of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8799.”—This statutory
provision was adopted pursuant to the legislature’s power under
Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution “to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts[.]” In
contrast, the designation of Special Commercial Courts, through
this court’s November 21, 2000 Resolution in A.M. No. 00-11-03-
SC, was pursuant to this court’s power under Article VIII, Section
6 of the 1987 Constitution to exercise “administrative supervision
over all courts.” A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC did not work to confer
jurisdiction independently of Section 5.2 of the Securities
Regulation Code. A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC itself declares that it was
adopted merely “[t]o implement the provisions of Sec. 5.2 of
Republic Act No. 8799[.]”
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the identity of Regional
Trial Courts (RTCs) as courts of general jurisdiction is no bar to
designating certain RTC branches to focus on certain types of
cases.—The identity of Regional Trial Courts as courts of general
jurisdiction is no bar to designating certain Regional Trial Court
branches to focus on certain types of cases. To the contrary, it is
this identity which permits it. Designating branches to focus on
certain types of cases, in order to facilitate the efficient
dispensation of justice, is well within their nature as courts
competent to take cognizance of cases not falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of any other court,

252

tribunal, person, or body. Designating branches as such

balances two considerations: on the one hand, their nature as
courts, which because they have general jurisdiction, can exercise
jurisdiction over the specific matter to which they were assigned;
and on the other, their duty to speedily administer justice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Section 5.2’s
qualification that this court’s power to designate is necessarily only
“in the exercise of its authority” is illuminating.—Section 5.2’s
qualification that this court’s power to designate is necessarily
only “in the exercise of its authority” is illuminating. It is to say
that, in going about its task of designating, this court cannot act
in excess of its constitutional authority. This affirms the
Constitution’s segregation of the competencies of Congress from
those of this court. It affirms the exclusivity of Congress’ power
“to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various
courts[.]” This affirms the reality that, bereft of this power, this
court’s competence is limited to “administrative supervision over
all courts[,]” as well as the “[p]romulgat[ion] [of] rules concerning .
. . pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts[.]”
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that in adopting A.M. No. 00-
11-03-SC, this court was fully cognizant of how Section 5.2 limited
its authority to designate only “in the exercise of its authority.”—
A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC did not create a new class of courts. Its
purpose is operational efficiency. In its own words, it was adopted
to serve “the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of
justice[.]” It is, thus, but a procedural and administrative
mechanism aimed (to echo the words of the ponencia) “to promote
expediency and efficiency in the exercise of the [Regional Trial
Courts’] jurisdiction[.]” Also in its own words, A.M. No. 00-11-03-
SC was adopted only “[t]o implement the provisions of Sec. 5.2 of
Republic Act No. 8799 [or the Securities Regulation Code].” Thus,
in adopting A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, this court was fully cognizant
of how Section 5.2 limited its authority to designate only “in the
exercise of its authority[.]” Indeed, this court could not have
intended to overstep the constitutional limits of its authority.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the orders of the

Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Br. 276.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

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Platon, Martinez, Flores, San Pedro & Leaño for

petitioners.
Roberto P. Mallari II for himself and respondent GJH
Land, Inc.
Chris Paolo P. Ruanto for respondents Mariechu N.
Yap and Steve Jang.
Jasmin R. Fiel for respondent Sang Rak Kim.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court, via a petition for
review on certiorari,1 from the Orders dated April 17, 20122
and July 9, 20123 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 (Branch 276) dismissing
Civil Case No. 11-077 for lack of jurisdiction.

The Facts
On August 4, 2011, petitioners Manuel Luis C.
Gonzales4 and Francis Martin D. Gonzales (petitioners)
filed a Complaint5 for “Injunction with prayer for Issuance
of Status Quo Order, Three (3)- and Twenty (20)-Day
Temporary Restraining Orders, and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with Damages” against respondents GJH Land,
Inc. (formerly known as S.J. Land, Inc.), Chang Hwan
Jang, Sang Rak Kim, Mariechu N. Yap, and Atty. Roberto
P. Mallari II6 (respondents) before the RTC of Muntinlupa
City seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J. Land, Inc.’s shares
which they purportedly bought from S.J.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 10-28.

2 Id., at pp. 34-38. Penned by Presiding Judge Antonietta Pablo-
Medina.
3 Id., at pp. 39-41.
4 “Francis Martin C. Gonzales” in some parts of the records.
5 Dated August 2, 2011. Rollo, pp. 42-53.
6 “Atty. Roberto P. Mallari” in some parts of the records.

254

Global, Inc. on February 1, 2010. Essentially, petitioners

alleged that the subscriptions for the said shares were
already paid by them in full in the books of S.J. Land, Inc.,7
but were nonetheless offered for sale on July 29, 2011 to
the corporation’s stockholders,8 hence, their plea for
injunction.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 11-077 and
raffled to Branch 276, which is not a Special
Commercial Court. On August 9, 2011, said branch
issued a temporary restraining order,9 and later, in an
Order10 dated August 24, 2011, granted the application for
a writ of preliminary injunction.
After filing their respective answers11 to the complaint,
respondents filed a motion to dismiss12 on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, pointing
out that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute
and should, thus, be heard by the designated Special
Commercial Court of Muntinlupa City.13
The RTC’s Ruling

In an Order14 dated April 17, 2012, Branch 276 granted
the motion to dismiss filed by respondents. It found that
the case involves an intra-corporate dispute that is within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs
designated as Special Commercial Courts. It pointed out
that the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 (Branch 256)
was specifically designated by the Court as the Special
Commercial Court, hence, Branch 276 had no jurisdiction
over the case and cannot law-
_______________
7 Rollo, p. 44.
8 Id., at p. 47.
9 Id., at pp. 90-91.
10 Id., at pp. 92-97.
11 Id., at p. 14.
12 Dated February 7, 2011. (Id., at pp. 98-114)
13 Id., at pp. 107-110.
14 Id., at pp. 34-38.

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fully exercise jurisdiction on the matter, including the

issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.15 Accordingly,
it dismissed the case.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a motion for
16
reconsideration, arguing that they filed the case with the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City
which assigned the same to Branch 276 by raffle.17 As the
raffle was beyond their control, they should not be made to
suffer the consequences of the wrong assignment of the
case, especially after paying the filing fees in the amount of
P235,825.00 that would be for naught if the dismissal is
upheld.18 They further maintained that the RTC has
jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes under Republic
Act No. (RA) 8799,19 but since the Court selected specific
branches to hear and decide such suits, the case must, at
most, be transferred or raffled off to the proper branch.20
In an Order21 dated July 9, 2012, Branch 276 denied the
motion for reconsideration, holding that it has no authority
or power to order the transfer of the case to the proper
Special Commercial Court, citing Calleja v. Panday22
(Calleja); hence, the present petition.
The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether
or not Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City erred in
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
_______________
15 Id., at p. 37.
16 Dated May 8, 2012. Id., at pp. 152-160.
17 Id., at pp. 152-154.
18 Id., at pp. 154-155.
19 Otherwise known as “The Securities Regulation Code.”
20 Rollo, p. 155.
21 Id., at pp. 39-41.
22 518 Phil. 801; 483 SCRA 680 (2006).

256

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, the Court finds Branch 276 to have
correctly categorized Civil Case No. 11-077 as a commercial
case, more particularly, an intra-corporate dispute,23
considering that it relates to petitioners’ averred rights
over the shares of stock offered for sale to other
stockholders, having paid the same in full. Applying the
relationship test and the nature of the controversy test, the
suit between the parties is clearly rooted in the existence of
an intra-corporate relationship and pertains to the
enforcement of their correlative rights and obligations
under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-cor-
porate regulatory rules of the corporation,24 hence, intra-
corporate, which should be heard by the designated Special
Commercial Court as provided under A.M. No. 03-03-03-
SC25 dated June 17, 2003 in relation to Item 5.2, Section 5
of RA 8799.
The present controversy lies, however, in the procedure
to be followed when a commercial case — such as the
instant intra-corporate dispute — has been properly
filed in the official station of the designated Special
Commercial Court but is, however, later wrongly
assigned by raffle to a regular branch of that station.
_______________
23 Rollo, p. 37.
24 See Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Corporation v. Cullen,
G.R. No. 181416, November 11, 2013, 709 SCRA 110, 120-121; citations
omitted.
25 Entitled “Re: Consolidation of Intellectual Property Courts with
Commercial Courts” (July 1, 2003). Prior to A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC,
however, the Court had already issued several resolutions in A.M. No. 00-
11-03-SC (entitled “Resolution Designating Certain Branches of Regional
Trial Courts to Try and Decide Cases Formerly Cognizable by the
Securities and Exchange Commission” [November 21, 2000]), A.M. No. 01-
5-298-RTC (August 27, 2001), and A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC (July 8, 2002)
to implement the provisions of Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799.

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As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that a court’s

acquisition of jurisdiction over a particular case’s subject
matter is different from incidents pertaining to the exercise
of its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law, whereas a court’s exercise of
jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is governed
by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued from time to
time by the Court.26 In Lozada v. Bracewell,27 it was
recently held that the matter of whether the RTC
resolves an issue in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special
court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing
to do with the question of jurisdiction.
Pertinent to this case is RA 8799 which took effect on
August 8, 2000. By virtue of said law, jurisdiction over
cases enumerated in Section 528 of Presidential Decree No.
_______________
26 See Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law, Vol. I, p. 73, 2007 Ed.
27 G.R. No. 179155, April 2, 2014, 720 SCRA 371, 381.
28 SEC. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of
the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships
and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted
under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving.
a. Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors,
business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public
and/or of the stockholder, partners, members of associations or
organizations registered with the Commission;
b. Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations,
between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or
all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they
are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns
their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity;

258

902-A29 was transferred from the Securities and

Exchange Commission (SEC) to the RTCs, being courts
of general jurisdiction. Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799
provides:

SEC. 5. Powers and Functions of the
Commission.—x x x
x x x x
5.2 The Commission’s jurisdiction over all
cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby
transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction
or the appropriate Regional Trial Court:
Provided, that the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its authority may designate the
Regional Trial Court branches that shall
exercise jurisdiction over the cases. The
Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending
cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for
final resolution which should be resolved within one
(1) year from the enactment of this Code. The
Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending
suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of
30 June 2000 until finally disposed. (Emphasis
supplied)

The legal attribution of Regional Trial Courts as
courts of general jurisdiction stems from Section 19(6),
Chapter II of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,30 known as
“The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980”:
_______________
c. Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees,

officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations.
29 Entitled “Reorganization of the Securities and Exchange
Commission with Additional Powers and Placing the Said Agency under
the Administrative Supervision of the Office of the President.” (March 11,
1976)
30 Entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
therefor, and for Other Purposes” (approved on August 14, 1981).

