Current Multinational Financial Challenges: The Credit Crisis of 2007-2009
Current Multinational Financial Challenges: The Credit Crisis of 2007-2009
Current Multinational Financial Challenges: The Credit Crisis of 2007-2009
Questions
1. Three Forces. What were the three major forces behind the credit crisis of 2007 and 2008?
The three major forces behind the credit crisis of 2007 and 2008 were a) complex financial
instruments, b) off-balance sheet accounting entities, and c) increased use of leverage.
a. Innovative securities were hard to value in the best of circumstances and had little history to
indicate how they might behave in a severe market downturn.
b. Few in the markets (or perhaps in the regulatory agencies) had an accurate idea of the scope or
nature of off-balance sheet entities and their activities until the credit crisis arrived.
c. Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) were a form of highly leveraged speculation, which was
dependent on the assumption that the markets would always supply liquidity. The risks of SIVs
were significantly underestimated.
6. LIBOR’s Role. Why does LIBOR receive so much attention in the global financial markets?
LIBOR, although only one of several key interest rates in the global marketplace, plays a critical role
in the interbank market as the basis for all floating rate debt instruments of all kinds. This includes
mortgages, corporate loans, industrial development loans, and the multitudes of financial derivatives
sold throughout the global marketplace.
With the onset of the credit crisis in September 2008, LIBOR rates skyrocketed between major
international banks, indicating a growing fear of counterparty default in a market historically
considered the highest quality and most liquid in the world.
7. Interbank Market. Why do you think it is important for many of the world’s largest commercial and
investment banks to be considered on-the-run in the interbank market?
The interbank market has historically operated, on its highest levels, as a “no-name” market. This
meant that for the banks at the highest level of international credit quality, interbank transactions
could be conducted without discriminating by name. Therefore, they traded among themselves at no
differential credit risk premiums. A major money center bank trading on such a level was said to be
trading on-the-run. Thus, on-the-run banks are viewed to have steadfast credit quality. Banks that are
not on-the-run are considered to be of less credit quality, sometimes reflecting more country risk than
credit risk, and pay slightly higher rates in the interbank market.
8. LIBOR Treasury Spread. Why were LIBOR rates so much higher than Treasury yields in 2007 and
2008? What is needed to return LIBOR rates to the lower, more stable levels of the past?
In July and August of 2008, 3-month LIBOR was averaging just under 80 basis points higher than the
3-month interest rate swap index—the difference being termed the TED Spread. In September and
October 2008, however, the spread rose to more than 350 basis points as the crisis caused many banks
to question the credit quality of other banks. Even this spread proved misleading, as many banks were
completely “locked-out” of the interbank market. Regardless of what they may or may not have been
willing to pay for funds, they could not get them. At the same time in the United States, as banks stopped
lending in mid- to late-September, and many interbank markets became illiquid, the U.S. financial
authorities worked feverishly to inject funds into the marketplace. The result was the rapid reduction
in the 3-month interest rate swap index. The TED Spread remained relatively wide for only a short
period of time, with LIBOR actually falling to under 1.5% by the end of 2008. In January 2009, the
TED Spread returned to a more common spread of under 80 basis points.