SI&FD
SI&FD
SI&FD
Every project is an opportunity to produce something new, to make a real difference. The firm can introduce
change, increase productivity, enhance its capabilities or of a client or build new relationships. What commonly
goes wrong? No communication tools, unclear or poorly communicated goals, no agreed milestones, inaccurate
staffing, missing deadlines, surprises, inconsistency from project to project. Consistently following these seven
key steps can directly improve the operations, profitability and sanity.
(2) Permanent and Irreversible Commitment of funds: Capital expenditure decisions result in commitment of
funds on long term basis. Once a project is taken up and investment is made, it is not usually possible to reverse
the decision. The reversal will be at the cost of heavy loss.
(3) Long-term impact on profitability: The Capital expenditure decisions will shape the future revenue streams
and the profitability of operations.
(4) Growth and Expansion: Business firms grow, expand diversity and acquire stature in the industry through
their capital budgeting activities. The success of mobilization and deployment of funds determines the future of
a firm.
(5) Cost over runs: If not meticulously implemented, delay in completion of projects will automatically result
in excess costs and heavy losses.
(6) Alternatives: Limited funds at the disposal of a firm have to be deployed in the most profitable of the
alternative projects. The elimination process is a difficult one.
(7) Multiplicity of variables: Large number of factors affects the decisions on capital expenditure. The make
the ‘capital expenditure decisions’ the most difficult to make.
(8) Top Management Activity: The metamorphic impact of capital expenditure decisions automatically thrusts
them on the top management. Only senior managerial personnel can take these decisions and bear responsibility
for them.
2.6.4.1 Accounting Rate of Return Method (Or) Average Rate of Return Method (A.R.R)
This method takes into account the total earnings expected from an investment proposal over its full life time.
The method is called Accounting rate of return method because it uses the accounting concept of profit i.e.,
income after depreciation and tax as the criterion for calculation of return. It should be noted that pay-back
period method and also the discounted cash flow methods make use of ‘cash inflows’ of projects, whereas
A.R.R. method is based on ‘profit’.
2.6.4.1.1 Steps in the use of A.R.R. method
(a) Accounting rate of return is calculated separately for each of the projects under consideration (Method of
computing is explained later).
(b) Different projects are ranked in the order of rate of earnings.
(c) If there is no cut-off rate, projects with higher A.R.R. are accepted over those with lower rates. The
availability of investible funds may limit the acceptable rate of return.
(d) A cut-off rate may be determined and all the projects with a lesser rate of return than the cut-off rate are
rejected outright. The cut-off rate is usually based on the cost of capital of the firm i.e., the rate at which funds
can be raised.
(e) Projects with higher rate of return than the cut-off rate are acceptable projects. Based on the availability of
funds, projects with the highest rates of return are taken up first and then the others in order of their respective
rates of return.
2.6.4.1.2 Computation of Accounting or Average Rate of Return There are three variations of the accounting
rate of return
(a). Total income method (or) Return per unit of investment methods Here, the total income, after
depreciation and tax, over the life time of a project is shown as a percentage of net investment in the project
(Original cost – scrap value)
Alternative (iv) above is more logical and popular method of ascertaining average investment, for the following
reasons.
(1) Assuming straight line method of depreciation, average investment for the entire life of the asset is 50% of
its original cost, less scrap value.
(2) The working capital needed to operate the asset will always be tied up during the full life time of the asset.
(3) The scrap value is reduced initially to ascertain depreciation rate. But the scrap value is realized only at the
end, tying up the amount of scrap value through the life time of the asset.
It should be noted that computation of accounting rate of return is a difficult process due to the alternative
methods available. Whichever method is adopted, by a firm, the same method should be consistently used so
that all the investment proposals are assessed on a uniform basis.
2.6.4.1.4 Disadvantages
(1) Like pay-back period method, this method also ignores the time value of money and treats all incomes
received, whether in the first year or last year, alike.
(2) Reliability of A.R.R. method is affected due to the various concepts of investment. Different rates can be
obtained, using different interpretations of the meaning of ‘investment’.
(3) By considering profit as the criterion, ‘cash flow’ aspect of projects is not properly assessed.
(4) It is not useful to assess projects where investment is made in two or more instalments, at different times.
Due to the complications in calculating ‘Investment’ and other shortcomings, accounting or average rate of
return method is not very popular in modern capital budgeting.
2.6.5 Non Traditional Methods (or) Modern Methods (or) Discounted Cash Flow Methods (D.C.F.)
These methods, together, are called ‘Present Value Methods’ or ‘Time Adjusted methods’. They are based upon
the technique of ‘Discounted Cash Flow (D.C.F.)’. They recognize the importance of ‘Time Value of money’.
2.6.5.1 Time Value of Money
This is an important concept which demarcates D.C.F. methods of Capital Budgeting from the traditional
methods. The essence of the concept is that money received earlier is more valuable than that received later.
The estimated future cash inflows and outflows of a project should not be treated at their face value ignoring
their ‘Timing’. Income expected at the end of the first year of a project is definitely more valuable than the
income which may be earned in the 8th year of a project. There are two reasons for assigning higher value to
earlier incomes. These reasons are like foundations for the concept of ‘Time Value of Money’.
(a) Interest Aspect: - Cash inflows received earlier can be invested elsewhere or even in banks and further
income can be earned on them. Thus, the ‘Compounding benefit’ makes earlier cash inflows more valuable.
(b) Uncertainty Aspect: - Cash inflows expected in earlier years may be deemed more probable to materialize
than those of the later years. The more distant in the future an income is the more uncertain and hazy or
nebulous it becomes.
In general, ‘D.C.F.’ Technique provides quantitative, systematic and reliable shape to the concept of ‘Time
Value of Money’. The basic defect of traditional methods, from the point of view of investment analysis is that
they neglect the ‘Time Value of Money’. The discounted cash flow technique rectifies the defect of traditional
methods by bringing all the future cash flows to the common parameter of ‘present value’. The present value
methods are increasingly becoming popular in capital expenditure decisions due to their scientific basis and
accuracy.
2.6.5.2.2 Demerits
(1) Compared to traditional methods it is complicated to understand and operate.
(2) Comparison of projects with unequal life times may be misleading because the amount of N.P.V. alone is
considered in these methods without any weightage for the time span.
(3) Comparing different projects with different amounts of investments becomes difficult in this method.
Generally, N.P.V. method is highly preferable to decide about a particular project whether to accept or reject.
2.6.5.3 Profitability Index (P.I.) (or) Excess Present value Index Method:
The profitability index is also called ‘Benefits cost Ratio’ Though this is treated as a separate method due to the
importance of results obtained by its usages, it is only a refinement of the N.P.V. method. It shows the
relationship between P.V. of cash inflows and P.V. of cash outflows.
Formula: Profitability Index (P.I.) (or) Benefit cost ratio (B/C) = Present value of future cash inflows/ Present
value of future cash outflows
2.6.5.4.4 Demerits
1. It is complicated method and may lead to cumbersome calculations.
2. The underlying assumption of I.R.R. that the earnings are reinvested at I.R.R. for the remaining life of the
project is not a justifiable assumption. From this point of view, N.P.V. and P.I. which assume reinvestment at
cost of capital rate are better.
3. The results obtained through NPV or PI methods may differ from that obtained through I.R.R. depending on
the size, life and timings of the cash flows.