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Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional

Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
x x x x
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person
or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
x x x x
As enunciated in Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. CA:31

The regional trial court, formerly the court of first
instance, is a court of general jurisdiction. All cases,
the jurisdiction over which is not specifically provided
for by law to be within the jurisdiction of any other
court, fall under the jurisdiction of the regional trial
court.32

To clarify, the word “or” in Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA
8799 was intentionally used by the legislature to
particularize the fact that the phrase “the Courts of general
jurisdiction” is equivalent to the phrase “the appropriate
Regional Trial Court.” In other words, the jurisdiction of
the SEC over the cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD
902-A was transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction,
that is to say (or, otherwise known as), the proper Regional
Trial Courts. This interpretation is supported by San
Miguel Corp. v. Municipal Council,33 wherein the Court
held that:
[T]he word “or” may be used as the equivalent of

“that is to say” and gives that which precedes it the
same significance as that which follows it. It is not
always disjunctive and is sometimes interpretative or
expository of the preceding word.34
_______________
31 427 Phil. 604; 377 SCRA 353 (2002).

32 Id., at p. 612; p. 359.
33 152 Phil. 30; 52 SCRA 43 (1973).
34 Id., at p. 38; p. 49.

260

Further, as may be gleaned from the following excerpt of

the Congressional deliberations:
Senator [Raul S.] Roco: x x x.
x x x x
x x x. The first major departure is as regards the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The Securities
and Exchange Commission has been authorized under
this proposal to reorganize itself. As an
administrative agency, we strengthened it and at the
same time we take away the quasi-judicial functions.
The quasi-judicial functions are now given back
to the courts of general jurisdiction — the
Regional Trial Court, except for two categories of
cases.
In the case of corporate disputes, only those that
are now submitted for final determination of the SEC
will remain with the SEC. So, all those cases, both
memos of the plaintiff and the defendant, that have
been submitted for resolution will continue. At the
same time, cases involving rehabilitation, bankruptcy,
suspension of payments and receiverships that were
filed before June 30, 2000 will continue with the SEC.
In other words, we are avoiding the possibility, upon
approval of this bill, of people filing cases with the
SEC, in manner of speaking, to select their court.35
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, one must be disabused of the notion that the
transfer of jurisdiction was made only in favor of particular
RTC branches, and not the RTCs in general.
Consistent with the foregoing, history depicts that when
the transfer of SEC cases to the RTCs was first
implemented, they were transmitted to the Executive
Judges of the RTCs for raffle between or among its
different branches, unless a
_______________
35 See Transcript of Session Proceedings in Securities Act of 1998, SB.

No. 1220/CR. No. 6, RA 8799 dated July 17, 2000, p. 222.

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VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 261

specific branch has been designated as a Special

Commercial Court, in which instance, the cases were
transmitted to said branch.36 It was only on November
21, 2000 that the Court designated certain RTC branches
to try and decide said SEC cases37 without, however,
providing for the transfer of the cases already distributed
to or filed with the regular branches thereof. Thus, on
January 23, 2001, the Court issued SC Administrative
Circular No. 08-200138 directing the transfer of said cases
to the designated courts (commercial SEC courts). Later, or
on June 17, 2003, the Court issued A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC
consolidating the commercial SEC courts and the
intellectual property courts39 in one RTC branch in a
particular locality, i.e., the Special Commercial Court, to
streamline the court structure and to
_______________
36 See Resolution dated August 22, 2000 in A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC,

entitled “In Re: Transfer of Cases from the Securities and Exchange
Commission to the Regular Courts Pursuant to R.A. No. 8799.”
37 See Resolution dated November 21, 2000 in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC,
entitled “Resolution Designating Certain Branches of Regional Trial
Courts to Try and Decide Cases Formerly Cognizable by the Securities
and Exchange Commission.”
38 Entitled “Transfer to Designated Regional Trial Courts of SEC
Cases Enumerated in Section 5, P.D. No. 902-A from the Regular Regional
Trial Courts” (March 1, 2001).
39 Designated to try violations of intellectual property rights under RA
8293, otherwise known as the “Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines” and under SC A.O. No. 113-95 (entitled “Re: Designation of
Special Courts for Intellectual Property Rights” [October 2, 1995]), as
amended by SC A.O. No. 104-96 (entitled “Re: Designation of Special
Courts for Kidnapping, Robbery, Carnapping, Dangerous Drugs Cases and
Other Heinous Crimes; Intellectual Property Rights Violations and
Jurisdiction in Libel Cases” [October 21, 1996]) and A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC
(entitled “Re: Designation of an Intellectual Property Judge for Manila.”
[February 19, 2002])

262

promote expediency.40 Accordingly, the RTC branch

so designated was mandated to try and decide SEC cases,
as well as those involving violations of intellectual property
rights, which were, thereupon, required to be filed in the
Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the
designated Special Commercial Courts, to wit:

1. The Regional Courts previously designated as
SEC Courts through the: (a) Resolutions of this Court
dated 21 November 2000, 4 July 2001, 12 November
2002, and 9 July 2002 all issued in A.M. No. 00-11-03-
SC; (b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M. No.
01-5-298-RTC; and (c) Resolution dated 8 July 2002 in
A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC are hereby DESIGNATED
and shall be CALLED as Special Commercial Courts
to try and decide cases involving violations of
Intellectual Property Rights which fall within their
jurisdiction and those cases formerly cognizable by
the Securities and Exchange Commission;
x x x x
4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have
jurisdiction over cases arising within their respective
territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National
Capital Judicial Region and within the respective
provinces with respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial
Regions. Thus, cases shall be filed in the Office of the
Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated
Special Commercial Court.41
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

It is important to mention that the Court’s designation
of Special Commercial Courts was made in line with its
consti-
_______________
40 Tan v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 514 Phil. 307, 316; 478 SCRA 115, 124
(2005). See also final whereas clause of A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC.
41 See OCA Circular No. 82-2003, entitled “Subject: Consolidation of
Intellectual Property Courts with Commercial Courts.” (June 30, 2003)

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tutional authority to supervise the administration of all

courts as provided under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution:

Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.

The objective behind the designation of such specialized
courts is to promote expediency and efficiency in the
exercise of the RTCs’ jurisdiction over the cases
enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902-A. Such designation
has nothing to do with the statutory conferment of
jurisdiction to all RTCs under RA 8799 since in the first
place, the Court cannot enlarge, diminish, or dictate when
jurisdiction shall be removed, given that the power to
define, prescribe, and apportion jurisdiction is, as a
general rule, a matter of legislative prerogative.42
Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to
define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts but may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5 hereof.
x x x x

Here, petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intra-
corporate dispute, with the Office of the Clerk of Court in
the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of
the designated Special Commercial Court, in accordance
with A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. It is, therefore, from the
time of such filing that the RTC of Muntinlupa City
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter or the
nature of
_______________
42 See Tinitigan v. Tinitigan, Sr., 188 Phil. 597, 611; 100 SCRA 619,
634 (1980).

264

the action.43 Unfortunately, the commercial case

was wrongly raffled to a regular branch, i.e., Branch
276, instead of being assigned44 to the sole Special
Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City,
which is Branch 256. This error may have been caused
by a reliance on the complaint’s caption, i.e., “Civil Case for
Injunction with prayer for Status Quo Order, TRO and
Damages,”45 which, however, contradicts and more
importantly, cannot prevail over its actual allegations that
clearly make out an intra-corporate dispute:

16. To the surprise of MLCG and FMDG,
however, in two identical letters both dated 13 May
2011, under the letterhead of GJH Land, Inc., Yap,
now acting as its President, Jang and Kim
demanded payment of supposed unpaid
subscriptions of MLCG and FMDG amounting to
P10,899,854.30 and P2,625,249.41, respectively.
16.1 Copies of the letters dated 13 May 2011
are attached hereto and made integral parts
hereof as Annexes “J” and “K,” respectively.
17. On 29 July 2011, MLCG and FMDG received
an Offer Letter addressed to stockholders of GJH
Land, Inc. from Yap informing all stockholders that
GJH Land, Inc. is now offering for sale the unpaid
shares of stock of
_______________
43 See Herrera, supra note 26 at pp. 112-113. See also Tinitigan v.

Tinitigan, Sr., id.
44 Item 6 of A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC provides:
6. In order to ensure a just and equitable distribution of cases, the
designated Special Commercial Court shall continue to participate in the
raffles of other cases. Provided, however, that the Executive Judge
concerned shall adopt a procedure whereby every IP and SEC case
assigned to a Special Commercial Court should be considered a
case raffled to it and duly credited to such court. (Emphasis
supplied)
45 See Rollo, p. 42.

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MLCG and FMDG. The same letter states that the

offers to purchase these shares will be opened on 10
August 2011 with payments to be arranged by deposit
to the depository bank of GJH Land, Inc.
17.1 A copy of the undated Offer Letter is
attached hereto and made and made an integral
part hereof as Annex “L.”
18. The letter of GJH Land, Inc. through Yap, is
totally without legal and factual basis because as
evidenced by the Deeds of Assignment signed and
certified by Yap herself, all the S.J. Land, Inc. shares
acquired by MLCG and FMDG have been fully paid in
the books of S.J. Land, Inc.
19. With the impending sale of the alleged unpaid
subscriptions on 10 August 2011, there is now a
clear danger that MLCG and FMDG would be
deprived of these shares without legal and
factual basis.
20. Furthermore, if they are deprived of these
shares through the scheduled sale, both MLCG and
FMDG would suffer grave and irreparable damage
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
21. For this reason, plaintiffs now come to the
Honorable Court for injunctive relief so that after
trial on the merits, a permanent injunction should be
issued against the defendants preventing them from
selling the shares of the plaintiffs, there being no
basis for such sale.46

According to jurisprudence, “it is not the caption but the
allegations in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
which give meaning to the pleading and on the basis of
which such pleading may be legally characterized.”47
However, so as to avert any future confusion, the Court
requires henceforth, that all initiatory pleadings state the
action’s nature both in
_______________
46 Id., at pp. 47-48.

