Filed: For Publication

Case: 09-17241 12/11/2009 Page: 1 of 38 ID: 7161560 DktEntry: 37-1
Case 09-17551 Document 23-1 Filed 12/11/09 38 pages FILED

FOR PUBLICATION DEC 11 2009
MO LLY C. DW YER, CLERK

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T O F APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KRISTIN M. PERRY; SANDRA B. No. 09-17241

STIER; PAUL T. KATAMI; JEFFREY J.
ZARRILLO, D.C. No. 3:09-cv-02292-VRW
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
OPINION
and
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO,
Plaintiff-intervenor,
v.
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, in his

official capacity as Governor of California;
EDMUND G. BROWN, Jr., in his official
capacity as Attorney General of California;
MARK B. HORTON in his official
capacity as Director of the California
Department of Public Health & State
Registrar of Vital Statistics; LINETTE
SCOTT, in her official capacity as Deputy
Director of Health Information & Strategic
Planning for the California Department of
Public Health; PATRICK O’CONNELL,
in his official capacity as Clerk-Recorder
for the County of Alameda; DEAN C.
LOGAN, in his official capacity as
Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk for the
County of Los Angeles,
Defendants,
and
DENNIS HOLLINGSWORTH; GAIL J.

KNIGHT; MARTIN F. GUTIERREZ;
HAK-SHING WILLIAM TAM; MARK
A. JANSSON;
PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM - YES ON
8, A PROJECT OF CALIFORNIA
RENEWAL,
Defendant-intervenors -
Appellants.
KRISTIN M. PERRY; SANDRA B. No. 09-17551

STIER; PAUL T. KATAMI; JEFFREY J.
ZARRILLO, D.C. No. 3:09-cv-02292-VRW
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
and
OUR FAMILY COALITION;

LAVENDER SENIORS OF THE EAST
BAY; PARENTS, FAMILIES, AND
FRIENDS OF LESBIANS AND GAYS,
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO,
Plaintiff-intervenors -
Appellees,
v.
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER;
2
EDMUND G. BROWN, Jr.; MARK B.

HORTON; LINETTE SCOTT; PATRICK
O’CONNELL; DEAN C. LOGAN,
Defendants,
and
DENNIS HOLLINGSWORTH; GAIL J.

KNIGHT; MARTIN F. GUTIERREZ;
HAK-SHING WILLIAM TAM; MARK
A. JANSSON;
PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM - YES ON
8, A PROJECT OF CALIFORNIA
RENEWAL,
Defendant-intervenors -
Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California
Vaughn R. Walker, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 1, 2009

Pasadena, California
Filed
Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Raymond C. Fisher and Marsha S. Berzon,

Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Fisher
RAYMOND C. FISHER, Circuit Judge:
3
Proposition 8 amended the California Constitution to provide that only
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California. Two
same-sex couples filed this action in the district court alleging that Proposition 8
violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The official proponents of Proposition 8 (“Proponents”) intervened
to defend the suit. Plaintiffs served a request for production of documents on
Proponents, seeking, among other things, production of Proponents’ internal
campaign communications relating to campaign strategy and advertising.
Proponents objected to disclosure of the documents as barred by the First
Amendment. In two orders, the district court rejected Proponents’ claim of First
Amendment privilege. Proponents appealed both orders. We granted Proponents’
motion for stay pending appeal.
We have the authority to hear these appeals either under the collateral order
doctrine or through the exercise of our mandamus jurisdiction. We reverse. The
freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs
and ideas lies at the heart of the First Amendment. Where, as here, discovery
would have the practical effect of discouraging the exercise of First Amendment
associational rights, the party seeking discovery must demonstrate a need for the
information sufficiently compelling to outweigh the impact on those rights.
4
Plaintiffs have not on the existing record carried that burden in this case. We
therefore reverse and remand.
I. B ACKGROUND
In November 2008, California voters approved Proposition 8, an initiative
measure providing that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or
recognized in California.” Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5. The California Supreme Court
has upheld Proposition 8 against several state constitutional challenges. Strauss v.
Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 63-64 (Cal. 2009). Plaintiffs, two same-sex couples
prohibited from marrying, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging “that Prop. 8,
which denies gay and lesbian individuals the right to marry civilly and enter into
the same officially sanctioned family relationship with their loved ones as
heterosexual individuals, is unconstitutional under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.” Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7. They alleged among other things that “[t]he
disadvantage Prop. 8 imposes on gays and lesbians is the result of disapproval or
animus against a politically unpopular group.” Id. ¶ 43. Defendants are a number
of state officials responsible for the enforcement of Proposition 8, including the
Governor and the Attorney General. Id. ¶¶ 13-19. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and
injunctive relief. Id. ¶ 8.
5
After the Attorney General declined to defend the constitutionality of
Proposition 8, the district court granted a motion by Proponents – the official
proponents of Proposition 8 and the official Proposition 8 campaign committee –
to intervene as defendants.
Plaintiffs served requests for production of documents on Proponents under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34. Plaintiffs’ eighth request sought:
All versions of any documents that constitute

