FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 178321. October 5, 2011.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CONRADO

LAOG y RAMIN, accused-appellant.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J : p

For our review is the March 21, 2007 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 which affirmed appellant's conviction for
murder in Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000 and rape in Criminal Case No.
2308-M-2000.
Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was charged with murder before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, of Malolos, Bulacan. The Information, 2
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of
San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a lead
pipe and with intent to kill one Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, did then and
there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and hit with
the said lead pipe the said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, thereby inflicting
upon said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal serious physical injuries which
directly caused her death.
Contrary to law.

He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape
of AAA. 3 The second Information, 4 which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
2308-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of
San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs,
by means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by attacking and
hitting with a lead pipe one [AAA] which resulted [in] her incurring
serious physical injuries that almost caused her death, and while in
such defenseless situation, did then and there have carnal knowledge
of said [AAA] against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two
cases were thereafter tried jointly because they arose from the same
incident.

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 The prosecution presented as its principal witness AAA, the rape victim
who was 19 years old at the time of the incident. Her testimony was
corroborated by her grandfather BBB, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, and her
neighbor CCC.
AAA testified that at around six o'clock in the evening of June 6, 2000,
she and her friend, Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice
paddies on their way to apply for work at a canteen near the National
Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly, appellant, who was
holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought them
to a grassy area at the back of a concrete wall. Without warning, appellant
struck AAA in the head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall
down. When Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help but appellant also hit
her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her down. Appellant stabbed
Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter covered her body with
thick grass. 5 Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head several
times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in
such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her jogging pants, removed
her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went on top of her,
sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA,
appellant also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out. 6
When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard.
She crawled until she reached her uncle's farm at daybreak on June 8, 2000.
7 When she saw him, she waved at him for help. Her uncle, BBB, and a
certain Nano then brought her to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where
she stayed for more than three weeks. She later learned that Jennifer had
died. 8
During cross-examination, AAA explained that she did not try to run
away when appellant accosted them because she trusted appellant who was
her uncle by affinity. She said that she never thought he would harm them. 9
BBB testified that on June 8, 2000, at about six o'clock in the morning,
he was at his rice field at Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan when he saw a
woman waving a hand and then fell down. The woman was about 200
meters away from him when he saw her waving to him, and he did not mind
her. However, when she was about 100 meters away from him, he
recognized the woman as AAA, his granddaughter. He immediately
approached her and saw that her face was swollen, with her hair covering
her face, and her clothes all wet. He asked AAA what happened to her, and
AAA uttered, "Si Tata Coni" referring to appellant who is his son-in-law. 10
With the help of his neighbor, he brought AAA home. 11 AAA was later
brought to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she recuperated for
three weeks.
CCC, neighbor of AAA and Jennifer, testified that sometime after June 6,
2000, she visited AAA at the hospital and asked AAA about the whereabouts
of Jennifer. AAA told her to look for Jennifer somewhere at Buenavista. She
sought the assistance of Barangay Officials and they went to Buenavista
where they found Jennifer's cadaver covered with grass and already bloated.
12
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 Meanwhile, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, a medico-legal officer of the
Province of Bulacan, conducted the autopsy on the remains of Jennifer. His
findings are as follows:
. . . the body is in advanced stage of decomposition[;] . . .
eyeballs and to[n]gue were protru[d]ed; the lips and abdomen are
swollen; . . . desquamation and bursting of bullae and denudation of
the epidermis in the head, trunks and on the upper extremities[;]
[f]rothy fluid and maggots coming from the nose, mouth, genital region
and at the site of wounds, . . . three (3) lacerations at the head[;] two
(2) stab wounds at the submandibular region[;] four [4] punctured
wounds at the chest of the victim[.]