47 Republic v. Nolasco, 496 Phil. 853, 867; 457 SCRA 400, 418 (2005).

266

its caption and the body, which parameters are defined

in the dispositive portion of this Decision.
Going back to the case at bar, the Court nonetheless
deems that the erroneous raffling to a regular branch
instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only a matter of
procedure — that is, an incident related to the exercise of
jurisdiction — and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction
which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already acquired.
In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not for
the commercial case to be dismissed; instead, Branch 276
should have first referred the case to the Executive
Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case;
thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign
said case to the only designated Special Commercial
Court in the station, i.e., Branch 256.
Note that the procedure would be different where the
RTC acquiring jurisdiction over the case has multiple
special commercial court branches; in such a scenario,
the Executive Judge, after re-docketing the same as a
commercial case, should proceed to order its re-raffling
among the said special branches.
Meanwhile, if the RTC acquiring jurisdiction has no
branch designated as a Special Commercial Court,
then it should refer the case to the nearest RTC with a
designated Special Commercial Court branch within the
judicial region.48 Upon referral, the RTC to which the case
was referred to should re-docket the case as a commercial
case, and then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch
designated as a Special Commercial Court, assign the case
to the sole special branch; or (b) if the said RTC has
multiple branches designated as Special Commercial
Courts, raffle off the case among those special branches.
_______________
48 See Item No. 3 of A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, as amended, dated June

15, 2015.

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VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 267

In all the above mentioned scenarios, any difference

regarding the applicable docket fees should be duly
accounted for. On the other hand, all docket fees already
paid shall be duly credited, and any excess, refunded.
At this juncture, the Court finds it fitting to clarify that
the RTC mistakenly relied on the Calleja case to support
its ruling. In Calleja, an intra-corporate dispute49 among
officers of a private corporation with principal address at
Goa, Camarines Sur, was filed with the RTC of San Jose,
Camarines Sur, Branch 58 instead of the RTC of Naga
City, which is the official station of the designated Special
Commercial Court for Camarines Sur. Consequently, the
Court set aside the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur’s order
to transfer the case to the RTC of Naga City and dismissed
the complaint considering that it was filed before a court
which, having no internal branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, had no jurisdiction over those kinds of
actions, i.e., intra-corporate disputes. Calleja involved
two different RTCs, i.e., the RTC of San Jose, Camarines
Sur and the RTC of Naga City, whereas the instant case
only involves one RTC, i.e., the RTC of Muntinlupa City,
albeit involving two different branches of the same court,
i.e., Branches 256 and 276. Hence, owing to the variance in
the facts attending, it was then improper for the RTC to
rely on the Calleja ruling.
Besides, the Court observes that the fine line that
distinguishes subject matter jurisdiction and exercise of
jurisdiction had been clearly blurred in Calleja. Harkening
back to the statute that had conferred subject matter
jurisdiction, two things are apparently clear: (a) that the
SEC’s subject matter jurisdiction over intra-corporate
cases under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A was
transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction, i.e., the
appropriate Regional Trial
_______________
49 A case for quo warranto against members of the board of directors

and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, docketed as Civil Case No.
T-1007.

268

Courts; and (b) the designated branches of the Regional

Trial Court, as per the rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court, shall exercise jurisdiction over such cases. Item
5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799 provides:

Commission.—x x x
x x x x
5.2 The Commission’s jurisdiction over all
cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby
transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction
or the appropriate Regional Trial Court:
Provided, that the Supreme Court in the exercise
of its authority may designate the Regional
Trial Court branches that shall exercise
jurisdiction over the cases. x x x.

In contrast, the appropriate jurisprudential reference to
this case would be Tan v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,50 which
involves a criminal complaint for violation of intellectual
property rights filed before the RTC of Cebu City but was
raffled to a regular branch thereof (Branch 21), and not to a
Special Commercial Court. As it turned out, the regular
branch subsequently denied the private complainant’s
motion to transfer the case to the designated special court
of the same RTC, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The
CA reversed the regular branch and, consequently, ordered
the transfer of the case to the designated special court at
that time (Branch 9). The Court, affirming the CA, declared
that the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter. In view, however, of the designation of another
court as the Special Commercial Court in the interim
(Branch 11 of the same Cebu City RTC), the Court
accordingly ordered the transfer of the case and the
transmittal of the records to said Special Commercial Court
_______________
50 Supra note 40.

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instead.51 Similarly, the transfer of the present
intra-corporate dispute from Branch 276 to Branch
256 of the same RTC of Muntinlupa City, subject to
the parameters above discussed is proper and will
further the purposes stated in A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC
of attaining a speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
For further guidance, the Court finds it apt to point out
that the same principles apply to the inverse situation
of ordinary civil cases filed before the proper RTCs
but wrongly raffled to its branches designated as
Special Commercial Courts. In such a scenario, the
ordinary civil case should then be referred to the
Executive Judge for re-docketing as an ordinary
civil case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should
then order the raffling of the case to all branches of
the same RTC, subject to limitations under existing
internal rules, and the payment of the correct docket
fees in case of any difference. Unlike the limited
assignment/raffling of a commercial case only to branches
designated as Special Commercial Courts in the scenarios
stated above, the re-raffling of an ordinary civil case in this
instance to all courts is permissible due to the fact that a
particular branch which has been designated as a Special
Commercial Court does not shed the RTC’s general
jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases under the imprimatur
of statutory law, i.e., Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129.52
To restate, the designation of Special Commercial
_______________
51 Id., at pp. 314-316; pp. 122-123.

52 Section 19 of BP 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes,” as amended by
RA 7691, Entitled “An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as
the ‘Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,’” reads:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

270

Courts was merely intended as a procedural tool to
expedite
_______________
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he
demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or,
in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the
gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross
value exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs
or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00).

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the resolution of commercial cases in line with the
court’s exercise of jurisdiction. This designation was not
made by statute but only by an internal Supreme Court
rule under its authority to promulgate rules governing
matters of procedure and its constitutional mandate to
supervise the administration of all courts and the
personnel thereof.53 Certainly, an internal rule
promulgated by the Court cannot go beyond the
commanding statute. But as a more fundamental reason,
the designation of Special Commercial Courts is, to stress,
merely an incident related to the court’s exercise of
jurisdiction, which, as first discussed, is distinct from the
concept of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The RTC’s
general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases is therefore
not abdicated by an internal rule streamlining court
procedure.
In fine, Branch 276’s dismissal of Civil Case No. 11-077
is set aside and the transfer of said case to Branch 256, the
designated Special Commercial Court of the same RTC of
Muntinlupa City, under the parameters above explained, is
hereby ordered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders
dated April 17, 2012 and July 9, 2012 of the Regional Trial
_______________
53 Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution reads:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance
to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
x x x x

272

Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 in Civil
Case No. 11-077 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Civil Case No. 11-077 is REFERRED to the Executive
Judge of the RTC of Muntinlupa City for re-docketing as a
commercial case. Thereafter, the Executive Judge shall
ASSIGN said case to Branch 256, the sole designated
Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City,
which is ORDERED to resolve the case with reasonable
dispatch. In this regard, the Clerk of Court of said RTC
shall DETERMINE the appropriate amount of docket fees
and, in so doing, ORDER the payment of any difference or,
on the other hand, refund any excess.
Furthermore, the Court hereby RESOLVES that
henceforth, the following guidelines shall be observed:
1. If a commercial case filed before the proper
RTC is wrongly raffled to its regular branch, the
proper courses of action are as follows:
1.1 If the RTC has only one branch
designated as a Special Commercial Court, then
the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge
for re-docketing as a commercial case, and
thereafter, assigned to the sole special branch;
1.2 If the RTC has multiple branches
designated as Special Commercial Courts, then
the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge
for re-docketing as a commercial case, and
thereafter, raffled off among those special
branches; and
1.3 If the RTC has no internal branch
designated as a Special Commercial Court, then
the case shall be referred to the nearest RTC
with a designated Special Commercial Court
branch within the judicial region. Upon referral,
the RTC to which the case was referred to
should re-docket the case as a commercial

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case, and then: (a) if the said RTC has only

one branch designated as a Special Commercial
Court, assign the case to the sole special branch;
or (b) if the said RTC has multiple branches
designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle
off the case among those special branches.
2. If an ordinary civil case filed before the proper
RTC is wrongly raffled to its branch designated as a
Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be
referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as an
ordinary civil case. Thereafter, it shall be raffled off to
all courts of the same RTC (including its designated
special branches which, by statute, are equally
capable of exercising general jurisdiction same as
regular branches), as provided for under existing
rules.
3. All transfer/raffle of cases is subject to the
payment of the appropriate docket fees in case of any
difference. On the other hand, all docket fees already
paid shall be duly credited, and any excess, refunded.
4. Finally, to avert any future confusion, the
Court requires that all initiatory pleadings state the
action’s nature both in its caption and body.
Otherwise, the initiatory pleading may, upon motion
or by order of the court motu proprio, be dismissed
without prejudice to its refiling after due rectification.
This last procedural rule is prospective in application.
5. All existing rules inconsistent with the
foregoing are deemed superseded.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin,

Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ.,
concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I concur in the result. I
subscribe to the ruling in the Calleja case that the misfiling
of a

274

commercial case with a court not duly designated

Special Commercial Court is an error of jurisdiction.
However, the Supreme Court has the constitutional and
legal basis [RA 8799] to promulgate guidelines here for
future cases.
Brion, J., On Leave.
Perez, J., I submitted Dissenting Opinion.
Mendoza, J., On Leave.
Leonen, J., See Concurring Opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
PEREZ, J.:

I am constrained to register my dissent to the ponencia
that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s)
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A was transferred to all
Regional Trial Courts, unaffected by the proviso in the
same Section that the Supreme Court may designate the
Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise the
transferred jurisdiction. I base my dissent on the plain
wording of Section 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 or “The
Securities Regulation Code.”
Briefly, the undisputed facts.
Petitioners Manuel Luis C. Gonzales and Francis
Martin D. Gonzales filed a Complaint against respondents
GJH Land, Inc. (formerly known as S.J. Land, Inc.), Chang
Hwan Jang, Sang Rak Kim, Mariechu N. Yap, and Atty.
Roberto P. Mallari II before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Muntinlupa City seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J. Land,
Inc.’s shares which petitioners purportedly already bought
from, and fully paid to, S.J. Global, Inc. on 1 February
2010. Petitioners, the Gonzales’, designated their
Complaint as a Civil

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Case for Injunction with prayer for Status Quo

Order, TRO and Damages.1
Essentially, the allegations in the Complaint state that
petitioners subscribed to a total of 295,116 shares fully
paid in the books of S.J. Land, Inc., acquiring 40% and 10%
of the outstanding capital stock thereof. The bone of
contention in the Complaint is the status of the shares, i.e.,
whether fully paid or unpaid by petitioners and the
consequent issue of ownership and its incidences.
Upon filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Clerk
of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, it was raffled to
Branch 276, which is not a Special Commercial Court.
On 9 and 24 August 2011, the RTC, Branch 276, in two
separate Orders, issued a temporary restraining order and
a writ of preliminary injunction.
After filing their respective answers to the complaint,
respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, pointing out
that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute and
should, thus, be heard by the designated Special
Commercial Court of Muntinlupa City.
In an Order dated 17 April 2011, Branch 276 granted
the motion to dismiss, ruling that the case involves an
intra-corporate dispute falling within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs designated as Special
Commercial Courts, Branch 256 in this instance. Since
Branch 276 was not specifically designated by the Supreme
Court as a commercial court, it had no jurisdiction over the
intra-corporate dispute, and accordingly, the case should be
dismissed.
On motion for reconsideration, petitioners argued that:
(1) they had no control over raffle of cases; (2) the RTCs
have jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799, with only the Supreme Court
desig-
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 42; Complaint.

