States V Us and States Compl 2021-11-23
States V Us and States Compl 2021-11-23
______, Original
BILL OF COMPLAINT
TABLE OF EXHIBITS
Memo., John Ratcliffe, Director of National
Intelligence, Views on Intelligence Community
Election Security Analysis (Jan. 7, 2021) ............... 1
Letter from Pamela S. Karlan, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, to Arizona Sen. Karen Fann (May 5,
2021) .......................................................................... 2
Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project,
Summary Report, Election Auditing, Key
Issues and Perspectives (2018)................................ 3
Declaration of Col. John R. Mills (USAR Ret.)
(Nov. 21, 2021) .......................................................... 4
Declaration of J. Alex Halderman (Sept. 21,
2021) .......................................................................... 5
Email, Steven Rosenberg, Fulton County Deputy
County Attorney to Garland Favorito (Sept.
27, 2021) .................................................................... 6
v
Email, Chris Harvey, Georgia Election Director,
to Larry Sampson, Murray Cty., Georgia (Dec.
2, 2020) ...................................................................... 7
Sen. William Ligon, Chairman, Election Law
Study Subcommittee of the Georgia Standing
Senate Judiciary Committee (Dec. 17, 2020) ......... 8
Letter, Sen. William Ligon, Georgia State
Senate, to Donald J. Trump (Jan. 2, 2021) ............ 9
Genetski v. Benson, Case No. 20-000216-MM,
(Mich. Ct. Claims, March 9, 2021) ........................ 10
Affidavit of Jessy Jacob (Nov. 7, 2020) ..................... 11
Affidavit of William Hartman (Nov. 18, 2020)......... 12
Affidavit of Monica Palmer (Nov. 18, 2020) ............. 13
Affidavit of Lisa Gage (Dec. 10, 2020) ...................... 14
Affidavit of Ben Cotton (Apr. 8, 2021) ...................... 15
Letter, Rep. Francis X. Ryan, Pennsylvania
House of Representatives, to Rep. Scott Perry,
U.S. House of Representatives (Dec. 4, 2020) ...... 16
Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau Report (Oct.
2021) ........................................................................ 17
Presentation, Sheriff, Racine County, Wisconsin
(Oct. 28, 2021) ......................................................... 18
First Interim Rept., Wisconsin Office of the
Special Counsel (Nov. 10, 2021) ............................ 19
Cyber Ninjas, Maricopa County Forensic
Election Audit, vol. III (Sept. 24, 2021) ................ 20
A. V. Shiva Ayyadurai, Ph.D., Pattern
Recognition Classification of Early Voting
Ballot (EVB) Return Envelope Images for
Signature Presence Detection: An Engineering
Systems Approach to Identify Anomalies to
Advance the Integrity of US. Election (Sept.
2124, 2021) .............................................................. 21
vi
Letter, Eugene A. DePasquale, Pennsylvania
Auditor General, to Tom Wolf, Governor,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Dec. 13,
2019) ........................................................................ 22
Wisconsin Elections Commission Memoranda,
To: All Wisconsin Election Officials 3 (Aug. 19,
2020) ........................................................................ 23
Wisconsin Safe Voting Plan 2020 Submitted to
the Center for Tech & Civic Life, June 15,
2020, by the Mayors of Madison, Milwaukee,
Racine, Kenosha and Green Bay (Jun. 15,
2020) ........................................................................ 24
1
“You will never know how much it has cost my
generation to preserve your freedom. I hope you will
make a good use of it.”
John Adams
INTRODUCTION
We are in unchartered territory as a Nation.
The November 2020 election was stolen. Our Country
is divided in a manner not seen in over a century. Just
last month, 56% of respondents agreed that “it’s likely
that cheating affected the outcome of the 2020
presidential election”—a 5% increase since April
2021.1 The fault for this deepening divide lies directly
with the federal and state public officials who not only
abdicated their sworn duty to support and defend the
Constitution of the United States, but in many cases
actively sought to subvert it. The Justices of this
Court can no longer ignore what the public already
sees—a time in history like that which Churchill once
characterized as the gathering storm.