communications referring to Proposition 8, between you
and any third party, including, without limitation, members
of the public or the media.
The parties understand this request as encompassing, among other things,
Proponents’ internal campaign communications concerning strategy and
messaging.
Proponents objected to the request as irrelevant, privileged under the First
Amendment and unduly burdensome and filed a motion for a protective order.
They argued that their internal campaign communications, including draft versions
of communications never actually disseminated to the electorate at large, were
privileged under the First Amendment. They offered evidence that the disclosure
of internal strategy documents would burden political association rights by
discouraging individuals from participating in initiative campaigns and by muting
6
the exchange of ideas within those campaigns. They asserted that the documents
plaintiffs sought were irrelevant to the issues in this case, and even if they were
relevant, the First Amendment interests at stake outweighed plaintiffs’ need for the
information.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion for protective order. They argued that their
request was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence
concerning the purpose of Proposition 8, as well as evidence concerning the
rationality and strength of Proponents’ purported state interests for Proposition 8.
They disputed Proponents’ contention that any of the documents requested were
privileged other than with respect to the names of rank-and-file members of the
campaign, which they agreed to redact.
In an October 1, 2009 order, the district court granted in part and denied in
part Proponents’ motion for a protective order. The court denied Proponents’
claims of privilege.1 The court also determined that plaintiffs’ request was
“reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” regarding
voter intent, the purpose of Proposition 8 and whether Proposition 8 advances a
1
The district court also observed that Proponents had failed to produce a
privilege log required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(A)(ii). We
agree that some form of a privilege log is required and reject Proponents’
contention that producing any privilege log would impose an unconstitutional
burden.
7
legitimate governmental interest. The court said that “communications between
proponents and political consultants or campaign managers, even about messages
contemplated but not actually disseminated, could fairly readily lead to admissible
evidence illuminating the messages disseminated to voters.” 2
Following the court’s October 1 order, Proponents submitted a sample of
documents potentially responsive to plaintiffs’ document request for in camera
review, asserting that the documents were both irrelevant and privileged. In a
November 11, 2009 order following that review, the district court again rejected
Proponents’ argument that their internal campaign communications were
privileged under the First Amendment:
2
The court indicated that plaintiffs’ request was
appropriate to the extent it calls for (1) communications by

and among proponents and their agents (at a minimum,
Schubert Flint Public Affairs) concerning campaign
strategy and (2) communications by and among proponents
and their agents concerning messages to be conveyed to
voters, . . . without regard to whether the messages were
actually disseminated or merely contemplated. In addition,
communications by and among proponents with those who
assumed a directorial or managerial role in the Prop 8
c a mp a ign, lik e p olitical c o ns ulta nts o r
ProtectMarriage.com’s treasurer and executive committee,
among others, would appear likely to lead to discovery of
admissible evidence.
8
Proponents have not . . . identified any way in which the . . .