7.3 RETURNS
There are many different methods for calculating portfolio returns. A traditional method has been using
quarterly or monthly money-weighted returns. A money-weighted return calculated over a period such as a
month or a quarter assumes that the rate of return over that period is constant. As portfolio returns actually
fluctuate daily, money-weighted returns may only provide an approximation to a portfolio’s actual return.
These errors happen because of cash flows during the measurement period. The size of the errors depends on
three variables: the size of the cash flows, the timing of the cash flows within the measurement period, and the
volatility of the portfolio. A more accurate method for calculating portfolio returns is to use the true time-
weighted method. This entails revaluing the portfolio on every date where a cash flow takes place (perhaps
even every day), and then compounding together the daily returns.
7.4 ATTRIBUTION
Performance Attribution explains the active performance (i.e. the benchmark-relative performance) of a
portfolio. For example, a particular portfolio might be benchmarked against the S&P 500 index. If the
benchmark return over some period was 5%, and the portfolio return was 8%, this would leave an active return
of 3% to be explained. This 3% active return represents the component of the portfolio’s return that was
generated by the investment manager (rather than by the benchmark). There are different models for
performance attribution, corresponding to different investment processes. For example, one simple model
explains the active return in “bottom up” terms, as the result of stock selection only. On the other hand, sector
attribution explains the active return in terms of both sector bets (for example, an overweight position in
Materials, and an underweight position in Financials), and also stock selection within each sector (for example,
choosing to hold more of the portfolio in one bank than another.
7.13. DIVERSIFICATION
Diversification in finance is a risk management technique, related to hedging, that mixes a wide variety of
investments within a portfolio. Because the fluctuations of a single security have less impact on a diverse
portfolio, diversification minimizes the risk from any one investment. A simple example of diversification is
the following: On a particular island the entire economy consists of two companies: one that sells umbrellas and
another that sells sunscreen. If a portfolio is completely invested in the company that sells umbrellas, it will
have strong performance during the rainy season, but poor performance when the weather is sunny. The reverse
occurs if the portfolio is only invested in the sunscreen company, the alternative investment: the portfolio will
be high performance when the sun is out, but will tank when clouds roll in. To minimize the weather-dependent
risk in the example portfolio, the investment should be split between the companies. With this diversified
portfolio, returns are decent no matter the weather, rather than alternating between excellent and terrible.
There are three primary strategies used in improving diversification: Spread the portfolio among multiple
investment vehicles, such as stocks, mutual funds, bonds, and cash. Vary the risk in the securities. A portfolio
can also be diversified into different mutual fund investment strategies, including growth funds, balanced funds,
index funds, small cap, and large cap funds. When a portfolio includes investments with varied risk levels, large
losses in one area are offset by other areas. The investor should vary his securities by industry, or by geography.
This will minimize the impact of industry- or location-specific risks. The example portfolio above was
diversified by investing in both umbrellas and sunscreen. Another practical application of this kind of
diversification is mixing investments between domestic and international funds. By choosing funds in many
countries, events within any one country’s economy have less effect on the overall portfolio. Diversification
reduces the risk of a portfolio, and consequently it can reduce the returns. However, since diversification
reduces the risk of an entire portfolio being diminished by single investment’s loss, it is referred to as “the only
free lunch in finance
7.13.1. Horizontal Diversification
Horizontal diversification is when a portfolio is diversified between same-type investments. It can be a broad
diversification (like investing in several NASDAQ companies) or more narrowed (investing in several stocks of
the same branch or sector). In the example above, the move to invest in both umbrellas and sunscreen is an
example of horizontal diversification. As usual, the broader the diversification the lower the risk from any one
investment.
Absorption
Absorption is a combination of two or more companies into an existing company. All companies except one
lose their identity in a merger through absorption.
An example of this type of merger is the absorption of Tata Fertilisers Ltd. (TFL) by Tata Chemicals Ltd.
(TCL), an acquiring company (a buyer), survived after merger while TFL, an acquired company (a seller),
ceased to exist. TFL transferred its assets, liabilities and shares to TCL. Under the scheme of merger, TFL
shareholders were offered 17 shares of TCL (market value per share being Rs.114) for every 100 shares of TFL
held by them.
Consolidation
Consolidation is a combination of two or more companies into new company. In this form of merger, all
companies are legally dissolved and a new entity is created. In a consolidation, the acquired company transfers
its assets, liabilities and shares to the new company for cash or exchange of shares. In a narrow sense, the terms
amalgamation and consolidation are sometime used interchangeably. An example of consolidation is the merger
or amalgamation of Hindustan Computers Ltd., Hindustan Instruments Ltd., Indian Software Company Ltd.,
and Indian Reprographics Ltd. in 1986 to an entirely new company called HCL Ltd.
Acquisition
A fundamental characteristic of merger (either through absorption or consolidation) is that the acquiring or
amalgamated company (existing or new) takes over the ownership of other company and combines its
operations with its own operations. Acquisition may be defined as an act of acquiring effective control over
assets or management of a company by another company without any combination of businesses or
companies.
A substantial acquisition occurs when an acquiring firm acquires substantial quantity of shares or voting
rights of the target company. Thus, in an acquisition, two or more companies may remain independent, separate
legal entity, but there may be change in control of companies. An acquirer may be a company or persons acting
in concert that act together for the purpose of substantial acquisition of shares or voting rights or gaining control
over the target company.
Takeover: Generally speaking take over means acquisition. A takeover occurs when the acquiring firm takes
over the control of the target firm. An acquisition or take-over does not necessarily entail full, legal control. A
company can have effective control over another company by holding minority ownership. Under the
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, take over means acquisition of not less than 25 percent of the
voting power in a company. Section 372 of the Companies Act defines the limit of a company’s investment in
the shares of another company. If a company wants to invest in more than 10 percent of the subscribed capital
of another company, it has to be approved in the shareholders general meeting and also by the central
government. The investment in shares of other companies in excess of 10 percent of the subscribed capital can
result into their takeovers.
Takeover vs. acquisition Sometimes, a distinction between takeover and acquisition is made. The term
takeover is understood to connote hostility. When an acquisition is a ‘forced’ or ‘unwilling’ acquisition, it is
called a takeover. In an unwilling acquisition, the management of “target” company would oppose a move of
being taken over. When managements of acquiring and target companies mutually and willingly agree for the
takeover, it is called acquisition or friendly takeover. An example of acquisition is the acquisition of controlling
interest (45 percent shares) of Universal Luggage Manufacturing Company Ltd. by Blow Plast Ltd. Similarly,
Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., a leading manufacturer of jeeps and tractors acquired a 26 percent equity stake in
Allwyn Nissan Ltd. Yet another example is the acquisition of 28 percent equity of International Data
Management (IDM) by HCL Ltd. In recent years, due to the liberalisation of financial sector as well as opening
up of the economy for foreign investors, a number of hostile take-overs could be witnessed in India. Examples
include takeover of Shaw Wallace, Dunlop, Mather and Platt and Hindustan Dorr Oliver by Chhabrias, Ashok
Leyland by Hindujas and ICICM, Harrison Malayalam and Spencers by Goenkas. Both Hindujas and Chhabrias
are non-resident Indian (NRIs).
Holding Company A company can obtain the status of a holding company by acquiring shares of other
companies. A holding company is a company that holds more than half of the nominal value of the equity
capital of another company, called a subsidiary company, or controls the composition of its Board of Directors.
Both holding and subsidiary companies retain their separate legal entities and maintain their separate books of
accounts. Unlike some countries like USA or UK, India it is not legally required to consolidate accounts of
holding and subsidiary companies.
