G.R. No.

207264               June 25, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B.
TAN, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante
Order dated 7 June 2013 filed by petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes,
assailing the Resolutions dated 27 March 2013 and 14 May 2013 issued by
public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-
053. The assailed Resolutions ordered the cancellation of the Certificate of
Candidacy of petitioner for the position of Representative of the lone district
of Marinduque.

On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter

and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the
COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the ground that it contained
material misrepresentations, specifically:

(1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I.

Mandanas of Batangas;1

(2)  (2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when
she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of her
husband, and at the same time, when she is also a resident of 135
J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the Directory
of Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives;2

 (3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show
that her birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;3 

(4) that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she
is a permanent resident or an immigrant4 of the United States of
America;5 and
 (5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American
citizen.6

In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is publicly known to be

the wife of Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman
Mandanas), there is no valid and binding marriage between them.
According to petitioner, although her marriage with Congressman
Mandanas was solemnized in a religious rite, it did not comply with certain
formal requirements prescribed by the Family Code, rendering it void ab
initio.7 Consequently, petitioner argues that as she is not duty-bound to live
with Congressman Mandanas, then his residence cannot be attributed to
her.8 As to her date of birth, the Certificate of Live Birth issued by the
National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964.9 Lastly,
petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a permanent resident and/or
a citizen of the United States of America is not supported by evidence.10

During the course of the proceedings, on 8 February 2013, respondent filed

a "Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and
Amended List of Exhibits"11 consisting of, among others: (1) a copy of an
article published on the internet on 8 January 2013 entitled "Seeking and
Finding the Truth about Regina O. Reyes" with an Affidavit of Identification
and Authenticity of Document executed by its author Eliseo J. Obligacion,
which provides a database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating
that petitioner is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport; (2) a
Certification of Travel Records of petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez,
Acting Chief, Verification and Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration
which indicates that petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various travels
abroad.

On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a

Resolution12 cancelling petitioner’s COC, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent REGINA
ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby CANCELLED.
The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that
she made in her COC, petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because
of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely:
(1) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and

(2) to make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship

before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In addition, the
COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the oneyear residency
requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.13 Thus,
she is ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the lone district
of Marinduque.

Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration14 on 8 April 2013 claiming that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such status by simply
obtaining and using an American passport. Additionally, petitioner surmised
that the COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her marriage to an
American citizen in concluding that she is a naturalized American citizen.
Petitioner averred, however, that such marriage only resulted into dual
citizenship, thus there is no need for her to fulfill the twin requirements
under R.A. No. 9225. Still, petitioner attached an Affidavit of Renunciation
of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public on 24 September
2012. As to her alleged lack of the one-year residency requirement
prescribed by the Constitution, she averred that, as she never became a
naturalized citizen, she never lost her domicile of origin, which is Boac,
Marinduque.

On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a

Resolution15 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit.

Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner

of the 13 May 2013 Elections.

On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of

Finality16 declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
final and executory, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have
elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order issued by this Court
restraining its execution.17
On same day, petitioner took her oath of office18 before Feliciano R.
Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at
noon of 30 June 2013.

In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order,
petitioner raises the following issues:19

31) Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over

Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already
taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque.

32) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took
cognizance of Respondent Tan’s alleged "newly-discovered
evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and
admitted in evidence which became the basis for its Resolution of the
case without giving the petitioner the opportunity to question and
present controverting evidence, in violation of Petitioner’s right to due
process of law.

33) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared
that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency
requirement for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives.

34) Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when, by enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, it
imposed additional qualifications to the qualifications of a Member of
the House of Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.

The petition must fail.

At the outset, it is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of respondent
COMELEC vis-a-vis that of House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) appears to be a non-issue. Petitioner is taking an inconsistent, if
not confusing, stance for while she seeks remedy before this Court, she is
asserting that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction over her. Thus, she
posits that the issue on her eligibility and qualifications to be a Member of
the House of Representatives is best discussed in another tribunal of
competent jurisdiction. It appears then that petitioner’s recourse to this
Court was made only in an attempt to enjoin the COMELEC from
implementing its final and executory judgment in SPA No. 13-053.

Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and consider each of the
issues raised by petitioner. The need to do so, and at once, was highlighted
during the discussion En Banc on 25 June 2013 where and when it was
emphasized that the term of office of the Members of the House of
Representatives begins on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.

According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when

she was duly proclaimed20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of
the Members of the House of Representatives.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction

for the following reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s
qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless
a petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she
has filed such action.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,21 the HRET does not have jurisdiction
over a candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives, to
wit:

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed

assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications after
the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of
the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has
no jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)

The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the

House of Representatives?

In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC,22 citing Aggabao v. COMELEC23 and

Guerrero v. COMELEC,24 the Court ruled that:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House
of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s
own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)

This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Limkaichong v.

COMELEC,25 wherein the Court, referring to the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC vis-a-vis the HRET, held that:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House
of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's
own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)

This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC,26 to wit:

After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office by Gonzalez,

jurisdiction over the matter of his qualifications, as well as questions
regarding the conduct of election and contested returns – were transferred
to the HRET as the constitutional body created to pass upon the same.
(Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the

House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption
of office.

Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once
a proclamation has been made, COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost
and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. However, it
must be noted that in these cases, the doctrinal pronouncement was made
in the context of a proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oath of
office, but who had also assumed office.

For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC,27 the Court upheld the

jurisdiction of the HRET against that of the COMELEC only after the
candidate had been proclaimed, taken his oath of office before the Speaker
of the House, and assumed the duties of a Congressman on 26 September
2007, or after the start of his term on 30 June 2007, to wit:

On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed his comment in

which he brought to Our attention that on September 26, 2007, even before
the issuance of the status quo ante order of the Court, he had already been
proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives of the First Congressional District of Lanao del Norte. On
that very same day, he had taken his oath before Speaker of the House
Jose de Venecia, Jr. and assumed his duties accordingly.

In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has already been
transferred to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
(Emphasis supplied.)

Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the questioned candidate
had already assumed office, and hence, was already considered a Member
of the House of Representatives, unlike in the present case.

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of

Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To
repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the
House of Representatives begins only "at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election."28 Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains
jurisdiction.

In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a

purported Oath Of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5
June 2013. However, this is not the oath of office which confers
membership to the House of Representatives.

Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of

Representatives provides:

Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members shall take their oath

or affirmation either collectively or individually before the Speaker in open
session.

Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be

made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in
open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker
Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open
session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office
was indeed complied with.

More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy –

that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC
En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner’s lack of
Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013.
After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any
pending case on petitioner’s qualifications to run for the position of Member
of the House of Representative. We will inexcusably disregard this fact if
we accept the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of
jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the
COMELEC En Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser which proclaimed
petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render nugatory a decision of
the COMELEC En Banc which affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First
Division.

Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division which was
promulgated on 27 March 2013, and the assailed Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc which was promulgated on 14 May 2013, became final
and executory on 19 May 2013 based on Section 3, Rule 37 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides:

Section 3. Decisions Final after five days. Decisions in pre-proclamation

cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of
candidacy, to declare nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and
to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory after
the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court.

To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013 from becoming final
and executory, petitioner should have availed herself of Section 1, Rule
3729 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or Rule 6430 of the Rules of
Court by filing a petition before this Court within the 5-day period, but she
failed to do so. She would file the present last hour petition on 10 June
2013. Hence, on 5 June 2013, respondent COMELEC rightly issued a
Certificate of Finality.

As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her Filipino citizenship,

as well as her one-year residency in Marinduque, suffice it to say that the
COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding her ineligible
for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it
took cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having
been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the
admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the
photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise
contends that there was a violation of her right to due process of law
because she was not given the opportunity to question and present
controverting evidence.

Her contentions are incorrect.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to

the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under
Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally
construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings in a
petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are
summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly
admitted by respondent COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as

petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her case before the
COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan’s petition was filed up to 27
March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a
period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not
avail herself of the opportunity given her.

Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires

that the party be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the
case of Sahali v. COMELEC:31

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily
mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.
One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps
many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through
pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed,
deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party
was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
(Emphasis supplied)

As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office on the ground of
citizenship, the COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:

"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become

eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished
the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the
USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent complied with the
aforesaid requirements. Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered
on petitioner’s lack of proof regarding her American citizenship, contending
that it is petitioner’s burden to present a case. She, however, specifically
denied that she has become either a permanent resident or naturalized
citizen of the USA.
Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a
Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, however, establishing the fact that
respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to use
until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The
burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to prove
otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the
conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC
that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish
that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual
Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation
of her American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is,
therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective public office in the
Philippines."32 (Emphasis supplied.)

Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the
cancellation of petitioner’s COC, respondent submitted records of the
Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport,
and that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of
proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has
reacquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225.
Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however,
petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she
submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.

Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc,

petitioner admitted that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred
that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of
R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her.33 Still, attached to the said motion is an
Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September
2012.34 Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit "if only to show
her desire and zeal to serve the people and to comply with rules, even as a
superfluity."35 We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner’s explanation. If
petitioner executed said Affidavit "if only to comply with the rules," then it is
an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that
she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the
assailed Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit
was executed in September 2012.
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of
office as Provincial Administrator, to this effect: "This does not mean that
Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of reacquisition of
natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper
proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office is in order to make
reference to what is already part of the records and evidence in the present
case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact that
was not previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC."36 This
statement raises a lot of questions – Did petitioner execute an oath of
allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why
did she not present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And
is this an admission that she has indeed lost her natural-born Filipino
status?

To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A.

No. 9225, petitioner contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in
connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of
Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born
Filipino citizen.

This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the
first time before this Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC.
For another, said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with
Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as
prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as
the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and
Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative
Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus,
petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered
as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.

These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast
on petitioner’s citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.

As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner has
lost her natural-born status, we quote with approval the ruling of the
COMELEC First Division that petitioner cannot be considered a resident of
Marinduque:
"Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively
abandons his domicile of origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225, he must still show that he chose to establish his
domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.

In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that petitioner had already re-
acquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that
she has regained her domicile in the Philippines. There being no proof that
petitioner had renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has
not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

The only proof presented by petitioner to show that she has met the one-
year residency requirement of the law and never abandoned her domicile
of origin in Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as Provincial
Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But
such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For,
petitioner has never regained her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to
be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can
substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the
USA."37 (Emphasis supplied.)

All in all, considering that the petition for denial and cancellation of the COC
is summary in nature, the COMELEC is given much discretion in the
evaluation and admission of evidence pursuant to its principal objective of
determining of whether or not the COC should be cancelled. We held in
Mastura v. COMELEC:38

The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed
by courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no
substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with
greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the
Constitution intended to place the COMELEC — created and explicitly
made independent by the Constitution itself — on a level higher than
statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to
ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the
attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of
evidence.1âwphi1
Time and again, We emphasize that the "grave abuse of discretion" which
warrants this Court’s exercise of certiorari jurisdiction has a welldefined
meaning. Guidance is found in Beluso v. Commission on Elections39 where
the Court held:

x x x A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is

alleged and proved to exist. "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65,
has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due
to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to
perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of
discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially
show that grave abuse of discretion exists.

Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of the COMELEC in
enforcing the provisions of R.A. No. 9225, insofar as it adds to the
qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives other than those
enumerated in the Constitution, is unconstitutional, We find the same
meritless.

The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for

the House of Representatives who have acquired foreign citizenship. It
merely applied the qualifications prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and must have one-year residency prior to the date of elections.
Such being the case, the COMELEC did not err when it inquired into the
compliance by petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to determine
if she reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. It simply
applied the constitutional provision and nothing more.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding

no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections.
The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane affirming the 27
March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld.

SO ORDERED.