Revelations of rampant lawlessness by officials
in states like Georgia, Michigan, Wisconsin, Arizona,
and Pennsylvania (collectively, “Defendant States”)
involving outcome-changing illegal votes appear
daily. For example, in Pennsylvania, after all counties
had finally uploaded their official November 2020
election results, there were still 49,171 more votes
records-for-355000-absentee-vote-by-mail-ballots-deposited-in-
drop-boxes/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2021).
5
Electors Clause of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, and
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
and their obstruction of audits and investigations into
their actions in attempt to cover up their participation
in stealing the November 2020 election. which injured
Plaintiff State.
2. Plaintiff State further challenges United
States and five federal officers 3 for violating both the
Guarantee Clause and Take Care Clause of Article IV,
Section 4 and Article II, Section 3 of the United States
Constitution, respectively, by failing to remedy the
Electors Clause violations which destroyed the
integrity of the Peoples’ vote in the November 2020
election.
3. This case presents two core questions of
law:
(i) Did Defendant States violate the
Electors Clause or the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
taking—or by allowing—non-legislative
actions to change the election rules that
would govern the November 2020
election?
(ii) Did the federal defendants violate the
Guarantee Clause or Take Care Clause
by failing to pursue claims against the
Defendant States for their constitutional
3 The five officers are the President of the United States, Vice-
President of the United States, Attorney General of the United
States, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives,
President Pro Tempore of the United States Senate (collectively,
the “Officer Defendants”).
6
violations described above or by ignoring
evidence of outcome-changing illegal
votes in the Defendant States and worse
by impeding investigations of illegal or
fraudulent votes in at least one
Defendant State?
6 https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2020/08/22/mail-
in-voting-civil-war-election-conspiracy-lincoln/ (last visited Nov.
23, 2021).
18
statutory protections designed to ensure election
integrity, Defendant States created a massive
opportunity for fraud. In addition, Defendant States
made it difficult or impossible to separate the
constitutionally tainted mail-in ballots from valid
mail-in ballots.
48. Rather than augment safeguards
against illegal voting in anticipation of the millions of
additional mail-in ballots flooding into their States,
Defendant States all materially weakened, or did
away with, security measures, such as witness or
signature verification procedures, and prohibitions on
unmanned ballot drop boxes, required by their
respective legislatures. Their legislatures established
those commonsense safeguards to prevent—or at least
reduce—fraudulent mail-in ballots.
49. Significantly, in Defendant States,
Democrat voters voted by mail at two to three times
the rate of Republicans. Mr. Biden thus greatly
benefited from this unconstitutional usurpation of
legislative authority, and the weakening of
legislatively mandated ballot security measures.
Electronic voting systems are inherently
vulnerable to hacking and manipulation.
50. In addition to the unconstitutional acts
associated with mail-in and absentee voting, there are
grave issues surrounding the vulnerability of
electronic voting machines—such as the electronic
voting systems provided by Dominion Voting Systems,
Inc. (“Dominion”) and Election Systems & Software
(“ES&S”)—that were in use in all of the Defendant
19
States (and other states as well) during the November
2020 election.
51. In 2017, the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) designated election
infrastructure as critical infrastructure pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 5195c. See Curling v. Kemp, 334 F. Supp.
3d 1303, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 2018). The United States thus
formally articulated its duty to protect the Nation’s
election systems.
52. On November 12, 2020, after the
November 2020 election, members of Elections
Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council &
The Election Infrastructure Sector Coordinating
Executive Committees issued a joint statement
declaring that “[t]he November 3rd election was the
most secure in American history.” The purveyors of
this statement provided no support for this bald-faced
assertion.
53. In an ironic twist, four weeks later, on
December 13, 2020, the U.S. Government announced
the largest cyberattack in the Country’s history
affecting more than 18,000 public and private
organizations—including at least one voting machine
company.
54. As Plaintiff’s expert, Col. John Mills
(USAR Ret.), a former Director of Cybersecurity
Policy, Strategy, and International Affairs, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Senior Civilian possessing
almost 40 years of experience in the planning and use
of U.S. cybersecurity-related instruments of national
power testifies:
• The United States Government has the
capability to project significant effects toward
20
critical infrastructure worldwide—including
election systems. This same capability now
exists in other countries, such as China,
Russian, Iran, and Venezuela, and these
foreign powers now use these same, similar,
and improved remote access operation
methodologies at will to assert their own
national agendas.
