Case No.

1
[ AM NO. P-07-2327, Jul 12, 2007 ] NENA GIMENA SOLWAY v. ARIEL R. PASCASIO
554 Phil. 269

FACTS:

On 9 February 2004, Palenzuela went to complainant's restaurant. She produced a copy of

a Notice of Execution signed by Barangay Chairman Carlito A. Baloy, who turned out to be
Palenzuela's brother, and forced complainant to sign the same. Complainant refused to do
so. The following day, Pascasio and Uclaray, with the same copy of the Notice of Execution
in tow, also forced and threatened complainant to sign. Out of fear, complainant relented and
signed the Notice of Execution. In her complaint, complainant questioned the presence of
respondents in the premises, considering that there was no court order to eject her. The
Amicable Settlement reached by the parties before the Barangay Lupon is susceptible to
legal enforcement. However, the Local Government Code mandates that it is the Lupon itself
which is tasked to enforce by execution the amicable settlement or arbitration award within
six (6) months from the date of settlement.

ISSUE: W/N Amicable Settlement reached by the parties before the Barangay Lupon is
susceptible to legal enforcement.

RULING: Yes. The Amicable Settlement reached by the parties before the Barangay Lupon
is susceptible to legal enforcement. However, the Local Government Code mandates that it
is the Lupon itself which is tasked to enforce by execution the amicable settlement or
arbitration award within six (6) months from the date of settlement.
 Case No. 2

PROCESO QUIROS, ET.AL., VS. MARCELO ARJONA, ET.AL.

G.R. NO. 158901, March 09, 2004

Facts:Petitioners Proceso Quiros and Leonarda Villegas filed with the office of the Brgy.
Captain of Labney, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land against their uncle Marcelo Arjona (one of the respondents).
The subject land was their lawful share/inheritance from their late grandmother.

The parties eventually reached an amicable settlement. By reason thereof, Arjona executed
a document/agreement which states that he will give to petitioners the 1-hectare land he
inherited from his mother. Another document/agreement was executed by a Jose Banda
which states that the land he is cultivating/tilling belongs to the Arjona family, and that he will
voluntarily surrender said land if ever the petitioners would get it from him.

Petitioners filed a complaint with the MCTC for the execution of the compromise agreement,
which was denied because the subject property cannot be determined with certainty.

On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision. Respondents appealed to the CA which
reversed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether the amicable settlement between the parties is valid and enforceable.

Ruling:No. The Court held that the general rule regarding the finality of amicable
settlements which is “where no repudiation was made during the 10-day period, such
settlement attains the status of finality and the courts have the ministerial duty to implement
and enforce it” admits certain exceptions; such as those special and exceptional
circumstances or facts that may have transpired after the finality of judgment and which
would render its execution unjust.

In the case at bar, the ends of justice would be frustrated if a writ of execution is issued
considering the uncertainty of the object of the agreement. Perusal of the 2 documents of
the amicable settlement show that the lands referred to were different from each other.
Hence, no writ of execution could be issued for failure to determine with certainty what
parcel of land respondent intended to convey.
 Case no. 3
ROSARIA LUPITAN PANG-ET VS CATHERINE MANACNES-DAO-AS,
G.R. NO. 167261; MARCH 02, 2007

Facts:
On 23 February 1995, during the course of the pre-trial, the parties, through their respective
counsels, agreed to refer the matter to the Barangay Lupon (Lupon) of Dagdag, Sagada for
arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.5
Consequently, the proceedings before the MCTC were suspended, and the case was
remanded to the Lupon for resolution.6

Thereafter, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995 due to the
refusal of the Manacnes spouses to enter into an Agreement for Arbitration and their
insistence that the case should go to court. On 8 March 1995, the Certification, as well as
the records of the case, were forwarded to the MCTC.

An Order was issued by the MCTC on 7 April 1995, once more remanding the matter for
conciliation by the Lupon and ordering the Lupon to render an Arbitration Award thereon.
According to the MCTC, based on the records of the case, an Agreement for Arbitration was
executed by the parties concerned; however, the Lupon failed to issue an Arbitration Award
as provided under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, so that, the case must be returned
to the Lupon until an Arbitration Award is rendered.

Issue/s:
1. Whether agreement to arbitrate is null and void?
2. Whether arbitration award is effective?

