FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 124043. October 14, 1998

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. COURT

OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and YOUNG MENS
CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., Respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is the income derived from rentals of real property owned by the

Young Mens Christian Association of the Philippines, Inc. (YMCA)
established as a welfare, educational and charitable non-profit
corporation -- subject to income tax under the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC) and the Constitution?

The Case

This is the main question raised before us in this petition for review
on certiorari challenging two Resolutions issued by the Court of
Appeals1 on September 28, 19952 and February 29, 19963 in CA-GR
SP No. 32007. Both Resolutions affirmed the Decision of the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA) allowing the YMCA to claim tax exemption on
the latters income from the lease of its real property.

The Facts

The Facts are undisputed.4 Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock,

non-profit institution, which conducts various programs and
activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young
people, pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable
objectives.

In 1980, private respondent earned, among others, an income

of P676,829.80 from leasing out a portion of its premises to small
shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators,
and P44,259.00 from parking fees collected from non-members. On
July 2, 1984, the commissioner of internal revenue (CIR) issued an
assessment to private respondent, in the total amount
of P415,615.01 including surcharge and interest, for deficiency
income tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals and
professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages. Private
respondent formally protested the assessment and, as a supplement
to its basic protest, filed a letter dated October 8, 1985. In reply,
the CIR denied the claims of YMCA.

Contesting the denial of its protest, the YMCA filed a petition for
review at the Court if Tax Appeals (CTA) on March 14, 1989. In due
course, the CTA issued this ruling in favor of the YMCA:

xxx [T]he leasing of private respondents facilities to small shop

owners, to restaurant and canteen operators and the operation of
the parking lot are reasonably incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives of the [private
respondents]. It appears from the testimonies of the witnesses for
the [private respondent] particularly Mr. James C. Delote, former
accountant of YMCA, that these facilities were leased to members
and that they have to service the needs of its members and their
guests. The Rentals were minimal as for example, the barbershop
was only charged P300 per month. He also testified that there was
actually no lot devoted for parking space but the parking was done
at the sides of the building. The parking was primarily for members
with stickers on the windshields of their cars and they charged P.50
for non-members. The rentals and parking fees were just enough to
cover the costs of operation and maintenance only. The earning[s]
from these rentals and parking charges including those from lodging
and other charges for the use of the recreational facilities constitute
[the] bulk of its income which [is] channeled to support its many
activities and attainment of its objectives. As pointed out earlier, the
membership dues are very insufficient to support its program. We
find it reasonably necessary therefore for [private respondent] to
make [the] most out [of] its existing facilities to earn some income.
It would have been different if under the circumstances, [private
respondent] will purchase a lot and convert it to a parking lot to
cater to the needs of the general public for a fee, or construct a
building and lease it out to the highest bidder or at the market rate
for commercial purposes, or should it invest its funds in the buy and
sell of properties, real or personal. Under these circumstances, we
could conclude that the activities are already profit oriented, not
incidental and reasonably necessary to the pursuit of the objectives
of the association and therefore, will fall under the last paragraph of
section 27 of the Tax Code and any income derived therefrom shall
be taxable.

Considering our findings that [private respondent] was not engaged

in the business of operating or contracting [a] parking lot, we find
no legal basis also for the imposition of [a] deficiency fixed tax and
[a] contractors tax in the amount[s] of P353.15 and P3,129.73,
respectively.

xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the following assessments

are hereby dismissed for lack of merit:

1980 Deficiency Fixed Tax P353,15;

1980 Deficiency Contractors Tax P3,129.23;
1980 Deficiency Income Tax P372,578.20.

While the following assessments are hereby sustained:

