Baba

Topic: Education, Science and Technology

DOCTRINE:
● Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a
university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This
freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student” for it is precisely the
"graduation" of such a student that is in question.
● An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has
conferred is not rightfully deserved
FACTS:
● Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a
Philippine visitor’s visa. Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the doctoral program in
Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP)
in Diliman, Quezon City.
● After going over private respondent’s dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo
Joaquin-Paz that there was a portion in private respondent’s dissertation that was lifted, without
proper acknowledgment, from Balfour’s Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern and Southern Asia
(1967), volume I, pp. 392-401 (3 v., Edward Balfour 1885 reprint) and from John Edye’s article
entitled “Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the Natives of
the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the Island of Ceylon for their Coasting Navigation” in the
Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal, volume I, pp. 1-14 (1833).
● Nevertheless, private respondent was able to defend her dissertation. She was eventually able to
graduate.
● Dr. Medina formally charged her of plagiarism.
● After several investigations, the UP Board of Regents withdrew her diploma. 90 instances of
plagiarism were discovered.
● Private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and damages. RTC dismissed. CA reversed.
ISSUE/S:
● Whether the withdrawal of the diploma was valid.
RULING:
YES, IT WAS.
● Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that “Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning.” This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution
likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of
universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to “institutions of higher
learning” which is thus given “a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of
students.” If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it
certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.
● Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud,
a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus
conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the “graduation” of a
student, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the “graduation” of such a student
that is in question.
● If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many
investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have been
allowed to graduate.
 ● Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the
Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council.
It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of
Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it
has granted without violating a student’s rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be
powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved.
Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a university’s highest academic degree upon an
individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is
the university’s concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to
protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.
● In the case at bar, the Board of Regents determined, after due investigation conducted by a
committee composed of faculty members from different U.P. units, that private respondent
committed no less than ninety (90) instances of intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. The
Board of Regents’ decision to withdraw private respondent’s doctorate was based on documents on
record including her admission that she committed the offense.

DISPOSITIVE: CA decision is reversed.

Cadiz
Topic: VIII. EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS

349. Pimentel v. Legal Education Board (2019)

DOCTRINE: The constitutionality of the PhiLSAT cannot be voided on the ground that it violates the right to
education. In the case of Tablarin, the SC held that “the State is not really enjoined to take appropriate
steps to make quality education "accessible to all" who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a
professional school, but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." However, when the PhiLSAT is used to
exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design mandates, the PhiLSAT goes
beyond mere supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable
and therefore, unconstitutional.

FACTS:

In 2016, LEB issued Memorandum Order No. 7 pursuant to its power to "prescribe the minimum standards
for law admission" under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662. The policy and rationale of LEBMO No. 7-2016 is
to improve the quality of legal education by requiring all those seeking admission to the basic law course to
take and pass a nationwide uniform law school admission test, known as the PhiLSAT. The PhilSAT is an
aptitude test measuring the examinee's communications and language proficiency, critical thinking, verbal
and quantitative reasoning. It was designed to measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue
the study of law. Exempted from the PhiLSAT requirement were honor graduates who were granted
professional civil service eligibility and who are enrolling within two years from their college graduation.

Petitioners, Atty Oscar Pimentel, Atty. Rene Gorospe, et. Al filed their Petition for Prohibition seeking RA
7662 be declared unconstitutional and the creation of LEB be invalidated together with its all issuances,
most especially the PhilSAT, for encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Court concerning
admissions to the practice of law; and the issuance of a TRO against conducting the PhilSAT.

ISSUE/S: Whether LEB Memo 7-2016, insofar as mandating that passing the PhilSAT be condition to
admission to law school, is unconstitutional
RULING: YES.

The law schools are left with absolutely no discretion to choose its students at the first instance and in
accordance with its own policies, but are dictated to surrender such discretion in favor of a State-
determined pool of applicants, under pain of administrative sanctions and/or payment of fines. The right of
the institutions then are constricted only in providing "additional" admission requirements, admitting of the
interpretation that the preference of the school itself is merely secondary or supplemental to that of the
State which is antithetical to the very principle of reasonable supervision and regulation.