9.4. FORMS OF MERGER There are three major types of mergers:
Horizontal merger: This is a combination of two or more firms in similar type of production, distribution or
area of business. Examples would be combining of two book publishers or two luggage manufacturing
companies to gain dominant market share.
Vertical merger: This is a combination of two or more firms involved in different stages of production or
distribution. For example, joining of a TV manufacturing (assembling) company and a TV marketing company
or the joining of a spinning company and a weaving company. Vertical merger may take the form of forward or
backward merger. When a company combines with the supplier of material, it is called backward merger and
when it combines with the customer, it is known as forward merger.
Conglomerate merger: This is a combination of firms engaged in unrelated lines of business activity. A
typical example is merging of different businesses like manufacturing of cement products, fertilizers products,
electronic products, insurance investment and advertising agencies. Voltas Ltd. is an example of a
conglomerate company.
9.11.1 Planning
A merger or acquisition should be seen in the over-all strategic perspective of the acquiring company. It should
fit with the strategy and must contribute in the growth of the company and in creating value for shareholders
and other stakeholders. The acquiring company must assess its strengths and weaknesses and likely
opportunities arising from the acquisitions in order to identify the target companies. The acquiring firm should
review its objective of acquisition in the context of its strengths and weaknesses, and corporate goals. This will
help in indicating the product-market strategies that are appropriate for the company. It will also force the firm
to identify business units that should be dropped and those that should be added or strengthened. The following
two steps are involved in the planning process:
Acquisition strategy: The Company should have a well articulated acquisition strategy. It should be growth-
oriented. It should spell out the objectives of acquisition and other growth options. The acquisition strategy
should be formulated after an assessment of the company’s own strengths and weaknesses.
Assessment approaches and criteria: The Company should spell out its approach to acquisitions and the
criteria to be applied to acquisitions. The planning of acquisition will require the analysis of industry-specific
and the firm specific information. The acquiring firm will need industry data on market growth, nature of
competition, ease of entry, capital and labour intensity, degree of regulation etc. About the target firm the
information needed will include the quality of management, market share, size, capital structure, profitability,
production and marketing capabilities etc.
13 FINANCIAL DISTRESS
Financial distress is defined as a condition where obligations are not met or are met with difficulty. It is a
situation where a firm’s operating cash flows are not sufficient to satisfy current obligations and the firm is
forced to take corrective action. Financial distress may lead a firm to default on a contract, and it may involve
financial restructuring between the firm, its creditors, and its equity investors. The three terms default,
bankruptcy and financial distress can be distinguished as follows
Default – Failure to meet an interest payment, or – Violation of debt agreement
Bankruptcy – Formal procedure for working out default – Does not automatically follow from default.
Financial Distress – Includes default and bankruptcy, but also – Threat of default or bankruptcy and its effect
on the company – Defined to capture the costs and benefits of using large amounts of debt finance A major
disadvantage for a firm taking on higher levels of debt is that it increases the risk of financial distress, and
ultimately liquidation. This may have detrimental effect on both the equity and debt holders.
13.1 TYPES OF BUSINESS FAILURE
A firm may fail because its returns are negative or low. A firm that consistently reports operating losses will
probably experience a decline in market value. If the firm fails to earn a return that is greater than its cost of
capital, it can be viewed as having failed. Negative or low returns, unless remedied, are likely to result
eventually in one of the following more serious types of failure.
A second type of failure, technical insolvency, occurs when a firm is unable to pay its liabilities as they come
due. When a firm is technically insolvent, its assets are still greater than its liabilities, but it is confronted with a
liquidity crisis. If some of its assets can be converted into cash within a reasonable period, the company may be
able to escape complete failure. If not, the result is the third and most serious type of failure, bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy occurs when a firm’s liabilities exceed the fair market value of its assets. A bankrupt firm has a
negative stockholders’ equity. This means that the claims of creditors cannot be satisfied unless the firm’s
assets can be liquidated for more than their book value. Although bankruptcy is an obvious form of failure, the
courts treat technical insolvency and bankruptcy in the same way. They are both considered to indicate the
financial failure of the firm.
13.2 MAJOR CAUSES OF BUSINESS FAILURE
The primary cause of business failure is mismanagement, which accounts for more than 50 percent of all cases.
Numerous specific managerial faults can cause the firm to fail. Overexpansion, poor financial actions, an
ineffective sales force, and high production costs can all singly or in combination cause failure. For example,
poor financial actions include bad capital budgeting decisions (based on unrealistic sales and cost forecasts,
failure to identify all relevant cash flows, or failure to assess risk properly), poor financial evaluation of the
firm’s strategic plans prior to making financial commitments, inadequate or nonexistent cash flow planning,
and failure to control receivables and inventories. Because all major corporate decisions are eventually
measured in terms of money value, the financial manager may play a key role in avoiding or causing a business
failure. It is his or her duty to monitor the firm’s financial pulse.
Economic activity – especially economic downturns – can contribute to the failure of a firm. If the economy
goes into a recession, sale may decrease abruptly, leaving the firm with high fixed costs and insufficient
revenues to cover them. In addition, rapid rises in interest rates just prior to a recession can further contribute to
cash flow problems and make it more difficult for the firm to obtain and maintain needed financing. During the
early 1990s, a number of major business failures such as those of Olympia and York (real estate) America,
West Airlines, and South mark Corporation (convenience stores) resulted from over expansion and the
recessionary economy. A final cause of business failure is corporate maturity. Firms, like individuals, do not
have infinite lives. Like a product, a firm goes through the stages of birth, growth, maturity, and eventual
decline. The firm’s management should attempt to prolong the growth stage through research, new products,
and mergers. Once the firm has matured and has begun to decline, it should seek to be acquired by another firm
or liquidate before it fails. Effective management planning should help the firm to postpone decline and
ultimate failure.
13.3 THE BUSINESS FAILURE RECORD
How widespread is business failure in the United States? In Table 13-2, we see that a fairly large number of
businesses fail each year, although the failures in any one year are not a large percentage of the total business
population.
It is interesting to note that the failure rate per 10,000 business population fluctuates with the state of the
economy, the average liability per failure has tended to increase over time, at least into the early 1990s.
This is due primarily to inflation, but it also reflects the fact that some very large firms have failed in recent
years. Although bankruptcy is more frequent among smaller firms, it is clear from Table 13- 3 that large firms
are not immune. However, some firms might be too big or too important to be allowed to fail. The mergers or
governmental intervention are often used as an alternative to outright failure and liquidation. The decision to
give federal aid to Chrysler (now a part of Daimler Chrysler AG) in the 1980s is an excellent illustration. Also,
in recent years federal regulators have arranged the absorption of many “problem” financial institutions by
financially sound institutions. In addition, several U.S. government agencies, principally the Defence
Department, were able to bail out Lockheed when it otherwise would have failed, and the “short gun marriage”
of Douglas Aircraft and Mc Donnel was designed to prevent Douglas’s failure. Another example of
intervention is that of Merrill Lynch taking over the brokerage firm Good body & company, which would
otherwise have gone bankrupt and would have frozen the accounts of its 225,000 customers while a
bankruptcy settlement was being worked out. Good body’s failure would have panicked investors across the
country, so New York Stock Exchange member firms put up $30 million as an inducement to get Merrill Lynch
to keep Good body from folding. Similar instances in other industries could also be cited. Why do government
and industry seek to avoid failure among larger firms? There are many reasons. In the case of banks, the main
reason is to prevent an erosion of confidence and a consequent run on the banks. With Lockheed and Douglas,
the Defence Department wanted not only to maintain viable suppliers but also to avoid disrupting local
communities. With Chrysler, the government wanted to preserve jobs as well as a competitor in the U.S. auto
industry. Even when the public interest is not at stake, the fact that bankruptcy is a very expensive process gives
private industry strong incentives to avoid outright bankruptcy. The costs and complexities of a formal
Bankruptcy are discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter, after we examine some less formal and less
expensive procedures.
