Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • 43 views

    Results and Discussion

    Uploaded by

    Daniyal Mirza
    The chapter presents results from regression, correlation, and descriptive analyses of the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (board size, independence, audit committee, CEO duality) and firm performance (ROE, PM, EPS, GP). Regression analysis found audit committee and CEO duality positively and negatively impact ROE respectively, while correlation analysis found all variables except board independence correlate significantly. Moderation analysis found ownership concentration positively moderates the audit committee-ROE relationship. Descriptive statistics showed ROE has highest skewness while gross profit has lowest skewness and highest kurtosis. The results will be discussed to determine if hypotheses are accepted or rejected.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Results and Discussion

    Uploaded by

    Daniyal Mirza
    43 views5 pages
    The chapter presents results from regression, correlation, and descriptive analyses of the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (board size, independence, audit committee, CEO duality) and firm performance (ROE, PM, EPS, GP). Regression analysis found audit committee and CEO duality positively and negatively impact ROE respectively, while correlation analysis found all variables except board independence correlate significantly. Moderation analysis found ownership concentration positively moderates the audit committee-ROE relationship. Descriptive statistics showed ROE has highest skewness while gross profit has lowest skewness and highest kurtosis. The results will be discussed to determine if hypotheses are accepted or rejected.

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    The chapter presents results from regression, correlation, and descriptive analyses of the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (board size, independence, audit committee, CEO duality) and firm performance (ROE, PM, EPS, GP). Regression analysis found audit committee and CEO duality positively and negatively impact ROE respectively, while correlation analysis found all variables except board independence correlate significantly. Moderation analysis found ownership concentration positively moderates the audit committee-ROE relationship. Descriptive statistics showed ROE has highest skewness while gross profit has lowest skewness and highest kurtosis. The results will be discussed to determine if hypotheses are accepted or rejected.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    43 views5 pages

    Results and Discussion

    Uploaded by

    Daniyal Mirza
    The chapter presents results from regression, correlation, and descriptive analyses of the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (board size, independence, audit committee, CEO duality) and firm performance (ROE, PM, EPS, GP). Regression analysis found audit committee and CEO duality positively and negatively impact ROE respectively, while correlation analysis found all variables except board independence correlate significantly. Moderation analysis found ownership concentration positively moderates the audit committee-ROE relationship. Descriptive statistics showed ROE has highest skewness while gross profit has lowest skewness and highest kurtosis. The results will be discussed to determine if hypotheses are accepted or rejected.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    You are on page 1of 5

    Chapter 4

    Results and Discussion

    4.1) Introduction
    .

    Based on the conceptual framework that has been designed in this study, in this chapter, we will
    analyze and determine the results of Corporate Governance mechanism and Performance of the
    firm. The results will demonstrate whether the hypothesis made in this research are rejected or
    accepted statistically or not. Regression Analysis and Correlation Analysis, and Descriptive
    Analysis are used in this study to analyze the results by using E-views.

    4.2) Regression Analysis


    Table 1: Return on Equity (ROE)
    Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
    C 0.310384 0.113642 2.731244 0.0068
    BDSIZE -0.02806 0.011109 -2.5255 0.0123
    BIND -0.0313 0.018596 -1.68305 0.0938
    AUDCOM 0.029938 0.014287 2.095476 0.0373
    CEODUAL 0.065912 0.033541 1.965138 0.0507
    FAGE -0.00081 0.001079 -0.74752 0.4555

    In table 1, the outcomes demonstrate that Audit Committee and CEO Duality shows a positive .

    and significant impact on Return On Equity (ROE). Board Size (BDSIZE) shows a negative and
    . . . . . .

    significant impact on ROE. However, other variables such as Board Independence (BIND), and
    .

    Firm Age (FAGE) have a negative and insignificant impact on ROE.


    Table 2: Profit Margin (PM)
    Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
    C -10.4275 6.385492 -1.633 0.1037
    BDSIZE 0.120389 0.635601 0.189409 0.8499
    BIND -0.78578 1.053124 -0.74614 0.4563
    AUDCOM 1.629392 0.782118 2.083307 0.0383
    CEODUAL -3.54499 1.825695 -1.94172 0.0533
    FAGE 0.138876 0.059643 2.328464 0.0207

    In table 2, the outcomes demonstrate that Audit Committee and Firm Age have a positive and
    .

    significant impact on Profit Margin (PM) while CEO Duality has a negative and significant
    . . . .

    impact on PM. However, Board Size and Board Independence do not show a significant impact
    on Profit Margin.

    Table 3: Earnings per Share (EPS)


    Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
    C 16.6019 9.809846 1.692371 0.0919
    BDSIZE -2.5602 0.926786 -2.76245 0.0062
    BIND 2.149263 1.485103 1.447215 0.1492
    AUDCOM 4.410955 1.270351 3.472234 0.0006
    CEODUAL -4.87788 2.694167 -1.81054 0.0515
    FAGE 0.201274 0.08486 2.371836 0.0185

    In table 3, the outcomes demonstrate that Audit Committee and Firm Age have a positive and .

    significant impact on Earnings per Share (EPS) while Board Size and CEO Duality have a
    . . .

    negative and significant impact on EPS. However, Board independence do not show a
    . .

    significant impact on EPS.