privilege could protect the disclosure of campaign
communications or the identities of high ranking members
of the campaign. . . . If the . . . privilege identified by
proponents protects anything, it is the identities of rank-
and-file volunteers and similarly situated individuals.
Applying the usual discovery standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, the
court determined that documents falling into the following categories were
reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence: documents
relating to “messages or themes conveyed to voters through advertising or direct
messaging,” documents dealing “directly with advertising or messaging strategy
and themes” and documents discussing voters’ “potential reactions” to campaign
messages. The court ordered production of 21 of the 60 documents submitted for
review.
Proponents appealed from the October 1 and November 11 orders. We
granted Proponents’ motion for a stay pending appeal. We have jurisdiction and
we reverse and remand.
II. J URISDICTION
Proponents contend that we have jurisdiction on two bases. First, they assert
that the district court’s orders are appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
Second, they have petitioned for issuance of a writ of mandamus.
9
While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Mohawk
Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. — (Dec. 8, 2009), holding that discovery
orders concerning the attorney-client privilege are not appealable under the
collateral order doctrine. After Mohawk, it is a close question whether the
collateral order doctrine applies to discovery orders addressing the First
Amendment privilege, and one we ultimately need not decide. On balance, we are
inclined to believe that the First Amendment privilege is distinguishable from the
attorney-client privilege and that we may have jurisdiction under the collateral
order doctrine in this case. But if we do not have collateral order jurisdiction, we
would have, and would exercise, our mandamus jurisdiction. We have repeatedly
exercised our mandamus authority to address important questions of first
impression concerning the scope of a privilege. As this case falls within that class
of extraordinary cases, mandamus would establish a basis of our jurisdiction if
there is no collateral order appeal available after Mohawk.
A. Collateral Order Doctrine
We have jurisdiction to review “final decisions of the district courts.” 28
U.S.C. § 1291. Under the collateral order doctrine, a litigant may appeal “from a
narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation, but must, in the
interest of ‘achieving a healthy legal system,’ nonetheless be treated as ‘final.’”
10
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994) (quoting
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 326 (1940)). To be immediately
appealable, a collateral decision “must conclusively determine the disputed
question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
The first prong is easily satisfied in this case. Taken together, the October 1
and November 11 discovery orders conclusively determined the scope of the First
Amendment privilege. The district court concluded that the privilege does not
extend to internal campaign communications and that it is limited to the disclosure
of identities of rank-and-file members and other similarly situated individuals.
Furthermore, in the November 11 order, the district court conclusively determined
that Proponents were required to produce 21 documents that, according to the
court, were not privileged. See United States v. Griffin, 440 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th
Cir. 2006) (“[T]he district court’s order ‘conclusively determine[s] the disputed
question’ whether the government is entitled to read the communications between
Griffin and his wife for which the [marital communications] privilege had been
claimed.”).
11
The second prong is also satisfied. The overall scope of the First
Amendment privilege is a question of law that is entirely separate from the merits
of the litigation. In theory, the application of the privilege to plaintiffs’ specific
discovery requests has some overlap with merits-related issues, such as whether
plaintiffs’ substantive claims are governed by strict scrutiny or rational basis
review and whether plaintiffs may rely on certain types of evidence to prove that
Proposition 8 was enacted for an improper purpose. We need not, and do not,
delve into those questions in this appeal, however. We assume without deciding
that the district court’s rulings on those questions are correct. There is, therefore,
no “overlap” between the issues we must decide in this appeal and the “factual and
legal issues of the underlying dispute.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S.
517, 529 (1988).
It is the third prong that poses the most difficult question. Under Mohawk,
the third prong turns on whether rulings on First Amendment privilege are, as a
class, effectively reviewable on appeal from final judgment – i.e., “whether
delaying review until the entry of final judgment ‘would imperil a substantial
public interest’ or ‘some particular value of a high order.’” Mohawk, 558 U.S. at
—, slip op. 6 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352-53 (2006)). In Mohawk,
the Court concluded that this prong was not satisfied with respect to the class of
12
rulings addressing invocation of the attorney-client privilege during discovery.
This was so because the typical ruling on the attorney-client privilege will involve
only “the routine application of settled legal principles.” Id. at 8. Denying
immediate appellate review would have no “discernible chill” because “deferring
review until final judgment does not meaningfully reduce the ex ante incentives for
full and frank consultations between clients and counsel.” Id. There being no
discernible harm to the public interest, the remaining harm from an erroneous
ruling (the harm to the individual litigant of having confidential communications
disclosed) could be adequately, if imperfectly, remedied by review after final
judgment: “Appellate courts can remedy the improper disclosure of privileged
material in the same way they remedy a host of other erroneous evidentiary
rulings: by vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial in which
the protected material and its fruits are excluded from evidence.” Id.
Some of Mohawk’s reasoning carries over to the First Amendment privilege.
There are, however, several reasons the class of rulings involving the First
Amendment privilege differs in ways that matter to a collateral order appeal
analysis from those involving the attorney-client privilege. First, this case
concerns a privilege of constitutional dimensions. The right at issue here –
freedom of political association – is of a high order. The constitutional nature of
13
the right is not dispositive of the collateral order inquiry, see, e.g., Flanagan v.
United States, 465 U.S. 259, 267-68 (1984), but it factors into our analysis.
Second, the public interest associated with this class of cases is of greater
magnitude than that in Mohawk. Compelled disclosures concerning protected First
Amendment political associations have a profound chilling effect on the exercise
of political rights. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm.,
372 U.S. 539, 557 (1963) (underscoring the substantial “deterrent and ‘chilling’
effect on the free exercise of constitutionally enshrined rights of free speech,
expression, and association” resulting from compelled disclosure of political
associations). Third, unlike the attorney-client privilege, the First Amendment
privilege is rarely invoked. Collateral review of the First Amendment privilege,
therefore, does not implicate significant “institutional costs.” Mohawk, 558 U.S.
—, slip op. at 11. Cf. id. (“Permitting parties to undertake successive, piecemeal
appeals of all adverse attorney-client rulings would unduly delay the resolution of
district court litigation and needlessly burden the Courts of Appeals.”). Finally, we
observe that Mohawk expressly reserved whether the collateral order doctrine
applies in connection with other privileges. See id. at 12 n.4.
In light of these considerations, whether Mohawk should be extended to the
First Amendment privilege presents a close question. The distinctions between the
14
First Amendment privilege and the attorney-client privilege – a constitutional
basis, a heightened public interest, rarity of invocation and a long recognized
chilling effect – are not insubstantial. We are therefore inclined to conclude that
we have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. Given that this is a close
question, however, we recognize that if we do not have collateral order
jurisdiction, we then could – and would – rely on our authority to hear this