. . . cause of death of the victim was hemorrhagic shock as result

of stab wounds [in] the head and trunk. 13 DECcAS

The prosecution and the defense also stipulated on the testimony of

Elizabeth Patawaran, Jennifer's mother, as to the civil aspect of Criminal
Case No. 2162-M-2000. It was stipulated that she spent P25,000 for
Jennifer's funeral and burial. 14
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him.
Appellant testified that he was at home cooking dinner around the time the
crimes were committed. With him were his children, Ronnie, Jay, Oliver and
Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey Laog. At around seven o'clock, he was
arrested by the police officers of San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his
wife had reported him to the police after he "went wild" that same night and
struck with a lead pipe a man whom he saw talking to his wife inside their
house. When he was already incarcerated, he learned that he was being
charged with murder and rape. 15
Appellant further testified that AAA and Jennifer frequently went to his
nipa hut whenever they would ask for rice or money. He claimed that in the
evening of June 5, 2000, AAA and Jennifer slept in his nipa hut but they left
the following morning at around seven o'clock. An hour later, he left his
house to have his scythe repaired. However, he was not able to do so
because that was the time when he "went wild" after seeing his wife with
another man. He admitted that his nipa hut is more or less only 100 meters
away from the scene of the crime. 16
The defense also presented appellant's nephew, Rey Laog, who
testified that he went to appellant's house on June 5, 2000, at around three
o'clock in the afternoon, and saw AAA and Jennifer there. He recalled seeing
AAA and Jennifer before at his uncle's house about seven times because AAA
and his uncle had an illicit affair. He further testified that appellant arrived
before midnight on June 5, 2000 and slept with AAA. The following morning,
at around six o'clock, AAA and Jennifer went home. He and appellant
meanwhile left the house together. Appellant was going to San Rafael to
have his scythe repaired while he proceeded to his house in Pinakpinakan,
San Rafael, Bulacan. 17
After trial, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision 18 on June 30, 2003
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. The
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 dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2162-M-2000, this court finds the
accused Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay
the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran, the following sums of money:

a. P60,000.00 as civil indemnity;

b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;

c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2308-M-2000, this Court hereby
finds the accused Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Rape under Art. 266-A par. (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and to pay the private complainant the following sums of money.
a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;

c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED. 19

Appellant appealed his conviction to this Court. But conformably with

our pronouncement in People v. Mateo, 20 the case was referred to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition.
In a Decision dated March 21, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification
the trial court's judgment. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed
Joint Decision, dated June 30, 2003, of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11, in Criminal Case Nos. 2162-M-2000 &
2308-M-2000, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION . In Criminal
Case [No.] 2162-M-2000, Accused-Appellant is further ordered to pay
the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran [an] additional P25,000.00 as actual
damages . The exemplary damages awarded by the Trial Court in
2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000 are hereby reduced to P25,000.00
each .
SO ORDERED. 21

Appellant is now before this Court assailing the CA's affirmance of his
conviction for both crimes of rape and murder. In a Resolution 22 dated
August 22, 2007, we required the parties to submit their respective
Supplemental Briefs, if they so desire. However, the parties submitted
separate Manifestations in lieu of Supplemental Briefs, adopting the
arguments in their respective briefs filed in the CA. Appellant had raised the
following errors allegedly committed by the trial court: HTSAEa

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 THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION
WITNESS [AAA].

II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 23

Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the killing of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal and the rape of
AAA. He assails AAA's credibility, the prosecution's main witness, and points
out alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. Appellant also contends that
the prosecution failed to establish that he carefully planned the execution of
the crimes charged. According to him, AAA's narration that he waylaid them
while walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work negates
evident premeditation since there was no evidence that the said path was
their usual route.
Appellant further contends that the trial court and CA erred in
appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. He
argues that for abuse of superior strength to be appreciated in the killing of
Jennifer, the physical attributes of both the accused and the victim should
have been shown in order to determine whether the accused had the
capacity to overcome the victim physically or whether the victim was
substantially weak and unable to put up a defense. Additionally, he attempts
to cast doubt upon AAA's testimony, arguing that it lacked some details on
how, after she was raped and stabbed by appellant, she was still able to put
on her clothes and crawl to her grandfather's farm.
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant principally attacks the credibility of prosecution witness AAA.
Jurisprudence has decreed that the issue of credibility of witnesses is "a
question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its
unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying which
opportunity is denied to the appellate courts" 24 and "absent any substantial
reason which would justify the reversal of the trial court's assessments and
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings,
particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have
been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected
the outcome of the case." 25 This rule is even more stringently applied if the
appellate court concurred with the trial court. 26
Here, both the trial and appellate courts gave credence and full
probative weight to the testimony of AAA, the lone eyewitness to Jennifer's
killing and was herself brutally attacked by appellant who also raped her.
Appellant had not shown any sufficiently weighty reasons for us to disturb
the trial court's evaluation of the prosecution eyewitness' credibility. In
particular, we defer to the trial court's firsthand observations on AAA's
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 deportment while testifying and its veritable assessment of her credibility, to
wit:
From the moment [AAA] took the stand, this Court has come to
discern in her the trepidations of a woman outraged who is about to
recount the ordeal she had gone through. She took her oath with
trembling hands, her voice low and soft, hardly audible. Face down, her
eyes were constantly fixed on the floor as if avoiding an eye contact
with the man she was about to testify against. After a few questions in
direct, the emotion building up inside her came to the fore and she
burst into tears, badly shaken, unfit to continue any further with her
testimony. Thus, in deference to her agitated situation, this Court has
to defer her direct-examination. When she came back, however, to
continue with her aborted questioning, this time, composed and
collected, direct and straightforward in her narration, all vestiges of
doubt on her credibility vanished. 27

