WALTER T. YOUNG vs. CEASAR G.

BATUEGAS

FACTS:
YOUNG is the private prosecutor in People of the Phil v Arana. BATUEGAS, et al are the
counsels for the accused in the said criminal case.
On Dec 13, 2000, BATUEGAS filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail alleging that the
accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and, as such, is now under
detention. Upon verification with the NBI, YOUNG discovered that the accused surrendered on
Dec 14, 2000 (not 13).
BATUEGAS, et al in their defense alleged that on Dec 13, 2000, upon learning that a
warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they filed a Manifestation with Motion for
Bail. They immediately fetched accused from Cavite and brought him to NBI to voluntarily
surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at NBI at 2am the next day. That was why
the Certificate of Detention indicated that the accused surrendered on Dec 14, 2000 and not 13.
They argued that there was neither unethical conduct nor falsehood in the subject
pleading as their client has voluntarily surrendered and was detained at the NBI. As regards the
lack of notice of hearing, they contend that complainant, as private prosecutor, was not entitled
to any notice.
Investigating Commissioner recommended suspension of 6 months. IBP Commissionon
Bar Discipline in a resolution approved said recommendation.

ISSUE:

W/N BATUEGAS, ET AL ARE GUILTY OF FALSEHOOD AND SHOULD BE SUSPENDED

HELD:

YES, CONCEALED TRUTH

A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission that he will do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. As officer of the court, his high vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and facts of the case to aid it in arriving at the correct
conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only comp lete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. His lawyer’s solemn duty is to defend his client, his
conduct must never be at the expense of truth.
Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from
them as members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court
if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the
truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under
detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby
contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a
contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted
to deception. Hence, BATUEGAS, et al should be suspended for 6 months
 ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
In a SC resolution, it directed Atty. Benjamin Dacanay counsel for petitioner Adez Realty,
Inc., to "SHOW CAUSE within 5 days from notice why he should not be disciplinary dealt with
for intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the court a quo thereby altering and
modifying its factual findings with the apparent purpose of misleading the SC in order to obtain
a favorable judgment, and thus failing to live up to the standards expected of a member of the
Bar.
In his defense, he humbly submitted to the court and threw himself at its mercy. He
explained that whenever he prepares pleadings, he dictates to his secretary and if portions of
the decision or order to be appealed from have to be quoted, he simply instructs his said
secretary to copy the particular pages of the said decision or order. In the case at bar, he did
instruct his secretary to copy the corresponding pages in the decision of the CA. Somehow,
however, some words were intercalated on a particular paragraph. He reasoned that it was his
secretary who was at fault.
His secretary attached an Affidavit supporting the explanation made by Dacanay and
admitted that it was her who committed the error.

ISSUE:
WON Atty. Dacanay should be disbarred for intercalating a material fact in a judicial decision.

HELD:
Yes. In the present case, the inserted phase "without notice to the actual occupants of
the property, Adez Realty," was just the right phrase intercalated at the right place, making it
highly improbable to be unintentionally, much less innocently, committed; and by the secretary
at that. Certainly, making it appear that Court of Appeals found that no notice was given to the
occupants of subject property –– when in fact it did not make such a finding –– is a clear indication
not merely of carelessness in lifting a portion of the assailed decision but a malicious attempt to
gain undue advantage in the sporting arena of fairplay and, more importantly, to deceive and
misguide this Court, which is the final arbiter of litigations.
The distortion of facts committed by counsel, with the willing assistance of his secretary,
is a grave offense and should not be treated lightly, not only because it may set a dangerous
precedent by, rather, because it is a clear and serious violation of one's oath as member of the
Bar. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility directs that "[a]
lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or
the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a
law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved"
Assuming it was the carelessness of his secretary, it is the bounden duty of lawyers to
check, review and recheck the allegation in their pleadings, more particularly the quoted
portions, and ensure that the statements therein are accurate and the reproductions faithful,
down to the last word and even punctuation mark. The legal profession demands that lawyers
thoroughly go over pleadings, motions and other documents dictated or prepared by them, type
or transcribed by their secretaries or clerks, before filing them with the court. If a client is bound
by the acts of his counsel, with more reason should counsel be bound the acts of his secretary
who merely follow his orders
 In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty

FACTS:
The decision of the case Vinuya v Executive Secretary was promulgated with Justice
Mariano del Castillo as its ponente. Motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner’s
counsel on the ground that not only did the ponente of the case plagiarised at least 3 books but
have also twisted such quotations making it appear contrary to the intent of the original works.
The UP College of Law faculty members gave their opinion on the matter of plagiarism by
issuing an article titled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme
Court” signed overall 37 faculty members. In said article, the faculty expressly gave their dismay
saying that the court had the hopes of relief from those “comfort women” during the war
“crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest
Court of the Land.”
In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as appropriation and misrepresentation of
another person’s work as one’s own, is considered as “dishonesty, pure and simple.” Hence, it
was argued that since the decision in the Vinuya case form part of the Philippine judicial system,
the Court, in fine, is allowing dishonesty to be promulgated. Furthermore, the plagiarism and
misrepresentation in the Vinuya case undermines the judicial system of our country and is a dirt
on the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court, the article sought for the resignation of Associate
Justice Mariano del Castillo.

