Nasa Technical Standard: Space System Protection Standard
Nasa Technical Standard: Space System Protection Standard
Nasa Technical Standard: Space System Protection Standard
SENSITIVE
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FOREWORD
This NASA Technical Standard is published by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) to provide uniform engineering and technical requirements for
processes, procedures, practices, and methods that have been endorsed as standard for NASA
programs and projects, including requirements for selection, application, and design criteria of an
item.
This NASA Technical Standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers
and Facilities, and applicable technical requirements may be cited in contract, program, and other
Agency documents. It may also apply to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (a Federally Funded
Research and Development Center [FFRDC]), other contractors, recipients of grants and
cooperative agreements, and parties to other agreements only to the extent specified or
referenced in applicable contracts, grants, or agreements.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION PAGE
1. SCOPE .................................................................................................................. 6
1.1 Purpose ................................................................................................................... 6
1.2 Applicability........................................................................................................... 6
1.3 Tailoring ................................................................................................................. 6
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LIST OF APPENDICES
APPENDIX PAGE
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1. SCOPE
1.1 Purpose
1.2 Applicability
This NASA Technical Standard is applicable to all NASA programs and projects.
This NASA Technical Standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers
and Facilities, and applicable technical requirements may be cited in contract, program, and other
Agency documents. It may also apply to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (a Federally Funded
Research and Development Center [FFRDC]), other contractors, recipients of grants and
cooperative agreements, and parties to other agreements only to the extent specified or
referenced in applicable contracts, grants, or agreements.
Verifiable requirement statements are designated by the acronym “SSPR” (Space System
Protection Requirement), numbered, and indicated by the word “shall”; this NASA Technical
Standard contains six (6) requirements. To facilitate requirements selection by NASA programs
and projects, a Requirements Compliance Matrix is provided in Appendix A. Programs and
projects should document adoption of the requirements in their Project Protection Plan.
Explanatory or guidance text is indicated in italics beginning in section 4.
1.3 Tailoring
Document tailoring of the requirements in this NASA Technical Standard for application to a
specific program or project as part of program or project requirements in the Project Plan and
obtain formal approval by the delegated Technical Authority or requirement owner in accordance
with NPR 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements.
2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
2.1 General
The documents listed in this section contain provisions that constitute requirements of this
NASA Technical Standard as cited in the text.
2.1.1 The latest issuances of cited documents apply unless specific versions are designated.
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None.
2.4.1 The requirements and standard practices established in this NASA Technical Standard do
not supersede or waive existing requirements and standard practices found in other Agency
documentation, or in applicable laws and regulations unless a specific exemption has been
obtained by the Office of the NASA Chief Engineer.
2.4.2 Conflicts between this NASA Technical Standard and other requirements documents are
resolved by the delegated Technical Authority.
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3.2 Definitions
Command Link: Free space command path connection from transmission at the ground
system terminal or space transmitter to receipt by the spacecraft receiver.
Command Stack: The end-to-end command chain from initial command transmission
at the operations center to receipt and execution on the platform.
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Objective: Missions need to maintain command authority to prevent unauthorized access and to
ensure data integrity. Unauthorized access could result in mission loss and/or damage to other
space systems.
[SSPR 1] Programs/projects shall protect the command stack with encryption that meets or
exceeds the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules.
4.1.1.a [Rationale: Command link incidents with civil space missions have demonstrated
potential impacts to safe operations. Additionally, NASA end of mission (EOM) experiments
found that spacecraft without encryption or authentication are particularly susceptible to these
impacts.]
4.1.1.b This requirement may be tailored to accommodate the nature of the mission. The
following tailoring is suggested for use by applicable missions:
4.1.1.c The following guidance is offered to assist missions in implementing this requirement:
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[SSPR 2] If a project uses an encrypted primary command link, any backup command link shall,
at a minimum, use authentication.
4.1.2.a [Rationale: Missions need to balance command authority with command integrity and
the ability to recover from an anomalous condition. Additionally, command link contingency
modes need protection from malicious actors.]
[SSPR 3] The program/project shall protect the confidentiality of command link CPI as NASA
sensitive but unclassified (SBU) information to prevent inadvertent disclosure to unauthorized
parties per NASA Interim Directive (NID) 1600.55, Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU)
Controlled Information, and NPR 2810.1, Security of Information Technology.
4.1.3.a [Rationale: Command link incidents with civil space missions have demonstrated
potential impacts to safe operations. Command link CPI protection is part of a defense in-depth
approach to command link protection, encompassing encryption, authentication, and CPI
protection.]
4.1.3.b The following guidance is offered to assist missions in implementing this requirement:
i. The Space Asset Protection Program (SAPP) can assist the program/project with
command link CPI identification.
ii. Command link CPI may include sensitive command information such as hardware
commands, key handling/management, and bit patterns of critical commands.
Objective: Missions dependent on external PNT services need to be able to recognize and
survive interference to ensure PNT resilience. Extended loss of PNT services could result in
mission degradation or loss if no mitigations are available.
[SSPR 4] If project-external PNT services are required, projects shall ensure that systems are
resilient to the complete loss of, or temporary interference with, external PNT services.
4.2.1.a [Rationale: Per www.gps.gov, PNT systems are subject to interference from both
natural and human-made sources.]