Indeed, records bear out that AAA became so tense and nervous when
she took the witness stand for the first time that the trial court had to cut
short her initial direct examination. However, during the next hearing she
was able to narrate her harrowing ordeal in a clear and straightforward
manner, describing in detail how appellant waylaid them and mercilessly hit
and attacked her and Jennifer with a lead pipe and ice pick before raping
her. We quote the pertinent portions of her testimony:
Q: During your previous testimony, Madam Witness, you said that
you're not able to reach your place of work on June 6, 2000, what
is the reason why you did not reach your place of work?
A: We were waylaid (hinarang) by Conrado Laog, sir.
Q: In what manner were you waylaid by Conrado Laog?

A: Conrado Laog hit me with the pipe on my head, sir.

xxx xxx xxx
Q: Where were you when you were hit?
A: We were walking along the rice puddies (sic), Your Honor.

Fiscal: SCHIac

Q: And what happened to you when you were hit with the lead pipe
by Conrado Laog?

A: I fell down (nabuwal) because I felt dizzy, sir.

Q: Now, what happened next, if any?
A: I heard Jennifer crying, sir.
Q: And you heard Jennifer but did you see her?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was Conrado Laog when you heard Jennifer crying?

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 A: He was beside me, sir.

Court:
Q: How about Jennifer, where was she when you heard her crying?
A: She was standing on the rice puddies, (sic), Your Honor.
Fiscal:
Q: And what was Conrado Laog doing?

A: He approached Jennifer, sir.

Q: Then, what happened next?
A: He hit Jennifer with the pipe, sir.
Q: And what happened to Jennifer?

A: She fell down, sir.

Q: What did Conrado Laog do next?
A: He stabbed Jennifer, sir.
Q: After Conrado Laog stabbed Jennifer, what happened next?
A: He covered Jennifer with grasses, sir.

Q: And after that, what did Conrado Laog do?

A: He came back to me, sir.
Q: When Conrado Laog came back to you, what did you do, if any?
A: He hit me with the pipe several times, sir.
Q: And what happened to you?

A: And he stabbed me on my face, sir.

Q: Then, what happened to you?
A: After that, he pulled down my jogging pants, sir. He removed my
panty and my blouse and my bra.
Q: After that, what did he do next?
A: And then, he went on top of me, sir.
Q: Then, what happened?

A: He sucked my breast, sir.

Q: And after that?
A: He was forcing his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q: Did he suc[c]eed in putting his penis into your vagina?

A: Yes, sir.

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 Q: For how long did the accused Conrado Laog insert his penis into
your vagina?
A: For quite sometime, sir.
Q: After that, what happened?

A: After that, he stood up, sir.

Q: And where did he go?
A: After that, he covered me with grasses, sir.
Q: And after that, what did you do?
A: I fell unconscious, sir.