13.4 CONSEQUENCES OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS
The risk of incurring the costs of financial distress has a negative effect on a firm’s value which offsets the
value of tax relief of increasing debt levels.
These costs become considerable with very high gearing. Even if a firm manages to avoid liquidation its
relationships with suppliers, customers, employees and creditors may be seriously damaged.
Suppliers providing goods and services on credit are likely to reduce the generosity of their terms, or even
stop supplying altogether, if they believe that there is an increased chance of the firm not being in existence in a
few months’ time.
Customers may develop close relationships with their suppliers, and plan their own production on the
assumption of a continuance of that relationship. If there is any doubt about the longevity of a firm it will not be
able to secure high-quality contracts. In the consumer markets customers often need assurance that firms are
sufficiently stable to deliver on promises. In a financial distress situation, employees may become demotivated
as they sense increased job insecurity and few prospects for advancement. The best staff will start to
move to posts in safer companies. Bankers and other lenders will tend to look upon a request for further finance
from a financially distressed company with a prejudiced eye – taking a safety-first approach – and this can
continue for many years after the crisis has passed. Management find that much of their time is spent “fire
fighting” – dealing with day-today liquidity problems – and focusing on short-term cash flow rather than long-
term shareholder wealth. The indirect costs associated with financial distress can be much more significant than
the more obvious direct costs such as paying for lawyers, accountants and for refinancing programs
13.5 SOME INDICATORS OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS
As the risk of financial distress rises with the gearing ratio, shareholders (and lenders) demand an increasing
return in compensation. The important issue is at what point does the probability of financial distress so
increase the cost of equity and debt that it outweighs the benefit of the tax relief on debt?
Financial Analysis may be used to view some of the indicators of the financial distress. Important ratios to be
considered include:
Liquidity ratios Debt management ratios Asset utilization ratios
13.6 BANKRUPTCY PREDICTION MODELS
Interest in insolvency prediction has long been confined to academics, with most of the published material
restricted to business and accounting journals specializing in esoteric and complicated subjects. A possible
reason why insolvency prediction models have not gained greater use in the business community is because it
has been difficult to calculate the results.
With the wide spread use of personal computers and the internet, the utilization of an insolvency prediction
model is now practical and available to all. Now may be the time when prediction models come into their own.
Four software programs are reviewed here using five different prediction models. All of the models reviewed
here, but one, were developed using the statistical technique, step wise multiple discriminate analysis. This
statistical technique gives weights to financial ratios used to best differentiate or discriminate between failed
and successful companies. For example, 22 financial ratios were tested in developing the Altman Model (1968).
66 companies were used - 33 failed and 33 successful. The first result was a formula with 22 functions. The
function that contributed the least to discriminating between the failed and successful companies was dropped
and the statistical software was run again. This was repeated over and over each time dropping the ratio which
least contributed to discriminating between the failed and successful companies. In the case of the Altman
model, five functions remained. The software we have reviewed here are easy to operate and give quick read
outs. We have not evaluated the models compared with each other because it is impossible to say, in this kind
of review, that one model is better or more accurate than another. One of the great problems in developing and
testing prediction models is that it is very difficult to gather data on matched sets of failed and successful
companies. Some Words of Caution! All developers of prediction models warn that the technique should be
considered as just another tool of the analyst and that it is not intended to replace experienced and informed
personal evaluation. Perhaps the best use of any of these models is as a “filter” to identify companies requiring
further review or to establish a trend for a company over a number of years. If, for example, the trend for a
company over a number of years is downward then that company has problems that if caught in time, could be
corrected to allow the company to survive.
13.6.1 Altman Model (U.S. - 1968)
Edward I. Altman (1968) is the dean of insolvency predictors. He was the first person to successfully use step-
wise multiple discriminate analysis to develop a prediction model with a high degree of accuracy. Using the
sample of 66 companies, 33 failed and 33 successful, Altman’s model achieved an accuracy rate of 95.0%.
Altman’s model takes the following form -:
Z = 1.2A + 1.4B + 3.3C + 0.6D + .999E
Z < 2.675; then the firm is classified as “failed”
C = Earnings before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets
D = Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Debt
E = Sales/Total Assets
13.6.2 Springate (Canadian - 1978)
This model was developed in 1978 at S.F.U. by Gordon L.V. Springate, following procedures developed by
Altman in the U.S. Springate used step-wise multiple discriminate analysis to select four out of 19 popular
financial ratios that best distinguished between sound business and those that actually failed. The Springate
model takes the following form -:
Z = 1.03A + 3.07B + 0.66C + 0.4D
Z < 0.862; then the firm is classified as “failed”
WHERE A = Working Capital/Total Assets
B = Net Profit before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets
C = Net Profit before Taxes/Current Liabilities
D = Sales/Total Assets
This model achieved an accuracy rate of 92.5% using the 40 companies tested by Springate. Botheras (1979)
tested the Springate Model on 50 companies with an average asset size of $2.5 million and found an 88.0%
accuracy rate. Sands (1980) tested the Springate Model on 24 companies with an average asset size of $63.4
million and found an accuracy rate of 83.3%.
13.6.3 Fulmer Model (U.S. - 1984)
Fulmer (1984) used step-wise multiple discriminate analysis to evaluate 40 financial ratios applied to a sample
of 60 companies -30 failed and 30 successful. The average asset size of these firms was $455,000.
WHERE A = Working Capital/Total Assets B = Retained Earnings/Total Assets
The model takes the following form -:
H = 5.528 (V1) + 0.212 (V2) + 0.073 (V3)
+ 1.270 (V4) - 0.120 (V5) + 2.335 (V6)
+ 0.575 (V7) + 1.083 (V8) + 0.894 (V9) - 6.075
H < 0; then the firm is classified as “failed”
V3 = EBT/Equity
V4 = Cash Flow/Total Debt
V5 = Debt/Total Assets
V6 = Current Liabilities/Total Assets
V7 = Log Tangible Total Assets
V8 = Working Capital/Total Debt
V9 = Log EBIT/Interest
Fulmer reported a 98% accuracy rate in classifying the test companies one year prior to failure and an 81%
accuracy rate more than one year prior to bankruptcy.
13.6.4 Blasztk System (Canadian 1984)
This is the only business failure prediction method outlined here that was not developed using multiple
discriminate analysis. This system was developed by William Blasztk in 1984. The essence of the system is that
the financial ratios for the company to be evaluated are calculated, weighted and then compared with ratios for
average companies in that same industry as given by Dunn & Bradstreet. One of this method’s strengths is that
it does compare the company being evaluated with companies in the same industry.
13.6.5 CA - Score (Canadian 1987)
This model is recommended by the Order des compatibles agrees des Quebec (Quebec CA’s) and according to
its developer is used by over 1,000 CA’s in Quebec. This model was developed under the direction of Jean
Legault of the University of Quebec at Montreal, using step-wise multiple discriminate analysis. Thirty
financial ratios were analyzed in a sample of 173 Quebec manufacturing businesses having annual sales ranging
between $1-20 million.