exceptionally important appeal under the mandamus authority, for reasons we now
explain.
B. Mandamus
In the event that we do not have jurisdiction under the collateral order
doctrine, we would have authority to grant the remedy of mandamus. See 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a); Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004); City of
Las Vegas v. Foley, 747 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1984).
“The writ of mandamus is an ‘extraordinary’ remedy limited to
‘extraordinary’ causes.” Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 408 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380). In
Bauman v. United States District Court, 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977), we
established five guidelines to determine whether mandamus is appropriate in a
given case: (1) whether the petitioner has no other means, such as a direct appeal,
15
to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or
prejudiced in any way not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the district court’s
order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the district court’s order
is an oft repeated error or manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules; and
(5) whether the district court’s order raises new and important problems or issues
of first impression. Id. at 654-55. “The factors serve as guidelines, a point of
departure for our analysis of the propriety of mandamus relief.” Admiral Ins. Co. v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 881 F.2d 1486, 1491 (9th Cir. 1989). “Not every factor need be
present at once.” Burlington, 408 F.3d at 1146. “However, the absence of the
third factor, clear error, is dispositive.” Id.
Mandamus is appropriate to review discovery orders “when particularly
important interests are at stake.” 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3935.3 (2d ed. 2009) (hereinafter Wright & Miller).
Although “the courts of appeals cannot afford to become involved with the daily
details of discovery,” we may rely on mandamus to resolve “new questions that
otherwise might elude appellate review” or “to protect important or clear claims of
privilege.” Id.; see Mohawk, 558 U.S. —, slip op. 9 (“[L]itigants confronted with a
particularly injurious or novel privilege ruling have several potential avenues of
review apart from collateral order appeal. . . . [A] party may petition the court of
16
appeals for a writ of mandamus.”). In Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104
(1964), for example, the Supreme Court relied on mandamus to answer the novel
question whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 authorized the physical and
mental examination of a defendant. “The opinion affords strong support for the
use of supervisory or advisory mandamus to review a discovery question that
raises a novel and important question of power to compel discovery, or that reflects
substantial uncertainty and confusion in the district courts.” Wright & Miller
§ 3935.3.
Consistent with Schlagenhauf, we have exercised mandamus jurisdiction to
review discovery orders raising particularly important questions of first
impression, especially when called upon to define the scope of an important
privilege. In Admiral Insurance, for example, we granted the mandamus petition
to resolve “a significant issue of first impression concerning the proper scope of
the attorney-client privilege.” 881 F.2d at 1488. Taiwan v. United States District
Court, 128 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 1997), likewise involved review of another issue of
first impression – the scope of testimonial immunity under the Taiwan Relations
Act. Id. at 714. Finally, in Foley, we exercised our mandamus authority to address
an “important issue of first impression” in a context similar to that here – whether
17
legislators can be deposed to determine their subjective motives for enacting a law
challenged as violative of the First Amendment. 747 F.2d at 1296.
Here, too, we are asked to address an important issue of first impression –
the scope of the First Amendment privilege against compelled disclosure of
internal campaign communications. Considering the Bauman factors, we conclude
that this is an extraordinary case in which mandamus review is warranted.
If no collateral order appeal is available, the first factor would indisputably
be present: “A discovery order . . . is interlocutory and non-appealable” under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292(a)(1) and 1292(b). Foley, 747 F.2d at 1297; see also id.
(“Mandamus review has been held to be appropriate for discovery matters which
otherwise would be reviewable only on direct appeal after resolution on the
merits.”). In Admiral Insurance, for example, we held that the first Bauman factor
was satisfied because “the petitioner lacks an alternative avenue for relief.” 881
F.2d at 1488.
The second factor also supports mandamus. A post-judgment appeal would
not provide an effective remedy, as “no such review could prevent the damage that
[Proponents] allege they will suffer or afford effective relief therefrom.” In re
Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1982); see Star Editorial,
Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 7 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[I]f the district court
18
erred in compelling disclosure, any damage the [newspaper] suffered would not be
correctable on appeal.”); Admiral Ins., 881 F.2d at 1491 (holding that the second
factor was satisfied in view of “the irreparable harm a party likely will suffer if
erroneously required to disclose privileged materials or communications”). One
injury to Proponents’ First Amendment rights is the disclosure itself. Regardless
of whether they prevail at trial, this injury will not be remediable on appeal. See In
re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d at 1302 (“[A] post-judgment reversal on
appeal could not provide a remedy for those injuries.”). If Proponents prevail at
trial, vindication of their rights will be not merely delayed but also entirely
precluded. See id. (“Moreover, whatever collateral injuries petitioners suffer will
have been incurred even if they prevail fully at trial and thus have no right to
appeal from the final judgment.”).
Under the second factor, we also consider the substantial costs imposed on
the public interest. The district court applied an unduly narrow conception of First
Amendment privilege. Under that interpretation, associations that support or
oppose initiatives face the risk that they will be compelled to disclose their internal
campaign communications in civil discovery. This risk applies not only to the
official proponents of initiatives and referendums, but also to the myriad social,
economic, religious and political organizations that publicly support or oppose
19
ballot measures. The potential chilling effect on political participation and debate
is therefore substantial, even if the district court’s error were eventually corrected
on appeal from final judgment. In this sense, our concerns in this case mirror those
we articulated in Foley, where the district court denied the city’s motion for a
protective order to prevent plaintiffs from deposing city officials about their
reasons for passing a zoning ordinance. Absent swift appellate review, we
explained, “legislators could be deposed in every case where the governmental
interest in a regulation is challenged.” 747 F.2d at 1296. More concerning still is
the possibility that if Proponents ultimately prevail in the district court, there would
be no appeal at all of the court’s construction of the First Amendment privilege.
Declining to exercise our mandamus jurisdiction in this case, therefore, “‘would
imperil a substantial public interest’ or ‘some particular value of a high order.’”
Mohawk, 558 U.S. at —, slip op. at 6 (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 352-53).
The third factor, clear error, is also met. As discussed below, we are firmly
convinced that the district court erred by limiting the First Amendment privilege to
“the identities of rank-and-file volunteers and similarly situated individuals” and
affording no greater protection to Proponents’ internal communications than the
generous relevance standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. See In re
Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d at 1306-07 (“[W]hen we are firmly convinced
20
that a district court has erred in deciding a question of law, we may hold that the
district court’s ruling is ‘clearly erroneous as a matter of law as that term is used in
mandamus analysis.’”) (quoting Bauman, 557 F.2d at 660). “[Plaintiffs’] need for
information is only one facet of the problem.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 385. A