PhilSAT vs NMAT: The SC held that they are different because the cut-off score of NMAT is evaluated by
the medical schools in relation to their own cut-off scores, unlike in PhilSAT where it is the sole determining
factor for admission in a law school. Medical schools have discretion as to how much weight should be
assigned to an NMAT score relative to the school’s own policy (like the applicant’s other credentials).
Obtaining a low NMAT percentile score does not absolutely disqualify an applicant, in contrast, obtaining a
high NMAT score only expands the applicant’s options for medical schools.

The Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission. The PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test to guide law schools in measuring the
applicants' aptness for legal education along with such other admissions policy that the law school may
consider, is such minimum standard.

However, the PhiLSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant's aptitude for law
school. The PhiLSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law schools who among the examinees
are to be admitted to any law program. When the PhiLSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict
admissions to law schools, as its present design mandates, the PhiLSAT goes beyond mere
supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable and
therefore, unconstitutional. In striking down these objectionable clauses in the PhiLSAT, the State's
inherent power to protect public interest by improving legal education is neither emasculated nor
compromised. Rather, the institutional academic freedom of law schools to determine for itself who to admit
pursuant to their respective admissions policies is merely protected. In turn, the recognition of academic
discretion comes with the inherent limitation that its exercise should not be whimsical, arbitrary, or gravely
abused.

Reforms for a more responsive legal education are constantly introduced and are evolving. The PhiLSAT,
for instance, is not a perfect initiative. Through time and a better cooperation between the LEB and the law
schools in the Philippines, a standardized and acceptable law admission examination may be configured. 

Note: The ponencia, however, is silent as to whether the taking of the PhiLSAT should be mandatory and
therefore, integral to admission.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

Among others, the Supreme Court declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:

1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding, restricting, and qualifying
admissions to law schools in violation of the institutional academic freedom on who to admit,
particularly:
 a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides that all college graduates or graduating
students applying for admission to the basic law course shall be required to pass the
PhiLSAT as a requirement for admission to any law school in the Philippines and that no
applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses
leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the
PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of studies for the basic law course;
b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT as a prerequisite for
admission to law schools; Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on March 12,
2019 enjoining the Legal Education Board from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 is
made PERMANENT. The regular admission of students who were conditionally admitted
and enrolled is left to the discretion of the law schools in the exercise of their academic
freedom

Chua
Topic: Education, Science, technology, Arts, Culture and Sports

350. DLSU v. CA (2007)

DOCTRINE: Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide
for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint. According to present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine
for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to
study.

FACTS: Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, 4 members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity, were
expelled by the DLSU Joint Discipline Board due to their involvement in an offensive action causing injury
to James Yap and 3 other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity.

James Yap overheard 2 men, including a member of Tau Gamma Phi, badmouthing Domino Lux Fraternity
in Manang’s, and confronted them with 6 other members. Tau Gama Phi sought an apology through the
intercession of the Student Council, but no apology was made. One late afternoon, 8-10 men ambushed
Yap across Taft Avenue. The incident was reported to the Discipline Office.

Later, as Dennis Pascual, the head of Domino Lux, along with Ericson Cano and Michael Perez, were near
Kolehiyo ng Malate Restaurant, a grip of guys got out of the restaurant and attacked them without
provocation. Cano and Perez were able to run, but Pascual was left behind and ganged up on by the
assailants. Pascual identified Reverente and Lee among those who hit him, and Valdes as another member
whom he did not see hit him.

Yap, Pascual and Cano filed complaints with the Discipline Board for direct assault. Aguilar, Bungubung,
Reverente and Valdes were found guilty and expelled. Aguilar filed a petition for certiorari and injunction
with the RTC, and a TRO was issued. Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes filed petitions-in-intervention.

