Abenion V Shell Petroleum

5/23/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 816

G.R. No. 200749. February 6, 2017.*

CECILIO ABENION, CANDELARIO S. CASIMSIMAN,
ERNESTO R. OLLEGUE, JIMMY S. SALE, PONCIANO T.
TINAMBACAN, DOMINADOR S. SELDURA, ANDRES P.
ATCHIVARA, ANTONIO M. CABULANG, TIRSO S. LIMBAGA,
RAMON J. LIPER, JUANITO P. GODOY, ANIANO J. DEJESICA,
JULITO I. JUNASA, SOFRONIO S. DUMBASE, APOLINAR S.
ESTAÑO, BEN S. ARIETA, VICENTE G. RIVAS, GLORIA S.
OMOÑA, MARINA L. TABUDLONG, ERNESTO S. PASCUAL,
NEMIA S. ROSIL, ROMEL M. RUEDAS, RODOLFO N.
ARTUBAL, VICTOR C. HONOR,
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.

550
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Abenion vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017998f7cdcfd5568b7b000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/43
FRUTO M. PEDRAL, JOVENTINO J. CADELIÑA,

CONSTANCIO S. COLE, TITO A. CAPUYAN, JUANITO D.
LEGASPINO, ALFREDO V. ACAS, CLOTILDO D. ALBASIN,
CERILO B. BALANGKIG, ISMAEL M. BAUTISTA, JAGDON D.
CASTAÑEDO, PRIMITIVO A. BANGAHO, SR., LEONARDO B.
DUMAN-AG, RODRIGO G. PATRIS, SR., LITO B. LABAJO,
EUTEMIO C. ESTOSE, RUSTOM T. TIO, BONIFACIO A.
PUROL, OSIAS A. ASURIZ, SR., RUDOLFO P. MACALISANG,
OSCAR G. MARTINEZ, VICTOR D. SINGSON, JR., ERNESTO
F. FATALLO, ARNOLD S. BASTIDA, ALFREDO L. MORALES,
BIBIANO M. PANUDA, DEOGENES L. LAORDEN,
CONCORDIO D. OCLARIT, VEVENCIO S. BASTIDA,
NEMESIO D. OCLARIT, EGLESIO M. OCLARIT, SR.,
CIPRIANO V. ABAT, ROMEO C. LUMAGOD, HERMINIGILDO
P. EXCLAMADO, SILVESTRE D. EDILLON, PONCIANO B.
GEROLAGA, LEOPOLDO D. ACEBEDO, EDUARDO B.
ARCAMO, BENEDICTO P. DELA CRUZ, and CRISOSTOMO M.
DIANA, SR., petitioners, vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, respondent.

G.R. No. 208725. February 6, 2017.*

CECILIO ABENION, BEN S. ARIETA, ERNESTO F. FATALLO,
PONCIANO B. GEROLAGA, EGLESIO M. OCLARIT, NEMESIO
D. OCLARIT, RODOLFO D. MACALISANG, FRUTO M.
PEDRAL, OSIAS A. ASURIZ, SR., LEONARDO B. DUMAN-AG,
VICTOR C. HONOR, PRIMITIVO M. BONGAHON, WILLIAM J.
BADE, HERMINIGILDO P. EXCLAMADO, WARLITO E.
BORRES, EDITO B. CAYANONG, EXEQUIEL M. LAPE,
ANTONIO A. JAROY, BUENAVENTURA A. BONONO,
MAXIMO A. JUANILLO, BENEDICTO P. DELA CERNA,
WILFREDO J. ESPAÑOLA, MARIANO S. CRISANTO,
RICARDO Q. DAVID, REYNALDO O. ICOY, REYNALDO Y.
RICO, CRISOSTOMO M. DIANA, LEONILO H. GALAN,
ALFREDO V. ACAS, DIOGENES B. LAORDEN, ROMY A.
MANANQUIL, POLICARPIO R. BORJA, GA-

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VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 551

BRIEL B. DIEZ, CONCORDIO D. OCLARIT, VENANCIO S.

BASTIDA, ALFREDO L. MORALES, BIBIANO M. PANUDA,
CIPRIANO V. ABAT, COMWELL R. LAYAGUIN, MUNDA P.

CONOIMON, MAXIMO J. GAGABE, VICTOR D. SINGSON,
OSCAR G. MARTINEZ, RODRIGO G. PATRIS, SR., EUTEMIO
C. ESTOSE, JETO B. LABAJO, SILVESTRE D. EDILLON,
LEOPOLDO D. ACEBEDO, EDUARDO B. ARCAMO, ARNOLD
S. BASTIDA and VICENTE G. RIVAS, petitioners, vs. PILIPINAS
SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION and BANCO DE ORO
UNIBANK, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; There is no forum

shopping where in one petition a party questions the order granting the
motion for execution pending appeal and at the same time questions the
decision on the merits in a regular appeal before the appellate court.—
Clearly, a judgment in one action would not necessarily affect the other. A
nullification of the ruling to allow an execution pending appeal, for
example, would not necessarily negate the right of the petitioners to still
eventually claim for damages under the injunction bonds. This is consistent
with the Court’s ruling in Manacop v. Equitable PCIBank, 468 SCRA 256
(2005), as it differentiated between the two actions and the implication of
the pendency of both on the prohibition against forum shopping. The Court
explained: Certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending
appeal where the same is not founded upon good reasons. The fact that the
losing party had also appealed from the judgment does not bar the certiorari
proceedings, as the appeal could not be an adequate remedy from such
premature execution. Additionally, there is no forum shopping where in one
petition a party questions the order granting the motion for execution
pending appeal and at the same time questions the decision on the merits in
a regular appeal before the appellate court. After all, the merits of the main
case are not to be determined in a petition questioning execution pending
appeal and vice versa.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Motion for Reconsideration;
Jurisprudence provides the settled exceptions to the general rule that sets as
a condition the filing of a motion for reconsideration before resorting to a
special civil action for certiorari.—In any case, even granting that the issue
was timely raised by the petitioners in

552

their Comment, jurisprudence provides the settled exceptions to the

general rule that sets as a condition the filing of an MR before resorting to a
special civil action for certiorari. Among these exceptions are the
following: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo
has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or
are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where
there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or
the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, [an MR] would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived
of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings
was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i)
where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
Same; Civil Procedure; Execution Pending Appeal; An execution
pending appeal is deemed an exception to the general rule.—It bears
emphasis that an execution pending appeal is deemed an exception to the
general rule, which allows an execution as a matter of right only in any of
the following instances: (a) when the judgment has become final and
executory; (b) when the judgment debtor has renounced or waived his right
of appeal; (c) when the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal
having been filed; or (d) when, having been filed, the appeal has been
resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of
origin. The Rules of Court allows executions pending appeal under the
conditions set forth in Section 2 of Rule 39 thereof, which reads: Sec. 2.
Discretionary execution.— (a) Execution of a judgment or final order
pending appeal.—On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case
and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as
the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in
its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the
expiration of the period to appeal. After the trial court has lost jurisdiction,
the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the

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VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 553

appellate court. Discretionary execution may only issue upon good

reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
Same; Same; Same; The grant of execution pending appeal must be
firmly grounded on the existence of “good reasons,” which consist of
compelling circumstances that justify immediate execution lest the judgment
becomes illusory.—In now declaring that the execution pending appeal was
unsupported by sufficient grounds, the Court restates the rule that the trial
court’s discretion in allowing execution pending appeal must be strictly
construed. Its grant must be firmly grounded on the existence of “good
reasons,” which consist of compelling circumstances that justify immediate
execution lest the judgment becomes illusory. “The circumstances must be
superior, outweighing the injury or damages that might result should the
losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would make
of execution pending appeal, instead of an instrument of solicitude and
justice, a tool of oppression and inequity.” The sufficiency of “good
reasons” depends upon the circumstances of the case and the parties thereto.
Conditions that are personal to one party, for example, may be insufficient
to justify an execution pending appeal that would affect all parties to the
case and the property that is the subject thereof. Thus, in Florendo, et al. v.
Paramount Insurance Corp., 610 SCRA 377 (2010), the Court ruled that the
execution pending appeal, which was supposedly justified by the old age
and life-threatening ailments of merely one of several parties to the case,
was unsupported by special reasons.
Same; Same; Intervention; Intervention, as a remedy, is not a right but
a matter that is left to the court’s discretion.—The CA correctly rejected the
petitioners’ plea to intervene in PSPC’s injunction case against BDO.
Intervention, as a remedy, is not a right but a matter that is left to the court’s
discretion. In all cases, legal interest in the matter in litigation is an
indispensable requirement among intervenors. As the Court ruled in Office
of the Ombudsman v. Sison, 612 SCRA 702 (2010), “[t]he interest, which
entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such
direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by
the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.” The herein petitioners
failed to establish their interest in the funds of PSPC. The latter was neither
their creditor nor one that could be held liable for the obligations of Shell
Oil under the subject compromise agreement. The

554

petitioners did not stand to lose by the injunction that was prayed for
before the trial court.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decisions and resolutions

of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Oswaldo A. Macadangdang for petitioners.
Martinez, Vergara, Gonzales & Serrano Law Offices for

respondent BDO Unibank.
Cruz, Marcelo & Tenefrancia for Pilipinas Shell Petroleum,
Inc.
REYES, J.:

This resolves the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 200749 and G.R. No. 208725, filed by the
petitioners to assail the rulings of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 114420 and C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 120638,
respectively.
G.R. No. 200749 was filed by its petitioners against Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC). Particularly assailed in the
petition are the CA Decision1 dated January 31, 2011 and
Resolution2 dated February 3, 2012 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 114420, in
relation to the CA’s reversal and setting aside of the Order3 dated
June 8, 2010 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 62, which granted an execution pending appeal
against the injunction bonds posted by PSPC in Civil Case No. 09-
749..
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, with Associate Justices

Ramon R. Garcia and Manuel M. Barrios, concurring; Rollo (G.R. No. 200749), Vol.
I, pp. 105-124.
2 Id., at pp. 158-172.
3 Issued by Judge Selma Palacio Alaras; id., Vol. III, pp. 1151-1156.