276

nating specific branches as special commercial courts,

thus, at most, the case should be transferred or raffled to
the proper branch; and (3) in all, as a matter of justice and
equity, they cannot be prejudiced by the incorrect raffling
of their case since they complied with the rules for the
filing of cases.
Branch 276 stood pat on its ruling that it was without
jurisdiction to hear, decide and act on the case, not
designated as a special commercial court pursuant to A.M.
No. 00-11-03-SC/11-21-00. Ratiocinating further that
without any kind of authority to act thereon, Branch 276
can only dismiss the case and cannot order the transfer of
the case to the proper RTC following our ruling in Calleja
v. Panday.2 The reversal of the rulings is the object of this
Petition before us.
In granting the petition, the ponencia starts with the
basic premise that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law, distinct from the exercise of jurisdiction
which, unless provided by the law itself, is governed by the
Rules of Court or by the orders issued from time to time by
the Court. The ponencia points to R.A. No. 8799,
specifically Section 5.2, as the law conferring (transferring)
original and exclusive jurisdiction to the appropriate RTCs
(from the Securities and Exchange Commission) over cases
enumerated in Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
902-A (SEC Cases). The ponencia clarifies, however, that
the Supreme Court’s designation of specific Special
Commercial Courts, made subject of various Supreme
Court Administrative Matters,3 was not a conferment of
jurisdiction, but a “procedural tool to promote
expediency and efficiency in the exercise of the
RTC’s jurisdiction over such cases.” In this instance,
pursuant to our Rules directing the manner by which
jurisdiction shall be exercised, commercial cases were
required to be filed in the
_______________
2 518 Phil. 801; 483 SCRA 680 (2006).

3 A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC; AM No. 00-11-03-SC; Administrative Circular
No. 08-2001; A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC; OCA Circular No. 82-2003.

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Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of

the designated Special Commercial Courts.
The ponencia emphasizes that, petitioners having
“correctly filed an intra-corporate case with the Office of
the Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is
the official station of the designated Special Commercial
Court, in accordance with [the Rules],” the RTC, “from the
time of such filing[,] acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the nature of the action.”
Specifically, the ponencia holds:

Unfortunately, the case was raffled to Branch 276
instead of being assigned to the single Special
Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City,
which is Branch 256. As the Court sees it, this
erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a
Special Commercial Court is only a matter of
procedure — that is, an incident related to the RTC’s
exercise of jurisdiction — and, thus, should not negate
the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City
had already acquired. As such, Branch 276 should
have merely ordered the transfer of the case to
Branch 256, and not its dismissal. x x x

In sum, the ponencia, discussing and citing the cases of
Calleja, on which the court a quo based the herein assailed
Order, Tan v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,4 and Home Guaranty
Corporation v. R-II Builders, Inc.,5 draws a distinction
between subject matter jurisdiction conferred by law, in
this instance falling with the RTCs, and the exercise of
jurisdiction, in accordance with the designation of
appropriate RTCs by the Supreme Court. Thus, according
to the ponencia, the RTC of Muntinlupa City regardless of
the Supreme Court designated branch, acquired
jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
_______________
4 514 Phil. 307; 478 SCRA 115 (2005).

5 660 Phil. 517; 652 SCRA 649 (2011), later deleted as citation in the
revised ponencias.

278

11-077 upon the filing of the complaint in the official

station of the designated Special Commercial Courts. Thus,
too, Branch 276, an RTC, albeit not designated as a Special
Commercial Court, should simply order the transfer of the
case to Branch 256, the designated Special Commercial
Court, contemplating merely a procedural matter,
incidental to the RTC’s exercise of jurisdiction. In all, as
per the ponencia, the general investiture of jurisdiction to
all RTCs is absolute, and once acquired, any of the RTCs
may, in the exercise of vested jurisdiction, order the
transfer of cases to the specific branch designated by the
Supreme Court as a Special Commercial Court.
With all due respect, the ponencia proceeds from the
wrong premise that the law vested jurisdiction over
transferred SEC cases on all the Regional Trial Courts and
that the designation by the Supreme Court of Special
Commercial Courts concern only an “exercise of
jurisdiction.”
Section 5, Item 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 reads:
Commission.— x x x
x x x x
5.2 The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases
enumerated under Section 56 of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A
_______________
6 SEC. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of

the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships
and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted
under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
(a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of
directors, business associates, its officers or partnership, amounting to
fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of
the public and/or of the stockholder, partners, members of associations or
(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations,
between and among stockholders, mem-

279
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 279

is hereby transferred to the Courts of general

jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court:
Provided, that the Supreme Court in the exercise of
its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court
branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over the
cases. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over
pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes
submitted for final resolution which should be
resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of
this Code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction
over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation
cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.

Thus, I am constrained to differ based on the statements
in, and exact wording of, the law.
It is first axiom in legal hermeneutics that a statutory
provision is read as a whole and not in disjointed parts.
The rule is as respected as it is ancient. Its sum and
substance has not been diluted no matter how frequent the
free paraphrases have been. The textbook says:

Subject always to the cardinal rule of statutory
construction, the courts should give every reasonable
interpretation to a statute which will give effect and
meaning to every part or word thereof.
A statute should be construed that no word, clause,
sentence, provision or part shall be rendered
surplusage, or superfluous, meaningless, void,
insignificant or nugatory, if that can be reasonably
avoided.
_______________
bers, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation,

partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or
associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or
association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise
or right to exist as such entity; and
(c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees,

280

The rule has its basis in the presumption that the

legislature could not have intended to use words in
vain or to leave part of its enactment devoid of sense
or meaning. It cannot be presumed that the
legislature introduced into a statute, words, clauses,
provisions which would annul or mutually destroy
each other. Rather, it is to be presumed that it is the
purpose of the legislature that the entire statute and
every part thereof should be significant and effective.
The maxim “ut res magis quam pereat” requires
not merely that a statute should be given effect as a
whole but that effect should be given to each of its
express provisions.
Under this rule, that construction is favored which
will render every word operative rather than one
which makes some words idle and nugatory.
However, the court may not, in order to give effect
to particular words, virtually destroy the meaning of
the entire context, e.g., give them a significance which
would be clearly repugnant to the statute looked upon
as a whole and destructive of its obvious intent.7

Included in the Philippine applications of the tenet are
the cases of: (1) Land Bank of the Philippines v. AMS
Farming Corporation;8 Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Urgello;9 and Smart Communications, Inc. v.
The City of Danao,10 as cited in Philippine International
Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit11 where the
Court’s ruling was:
_______________
7 Martin, Statutory Construction, 6th ed., p. 141, citing Martin v.

Shippard, 102 S. Co. 2nd, p. 1036; Adamowski v. Bard, A.C., Pa. 193 F.
2d., p. 578; Black on Interpretation of Laws, pp. 322-323; Denvis v. Roses,
52 P. 333; Shimonek v. Tillanan, 1 P. 2d., 154; and Van Dyke v. Cordova
Copper Co., 15 Ld 2d. 1273.
8 G.R. No. 174971, 15 October 2008, 569 SCRA 154, 183.
9 G.R. No. 162288, 4 April 2007, 520 SCRA 515, 535.
10 G.R. No. 155491, 16 September 2008, 565 SCRA 237, 247-248.
11 635 Phil. 447, 454; 621 SCRA 461, 469 (2010).

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VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 281

It is a rule in statutory construction that every

part of the statute must be interpreted with reference
to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must
be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. Because the law must not be read in
truncated parts, its provisions must be read in
relation to the whole law. The statute’s clauses and
phrases must not, consequently, be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning
of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious
whole. Consistent with the fundamentals of statutory
construction, all the words in the statute must be
taken into consideration in order to ascertain its
meaning.

I must here repeat the application of the rule. Thus
must the following conclusions be reached.
Section 5, Item 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 did not transfer the
cases enumerated under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A to all
the RTCs. If that was the legislative intention, then the
provision should have simply stated that such cases are
“hereby transferred to the Regional Trial Courts.” The
complete investiture is, however, on “the courts of general
jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court:
Provided, that the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches
that shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases.” If the law is
a general conferment of jurisdiction on all RTC, then the
phrase “or the appropriate Regional Trial Court” is an
inutile surplusage and the proviso that “the Supreme Court
in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional
Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over
the cases” is a purposeless appendage and wasted words. A
general grant to all RTCs renders irrelevant the “Supreme
Court’s exercise of authority” on the matter. Such a general
grant renders meaningless the designation by the Supreme
Court of the RTC branches that shall exercise jurisdiction
over the cases.

282

Each word in the law was purposely written; and all

such words make up the phrased idea. This is a basic
presumption. To repeat —

[T]he legislature could not have intended to use
words in vain or to leave part of its enactment devoid
of sense or meaning. It cannot be presumed that the
legislature introduced into a statute, words, clauses,
provisions which would annul or mutually destroy
each other. Rather, it is to be presumed that it is the
purpose of the legislature that the entire statute and
every part thereof should be significant and
effective.12

Section 5, Item 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 should therefore be
read to mean that SEC’s jurisdiction over all cases under
Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A is transferred to the specific
RTC branch designated by the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its authority.
This is the reading of the Supreme Court as expressed
with precision in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC dated 21 November
2000 which is aptly titled “Resolution Designating Certain
Branches of Regional Trial Courts To Try and Decide Cases
Formerly Cognizable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission” “arising within their respective territorial
jurisdictions with respect to the National Capital Region
and within the respective provinces in the First to the
Twelfth Judicial Regions.” This En Banc Resolution opened
with a purpose clause reading “to implement the provisions
of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 (The Securities
Regulation Code). This is an unequivocal statement that
the Court interprets the provision to mean that only the
RTC Branches that it shall designate to hear and decide
Special Commercial Court cases can exercise jurisdiction
over such cases. The issued guideline reinforces the
exclusivity of the designation:
_______________
12 Martin, supra note 7, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, supra

note 7.