1980 Deficiency Expanded Withholding Tax P1,798.93;

1980 Deficiency Withholding Tax on Wages P33,058.82

plus 10% surcharge and 20% interest per annum from July 2, 1984
until fully paid but not to exceed three (3) years pursuant to Section
51 (e)(2) & (3) of the National Internal Revenue Code effective as
of 1984.5cräläwvirtualibräry
Dissatisfied with the CTA ruling, the CIR elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals (CA). In its Decision of February 16, 1994, the
CA6 initially decided in favor of the CIR and disposed of the appeal
in the following manner:

Following the ruling in the afore-cited cases of Province of

Abra v. Hernando and Abra Valley College Inc. v. Aquino, the ruling
of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals that the leasing of
petitioners (herein respondent) facilities to small shop owners, to
restaurant and canteen operators and the operation of the parking
lot are reasonably incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the objectives of the petitioners,' and the income
derived therefrom are tax exempt, must be reversed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED in so far

as it dismissed the assessment for:

1980 Deficiency Income Tax P 353.15

1980 Deficiency Contractors Tax P 3,129.23, &
1980 Deficiency Income Tax P372,578.20,

but the same is AFFIRMED in all other respect.7 cräläwvirtualibräry

Aggrieved, the YMCA asked for reconsideration based on the

following grounds:

The findings of facts of the Public Respondent Court of Tax

Appeals being supported by substantial evidence [are] final and
conclusive.

II

The conclusions of law of [p]ublic [r]espondent exempting

[p]rivate [r]espondent from the income on rentals of small shops
and parking fees [are] in accord with the applicable law and
jurisprudence.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Finding merit in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the YMCA,
the CA reversed itself and promulgated on September 28, 1995 its
first assailed Resolution which, in part, reads:

The Court cannot depart from the CTAs findings of fact, as they are
supported by evidence beyond what is considered as substantial.

xxx

The second ground raised is that the respondent CTA did not err in
saying that the rental from small shops and parking fees do not
result in the loss of the exemption. Not even the petitioner would
hazard the suggestion that YMCA is designed for profit.
Consequently, the little income from small shops and parking fees
help[s] to keep its head above the water, so to speak, and allow it
to continue with its laudable work.

The Court, therefore, finds the second ground of the motion to be

meritorious and in accord with law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED; the

respondent CTAs decision is AFFIRMED in toto.9 cräläwvirtualibräry

The internal revenue commissioners own Motion for Reconsideration

was denied by Respondent Court in its second assailed Resolution of
February 29, 1996. Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.10

The Issues

Before us, petitioner imputes to the Court of Appeals the following

errors:

In holding that it had departed from the findings of fact of

Respondent Court of Tax Appeals when it rendered its Decision
dated February 16, 1994; and

II
In affirming the conclusion of Respondent Court of Tax Appeals that
the income of private respondent from rentals of small shops and
parking fees [is] exempt from taxation.11

This Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:

Factual Findings of the CTA

Private respondent contends that the February 16, 1994 CA

Decision reversed the factual findings of the CTA. On the other
hand, petitioner argues that the CA merely reversed the ruling of
the CTA that the leasing of private respondents facilities to small
shop owners, to restaurant and canteen operators and the operation
of parking lots are reasonably incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives of the private
respondent and that the income derived therefrom are tax
exempt.12 Petitioner insists that what the appellate court reversed
was the legal conclusion, not the factual finding, of the CTA.13 The
commissioner has a point.

Indeed, it is a basic rule in taxation that the factual findings of the

CTA, when supported by substantial evidence, will not be disturbed
on appeal unless it is shown that the said court committed gross
error in the appreciation of facts.14 In the present case, this Court
finds that the February 16, 1994 Decision of the CA did not deviate
from this rule. The latter merely applied the law to the facts as
found by the CTA and ruled on the issue raised by the CIR: Whether
or not the collection or earnings of rental income from the lease of
certain premises and income earned from parking fees shall fall
under the last paragraph of Section 27 of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1977, as amended.15 cräläwvirtualibräry

Clearly, the CA did not alter any fact or evidence. It merely resolved
the aforementioned issue, as indeed it was expected to. That it did
so in a manner different from that of the CTA did not necessarily
imply a reversal of factual findings.
The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is
clear-cut. It has been held that [t]here is a question of law in a
given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged
facts.16 In the present case, the CA did not doubt, much less
change, the facts narrated by the CTA. It merely applied the law to
the facts. That its interpretation or conclusion is different from that
of the CTA is not irregular or abnormal.