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VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 555

G.R. No. 208725 was filed by its petitioners against respondents

PSPC and Banco de Oro Unibank (BDO) to assail the CA Decision4
dated August 31, 2012 and Resolution5 dated August 8, 2013 in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 120638. The CA reversed via the challenged
issuances the RTC Makati, Branch 59’s Orders dated January 31,
2011,6 May 27, 2011,7 July 21, 2011,8 October 5, 20119 and
November 15, 201110 in Civil Case No. 09-941. Essentially, the RTC
orders allowed the petitioners’ intervention in the civil case and
then eventually ordered the complaint’s dismissal.

The Facts

Civil Case No. 09-749 and Civil Case No. 09-941, both instituted
by PSPC with the RTC Makati, are offshoots of Civil Case No. 95-
45, which is a complaint11 for damages filed in 1996 with the RTC
of Panabo City, Davao Del Norte, Branch 4 by 1,843 plaintiffs12
(plaintiffs) that included herein petitioners, against Shell Oil
Company (Shell Oil), among several other defendants.13 The
defendants in Civil Case No. 95-45 were all foreign corporations
that manufactured, sold, distributed, used and/or made available in
commerce nemato-
_______________
4 Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam, with Associate Justices Romeo F.

Barza and Edwin D. Sorongon, concurring; Rollo (G.R. No. 208725), Vol. I, pp. 70-
110.
5 Id., at pp. 130-133.
6 Id., at p. 134.
7 Id., at p. 135.
8 Id., at pp. 136-138.
9 Id., at pp. 139-144.
10 Id., at p. 145.
11 Id., at pp. 224-269.
12 Id., at pp. 238-269.
13 Other defendants were Dow Chemical Company, Occidental Chemical
Corporation, Standard Fruit Company, Chiquita Brands, Inc., Chiquita Brands
International, Inc., Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co.

556

cides against the parasite nematode prevalent in banana plantations.

These nematocides contained the chemical dibromochloropropane
(DBCP). The plaintiffs identified themselves as a group of banana
plantation workers who were exposed to DBCP, which caused their
sterility and other serious and permanent health injuries.14
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 95-45, Shell Oil entered
into a compromise agreement15 with its claimants for a total
consideration of US$17 Million, a copy of which was submitted for
approval by Shell Oil to RTC Panabo City. The copy submitted to
the court did not bear the agreement’s exhibits which, according to
Shell Oil, indicated the list of 26,328 “worldwide plaintiffs”
intended to be covered by the compromise.16 The agreement, sans

the list, was approved by RTC Panabo City in its Omnibus Order
dated December 20, 2002.17 In view of the compromise, the
complaint against Shell Oil was dismissed in an Order18 dated
March 24, 2003.
Civil Case No. 95-45 was later transferred to the RTC of Davao
City, Branch 14. The plaintiffs again sought recourse from the RTC
Davao City, via a Motion for Execution (Re: Enforcement of
Judgment Based on Compromise Agreement between plaintiffs and
Shell Oil), after Shell Oil allegedly failed to fully satisfy its
obligations to them under the compromise agreement. For its
defense, Shell Oil argued that it had fully complied with the terms of
the compromise agreement. The approved compromise and amount
stated therein covered 26,328 agricultural workers from across the
globe who filed various cases against it and not just the 1,843
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-45. When it resolved the motion, the
RTC Davao City ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and thus is-
_______________
14 Rollo (G.R. No. 208725), Vol. I, pp. 230-231.

15 Compromise Settlement, Indemnity and Hold Harmless Agreement; id., at pp.
270-287.
16 Id., at p. 304.
17 Id., at pp. 288-290.
18 Id., at pp. 288-296.

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VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 557

sued the Order19 dated July 17, 2009 that directed the issuance of a
writ of execution to be enforced against Shell Oil, its subsidiaries,
affiliates, controlled and related entities, successors or assigns. The
order’s dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, let Writ of Execution

issue based on the Compromise Agreement between the herein plaintiffs and
the defendant [Shell Oil] dated March 15, 2007 — to be ENFORCED as
well, on the defendant [Shell Oil’s] subsidiaries, affiliates, controlled and
related entities, successors or assigns pursuant to the common provision
under Clause 28 of the said 1997 Compromise Agreement which are doing
business in the Philippines or registered in the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
SO ORDERED.20

Although not a defendant in Civil Case No. 95-45, PSPC was
brought into the case when the plaintiffs filed with the RTC Davao
City an ex parte motion alleging that PSPC was one of Shell Oil’s
“subsidiaries, affiliates, controlled and related entities or assigns,” in
relation to Clause 28 of the compromise agreement, which reads:

28. Affiliates and Successors
This Agreement and the rights, obligations, and covenants
contained herein shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the
Plaintiffs and Settling Defendants and their respective parent
corporations, subsidiaries, affiliates, controlled and related entities,
successors, and assigns.21
_______________

20 Id., at p. 344.
21 Rollo (G.R. No. 208725), Vol. I, p. 279.

558

Acting on the motion, an Amended Order22 for the issuance of an

alias writ of execution was issued by the RTC Davao City on
August 11, 2009. Pursuant thereto, an Alias Writ of Execution23
addressed to Sheriff Roberto C. Esguerra (Sheriff Esguerra), Sheriff
IV of RTC Davao City, was issued on August 12, 2009, citing PSPC
as one of the parties against whom the writ of execution may be
implemented, to wit:
x x x WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, let Writ of

Execution issued based on the Compromise Agreement between the herein
plaintiffs and the defendant [SHELL OIL] dated MARCH 15, 2007 to be
ENFORCED as well, on subsidiaries, affiliates, controlled and related
entities or assigns pursuant to the common provision under clause 28 of the
said 1997 Compromise Agreement which are doing business in the
Philippines or registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
which subsidiaries or entities as earlier stated, namely: [PSPC], SHELL
GAS EASTERN, INC., SHELL GAS TRADING (Asia Pacific), INC.,
SHELL CHEMICALS PHILIPPINES INC., SHELL RENEWABLES
PHILIPPINES CORP., THE SHELL COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES,LIMITED and SHELL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION,
B.V. (SPEX) in the total judgment debt of U.S. $17 MILLION, are
solidarily liable if in the event the principal defendant [SHELL OIL] shall
fail to pay or becomes insolvent.24 (Emphasis and underscoring in the
original)

Sheriff Esguerra sought to implement the alias writ against PSPC
and, thus, issued a notice of garnishment25 to cover the latter’s
accounts with BDO. Feeling aggrieved, PSPC thereafter filed with
the RTC Makati two actions, specifically Civil Case No. 09-749 and
Civil Case No. 09-941, on
_______________

23 Id., at pp. 257-260.
24 Id., at pp. 258-259.
25 Id., at p. 261.

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VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 559

issues pertinent to the issuances and actions of RTC Davao City.

A. Petition for Prohibition against
Sheriff Esguerra and the plaintiffs
(Civil Case No. 09-749)

PSPC filed with the RTC Makati the petition26 for prohibition
with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of
preliminary injunction (WPI) docketed as Civil Case No. 09-749
against Sheriff Esguerra and the plaintiffs, as it sought to prohibit the
sheriff from enforcing the Alias Writ of Execution dated August 12,
2009 and the notice of garnishment that was issued pursuant thereto.
PSPC insisted that it was never a party to Civil Case No. 95-45 and
the compromise agreement between Shell Oil and the plaintiffs;
thus, the enforcement of the alias writ of execution and the
garnishment of its bank accounts were a violation of law and settled
jurisprudence.
On August 26, 2009, Judge Alberico Umali (Judge Umali) of
RTC Makati, Branch 138, granted PSPC’s application for TRO.27
Sheriff Esguerra and the plaintiffs were directed under the TRO to
cease and desist from implementing the alias writ of execution and
the notice of garnishment against PSPC.28 PSPC posted an
injunction bond issued by Malayan Insurance Company, Inc.

