REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution
dated 09 December 2020 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 200652 (Government Service Insurance System v. Ma.

Clara R. Calleja). - This is an appeal from the June 30, 2011 Decision I and
February 16, 2012 Resolution2 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA), which
reversed the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC)
and ordered the Govermnent Service Insurance System (GSIS) to grant
respondent's claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 (P.D.
626).

Lorenzo B. Calleja (Lorenzo) was employed with the Municipality of

Pamplona, Camarines Sur from January 1, 1987 until his death on March 15,
2007. He was Municipal Budget Officer, but was also required to perform the
functions of the Human Resource Management Officer. 3 His assistant took a
rehabilitation leave from October 26, 2006 to January 12, 2007, which caused
Lorenzo to carry out not only his own duties and responsibilities, but also
those of his assistant. 4

On February 7, 2007, Lorenzo was admitted to the Mother Seton

Hospital. He was discharged on February 17, 2007 with the diagnosis of Acute
Coronary Syndrome, Unstable Angina with Congestive Heart Failure and
underlying Pneumonia. 5

On March 5, 2007, Lorenzo lost consciousness. He was rushed to St.

John Hospital in Naga City, then transferred again to Mother Seton Hospital.
1
Rollo, pp. 26-36; penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting, with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De
Leon and Mario V. Lopez (now a member of this Court), concurring.
2
Id. at 37-38.
3
Id. at 39.
4
CA rollo, p. 3 I.
5
Rollo, p. 40.

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 Resolution 2 G.R. No. 200652

He was diagnosed with Cerebrovascular Disease, Thrombotic left

Frontopareital, left Basal Ganglia, right Temporopareital and Cerebellar area
with Hydrocephalus, Hospital Acquired Pneumonia, HASCVD. On March
15, 2007, Lorenzo died, at the age of 57, ofUncal Herniation, Cardio-embolic
Cerebrovascular Disease, and Hypertensive Heart Disease. 6

Consequently, Lorenzo's wife, Ma. Clara R. Calleja (respondent) , filed

with GSIS a claim for death benefits under P.D. 626, as amended, otherwise
known as the Employees' Compensation Law. She asserted that her husband' s
death was caused by occupational diseases brought about by stress due to his
heavy workload. 7

On July 17, 2007, respondent received a letter from GSIS, dated July 6,
2007, denying her claim on the ground that there is no sufficient evidence to
show that the cause of Lorenzo's death was work-related. 8 ·Respondent
submitted additional documents to GSIS, but the latter was unmoved, holding
that Lorenzo's smoking history constituted negligence on his part, which is
sufficient reason to deny the claim for death benefits. 9

For this reason, respondent filed an appeal with the ECC. On July 31,
2008, the ECC rendered a Decision 10 dismissing the claim. Thus:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and

the claim for EC Death benefits is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

so ORDERED. 11

The ECC held that the records failed to show a causal relationship
between Lorenzo's illness and his occupation. The stroke was not shown to
be due to trauma to the head or that it was precipitated by undue or
extraordinary strain at work, which are the conditions that make the illness
compensable under P.D. No. 626, as amended. 12

Moreover, the ECC held that medical science already established that
the risk of developing a stroke increases with older age, cardiovascular disease
and other conditions linked with atherosclerosis. In this case, the presence of
atherosclerotic changes is demonstrated by Lorenzo's x-ray result. He had

6
Id. at 28.
7
Id.
8
CA rollo, p. 35.
9
Rollo, pp. 28-29.
10
Id. at 39-45.
11
1d.at45.
12
Id. at 43.

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 Resolution 3 G.R. No. 200652

also been recently treated for a hea1i condition. 13 Lorenzo' s cigarette smoking
also caused or contributed to the development of his cerebrovascular disease.
Hence, there was no reason to deviate from the GSIS decision denying
respondent's claim. 14

Undaunted, respondent elevated the case to the CA which, on June 30,

2011, rendered the assailed Decision granting the appeal. Thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

July 3 1, 2008 of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC
Case No. GM-18095-0512-08 (Lorenzo B. Calleja-Deceased), entitled
"Clara R. Calleja, Appellant versus Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), Municipality of Pamplona, Camarines Sur, Respondent, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Government Service Insurance
System is ordered to grant the claim for the death benefits of Lorenzo
Calleja under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. No costs.