Ruling/s:
1. Yes, in the meeting before the Lupon, it would seem that the agreement to arbitrate was
not signed by the spouses Manacnes. More importantly, when the pangkat chairman asked
the spouses Manacnes to sign or affix their thumbmarks in the agreement, they refused and
insisted that the case should instead go to court. Thus, the Lupon had no other recourse but
to issue a certificate to file action. This was made clear in both the minutes of the Arbitration
Hearing on 26 February 1995 and on 9 April 1995. The key in achieving the objectives of an
effective amicable settlement under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the free and
voluntary agreement of the parties to submit the dispute for adjudication either by the Lupon
or the Pangkat, whose award or decision shall be binding upon them with the force and
effect of a final judgment of a court. Absent this voluntary submission by the parties to
submit their dispute to arbitration under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, there cannot
be a binding settlement arrived at effectively resolving the case. Hence, we fail to see why
the MCTC further remanded the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and insisted that the
arbitration proceedings continue, despite the clear showing that the spouses Manacnes
refused to submit the controversy for arbitration.

2. No, following the rule in the first issue and as reflected in Section 413 of the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in order that a party may be bound by an arbitration award,
said party must have agreed in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the
Lupon or the Pangkat. Like in any other contract, parties who have not signed an agreement
to arbitrate will not be bound by said agreement since it is axiomatic that a contract cannot
be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it. In view of the
fact that upon verification by the Pangkat Chairman, in order to settle the issue of whether or
not they intend to submit the matter for arbitration, the spouses Manacnes refused to affix
their signature or thumb mark on the Agreement for Arbitration Form, the Manacnes spouses
cannot be bound by the Agreement for Arbitration and the ensuing arbitration award since
they never became privy to any agreement submitting the case for arbitration by the
Pangkat.
 Case 4.
FLORES, et.al., vs. DRILON, et.al.,
G.R. No. 104732; June 22, 1993
FACTS:
Respondent mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Petitioners, who claim to be
taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and members
of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, challenge
the constitutionality of Sec 13 par (d) o RA 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator
of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City
(Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”
ISSUE:
W/n the appointment of Respondent Mayor Richard Gordon is valid
Held:

No. The appointment of Mayor Gordon is invalid. Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution
provides:

No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any

capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position,

no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one
person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be
efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time
job. Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an executive department described
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, and Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 83815, ". .
. . should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of
other governmental duties or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his
efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in
haphazardness and inefficiency . . . ."
 Case No. 5

FELICIDAD UY vs. HON. MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, et.al.

G.R. No. 111416, September 26, 1994

FACTS: Uy subleased from Atayde the other half of the 2 nd floor of a building located in Makati, to
which was used as a beauty parlor. The sublease expired on April 15,1993, but Uy was not able to
remove her movable properties.

On April 17, an argument arose to which led into a scuffle between Uy and Atayde including Javier.
On April 21, they were medically examined for alleged injuries by Uy. On April 23, Atayde and Javier
filed a complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati, confrontation was scheduled on
April 28. On that day, only the petitioner appeared and was eventually reset to May 26. On May 11,
the prosecutor filed a complaint for slight physical injuries. Uy submitted the required counter-
affidavits, it was stated that there is an undergoing conciliation proceeding between the parties dated
May 18 and filed a motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the requirement of prior referral to the
Lupong Tagapamayapa and pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. Judge Contreras handed down an order denying the motion to dismiss due to being
residents of different barangays and the offense is about to prescribe. Uy filed for special civil action
for certiorari.

ISSUE: WoN the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when he denied the motion to dismiss considering that the private respondents failed to
comply with the mandatory requirement of P.D. No. 1508, now embodied in Section 412 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and further required under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.

RULING: Yes. Judge Contreras acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss Criminal
Cases.

The revised Katarungang Pambarangay law has at least three new significant features, to wit:

a) It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal offenses from those punishable by imprisonment
not exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding P200.00 in P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00.

b) As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are
employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the
barangay where such workplace or institutions located.

c) It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses during the pendency of the
mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process.

Thus, the filing then of Criminal cases with the said court was premature and, pursuant to paragraph
(a), Section 412 of the Local Government Code. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991) which states
that the parties may go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe.
 CASE NO. 7
Felicidad Uy vs. Hon.Maximo C. Contretas et.al
G.R No. 111416, September 26, 1994

FACTS:

Uy subleased from Atayde the other half of the second floor of a building, operated and
maintained as a beauty parlor. The sublease contract expired on 15 April 1993. However, the
petitioner was not able to remove all her movable properties. On 17 April 1993, an argument
arose between the Uy and Atayde when the former sought to withdraw from the subleased
premises her remaining movable properties.The argument degenerated into a scuffle between
the Uy and Atayde, and several of Atayde’s employees including Winnie Javier.