(Malayan Insurance) amounting to P20 Million.
Judge Umali later inhibited from the case, which led to the
petition’s re-raffle to RTC Makati, Branch 141 presided by Judge
Mary Ann E. Corpus-Mañalac (Judge Mañalac). Pursuant to an
Order29 dated September 16, 2009 issued by Judge
_______________
26 Id., at pp. 233-256.

27 Id., at pp. 501-505.
28 Id., at pp. 506-507.
29 Id., at pp. 511-516.

560

Mañalac, a WPI30 was consequently issued on September 17,

2009. The order barred the garnishment of PSPC’s account with
BDO until further orders from the court, as it stated:
WHER[E]FORE, upon posting of an additional bond executed in favor

of the respondents in the amount of Twenty Million Pesos (P20 million) to
compensate for the damages they may sustain arising from the preliminary
injunction should this court decide that the [PSPC] is not entitled thereto, let
a preliminary writ of injunction be issued directing the respondents Sheriff
Esguerra, Abenion, et al., and/or their duly authorized representatives, agent
or person acting in their behalf, to cease and desist from enforcing against
[PSPC] the Alias Writ of Execution dated August 12, 2009 and Notices of
Garnishment dated August 13, 2009 issued or served on Banco de Oro,
Makati City Head Office and BPI-Intramuros Manila, until further orders
from this court.
SO ORDERED.31

PSPC posted the required additional bond, also issued by
Malayan Insurance, in the amount of P20 Million.32
Following the inhibition of the judges who successively handled
the case, the petition was eventually re-raffled to the sala of Judge
Selma Palacio Alaras (Judge Alaras) of RTC Makati, Branch 62. On
October 13, 2009, Judge Alaras issued an Order33 dismissing
PSPC’s petition for prohibition and dissolved the injunctive writs
that were previously issued. She explained that the remedy of
prohibition is allowed only if there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that is

available to a petitioner. In this case, PSPC had simple and more
than adequate remedies under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as a
_______________
30 Id., at pp. 517-518.

31 Id., at p. 516.
32 Id., at p. 519.
33 Id., Vol. III, pp. 1476-1480.

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VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 561

garnishee who claimed to be a stranger to the suit subject of the

attachment.34
On October 21, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Call on the
Bond and/or For Execution against the TRO and Injunction Bond35
so that they could be allowed to recover on the injunction bonds for
damages in the total amount of P40 Million. The motion was
opposed by PSPC and Malayan Insurance, mainly on the ground that
the plaintiffs did not suffer any compensable damage on account of
the issuance of the injunctive writs. Furthermore, PSPC cited C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 03101-MIN,36 which was a petition for certiorari filed
by Shell Oil with the CA-Mindanao Station, imputing grave abuse
of discretion upon the RTC Davao City for its issuance of the writ of
execution and alias writ of execution against Shell Oil, its
subsidiaries, affiliates, controlled and related entities, successors or
assigns. In the said case, the CA had issued a TRO enjoining the
implementation of the execution orders that were issued in Civil
Case No. 95-45.37 On October 16, 2009, the CA-Mindanao Station
also issued a Resolution38 for the issuance of a WPI that would
direct the RTC Davao City to cease and desist from enforcing the
challenged writs against the deposits in Philippine banks of Shell
Oil, its subsidiaries, affiliates, controlled and related entities,
successors or assigns, until further orders from the court.
In an Order39 dated November 4, 2009, the RTC Makati resolved
to grant the motion to call on the bond, but directed the plaintiffs to
still submit evidence in support of the prayer for
_______________
34 Id., at p. 1478.
35 Rollo (G.R. No. 200749), Vol. II, pp. 531-533.

36 Shell Oil Company v. Hon. George E. Omelio, as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 14, Cecilia Abenion.
38 Id., at pp. 520-530.
39 Id., Vol. III, pp. 1511-1515.

562

a judgment on the bond as regards their claim of damages, if

warranted. It explained in part:
[PSPC] strongly advocates that [the plaintiffs] cannot go after the surety
as it would circumvent the CA injunction issued against [the plaintiffs’]
garnishing its accounts. This Court disagrees.
The injunction bond rule assures the enjoined party that it may readily
collect damages in the event that it was wrongfully enjoined without further
litigation and without regard to the possible insolvency of the applicant, and
it provides the plaintiff with notice of the maximum extent of its potential
liability. In fact, as may be seen from the document submitted by [PSPC]
which purports to be a TRO from the CA effective for the period August 25,
2009 and until October 16, 2009 (the date when the Preliminary Injunction
was issued mentioning [PSPC] as included from among those “subsidiaries,
affiliates, controlled and related entities, successors or assigns” of [Shell
Oil], the lone petitioner in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 03101-MIN), contrary to
[PSPC’s] allegation, it was not included in the sixty (60)[-]day TRO
previously issued by the CA. Thus, it is incumbent on the part of the
[plaintiffs] to prove by their evidence the material and relevant assertion of
facts justifying BDO’s compliance with the court[-]issued garnishment even
prior to the issuance by the CA of the broadened injunction on October 16,
2009 shielding [PSPC] from execution. The materiality of this justifies
whether damage was indeed suffered by [the plaintiffs].
Also, [PSPC] argues that [the plaintiffs] are unentitled to recovery under
the bond because there was no adjudication that [PSPC] was not entitled to
the writ of injunction. This Court is not persuaded.
It is plain that the injunction should not have been entered in the first
place and the motion which sought to vacate the said order should have been
granted. This must be so if only had the rules prescribed under the pertinent
provision on prohibition petition was followed to the letters as what this
jurisdiction had opined in its last

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VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 563

order. The Florida Supreme Court defines a “wrongfully issued” injunction

as an injunction “that should not have been issued” and this precept squarely
applies in this case.
Be that as it may, this jurisdiction is mindful that the necessary
elements to be established in an application for damages are essentially
factual: namely, the fact of damage or injury and the quantifiable
amount of damages sustained, the maximum amount limit of which is
that mentioned under the bond. Surely, such matters cannot be
established on the mere say-so of the applicant, but require evidentiary
support. On this point, this Court fully concurs with the observation of
the [PSPC]. Thus, the [plaintiffs] are afforded the chance to adduce
evidence to establish provable damage/s, if there be any occasioned by
reason of the wrongful injunction.40 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

After hearing the parties, the RTC Makati issued the Order41
dated April 30, 2010 indicating that the bonds posted by Malayan
Insurance, totaling P40 Million, were to answer for the damages
suffered by the plaintiffs as a result of the injunctive writs issued. In
this case, the injunction prevented the sheriff from demanding the
payment of the RTC Davao City’s awards through PSPC’s garnished
deposit accounts with BDO. Thus, the decretal portion of the order
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment against the bond is hereby made ordering the

surety [Malayan Insurance] to pay the [plaintiffs], through their authorized
representative/s the sum in full or the total of forty million
(Php40,000,000.00) pesos representing its undertaking under MICO Bond
No. 200902369 dated August 27, 2009 and MICO Bond No. 200902601
dated September 17,
_______________
40 Id., at pp. 1514-1515.

41 Id., Vol. IV, pp. 1718-1726.

564

2009. Likewise, respondents are awarded one hundred thousand

(Php100,000.00) pesos as and for attorney’s fees chargeable against the
aforesaid undertaking.
SO ORDERED.42

As the Order dated April 30, 2010 already awarded damages to
the plaintiffs in the total amount of P40 Million, which was declared
recoverable from the bonds, the plaintiffs immediately filed on May
4, 2010 a Motion for Execution.43
In the meantime, PSPC filed on May 5, 2010 a Notice of
Appeal44 to assail the Order dated April 30, 2010, while Malayan
Insurance filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR)45 with the RTC
Makati.
In view of PSPC’s filing of a notice of appeal, the plaintiffs filed
on May 7, 2010 a Supplement to Motion for Execution,46 asking for
an execution pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court. They cited the advanced age and failing health condition of
several plaintiffs; some of them had even died. To support their
supplemental motion, the plaintiffs later submitted to the trial court
affidavits, medical certificates and certificates of death.47
On June 8, 2010, the RTC Makati issued an Order48 that, first,
gave due course to PSPC’s notice of appeal and second, ordered the
issuance of a writ of execution under Section 2 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court on executions pending appeal. The dispositive
portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, let Writ of Execution ISSUE commanding the Sheriff

of this Court to satisfy [the plain-
_______________
42 Id., at p. 1726.
43 Id., at pp. 1743-1746.
44 Id., at pp. 1727-1729.
45 Id., at pp. 1730-1742.
46 Id., at pp. 1747-1748.
47 Id., at pp. 1749-1751.
48 Id., Vol. III, pp. 1151-1156.