Q: Now, if Conrado Laog is inside the courtroom, will you be able to

point to him? EHTADa

Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to a man wearing an inmate's uniform and when
asked his name, answered: Conrado Laog.

xxx xxx xxx 28

On the other hand, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial

and alibi. He claimed that at the time of the incident, he was at his house
with his children and nephew cooking dinner. His defense, however, cannot
prevail over the straightforward and credible testimony of AAA who
positively identified him as the perpetrator of the murder and rape. Time and
again, we have held that positive identification of the accused, when
categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part
of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of the
appellant whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. 29 AAA was firm and unrelenting in pointing to appellant as the
one who attacked her and Jennifer, stabbing the latter to death before raping
AAA. It should be noted that AAA knew appellant well since they were
relatives by affinity. As correctly held by the CA, with AAA's familiarity and
proximity with the appellant during the commission of the crime, her
identification of appellant could not be doubted or mistaken. In fact, AAA,
upon encountering appellant, did not run away as she never thought her own
uncle would harm her and her friend. Moreover, the most natural reaction of
victims of violence is to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of
the crime and observe the manner in which the crime is being committed. 30
There is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of AAA to
testify falsely against appellant or to falsely implicate him in the commission
of a crime. Thus, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full
faith and credence. 31
In People v. Nieto, 32 we reiterated that —
It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial,
without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the
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 positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of
appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is
likewise unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because
it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by
clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and
undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when
there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness.
Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that
the accused has been somewhere else during the commission of the
crime; it must also be shown that it would have been impossible for
him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.

Appellant does not dispute that he was near the vicinity of the crime on
the evening of June 6, 2000. In fact, during his cross-examination, appellant
admitted that his house was more or less only 100 meters from the crime
scene. Thus, his defense of alibi is not worthy of any credit for the added
reason that he has not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
In view of the credible testimony of AAA, appellant's defenses of denial
and alibi deserve no consideration. We stress that these weak defenses
cannot stand against the positive identification and categorical testimony of
a rape victim. 33
Appellant attempts to discredit AAA's accusation of rape by pointing
out that while she testified on being very weak that she even passed out
after she was raped by appellant, she nevertheless stated that when she
crawled her way to her grandfather's farm she was wearing her clothes.
Appellant also contends that the prosecution should have presented the
physician who examined AAA to prove her allegations that she was beaten
and raped by appellant.
We are not persuaded.
Based on AAA's account, appellant did not undress her completely —
her blouse and bra were merely lifted up ("nililis") while her undergarments
were just pulled down, which therefore explains why she still had her clothes
on when she crawled to her grandfather's farm. Nonetheless, this matter
raised by appellant is a minor detail which had nothing to do with the
elements of the crime of rape. Discrepancies referring only to minor details
and collateral matters — not to the central fact of the crime — do not affect
the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses'
declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on
the whole. 34 For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a
witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the
innocence of the appellant for the crime charged. 35 It cannot be
overemphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let
alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony. 36
As to the fact that the physician who examined AAA at the hospital did
not testify during the trial, we find this not fatal to the prosecution's case.
It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the
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 prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony and not the findings of the
medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape, the victim's testimony alone, if
credible, is sufficient to convict. 37 Thus we have ruled that a medical
examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely
corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element for conviction
in rape. What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about
the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible. 38 as what we find in this
case. HICcSA

While we concur with the trial court's conclusion that appellant indeed
was the one who raped AAA and killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should
not have been convicted of the separate crimes of murder and rape. An
appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question,
including one not raised by the parties. 39 The facts alleged and proven
clearly show that the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide, a
special complex crime provided under Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353. 40
In People v. Larrañaga , 41 this Court explained the concept of a special
complex crime, as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is
imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or
more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a
special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under
the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery
with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping
with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special
complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of
the component offenses with the same precision that would be
necessary if they were made the subject of separate
complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the
victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped,
or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed;["] and that this provision gives rise to a special
complex crime. In the cases at bar, particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-
45303, the Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was
raped "on the occasion and in connection" with her detention and was
killed "subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof." Considering
that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component
offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape. . . .
42 (Emphasis supplied.)