SO ORDERED. 15 (Citation omitted)

In essence, the CA held that under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules
on Employees' Compensation, cerebrovascular accidents and essential
hypertension are occupational and compensable diseases, and the resulting
death entitles beneficiaries of employees to benefits under P.D. 626. Since
Lorenzo died of Uncal Herniation, Cerebrovascular Disease-Cardioembolic
and Hypertensive Heart Disease, his disease is compensable and respondent
is entitled to death benefits. 16

The CA Decision prompted GSIS to bring the present appeal. It argues

that Lorenzo's ailment is not compensable under P.D. 626, as amended. Under
Annex "A," Item No. 19 of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation, cerebrovascular disease or accident is compensable if all of
the following conditions are satisfied:

a) There must be a history, which must be proved, of trauma at work

(to the head especially) due to unusual and extraordinary physical
or mental strain or event, or undue exposure to noxious gases in
industry;

b) There must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion

in the course of the employment and the worker's collapse;

13 ld.
14
Id. at 44.
15
Id. at 35.
16
Id. at 30-31.
I
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 Resolution 4 G.R. No. 200652

c) If the trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage,

the injury may be considered as arising from work. 17 (emphases
omitted)

According to GSIS, not all of the above conditions were satisfied.

Particularly, it was not shown that Lorenzo had a history of trauma at work
especially to the head due to unusual and extraordinary physical or mental
strain or event. Hence, Lorenzo' s death is not compensable. 18

Moreover, under Item No. 29 of Annex "A," hypertension is considered

compensable if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys,
heart, eyes and brain resulting in permanent disability. GSIS asserts that the
documents presented by respondent failed to show that Lorenzo 's body organs
were impaired and that such impairment was caused by hypertension. 19

GSIS further asseLis that if the illness is not listed as occupational

disease, proof must be shown that it was caused by employment and that the
risk of contracting the disease was increased by the working conditions. Here,
respondent made bare assertions that Lorenzo' s work was heavy and stressful
and concluded that the illness was caused by his employment. However, she
did not present proof to supp01i her argument. 20 There was also negligence on
the paii of Lorenzo arising from his being a smoker. Cigarette smoking caused
or contributed to the development of his cerebrovascular disease. In any event,
findings of fact of administrative officials are accorded by the comis not only
respect but, most often, finality. 2 1

We deny the petition.

The Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation provide that for a

sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness
must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the
Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied. Otherwise, proof must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the working
conditions. Cerebrovascular disease and hypertension, which have been
identified as among the causes of death of Lorenzo, are both compensable
since they are listed as occupational diseases under Nos. 19 and 29,
respectively, of Annex "A" of the said Rules.

17
Id. at 15-16.
18 Id. at 16.
i9 Id.
20
Id. at 17.
21
Id. at 18.

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 Resolution 5 G.R. No. 200652

It must be emphasized at the outset that the degree of proof required to

validate the concurrence of the conditions in the Rules is merely substantial
evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable work-
connection and not direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on
which the workmen's claim is based is probable. 22

In this case, the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Pamplona, Camarines

Sur, issued a Certification23 stating that Lorenzo was handling two positions
during his lifetime, those of the Municipal Budget Officer and the Human
Resource Management Officer. On top of these, his assistant took a leave of
absence for almost tlu·ee months, which led him to carry out both his duties
and responsibilities and those of his assistant. Lorenzo's Daily Time Record24
showed that he worked for three consecutive weekends in January and
February before he was hospitalized on February 7, 2007. In this respect, We
uphold the ruling of the CA that the two positions held by Lorenzo
undoubtedly caused unusual and extraordinary physical and mental strain on
him. His job demanded a lot of mental work, making him susceptible to stress
and fatigue that could weaken his resistance and cause hypertension, which in
turn could trigger a cerebrovascular accident or stroke. The chain of causation
that led to said illness and caused his immediate and untimely death is too
obvious to be disregarded. 25

Respondent was able to establish a reasonable connection between

Lorenzo's work and the diseases he suffered. At this point, We underscore
that direct evidence showing that work caused the illness is not necessary.
Rather, the test of proof in compensation proceedings is probability, and not
the ultimate degree of certainty. Strict rules of evidence need not be observed
as the primordial and paramount consideration should be the employee' s
welfare. 26

In the pet1t10n, GSIS cites the finding of the ECC that there was
negligence on the part of Lorenzo, comprised of his cigarette smoking, which
caused or contributed to the development of his cerebrovascular disease. 27
GSIS refers to the "medical findings" quoted in the ECC Decision which
pertinently states that "[c]igarette smoking is an important cause of
cerebrovascular disease and accounts for an estimated [18%] of 150,000 stroke
deaths that occur every year in the United States. Studies have shown

22 Government Service insurance System v. Baul, 529 Phil. 390, 396 (2006).
23
CA rollo, p. 3 I.
24 Id. at 33-34.
25
Rollo, p. 32.
26
Villamar v. Employees ' Compensation Co111111ission. 800 Phil. 269, 282(2016).
27
Rollo, pp. 17- 18.