political campaign’s communications and activities “encompass a vastly wider
range of sensitive material” protected by the First Amendment than would be true
in the normal discovery context. Id. at 381; see Foley, 747 F.2d at 1298-99. Thus,
“[a]n important factor weighing in the opposite direction is the burden imposed by
the discovery orders. This is not a routine discovery dispute.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at
385.
Finally, the fifth factor weighs in favor of exercise of our supervisory
mandamus authority: we are faced with the need to resolve a significant question
of first impression. See, e.g., Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 110-11 (finding
mandamus jurisdiction appropriate where there was an issue of first impression
concerning the district court’s application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 in
a new context); Foley, 747 F.2d at 1296. As these cases – and the very existence
of the fifth Bauman factor, whether the issue presented is one of first impression –
illustrate, the necessary “clear error” factor does not require that the issue be one as
to which there is established precedent. Moreover, this novel and important
21
question may repeatedly evade review because of the collateral nature of the
discovery ruling. See In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d at 1304-05 (“[A]n
important question of first impression will evade review unless it is considered
under our supervisory mandamus authority. Moreover, that question may continue
to evade review in other cases as well.”); Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d
517, 524-26 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (exercising mandamus jurisdiction to correct an error
in a discovery order).
In sum, assuming that collateral order review is not available, this is an
important case for exercise of our mandamus jurisdiction: adequate, alternative
means of review are unavailable; the harm to Proponents and to the public interest
is not correctable on appeal; the district court’s discovery order is clearly
erroneous; and it presents a significant issue of first impression that may repeatedly
evade review. As in Foley, a closely analogous case, these factors “remove this
case from the category of ordinary discovery orders where interlocutory appellate
review is unavailable, through mandamus or otherwise.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381.
Accordingly, we hold that the exercise of our supervisory mandamus authority is
appropriate.
22
III. F IRST A MENDMENT P RIVILEGE3
A.
“Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.” NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 622 (1984) (“An individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the
government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from
interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort
toward those ends were not also guaranteed.”). Thus, “[t]he First Amendment
protects political association as well as political expression,” Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 15 (1976), and the “freedom to associate with others for the common
advancement of political beliefs and ideas is . . . protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.” Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973). “The
right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute.” Roberts, 468
U.S. at 623. “Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted
to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that
3
We review de novo a determination of privilege. United States v. Ruehle,
583 F.3d 600, 606 (9th Cir. 2009) (attorney-client privilege).
23
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms.” Id.
The government may abridge the freedom to associate directly, or
“abridgement of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from
varied forms of governmental action.” NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461. Thus, the
government must justify its actions not only when it imposes direct limitations on
associational rights, but also when governmental action “would have the practical
effect ‘of discouraging’ the exercise of constitutionally protected political rights.”
Id. (quoting Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393 (1950)). Such
actions have a chilling effect on, and therefore infringe, the exercise of
fundamental rights. Accordingly, they “must survive exacting scrutiny.” Buckley,
424 U.S. at 64.
The compelled disclosure of political associations can have just such a
chilling effect. See id. (“[W]e have repeatedly found that compelled disclosure, in
itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the
First Amendment.”); AFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 175 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“The
Supreme Court has long recognized that compelled disclosure of political
affiliations and activities can impose just as substantial a burden on First
24
Amendment rights as can direct regulation.”).4 Disclosures of political affiliations
and activities that have a “deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment
rights” are therefore subject to this same “exacting scrutiny.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at
64-65. A party who objects to a discovery request as an infringement of the
party’s First Amendment rights is in essence asserting a First Amendment
privilege. See, e.g., Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1264 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. granted and vacated as moot, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense[.]”) (emphasis added).5
In this circuit, a claim of First Amendment privilege is subject to a two-part
framework. The party asserting the privilege “must demonstrate . . . a ‘prima facie
4
See, e.g., NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461-64 (prohibiting the compelled disclosure
of the NAACP membership lists); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 525-
27 (1960) (same); DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 828-30 (1966)
(prohibiting the state from compelling defendant to discuss his association with the
Communist Party); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 63-74 (recognizing the burden but
upholding the compelled disclosure of campaign contributor information under the
“exacting scrutiny” standard).
5
This privilege applies to discovery orders “even if all of the litigants are
private entities.” Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463, 1466 (10th Cir. 1987);
see also Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace, 570 F. Supp. 202, 208 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(“[A] private litigant is entitled to as much solicitude to its constitutional
guarantees of freedom of associational privacy when challenged by another private
party, as when challenged by a government body.”) (footnote omitted).
25
showing of arguable first amendment infringement.’” Brock v. Local 375,
Plumbers Int’l Union of Am., 860 F.2d 346, 349-50 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting United
States v. Trader’s State Bank, 695 F.2d 1132, 1133 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)).
“This prima facie showing requires appellants to demonstrate that enforcement of
the [discovery requests] will result in (1) harassment, membership withdrawal, or
discouragement of new members, or (2) other consequences which objectively
suggest an impact on, or ‘chilling’ of, the members’ associational rights.” Id. at
350. 6 “If appellants can make the necessary prima facie showing, the evidentiary
burden will then shift to the government . . . [to] demonstrate that the information
sought through the [discovery] is rationally related to a compelling governmental
interest . . . [and] the ‘least restrictive means’ of obtaining the desired
information.” Id.; see also Dole v. Serv. Employees Union, AFL-CIO, Local 280,
950 F.2d 1456, 1459-61 (9th Cir. 1991) (same). More specifically, the second step
6
A protective order limiting the dissemination of disclosed associational
information may mitigate the chilling effect and could weigh against a showing of
infringement. The mere assurance that private information will be narrowly rather
than broadly disseminated, however, is not dispositive. See Dole v. Serv.
Employees Union, AFL-CIO, Local 280, 950 F.2d 1456, 1461 (9th Cir. 1991)
(“[N]either letter suggests that it is the unlimited nature of the disclosure of the
Union minutes that underlies the member’s unwillingness to attend future
meetings. Rather, both letters exhibit a concern for the consequences that would
flow from any disclosure of the contents of the minutes to the government or any
government official.”).
26