A special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its

own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros , 43
explained that composite crimes are "neither of the same legal basis as nor
subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal
Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more
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 grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do they involve an
offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex crime
proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case
of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed
for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more
offenses." 44
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a
single penalty for the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by
reason or on the occasion of the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the
next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide
is committed, the penalty shall be death.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both
the rape of AAA and the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he
is liable for rape with homicide under the above provision. There is no doubt
that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for
help once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she
may not witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal
desire having been satiated, appellant purposely covered AAA's body with
grass, as he did earlier with Jennifer's body, so that it may not be easily
noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought that the savage
blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough to cause her death as with
Jennifer. But AAA survived and appellant's barbaric deeds were soon enough
discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape
with homicide were consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed
in this case is someone other than the woman victim of the rape. An analogy
may be drawn from our rulings in cases of robbery with homicide, where the
component acts of homicide, physical injuries and other offenses have been
committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery. In People v. De Leon , 45
we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as
follows: HcACTE

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the

malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the
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 occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery
must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place
before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained,
without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or
modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has
to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with
homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The
constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide,
must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere

accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim
of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside
from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of
authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime.
Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the
robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a
homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery,
the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies
committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are
integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide,
thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide. 46 (Emphasis
supplied.)

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term

"homicide" is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and
slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. 47
Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior
strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been
duly established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to
murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As
in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of
treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only.
Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales 48
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding
that the aggravating circumstance of treachery is present. They aver
that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes
against property. However, we find that the trial court in this case
correctly characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than
qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants
in defending himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers
before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as their
other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra , we ruled
that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic
aggravating circumstance. Robbery with homicide is a composite crime
with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code.
There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder
under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of
the circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of
the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide
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 to murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps
determine the penalty to be imposed. 49 (Emphasis supplied.)

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is

considered whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the
aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the
commission of the crime. 50 It is taken into account whenever the aggressor
purposely used excessive force that is out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked. 51
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer
in the head with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead.
Clearly, the manner by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a
lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to render her
defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably
showed that appellant intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to
the means of defense available to his unarmed victim. As aptly observed by
the appellate court:
It has long been established that an attack made by a man with
a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes
the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the
weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was
unable to defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not
given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking
advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was
completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the
excess of the aggressor's natural strength over that of the victim,
considering the momentary position of both and the employment of
means weakening the defense, although not annulling it. By
deliberately employing deadly weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe,
[a]ccused-[a]ppellant clearly took advantage of the superiority which
his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim. The
accused-appellant's sudden attack caught the victim off-guard
rendering her defenseless. 52

Abuse of superior strength in this case therefore is merely a generic

aggravating circumstance to be considered in the imposition of the penalty.
The penalty provided in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is death. However, in view of the passage on June 24, 2006 of R.A.
No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in
the Philippines" the Court is mandated to impose on the appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. 53
The aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength
and use of deadly weapon have greater relevance insofar as the civil aspect
of this case is concerned. While the trial court and CA were correct in holding
that both the victim of the killing (Jennifer) and the rape victim (AAA) are
entitled to the award of exemplary damages, the basis for such award needs
further clarification. ACTISD

Articles 2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code provide:

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 Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by
way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part
of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are
separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended
party.

In view of the presence of abuse of superior strength in the killing of

Jennifer, her heirs are entitled to exemplary damages pursuant to Article
2230. With respect to the rape committed against AAA, Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman through force, threat or intimidation under Article
266-A (a), whenever such rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua
to death. Since the use of a deadly weapon raises the penalty for the rape,
this circumstance would justify the award of exemplary damages to the
offended party (AAA) also in accordance with Article 2230.
Article 266-B likewise provides for the imposition of death penalty if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the aggravating/qualifying
circumstances enumerated therein. Among these circumstances is minority
of the victim and her relationship to the offender:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree , or
the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphasis
supplied.)

AAA's relationship to appellant, who is his uncle by affinity, was not

alleged in the information but admitted by appellant when he testified in
court:
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
CONRADO LAOG By:
Atty. Roque:

xxx xxx xxx

Q Do you know a person by the name of [AAA]?

A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know her?

A Because she is our neighbor. Her house is just adjacent to ours,

sir.

Q How are you related to [AAA]?

A Her mother and my wife are sisters.

Q So she is your niece-in-law?

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 A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx 54 (Emphasis supplied.)

