Côte D'ivoire's Post-Election Crisis

Côte d’Ivoire’s Post-Election Crisis
Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
March 29, 2011
Congressional Research Service

7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21989
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Cote d'Ivoire’s Post-Election Crisis
Summary
Côte d’Ivoire has entered a renewed period of extreme political instability, accompanied by
significant political violence, following a contested presidential election designed to cap an often
forestalled peace process. The election was held under the terms of the 2007 Ouagadougou
Political Agreement, the most recent in a series of partially implemented peace accords aimed at
reunifying Côte d’Ivoire, which has remained largely divided between a government-controlled
southern region and a rebel-controlled zone in the north since the outbreak of a civil war in 2002.
Extensive recent fighting in the west, Abidjan, and in a growing number of other areas, among
diverse other indicators, suggest that a new Ivoirian civil war is now under way.
These developments directly threaten long-standing U.S. and international efforts to support a
transition to peace, political stability, and democratic governance in Côte d’Ivoire, among other
U.S. objectives. Indirectly at stake are broader, long-term U.S. efforts to ensure regional stability,
peace, democratic and accountable governance, and economic growth in West Africa, along with
billions of dollars of U.S. foreign aid to achieve these ends. The United States has supported the
Ivoirian peace process since the 2002 war, both diplomatically and financially, with funding
appropriated by Congress. It supports the ongoing U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI);
funded a UNOCI predecessor, the U.N. Mission in Côte d’Ivoire; and assisted in the deployment
in 2003 of a now defunct Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military
intervention force. The 112th Congress may be asked to consider additional funding for UNOCI;
U.S. support for a potential ECOWAS military intervention force; or funding for emergency
humanitarian aid in response to the deteriorating political-military situation.
On November 28, 2010, a presidential election runoff vote was held between the incumbent
president, Laurent Gbagbo, and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, the two leading
winners of a first-round poll a month earlier. Both claim to have won the runoff and separately
inaugurated themselves as president and formed rival governments. Ouattara bases his victory
claim on the U.N.-certified runoff results announced by the Ivoirian Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC). These show that he won the election with a 54.1% share of votes, against
45.9% for Gbagbo. The international community, including the United States, endorsed the IEC-
announced poll results as legitimate and demanded that Gbagbo cede the presidency to Ouattara.
H.Res. 85 (Payne), introduced on February 10, 2011, voices support for these positions. Gbagbo,
rejecting the IEC decision, appealed it to the Ivoirian Constitutional Council, which reviewed and
annulled it and proclaimed Gbagbo president, with 51.5% of votes against 48.6% for Ouattara.
Gbagbo therefore claims to have been duly elected and refuses to hand power over to Ouattara.
The electoral standoff has caused a sharp rise in political tension and violence, deaths and human
rights abuses, and spurred attacks on U.N. peacekeepers. The international community has
broadly rejected Gbagbo’s victory claim and endorsed Ouattara as the legally elected president. It
is using diplomatic and financial efforts, sanctions, and a military intervention threat to pressure
Gbagbo to step aside. H.Res. 85 would express congressional support for such ends. Top U.S
officials have attempted to directly pressure Gbagbo to step down. An existing U.S. ban on
bilateral aid was augmented with visa restrictions and financial sanctions targeting the Gbagbo
administration. As of early 2011, regional mediation had produced few results. Continued
political volatility was likely under most current scenarios, and there was a growing risk of war. A
unity government might temporarily reduce political tension, but would likely not resolve the root
causes of the crisis. If the political crisis is resolved, however, Côte d’Ivoire is well-placed to
recover economically.