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VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 283

1. In multiple sala courts where one (1) or more

branches of the RTC are herein designated as special
courts, there will be no unloading of cases already
pending in the branches designated. They shall
continue to try and decide the said cases in addition
to the SEC cases. In the meantime, in view of the
temporary imbalance of caseload as a result of the
transfer of SEC cases, the Executive Judge concerned
shall exclude them in the raffle of newly filed cases in
their station until their workload equals to that of the
other branches, in which event they shall be included
in the raffle of other civil and criminal cases.
x x x x
5. In provinces (for the First to the Twelfth
Judicial Regions) where there are no designated
special courts, the Executive Judge of the station
where new SEC cases will be filed shall consult the
Supreme Court thru the Office of the Court
Administrator.

There have been subsequent designations of RTC
Branches as SEC courts, namely: RTC Branch 142, Makati
City through A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC; RTC Branch 34,
Calamba, Laguna through amendment A.M. No. 00-11-03-
SC; RTC Branch 40, in Daet, Camarines Norte; RTC
Branch 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; RTC Branch 74, Malabon;
RTC Branch 36, Masbate again through an amendment of
A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC; and RTC Branch 23 of Naga City
through A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC.
There has been, as just enumerated, as many iterations
by the court itself of its reading of Section 5, Item 5.2 of
R.A. No. 8799 i.e., that the law transferred the SEC
jurisdiction over the cases listed in Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A
to the particular branches of the RTCs designated by the
Supreme Court as such. Unavoidable, therefore, is the
conclusion that all other Branches of the RTCs without the
Supreme Court designation are without jurisdiction over
SEC cases. And following unre-

284

versed rulings13 the other Branches of the RTC before

whom a SEC case is filed must dismiss such case for want
of jurisdiction. Furthermore, absent such jurisdiction, the
non-SEC RTC cannot direct the case to the “proper”
court.14
The unavoidable, because statutorily mandated,
allocation to RTC branches of the authority to decide SEC
cases had, just as unavoidably, resulted in caseload
imbalance in affected areas. Parenthetically, there was a
resulting caseload imbalance since R.A. No. 8799 did not
create Commercial Courts. The law merely unloaded SEC
cases to the branches designated by the Supreme Court as
Commercial Courts. The consequent caseload problem
urged the exercise by the Court, as administrator, to effect
an equitable distribution of cases among the RTC branches
in areas where RTC branches have been given jurisdiction
over the additional case types. Thus did the Court issue the
Resolutions on the exclusion of the SEC designated courts
from the raffle of cases.
Such arrangement continued until the weight of the
unloaded jurisdiction eased such that the Court in 1 July
2003 issued A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. It states:
1. The Regional Trial Courts previously designated
as SEC Courts through the: (a) Resolutions of this
Court dated 21 November 2000, 4 July 2001, 12
November 2002, and 9 July 2002, all issued in A.M.
No. 00-11-03-SC; (b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001
in A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC; and (c) Resolution dated 8
July 2002 in A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC are hereby
DESIGNATED and shall be CALLED as Special
Commercial Courts to try and decide cases involving
violations of Intellectual Property Rights which fall
within their jurisdiction and those cases
_______________
13 Calleja v. Panday, supra note 2; Home Guaranty Corporation v. R-II

Builders, Inc., supra note 5; and Fabia v. Court of Appeals, 11 September
2002, 388 SCRA 574.
14 Home Guaranty Corporation v. R-II Builders, Inc., id.

285
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 285

formerly cognizable by the Securities and

Exchange Commission;
2. The designation of Intellectual Property Courts
under Administrative Order No. 113-95 dated 2
October 1995, as amended by Administrative Order
No. 104-96 dated 21 October 1996 and Resolution
dated 19 February 2002 in A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC, is
hereby revoked. However, the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, Manila is hereby designated as an
additional Special Commercial Court in the City of
Manila;
3. Upon the effectivity of this Resolution, all IP
cases shall be transferred to the designated Special
Commercial Courts except those which have
undergone the pretrial state in civil cases or those
where any of the accused has been arraigned in
criminal cases which shall be retained by the court
previously assigned to try them;
4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have
jurisdiction over cases arising within their respective
territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National
Capital Judicial Region and within the respective
provinces with respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial
Regions. Thus, cases shall be filed in the Office of the
Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated
Special Commercial Court;
5. In the event of inhibition of the judge of a
designated Special Commercial Court, the following
guidelines shall be observed: (a) where there is only
one (1) Special Commercial Court, the case shall be
raffled among the other judges in the station; (b)
where there are two (2) Special Commercial Courts in
the station, the Executive Judge shall immediately
assign the case to the other Special Commercial
Court; and (c) in case of inhibition of both judges of
the Special Commercial Court, the Executive Judge
shall raffle the case among the judges in the station;
and
6. In order to ensure a just and equitable
distribution of cases, the designated Special
Commercial Courts

286

shall continue to participate in the raffles of other
cases. Provided, however, that the Executive Judge
concerned shall adopt a procedure whereby every IP
and SEC case assigned to a Special Commercial Court
should be considered a case raffled to it and duly
credited to such court.

What must be noted is the fact that the chosen RTC
branch, now called Commercial Court, became such, as
distinguished from the other RTC branches because of a
special bestowal of jurisdiction by the Court in
implementation of the statutorily granted authority.
Without such grant mandated by the law, the undesignated
RTC branch is without SEC case jurisdiction.
Upon the other hand, the RTC branch, or the
Commercial Court, maintain jurisdiction over the cases
enumerated in Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.15
_______________
15 Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts

shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he
demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or,
in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00);

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But the exercise of such jurisdiction is subject to the

regulation of the Court in the exercise of its constitutional
power of administrative supervision over all lower courts:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to
the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive
_______________
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross
value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or,
in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs
or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other above mentioned items exceeds Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). (as amended by R.A. No. 7691*)

288

rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and

quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
x x x x
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.

This is evident from A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and A.M. No.
03-03-03-SC.
Palpably, RTC caseloads and the need to equalize the
caseloads among all branches determine the need for the
Court to issue regulations regarding the Commercial
Courts’ exercise of jurisdiction over noncommercial cases.
In all, the RTC Commercial Court has exclusive
jurisdiction over commercial cases and can still exercise
jurisdiction over regular cases if, as determined by the
Supreme Court, the caseloads necessitate such exercise.
While there may be arguments in favor of a simpler
arrangement whereby all the RTCs in all the Judicial
Districts are made Commercial Courts, such arguments
cannot be submitted for resolution by the Court. The
settlement is in the legislature.
Further on the issue, the proviso that “the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the
Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise
jurisdiction over these cases” is a definition of the
conferred jurisdiction. The designation of specific
Regional Trial Court branches that will exercise
jurisdiction over cases enumerated under Section 5 of P.D.
No. 902-A is pursuant to statute and not solely the
consequence of the Court’s rule-making power and
administrative supervisory power of the Court over lower
courts under Article VIII, Sections 5 (paragraph 5) and 6,
respectively. In fact, A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC on which the
ponencia relies heavily for its position that the designation
of specific RTC branches as a simple procedural rule
incidental to the exer-

289
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cise of jurisdiction, primarily traces its authority for

designation of Special Commercial Courts to Section 5.2 of
R.A. No. 8799, gleaned from the 1st recital clause, to wit:

WHEREAS, to implement the provisions of
Section 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 (The
Securities and Regulation Code), and in the
interest of a speedy and efficient administration of
justice, the Supreme Court En Banc, in the (a)
Resolutions dated 21 November 2000 (Annex 1), 4
July 2001 (Annex 1-a), 12 November 2002 (Annex 1-
b), and 9 July 2002 (Annex 1-c), all issued in A.M. No.
00-11-03-SC; (b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in
A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC (Annex 2); and (c) Resolution
dated 8 July 2002 in A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC (Annex
3), resolved to designate certain branches of the
Regional Trial Courts to try and decide cases formerly
recognizable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.

Plainly, the designation of Special Commercial Courts,
as implemented by the Supreme Court through its various
rules, pertains to the statutorily conferred jurisdiction and
not merely an incident related to the court’s exercise of
jurisdiction.
The ponencia fails to address an equally important
precept on subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., jurisdiction is
determined by the averments and allegations of the
complaint which in this instance is inarguably a
commercial case concerning subscription of shares in a
corporation.
From the onset, petitioners, by the filing of their
Complaint, supplied the occasion for the exercise of
jurisdiction vested by law in a particular court. In
short, petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC (not
as a court of general jurisdiction), and with the allegations
in their Complaint, specifically invoked the RTC
designated as a Special Commercial Court under Section
5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, implemented under A.M. No. 03-03-
03-SC. Petitioners cannot just simply file their
Complaint before the RTC

290

without any specificity, given the allegations

contained therein and the reliefs they prayed for.
I cannot give credence to petitioners’ stance that they
cannot be faulted for the incorrect raffling of their
Complaint to a regular court, having filed the same before
the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa
City. Petitioners obviously argue that their only
responsibility as plaintiffs in this case is to file the case
with the RTC despite Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799
confining exclusive and original jurisdiction over
cases enumerated under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A
to the appropriate RTC.
I invite attention to the statement in the ponencia that
“petitioners correctly filed an intra-corporate case with the
Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City,
which is the official station of the designated Special
Commercial Court, in accordance with A.M. No. 03-03-03-
SC.” The ponencia then concludes that the RTC had validly
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature
of the action from the time of such filing.
Quite notably, petitioners did not intend to file an intra-
corporate case: they labeled their Complaint though
incorrectly as a Civil Case for Injunction with prayer for
Status Quo Order, TRO and Damages. At that time they
filed their Complaint in 2011, petitioners were with the aid
of counsel, a full service law firm and R.A. No. 8799 and
the implementing rules of the Supreme Court for the
designation of Special Commercial Courts, have long been
effective. Subject matter jurisdiction over their Complaint,
the nature determined by the allegations therein, has been
settled and delineated to be with not just any RTC, but the
appropriate RTC specially designated by the Supreme
Court as a Special Commercial Court pursuant to law.
Petitioners, as plaintiffs, by the filing of their
Complaint, are charged with responsibility to properly
and correctly invoke the jurisdiction of the RTC
whether in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or
as a Special Com-

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mercial Court. Palpably, petitioners’ incorrect labeling

of their Complaint precipitated the incorrect raffling
thereof to a regular court, Branch 276, which, by specific
provision of law, is without subject matter jurisdiction to
act thereon given that it had not been designated as a
Special Commercial Court.
Second, with the incorrect labeling of their Complaint
and the wrong invocation of the RTC’s regular jurisdiction,
the designated Special Commercial Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the Complaint by the mere filing thereof
with the multi sala RTC. Since petitioners had filed what
they labeled as a Civil Case, they knowingly filed it
pursuant to the general jurisdiction of the RTC under Sec.
19 of B.P. Blg. 129.
The mere filing of the Complaint before the Office of the
Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, in the
official station of the designated Special Commercial Court
as what occurred herein, is not equivalent to the correct
and proper filing of the Complaint before the appropriate
Regional Trial Court specially designated by the Supreme
Court to hear and decide cases enumerated under Section 5
of P.D. No. 902-A. Branch 276 of the RTC, to which the
Complaint was consequently raffled, in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction, cannot order the transfer of the
Complaint to Branch 256, the designated Special
Commercial Court. Branch 276 cannot do so on the basis of
authority over the case which it did not have. Neither does
it have authority over a coequal court.
Note that in this case, petitioners, given the labeling of
their Complaint as a Civil Case, should suffer the
consequences of its own act. The Office of the Clerk of
Court, cannot be faulted for raffling it to the RTC of
general jurisdiction as petitioners themselves invoked such
general jurisdiction.
In Calleja v. Panday,16 we likewise took note of the fact
that therein plaintiff’s petition for quo warranto was filed
as late
_______________
16 Calleja v. Panday, supra note 2.