Aguilar was refused enrollment by DLSU, and filed a motion to cite DLSU in contempt of court. The RTC
issued a writ of injunction and ordered DLSU to desist from barring the enrollment of the students. DLSU
filed a petition for certiorari and was granted a writ of preliminary injunction against the order.
CHED issued Resolution No. 181-96 summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private
respondents. Aguilar was resolved to be reinstated, and the penalty for Bungubung, Valdez, Lee and
Reverente were lowered to exclusion. However, DLSU still prevented Aguilar from enrolling.

DLSU requested to transfer the case records to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
from CHED, arguing it is DECS which has jurisdiction over expulsion cases, and not CHED.

Aguilar filed a motion to dismiss the petition for certiorari by DLSU with the CA, arguing the CHED
Resolution rendered issue moot and academic, which was granted. Aguilar was allowed to conditionally
enroll pending the outcome of the RTC case.

DLSU filed the present petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing Resolution No. 181-96.

ISSUE 1: Whether CHED has the power of review over disciplinary cases decided by institutions of higher
learning

RULING 1: Yes. RA 7722 created the Commission on Higher Education to cover all public and private
institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational
institutions, public and private. It gave CHED the power, among others, to promulgate such rules and
regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary to carry out effectively the
purpose and objectives of this Act; and perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective
operations and for the continued enhancement of growth or development of higher education. The
provisions are all-embracing and made no reservations of powers to DECS insofar as institutions of higher
learning are concerned. To rule that DECS has authority to decide disciplinary cases involving students on
the tertiary level would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED.

ISSUE 2: Whether DLSU is within its rights to expel the respondents

RULING 2: No, the respondents should only be sanctioned with exclusion, and not expulsion.

(A) Due Process. Respondents were accorded due process of law. In administrative cases, such as
investigations of students found violating school discipline, there are withal minimum standards which must
be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must
be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right
to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed
of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5)
the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process – it is enough
that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. "To be heard" does
not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard through pleadings and
where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.

Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint
Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against
them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence
presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents
were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board
considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its resolution in the
disciplinary case.

Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to cross-
examine the witnesses against them. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The
proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential
part thereof.

(B) Academic Freedom. DLSU has the right to exercise its academic freedom in refusing to admit
respondents. Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide
for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint. According to present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine
for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to
study.

The right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach." While it is
categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a right "to freely choose their field
of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is
subject to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice of
students for admission to its school.

(C) Substantial Evidence. The guilt of Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes was proven by substantial
evidence. The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is neither proof
beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence. According to Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, it means "such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." We reject the alibi of private respondents Bungubung, Valdes
Jr., and Reverente.1awphi1 They were unable to show convincingly that they were not at the scene of the
crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been there. Moreover, their alibi
cannot prevail over their positive identification by the victims.

(D) Disproportionate Penalty. Under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for few
seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury. Disciplinary measures especially where they
involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the future of a student. They attach to him
for life and become a mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of colleges and
universities must be anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary
action should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure.

DISPOSITIVE: The penalty of exclusion as imposed by CHED is affirmed. DLSU may exclude or drop the
names of the said private respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials
immediately issued.
Cheryll Santos Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove and/or Sr. Edna Quiambap, OSB
GR 187226, January 28, 2015, Reyes, J

DOCTRINE:
 ● The 1992 MRPS was issued by the Secretary of Education pursuant to BP 232. Secretary of
Education was authorized under BP 232.
● When the law speaks of immoral or, necessarily, disgraceful conduct, it pertains to public and
secular morality; it refers to those conducts which are proscribed because they are detrimental to
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society

FACTS:
Cheryll was hired as “assistant to school’ director of the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach
Directorate” by SSCW, a Catholic educational institution, as a non-teaching personnel. She engaged in
premarital sexual relations and got pregnant out of wedlock, then married the father of her child. She got
dismissed by SSCW. Cheryll explained that her pregnancy out of wedlock did not amount to serious
misconduct under the school policy.