Second Issue:

Is the Rental Income of the YMCA Taxable?

We now come to the crucial issue: Is the rental income of the YMCA
from its real estate subject to tax? At the outset, we set forth the
relevant provision of the NIRC:

SEC. 27. Exemptions from tax on corporations. -- The following

organizations shall not be taxed under this Title in respect to income
received by them as such --

xxx

(g) Civic league or organization not organized for profit but

operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare;

(h) Club organized and operated exclusively for pleasure,

recreation, and other non-profitable purposes, no part of the net
income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or
member;

xxx

Notwithstanding the provision in the preceding paragraphs, the

income of whatever kind and character of the foregoing organization
from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of their
activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of
such income, shall be subject to the tax imposed under this Code.
(as amended by Pres. Decree No. 1457)
Petitioners argues that while the income received by the
organizations enumerated in Section 27 (now Section 26) of the
NIRC is, as a rule, exempted from the payment of tax in respect to
income received by them as such, the exemption does not apply to
income derived xxx from any if their properties, real or personal, or
from any of their activities conducted for profit, regardless, of the
disposition made of such income xxx.

Petitioner adds that rented income derived by a tax-exempt

organization from the lease of its properties, real or personal, [is]
not, therefore, exempt from income taxation, even if such income
[is] exclusively used for the accomplishment of its objectives.17 We
agree with the commissioner.

Because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always
applied the doctrine of strict interpretation in construing tax
exemptions.18 Furthermore, a claim of statutory exemption from
taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of
the law on which it is based. Thus, the claimed exemption must
expressly be granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to
be mistaken.19 cräläwvirtualibräry

In the instant case, the exemption claimed by the YMCA is expressly

disallowed by the very wording of the last paragraph of then Section
27 of the NIRC which mandates that the income of exempt
organizations (such as the YMCA) from any of their properties, real
or personal, be subject to the imposed by the same Code. Because
the last paragraph of said section unequivocally subjects to tax the
rent income f the YMCA from its rental property,20 the Court is duty-
bound to abide strictly by its literal meaning and to refrain from
resorting to any convoluted attempt at construction.

It is axiomatic that where the language of the law is clear and

unambiguous, its express terms must be applied.21 Parenthetically,
a consideration of the question of construction must not even begin,
particularly when such question is on whether to apply a strict
construction or a literal one on statutes that grant tax exemptions
to religious, charitable and educational propert[ies] or
institutions.22
cräläwvirtualibräry
The last paragraph of Section 27, the YMCA argues, should be
subject to the qualification that the income from the properties
must arise from activities conducted for profit before it may be
considered taxable.23 This argument is erroneous. As previously
stated, a reading of said paragraph ineludibly shows that the income
from any property of exempt organizations, as well as that arising
from any activity it conducts for profit, is taxable. The phrase any of
their activities conducted for profit does not qualify the word
properties. This makes income from the property of the organization
taxable, regardless of how that income is used -- whether for profit
or for lofty non-profit purposes.

Verba legis non est recedendum. Hence, Respondent Court of

Appeals committed reversible error when it allowed, on
reconsideration, the tax exemption claimed by YMCA on income it
derived from renting out its real property, on the solitary but
unconvincing ground that the said income is not collected for profit
but is merely incidental to its operation. The law does not make a
distinction. The rental income is taxable regardless of whence such
income is derived and how it used or disposed of. Where the law
does not distinguish, neither should we.