565
VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 565

tiffs] or through their authorized representative/s the total sum of forty

million (Php40,000,000.00) pesos representing Malayan Surety Co., Inc.’s
undertaking under MICO Bond No. 200902369 and MICO Bond No.
200902601 dated August 27, 2009 [and] September 17, 2009, respectively.
Send this Order as well as a copy of the Writ of Execution [to] the Office
of the Clerk of Court, [RTC Makati], and other stations in the National
Capital Judicial Region, the Office of the Court Administrator, Supreme
Court of the Philippines and the Insurance Commission for their reference.
Notify both the [PSPC] and the [Malayan Insurance].
SO ORDERED.49

The corresponding Writ of Execution (pending appeal),50
addressed to Sheriff Rey Magsajo (Sheriff Magsajo), was issued by
the RTC Makati on June 9, 2010. Pursuant thereto, Sheriff Magsajo
issued a Notice of Demand to Pay51 upon Malayan Insurance.
Deposits of Malayan Insurance in various bank accounts were later
garnished.52
Feeling aggrieved, PSPC filed on June 15, 2010 with the CA a
Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for Issuance of TRO and
WPI),53 docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 114420, which sought to set
aside the RTC Makati’s Order dated June 8, 2010 and Writ of
Execution dated June 9, 2010. It contended that the RTC Makati
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order and writ on
the following grounds: first,
_______________
49 Id., at p. 1156.
50 Id., at pp. 1157-1158.
51 Id., Vol. IV, p. 1766.
52 Id., at pp. 1767-1771; Notices of Garnishment sent to RCBC Head Office,
RCBC Binondo, Security Bank Head Office and all Metro Manila branches, Bank of
the Philippine Islands Head Office and all Metro Manila branches, Chinabank Head
Office and all Metro Manila branches.
53 Id., Vol. III, pp. 1098-1143.

566

Malayan Insurance’s MR of the RTC Makati’s Order dated April 30,

2010 was still pending resolution; second, the RTC was divested of
any jurisdiction to allow an execution pending appeal when PSPC’s
notice of appeal was perfected; and third, the plaintiffs’ motion for
execution was based on Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court

and was not a motion for execution pending appeal. Even granting
that the motion for execution prayed for an execution pending
appeal, there were no serious and compelling reasons to support the
relief prayed for.
Meanwhile, the RTC Makati issued several orders that still
sustained the claim of the plaintiffs and supported an execution of its
awards, particularly the Order54 dated June 15, 2010, Order55 dated
June 16, 2010, and the Order of Delivery of Money56 issued by
Sheriff Magsajo on June 16, 2010 and addressed to Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation.
On June 22, 2010, the CA issued a Resolution57 for the issuance
of TRO against the enforcement of the RTC Makati’s Order dated
June 8, 2010 and the writ of execution that was issued pursuant
thereto. On August 24, 2010, the CA issued another Resolution58
granting PSPC’s application for a WPI.
On January 31, 2011, after an exchange of pleadings between the
parties, the CA rendered the Decision59 granting PSPC’s petition.
The CA decision provided that an execution pending appeal was
unjustified under the circumstances. At the time the RTC Makati
issued the order of execution, Malayan Insurance’s MR remained
unresolved. An execution pending appeal is allowed only when the
period to appeal has commenced. The fact that the motion to
reconsider was as yet unresolved prevented the running of the period
within which
_______________
54 Id., Vol. IV, pp. 1846-1850.

55 Id., at p. 1859.
56 Id., at p. 1860.
57 Id., at pp. 1876-1885.
58 Id., at pp. 2000-2009.
59 Id., Vol. I, pp. 105-124.

567
VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 567

a party could appeal from the trial court’s decision, and rendered an
order allowing execution pending appeal premature.60 In addition to
this, the CA-Mindanao Station, in a WPI issued on October 16, 2009
in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 03101-MIN, had expressly enjoined an
execution against PSPC under the RTC Davao City judgment. C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 03101-MIN was filed by Shell Oil and PSPC to assail
the writ of execution and alias writ of execution previously issued
by the RTC Davao City.
Hence, the CA reversed the RTC Makati’s Order dated June 8,
2010 and the writ of execution that was issued pursuant thereto. The
dispositive portion of the CA Decision dated January 31, 2011 reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed June 8, 2010

Order and the Writ of Execution issued pursuant thereto are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.61

The MR62 filed by the plaintiffs was denied by the CA in a
Resolution63 dated February 3, 2012, prompting the filing of the
present petition for review on certiorari64 docketed as G.R. No.
200749. Only 6365 of the 1,843 plaintiffs are petitioners in this case.
_______________
60 Id., at pp. 112-114.

61 Id., at p. 123.
62 Id., at pp. 125-146.
63 Id., at pp. 158-172.
64 Id., at pp. 14-99.
65 Strictly, only 62 petitioners considering that no Special Power of Attorney
executed by Cecilio Abenion, for the purpose of the filing of the petition, forms part
of the records.

568

B. Complaint for Injunction

against BDO and John Doe
(Civil Case No. 109-941)

On October 16, 2009, PSPC also filed with the RTC Makati a
Complaint for Injunction with application for TRO and/or WPI,66
docketed as Civil Case No. 09-941 and raffled to RTC Makati,
Branch 59, against BDO and John Doe. It sought to prevent BDO
from releasing its funds to Sheriff Esguerra and his deputies, Sheriff
Villamor Villegas and Sheriff Rommel Ignacio, or any other person
who might attempt to withdraw the funds. PSPC insisted that its
liability for the claims against Shell Oil had not yet been determined
with finality.
On January 11, 2010, the RTC Makati issued a WPI in the case.67
Some of the plaintiffs68 in Civil Case No. 95-45 later moved to
intervene as John Doe Intervenors, claiming to be the parties who
would benefit from the release of the garnished BDO deposits.69 The
intervention was opposed by PSPC and BDO.70
_______________
66 Rollo (G.R. No. 208725), Vol. III, pp. 1209-1227.

67 Id., Vol. IV, pp. 1567-1579; Order dated January 11, 2010 was issued by
Presiding Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino.
68 Domingo Escobar, Wilfredo A. Pombo, Celso T. Tabile, Carlos L. Lapinid,
Eddie D. Pulgo, Felix E. Grecia, Juan Valleser, Aniano J. Dejesica, Jr., Antonio
Medina, Eleuterio H. Del Rosario, Sr., Ramon Liper, Doroteo Llanza, Dominador E.
Prieto, Saturnino O. Becera, Alejandro S. Nabong, Teofilo C. Libre, Juanito P. Godoy,
Candelario C. Casimsiman, Carlos P. Ampilan, Carmencito Capuyan, Fortunato V.
Amistoso, Fortino L. Berou, Leo C. Molina, Jimmy L. Mangcao, Godofrecio L.
Lasquite, Sigfredo M. Cuanan, Johnny F. Peralta, Andres P. Atchivara, Jimmy S. Sale,
Julito I. Junasa, Rodrigo O. Pinas, Roel B. Pales, Ruben T. Pales, Jr., Raymundo N.
Montero, Romeo C. Pansoy, Segundo S. Polentinos.
69 Rollo (G.R. No. 208725), Vol. IV, pp. 1583-1613.
70 Id., at pp. 1614-1624, 1636-1642.

569
VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 569

In an Order71 dated January 31, 2011, the RTC Makati granted

the motion for intervention. PSPC moved to reconsider,72 but this
was denied by the trial court on May 27, 2011.73
Thus, PSPC filed with the CA the petition for certiorari74
docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 120638. It insisted that the RTC
Makati committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in allowing the intervention despite the CA-
Mindanao Station’s nullification, via a Decision dated March 15,
2011 in C.A.-G.R. S.P No. 03101-MIN, of the RTC Davao City’s
Amended Order dated August 11, 2009 and Alias Writ of Execution
upon which the intervention was based.75
Subsequent issuances of the RTC Makati prompted PSPC to file
a Supplemental Petition to include the following orders as subjects
of the petition: (1) the Order76 dated July 21, 2011 dismissing Civil
Case No. 09-941 on the grounds of forum shopping and res judicata;
77
(2) the Order dated October 5, 2011 granting John Doe
Intervenors’ Motion to Call on the Bond and/or for Execution
Against Injunction Bond Pending Appeal; and (3) the Order78 dated
November 15, 2011 denying PSPC’s MR of the Order dated October
5, 2011.79
On August 31, 2012, the CA rendered its Decision80 granting the
petition. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
_______________
71 Issued by Presiding Judge Winlove M. Dumayas; id., Vol. I, p. 134.

72 Id., Vol. II, pp. 936-983.
73 Id., Vol. I, p. 135.
74 Id., at pp. 146-185.
75 Id., at pp. 160-164.
76 Id., at pp. 136-138.
77 Id., at pp. 139-144.
78 Id., at p. 145.
79 Id., at p. 78.
80 Id., at pp. 70-110.

570

WHEREFORE, the Petition and the Supplemental Petition are

GRANTED. The assailed Orders, dated January 31, 2011, May 27, 2011,
July 21, 2011, October 5, 2011, and November 15, 2011, all issued by the
[RTC] of Makati City, Branch 59 in Civil Case No. 09-941 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the following are all DISALLOWED for utter lack of
basis:
1) the intervention of Private Respondents “John Does”;
2) the dismissal of Civil Case No. 09-941;
3) the dissolution of the preliminary injunction issued therein(;) and
4) the execution against the bond.
SO ORDERED.81

An MR82 of the CA decision was denied in a Resolution83 dated
August 8, 2013. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari84
docketed as G.R. No. 208725 still filed by a group of plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 95-45, particularly 5185 herein petitioners.