Contents
Recent Developments..................................................................................................................1
Introduction and Implications for the United States .....................................................................2
Post-Electoral Crisis....................................................................................................................4
Competing Electoral Victory Claims .....................................................................................5
International Recognition of Ouattara Resisted by Gbagbo ....................................................8
Political Tension and Violence............................................................................................. 12
Casualties and Rising Threat Level................................................................................ 13
Violence Escalates and the Threat of War Rises ............................................................. 16
Threats to International Mandates and Accountability.................................................... 19
Humanitarian Effects and Responses ................................................................................... 20
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance ....................................................................................... 21
International Reactions.............................................................................................................. 22
International Multilateral and Bilateral Responses ............................................................... 22
Regional Diplomacy ........................................................................................................... 24
AU High-Level Panel.................................................................................................... 25
AU Panel Recommendations: Prospects and Significance.............................................. 27
Threat of Military Intervention to Oust Gbagbo................................................................... 30
U.N. Sanctions .................................................................................................................... 32
European Union Sanctions .................................................................................................. 33
Constriction of Gbagbo Administration Access to Finance................................................... 34
U.S. Diplomatic and Policy Responses ...................................................................................... 38
U.S. Stance ......................................................................................................................... 38
Presidential and Other High-Level Efforts to Pressure Gbagbo to Step Down ................ 39
U.S. Visa Restrictions ................................................................................................... 40
U.S. Targeted Financial Sanctions ................................................................................. 41
Congressional Responses .................................................................................................... 41
U.S. Relations, Assistance, and Elections Support ..................................................................... 42
Outlook..................................................................................................................................... 44
Figures
Figure 1. Côte d’Ivoire: National Map with Regions.................................................................. 46
Tables
Table C-1. Acronyms Used in This Report................................................................................. 72
Appendixes
Appendix A. Background on the Election.................................................................................. 47
Appendix B. Background to the Crisis....................................................................................... 60

Appendix C. Acronym Table ..................................................................................................... 72
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 74

Recent Developments
The two contenders in Côte d’Ivoire’s November 28, 2010 presidential election runoff election,
Laurent Gbagbo (baag-boh) and his rival, former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara (wah-tah-
rah), both continue to claim to have won the runoff and to exercise exclusive national executive
authority, and to attempt to consolidate their control over state institutions. In response to the
expansion of UNOCI authorized by the U.N. Security Council on January 19, 2011, Congress
may be asked to appropriate increased levels of funding for the operation. Similarly, if ECOWAS
mounts a new military intervention—which the organization has contingently planned, but
deferred for the time being—the Administration may request Congressional appropriations to
support such an action, as past administrations have for several previous ECOWAS interventions.
Lastly, if a renewed armed conflict erupts in Côte d’Ivoire, whether as a result of external
intervention or civil war, Congress is likely to be asked to fund emergency humanitarian
interventions to aid war-affected civilians and refugees. Under any of the scenarios outlined
above, with respect to possible future efforts to consolidate peace if the crisis is resolved,
Congress may consider new funding and related oversight activities—or may decide that none
should be provided at all, given competing, pressing U.S. priorities. Apart from any consideration
of possible crisis-related aid, Congress is likely to monitor U.S. efforts to help resolve the Ivoirian
crisis because of the implications of such efforts for bilateral and regional U.S. policy goals. See
“Post-Electoral Crisis,” below
Post-electoral political violence is escalating and had resulted in at least 462 deaths by March 25
and likely many more. Territorial military battles in the west and elsewhere, extensive armed
clashes in Abidjan, and a range of other indicators suggest that a new Ivoirian civil war is now
under way. State security forces have violently suppressed political protests and raided opposition
strongholds, often causing fatalities, and numerous armed clashes have occurred in the
commercial capital, Abidjan. The combat has involved state security forces, elements of the
northern rebel Forces Nouvelles (FN, or New Forces)1, and militant supporters of Gbagbo and
Ouattara, resulting in many deaths and internal displacements. The FN has seized territory in the
far west, along with multiple towns in that region and in central and eastern Côte d’Ivoire. In
some instances, presumed ethnicity is being used an indicator of putative political affiliation, and
as the basis for attacks on individuals and communities by militant supporters of the two
presidential contenders. See “Political Tension and Violence,” below.
Humanitarian conditions are deteriorating. As of late March, the crisis had internally displaced or
prompted the flight as refugees of between 800,000 and 1.1 million people, including over 93,000
who had fled to neighboring Liberia, and the number was projected to rise sharply due to fighting
in western Côte d’Ivoire. Current U.S. assistance responses to help address emergency
humanitarian needs generated by the Ivoirian crisis are being expanded; all such assistance, in
Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and elsewhere in the region, totaled about $28.6 million as of mid-March.
See “Humanitarian Effects and Responses,” below.
United Nations (U.N.) sanctions compliance experts are monitoring multiple cases of alleged
violations of a U.N. arms embargo. Attempts to hinder the movement and activities of U.N.
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) personnel and activities, in some cases through armed
1
In this report, in most cases and except where otherwise specified, French acronyms are given and employed for
Ivoirian entities, in accordance with common usage.
Congressional Research Service 1