WHERE V1 = Retained Earning/Total Assets
V2 = Sales/Total Assets
The model takes the following form -:
CA-Score = 4.5913 (*shareholders’ investments(1)/total assets(1)) + 4.5080 (earnings before taxes and
extraordinary items + financial expenses(1)/total assets(1)) + 0.3936 (sales(2)/total assets(2)) 2.7616
CA-Score < - 0.3; then the firm is classified as “failed”
1) Figures from previous period
2) Figures from two previous periods
* Shareholders’ investments is calculated by adding to shareholders’ equity the net debt owing to directors.
This model, as reported in Bilanas (1987), has an average reliability rate of 83% and
is restricted to evaluating manufacturing companies.
13.7 ISSUES FACING A FIRM IN FINANCIAL DISTRESS
Financial distress begins when a firm is unable to meet scheduled payments or when cash flow projections
indicate that it will soon be unable to do so. As the situation develops, these central issues arise:
1. Is the firm’s inability to meet scheduled debt payments a temporary cash flow problem, or is it a permanent
problem caused by asset values having fallen below debt obligations?
2. If the problem is a temporary one, then an agreement with creditors that gives the firm time to recover and to
satisfy everyone may be worked out. However, if basic long-run asset values have truly declined, then
economic losses have occurred. In this event, who should bear losses, and who should get whatever value
remains?
3. Is the company “worth more dead than alive”? That is, would the business be more valuable if it were
maintained and continued in operation or if it were liquidated and sold off in pieces?
4. Should the firm file for protection under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, or should it try to use informal
procedure? (Both reorganization and liquidation can be accomplished either informally or under the direction of
a bankruptcy court)
5. Who should control the firm while it is being liquidated or rehabilitated? Should the existing management be
left in charge, or should a trustee be placed in charge of operations? In the remainder of the chapter, we discuss
these questions.
13.8 WHAT HAPPENS IN FINANCIAL DISTRESS?
Financial distress does not usually result in the firm’s death.
Firms deal with distress by
Selling major assets.
Merging with another firm.
Reducing capital spending and research and development.
Issuing new securities.
Negotiating with banks and other creditors.
Exchanging debt for equity.
Filing for bankruptcy
13.9 RESPONSES TO FINANCIAL DISTRESS
Think of the two sides of the balance sheet.
Asset Restructuring:
– Selling major assets.
– Merging with another firm.
– Reducing capital spending and R&D spending.
Financial Restructuring:
– Issuing new securities.
– Negotiating with banks and other creditors.
– Exchanging debt for equity.
– Filing for bankruptcy
13.10 VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT TO SUSTAIN THE FIRM
Normally, the rationale for sustaining a firm is that it is reasonable to believe that the firm’s recovery is
feasible. By sustaining the firm, the creditor can continue to receive business from it. A number of strategies are
commonly used. An extension is an arrangement whereby the firm’s creditors receive payment in full, although
not immediately. Normally, when creditors grant an extension, they require the firm to make cash payments for
purchases until all past debts have been paid. A second arrangement, called composition, is a pro rata cash
settlement of creditor claims. Instead of receiving full payment of their claims, creditors receive only a partial
payment. A uniform percentage of each dollar owed is paid in satisfaction of each creditor’s claim. A third
arrangement is creditor control. In this case, the creditor committee may decide that the only circumstance in
which maintaining the firm is feasible, if the operating management is replaced. The Committee may then take
control of the firm and operate it until all claims have been settled. Sometimes, a plan involving some
combination of extension, composition, and creditor control will result. An example of this would be a
settlement whereby the debtor agrees to pay a total of 75 cents on the dollar in three annual instalments of 25
cents on the dollar, and the creditors agree to sell additional merchandise to the firm on 30 day terms if the
existing management is replaced by new management that is acceptable to them.
13.10.1 Voluntary Settlement Resulting in Liquidation
After the situation of the firm has been investigated by the creditor committee, the only acceptable course of
action may be liquidation of the firm. Liquidation can be carried out in two ways – privately or through the
legal procedures provided by bankruptcy law. If the debtor firm is willing to accept liquidation, legal
procedures may not be required. Generally, the avoidance of litigation enables the creditors to obtain quicker
and higher settlements. However, all the creditors must agree to a private liquidation for it to be feasible. The
objective of the voluntary liquidation process is to recover as much per dollar owed as possible. Under
voluntary liquidation, common stockholders (the firm’s true owners) cannot receive any funds until the claims
of all other parties have been satisfied. A common procedure is to have a meeting of the creditors at which they
make an assignment by passing the power to liquidate the firm’s assets to an adjustment bureau, a trade
association, or a third party, which is designated the assignee. The assignee’s job is to liquidate the assets,
obtaining the best price possible. The assignee is sometimes referred to as the trustee, because it is entrusted
with the title to the company’s assets and the responsibility to liquidate them efficiently. Once the trustee has
liquidated the assets, it distributes the recovered funds to the creditors and owners (if any funds remain for the
owners). The final action in a private liquidation is for the creditors to sign a release attesting to the satisfactory
settlement of their claims.
13.11 INFORMAL REORGANIZATION
In the case of an economically sound company whose financial difficulties appear to be temporary, creditors are
generally willing to work with the company to help it recover and re establish itself on a sound financial basis.
Such voluntary plans, commonly called workouts, usually require a restructuring of the firm’s debt, because
current cash flows are insufficient to service the existing debt. Restructuring typically involves extension and /
or composition. In an extension, creditors postpone the dates of required interest or principal payments, or both.
In a composition, creditors voluntarily reduce their fixed claims on the debtor by accepting a lower principal
amount, by reducing the interest rate on the debt, by taking equity for debt, or by some combination of these
changes. A debt restructuring begins with a meeting between the failing firm’s managers and creditors. The
creditors appoint a committee consisting of four or five of the largest creditors, plus one or two of the smaller
ones. This meeting is often arranged and conducted by an adjustment bureau associated with and run by a local
credit manager’s association. The first step is to draw up a list of creditors, with amounts of debt owed.
There are typically different classes of debt, ranging from first – mortgage holders to unsecured creditors. Next,
the company develops information showing the value of the firm under different scenarios. Typically, one
scenario is going out of business, selling off the assets, and then distributing the proceeds to the various
creditors in accordance with the priority of their claims, with any surplus going to the common stockholders.