Constitutional Provisions
on Taxation

Invoking not only the NIRC but also the fundamental law, private
respondent submits that Article VI, Section 28 of par. 3 of the 1987
Constitution,24 exempts charitable institutions from the payment not
only of property taxes but also of income tax from any source.25 In
support of its novel theory, it compares the use of the words
charitable institutions, actually and directly in the 1973 and the
1987 Constitutions, on the hand; and in Article VI Section 22, par. 3
of the 1935 Constitution, on the other hand.26 cräläwvirtualibräry

Private respondent enunciates three points. First, the present

provision is divisible into two categories: (1) [c]haritable
institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques and non-profit cemeteries, the incomes of which
are, from whatever source, all tax-exempt;27 and (2) [a]ll lands,
buildings and improvements actually and directly used for religious,
charitable or educational purposes, which are exempt only from
property taxes.28 Second, Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,29 which limited the exemption only to the payment of
property taxes, referred to the provision of the 1935 Constitution
and not to its counterparts in the 1973 and the 1987
Constitutions.30 Third, the phrase actually, directly and exclusively
used for religious, charitable or educational purposes refers not only
to all lands, buildings and improvements, but also to the above-
quoted first category which includes charitable institutions like the
private respondent.31 cräläwvirtualibräry

The Court is not persuaded. The debates, interpellations and

expressions of opinion of the framers of the Constitution reveal their
intent which, in turn, may have guided the people in ratifying the
Charter.32 Such intent must be effectuated.

Accordingly, Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., a former constitutional

commissioner, who is now a member of this Court, stressed during
the Concom debates that xxx what is exempted is not the institution
itself xxx; those exempted from real estate taxes are lands,
buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used
for religious, charitable or educational purposes.33 Father Joaquin G.
Bernas, an eminent authority on the Constitution and also a
member of the Concom, adhered to the same view that the
exemption created by said provision pertained only to property
taxes.34
cräläwvirtualibräry

In his treatise on taxation, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug concurs, stating

that [t]he tax exemption covers property taxes only."35 Indeed, the
income tax exemption claimed by private respondent finds no basis
in Article VI, Section 28, par. 3 of the Constitution.

Private respondent also invokes Article XIV, Section 4, par. 3 of the

Charter,36 claiming that the YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit
educational institution whose revenues and assets are used actually,
directly and exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt
from taxes on its properties and income.37 We reiterate that private
respondent is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not
income tax on the rentals from its property. The bare allegation
alone that it is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is
insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of income tax.

As previously discussed, laws allowing tax exemption are

construed strictissimi juris. Hence, for the YMCA to be granted the
exemption it claims under the aforecited provision, it must prove
with substantial evidence that (1) it falls under the
classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (2)
the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually,
directly, and exclusively for educational purposes. However, the
Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by private
respondent to prove that it met the said requisites.

Is the YMCA an educational institution within the purview of Article

XIV, Section 4, par.3 of the Constitution? We rule that it is not. The
term educational institution or institution of learning has acquired a
well-known technical meaning, of which the members of the
Constitutional Commission are deemed cognizant.38 Under the
Education Act of 1982, such term refers to schools.39 The school
system is synonymous with formal education,40 which refers to the
hierarchically structured and chronological graded learnings
organized and provided by the formal school system and for which
certification is required in order for the learner to progress through
the grades or move to the higher levels.41 The Court has examined
the Amended Articles of Incorporation42 and By-Laws43 of the YMCA,
but found nothing in them that even hints that it is a school or an
educational institution.44
cräläwvirtualibräry

Furthermore, under the Education Act of 1982, even non-formal

education is understood to be school-based and private auspices
such as foundations and civic-spirited organizations are ruled
out.45 It is settled that the term educational institution, when used
in laws granting tax exemptions, refers to a xxx school seminary,
college or educational establishment xxx.46 Therefore, the private
respondent cannot be deemed one of the educational institutions
covered by the constitutional provision under consideration.