292

as 2005, by that time A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been in

effect for four years, and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC effective for
almost two years, where there appears no cogent reason
why plaintiffs were not aware of the appropriate court
where their petition should be filed.
Such can also be said in this case, albeit there is only
one designated Special Commercial Court. With more
reason should it be noted in this case since petitioners
herein has even incorrectly labeled their Complaint as a
Civil Case. They cannot claim that it should not be
prejudiced by the incorrect raffling of their Complaint,
laying fault solely on the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Indeed, We should, as warranted, require from counsels
disciplined knowledge of procedure. Courts should not
themselves correct the procedural mistakes of pleaders. I
cannot overemphasize, and ultimately revert to the fact,
that subject matter jurisdiction was conferred by law
(Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799) to the appropriate RTC as
determined thru the designation by the Supreme Court.
Consistent with the observable conformity with, nay
affirmance by the existing administrative issuances
relative to the foregoing opinion, the following directives
are reiterated for continuing validity and, therefore,
compliance.
1. A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, August 27, 2001,
2. A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, July 1, 2003, and
3. All related issuances.
Thus, I vote to DENY the petition. The Orders dated 17
April 2012 and 9 July 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 in Civil Case No. 11-077 are
AFFIRMED. The Complaint docketed as Civil Case No.
11-077 is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction without
prejudice to its refiling in the proper court.

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CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:

I concur with the ponencia’s conclusion that the
designation of certain Regional Trial Court branches as
Special Commercial Courts does not work to confer
jurisdiction over the branches designated as such. It was
an error for the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court,
Branch 276, to dismiss the Complaint filed by petitioners.
As the ponencia underscores, Branch 276 should have
instead transferred the case to the Muntinlupa City
Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, the branch duly
designated to perform the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial
Court’s functions as a Special Commercial Court. The
present Petition must, thus, be granted.
Jurisdiction over what the ponencia collectively refers to
as SEC Cases was vested by Republic Act No. 8799,
otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, in
Regional Trial Courts and is not limited to the Regional
Trial Court branches designated by this court as Special
Commercial Courts. It is only the legislature that has the
power “to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction
of various courts[.]”1 As Congress does not share this power
with this court, in relation with these issues, this court’s
competence is limited to “administrative supervision over
all courts[,]”2 as well as the “[p]romulgat[ion of] rules
concerning . . . pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts[.]”3 It was purely in the exercise of these powers,
and not for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction where
previously there was none, that this court designated
certain Regional Trial Court branches as Special
Commercial Courts.
_______________
1 Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 2.

3 Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5).

294

The text of Section 5.24 of the Securities Regulation

Code, the statutory provision that transferred jurisdiction
over SEC Cases from the Securities and Exchange
Commission to the Regional Trial Courts, bears this out. It
refers to Regional Trial Courts in general and in their
capacity as courts of general jurisdiction. It delimits the
capacity of this court to designate Regional Trial Court
branches as Special Commercial Courts to only be “in the
exercise of its authority[,]”5 i.e., administrative supervision
and promulgation of procedural rules. It specifies that the
effect of this court’s designation is to enable the branches
so specified to “exercise jurisdiction”6 and not to vest
jurisdiction.

I

Jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 57
of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, which were previously
under
_______________
4 Securities Regulation Code, Sec. 5.2 provides:

SEC. 5. Powers and Functions of the Commission.—. . .
....
5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the
Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court:
Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may
designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise
jurisdiction over these cases. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction
over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final
resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the
enactment of this Code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over
pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June
2000 until finally disposed.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Pres. Decree No. 902-A (1976), Sec. 5 provides:
SEC. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the
Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and
other forms of associations registered

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VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 295

the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange

Commission, was vested in Regional Trial Courts by
Section 5.2 of the Securities Regulation Code. Section 5.2
reads:

Commission.—. . .
....
5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases
enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of
general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial
Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its authority may designate the Regional
Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction
over these cases. The Commission shall retain
jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-
corporate disputes submitted for final resolution
which should be resolved within one (1) year from the
enactment of this Code. The Commission shall retain
jurisdiction over pending suspension of
payments/rehabili-
_______________
with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall

have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving.
a. Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors,
business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public
and/or of the stockholder, partners, members of associations or
b. Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations,
between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or
all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they
are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns
their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; and
c. Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees,

296

tation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally

disposed.

This statutory provision was adopted pursuant to the
legislature’s power under Article VIII, Section 28 of the
1987 Constitution “to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts[.]” In contrast, the designation
of Special Commercial Courts, through this court’s
November 21, 2000 Resolution in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC,
was pursuant to this court’s power under Article VIII,
Section 69 of the 1987 Constitution to exercise
“administrative supervision over all courts.” A.M. No. 00-
11-03-SC did not work to confer jurisdiction independently
of Section 5.2 of the Securities Regulation Code. A.M. No.
00-11-03-SC itself declares that it was adopted merely “[t]o
implement the provisions of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act No.
8799[.]”10
_______________
8 Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 2 provides:

SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
hereof. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it
undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
SECTION 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
10 A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC (2000), first par. provides:
To implement the provisions of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 (The
Securities Regulation Code), and in the interest of a speedy and efficient
administration of justice and subject to the guidelines hereinafter set
forth, the following branches of the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) are
hereby designated to try and decide Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) cases enumerated in Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A (Reorganization of the
Securities and Exchange Commission), arising within their respective
territorial jurisdictions with respect to the National Capital Judicial
Region, and within the respective provinces in the First to the Twelfth
Judicial Regions[.]

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Congress’ power “to define, prescribe, and apportion the

jurisdiction of various courts” is constitutionally
established. While it may be true that the allocation of
competencies among courts may be incidental and
necessary to the power to adjudicate cases, the sovereign,
through the Constitution, deemed it fit for the legislature
to exercise this power to balance and temper judicial
power. We cannot, in the guise of judicial interpretation,
disregard a clear command of the Constitution.
The power vested solely and exclusively in Congress has
clear limitations: First, Congress cannot diminish the
jurisdiction of this court, which jurisdiction is spelled out in
Article VIII, Section 511 of the 1987 Constitution; and
second,
_______________

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or
toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public
interest may require. Such temporary as-

298

Congress cannot increase the “appellate jurisdiction of

[this court] without its advice and concurrence.”12
The exclusivity and non-delegability of Congress’ power
“to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
various courts” is long settled.
In University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals,13
this court was confronted with an issuance by the
President of the Philippines, i.e., Executive Order No. 401-
A, that was purportedly enacted pursuant to an enabling
statute, Republic Act No. 422.14 Executive Order No. 401-A
created the Board of Tax Appeals and defined its
jurisdiction, as follows:
_______________
signment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance
with the Civil Service Law.
12 Const., Art. VI, Sec. 30 provides:
SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without
its advice and concurrence.
13 93 Phil. 376 (1953) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc].
14 Id., at p. 379; Rep. Act No. 422 (1950), otherwise known as An Act
Authorizing the President of the Philippines to Reorganize within One
Year the Different Executive Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and
Other Instrumentalities of the

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VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 299

SEC. 8. The Board of Tax Appeals shall have

exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
administratively as hereinafter provided —
(1) All appeals from decisions of the Collector of
Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees
or other charges, penalties imposed in relation
thereto, or other matters arising under the National
Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue[.]15

This court declared Executive Order No. 401-A null and
void to the extent where it interfered with the jurisdiction
of Courts of First Instance, but sustained its validity in all
other respects.16 This court emphasized that, in the first
place, Republic Act No. 422’s purpose was limited only to
“effect[ing] a
_______________
Government, including the Corporations Owned or Controlled by it.

Sec. 2 provides:
SEC. 2. For the purpose of carrying out the policy set forth in section
one of this Act, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized to
effect by executive order from time to time, for a period not exceeding one
year from the date of the approval of this Act, and within the limits of the
total current appropriation, such reforms and changes in the different
executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and other
instrumentalities of the government including the corporations owned or
controlled by the government as he may deem necessary, with the power
to diminish, add to or abolish those existing and create new ones;
consolidate related undertakings; transfer functions, appropriations,
equipment, property, records, and personnel from one department,
bureau, office, agency or instrumentality to another; to eliminate
duplicated services or authorize new ones not provided for; classify,
combine, split or abolish positions; standardize salaries and do whatever
is necessary and desirable to effect economy and promote efficiency in the
government service.
15 Id.
16 Id., at p. 382.

300

reorganization of the different bureaus, offices, agencies

and instrumentalities of the executive branch of the
government.”17 Republic Act No. 422 did not go so far as to
enable the President to create a body or to promulgate an
issuance which, “in effect deprives the courts of first
instance of their jurisdiction in actions for recovery of taxes
which is granted to them by Section 30618 of the National
Internal Revenue Code.”19
For that matter, even though Republic Act No. 422
actually enabled the President to do so, this statutory grant
(i.e., delegation) of power would have been invalid. This
court categorically stated that under the Constitution,
“Congress alone has ‘the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts[,]’”20 and
that this is a power that cannot be delegated by Congress.21
Pursuant to this power, jurisdiction vested in Courts of
First Instance was conferred on them by statute, i.e., an act
of the legislature, and the President, the existence of a
supposed enabling statute notwithstanding, cannot himself
define their jurisdiction:
_______________
17 Id.
18 Id., at p. 380. University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals
cites Sec. 306: SEC. 306. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally
collected.—No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the
recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have
been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty
claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to
have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim
for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Collector of Internal
Revenue; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not
such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress. In any
case, no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after the expiration of two
years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty.
19 Id., at p. 381.
20 Id., at p. 382.
21 Id.