    . .

    Table 4: Gross Profit (GP)


    Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
    C -8.72637 5.073846 -1.71987 0.0868
    BDSIZE 0.11868 0.5025 0.23618 0.8135
    BIND -0.62022 0.837788 -0.74031 0.4599
    AUDCOM 1.313137 0.620362 2.116727 0.0353
    CEODUAL -2.87096 1.469359 -1.95389 0.0519
    FAGE 0.116442 0.048275 2.412038 0.0166

    In table 4, the outcomes demonstrate that Audit Committee and Firm Age have a positive and
    .

    significant impact on Gross Profit (GP), while CEO Duality has a negative and significant
    . . .

    impact on GP. However, Board Size and Board Independence do not show a significant impact
    ,

    on Gross Profit.

    4.3) Moderation Effect


    Table 5: Return on Equity (ROE)
    Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
    C -1.47478 0.347485 -4.24416 0.0000
    AUDCOM 0.420468 0.092893 4.526349 0.0000
    OWNCON 1.880511 0.437948 4.293915 0.0000
    OWNCON_AUDCOM -0.47346 0.114417 -4.138002 0.0001

    In table 5, the outcomes demonstrate that Ownership Concentration positively moderates the
    association among Audit Committee and Return on Equity.

    4.4) Correlation Analysis


    Table 6: Correlation Matrix
    AUDCO CEODUA
    ROE PM GP EPS BDSIZE BIND M L FAGE
    ROE 1
    0.03848
    PM 3 1
    0.04144 0.98299
    EPS 6 9 1
    0.35628 0.14295 0.141880
    GP 9 9 9 1
    - - - -
    BSIZE 0.25594 0.02548 0.019284 0.20865 1
    - - - 0.03477 0.370870
    BIND 0.23113 0.00757 0.006114 5 5 1
    AUDCO 0.11373 0.112879 0.19959 - -
    M 0.10913 7 7 8 0.116812 0.01966 1
    0.15279 - - 0.048378 - 0.32281
    CEO 8 0.07403 -0.07431 0.06552 3 0.13018 8 1
    - 0.14242 0.141310 0.15848 - 0.15941 0.01945 0.11509
    FAGE 0.03644 3 7 6 0.043351 2 5 2 1

    Correlation coefficients with values greater than |0.05| are significant at the 5% level of significance; two-tailed tests

    4.5) Descriptive Statistics


    Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
    ROE PM GP EPS BDSIZE BIND AUDCOM CEODUAL FAGE
     Mean 0.184490 -1.339688 -0.966979 18.163990 8.321429 0.952381 3.984127 0.691700 34.553360
     Median 0.194000 0.048000 0.131000 14.90000 8.000000 1.000000 4.000000 1.000000 32.00000
     Maximum 2.001000 0.764000 0.278000 73.04000 14.000000 5.000000 7.000000 1.000000 67.00000
     Minimum -0.595900 -159.7800 -132.3200 -13.02000 7.000000 0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 8.000000
     Std. Dev. 0.227939 12.81981 10.05069 18.40078 1.366888 0.840766 1.059836 0.462707 13.93615
     Skewness 3.097327 -10.27601 -10.92488 0.795662 1.545006 1.863077 0.474247 -0.830243 0.314876
     Kurtosis 30.74925 113.6405 131.6261 2.921955 6.722345 9.897345 3.584173 1.689304 2.013417

    Table 6 shows that Return on Equity with a (Mean=0.18, SD=0.22) has a highest skewness (3.09)
    and Gross Profit with a (Mean=-0.96, SD=10.05) has a lowest skewness (-10.9), Whereas, the
    highest value of Kurtosis is (KT=131.62) for Gross Profit has a (Mean=-0.96, SD=10.05) and the
    lowest value of Kurtosis is (KT=1.68) for CEO Duality has a (Mean=0.69, SD=13.9).

    4.6) Results and Discussion


    In this part, we will discuss whether our hypothesis have been accepted or rejected based on the
    results we have gathered from the selected data. On the basis of the interpretation of data, it will
    be analyzed whether Corporate Governance Mechanism has an impact on Firm Performance or
    . .

    not.
    Audit Committee shows a positive and significant impact on all the dependent variables.
    . . . . . . .

    Whereas, Board Independence has a negative and insignificant impact with all the dependent
    variables. Firm age has a positive impact on PM, EPS, and GP, but has a negative and
    . . .

    insignificant impact on ROE. CEO Duality has a negative and significant impact on PM, EPS,
    . . ..

    and GP, but has a positive and significant impact on ROE. Board Size has a negative and
    . . .

    significant impact on ROE and EPS, but has a positive and insignificant impact on PM and GP.
    . . .

    All the hypothesis related to Board Size and Board Independence have been rejected as they are
    not in line with the prior research. However, the hypothesis related to Audit Committee, CEO
    Duality, and Firm Age have been accepted and are in line with the previous research with an
    exception of CEO Duality and Firm Age impact on ROE.

    4.5) Summary
    This section gives an overview of this chapter. Results and Discussion has been discussed in this
    chapter in detail. This chapter discusses the regression analysis with all the calculations and
    interpretation of data. The results of the hypothesis made in this study have also been discussed
    in the above chapter.

    You might also like