of the analysis is meant to make discovery that impacts First Amendment
associational rights available only after careful consideration of the need for such
discovery, but not necessarily to preclude it. The question is therefore whether the
party seeking the discovery “has demonstrated an interest in obtaining the
disclosures it seeks . . . which is sufficient to justify the deterrent effect . . . on the
free exercise . . . of [the] constitutionally protected right of association.” NAACP,
357 U.S. at 463.
To implement this standard, we “balance the burdens imposed on individuals
and associations against the significance of the . . . interest in disclosure,” AFL-
CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d at 176, to determine whether the “interest in disclosure . . .
outweighs the harm,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 72. This balancing may take into
account, for example, the importance of the litigation, see Dole, 950 F.2d at 1461
(“[T]here is little doubt that the . . . purpose of investigating possible criminal
violations . . . serves a compelling governmental interest[.]”); the centrality of the
information sought to the issues in the case, see NAACP, 357 U.S. at 464-65;
Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463, 1466 (10th Cir. 1987); Black Panther
Party, 661 F.2d at 1268; the existence of less intrusive means of obtaining the
information, see Grandbouche, 825 F.2d at 1466; Black Panther Party, 661 F.2d at
1268; and the substantiality of the First Amendment interests at stake, see Buckley,
27
424 U.S. at 71 (weighing the seriousness of “the threat to the exercise of First
Amendment rights” against the substantiality of the state’s interest); Black Panther
Party, 661 F.2d at 1267 (“The argument in favor of upholding the claim of
privilege will ordinarily grow stronger as the danger to rights of expression and
association increases.”).7 Importantly, the party seeking the discovery must show
that the information sought is highly relevant to the claims or defenses in the
litigation – a more demanding standard of relevance than that under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). The request must also be carefully tailored to avoid
unnecessary interference with protected activities, and the information must be
otherwise unavailable.
Before we apply these rules to the discovery at issue on this appeal, we
address the district court’s apparent conclusion that the First Amendment privilege,
as a categorical matter, does not apply to the disclosure of internal campaign
communications.
B.
The district court concluded that “[i]f the . . . privilege identified by
proponents protects anything, it is the identities of rank-and-file volunteers and
7
Courts generally apply some combination of these factors. See, e.g., In re
Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 258 F.R.D. 407, 412-15 (D. Kan.
2009); Adolph Coors Co., 570 F. Supp. at 208.
28
similarly situated individuals,” and said that “Proponents have not . . . identified a
way in which the . . . privilege could protect the disclosure of campaign
communications.” The First Amendment privilege, however, has never been
limited to the disclosure of identities of rank-and-file members. See, e.g.,
DeGregory, 383 U.S. at 828 (applying the privilege to “the views expressed and
ideas advocated” at political party meetings); Dole, 950 F.2d at 1459 (applying
privilege to statements “of a highly sensitive and political character” made at union
membership meetings). The existence of a prima facie case turns not on the type
of information sought, but on whether disclosure of the information will have a
deterrent effect on the exercise of protected activities. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at
460-61; Brock, 860 F.2d at 349-50. We have little difficulty concluding that
disclosure of internal campaign communications can have such an effect on the
exercise of protected activities.
First, the disclosure of such information can have a deterrent effect on
participation in campaigns. There is no question that participation in campaigns is
a protected activity. See San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Eu,
826 F.2d 814, 827 (9th Cir. 1987) (“‘[T]he right of individuals to associate for the
advancement of political beliefs’ is fundamental.”) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968)). Compelled disclosure of internal campaign information
29
can deter that participation. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68 (“It is undoubtedly true
that public disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will deter
some individuals who otherwise might contribute.”); In re Motor Fuel
Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 258 F.R.D. 407, 414 (D. Kan. 2009) (holding
that disclosure of “trade associations’ internal communications and evaluations
about advocacy of their members’ positions on contested political issues” might
reasonably “interfere with the core of the associations’ activities by inducing
members to withdraw . . . or dissuading others from joining”).8
Second, disclosure of internal campaign information can have a deterrent
effect on the free flow of information within campaigns. Implicit in the right to
associate with others to advance one’s shared political beliefs is the right to
exchange ideas and formulate strategy and messages, and to do so in private.9
8
In addition to discouraging individuals from joining campaigns, the threat
that internal campaign communications will be disclosed in civil litigation can
discourage organizations from joining the public debate over an initiative. See
Letter brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Northern
California, at 2 (explaining that the ACLU’s internal campaign information has
been subpoenaed in this case).
9
We derive this conclusion from cases that have recognized the right of
associations to be free of infringements in their internal affairs. The freedom of
members of a political association to deliberate internally over strategy and
messaging is an incident of associational autonomy. We recognized this right in
San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee v. Eu, where we said that
(continued...)
30
Compelling disclosure of internal campaign communications can chill the exercise
of these rights.
In identifying two ways in which compelled disclosure of internal campaign
communications can deter protected activities – by chilling participation and by
muting the internal exchange of ideas – we do not suggest this is an exhaustive list.
Disclosures of the sort challenged here could chill protected activities in other
9
(...continued)
“the right of association would be hollow without a corollary right of
self-governance.” 826 F.2d at 827. “[T]here must be a right not only to form
political associations but to organize and direct them in the way that will make
them most effective.” Id. (quoting Ripon Soc’y Inc. v. Nat’l Republican Party, 525
F.2d 567, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 224 (1986) (“The
Party’s determination of the boundaries of its own association, and of the structure
which best allows it to pursue its political goals, is protected by the Constitution.”);
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 n.21
(1989) (“By regulating the identity of the parties’ leaders, the challenged statutes
may also color the parties’ message and interfere with the parties’ decisions as to
the best means to promote that message.”). The government may not “interfere
with a [political] party’s internal affairs” absent a “compelling state interest.” Eu,
489 U.S. at 231. Associations, no less than individuals, have the right to shape
their own messages. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342,
348 (1995) (striking down a state law prohibiting anonymous pamphleteering in
part because the First Amendment includes a speaker’s right to choose a manner of
expression that she believes will be most persuasive); AFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d
at 177 (“[E]xtensive interference with political groups’ internal operations and
with their effectiveness . . . implicate[s] significant First Amendment interests in
associational autonomy.”).
31
ways as well.10 We cite these two examples for purposes of illustration only, and
because they are relevant to the assertions of privilege made by Proponents here.
C.
In this case, Proponents have made “a ‘prima facie showing of arguable first
amendment infringement’” by demonstrating “consequences which objectively
suggest an impact on, or ‘chilling’ of, . . . associational rights.” Brock, 860 F.2d at
349-50 (quoting Trader’s State Bank, 695 F.2d at 1133). Mark Jansson, a member
of ProtectMarriage.com’s ad hoc executive committee, stated:
I can unequivocally state that if the personal, non-public