The Present Petitions

The petitioners in G.R. No. 200749 cite the following arguments
in support of their petition:
_______________
81 Id., at pp. 109-110.

82 Id., at pp. 111-117.
83 Id., at pp. 130-133.
84 Id., at pp. 15-69.
85 Strictly, only 50 petitioners considering that no Special Power of Attorney
executed by Cecilio Abenion, for the purpose of the filing of the petition, forms part
of the records.

571
VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 571

I.

THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS OUTRIGHT
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI OF PSPC DESPITE ITS FAILURE
TO FILE AN MR OF THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED JUNE 8, 2010
AND THE WRIT OF EXECUTION DATED JUNE 9, 2010.

II.

THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING IN FAVOR OF PSPC DESPITE
ITS WILLFUL AND DELIBERATE ACT OF FORUM SHOPPING
WHICH IS PUNISHABLE BY THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF ITS
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

III.

THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONERS’
INSISTENCE TO IMPLEMENT THE WRIT OF EXECUTION PENDING
APPEAL IS ACTUALLY AN ATTEMPT ON THEIR PART TO
INDIRECTLY DO WHAT THEY CANNOT DO DIRECTLY IS DEVOID
OF LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS AS SHOWN IN THE ASSAILED
ORDER DATED APRIL 30, 2010.

IV.

THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN REFUSING OR FAILING TO DISMISS

PSPC’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE ITS MOOTNESS AND
ITS BEING DEVOID OF ANY PRACTICAL LEGAL EFFECT.

V.

THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO PROVE WITH
REASONABLE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY THE FACT OF DAMAGES
SUFFERED BY THEM BY REASON OF THE ISSUANCES OF THE
INJUNCTION.

572

VI.

THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT MALAYAN
INSURANCE WAS NOT HEARD ON THE MATTER OF ITS
SOLIDARY LIABILITY THROUGH THE PROPER AND TIMELY
RESOLUTION OF ITS MR BEFORE THE EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENT ON THE INJUNCTION BOND.

VII.

THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
INHIBITION FILED BY THE PETITIONERS EVEN IF THE PONENTE
UNMERITORIOUSLY TILTED THE SEALS OF JUSTICE AGAINST
THEM BY NOT DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THEIR PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI.86

Based on the foregoing, the petition raises procedural and
substantive issues. As to procedure, the petitioners maintain that the
CA should have dismissed C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 114420 on the
grounds of forum shopping, mootness and PSPC’s failure to file an
MR of the RTC Makati’s Order dated June 8, 2010 and writ of
execution dated June 9, 2010.
As regards the substantive issue on entitlement to the injunction
bonds that were posted with the CA, the petitioners insist that they
should have been allowed by the appellate court to claim on the
bonds pending the appeal, after they have proved their right thereto
and the damages they have suffered by reason of the injunctive

writs.
PSPC opposes the petition.87 It insists that the CA ruled correctly
in its favor, as it reiterates the grounds that were relied upon by the
appellate court in arriving at the challenged decision.
_______________

87 Id., Vol. III, pp. 1022-1093.

573
VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 573

In G.R. No. 208725, the petitioners raise the following

arguments:
I.

THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS PSPC’S
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI EVEN IF IT HAS BECOME MOOT,
ACADEMIC AND DEVOID OF ANY PRACTICAL LEGAL EFFECT.

II.

THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING THE
INTERVENTION OF THE PETITIONERS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 09-941
BEFORE THE RTC OF MAKATI, BRANCH 59.

III.

THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PSPC’S
CLAIM THAT THE INTERVENTION OF THE PETITIONERS IS IN
DIRECT COLLISION WITH THE RULING OF THE CA SINCE THEY
INVOLVED DIFFERENT CLAIMS.

IV.

THE CA GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
PETITIONERS HAVE LOST THEIR LEGAL INTEREST IN THE
MATTER IN LITIGATION, CONSIDERING THAT ORDERS OF THE
DAVAO COURT, UPON WHICH THEY ANCHORED THEIR
INTERVENTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 09-941, HAVE NOT BEEN

NULLIFIED BY FINAL JUDGMENT BY A SUPERIOR COURT.

V.

THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONERS
ARE FULLY PROTECTED IN A SEPARATE PROCEEDING IN WHICH
PSPC IS ALSO AS-

574

SAILING THE SAME ORDERS OF THE DAVAO COURT, HENCE,

THEY HAVE NO PROTECTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 09-941 AS PSPC
IS SIMILARLY SEEKING THE ANNULMENT OF THE ALIAS WRIT
OF EXECUTION AND NOTICE OF GARNISHMENT.

VI.

THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING IN FAVOR OF PSPC
DESPITE ITS WILLFUL AND DELIBERATE ACT OF FORUM
SHOPPING WHICH IS PUNISHABLE BY THE SUMMARY
DISMISSAL OF ITS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

VII.

THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN ENTERTAINING THE
SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FILED BY PSPC WHICH IS A WRONG
PROCEDURAL RECOURSE AS IT SHOULD HAVE FILED AN
APPEAL AFTER THE DISMISSAL OF PSPC’S COMPLAINT IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 09-941 PURSUANT TO THE FINAL ORDER DATED JULY
21, 2011 AS A RESULT OF THE DENIAL OF ITS MR AS SHOWN IN
THE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 15, 2011.88

From the arguments, the petition also raises procedural and
substantive issues. On the issue of procedure, the petitioners again
raise the issues of mootness and forum shopping. They also contend
that after the RTC Makati dismissed Civil Case No. 09-941, PSPC
should have filed an appeal, instead of a mere supplemental petition
for certiorari. The substantive issue concerns the petitioners’
assertion that they should have been allowed to intervene in Civil
Case No. 09-941.
Both the PSPC and BDO seek the dismissal of the petition. In its
Comment,89 BDO insists that the petitioners lack the
_______________

89 Id., Vol. II, pp. 823-834.

575
VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 575

legal interest to intervene in Civil Case No. 09-941. PSPC, on the

other hand, contends that the injunction case it filed against BDO
arose from a depositor-depositary relationship, to which the
petitioners are not privy. Moreover, PSPC reiterates the fact that the
RTC Davao City’s Amended Order dated August 11, 2009 and Alias
Writ of Execution dated August 12, 2009 have been nullified by the
CA-Mindanao Station.90

Ruling of the Court

The Court denies the petitions for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 200749

Procedural Issues

Forum shopping is among the procedural issues that are being
raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 200749. They contend that
PSPC violated the rule against forum shopping when it resorted to
the following remedies to assail the RTC Makati’s rulings in Civil
Case No. 09-749: first, the petition for certiorari docketed as C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 114420; and second, the appeal from the RTC
Makati’s Order dated April 30, 2010.
In Philippine Postal Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al.,91 the
Court explained settled parameters in determining whether the rule
against forum shopping is breached, particularly:
Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same

parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,
for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
_______________
90 Id., at pp. 835-885.

91 722 Phil. 860; 711 SCRA 632 (2013).

576

There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at

least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful would amount to res judicata.92 (Italics in the original)

Applying the foregoing, the petitioners’ claim of forum shopping
necessarily fails.
Given the nature of the petition for certiorari and the challenged
appeal, it is evident that the issues involved and reliefs sought by
PSPC in the two actions were distinct. Even the RTC orders being
challenged in the two cases were different. While the two actions
may be related as they arose from the same prohibition case, the
appeal was intended to assail the judgment on the injunction bonds,
while the petition for certiorari was filed specifically to challenge
only the ruling that granted an execution pending appeal.
Clearly, a judgment in one action would not necessarily affect the
other. A nullification of the ruling to allow an execution pending
appeal, for example, would not necessarily negate the right of the
petitioners to still eventually claim for damages under the injunction
bonds. This is consistent with the Court’s ruling in Manacop v.
Equitable PCIBank,93 as it differentiated between the two actions
and the implication of the pendency of both on the prohibition
against forum shopping. The Court explained:
Certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where

the same is not founded upon good reasons. The fact that the losing party
had also appealed
_______________
92 Id., at p. 876; pp. 646-648, citing Zosa v. Estrella, 593 Phil. 71, 77; 572 SCRA
428, 433-434 (2008).
93 505 Phil. 361; 468 SCRA 256 (2005).
577
VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 577

from the judgment does not bar the certiorari proceedings, as the appeal
could not be an adequate remedy from such premature execution.
Additionally, there is no forum shopping where in one petition a party
questions the order granting the motion for execution pending appeal and at
the same time questions the decision on the merits in a regular appeal before
the appellate court. After all, the merits of the main case are not to be
determined in a petition questioning execution pending appeal and vice
versa.94 (Citation omitted)

Even PSPC’s successive filing with the RTC Makati of Civil
Case No. 09-941 and Civil Case No. 09-749 cannot validly support
the petitioners’ plea for dismissal on the ground of forum shopping.
It is worthy to note that the issue was not raised by the petitioners in
their Comment95 they filed in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 114420, but was
cited for the first time in their MR of the CA decision that already
resolved the main petition.96 In any case, as will be further discussed
by the Court in relation to its ruling in G.R. No. 208725, the
petitioners lacked the required legal interest to intervene in Civil
Case No. 09-941. This circumstance even prompted the CA to
reverse the RTC Makati’s dismissal of Civil Case No. 09-941 on the
ground of forum shopping because inevitably, their lack of interest
barred them from claiming any relief from the said action. The
foregoing only signifies that the two actions called for a resolution
of distinct issues, especially as there was no identity of parties
involved.
The subsequent nullification by the CA of the RTC Makati’s
rulings in Civil Case No. 09-941, including the finding of forum
shopping and consequent order for the dismissal of the case,
likewise negates the petitioners’ argument that its similar claim of
forum shopping should have been sustained in Civil Case No. 09-
749, or that the petition docketed as
_______________
94 Id., at p. 380; p. 275.