xxx Words used in the Constitution are to be taken in their ordinary

acceptation. While in its broadest and best sense education
embraces all forms and phrases of instruction, improvement and
development of mind and body, and as well of religious and moral
sentiments, yet in the common understanding and application it
means a place where systematic instruction in any or all of the
useful branches of learning is given by methods common to schools
and institutions of learning. That we conceive to be the true intent
and scope of the term [educational institutions,] as used in the
Constitution.47
cräläwvirtualibräry

Moreover, without conceding that Private Respondent YMCA is an

educational institution, the Court also notes that the former did not
submit proof of the proportionate amount of the subject income that
was actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.
Article XIII, Section 5 of the YMCA by-laws, which formed part of
the evidence submitted, is patently insufficient, since the same
merely signified that [t]he net income derived from the rentals of
the commercial buildings shall be apportioned to the Federation and
Member Associations as the National Board may decide.48 In sum,
we find no basis for granting the YMCA exemption from income tax
under the constitutional provision invoked

Cases Cited by Private

Respondent Inapplicable

The cases49 relied on by private respondent do not support its

cause. YMCA of Manila v. Collector of Internal Revenue50 and Abra
Valley College, Inc. v. Aquino51 are not applicable, because the
controversy in both cases involved exemption from the payment of
property tax, not income tax. Hospital de San Juan de Dios, Inc. v.
Pasay City52 is not in point either, because it involves a claim for
exemption from the payment of regulatory fees, specifically
electrical inspection fees, imposed by an ordinance of Pasay City --
an issue not at all related to that involved in a claimed exemption
from the payment if income taxes imposed on property leases.
In Jesus Sacred Heart College v. Com. Of Internal Revenue,53 the
party therein, which claimed an exemption from the payment of
income tax, was an educational institution which submitted
substantial evidence that the income subject of the controversy had
been devoted or used solely for educational purposes. On the other
hand, the private respondent in the present case had not given any
proof that it is an educational institution, or that of its rent income
is actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.

Epilogue

In deliberating on this petition, the Court expresses its sympathy

with private respondent. It appreciates the nobility its cause.
However, the Courts power and function are limited merely to
applying the law fairly and objectively. It cannot change the law or
bend it to suit its sympathies and appreciations. Otherwise, it would
be overspilling its role and invading the realm of legislation.

We concede that private respondent deserves the help and the

encouragement of the government. It needs laws that can facilitate,
and not frustrate, its humanitarian tasks. But the Court regrets that,
given its limited constitutional authority, it cannot rule on the
wisdom or propriety of legislation. That prerogative belongs to the
political departments of government. Indeed, some of the member
of the Court may even believe in the wisdom and prudence of
granting more tax exemptions to private respondent. But such
belief, however well-meaning and sincere, cannot bestow upon the
Court the power to change or amend the law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the

Court of Appeals dated September 28, 1995 and February 29, 1996
are hereby dated February 16, 1995 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 1995
is REINSTATED, insofar as it ruled that the income tax. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., see Dissenting Opinion.

Endnotes:

1
  Special Former Fourth Division composed of  J.  Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr., presiding justice and  ponente; and  JJ.,  Fidel P.
Purisima (now an associate justice of the Supreme Court) and Corona Ibay-Somera, concurring.
2
  Rollo,  pp. 42-48.

3
  Ibid.,  pp. 50-51.

4
  See  Memorandum of private respondent, pp. 1-10 and Memorandum of petitioner, pp. 3-10;  rollo,  pp. 149-158 and
192-199, respectively.  See also  Decision of the CTA, pp. 1-21;  rollo,  pp. 69-89.

5
  CTA Decision, pp. 16-18 and 2--21;  rollo,  pp. 84-86 and 88-89.

6
  Penned by  J.  Asaali S. Isnani and concurred in by  JJ.  Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., chairman, and Corona Ibay-Somera of
the Fourth Division.