communications I have had regarding this ballot initiative
– communications that expressed my personal political and
moral views – are ordered to be disclosed through
discovery in this matter, it will drastically alter how I
communicate in the future. . . .
I will be less willing to engage in such communications

knowing that my private thoughts on how to petition the
government and my private political and moral views may
10
See AFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d at 176-77 (“[T]he AFL-CIO and DNC
affidavits charge that disclosing detailed descriptions of training programs,
member mobilization campaigns, polling data, and state-by-state strategies will
directly frustrate the organizations’ ability to pursue their political goals effectively
by revealing to their opponents ‘activities, strategies and tactics [that] we have
pursued in subsequent elections and will likely follow in the future.’”); In re Motor
Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 258 F.R.D. at 415 (“Disclosure of the
associations’ evaluations of possible lobbying and legislative strategy certainly
could be used by plaintiffs to gain an unfair advantage over defendants in the
political arena.”).
32
be disclosed simply because of my involvement in a ballot

initiative campaign. I also would have to seriously
consider whether to even become an official proponent
again.
Although the Jansson declaration is lacking in particularity, it is consistent with the
self-evident conclusion that important First Amendment interests are implicated by
the plaintiffs’ discovery request. The declaration creates a reasonable inference
that disclosure would have the practical effects of discouraging political
association and inhibiting internal campaign communications that are essential to
effective association and expression. See Dole, 950 F.2d at 1459-61 (holding that
the union satisfied its prima facie burden by submitting the declarations of two
members who said they would no longer participate in union membership meetings
if the disclosure of the minutes of the meetings were permitted). A protective
order limiting dissemination of this information will ameliorate but cannot
eliminate these threatened harms. Proponents have therefore made a prima facie
showing that disclosure could have a chilling effect on protected activities. The
chilling effect is not as serious as that involved in cases such as NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), but neither is it insubstantial. See AFL-CIO v. FEC,
333 F.3d at 176 (“Although we agree that the evidence in this case is far less
compelling than the evidence presented in cases involving groups whose members
33
had been subjected to violence, economic reprisals, and police or private
harassment, that difference speaks to the strength of the First Amendment interests
asserted, not to their existence.”) (citations omitted).
The Proponents having made a prima facie showing of infringement, the
evidentiary burden shifts to the plaintiffs to demonstrate a sufficiently compelling
need for the discovery to counterbalance that infringement. The district court did
not apply this heightened relevance test. Rather, having determined that the First
Amendment privilege does not apply to the disclosure of internal campaign
communications except to protect the identities of rank-and-file members and
volunteers, the court applied the Rule 26 standard of reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. We agree with the district court that
plaintiffs’ request satisfies the Rule 26 standard. Plaintiffs’ request is reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence on the issues of voter
intent and the existence of a legitimate state interest.11 Such discovery might help
to identify messages actually conveyed to voters. See Washington v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 471 (1982) (considering statements made by proponents
11
The parties dispute whether plaintiffs’ substantive claims are governed by
strict scrutiny or rational basis review. They also disagree about what types of
evidence may be relied upon to demonstrate voter intent. These issues are beyond
the scope of this appeal. We assume without deciding that the district court has
decided these questions correctly.
34
during an initiative campaign to determine whether voters adopted an initiative for
an improper purpose). It also might lead to the discovery of evidence showing that
Proponents’ campaign messages were designed to “appeal[] to the . . . biases of the
voters.” Id. at 463 (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 473 F. Supp.
996, 1009 (W.D. Wash. 1979)). It might reasonably lead to the discovery of
evidence undermining or impeaching Proponents’ claims that Proposition 8 serves
legitimate state interests. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“[A] law
must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.”).
The Rule 26 standard, however, fails to give sufficient weight to the First
Amendment interests at stake. Given Proponents’ prima facie showing of
infringement, we must apply the First Amendment’s more demanding heightened
relevance standard. Doing so, we cannot agree that plaintiffs have “demonstrated
an interest in obtaining the disclosures . . . which is sufficient to justify the
deterrent effect . . . on the free exercise . . . of [the] constitutionally protected right
of association.” NAACP, 357 U.S. at 463. Plaintiffs can obtain much of the
information they seek from other sources, without intruding on protected activities.
Proponents have already agreed to produce all communications actually
disseminated to voters, including “communications targeted to discrete voter
35
groups.” 12 Whether campaign messages were designed to appeal to voters’
animosity toward gays and lesbians is a question that appears to be susceptible to
expert testimony, without intruding into private aspects of the campaign. Whether
Proposition 8 bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest is primarily
an objective inquiry.
In sum, although the First Amendment interests at stake here are not as
weighty as in some of the membership list cases, and harms can be mitigated in
part by entry of a protective order, Proponents have shown that discovery would
likely have a chilling effect on political association and the formulation of political
expression. On the other side of the ledger, plaintiffs have shown that the
information they seek is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence, but, bearing in mind other sources of information, they have
not shown a sufficiently compelling need for the information. The information
12
Our holding is limited to private, internal campaign communications
concerning the formulation of campaign strategy and messages. Proponents cannot
avoid disclosure of broadly disseminated materials by stamping them “private” and
claiming an “associational bond” with large swaths of the electorate. See In re
Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 258 F.R.D. at 415 (“The court
wishes to make clear that defendants have met their prima facie burden only with
respect to the associations’ internal evaluations of lobbying and legislation,
strategic planning related to advocacy of their members’ positions, and actual
lobbying on behalf of members. Any other communications to, from, or within
trade associations are not deemed protected under the First Amendment
associational privilege.”).
36
plaintiffs seek is attenuated from the issue of voter intent, while the intrusion on
First Amendment interests is substantial.13
Accordingly, we reverse the October 1 and November 11 orders.
Proponents have made a prima facie showing of infringement. Plaintiffs have not
shown the requisite need for the information sought. The district court shall enter a
protective order consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED. Each party shall bear its costs on
appeal.
13
We do not foreclose the possibility that some of Proponents’ internal
campaign communications may be discoverable. We are not presented here with a
carefully tailored request for the production of highly relevant information that is
unavailable from other sources that do not implicate First Amendment
associational interests. We express no opinion as to whether any particular request
would override the First Amendment interests at stake.
37
Counsel
Andrew P. Pugno, Law Offices of Andrew P. Pugno, Folsom, California;