The failure of the prosecution to allege in the information AAA's

relationship to appellant will not bar the consideration of the said
circumstance in the determination of his civil liability. In any case, even
without the attendance of aggravating circumstances, exemplary damages
may still be awarded where the circumstances of the case show the "highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender." Citing our earlier
ruling in the case of People v. Catubig , 55 this Court clarified in People v.
Dalisay: 56
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
courts generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when
an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been
proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same
was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the
aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the Revised
Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not
alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the
award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has
been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary
damages. Pertinent are the following sections of Rule 110:

xxx xxx xxx

Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle
that courts may still award exemplary damages based on the
aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating
circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been
proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the
Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter. Catubig
reasoned that the retroactive application of the Revised Rules should
not adversely affect the vested rights of the private offended party. AIaDcH

Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases,

especially those involving rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary
damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending the
commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was
consequently proven in the light of Catubig; and another awarding
exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has both
been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in
the first set are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla,
People v. Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the Philippines v.
Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag
Jimenez, and People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the
second set are People v. Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante
Gragasin y Par, and People of the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the
difference between the two sets rests on when the criminal case was
instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the Revised Rules.

xxx xxx xxx

Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis
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 for the grant of exemplary damages — taking into account simply the
attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a
crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary
damages are awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus —

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages,

exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a
deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of
undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an
injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.
These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In
common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages
when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the
sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a
result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly
inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the
hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant —
associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice,
gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross
fraud — that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive
damages are often used to refer to those species of damages
that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are
intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others
like him from similar conduct in the future.

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages,

therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of
the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct
of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an
instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the
main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People
v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other
fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from
sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal , the
Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption,
perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a
pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the Philippines v.
Cristino Cañada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The
People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr. , the Court awarded
exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to
elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from
sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis
Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary
damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales' words in her
separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, "
[t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in
such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy
behind the award of exemplary damages — to set a public example or
correction for the public good." 57 (Emphasis supplied.)

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 In this case, the brutal manner by which appellant carried out his
lustful design against his niece-in-law who never had an inkling that her own
uncle would do any harm to her and her friend, justified the award of
exemplary damages. Appellant's sudden and fierce attack on AAA — hitting
her several times on the head with a lead pipe before stabbing her face until
she fell down, hurriedly lifting her bra and blouse and pulling down her
undergarments, raping her while she was in such a defenseless position,
covering her body with grasses and abandoning her to die in a grassy field —
was truly despicable and outrageous. Such vicious assault was made even
more reprehensible as it also victimized Jennifer, who sustained more stab
wounds and beatings, causing her violent death. Article 2229 of the Civil
Code allows the award of exemplary damages in order to deter the
commission of similar acts and to allow the courts to forestall behavior that
would pose grave and deleterious consequences to society. 58 In line with
current jurisprudence, the amount of P30,000 each for AAA and the heirs of
Jennifer as exemplary damages was correctly awarded by the trial court.
We also affirm the trial court and CA in ordering appellant to pay the
heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal the amounts of P50,000 as moral
damages. In cases of murder and homicide, the award of moral damages is
mandatory, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the
victim. 59 Anent the award of civil indemnity, the same is increased to
P75,000 to conform with recent jurisprudence. 60 As to expenses incurred for
the funeral and burial of Jennifer, the CA correctly awarded her heirs the
amount of P25,000 as actual damages, said amount having been stipulated
by the parties during the trial.
Lastly, we affirm the award of P50,000 to AAA as civil indemnity for the
crime of rape, as well as the award of P50,000 as moral damages. Civil
indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape while
moral damages are awarded upon such finding without need of further proof,
because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries
entitling the victim to such award. 61 DEcTCa

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The March

21, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Conrado Laog y
Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape with
Homicide under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 8353, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer
Patawaran-Rosal P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral
damages, P25,000 as actual damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages.
He is further ordered to pay to the victim AAA the sums of P50,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages and P30,000 as exemplary
damages.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

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 SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin and Del Castillo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Rollo , pp. 3-16. Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam with Associate Justices
Vicente S.E. Veloso and Sesinando E. Villon concurring.

2.Records, Vol. I, p. 1.

3.Consistent with our decision in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693,

September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419, the real name of the rape victim in this
case is withheld and instead fictitious initials are used to represent her. Also,
the personal circumstances of the victim or any other information tending to
establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate
family or household members, are not disclosed in this decision.