• These operations have created a growing talent
base of personnel, software, and network-
enabled, remote-access capabilities that are
becoming ubiquitous in the hands of companies
and personnel outside of the U.S. Government.
• Statements that the November 2020 election
was “the most secure in American history”
asserted in a November 12, 2020, posted on the
CISA website, had little, if any, basis in fact.
Declaration of Col. John R. Mills, ¶¶ 9 -14 (USAR Ret.)
(Tab 4).
55. Further highlighting the extreme risk of
manipulation of our electronic voting systems is the
public testimony of renowned cyber security expert,
University of Michigan Professor J. Alex Halderman.
On June 21, 2017, he testified to the United States
Senate Intelligence Committee on how easy it is to
hack electronic voting systems to change the outcome
of a national election.
56. The following statement by Professor
Halderman at this hearing is startling:
21
7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AmivIHUAy8Q
(opening testimony at 2:15:15 to 2:21:15) (last visited Nov. 23,
2021).
8 See Declaration of J. Alex Halderman (Tab 5). The 16 states
are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois,
Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada New Jersey,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington. Id. at ¶5
23
on attacking elections certainly could have already
discovered the same problems I did.” Id.
60. Prof. Halderman testified that Georgia
Secretary of State Raffensperger is refusing to
address these issues and, along with the other
defendant Georgia county election officials, has
objected to disclosing his Report just to CISA leaving
Prof. Halderman to state that “continuing to conceal
[these] problems . . . serves no one and only hurts
voters.” Id. (emphasis added).
The State of Arizona’s electoral votes were
unlawfully certified and counted.
61. Arizona has 11 electoral votes, with a
state-wide vote tally 1,661,686 for Mr. Trump and
1,672,143 for Mr. Biden, a margin of 10,457 votes.
62. The number of illegal votes and votes
affected by the various constitutional violations far
exceeds the margin of votes separating the
candidates.
1. Arizona’s election violated the
Electors’ Clause.
63. Since 1990, Arizona law has required
that residents wishing to participate in an election
submit their voter registration materials no later than
29 days prior to election day in order to vote in that
election. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-120(A). For 2020, that
deadline was October 5.
64. Such deadlines are permissible: “State is
certainly justified in imposing some reasonable cutoff
point for registration … which citizens must meet in
24
order to participate in the next election.” Rosario v.
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760 (1973).
65. In Mi Familia Vota v. Hobbs, 492 F.
Supp. 3d 980 (D. Ariz. 2020), however, a federal
district court violated the Electors Clause and
enjoined that law, extending the registration deadline
to October 23, 2020. The Ninth Circuit stayed that
order on October 13, 2020, with a two-day grace
period, Mi Familia Vota v. Hobbs, 977 F.3d 948, 955
(9th Cir. 2020).
66. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit did not
apply the stay retroactively because neither the
Arizona Secretary of State nor the Arizona Attorney
General requested retroactive relief. Id. at 954-55. As
a net result, the deadline was unconstitutionally
extended from the statutory deadline of October 5 to
October 15, 2021, thereby allowing more than 52,000
registrations in violation of Arizona law. Brahm
Resnik, Court cuts off extension of Arizona voter
registration on Thursday, 12 NEWS, Oct. 13, 2020.9
2. Audits of Maricopa County found
outcome-determinative numbers of
unlawful votes.
67. In addition the foregoing purely legal
Electors Clause violation, audits of the 2020 election
results in Maricopa County discovered evidence of
outcome-determinative discrepancies and fraud.
9 https://www.12news.com/article/news/politics/elections/court-
cuts-off-extension-of-arizona-voter-registration-after-2-more-
days/75-86c59dfb-2950-4fea-89aa-6c38542b10de (last visited
Nov. 23, 2021).
25
68. On December 15, 2020, the Arizona
State senate served two subpoenas on the Maricopa
County Board of Supervisors (the “Maricopa Board”)
to audit scanned ballots, voting machines, and
software based on voting irregularities. The Arizona
Senate Judiciary Chairman stated in a public hearing
earlier that day that “[t]here is evidence of tampering,
there is evidence of fraud” with vote in Maricopa
County.