ISSUE:
W/N the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violation of various Canons and Rules of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes. While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a
free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so
far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must “insist on being permitted to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice.”
In the present case, the publication of a statement by the faculty of the
UP College of Law regarding the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme
Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public
knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations.
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than
objective comments except to discredit the Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Court’s honesty, integrity and competence. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not
controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a
resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law
professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and au thority of this
Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice.
The Court further reminded the respondent law professors “of their lawyerly duty, under
Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court
and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on
pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the
same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.”
 RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA

FACTS:

Atty. Noel S. Sorreda expressed his frustrations over the unfavorable outcome of and the manner
by which the Court resolved the cases filed by him. Atty. Sorreda wrote a letter addressed to the
Chief Justice, denouncing the Court, as follows:

• Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the manner the Court comported itself in the aforesaid case is
totally execrable and atrocious, entirely unworthy of the majesty and office of the highest
tribunal of the land. It is the action not of men of reason or those who believe in the rule
of law, but rather of bullies and tyrants from whom 'might is right. I say, shame on the
High Court, for shoving down a hapless suitor's throat a ruling which, from all
appearances, it could not justify.

The Court, in an en banc Resolution required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he should not be
properly disciplined for degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme Court by using vile,
offensive, intemperate and contemptuous derogatory language against it. Again, Atty. Sorreda
disparaged the Court with intemperate, insulting, offensive and derogatory language, such as:
• something has got to be seriously and terribly wrong with the country's justice system
• what is happening to the justice system in this country, mr. chief justice?

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Sorreda is guilty both of contempt of court and violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility amounting to gross misconduct as an officer of the court and
member of the Bar

HELD:
Yes. Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the co urt or to
bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose.
On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a
violation of the lawyer's oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. If a
pleading containing derogatory, offensive and malicious statements is submitted in the same
court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt, equivalent as it is to a
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. Direct contempt is punishable summarily.
Atty Sorreda's conduct likewise violated the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motive not supported by the record or having
no materiality to the case.
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his client's
genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as
the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law.
Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, is entitled to criticize the rulings
of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed with error. But, this does
not give him the unbridled license to insult and malign the Court and bring it into disrepute.
Against such an assault, the Court is duty-bound 'to act to preserve its honor and dignity - and to
safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice, to which his client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought
to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. The use of intemperate language
and unkind ascription can hardly be justified nor can it have a place in the dignity of judicial
forum. Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and constructive
criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice.
 BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA vs. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ

Facts:
A complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Judge Maceda of the
RTC for allegedly falsifying his Certificate of Service by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases
which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been
determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner
knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have
been submitted for decision. The petitioner moves to have his case referred to the SC. He
contends, among others, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over his case and investigation of
the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision
over all inferior courts.

Issue:

Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to investigate a criminal
complaint against a judge for alleged falsification of Certification of Service in the absence of an
administrative action.

Held:
No. In the absence of any administrative action taken against Maceda by the Supreme
Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and
its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest MTC clerk. It is only the
SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of the govt may
intrude. Thus, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from
their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to the Supreme Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted
within the scope of their administrative duties. In the case at bar, the Ombudsman should first
refer the matter of Maceda’s certificates of service to the Supreme Court.
 THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. UY TENG PIAO

Facts:
Uy Teng Piao was ordered by the CFI Manila to pay sum of money in favor of PNB.
However, he failed to comply and so the sheriff sold in a public auction of his mortgaged
properties to PNB.
Subsequently, PNB obtained a waiver of his right to redeem the 2nd parcel of land before
selling it to another. After selling both properties, and crediting the sum of 11,300 PHP to Uy Teng
Piao, PNB brought the present action before the court to revive the judgment for the rest of the
balance. Uy Teng Piao opposed and argued that there was an agreement of condonation of the
remaining balance between PNB and him, which is why he agreed to sign the waiver. CFI ruled in
favor of him and so the appeal. In reversing its previous decision, the Court held that Uy Teng
Piao failed to substantiate his claim of an agreement. Plus, one of the attorneys of PNB testified
that Uy Teng Piao only waived his right because a friend of his was willing to pay the land.

Issue:

Whether or not lawyers shall avoid being a witness for a client.

Held:
Yes. With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to observe that
although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney
in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary,
and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case.

Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:

When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the
attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other
counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in
behalf of his client.