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But Executive Order No. 401-A does not merely

create the Board of Tax Appeals, which, as an
instrumentality of the Department of Finance, may
properly come within the purview of Republic Act No.
422, but goes as far as depriving the courts of first
instance of their jurisdiction to act on internal
revenue cases a matter which is foreign to it and
which comes within the exclusive province of
Congress. This the Chief Executive cannot do, nor can
that power be delegated by Congress, for under our
Constitution, Congress alone has “the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts.”22 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

The same conclusions were reached by this court in
Corominas, Jr. and Corominas & Co. v. Labor Standards
Commission, et al.23 Here, this court found the Government
Survey and Reorganization Commission to have exceeded
its authority when, through its Reorganization Plan No.
20A,24 it vested jurisdiction over money claims arising from
labor standards violations in the regional offices of the
(then) Department of Labor.25 Reorganization Plan No. 20-
A ran counter to Republic Act No. 602, the then Minimum
Wage Law, Sections 15(d),26 15(e),27 and 16(a)28 of which
vested jurisdiction over money claims cases in a “competent
court.”
_______________
22 Id.
23 112 Phil. 551; 2 SCRA 721 (1961) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].
24 Id., at p. 557; p. 725. Corominas, Jr. v. Labor Standards
Commission, cites Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, Sec. 25:
25. Each Regional Office shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases affecting all money claims arising from violations of labor
standards on working conditions, including but not restrictive to: unpaid
wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay, and maternity leave of
employees/laborers; and unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation
pay, and payment for medical services of domestic help.
25 Id., at p. 562; p. 730.
26 Rep. Act No. 602 (1951), Sec. 15(d) provides:

302

_______________
SEC. 15. Penalties and recovery of wage due under this Act.—. . .
d. The Secretary may bring an action in any competent court to recover
the wages owing to an employee under this Act, with legal interest. Any
sum thus recovered by the Secretary on behalf of an employee pursuant to
this subsection shall be held in a special deposit account and shall be paid,
on order of the Secretary, directly to the employee or employees affected.
Any such sums not paid to an employee because he cannot be located
within a period of three years shall be covered into the Treasury as
miscellaneous receipts.
27 Rep. Act No. 602 (1951), Sec. 15(e) provides:
SEC. 15. Penalties and recovery of wage due under this Act.—. . .
e. Any employer who underpays an employee in violation of this Act
shall be liable to the employee affected in the amount of the unpaid wages
with legal interest. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in
any competent court by anyone or more employees on behalf of himself or
themselves. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment
awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee
which shall not exceed ten percent of the amount awarded to the
plaintiffs, unless the amount awarded is less than one hundred pesos, in
which event the fee may be ten pesos, but not in excess of that amount.
Payment of the amount found due to the plaintiffs shall be made directly
to the plaintiffs, in the presence of a representative of the Secretary of the
Court. In the event payment is witnessed by the court of its
representative, the Secretary shall be notified within ten days of payment
that the payment has been made.
28 Rep. Act No. 602 (1951), Sec. 16 provides:
SEC. 16. Jurisdiction of the courts.—
a. The Court of First Instance shall have jurisdiction to restrain
violations of this act; action by the Secretary or by the employees affected
to recover underpayment may be brought in any competent Court, which
shall render its decision on such cases within fifteen days from the time
the case has been submitted for decision; in appropriate

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In Corominas, this court noted that Republic Act No.

997,29 the statute creating the Government Survey and
Reorganization Commission, did not enable the
Commission to create a body exercising judicial power and
intruding into the jurisdiction of courts.30 So, too, this court
emphasized that Congress could not have done so “as the
Legislature may not and cannot delegate its power to
legislate or create courts of justice to any other agency of the
Government.”31
Bereft of the power “to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of various courts[,]” this court’s competence
is limited to “administrative supervision over all courts[,]”32
as well as the “[p]romulgat[ion] [of] rules concerning . . .
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts[.]”33
II

Section 5.2 of the Securities Regulation Code’s
investiture of jurisdiction over erstwhile SEC Cases in
Regional Trial Courts is clear: “The Commission’s
jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the
Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional
Trial Court[.]”
Concededly, the use of the disjunctive conjunction “or”
leads to some degree of confusion. Customarily, the use of
“or” denotes that the items mentioned are alternative to
each other. Thus, Section 5.2 appears to mean that “Courts
of gen-
_______________
instances, appeal from the decisions of these courts on any action under
this Act shall be in accordance with applicable law.
29 An Act Creating the Government Survey and Reorganization
Commission and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
30 Corominas, Jr. v. Labor Standards Commission, supra note 23 at p.
561; p. 729.
31 Id.

304

eral jurisdiction” are distinct from Regional Trial Courts

and that one can stand in place of the other. However, it is
settled that, in our judicial system, it is the Regional Trial
Courts which themselves stand as courts of general
jurisdiction. They are one and the same. As this court
stated in Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:34

The regional trial court, formerly the court of first
instance, is a court of general jurisdiction. All cases,
the jurisdiction over which is not specifically provided
for by law to be within the jurisdiction of any other
court, fall under the jurisdiction of the regional trial
court.35

The consideration of Regional Trial Courts as courts of
general jurisdiction proceeds from Section 19(6) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
....
6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction
of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions[.]

The identity of Regional Trial Courts as courts of
general jurisdiction is no bar to designating certain
Regional Trial Court branches to focus on certain types of
cases. To the contrary, it is this identity which permits it.
Designating branches to focus on certain types of cases, in
order to facilitate the efficient dispensation of justice, is
well within their nature as courts competent to take
cognizance of cases not falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of any other court, tribunal, person,
_______________
34 427 Phil. 604; 377 SCRA 353 (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First
Division].
35 Id., at p. 612; p. 359.

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or body. Designating branches as such balances two

considerations: on the one hand, their nature as courts,
which because they have general jurisdiction, can exercise
jurisdiction over the specific matter to which they were
assigned; and on the other, their duty to speedily
administer justice.
Accordingly, this designation does not work to confer
jurisdiction over these branches when previously there was
none. It merely exhorts them to proceed with dispatch and
deftness. This is evident from Section 23 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980:

SEC. 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases.
—The Supreme Court may designate certain
branches of the Regional Trial Courts to handle
exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic
relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform
cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of quasi-
judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such other special
cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the
interest of a speedy and efficient administration of
justice. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 23 is not a blanket license for this court to create
new courts of limited jurisdiction. It is an enabling
mechanism, empowering this court to fulfill its function as
the authority having “administrative supervision over all
courts[.]”36
When the legislature (at that time, it was the interim
Batasang Pambansa) adopted the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, it created all Regional Trial Courts as courts of
general jurisdiction, equally competent to exercise the
jurisdiction vested in them by the same statute. So, too,
when the Securities Regulation Code transferred
jurisdiction over SEC Cases, it did so to all of our courts
which were recognized as courts of general jurisdiction,
that is, to Regional Trial Courts.
_______________

306

Section 5.2’s investiture of jurisdiction over Regional

Trial Courts notwithstanding, it also contains a proviso
enabling this court to “in the exercise of its authority . . .
designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall
exercise jurisdiction over [the] cases.”
Section 5.2’s qualification that this court’s power to
designate is necessarily only “in the exercise of its
authority” is illuminating. It is to say that, in going about
its task of designating, this court cannot act in excess of its
constitutional authority. This affirms the Constitution’s
segregation of the competencies of Congress from those of
this court. It affirms the exclusivity of Congress’ power “to
define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various
courts[.]” This affirms the reality that, bereft of this power,
this court’s competence is limited to “administrative
supervision over all courts[,]”37 as well as the
“[p]romulgat[ion] [of] rules concerning . . . pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts[.]”38
Accordingly, it was exclusively in the performance of
these competencies that this court adopted its November
21, 2000 Resolution in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and specified
the Regional Trial Court branches which are to perform
functions as Special Commercial Courts.
Equally illuminating is Section 5.2’s specification that
this court’s competence is in designating which branches
shall “exercise jurisdiction[.]” As deftly emphasized by the
ponencia, conferment of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case is a matter of substantive law.39 In contrast,
incidents pertaining to the exercise of jurisdiction are a
matter of procedure.40
_______________
37 Id.
39 Ponencia, p. 257.
40 See Lozada v. Bracewell, G.R. No. 179155, April 2, 2014, 720 SCRA
371, 381 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].

307
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 307

A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC did not create a new class of

courts. Its purpose is operational efficiency. In its own
words, it was adopted to serve “the interest of a speedy and
efficient administration of justice[.]”41 It is, thus, but a
procedural and administrative mechanism aimed (to echo
the words of the ponencia) “to promote expediency and
efficiency in the exercise of the [Regional Trial Courts’]
jurisdiction[.]”42
Also in its own words, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC was
adopted only “[t]o implement the provisions of Sec. 5.2 of
Republic Act No. 8799 [or the Securities Regulation
Code].”43 Thus, in adopting A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, this
court was fully cognizant of how Section 5.2 limited its
authority to designate only “in the exercise of its
authority[.]” Indeed, this court could not have intended to
overstep the constitutional limits of its authority.
III

A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC is not the only administrative
issuance of this court specifying Regional Trial Court
branches which are to focus on certain types of cases, not
because this court created or transformed them into special
types of courts in lieu of their being courts of general
jurisdiction, but solely in the interest of expediency and
efficiency.
In this court’s August 1, 2000 Resolution in A.M. No. 00-
8-01-SC,44 this court designated certain Regional Trial
Court branches as “Special Courts for drugs cases, which
shall hear and decide all criminal cases in their respective
jurisdictions involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act [of] 1972
_______________
41 A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC (2000).

42 Ponencia, p. 263.
43 A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC (2000).
44 Resolution Designating Certain Branches of the Regional Trial
Courts as Special Courts for Drugs Cases Regardless of the Quantity of
the Drugs Involved.