69. Rather than comply with the subpoenas,
the Maricopa Board fought the subpoenas in state
court, which resulted in the issuance of two new,
superseding subpoenas on January 12, 2021.
Although the Maricopa Board complied in part, it
continued to seek to withhold the balance of the
subpoenaed election materials (e.g., ballots, voting
equipment) needed to audit election results.
70. Although the Arizona Senate prevailed
on the lawfulness of the subpoenas, Maricopa Cty. v.
Fann, No. CV 2020-016840 (Maricopa Cty. Super. Ct.
Feb. 25, 2021), the Maricopa Board and other County
officials continued to obstruct the audit and withheld
materials covered by the subpoenas (e.g., splunk logs,
routers, and equipment) that could determine the
extent of internet connectedness or intrusions.
71. After the Maricopa County Superior
Court upheld the issuance of the operative subpoenas,
on March 3, 2021, someone using an administrative
account from a valid local network address accessed
Maricopa County’s Election Management System
(“EMS”) server and executed a script 37,686 times,
with each execution resulting on the overwriting of
one entry in the EMS server’s security log (i.e., the log
26
has a fixed capacity, and each new entry displaced the
oldest entry), thereby destroying evidence of the
network accesses to the EMS during the 2020 election.
72. The Arizona Senate engaged systems
and cybersecurity firms to audit the election materials
produced by the County using forensic methods that
exceed the type of hand recount typically conducted in
close elections. Unlike a forensic audit, a recount
would not detect fraud in the same way that
recounting the money in a cash register would not
detect whether a business had been passed counterfeit
currency.
73. On September 24, 2021, the forensic
auditors presented their reports to the Arizona State
Senate in both written form and testimony.
74. The forensic auditors found numerous
anomalies and outcome-determinative discrepancies
with the Maricopa County election materials made
available to them, including:
• 255,326 ballots included in the “final voted file”
(the “VM55” file) as having voted early that
were not included in the “early voting returns
file” (the “EV33” file), when the EV33 file
should have an entry for each early vote cast
(whether by mail or in person) with the details
as to when and how that vote was cast;
• 23,344 mail-in ballots cast when the registered
voter had moved and where no one with the
same surname remained at the address;
• 5,295 instances of multiple ballots from the
same person;
27
• 3,432 more votes in the official results than in
the final-voted (“VM55”) file;
• 2,592 more duplicate ballots than ballots sent
for duplication;
• 1,528 voters who had moved to another state;
• 618 votes by persons not on the official precinct
register 10 days prior to election;
• 397 mail-in ballots returned without any record
of a ballot having been sent to the voter;
• 282 registered voters who died before October
5, 2020, and nonetheless voted;
• 198 votes by persons who registered after the
cut-off date for registering to vote in the 2020
election.
Cyber Ninjas, Maricopa County Forensic Election
Audit, vol. III, at 6, 51, 10, 12-14, 20-21, 25-26, 29-30,
34-36 (Sept. 24, 2021) (Tab 20).
75. Although Maricopa County withholding
the router, Splunk, and NetFlow data prevented an
audit of all internet connections with the Maricopa
County election system, the audit network auditors
did find evidence of internet activity in unallocated
space—i.e., portions of deleted files—on the Maricopa
County election systems dated after the installation of
the Dominion voting software suite on August 6, 2020.
This finding proves that Maricopa County’s claim that
its election systems were not connected to the internet
is false.
76. The forensic auditors were unable to
determine whether votes or results had been
electronically altered from the materials initially
provided because Maricopa County officials withheld
28
or overwrote equipment and data that would allow
forensic auditors to determine whether intrusions
had—or had not—occurred and, if so, from where
those intrusions came.
