Entry Mode - Walmart
Entry Mode - Walmart
Entry Mode - Walmart
are sold off or shut down. On the other hand, if the subsidiary is a good economic per
former, the owners may see an opportunity to obtain a good price for the unit while it is
performing well.
● Growth. Economic growth in the host country would normally make FDI even more
attractive, thereby increasing the barriers to exit from such a country. However, the attrac
tiveness of the location would make such operations more likely targets for takeovers by
other investors.
Wal-mart (www.walmartstores.com) was founded by Sam Walton in 1962, with the opening of the first
Wal-mart discount store. Today there are more than 8,100 retail stores under 55 different store brands in
16 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India,
Japan, mexico, Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, UK and the US). With fiscal year 2009 sales of US$401 billion (only
20 per cent outside the US), Wal-mart employs more than 2.1 million associates worldwide. Wal-mart had
high hopes for Germany (the world’s third-largest retail market after the US and Japan) when it entered the
market in 1997 by acquiring Wertkauf GmbH with its 21 hypermarkets. one year later Wal-mart aquired a
further 74 Interspar stores of Spar AG.
However, nine years later Wal-mart had to withdraw from the German market. What happened?
There are several explanation for this withdrawal:
1. Wal-mart appointed a CEo for Germany who spoke no German. Not only that, he insisted that his managers
work in English. The next CEo, an Englishman, tried to run the show from England. The men at the top
misunderstood both the employees and the customers. other surprises for Wal-mart were Germany’s
short shopping hours, including almost no Sunday trading. Wal-mart Germany was frustrated by German
shopping regulations – the feared Ladenschlussgesetz which regulates store opening times – and restrictions
on discounting.
2. Wal-mart’s American managers pressured German executives to enforce American-style management
practices in the workplace. Employees were forbidden, for instance, from dating colleagues in positions
of influence. Workers were also told not to flirt with one another.
3. The German Wal-mart management threatened to close certain stores if staff did not agree to work longer
hours than their contracts foresaw and did not permit video surveillance of their work. As a consequence
Wal-mart Germany had several conflicts with the trade union.
4. There were some cultural misunderstandings too: German Wal-mart shoppers didn’t like having their
purchases bagged by others and German shoppers like to hunt for bargains on their own, without smiling
assistants at their elbows.
5. Some of the American products did not fit into the German homes: for example, American pillowcases are
a different size from German ones. As a consequence, Wal-mart Germany ended up with a huge stock of
pillowcases that they could not sell to German customers.
6. Wal-mart did not reach ‘critical mass’ in Germany. Its infrastructure in Germany, which involved two HQs
(for a while) and three logistics centres, piled up costs without achieving economies of scale. With its
relatively low number of stores, it only reached 2 per cent of the German food market. It was up against
fierce competition from Aldi and Lidl, two German discount chains. For example, Aldi had a network of
4,000 stores, compared with Wal-mart’s approximately 100 stores.
After nine years of trying to make a go of it, in July 2006 Wal-mart sold its 85 stores to German rival metro.
Wal-mart’s attempt to apply the company’s proven US success formula in an unmodified manner to the
German market turned out to be a fiasco. This case shows how important is is to address cultural differences
when setting up international operations.
Sources: The Economist ‘After struggling for years, Wal-Mart withdraws from Germany’, US Edition, 5 August, 2006; The Independent ‘Mighty Wal-Mart
admits defeat in Germany’, 29 July 2006, London; www.walmartstores.com.