Cheryll filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against SSCW and Sr. Quiambao, claiming no just cause for
her dismissal because her disputed act was a purely private matter. On the other hand, Respondents claim
that premarital sex, and getting pregnant as a result, amounts to a disgraceful or immoral conduct, which is
abhorred by a catholic educational institution exclusively to young girls. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC
affirmed. CA affirmed, adding that the school rules/policy, governing the employment of private schools,
prevails over the Labor Code.

ISSUE:
Whether the school rules/policy (1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools) governs the employment
termination of private schools

RULING: YES
The 1992 MRPS, the regulation in force at the time of the instant controversy, was issued as the revised
IRR of BP 232 or the Education Act of 1982. The 1992 MRPS was issued by the Secretary of Education
pursuant to BP 232. The qualifications of teaching and nonteaching personnel of private schools, as well as
the causes for the termination of their employment, are an integral aspect of the educational system of
private schools and the Secretary of Education has the authority to issue a rule for dismissal based on
incompetence, inefficiency or some other disqualification with the corresponding sanctions.

Cheryll claims that the 1992 MRPS providing for causes of termination is invalid due to “widened scope and
coverage” of BP 232. This claim is untenable.

ISSUE:
Whether the pregnancy out of wedlock constitutes valid ground for termination

RULING: NO
The totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct alleged to be disgraceful or immoral must be
assessed against the prevailing norms of conduct. The determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or
immoral involves a two-step process: first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the conduct; and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis the prevailing norms of
conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and respectable.

The fact of employment by a Catholic educational institution per se does not absolutely determine whether
her pregnancy out of wedlock is disgraceful or immoral. Furthermore, public and secular morality should
determine the prevailing norms of conduct, not religious morality. In Estrada v. Escritor, an administrative
case against a court interpreter charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Court stressed that in
determining whether a particular conduct can be considered as disgraceful and immoral, the distinction
between public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, should be kept in
mind.40 That the distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality is important
because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

When the law speaks of immoral or, necessarily, disgraceful conduct, it pertains to public and secular
morality; it refers to those conducts which are proscribed because they are detrimental to conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society. In Anonymous v. Radam, an administrative
case involving a court utility worker likewise charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct. For a particular
conduct to constitute “disgraceful and immoral” behavior under civil service laws, it must be regulated on
account of the concerns of public and secular morality. It cannot be judged based on personal bias,
specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on “cultural” values not
convincingly demonstrated to have been recognized in the realm of public policy expressed in the
Constitution and the laws

In this case, applying the standard that morality pertains to public and secular morality and not religious
morality, in order for a conduct to be considered as “disgraceful or immoral”, it must be “‘detrimental (or
dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society’ and not
because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other.” Cheryll’s pregnancy out of
wedlock is not a disgraceful or immoral conduct since she and the father of her child have no impediment to
marry each other. It may be an unusual arrangement, but it certainly was not “disgraceful or immoral” within
the contemplation of the law.

There was no substantial evidence to prove that the pregnancy out of wedlock caused grave scandal to
SSCW and its students, as stated by the labor tribunals. There were only bare allegations affecting the
school’s integrity. In termination cases, the burden of proving that the dismissal of the employees was for a
valid and authorized cause rests on the employer. Furthermore, SSCW did not exercise valid management
prerogative. there is no cause to dismiss the petitioner. Her conduct is not considered by law as disgraceful
or immoral. Further, the respondents themselves have admitted that SSCW, at the time of the controversy,
does not have any policy or rule against an employee who engages in premarital sexual relations and
conceives a child as a result thereof.

PETITION GRANTED. Cheryll was illegally dismissed due to no just cause of termination. She is entitled to
separation pay, in lieu of actual reinstatement, full backwages and attorney’s fees, but not to moral and
exemplary damages.