96 Id., Vol. I, p. 162.

578

C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 114420 should have been similarly dismissed on

the ground of mootness. Even before the finding of forum shopping
by the RTC Makati, Branch 59, in Civil Case No. 09-941 was
nullified by the CA, the ruling did not necessarily carry with it the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 09-749 and actions that arose therefrom,
because the disposition thereof should ultimately proceed from the
courts handling them.
Anent the PSPC’s act of immediately filing with the CA a
petition for certiorari, instead of first filing an MR to challenge the
execution pending appeal, the CA aptly explained that the issue
could not have been validly raised for the first time by the petitioners
in their MR.97 The appellate court correctly reasoned in its
resolution:
It is a fundamental rule of procedure that higher courts are precluded from

entertaining matters not alleged in the pleadings but ventilated for the first
time only in [an MR]. We are, therefore, precluded from entertaining the
first argument of private respondents since it is only now in their [MR] that
they are questioning [PSPC’s] failure to file [an MR].98 (Citation omitted)

In any case, even granting that the issue was timely raised by the
petitioners in their Comment, jurisprudence provides the settled
exceptions to the general rule that sets as a condition the filing of an
MR before resorting to a special civil action for certiorari. Among
these exceptions are the following:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court;
_______________
97 Id., at p. 160.
98 Id.

579
VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 579

(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and
any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of
the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, [an MR] would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is
involved.99

PSPC already presented in the CA petition its justification for the
failure to first file any MR, contending that a motion to reconsider
could not be deemed a plain and speedy remedy to challenge the
order for execution pending appeal. Specifically, PSPC explained
that its case was covered by the aforequoted exceptions under settled
jurisprudence, particularly items (b), (c), (d), (e) and (g).100
Given the circumstances, PSPC’s immediate filing of the petition
for certiorari was indeed justified. Considering that the subject of
the petition was already an order and writ that permitted an
immediate execution of the monetary award, the urgency and
necessity for a prompt resolution of its arguments were clear. There
is no cogent reason for the Court to
_______________
99 Cervantes v. Court of Appeals, 512 Phil. 210, 216-217; 475 SCRA 562, 569-
570 (2005), citing Acance v. Court of Appeals, 493 Phil. 676, 684; 453 SCRA 548,
558-559 (2005).

580

disturb the CA’s ruling that “the patent nullity of the assailed Order,
the uselessness of an MR, the urgent necessity of resolving questions
to avoid prejudice caused by delay, deprivation of due process and

extreme urgency for relief” justified PSPC’s action.101

Execution Pending Appeal

The main issue in G.R. No. 200749 concerns the RTC’s order
that allowed an execution, pending appeal, of the P40 Million award
that it granted to the petitioners. It must be emphasized though that
the Court’s review of the issue precludes a reexamination of the
propriety or legality of the P40 Million damages that was declared
chargeable under the injunction bonds. Considering that an appeal
from the order granting the award was filed by PSPC, the merits
thereof had to be threshed out in the said appeal.
It bears emphasis that an execution pending appeal is deemed an
exception to the general rule, which allows an execution as a matter
of right only in any of the following instances: (a) when the
judgment has become final and executory; (b) when the judgment
debtor has renounced or waived his right of appeal; (c) when the
period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been filed; or
(d) when, having been filed, the appeal has been resolved and the
records of the case have been returned to the court of origin.102
The Rules of Court allows executions pending appeal under the
conditions set forth in Section 2 of Rule 39 thereof, which reads:
Sec. 2. Discretionary execution.—

(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.—On
motion of the prevailing party with notice to
_______________
101 Id., at p. 160.

102 Florendo v. Paramount Insurance Corp., 624 Phil. 373, 381; 610 SCRA 377,
384 (2010).

581
VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 581

the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case
and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as
the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in
its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the
expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution
pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated

in a special order after due hearing.
x x x x

Corollary thereto, jurisprudence provides rules that are generally
applied in resolving litigants’ pleas for executions pending appeal,
specifically:
The general rule is that only judgments which have become final and
executory may be executed. However, discretionary execution of appealed
judgments may be allowed under Section 2(a) of Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure upon concurrence of the following requisites: (a)
there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party; (b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and (c)
the good reason must be stated in a special order. The yardstick remains
the presence or the absence of good reasons consisting of exceptional
circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that
the losing party may suffer, should the appealed judgment be reversed
later. Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception
to the general rule, the existence of good reasons is essential.103
(Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
_______________
103 Manacop v. Equitable PCIBank, supra note 93 at p. 381; pp. 275-276.

582

Applying the foregoing principles, the Court sustains the CA’s

nullification of the RTC Makati’s order that granted the petitioners’
motion for execution pending appeal.
The Court recaps the incidents prior to the trial court’s resolve to
grant the challenged execution pending appeal. The RTC Makati
dismissed Civil Case No. 09-749 on October 13, 2009. On
November 4, 2009, the trial court granted the petitioners’ motion to
call on the injunction bonds, subject to the presentation of evidence
to establish the damages that were suffered by the claimants.
Thereafter, in an Order dated April 30, 2010, the trial court declared
the petitioners to be entitled to the full amount of P40 Million
injunction bonds, which prompted the petitioners to immediately file
on May 4, 2010 a motion for execution. Malayan Insurance filed an
MR on May 19, 2010, while PSPC filed a notice of appeal on May
5, 2010. Given PSPC’s appeal, the petitioners opted to file a

Supplement to Motion for Execution, so that they could be allowed
an execution pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court. It was such recourse by the petitioners, and the RTC
Makati’s grant thereof, that PSPC mainly challenged when it filed
with the CA the petition for certiorari docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 114420. Moreover, it argued that Malayan Insurance’s MR was
still unresolved at the time that the execution pending appeal was
granted by the trial court.
It is clear from the antecedents that notwithstanding PSPC’s
filing of a notice of appeal, the RTC Makati still had the jurisdiction
to act upon the motion for execution pending appeal, because the
reglementary period for all the parties in the case to file an appeal
from the Order dated April 30, 2010 had not yet lapsed. Malayan
Insurance, in particular, could not have filed an appeal yet as its MR
remained unresolved. This circumstance is material because PSPC
argued before the RTC and CA that the trial court had already lost its
jurisdiction to act on the petitioners’ motion. Section 2 of Rule 39,
however, allows a court to act upon a motion for execution pending
appeal while it retains jurisdiction over the action. In

583
VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 583

relation to this, Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on

appeals from the RTCs provides the rules on the perfection of
appeals and loss of jurisdiction, particularly:
Sec. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof.—A party’s appeal by

notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice
of appeal in due time.
x x x x
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case
upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the
time to appeal of the other parties.
x x x x
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record
on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of
the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the
appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order
execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and
allow withdrawal of the appeal.
As the Court nonetheless still affirms the CA’s finding that the
RTC Makati committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing
execution pending appeal, it underscores the rule that an execution
pending appeal must, at all times, be justified by good reasons stated
in an order issued by the court. Pertinent thereto, the Court refers to
the trial court’s own grounds for the subject execution pending
appeal, as cited in its Order dated June 8, 2010, to wit:
[P]rivate respondents advance x x x that execution can be had under Section
2 [of] Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court contending that the
wrongfulness of the writ and the length of time respondents have been
deprived of their money by reason of the wrongful injunction justifies
execution pending appeal. To bolster their claim, private respondents
submitted affidavits with notarized medical

584

certificates of several of the party respondents attesting to the fact that they
are of advanced age and in failing health conditions. They also furnished
this Court several death certificates in certified true copies attesting to the
fact that some of the private respondents have not seen the fruits of their
cause because of their demise.
x x x x
In this case, do good reasons exist to justify the grant of private
respondents’ motion for execution pending appeal? The answer is in the
affirmative.
[PSPC] faults the assertion of the private respondents claiming that the
persons who submitted their documents may not be representative of all
respondents. Suffice to say that generally, the bond goes to the protection of
all parties to the injunction suit who are restrained and damaged thereby,
and they may enforce it. An injunction bond by its terms payable to the
defendants in the suit creates a liability in favor of anyone of the defendants;
the remedy is not confined to a liability running to all the defendants jointly.
An injunction bond, though running to all the defendants, is an obligation to
each one severally.
The Court finds the allegations of the private respondents
meritorious. Inasmuch as some of the private respondents have failing
health, of advanced age and in fact some of them have died even before
the termination of the protracted case or cases that brought the instant
case here, the Court is morally convinced that the demands of equity
and justice would be best served if they will be permitted to enjoy part
of the fruits of their cause, even at this juncture.104 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)

In now declaring that the execution pending appeal was
unsupported by sufficient grounds, the Court restates the rule
_______________
104 Rollo (G.R. No. 200749), Vol. III, pp. 1153-1156.