The company may hire an appraiser to get an appraisal for the value of the firm’s property to use as basis for
this scenario. Other scenarios include continued operations, frequently with some improvements in capital
equipment, marketing, and perhaps some management changes. This information is then shared with the firm’s
bankers and other creditors. Frequently, it can be demonstrated that the firm’s debts exceed its liquidating
value, and it can also be shown that legal fees and other costs associated with a formal liquidation under federal
bankruptcy procedures would materially lower the net proceeds available to creditors. Further, it generally takes
at least a year, and often several years, to resolve matters in a formal proceeding, so the present value of the
eventual proceeds will be lower still. This information, when presented in a credible manner, often convinces
creditors that they would be better off accepting something less than the full amount of their claims rather than
holding out for the full face amount. If management and the major creditors agree that the problems
can probably be resolved, then a more formal plan is drafted and presented to all the creditors, along with the
reasons creditors should be willing to compromise on their claims. In developing the reorganization plan,
creditors prefer an extension because it promises eventual payment in full. In some cases, creditors may agree
not only to postpone the date of payment but also to subordinate existing claims to vendors who are willing to
extend new credit during the extension, perhaps in exchange for a pledge of collateral. Because of the sacrifices
involved, the creditors must have faith that the debtor firm will be able to solve its problems. In a composition,
creditors agree to reduce their claims. Typically, creditors receive cash and / or new securities that have a
combined market value that is less than the amounts owned them. The cash and securities, which might have a
value of only 10 percent of the original claim, are taken as full settlement of the original debt. Bargaining will
take place between the debtor and the creditors over the savings that result from avoiding the costs of legal
bankruptcy: administrative costs, legal fees, investigative costs, and so on. In addition to escaping such costs,
the debtor gains in that the stigma of bankruptcy may be avoided. As a result, the debtor may be induced to part
with most of the savings from avoiding formal bankruptcy. Often, the bargaining process will result in a
restructuring that involves both extension and composition. For example, the settlement may provide for a cash
payment of 25 percent of the debt immediately, plus a new note promising six future instalments of 10 percent
each, for a total payment of 85 percent. Voluntary settlements are both informal and simple, and also relatively
inexpensive because legal and administrative expenses are held to a minimum. Thus, voluntary procedures
generally result in the largest return to creditors. Although creditors do not obtain immediate payment and may
even have to accept less than is owned them, they generally recover more money, and sooner, than if the firm
were to file for bankruptcy. In recent years, one factor that has motivated some creditors, especially banks and
insurance companies, to agree to voluntary restructurings is the fact that restructurings can sometimes help
creditors avoid showing a loss. Thus, a bank that is “in trouble” with its regulators over weak capital ratios may
agree to extend further loans that are used to pay the interest on earlier loans in order to keep the bank from
having to write down the value of its earlier loans. The particular type of restructuring depends on (1) the
willingness of the regulators to go along with the process, and (2) whether the bank is likely to recover more in
the end by restructuring the debt than by forcing the borrower into bankruptcy immediately. We should point
out that informal voluntary settlements are not reserved for small firms. International Harvester (now Navistar
International) avoided formal bankruptcy proceedings by getting its creditors to agree to restructure more than
$3.5 billion of debt. Likewise, Chrysler’s creditors accepted both an extension and a composition to help it
through its bad years. The biggest problem with informal reorganizations is getting all the parties to agree to the
voluntary plan. This problem, called the holdout problem, is discussed in a later section.
13.12 INFORMAL LIQUIDATION
When it is obvious that a firm is more valuable dead than alive, informal procedures can also be used to
liquidate the firm. Assignment is an informal procedure for liquidating a firm, and it usually yields creditors a
larger amount than they would get in formal bankruptcy liquidation. However, assignments are feasible only if
the firm is small and its affairs are not too complex. An assignment calls for title to the debtor’s assets to be
transferred to a third party, known as an assignee or trustee. The assignee is instructed to liquidate the assets
through a private sale or public auction and then to distribute the proceeds among the creditors on a pro rata
basis. The assignment does not automatically discharge the debtor’s obligations. However, the debtor may have
the assignee write on the check to each creditor the requisite legal language to make endorsement of the check
acknowledgement of full settlement of the claim. Assignment has some advantages over liquidation in federal
bankruptcy courts in terms of time, legal formality, and expense.
The assignee has more flexibility in disposing of property than does a federal bankruptcy trustee, so action can
be taken sooner, before inventory becomes obsolete or machinery rusts. Also, because the assignee is often
familiar with the debtor’s business, better results may be achieved. However, an assignment does not
automatically result in a full and legal discharge of all the debtor’s liabilities, nor does it protect the creditors
against fraud. Both of these problems can be reduced by formal liquidation in bankruptcy, which we discuss in
a later section.
13.13 REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY
It might appear that most reorganizations should be handled informally because informal reorganizations are
faster and less costly than formal bankruptcy. However, two problems often arise to stymie informal
reorganization and thus force debtors into Chapter 11 bankruptcy – the common pool problem and the holdout
problem. To illustrate these problems, consider a firm that is having financial difficulties. It is worth $9 million
as a going concern (this is the present value of its expected future free cash flows) but only $7 million if it is
liquidated. The firm’s debt totals $10 million at face value – ten creditors with equal priority each have a $1
million claim. Now suppose the firm’s liquidity deteriorates to the point where it defaults on one of its loans.
The holder of that loan has the contractual right to accelerate the claim, which means the creditor can
foreclose on the loan and demand payment of the entire balance. Further, since most debt agreements have
cross –default provisions, defaulting on one loan effectively places all loans in default. The firm’s market value
is less than the $10 million face value of debt, regardless of whether it remains in business or liquidates.
Therefore, it would be impossible to pay off all of the creditors in full. However, the creditors in total would be
better off if the firm I not shut down, because they can recover $9 million if the firm remains in business but
only $7 million if it is liquidated. The problem here, which is called the common pool problem, is that, in the
absence of protection under the bankruptcy Act, individual creditors would have an incentive to foreclose on
the firm even though it is worth more as an ongoing concern. An individual creditor would have the incentive to
foreclose because it could then force the firm to liquidate a portion of its assets to pay off that particular
creditor’s $I million claim in full. The payment to that creditor would probably require the liquidation of vital
assets, which might cause a shutdown of the firm and thus lead to liquidation. Therefore, the value of the
remaining creditor’s claims would decline. Of course, all the creditors would recognize the gains to be had from
this strategy, so they would storm the debtor with foreclosure notices. Even those creditors who understand the
merits of keeping the firm alive would be forced to foreclose, because the foreclosures of the other creditors
would reduce the payoff to those who do not. In our hypothetical example, if seven creditors foreclosed and
forced liquidation, they would be paid in full, and the remaining three creditors would receive nothing. With
many creditors, as soon as a firm defaults on one loan, there is the potential for a disruptive flood of
foreclosures that would make the creditors collectively worse off. In our example, the creditors would lose $9 -
$7 = $2 million in value if a flood of foreclosures were to force the firm to liquidate. If the firm had only one
creditor, say, a single bank loan, the common pool problem would not exist. If a bank has loaned the company
$10 million, it would not force liquidation to get $7 million when it could keep the firm alive and eventually
realize $9 million. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act provides a solution to the common pool problem through
its automatic stay provision. An automatic stay, which is forced on all creditors in a bankruptcy, limits the
ability of creditors of foreclose to collect their individual claims. However, the creditors can collectively
foreclose on the debtor and force liquidation. While bankruptcy gives the firm a chance to work out its
problems without the threat of creditor foreclosure, management does not have a completely free reign over the
firm’s assets. First, bankruptcy law requires the debtor firm to request permission from the court to take many
actions, and the law also gives creditors the right to petition the bankruptcy court to block almost any action the
firm might take while in bankruptcy. Second, fraudulent conveyance statutes, which are part of debtor-creditor
law, protect creditors from unjustified transfers of property by a firm in financial distress. To illustrate
fraudulent conveyance, suppose a holding company is contemplating bankruptcy protection for one of its
subsidiaries. The holding company might be tempted to sell some or all of the subsidiary’s assets to itself (the
parent company) for less than the true market value of its assets and the amount paid and the loss would be
borne primarily by the subsidiary’s creditors. Such a transaction would be voided by the courts as a fraudulent
conveyance. Note also that transactions that favour one creditor at the expense of another can be voided under
the same law. For example, a transaction in which an asset is sold and the proceeds are used to pay one creditor
in full at the expense of other creditors could be voided. Thus, fraudulent conveyance laws also protect
creditors from each other. The second problem that the bankruptcy law mitigates is the holdout problem. To
illustrate this problem, consider again our example with ten creditors owed $1 million each but with assets
worth only $9 million. The goal of the firm is to avoid Liquidation by remedying the default. In an informal
workout, this would require a reorganization plan that is agreed to by each of the ten creditors.