77. In addition, A. V. Shiva Ayyadurai,
Ph.D., analyzed signatures from the images of early-
voting ballot envelopes that Maricopa County
provided to the Arizona Senate. His findings included
the following anomalies and outcome-determinative
discrepancies from an analysis of the signature
regions of the 1,929,240 early-voting ballot (“EVB”)
return envelope images provided:
• 17,322 duplicate mail-in voting early ballots by
17,126 voters who voted twice (16,934 voters),
thrice (188 voters), or four times (4 voters);
• 9,589 fewer EVB return envelopes identified as
even having a signature than Maricopa County
submitted for signature verification;
• A 59.7% decrease in the number of EVB return
envelopes rejected as having a signature
mismatch versus the 2016 election,
notwithstanding that the number of EVB
return envelopes increased 52.6% from 2016 to
2020;
• 6,545 fewer EVB return envelope images made
available than reported by Maricopa County’s
canvass report on the 2020 general election;
• 2,580 “scribbles” in the signature region—
which would indicate a “bad signature” if a
review were commissioned to analyze
signatures—when Maricopa County reported
having rejected only 587 “bad signature” EVB
29
return envelopes in its canvass report on the
2020 general election;
• 464 more "no signature" EVB return
envelopes—a total of 1,919—when Maricopa
County reported having rejected only 1,455 “no
signature” EVB return envelopes in its canvass
report on the 2020 general election.
A. V. Shiva Ayyadurai, Ph.D., Pattern Recognition
Classification of Early Voting Ballot (EVB) Return
Envelope Images for Signature Presence Detection:
An Engineering Systems Approach to Identify
Anomalies to Advance the Integrity of US. Election
Processes, at 62, 88-89 (Sept. 24, 2021) (Tab 21).
78. Based on his review of signature region
on the EVB return envelopes, Dr. Shiva concluded
that a full audit (e.g., comparing the signature on EVB
return envelope images with voters’ signatures from
voter registration files) of the Maricopa signature-
verification process is needed.
The State of Georgia’s electoral votes were
unlawfully certified and counted.
79. Georgia has 16 electoral votes, with a
statewide vote tally of 2,461,854 for Mr. Trump and
2,473,633 for Mr. Biden, a margin of approximately
11,779 votes.
80. The number of illegal votes and votes
affected by the various constitutional violations far
exceeds the margin of votes separating the
candidates.
30
1. The violations of Article II in Georgia
resulted in outcome-determinative
numbers of unlawful votes.
81. In July 2020, Georgia Secretary of State
Raffensperger and the Georgia State Election Board,
without legislative approval as required under
Georgia’s Constitution, authorized the use of 300
absentee ballot drop boxes beginning 49 days before
the November 2020 election. Rule 183-1-14-0.8-.14
Secure Absentee Ballot Drop Boxes.
82. Under this Rule, each of Georgia’s 159
counties is responsible for documenting the transfer
of every batch of absentee ballots picked up at drop
boxes and delivered to the county election offices with
ballot transfer forms. The forms are required to be
signed and dated, with time of pick up by the
collection team upon pick up, and then signed, dated,
with time of delivery by the registrar or designee upon
receipt and accepted.
83. As of April 2021, officials at the state and
county level in Georgia have failed to produce chain of
custody records for more than 355,000 absentee vote
by mail ballots deposited in drop boxes located around
the state for that election.
84. In addition, Georgia’s Secretary of State,
Brad Raffensperger, without legislative approval,
unilaterally abrogated Georgia’s statutes governing
the date a ballot may be opened, and the signature
verification process for absentee ballots.
85. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-386(a)(2) prohibits the
opening of absentee ballots until after the polls open
on Election Day. In April 2020, however, the State
Election Board adopted Secretary of State Rule 183-1-
31
14-0.9-.15, Processing Ballots Prior to Election Day.
That rule purports to authorize county election
officials to begin processing absentee ballots up to
three weeks before Election Day. Outside parties were
then given early and illegal access to purportedly
defective ballots to “cure” them in violation of
O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-386(a)(1)(C), 21-2-419(c)(2).
86. Specifically, Georgia law authorizes and
requires a single registrar or clerk—after reviewing
the outer envelope—to reject an absentee ballot if: the
voter failed to sign the required oath or to provide the
required information; the signature appears invalid or
the required information does not conform with the
information on file; or if the voter is otherwise found
ineligible to vote. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-386(a)(1)(B)-(C).