Atayde and Javier had themselves medically examined for the alleged injuries inflicted on
them by the Uy and subsequently filed a complaint with the barangay captain. The
confrontation of the parties was scheduled for 28 April 1993. On the said date, only the Uy
appeared. The barangay captain then reset the confrontation to 26 May 1993.

On 11 May 1993, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed two informations for slight
physical injuries against Uy. Uy submitted the counter-affidavits, specifically alleging the
prematurity of the filing of the criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings
and led to the filing of a motion to dismiss the two charges for non-compliance with the
requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa and pursuant to
Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Judge Contreras handed down
an order denying the motion to dismiss. A motion to reconsider the above order was also
denied. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the motion to dismiss the complaint, grounded on the failure of Atayde and Javier to
comply with the mandatory requirement of prior referral of disputes to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of the proper barangay, was properly denied.

RULING:

NO. In view of the private respondents’ failure to appear at the first scheduled mediation on
28 April 1993 for which the mediation was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for slight
physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC at any time before such date. The filing
then of the two criminal cases with the said court on 11 May 1993 was premature and,
pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local Government Code, Judge Contreras
should have granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by
taking refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the
Local Government Code of 1991) which states that the parties may go directly to court where
the action is about to prescribe. This is because, as earlier stated, pursuant to paragraph (c),
Section 410 of the Code, the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum
period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed their complaints
with the lupon.

Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and
145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the prescriptive period therefor would have
expired two months thereafter. Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the filing of the private
respondents’ complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April 1993 and
automatically suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22 June 1993. If no mediation or
conciliation could be reached within the said period of suspension and, accordingly, a
certification to file action is issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six days
within which to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense. Evidently, there was
no basis for the invocation by the respondent judge of the exception provided for in
paragraph (b), Section 412 of the Local Government Code.
 Case No. 8
[G.R. No. 183623 June 25, 2012] LETICIA B. AGBAYANI, Petitioner, vs COURT OF
APPEALS

FACTS:

Agbayani and Genabe were both employees of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275
of Las Pias City, working as Court Stenographer and Legal Researcher II, respectively. On
December 29, 2006, Agbayani filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation against
Genabe.

In a resolution, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City, found probable cause for
the filing of the information for the grave oral defamation against Genabe. However, upon
petition for review filed by Genabe, the DOJ Undersecretary Ernesto Pineda found that
subject utterances of respondent constitute only slight oral defamation. The complaint-
affidavit, however, failed to show that the instant case was previously referred to the
barangay for conciliation in compliance with Sections 408 and 409, paragraph (d), of the
Local Government Code,

The records of the case likewise show that the instant case is not one of the exceptions
enumerated under Section 408 of the Local Government Code. Hence, the dismissal of the
instant petition is proper.

The DOJ Undersecretary move for the withdrawal of the Information. The petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied.

Consequently, Agbayani filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that the DOJ
committed grave abuse of discretion. She averred that the respondents petition for review
filed with the DOJ did not comply with Sections 5 and 6 of DOJ Circular No. 70, or the 2000
National Prosecution Service
(NPS) Rules on Appeal, and maintained that her evidence supported a finding of probable
cause for grave oral defamation against respondent Genabe. Petition was denied by CA.

ISSUE:

WON the DOJ Undersecretary committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled out the
withdrawal of the filing of Information in court for non-compliance with the Barangay
conciliation.

HELD:

NO. Undeniably, both petitioner Agbayani and respondent Genabe are residents of Las Pias
City and both work at the RTC, and the incident which is the subject matter of the case
happened in their workplace. Agbayani’s complaint should have undergone the mandatory
barangay conciliation for possible amicable settlement with respondent Genabe, pursuant to
Sections 408 and 409 of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991.
Prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any government
offices, except in the following disputes: [1] Where one party is the government, or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof; [2] Where one party is a public officer or employee and
the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions. [3] Where the dispute involves
real properties located in different cities and municipalities, unless the parties thereto agree
to submit their difference to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon; [4] Any complaint
by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical entities, since only individuals shall be
parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents [Sec. 1,
Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules]; [5] Disputes involving parties who actually
reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units
adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriate Lupon; [6] Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum
penalty of imprisonment exceeding one [1] year or a fine of over five thousand pesos
([P]5,000.00); [7] Offenses where there is no private offended party; [8] Disputes where
urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or further
continued, specifically the following: [a] Criminal cases where accused is under police
custody or detention [See Sec. 412(b)(1), Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law]; [b]
Petitions for habeas corpus by a person illegally deprived of his rightful custody over another
or a person illegally deprived of or on acting in his behalf; [c] Actions coupled with provisional
remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and
support during the pendency of the action; and [d] Actions which may be barred by the
Statute of Limitations.