7
  Rollo,  pp. 39-40.

8
  CA Resolution, p. 2;  rollo,  p. 43.

9
  Ibid.,  pp. 2,, 6-7;  rollo,  pp. 43, 47-48.

  The case was submitted for resolution on April 27, 1998, upon receipt by this Court of private respondents Reply
10

Memorandum.

11
  Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 10-11;  rollo,  pp. 199-200.

12
  Ibid.,  p. 16;  rollo,  p. 205.

13
  Ibid.,  p. 17;  rollo,  p. 206.

14
  Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mitsubishi Metal Corp., 181 SCRA 214, 220, January 22, 1990.

15
  Rollo,  p. 36.

  Ramos et al. v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I.  et al., 19 SCRA 289, 292, February 9, 1967, per Bengzon,  J.;  citing II
16

Martin,  Rules of Court in the Philippines,  255 and II  Bouviers Law Dictionary,  2784.

17
  Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 21-22;  rollo, pp. 210-211.

18
  See  Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 605, 613, April 18, 1997.

  Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Court of Appeals, GR No. 117359, p. 15, July
19

23, 1998, per Panganiban,  J.

  Justice Jose C. Vitug,  Compendium of Tax Law and Jurisprudence, p. 75, 4th revised ed. (1989); and De Leon, Hector
20

S.,  The National Internal Revenue Code Annotated, p. 108, 5th ed. (1994), citing a BIR ruling dated May 6, 1975.

21
  See  Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, 596, September 28, 1995.

22
  Cooley, Thomas M.,  The Law of Taxation, p. 1415, Vol. II, 4th ed. (1924).

23
  Reply Memorandum of private respondent, p. 10. p. 234.

24
  Charitable institutions,  churches and parsonages of convents appurtenant thereto,  mosques, non-profit  cemeteries, and
all lands, buildings, and improvements  actually, directly,  and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation. (Underlining copied from Reply Memorandum of Private Respondent, p. 7;  rollo,
p. 231)

25
  Reply Memorandum of private respondent, p. 7;  rollo,  p. 231.
   Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements
26

actually, directly , and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

27
  Reply Memorandum of private respondent, pp. 7-8;  rollo,  pp. 231-232.

28
  Ibid.,  p. 8;  rollo,  p. 232.

29
  14 SCRA 292, June 16, 1965.

30
  Reply Memorandum of private respondent, pp. 6-7;  rollo,  pp. 230-231.

31
  Ibid.,  p. 9;  rollo,  p. 233.

32
  Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284, 291-292, July 27, 1987.

33
  Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. Two, p. 90.

34
  Bernas, Joaquin G.,  The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines:  A Commentary,  p. 720, 1996 ed.;
citing  Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,  supra,  p. 295.

35
  Vitug,  supra,  p. 16.

  All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for
36

educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence
of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.

37
  Reply Memorandum of private respondent, p. 20;  rollo,  p. 244.

38
  See  Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phil 461, 468 (1947).

39
  Section 26, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232.

40
  Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232.

41
  Section 20, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232.

42
  Exhibit B, BIR Records, pp. 54-56.

43
  Exhibit C, BIR Records, pp. 27-53.

44
  This is in stark contrast to its predecessor, the YMCA of Manila. In  YMCA of Manila v. Collector of Internal Revenue  (33
Phil 217, 221 [1916]), cited by private respondent, it was noted that the said institution had an educational department
that taught courses in various subjects such as law, commerce, social ethics, political economy and others.

45
  Dizon, Amado C.,  Education Act of 1982 Annotated, Expanded and Updated,  p. 72 (1990).

46
  84 CJS 566.

47
  Kesselring v. Bonnycastle Club, 186 SW2d 402, 404 (1945).

48
  By-Laws of the YMCA, p. 22; BIR Records, p. 31.

49
  Reply Memorandum of private respondent, pp. 14-16;  rollo,  pp. 238-240.

50
  Supra.

51
  162 SCRA 106, June 15, 1988.
52
  16 SCRA 226, February 28, 1966.

53
  95 SCRA 16, May 24, 1954.