Brian W. Raum and James A. Campbell, Alliance Defense Fund, Scottsdale,
Arizona; Charles J. Cooper (argued), David H. Thompson, Howard C. Nielson, Jr.,
Nicole J. Moss, Jesse Panuccio and Peter A. Patterson, Cooper and Kirk, PLLC,
Washington, D.C., for Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants.
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. (argued), Rebecca Justice Lazarus, Enrique A.

Monagas, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, California; Theodore B.
Olson, Matthew D. McGill and Amir C. Tayrani, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Stephen V. Bomse, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, San Francisco,

California, Allan L. Schlosser and Elizabeth O. Gill, ACLU Foundation of
Northern California, for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of
Northern California.
Robert H. Tyler and Jennifer Lynn Monk, Advocates for Faith and Freedom,
Murrieta, California, for Amici Curiae Schubert Flint Public Affairs, Inc., Frank
Schubert and Jeff Flint.
38

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Case: 09-17241 12/11/2009 Page: 1 of 38 ID: 7161560 DktEntry: 37-1

Case 09-17551 Document 23-1 Filed 12/11/09 38 pages FILED

MO LLY C. DW YER, CLERK

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KRISTIN M. PERRY; SANDRA B. No. 09-17241

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, in his

DENNIS HOLLINGSWORTH; GAIL J.

KRISTIN M. PERRY; SANDRA B. No. 09-17551

OUR FAMILY COALITION;

EDMUND G. BROWN, Jr.; MARK B.

DENNIS HOLLINGSWORTH; GAIL J.

Appeal from the United States District Court

Argued and Submitted December 1, 2009

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Raymond C. Fisher and Marsha S. Berzon,

Opinion by Judge Fisher

RAYMOND C. FISHER, Circuit Judge:

Proposition 8 amended the California Constitution to provide that only

marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California. Two

Amendment. The official proponents of Proposition 8 (“Proponents”) intervened

to defend the suit. Plaintiffs served a request for production of documents on

Proponents, seeking, among other things, production of Proponents’ internal

campaign communications relating to campaign strategy and advertising.

Proponents objected to disclosure of the documents as barred by the First

Amendment privilege. Proponents appealed both orders. We granted Proponents’

motion for stay pending appeal.

doctrine or through the exercise of our mandamus jurisdiction. We reverse. The

information sufficiently compelling to outweigh the impact on those rights.

therefore reverse and remand.

In November 2008, California voters approved Proposition 8, an initiative

has upheld Proposition 8 against several state constitutional challenges. Strauss v.

heterosexual individuals, is unconstitutional under the Due Process and Equal

Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.” Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7. They alleged among other things that “[t]he

disadvantage Prop. 8 imposes on gays and lesbians is the result of disapproval or

of state officials responsible for the enforcement of Proposition 8, including the

injunctive relief. Id. ¶ 8.

After the Attorney General declined to defend the constitutionality of

Proposition 8, the district court granted a motion by Proponents – the official

proponents of Proposition 8 and the official Proposition 8 campaign committee –

Plaintiffs served requests for production of documents on Proponents under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34. Plaintiffs’ eighth request sought:

All versions of any documents that constitute

The parties understand this request as encompassing, among other things,

Proponents’ internal campaign communications concerning strategy and

Proponents objected to the request as irrelevant, privileged under the First

of communications never actually disseminated to the electorate at large, were

of internal strategy documents would burden political association rights by

discouraging individuals from participating in initiative campaigns and by muting

request was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence

concerning the purpose of Proposition 8, as well as evidence concerning the

rationality and strength of Proponents’ purported state interests for Proposition 8.

campaign, which they agreed to redact.

“reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” regarding

voter intent, the purpose of Proposition 8 and whether Proposition 8 advances a

legitimate governmental interest. The court said that “communications between

proponents and political consultants or campaign managers, even about messages

evidence illuminating the messages disseminated to voters.” 2