[9] Any class of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice; [10] Where the dispute arises from the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) [Secs. 46 & 47, R. A. 6657]; [11] Labor
disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations [Montoya vs. Escayo,
171 SCRA 442; Art. 226, Labor Code, as amended, which grants original and exclusive
jurisdiction over conciliation and mediation of disputes, grievances or problems to certain
offices of the Department of Labor and Employment]; [12] Actions to annul judgment upon a
compromise which may be filed directly in court [See Sanchez vs. [Judge] Tupaz, 158 SCRA
459]. The compulsory process of arbitration is a pre-condition for the filing of the complaint in
court. Where the complaint (a) did not state that it is one of excepted cases, or (b) it did not
allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or (c) did not have a certification that no
conciliation had been reached by the parties, the case should be dismissed. Here, petitioner
Agbayani failed to show that the instant case is not one of the exceptions enumerated
above. Neither has she shown that the oral defamation caused on her was so grave as to
merit a penalty of more than one year. Oral defamation under Article 358 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, is penalized as follows: Article 358. Slander. Oral defamation
shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty shall be
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos. We recall that in the morning of December
27, 2006 when the alleged utterances were made, Genabe was about to punch in her time in
her card when she was informed that she had been suspended for failing to meet her
deadline in a case, and that it was Agbayani who informed the presiding judge that she had
missed her deadline when she left to attend a convention in Baguio City, leaving Agbayani to
finish the task herself. According to Undersecretary Pineda, the confluence of these
circumstances was the immediate cause of respondent Genabe's emotional and
psychological distress. We rule that his determination that the defamation was uttered while
the respondent was in extreme excitement or in a state of passion and obfuscation,
rendering her offense of lesser gravity than if it had been made with cold and calculating
deliberation, is beyond the ambit of our review. The CA concurred that the complained
utterances constituted only slight oral defamation, having been said in the heat of anger and
with perceived provocation from Agbayani. Respondent Genabe was of a highly volatile
personality prone to throw fits (sumpongs), who thus shared a hostile working environment
with her co-employees, particularly with her superiors, Agbayani and Hon. Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda, the Presiding Judge of Branch 275, whom she claimed had committed against her
grievous acts that outrage moral and social conduct. That there had been a long-standing
animosity between Agbayani and Genabe is not denied.
 Case No. 9.
VALENCIDES VERCIDE, vs. JUDGE PRISCILLA T. HERNANDEZ
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1265, April 6, 2000

Facts:

Judge Hernandez was charged with grave abuse of authority and ignorance of the
law when she dismissed the complaint of Valencides filed against Galleros for recovery of
possession of a piece of land. The land is located in Upper Centro, Tudela, Misamis
Occidental. Defendant Galleros is a resident of the same municipality while complainant are
resident of Dipolog City. Because of this fact, the case was filed in court without prior referral
to the Lupong Tagapamayapa. 

For her part, Judge Hernandez argued that the parties whose disputes involved real
properties should first bring the dispute before the Barangay where the property is located,
and that failure to bring the dispute before the Barangay Conciliation no action may be filed
in court for final adjudication of the said dispute.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the lupon has jurisdiction in this case?

2. Whether or not Judge Hernandez is guilty of grave abuse of authority and
ignorance of the law?

Ruling:

1. No, under Sec. 408 of RA 7160:

“The lupon shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city
or municipality for amicable settlement…” 

and Sec. 408 (f) and Sec. 2, Rule VI of the Katarungan Pambarangay Rules:

“Exception to amicable settlement: Disputes involving parties who actually reside in

barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each
other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon”

It is clear that recourse to barangay conciliation proceedings is not necessary where the
parties do not reside in the same municipality or city or in adjoining barangays. Hence, there
is no need for prior referral to the lupon.
 2. Yes, Judge Hernandez showed patent ignorance, if not, disregard of this Supreme
Court’s rulings on the jurisdiction of the Lupong Tagapamayapa by erroneous quotation of
the provisions of the Katarungan Pambarangay Rules of implementing RA 7160.