585
VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 585

that the trial court’s discretion in allowing execution pending appeal

must be strictly construed.105 Its grant must be firmly grounded on
the existence of “good reasons,” which consist of compelling
circumstances that justify immediate execution lest the judgment
becomes illusory. “The circumstances must be superior, outweighing
the injury or damages that might result should the losing party
secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would make of
execution pending appeal, instead of an instrument of solicitude and
justice, a tool of oppression and inequity.”106
The sufficiency of “good reasons” depends upon the
circumstances of the case and the parties thereto. Conditions that are
personal to one party, for example, may be insufficient to justify an
execution pending appeal that would affect all parties to the case and
the property that is the subject thereof. Thus, in Florendo, et al. v.
Paramount Insurance Corp.,107 the Court ruled that the execution
pending appeal, which was supposedly justified by the old age and
life-threatening ailments of merely one of several parties to the case,
was unsupported by special reasons. As the Court sustained the CA’s
reversal of the execution, it explained:
The Florendos point out that Rosario is already in her old age and suffers
from life threatening ailments. But the trial court has allowed execution
pending appeal for all of the Florendos, not just for Rosario whose share in
the subject lands had not been established. No claim is made that the rest of
the Florendos are old and ailing. Consequently, the execution pending
appeal was indiscreet and too sweeping. All the lands could be sold for P42
million, the value mentioned in the petition, and distributed to all the
Florendos for their enjoyment with no sufficient assurance that they all will
and can return such sum in case the CA reverses, as it has in fact done,
_______________
105 Supra note 102.

106 Id.
107 Id.

586

the RTC decision. Moreover, it is unclear how much of the proceeds of the
sale of the lands Rosario needed for her old age.108

Similarly, in the instant case, the RTC Makati’s order of
execution pending appeal was unsupported by sufficient grounds.
The trial court solely harped on the health condition of some of the
petitioners and the death of some claimants under the compromise
agreements. While the private respondents named by PSPC in its
petition for prohibition were “Abenion, et al.,” referring to “the
1,843 listed plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-45,”109 the RTC sought to
justify an execution pending appeal by citing the following
circumstances and evidence that affected a mere 23 claimants: (1)
the affidavits with notarized medical certificates attesting to the fact
of advanced age and failing conditions of only 8 claimants,
particularly Andres P. Atchivara, Antonio M. Cabulang, Cecilio G.
Flores, Benjamin R. Royo, Jimmy S. Sale, Ponciano T. Tinambacan,
Rodrigo M. Serenado and Jose M. Serenado; and (2) the death
certificates of 15 claimants, particularly Mario B. Abas, Generoso Y.
Alas, Pastor C. Capuyan, Jr., Valentino E. Camporedondo, Leonardo
S. Dayot, Virgilio O. Dela Cruz, Jarlen Jalalon, Francia L. Mahinay,
Lorewto B. Maniquez, Glorioso P. Oclarit, Beddy R. Relux,
Wilfredo S. Sabanal, Apolinario R. Villaver, Domingo R. Villaver
and Patricio M. Villotes.110 These grounds on the failing health and
death of some claimants were raised by the petitioners to support
their Supplement to Motion for Execution, by which they alleged:
3. Consequently, private respondents who are too old and sickly, while
others have died, are humbly seeking the execution of the judgment of
award for damages recoverable from the temporary restraining order and
injunctive bonds in the total amount of Php40 million,
_______________
108 Id., at pp. 381-382; p. 385.
109 Rollo (G.R. No. 200749), Vol. I, p. 236.

110 Id., Vol. III, p. 1154.

587
VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 587

which is an adjunct to the October 13, 2009 order, pending appeal pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
4. As stated above, private respondents are already of advance age and
some of them are seriously ill and they may not be able to enjoy the award
for damages as per order of April 30, 2010, if they will still wait for the
outcome of the appeal.111

The execution pending appeal, however, could not be justified by
conditions that applied only to a mere few claimants. Jurisprudence
precludes an execution pending appeal that is, as in this case, too
sweeping and unfounded by the required urgency and compelling
reasons that can justify it.
Besides this lack of good reasons to justify the execution pending
appeal, the RTC Makati also erred in allowing the execution even
when there was a pending MR of its Order dated April 30, 2010.
When it explained that it still had the jurisdiction to act upon the
motion for execution pending appeal, the trial court itself cited the
pendency of Malayan Insurance’s MR. Thus, it stated in its Order
dated June 8, 2010:
Here, since [Malayan Insurance] is considered a forced party and fall[s]

within the class of “other parties” making it, for purpose of appealing to the
higher court the final order adjudicating liability on its undertaking,
jurisdiction is not lost. This is because, with the period to appeal
pertaining to the surety has not even started to run given that its [MR]
is still pending, the expiration of the period to appeal by such party
mentioned in Section 9[,] Rule 41 has not even commenced. In other words,
this Court has absolute authority to decide on this question and such other
questions until limited by the setting of the residual jurisdiction upon the
_______________
111 Id., Vol. IV, p. 1747.

588

happening of the condition described therein.112 (Emphasis ours)

The RTC Makati should have first resolved the MR of Malayan
Insurance, especially since the arguments in the motion could still
prompt the trial court to recall its prior resolve to declare the
injunction bonds liable for the damages awarded to the petitioners.
As the Court held in JP Latex Technology, Inc. v. Ballons Granger
Balloons, Inc., et al.:113
Where there is a pending [MR] of the RTC decision, an order [of]

execution pending appeal is improper and premature. The pendency of the
[MR] legally precludes execution of the RTC decision because the motion
serves as the movant’s vehicle to point out the findings and conclusions of
the decision which, in his view, are not supported by law or the evidence
and, therefore, gives the trial judge the occasion to reverse himself. In the
event that the trial judge finds the [MR] meritorious, he can of course
reverse the decision.114 (Citation omitted)

Finally, the RTC erred in ordering the execution pending appeal
because the petitioners’ recourse against PSPC for the obligations of
Shell Oil remained uncertain, even doubtful, at the time the
execution pending appeal was allowed. Records confirm that the
trial court was appraised of the CA-Mindanao Station’s injunctive
writs in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 03101-MIN, which covered RTC Davao
City’s Order dated August 11, 2009 and Alias Writ of Execution
dated August 12, 2009 affecting PSPC. When it finally decided on
the merits of C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 03101-MIN, the appellate court
even later on ruled against the validity of the RTC Davao City’s
issuances.
_______________
112 Id., Vol. III, p. 1154.

113 600 Phil. 600; 581 SCRA 553 (2009).
114 Id., at p. 611; p. 563.

589
VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 589
Clearly, the RTC Makati gravely abused its discretion when it

allowed an execution pending appeal in favor of the petitioners. The
CA only ruled properly when it nullified the trial court’s Order dated
June 8, 2010 and writ of execution dated June 9, 2010.

G.R. No. 208725

Intervention

The Court finds it necessary to first resolve the issue on the
petitioners’ right to intervene in Civil Case No. 09-941, for it is only
after their legal interest in the case is established can they be allowed
to validly raise the other issues that could support the complaint’s
dismissal, such as the procedural issues affecting mootness of the
case and the alleged forum shopping.
On the matter of the petitioners’ intervention in Civil Case No.
09-941, Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court applies. This
provision identifies the persons who may rightfully intervene in a
court action, as it reads:
Sec. 1. Who may intervene.—A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether
or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.