4.Records, Vol. II, p. 1.

5.TSN, June 20, 2001, pp. 3-4; TSN, December 12, 2001, pp. 3-7.

6.Id. at 4-5.
7.Id. at 6; TSN, December 12, 2001, pp. 12-13.

8.Id. at 6-7.

9.TSN, December 12, 2001, p. 7.

10.TSN, January 16, 2002, pp. 5-7.

11.Id. at 8.
12.TSN, May 22, 2002, pp. 4-7.

13.TSN, February 27, 2002, p. 5.

14.CA rollo, p. 31.

15.TSN, December 4, 2002, pp. 3-5.

16.Id. at 4-7.
17.TSN, March 26, 2003, pp. 3-5.

18.CA rollo, pp. 29-33.

19.Id. at 32-33.
20.G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

21.Rollo , p. 15.
22.Id. at 20.

23.CA rollo, p. 70.

24.People v. Nieto, G.R. No. 177756, March 3, 2008, 547 SCRA 511, 524.

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 25.People v. Dominguez, Jr., G.R. No. 180914, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 134,
161.
26.Id.

27.CA rollo, pp. 31-32.

28.TSN, June 20, 2001, pp. 3-5.

29.People v. Cañada , G.R. No. 175317, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 378, 393.

30.People v. Honra, Jr., G.R. Nos. 136012-16, September 26, 2000, 341 SCRA 110,
127, citing People v. Pulusan , G.R. No. 110037, May 21, 1998, 290 SCRA 353,
372.
31.See People v. Malate , G.R. No. 185724, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 817, 827.

32.Supra note 24 at 527-528.

33.People v. Orande , G.R. Nos. 141724-27, November 12, 2003, 415 SCRA 699,
708.

34.People v. Suarez , G.R. Nos. 153573-76, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 333, 345.
35.People v. Villarino , G.R. No. 185012, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 372, 387, citing
People v. Masapol , G.R. No. 121997, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 371,
377.

36.People v. Wasit , G.R. No. 182454, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 721, 729.
37.People v. Cadap , G.R. No. 190633, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 655, 663, citing
People v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. 176742, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 682, 700-
701.

38.People v. Tamano , G.R. No. 188855, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 672, 688,
citing People v. Arivan, G.R No. 176065, April 22, 2008, 552 SCRA 448, 468-
469.

39.People v. Madsali , G.R. No. 179570, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 596, 613-614,
citing Esqueda v. People , G.R. No. 170222, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 489,
506.
40.The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 , which took effect on October 22, 1997.

41.G.R. Nos. 138874-75, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 530.

42.Id. at 580.
43.G.R. Nos. 101107-08, June 27, 1995, 245 SCRA 312, 323-332.

44.Id. at 328-329.
45.G.R. No. 179943, June 26, 2009, 591 SCRA 178.

46.Id. at 192-193, citing People v. Salazar , G.R. No. 99355, August 11, 1997, 277
SCRA 67; People v. Abuyen , G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA
569, 582; People v. Ponciano , G.R. No. 86453, December 5, 1991, 204 SCRA
627, 639; and People v. Mangulabnan, et al., 99 Phil. 992, 999 (1956).
47.People v. Nanas , G.R. No. 137299, August 21, 2001, 363 SCRA 452, 469-470,
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 citing People v. Penillos , G.R. No. 65673, January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 546,
564 and People v. Sequiño , G.R. No. 117397, November 13, 1996, 264 SCRA
79, 101.

48.G.R. No. 111102, December 8, 2000, 347 SCRA 429.

49.Id. at 442, citing People v. Salvatierra , G.R. No. 111124, June 20, 1996, 257
SCRA 489, 507 and People v. Vivas , G.R. No 100914, May 6, 1994, 232 SCRA
238, 242.

50.See People v. Beduya, G.R. No. 175315, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 275, 284.
51.Id.

52.Rollo , pp. 13-14.

53.People v. Villarino, supra note 35 at 389.

54.TSN, December 4, 2002, p. 3.

55.G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621.

56.G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 807.

57.Id. at 817-821.

58.People v. Villarino, supra note 35 at 390.

59.People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009, 580 SCRA 436, 457.

60.People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 180915, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 383, 393.
61.Supra note 38 at 475.

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