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Resolution 6 G.R. No. 200652

increased risk of stroke among smokers compared to non-smokers."28

The Court cannot subscribe to the position taken by GSIS. It singled out
the presence of smoking as a factor that rendered Lorenzo's ailments, otherwise
listed as occupational, to be non-compensable. To be sure, while smoking is
undeniably among the causes of cerebrovascular disease, it is not the sole
cause thereof. This is evident not only from the facts of the case, but even in
the " medical findings" quoted above. Cerebrovascular disease may be caused
by other factors such as working and living under stressful conditions. Thus,
the peremptory presumption that Lorenzo's smoking habit caused his illness
and resulting death, without more, cannot suffice to bar respondent's claim for
disability benefits. 29

The implication, if GSIS' position will be sustained, is that smoking by

itself will be a factor that will bar compensability, even for diseases that are
listed as occupational in character. 30 This will defeat the purpose of P.D. 626.
To be certain, in determining compensability, the nature and characteristics of
the job are as important as raw medical findings and a claimant' s personal and
social history . This is a basic legal reality in workers' compensation law. 3 1

As a final argument, GSIS invokes the Court to respect the factual

findings of administrative agencies who have acquired expertise on account
of their specialized jurisdiction on employees' compensation matters. 32
However, this rule is not absolute and admits of exceptions. Some of the well-
settled ones are: when factual findings of the administrative agencies
concerned are conflicting or contrary with those of the CA, 33 when the
findings are grounded on speculation, and when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken. 34 The ECC and GSIS are admittedly the government
entities with jurisdiction over the administration of workers ' disability
compensation and can thus claim primacy in these areas. However, they
cannot claim infallibility, particularly when they use wrong or limited
considerations in determining compensability. 35 While these agencies possess
the requisite expertise and knowledge in compensation cases, their decision
in respondent 's case is nonetheless erroneous and contrary to law. The Court
cannot uphold these findings.36

28
lei. at 18.
29
GSIS v. De Caslro, 610 Phil. 568, 584 (2009).
30
Id. at 581.
31
Id.at 582.
32
Rollo, pp. 18-1 9.
33 Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc. v. Heirs of Gana/, 8 10 Phi l. 956, 961 (20 17).
34
NGEJ Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Filipinas Pa/moil Plan/a /ion Inc., 697 Phil. 433, 444 (2012).
35
GSIS v. De Castr o, supra note 27 at 582.
36
GSIS v. Calwnpiano, 748 Phil. 743, 759(20 14).

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 Resolution 7 G.R. No. 200652

In arriving at its conclusion, the Court is guided by the principle that

any doubt on the issue of employees' compensation should be interpreted in
favor of the employee, considering that P .D. 626 is a social legislation. A
humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself under
the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to
legitimate appeals of disabled public servants, or that all doubts to the right to
compensation must be resolved in favo r of the employee or laborer. Verily,
the policy is to extend the applicability of the law on employees'
compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits
thereunder. 37

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The June 30, 2011 Decision

and February 16, 2012 Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP. No. 105836 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. (Lopez, J, no part due to prior action in the Court of

Appeals; Gaerlan, J, designated additional member per Raffle dated October
29, 2020; Rosario, J, designated additional member per Special Order No.
2797 elated November 5, 2020)"

By authority of the Court:

INOTUAZON
erk of Court ,,, ,12 G.
2 6 JAN 2lJL1 r

- JUDGMENT DIVISION (x)

Supreme Court, Manila
LEGAL SERVICE GROUP (reg)
Counsel for Petitioner PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (x)
GSIS Headquarters, Financial Center LIBRARY SERVICES (x)
Reclamation Area, 1308 Pasay City [For uploading pursuant to A.M . No. 12-7-SC]

ATTY. EUSEBIO JOSEF. ALVINA (reg) OFFICE OF THE CHI EF ATTORNEY (x)
Counsel for Respondent OFFICE OF THE REPORTER (x)
Ground Floor, Prieto Building Supreme Court, Manila
Panganiban Dr., Naga City
4400 Camarines Sur COURT OF APPEALS (x)
Ma. Orosa Street
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION (reg) Ermita, 1000 Manila
th
4 th & 5 Floor, ECC Building CA-G.R. SP No. 105836
355 Sen. Gil J. Puyat Avenue
Makati City Please 1101(/j, tlte Court of any change in your address.
(ECC Case No. GM-18095-0512-08) GR200652. I 2/09/2020(277)URES

n Id. at 753.

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