The petitioners insist that their interest in the case stems from
their standing in Civil Case No. 95-45, being the persons intended to
benefit from the RTC Davao City’s amended order and alias writ of
execution affecting PSPC. The Court, how-

590

ever, disagrees with this assertion, taking into account the nature of
the injunction case and the court’s rulings in related cases that
ultimately determined the liability of PSPC for the petitioners’

claims against Shell Oil.
The CA ruled correctly when it declared the petitioners to be
wanting of any legal interest in Civil Case No. 09-941. Civil Case
No. 09-941 was a complaint for injunction filed by PSPC against
BDO and John Doe, as it sought to prevent the bank from releasing
its funds to the sheriffs or any other person who might attempt to
withdraw from its accounts under Civil Case No. 95-45. It is
material that the RTC Davao City’s amended order and alias writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 95-45 had been nullified by the CA in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 03101-MIN. This ruling could not be simply
disregarded in determining the petitioners’ legal interest in Civil
Case No. 09-941, especially since the appellate court defined therein
the limits of Shell Oil’s obligations under the compromise
agreements and the parties that were bound thereby. After finding
that Shell Oil had fully satisfied its obligations under the
compromise agreement, the CA went on to cite the RTC Davao
City’s error in declaring affiliates and subsidiaries such as PSPC
liable for the obligations of Shell Oil. It explained:
Corollary thereto is the issue on whether or not the Court a quo acquired
jurisdiction over them. The lingering question really is whether or not the
act of the public respondent in holding nonparties to the Abenion case and
nonparties of the Compromise Agreements like the alleged subsidiaries and
affiliates of DOW, OCCIDENTAL, SHELL OIL and DEL MONTE Group
in the Philippines constitutes grave abuse of discretion, for being blatant
violation of their right to due process. We rule in the affirmative.
Evidently even the Amended Complaint filed before the Panabo Court is
only against petitioners SHELL OIL, OCCIDENTAL, DOW and the DEL
MONTE Group. Nowhere in the said Amended Complaint are the names of
x x x [PSPC], SHELL GAS EASTERN, INC., THE

591
VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 591

SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, LIMITED and SHELL

PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, B.V. (SPEX) the alleged subsidiaries
and/or affiliates of SHELL OIL ever mentioned.
Thus, We disagree with private respondents’ [Abenion, et al.] insistence
that they actually impleaded the subsidiaries or affiliates of the petitioners in
their initiatory Complaint filed with the Panabo Court, as was alleged in the
Amended Complaint, thus:
x x x x
as the Petitioners were neither impleaded nor named with specificity. No

proofs were adduced to show the ties of the subsidiaries with their alleged
principal. x x x.
On an important note, jurisprudence tells us that jurisdiction over the
person of a party is assumed upon the service of summons in the manner
required by law or otherwise by his voluntary appearance. Thus, as a rule if
a defendant has not been summoned, the Court acquires no jurisdiction over
his person and a personal judgment rendered against such defendant is null
and void.
It bears stressing that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment
rendered by the court. x x x[.]
x x x x
Ironically, this complexity stemmed from a harmless provision of the
Compromise Agreements (paragraph 28 thereof) thus[:]
“This agreement and the rights[,] obligations, and covenants
contained, herein shall INURE TO THE BENEFIT and be binding
upon the plaintiffs and settling defendants and their respective parent
corporation, subsidiaries, affiliates, controlled and related entities,
successor and assigns.”

592

a stipulation pour autri which could not be made to work against the
interest of others, in this case the perceived subsidiaries and affiliates.
Stipulation pour autri as explained by the Supreme Court in the case of
Bonifacio Bros., Inc., et al., v. Mora[,] et al., is a provision in favor of a
third person not a party to the contract. x x x[.]115 (Citations omitted and
emphasis and italics in the original)

Clearly, the circumstances rendered baseless the petitioners’
pursuit against the funds of PSPC, if only to enforce a judgment
claim that they had against Shell Oil. In going after PSPC, the
petitioners merely relied on the RTC Davao City’s Amended Order
dated August 11, 2009 and Alias Writ of Execution dated August 12,
2009, which had been annulled and set aside in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
03101-MIN.
By their arguments, the petitioners in effect seek the Court to still
reexamine the correctness of the pronouncements of the CA in C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 03101-MIN. The Court, however, is precluded from
doing so because it is not the subject of the present petitions.
Moreover, the CA’s decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 03101-MIN was

already affirmed by the Supreme Court via the Minute Resolutions
dated October 3, 2012116 and October 23, 2013117 in G.R. Nos.
202295-301.
Thus, the CA correctly rejected the petitioners’ plea to intervene
in PSPC’s injunction case against BDO. Intervention, as a remedy, is
not a right but a matter that is left to the court’s discretion.118 In all
cases, legal interest in the matter in litigation is an indispensable
requirement among intervenors. As the Court ruled in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Sison,119
_______________
115 Rollo (G.R. No. 208725), Vol. IV, pp. 1754-1757.

116 Rollo (G.R. No. 200749), Vol. V, pp. 2859-2860.
117 Id., at pp. 2861-2864.
118 Ongco v. Dalisay, 691 Phil. 462, 469; 677 SCRA 232, 239 (2012).
119 626 Phil. 598; 612 SCRA 702 (2010).

593
VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 593

“[t]he interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the

matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that
the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment.”120 The herein petitioners failed to
establish their interest in the funds of PSPC. The latter was neither
their creditor nor one that could be held liable for the obligations of
Shell Oil under the subject compromise agreement. The petitioners
did not stand to lose by the injunction that was prayed for before the
trial court.
Considering their failure to establish their legal interest in Civil
Case No. 09-941, the petitioners could not now be allowed to raise
the other issues affecting the injunction case, including the alleged
procedural infirmities and the petitioners’ claim in the injunction
bond posted in the case. The Court finds it unnecessary to still
discuss the merits of the petitioners’ arguments on the said issues.
Moreover, it is clear that the eventual finality of the CA ruling to
nullify the RTC Davao City’s Amended Order dated August 11,
2009 and Alias Writ of Execution dated August 12, 2009 has
rendered moot and academic the claims of the petitioners against
PSPC and BDO. This applies to both G.R. No. 200749 and G.R. No.
208725, because both disputes merely stemmed from an
implementation of the nullified court issuances. The petitioners have

lost any remedy against PSPC and necessarily, the latter’s funds with
BDO, for their claims in Civil Case No. 95-45. Circumstances that
render a case moot were explained by the Court in Deutsche Bank
AG v. Court of Appeals, et al.,121 wherein it declared that “[a] moot
and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness.”122
_______________
120 Id., at p. 609; p. 713.

121 683 Phil. 80; 667 SCRA 82 (2012).
122 Id., at p. 88; p. 91.

594

WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on certiorari docketed

as G.R. No. 200749 and G.R. No. 208725 are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Jardeleza and

Caguioa,** JJ., concur.
Petitions denied.
Notes.—Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not

originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein
to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest
which may be affected by such proceedings. (Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority vs. Heirs of Estanislao Miñoza, 641
SCRA 520 [2011])
The presence or the absence of good reasons remains the
yardstick in allowing the remedy of execution pending appeal,
which should consist of exceptional circumstances of such urgency
as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer,
should the appealed judgment be reversed later. (Urban Bank, Inc.
vs. Peña, 659 SCRA 418 [2011])

——o0o——
_______________
** Designated fifth member of the Third Division per Special Order No. 2417
dated January 4, 2017.
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5/23/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 816

G.R. No. 200749. February 6, 2017.*

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

FRUTO M. PEDRAL, JOVENTINO J. CADELIÑA,

VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 551

BRIEL B. DIEZ, CONCORDIO D. OCLARIT, VENANCIO S.

CIPRIANO V. ABAT, COMWELL R. LAYAGUIN, MUNDA P.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; There is no forum

552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

their Comment, jurisprudence provides the settled exceptions to the

VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 553

appellate court. Discretionary execution may only issue upon good

554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decisions and resolutions

Martinez, Vergara, Gonzales & Serrano Law Ofﬁces for

1 Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, with Associate Justices

VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 555

G.R. No. 208725 was ﬁled by its petitioners against respondents

4 Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam, with Associate Justices Romeo F.

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

cides against the parasite nematode prevalent in banana plantations.

intended to be covered by the compromise.16 The agreement, sans

14 Rollo (G.R. No. 208725), Vol. I, pp. 230-231.

VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 557

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, let Writ of Execution

19 Rollo (G.R. No. 200749), Vol. I, pp. 343-345.

558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Acting on the motion, an Amended Order22 for the issuance of an

x x x WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, let Writ of

22 Rollo (G.R. No. 200749), Vol. I, pp. 416-420.

VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 559

issues pertinent to the issuances and actions of RTC Davao City.

injunction bond issued by Malayan Insurance Company, Inc.

26 Id., at pp. 233-256.

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mañalac, a WPI30 was consequently issued on September 17,

WHER[E]FORE, upon posting of an additional bond executed in favor

speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that is

30 Id., at pp. 517-518.

VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 561

garnishee who claimed to be a stranger to the suit subject of the

35 Rollo (G.R. No. 200749), Vol. II, pp. 531-533.

562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

a judgment on the bond as regards their claim of damages, if

VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 563

order. The Florida Supreme Court deﬁnes a “wrongfully issued” injunction

WHEREFORE, judgment against the bond is hereby made ordering the

40 Id., at pp. 1514-1515.

564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2009. Likewise, respondents are awarded one hundred thousand

WHEREFORE, let Writ of Execution ISSUE commanding the Sheriff

VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 565

tiffs] or through their authorized representative/s the total sum of forty

566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Malayan Insurance’s MR of the RTC Makati’s Order dated April 30,

execution was based on Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court

54 Id., Vol. IV, pp. 1846-1850.

VOL. 816, FEBRUARY 6, 2017 567

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed June 8, 2010