87. Georgia law provides absentee voters the
chance to “cure a failure to sign the oath, an invalid
signature, or missing information” on a ballot’s outer
envelope by the deadline for verifying provisional
ballots (i.e., three days after the election). O.C.G.A. §§
21-2-386(a)(1)(C), 21-2-419(c)(2). To facilitate cures,
Georgia law requires the relevant election official to
notify the voter in writing: “The board of registrars or
absentee ballot clerk shall promptly notify the elector
of such rejection, a copy of which notification shall be
retained in the files of the board of registrars or
absentee ballot clerk for at least two years.” O.C.G.A.
§ 21-2-386(a)(1)(B).
88. There were 284,817 early ballots
corrected and accepted in Georgia out of 4,018,064
early ballots used to vote in Georgia. Mr. Biden
received nearly twice the number of mail-in votes as
32
Mr. Trump and thus materially benefited from this
unconstitutional change in Georgia’s election laws.
89. In addition, on March 6, 2020, in
Democratic Party of Georgia v. Raffensperger, No.
1:19-cv-5028-WMR (N.D. Ga.), Georgia’s Secretary of
State, a non-legislative actor, entered a Compromise
Settlement Agreement and Release with the
Democratic Party of Georgia (the “Settlement”) to
materially change the legislature’s statutory
requirements for reviewing signatures on absentee
ballot envelopes to confirm the voter’s identity by
making it far more difficult to challenge defective
signatures beyond the express mandatory procedures
set forth at GA. CODE § 21-2-386(a)(1)(B).
90. Among other things, before a ballot could
be rejected, the Settlement required a registrar who
found a defective signature to now seek a review by
two other registrars, and only if a majority of the
registrars agreed that the signature was defective
could the ballot be rejected but not before all three
registrars’ names were written on the ballot envelope
along with the reason for the rejection. These
cumbersome procedures are in direct conflict with
Georgia’s statutory requirements, as is the
Settlement’s requirement that notice be provided by
telephone (i.e., not in writing) if a telephone number
is available. Finally, the Settlement purports to
require State election officials to consider issuing
guidance and training materials drafted by an expert
retained by the Democratic Party of Georgia.
91. Georgia’s legislature has not ratified
these material purported changes to statutory law
mandated by the Compromise Settlement Agreement
33
and Release, including altered signature verification
requirements and early opening of ballots. The
relevant legislation that was violated by the
Compromise Settlement Agreement and Release did
not include a severability clause.
92. This unconstitutional purported change
in Georgia law materially benefitted Mr. Biden.
According to the Georgia Secretary of State’s office,
Mr. Biden had almost double the number of absentee
votes (65.32%) as Mr. Trump (34.68%).
93. The effect of this unconstitutional
change in Georgia election law, which made it more
likely that ballots without matching signatures would
be counted, had a material impact on the outcome of
the election.
94. Specifically, there were 1,305,659
absentee mail-in ballots submitted in Georgia in 2020.
There were 4,786 absentee ballots rejected in 2020.
This is a rejection rate of .37%. In contrast, in 2016,
the 2016 rejection rate was 6.42% with 13,677
absentee mail-in ballots being rejected out of 213,033
submitted, which is more than seventeen times greater
than in 2020.
95. If the rejection rate of mailed-in absentee
ballots remained the same in 2020 as it was in 2016,
there would be 83,517 fewer tabulated ballots in 2020.
The statewide split of absentee ballots was 34.68% for
Trump and 65.2% for Biden. Rejecting at the higher
2016 rate with the 2020 split between Trump and
Biden would decrease Trump votes by 28,965 and
Biden votes by 54,552, which would be a net gain for
Trump of 25,587 votes. This would be more than
needed to overcome the Biden advantage of 11,779
34
votes. Regardless of the number of ballots affected,
however, the non-legislative changes to the election
rules violated the Electors Clause.
2. Georgia’s use of electronic voting
machines opened the door to
electronic manipulation of the vote.
96. In addition, Georgia uses Dominion’s
electronic voting machines throughout the State. Less
than a month before the election, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
ruled on a motion brought by a citizen advocate group
and others seeking a preliminary injunction to stop
Georgia from using Dominion’s voting systems due to
their known vulnerabilities to hacking and other
irregularities. See Curling v. Raffensperger, 493 F.
Supp. 3d 1264 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (“Curling”).