Suppose the firm offers each creditor new debt with a face value of $850,000 in exchange for the old
$1,000,000 face value debt. If each of the creditors accepted the offer, the firm could be successfully
reorganized. The reorganization would leave the equity holders with some value – the market value of the
equity would be $9,000,000 – 10($850,000) = $500,000. Further, the creditors would have claims worth $8.5
million, much more than the $7 million value of their claims in liquidation. Although such an exchange offer
seems to benefit all parties, it might not be accepted by the creditors. Here’s why: Suppose seven of the ten
creditors tender their bonds; thus seven creditors each now have claims with a face value of $850,000 each, or
$5,950,000 in total, while the three creditors that did not tender their bonds each still have a claim with a face
value of $1 million. The total face value of the debt at this pointy is $8,950,000 which is less than the $9
million value of the firm. In this situation, the three holdout creditors would receive the full face value of their
debt. However, this probably would not happen, because (1) all of the creditors would be sophisticated enough
to realize this could happen, and (2) each creditor would want to be one of the three holdouts that gets paid in
full. Thus, it is likely that none of the creditors would accept the offer. Thus, the holdout problem makes it
difficult to restructure the firm’s debts. Again, if the firm had a single creditor, there would be no holdout
problem. The holdout problem is mitigated in bankruptcy proceedings by the bankruptcy court’s ability to lump
creditors into classes. Each class is considered to have accepted a reorganization plan if two-thirds of the
amount of debt and one-half the number of claimants vote for the plan, and the plan will be approved by the
court if it is deemed to be “fair and equitable” to the dissenting parties. This procedure, in which the court
mandates a reorganization plan in spite of dissent, is called a cram down, because the court crams the plan
down the throats of the dissenters. The ability of the court to force acceptance of a reorganization plan greatly
reduces the incentive for creditors to hold out. Thus, in our example, if the reorganization plan offered each
creditor a new claim worth $850,000 in
face value, along with information that each creditor would probably receive only &700,000 under the
liquidation alternative, it would have a good chance of success. It is easier for a firm with few creditors to
informally reorganize than it is for a firm with many creditors. A study examined 169 publicly traded firms that
experienced severe financial distress from 1978 to 1987. About half of the firms reorganized without filing for
bankruptcy, while the other half were forced to reorganize in bankruptcy. The firms that reorganized without
filing for bankruptcy owed most of their debt to a few banks, and they had fewer creditors. Generally, bank debt
can be reorganized outside of bankruptcy, but a publicly traded bond issue held by thousands of individual
bondholders makes reorganization difficult. Filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 has several other features
that help the bankrupt firm:
1. Interest and principal payments, including interest on delayed payments, may be delayed without penalty
until a reorganization plan is approved, and the plan itself may call for even further delays. This permits cash
generated from operations to be used to sustain operations rather than be paid to creditors.
2. The firm is permitted to issue debtor-in-possession (DIP0 financing). DIP financing enhances the ability of
the firm to borrow funds for short-term liquidity purposes, because such as loans are, under the law, senior to
all previous unsecured debt.
3. The debtor firm’s managers are given the exclusive right for 120 days after filing for bankruptcy protection
to submit a reorganization plan, plus another 60 days to obtain agreement on the plan from the affected parties.
The court may also extend these dates. After management’s first right to submit a plan has expired, any party
to the proceedings may propose its own reorganization plan. Under the early bankruptcy laws, most formal
reorganization plans were guided by the absolute priority doctrine. This doctrine holds that creditors should
be compensated for their claims in a rigid hierarchical order, and that senior claims must be paid in full
before junior claims can receive even a dime. If there was any chance that a delay would lead to losses by
senior creditors, then the firm would be shut down and liquidated. However, an alternative position, the relative
priority doctrine, holds that more flexibility should be allowed in reorganization, and that a balanced
consideration should be given to all claimants. The current law represents a movement away from absolute
priority toward relative priority. The primary role of the bankruptcy court in reorganization is to determine the
fairness and the feasibility of the proposed plan of reorganization. The basis doctrine of fairness states that
claims must be recognized in the order of their legal and contractual priority. Feasibility means that there is a
reasonable chance that the reorganized company will be viable. Carrying out the concepts of fairness and
feasibility in reorganization involves the following steps:1. Future sales must be estimated.
2. Operating conditions must be analyzed so that future earnings and cash flows can be predicted.
3. The appropriate capitalization rate must be determined.
4. This capitalization rate must then be applied to the estimated cash flows to obtain an estimate of the
company’s value.
5. An appropriate capital structure for the company after it emerges from Chapter 11 must be determined.
6. The reorganized firm’s securities must be allocated to the various claimants in a fair and equitable manner.
The primary test of feasibility in reorganization is whether the fixed charges after reorganization will be
adequately covered by earnings. Adequate coverage generally requires an improvement in earnings, a reduction
of fixed charges, or both. Among the actions that must generally be taken are the following:
1. Debt maturities are usually lengthened, interest rates may be lowered, and some debt is usually converted
into equity.
2. When the quality of management has been substandard, a new team must be given control of the company.
3. If inventories have become obsolete or depleted, they must be replaced.
4. Sometimes the plant and equipment must be modernized before the firm can operate and compete
successfully.
5. Reorganization may also require an improvement in production, marketing, advertising, and other functions.
6. It is sometimes necessary to develop new products or markets to enable the firm to move from areas where
economic trends are poor into areas with more potential for growth.
These actions usually require at least some new money, so most reorganization plans include new investors
who are willing to put up new capital. It might appear that stockholders have very little to say in a bankruptcy
situation where the firm’s assets are worth less than the face value of its debt. Under the absolute priority rule,
stockholders in such a situation should get nothing of value under a reorganization plan. In fact, however,
stockholders may be able to extract some of the firm’s value. This occurs because (1) stockholders generally
continue to control the firm during the bankruptcy proceedings, (2) stockholders have the first right to file a
reorganization plan, and (3) for the creditors, developing a plan taking it through the courts would be expensive
and time consuming, Given this situation, creditors may support a plan under which they are not paid off in full
and where the old stockholders will control the reorganized company just because the creditors want to get the
problem behind them and to get some money in the near future.
13.14 PREPACKAGED BANKRUPTCIES
In recent years, a new type of reorganization that combines the advantages of both the informal workout and
formal chapter 11 reorganization has become popular. This new hybrid is called a pre-packaged bankruptcy, or
pre-pack. In an informal workout, debtor negotiates a restructuring with its creditors. Even though complex
workouts typically involve corporate officers, lenders, lawyers, and investment bankers, workouts are still less
expensive and less damaging to reputations than are chapter 11 reorganizations. In a prepackaged bankruptcy,
the debtor firm gets all, or most of, the creditors to agree to the reorganization plan prior to filing for
bankruptcy. Then, a reorganization plan is filed along with, or shortly after, the bankruptcy petition. If enough
creditors have signed on before the filing, a cram down can be used to bring reluctant creditors along. A logical
question arises: Why would a firm that can arrange an informal reorganization want to file for bankruptcy? The
three primary advantages of a prepackaged bankruptcy are (1) reduction of the holdout problem, (2) preserving
creditors’ claims, and (3) taxes. Perhaps the biggest benefit of a prepackaged bankruptcy is the reduction of the
holdout problem-a bankruptcy filing permits a cream down that would otherwise be impossible. By eliminating
holdouts, bankruptcy forces all creditors in each class to participate on a pro rata basis, which preserves the
relative value of all claimants. Also, filing for formal bankruptcy can at times have positive tax implications.