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4.2.1.b The following guidance is offered to assist missions in performing trade studies to
evaluate the risk and impact of a denial of PNT services and to design appropriate mitigations,
as appropriate:
i. PNT filtering algorithms that blend high-fidelity models of orbital dynamics and/or a
diversity of measurement sources have been proven in flight operations to detect and
survive interference. NASA/TP-2018-219822, Navigation Filter Best Practices,
describes NESC Best Practices for navigation filter design.
ii. PNT computations should be tested for resiliency to invalid parameter inputs, e.g. as
specified in the current version of Global Positioning System (GPS) interface
specification IS-GPS-200, Navstar GPS Space Segment/Navigation User.
iii. Projects should have a plan for emergency backup independent PNT sources that is
appropriate to the mission’s risk tolerance and cost-benefit posture. Backup
implementations involving either the mission’s space segment or ground segment are
possible.
iv. Nominally, the emergency backup plan is only intended to enable spacecraft survival.
Projects whose mission requirements necessitate that the spacecraft continue to
perform the mission (i.e. still meet the minimum Level 1 requirements) while
operating in the face of denial or manipulation of the primary PNT source will need
to address such consideratons in their planning and possibly incorporate design
features in the flight or ground hardware to provide for backup PNT capabilities.
v. Missions requiring PNT services should also consult NPD 8900.4, NASA Use of
Global Positioning System Precise Positioning Service.
Objective: Missions need to detect and report instances of unexplained interference to enable
Agency awareness of the contested space environment and to develop appropriate mitigations.
Lack of Agency awareness of unexplained interference events could deprive NASA of indications
and warning of adversary actions and increase the vulnerability of NASA systems.
4.3.1.a [Rationale: Command link and GPS degradation/disruption incidents can potentially
impact the safe operation of civil space missions. Additionally, NASA has the responsibility to
report unexpected interference with command links and GPS signals to other Federal agencies
in compliance with the charter of the Purposeful Interference Response Team and with the
National Space Policy.]
4.3.1.b The following guidance is offered to assist missions in implementing this requirement:
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i. Hosted instruments need only monitor indigenous telemetry and mission data.
ii. Missions should incorporate autonomous telemetry monitoring to support operational
teams in the detection of unexpected command link energy, unexpected loss of GPS
satellite solutions, and other unexplained interference events.
iii. Missions should incorporate procedures for operations teams to contact NASA SAPP
in case of unexpected command link energy, unexpected loss of GPS satellite
solutions, or any unexplained interference event. The intent here is for only suspected
purposeful interference to be reported.
iv. This requirement may be implemented in either the space segment or the ground
segment.
v. In the absence of a designated notifying organization, contact NASA SAPP via gsfc-
dl-sapp@mail.nasa.gov.
vi. SAPP, in coordination with the Enterprise Protection Program (EPP), will maintain
a registery of NASA notifying organizations, responsibilities of notifying
organizations, and external recipients of NASA notifications.
vii. This requirement does not replace other reporting or notification requirements such
as to the NASA spectrum managers. (See NPR 2570.1, NASA Radio Frequency (RF)
Spectrum Management Manual.)
4.3.2.a [Rationale: Command link incidents with civil space missions have demonstrated
potential impacts to safe operations. These incidents can be easily missed if operators are not
aware of, or focusing on, the characteristics of adversarial intrusions. Additionally, GPS
incidents with civil space missions have shown that missions can unexpectedly lose GPS signals.
Furthermore, NASA has the responsibility to report unexpected interference with command links
and GPS signals to other Federal agencies. Finally, the dynamic nature of the threat
environment and operations team turnover necessitate annual proficiency training.]
4.3.2.b The following guidance is offered to assist missions in implementing this requirement:
Missions should conduct training annually, as a minimum, using the latest reporting procedures.
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APPENDIX A
A.1 Purpose/Scope
Due to the complexity and uniqueness of space flight, it is unlikely that all of the requirements in a NASA technical standard will
apply. The Requirements Compliance Matrix below contains this NASA Technical Standard’s technical authority requirements and
may be used by programs and projects to indicate requirements that are applicable or not applicable to help minimize costs. Enter
“Yes” in the “Applicable” column if the requirement is applicable to the program or project or “No” if the requirement is not
applicable to the program or project. The “Comments” column may be used to provide specific instructions on how to apply the
requirement or to specify proposed tailoring.
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Applicable
Section Description Requirement in this Standard (Enter Yes Comments
or No)
4.1.1 Command Stack Protection [SSPR 1] Programs/projects shall protect the command stack with encryption that
meets or exceeds the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140,
Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.
4.1.2 Backup Command Link [SSPR 2] If a project uses an encrypted primary command link, any backup
Protection command link shall, at a minimum, use authentication.
4.1.3 Command Link Critical [SSPR 3] The program/project shall protect the confidentiality of command link
Program/Project Information CPI as NASA sensitive but unclassified (SBU) information to prevent inadvertent
(CPI) disclosure to unauthorized parties per NASA Interim Directive (NID) 1600.55,
Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) Controlled Information, and NPR 2810.1,
Security of Information Technology.
4.2.1 Positioning, Navigation, and [SSPR 4] If project-external PNT services are required, projects shall ensure that
Timing (PNT) Resilience systems are resilient to the complete loss of, or temporary interference with,
external PNT services.
4.3.1 Interference Reporting [SSPR 5] Projects/Spectrum Managers/Operations Centers shall report
unexplained interference to SAPP or to other designated notifying organizations.
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Applicable
Section Description Requirement in this Standard (Enter Yes Comments
or No)
4.3.2 Interference Reporting [SSPR 6] Projects/Spectrum Managers/Operations Centers shall conduct
Training proficiency training for reporting unexplained interference.
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APPENDIX B
REFERENCES
B.1 Purpose/Scope
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