97. Though the district court found that it
was bound by Eleventh Circuit law to deny plaintiffs’
motion, it issued a prophetic warning stating:
The Court's Order has delved deep into the
true risks posed by the new BMD voting
system as well as its manner of
implementation. These risks are neither
hypothetical nor remote under the current
circumstances. The insularity of the
Defendants’ and Dominion's stance
here in evaluation and management of
the security and vulnerability of the
BMD system does not benefit the public
or citizens' confident exercise of the
franchise. The stealth vote alteration or
operational interference risks posed by
35
malware that can be effectively invisible to
detection, whether intentionally seeded or
not, are high once implanted, if equipment
and software systems are not properly
protected, implemented, and audited.
493 F. Supp. 3d at 1341 (emphasis added).
98. In a November 4, 2020, video interview,
Fulton County, Georgia Director of Elections, Richard
Barron, stated that the tallied vote of over 93% of
ballots were based on a “review [panel’s]”
determination of the voter’s “intent”—not what the
voter actually voted. Specifically, he stated that “so far
we’ve scanned 113,130 ballots, we’ve adjudicated over
106,000. . . . The only ballots that are adjudicated are
if we have a ballot with a contest on it in which there’s
some question as to how the computer reads it so that
the vote review panel then determines voter intent.” 10
There is no way to know whether that vast number of
ballots were accurately adjudicated in that short
period of time to reflect the true vote.
99. This astounding figure demonstrates
how easy it is for election officials to use electronic
voting systems to modify votes on a massive scale with
no oversight. These figures, in and of themselves in
this one sample, far exceeds the margin of votes
separating the two candidates in Georgia.
100. On November 9, 2021, a voting rights
group, VoterGA, announced that 56 Georgia counties
admitted that most or all of the images created
10 https://www.c-span.org/video/?477819-1/fulton-county-
georgia-election-update (last visited Nov. 23, 2021) (from 0:20
through 1:21).
36
automatically by the Dominion voting system for
results tabulation have been destroyed, and that a
total of 74 Georgia counties have been unable to
produce all the original ballot images from the
November 2020 election.
101. For example, VoterGA sent an open
records act request to Fulton County for an
“[e]lectronic Copy of all original Election Day ballot
images for the November 3rd, 2020 election.” The
County responded:
I recall our conversation and I appreciate you
emailing me your requests. I can confirm that
the County maintains no records which are
responsive to your request. The answer is the
same for both the request contained in this
email as well as the email you just sent seeking
“Electronic Copy of the approximately 315,000
original In-Person Advance Voting ballot
images for the November 3rd, 2020 election”.
The County maintains nothing responsive. 11
102. Thus, Fulton County apparently
destroyed over 350,000 ballot images—the only
records which can show the authenticity of the ballot
cast such as through the proof of date and time when
cast based on metadata contained on the images.
Paper ballots have no such evidence that proves their
authenticity.
103. The destruction of these election records
violated 52 USC § 20701, which requires a 22-month
15 https://www.media.pa.gov/pages/state-
details.aspx?newsid=434 (last visited Nov. 23, 2021)
54
4. The Pennsylvania Secretary of State
unconstitutionally threw out state
election integrity laws governing
mail-in ballots.
161. In 2016, Pennsylvania received 266,208
mail-in ballots; 2,534 of them were rejected (.95%).16
However, in 2020, Pennsylvania received 2,623,867
mail-in ballots—nearly 10 times the number of mail-
in ballots compared to 2016. Despite this flood of
ballots, the reported rejection rate was just 1.3% with
just 34,171 ballots rejected.17 As explained below, this
vastly larger volume of mail-in ballots was treated in
an unconstitutionally modified manner that included:
(1) doing away with the Pennsylvania’s signature
verification requirements; and (2) blocking poll
watchers in Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties in
violation of State law.
162. The blatant disregard of statutory law
renders all mail-in ballots constitutionally tainted
and should not have formed the basis for appointing
or certifying Pennsylvania’s presidential electors to
the Electoral College.
163. Specifically, Pennsylvania’s then-
Secretary of State, Kathy Boockvar, without
legislative approval, unilaterally abrogated several
Pennsylvania statutes requiring signature
verification for absentee or mail-in ballots.
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