308

(R.A. No. 6425) as amended, regardless of the quantity

of the drugs involved.”45
This court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 00-8-01-SC made no
pretenses that it was creating new courts of limited
jurisdiction or transforming Regional Trial Courts into
courts of limited jurisdiction. Instead, it repeatedly referred
to its operational and administrative purpose: efficiency.
Its preambular clauses emphasized that the designation of
Special Courts was being made because “public policy and
public interest demand that [drug] cases . . . be
expeditiously resolved[,]”46 and in view of “the consensus of
many that the designation of certain branches of the
Regional Trial Courts as Special Courts to try and decide
drug cases . . . may immediately address the problem of
delay in the resolution of drugs cases.”47 Moreover, its
dispositive portion provides that it was being adopted
“pursuant to Section 23 of [the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980], [and] in the interest of speedy and efficient
administration of justice[.]”48
Consistent with these operational and administrative
aims, this court’s October 11, 2005 Resolution in A.M. No.
05-9-03-SC,49 which addressed the question of whether
“special courts for dr[u]g cases [may] be included in the
raffle of civil and criminal cases other than drug related
cases[,]”50 stated:
The rationale behind the exclusion of dr[u]g courts from

the raffle of cases other than drug cases is to expeditiously
resolve criminal cases involving violations of [R.A. No.]
9165 (previously, of [R.A. No.] 6435). Otherwise, these
courts may be sidelined from hearing drug
_______________
45 A.M. No. 00-8-01-SC (2000).

46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Re: Request for Clarification on Whether Drug Court[s] should be
Included in the Regular Raffle.
50 A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC (2005).

309
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 309

cases by the assignment of nondrug cases to them and

the purpose of their designation as special courts would be
negated. The faithful observance of the stringent time
frame imposed on drug courts for deciding dr[u]g related
cases and terminating proceedings calls for the continued
implementation of the policy enunciated in A.M. No. 00-8-
01-SC.51
To reiterate, at no point did this court declare the
Regional Trial Court branches identified in these
administrative issuances as being transformed or
converted into something other than Regional Trial Courts.
They retain their status as such and, along with it, the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980’s characterization of
them as courts of general jurisdiction. However, this court,
in the interest of facilitating operational efficiency and
promoting the timely dispensation of justice, has opted to
make these Regional Trial Court branches focus on a
certain class of the many types of cases falling under their
jurisdiction.
Having mentioned this court’s Resolutions, which
designated Regional Trial Court branches as so-called
Drugs Courts, it is crucial to draw the distinction between,
on the one hand, this court’s designation of certain
Regional Trial Court branches as such Drugs Courts, or (as
is the subject of this case) Commercial Courts, and on the
other, this court’s designation of certain Regional Trial
Court branches as so-called Family Courts.
Similarly through a Resolution in an Administrative
Matter, this court’s February 1, 2000 Resolution in A.M.
No. 99-11-07-SC52 designated certain Regional Trial Court
branches as Family Courts. As with Drugs Courts, this
court declared this designation of Family Courts to be “in
the interest of the expeditious, effective and efficient
administration of jus-
_______________
51 Id.
52 Designation of Certain Branches of the Regional Trial Courts as
Family Courts.

310

tice[.]”53 This court further specified that this

designation was in order “[t]o implement the provisions of
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 8369, otherwise known as
the ‘Family Courts Act of 1997[.]’”54
This court’s February 1, 2000 Resolution in A.M. No. 99-
11-07-SC is, thus, an offshoot of the Family Courts Act of
1997. Section 3 of this statute did not add to, clarify, or
make specific mention of the types of cases cognizable by
Regional Trial Courts. Rather, it created independent
Family Courts that are distinct from Regional Trial Courts.
Section 5 spelled out the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Family Courts, that is, subject matter jurisdiction that,
henceforth, was no longer within the jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts. Parenthetically, it is well to
emphasize that the Family Courts Act of 1997 is a
legislative enactment. Accordingly, it was well within its
bounds to create courts and define their jurisdiction.
Sections 3 and 5 of the Family Courts Act of 1997
provide:
SEC. 3. Establishment of Family Courts.—There
shall be established a Family Court in every province
and city in the country. In case where the city is the
capital of the province, the Family Court shall be
established in the municipality which has the highest
population.
....
SEC. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts.—The
Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the
accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not
less than nine (9) years of age or where one or more of
the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of
the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found
guilty, the court shall
_______________
53 A.M. No. 99-11-07-SC (2000).

54 Id.

311
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 311

promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil

liability which the accused may have incurred.
The sentence, however, shall be suspended without
need of application pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 603, otherwise known as the “Child and Youth
Welfare Code”;
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children,
habeas corpus in relation to the latter;
c) Petitions for adoption of children and the
revocation thereof;
d) Complaints for annulment of marriage,
declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating
to marital status and property relations of husband
and wife or those living together under different
status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution
of conjugal partnership of gains;
e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;
f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under
the provisions of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the “Family Code of the Philippines”;
g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as
abandoned, dependent or neglected children, petitions
for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children;
the suspension, termination, or restoration of
parental authority and other cases cognizable under
Presidential Decree No. 603, Executive Order No. 56,
(Series of 1986), and other related laws;
h) Petitions for the constitution of the family
home;
i) Cases against minors cognizable under the
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;
j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise
known as the “Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,” as
amended by Republic Act No. 7658; and
k) Cases of domestic violence against:
1) Women — which are acts of gender based
violence that results, or are likely to result in
physical, sexual or psychological harm or
suffering to women; and other forms of physical

312

abuse such as battering or threats and

coercion which violate a woman’s personhood,
integrity and freedom of movement; an
2) Children — which include the commission
of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all
other conditions prejudicial to their
development.
If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused
or batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings
and the corresponding penalties.
If any question involving any of the above matters
should arise as an incident in any case pending in the
regular courts, said incident shall be determined in
that court.

This court’s designation of Family Courts through its
February 1, 2000 Resolution in A.M. No. 99-11-07-SC was
pursuant to a transitory provision: Section 17 of the Family
Courts Act of 1997. Section 17 required this court to, in the
meantime, designate Regional Trial Court branches to act
as Family Courts. This designation was of a temporary
nature, effective only in the intervening period pending the
establishment of Family Courts:

SEC. 17. Transitory Provisions.—Pending the
establishment of such Family Courts, the Supreme
Court shall designate from among the branches of the
Regional Trial Court at least one Family Court in
each of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan,
Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Muntinlupa, Laoag,
Baguio, Santiago, Dagupan, Olongapo, Cabanatuan,
San Jose, Angeles, Cavite, Batangas, Lucena, Naga,
Iriga, Legazpi, Roxas, Iloilo, Bacolod, Dumaguete,
Tacloban, Cebu, Mandaue, Tagbilaran, Surigao,
Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Davao, General Santos,
Oroquieta, Ozamis, Dipolog, Zamboanga, Pagadian,
Iligan, and in such other places as the Supreme Court
may deem necessary.

313
VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 313

Additional cases other than those provided in Sec.

5 may be assigned to the Family Courts when their
dockets permit: Provided, That such additional cases
shall not be heard on the same day family cases are
heard.
In areas where there are no Family Courts, the
cases referred to in Section 5 of this Act shall be
adjudicated by the Regional Trial Court.

This court’s designation of Family Courts, insofar as
there was a need to tentatively provide for specialized
courts, proceeded from the same mandate which animated
its designation of Drugs Courts, as well as Special
Commercial Courts. It was pursuant to the power of this
court to administratively supervise lower courts.
The status quo engendered by A.M. No. 99-11-07-SC
persists to the present day, more than 15 years after its
adoption and almost 18 years after the adoption of the
Family Courts Act of 1997. However, the delineation of the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Family Courts as against
the subject matter jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts
remains. It is just that, from the time of its enactment, the
Family Courts Act of 1997 has not been fully implemented.
This state of affairs is a fact acknowledged by this court, as,
on August 13, 2014, this court issued Memorandum Order
No. 20-14 establishing a Committee on Family Courts and
Juvenile Concerns, the mandate of which includes the
drafting of a plan for effecting the organization of Family
Courts.
I have no doubt that this Committee, under the present
and able leadership of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de
Castro, will do all it can to provide a workable and
comprehensive plan that will convince Congress to create
and fund the statutorily mandated Family Courts.
However, this temporary state of affairs can only be
remedied by an act of Congress. Hopefully, in due time,
Congress can proceed to complete what is mandated by the
Family Courts Act of 1997.

314

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition for

Review on Certiorari. The Orders dated April 17, 2012 and
July 9, 2012 of the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court,
Branch 276, in Civil Case No. 11-077 must be REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Instead of being dismissed, Civil Case
No. 11-077, must be REFERRED to the Executive Judge
of the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court, in order that
it may be ASSIGNED to the Muntinlupa City Regional
Trial Court, Branch 256, the branch duly designated to
perform the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court’s
functions as a Special Commercial Court.
Petition granted, orders reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Under Section 8, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of

Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, a motion to
dismiss is a prohibited pleading. (Aldersgate College, Inc.
vs. Gauuan, 685 SCRA 646 [2012])
Republic Act No. 8799 conferred jurisdiction over intra-
corporate controversies on courts of general jurisdiction or
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs), to be designated by the
Supreme Court. (Aguirre II vs. FQB+7, Inc., 688 SCRA 242
[2013])

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G.R. No. 202664. November 10, 2015.

Mercantile Law; Corporations; Intra-Corporate Controversies;

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 243

hence, intra-corporate, which should be heard by the

244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

where the RTC acquiring jurisdiction over the case has

246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

intended as a procedural tool to expedite the resolution of

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 247

merated under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A to all the RTCs. If

248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that absent such jurisdiction,

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 249

allegations of the complaint which in this instance is

250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

should, as warranted, require from counsels disciplined

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 251

for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction where previously there

252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tribunal, person, or body. Designating branches as such

PETITION for review on certiorari of the orders of the

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 253

Platon, Martinez, Flores, San Pedro & Leaño for

1 Rollo, pp. 10-28.

254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Global, Inc. on February 1, 2010. Essentially, petitioners

The RTC’s Ruling

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 255

fully exercise jurisdiction on the matter, including the

The Issue Before the Court

256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Court’s Ruling

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 257

As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that a court’s

258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

902-A29 was transferred from the Securities and

c. Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees,

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 259

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional

[T]he word “or” may be used as the equivalent of

31 427 Phil. 604; 377 SCRA 353 (2002).

260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Further, as may be gleaned from the following excerpt of

35 See Transcript of Session Proceedings in Securities Act of 1998, SB.

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 261

specific branch has been designated as a Special

36 See Resolution dated August 22, 2000 in A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC,

262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

promote expediency.40 Accordingly, the RTC branch

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 263

tutional authority to supervise the administration of all

264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the action.43 Unfortunately, the commercial case

43 See Herrera, supra note 26 at pp. 112-113. See also Tinitigan v.

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 265

MLCG and FMDG. The same letter states that the

46 Id., at pp. 47-48.

266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

its caption and the body, which parameters are defined

48 See Item No. 3 of A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, as amended, dated June