First, in an informal reorganization in which the debt holders trade debt for equity, if the original equity holders
end up with less than 50 percent ownership, the company loses its accumulated tax losses. If formal bankruptcy,
the firm may get to keep its loss carry forwards. Second, in a workout, when debt worth, say, $1,000, is
exchanged for debt worth, say, $500, the reduction in debt of $500 is considered to be taxable income to the
corporation. However, if this same situation occurs in a chapter 11 reorganization, the difference is not treated
as taxable income.
13.15 REORGANIZATION TIME AND EXPENSE
The time, expense, and headaches involved in reorganization are almost beyond comprehension. Even in $2 to
$3 million bankruptcies, many people and groups are involved: lawyers representing the company, the U.S.
Bankruptcy Trustee, each class of secured creditor, the general creditors as a group, tax authorities, and the
stockholders if they are upset with management. There are time limits within which things are supposed to be
done, but the process generally takes at least a year and probably much longer. The company must be given
time to file its plan, and creditor groups must be given time to study and seek clarifications to it and then file
counter plans to which the company must respond. Also, different creditor classes often disagree among
themselves as to how much each class should receive, and hearings must be held to resolve such conflicts.
Management may want to remain in business, while some well-secured creditors may want the company
liquidated as quickly as possible.
Often, some party’s plan will involve selling the business to another concern. Obviously, it can take months to
seek out and negotiate with potential merger candidates. The typical bankruptcy case takes about two years
from the time the company files for protection under chapter 11 until the final reorganization plan is approved
or rejected. While all of this is going on, the company’s business suffers. Sales certainly won’t be helped, key
employees may leave, and the remaining employees will be worrying about their jobs rather than concentrating
on their work. Further, management will be spending much of its time on the bankruptcy rather than running
the business, and it won’t be able to take any significant action without court approval, which requires filing a
formal petition with the court and giving all parties involved a chance to respond. Even if its operations do not
suffer, the company’s assets will surely be reduced by its own legal fees and the required court and trustee
costs. Good bankruptcy lawyers charge from $200 to $400 per hour, depending on the location, so those costs
are not trivial. The creditors will also be incurring legal costs. Indeed, the sound of all of those meters ticking at
$200 or so an hour in a slow-moving hearing can be deafening. Note that creditors also lose the time value of
their money. A creditor with a $100,000 claim and a 10 percent opportunity cost who ends up getting $50,000
after two years would have been better off settling for $41,500 initially. When the creditor’s legal fees,
executive time, and general aggravation are taken into account, it might make sense to settle for $20,000 or
$25,000. Both the troubled company and its creditors know the drawbacks of formal bankruptcy or their
lawyers will inform them. Armed with knowledge of how bankruptcy works, management may be in a strong
position to persuade creditors to accept a workout which on the surface appears to be unfair and unreasonable.
Or, if a Chapter 11 case has already begun, creditors may at some point agree to settle just to stop the bleeding.
One final point should be made before closing this section. In most reorganization plans, creditors with claims
of less than $1,000 are paid off in full. Paying off these “nuisance claims” does not cost much money, and it
saves time and gets votes to support the plan.
13.16 LIQUIDATION IN BANKRUPTCY
If a company “too far gone” to be recognized, then it must be liquidated. Liquidation should occur when the
business is worth more dead than alive, or when the possibility of resorting it to financial health is remote and
the creditors are exposed to a high risk of greater loss if operations are continued. Earlier we discussed
assignment, which is an informal liquidation procedure. Now we consider liquidation in bankruptcy, which is
carried out under the jurisdiction of a federal bankruptcy court. Chapter 7 of the federal Bankruptcy reform Act
deals with liquidation. It (10s provides safeguards against fraud by the debtor, (2) provides for an equitable
distribution of the debtors assets among the creditors (3) allows insolvent debtors to discharge all their
obligations and thus be able to start new business unhampered by the burdens of prior debt. However, formal
Liquidations is time consuming and costly, and it extinguishes the business. The distribution of assets in
liquidation under chapter 7 is governed by the following priority of claims:
1. Past – due property taxes.
2. Secured creditors, who are entitled to the proceeds of the sale of specific property pledged for a lien or a
mortgage. If the proceeds from the sale of the pledged property do not fully satisfy a secured creditors claim the
remaining balance is treated as a general creditor claim ( see Item 10 below) 12
3. Legal fees and other expenses to administer and operate the bankrupt firm. These costs include legal fees
incurred in trying to reorganize.
4. Expenses incurred after an involuntary case has begun but before a trustee is appointed.
5. Wages due workers if earned within three months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. The
amount of wages is limited to $2,000 per employee.
6. Claims for unpaid contributions to employee pension plans that should have been paid within six months
prior to filing. These claims, plus wages in Item 5, may not exceed the $2,000 per- wage-earner limit.
7. Unsecured claims for customer deposits. These claims are limited to a maximum of $900 per individual.
8. Taxes due to federal, state, country and other government agencies.
9. Unfunded pension plan liabilities. These liabilities have a claim above that of the general creditors for an
amount up to 30 percent of the common and preferred equity, and any remaining unfunded pension claims rank
with the general creditors.
10. General, or unsecured, creditors. Holders of trade credit, unsecured loans, the unsatisfied portion of
secured loans, and debenture bonds are classified as general creditors. Holders of subordinated debt also fall
into this category, but they must turn over required amounts to the senior debt.
11. Preferred stockholders. These stockholders can receive an amount up to the par value of their stock.
12. Common stockholders. These stockholders receive any remaining funds.
13.17 OTHER MOTIVATIONS FOR BANKRUPTCY
Normally, bankruptcy proceedings do not commence until a company has become so financially weak that it
cannot meet its current obligations. However, bankruptcy law also permits a company to file for bankruptcy if
its financial forecasts indicate that a continuation of current conditions would lead to insolvency. This provision
was used by Continental Airlines in 1993 to break its union contract and hence lower its labour costs.
Continental demonstrated to a bankruptcy court that operations under the then current union contract would
lead to insolvency in a matter of months. The company then filed a reorganization plan that included major
changes in all its contracts, including its union contract. Continental then reorganized as a non union carrier,
and that reorganization turned the company from a money loser into a money maker. Congress changed the law
after the Continental affair to make it more difficult for companies to use bankruptcy to break union contracts,
but this case did set the precedent for using bankruptcy to help head off financial problems as well as to help
solve existing ones. Bankruptcy law has also been used to hasten settlements in major product liability suits.
The Manville asbestos and A.H. Robins Dalkon Shield cases are examples. In both situations, the companies
were being bombarded by thousands of lawsuits, and the very existence of such huge contingent liabilities
made normal operations impossible. Further, in both cases it was relatively easy to prove (1) that if the
plaintiffs won, the companies would be unable to be the full amount of the claims, (2) that a larger amount of
funds would be available to the claimants if the companies continued to operate rather than liquidate, (3) that
continued operations were possible only if the suits were brought to a conclusion, and (4) that a timely
resolution of all the suits was impossible because of their vast number and variety. The bankruptcy statutes
were used to consolidate all the suits and to reach settlement under which the plaintiffs obtained more money
than they otherwise would have received, and the companies were able to stay in business. The stockholders did
poorly under these plans, because most of the companies’ future cash flows were assigned to the plaintiffs, but
even so, the stockholders probably fared better than they would have if the suits had been concluded through
the jury system.