attacks, continue. UNOCI has recently received new helicopter gunships and is attempting to
attain its fully authorized force level. In response to the expansion of UNOCI authorized by the
U.N. Security Council on January 19, 2011, Congress may be asked to appropriate increased
levels of funding for the operation. Similarly, if ECOWAS mounts a new military intervention—
which the organization has contingently planned, but deferred for the time being—the
Administration may request Congressional appropriations to support such an action, as past
administrations have for several previous ECOWAS interventions. Lastly, if a renewed armed
conflict erupts in Côte d’Ivoire, whether as a result of external intervention or civil war, Congress
is likely to be asked to fund emergency humanitarian interventions to aid war-affected civilians
and refugees. Under any of the scenarios outlined above, with respect to possible future efforts to
consolidate peace if the crisis is resolved, Congress may consider new funding and related
oversight activities—or may decide that none should be provided at all, given competing,
pressing U.S. priorities. Apart from any consideration of possible crisis-related aid, Congress is
likely to monitor U.S. efforts to help resolve the Ivoirian crisis because of the implications of
such efforts for bilateral and regional U.S. policy goals. See “Post-Electoral Crisis” and text box
on UNOIC, below.
Most governments around the world, including that of the United States, as well as the African
Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), are pressing for
Gbagbo to cede the presidency to Ouattara, in accordance with the U.N.-certified run-off result
announced by the Ivoirian Independent Electoral Commission. An AU heads of state crisis
resolution panel delivered its findings on March 10. It reaffirmed Ouattara’s election win,
reiterated an AU demand that Gbagbo to step down, and recommended that a national unity
government and peace and reconciliation process based on an existing peace agreement be
established. The panel’s findings were rejected by Gbagbo and largely accepted by Ouattara, but
he rejected the appointment of an AU representative appointed to implement the panel’s
recommendations, asserting that the appointee, a former Cape Verdean prime minister, has links
to Gbagbo. Prior AU/ECOWAS mediation efforts had produced few tangible results. See
“International Reactions“ and “U.S. Diplomatic and Policy Responses,” below.
International financial pressure and sanctions on the Gbagbo administration appear to be reducing
its ability to pay state salaries, possibly undermining civil servant loyalties. The Ivoirian financial
sector has become increasingly paralyzed following the withdrawal from Côte d’Ivoire of several
international banks and the transfer of Ivoirian central bank authority to Ouattara. A cocoa export
ban imposed by the Ouattara administration has been extended through the end of March 2011.
Gbagbo has nationalized the cocoa sector and may seize unexported stocks, and may nationalize
other sectors. Record global cocoa price rises are being attributed to political uncertainty in Côte
d’Ivoire. Some governments are calling for expanded sanctions on the Gbagbo administration.
See “Constriction of Gbagbo Administration Access to Finance,” below.
State media coverage continues to be highly partisan, and often contains xenophobic material and
rhetoric directed against governments that have endorsed Ouattara’s election, including that of the
United States. Attacks on press freedom relating to coverage of the election continue. See
“Control of Information” textbox, below.
Introduction and Implications for the United States

Côte d’Ivoire, a former French West African colony of 21.1 million people that is nearly as large
as New Mexico and is the world’s leading cocoa producer, has entered a renewed period of

extreme political instability in the wake of a contested presidential election. The election was
conducted under the terms of the most recent in a series of partially implemented peace
agreements aimed at reunifying Côte d’Ivoire, which has remained largely divided between a
government-controlled southern region and a rebel-controlled zone in the north since the outbreak
of a civil war in 2002. The war, along with the political events that contributed to and followed it,
is discussed Appendix B.
The current instability, which has been accompanied by significant political violence, threatens
long-standing U.S. and international efforts to support a transition to peace, political stability, and
democratic governance in Côte d’Ivoire, which are prerequisites for long-term socio-economic
development in Côte d’Ivoire, another key U.S. bilateral objective. While the situation in Côte
d’Ivoire does not directly affect vital U.S. national interests, the country remains an important
economic hub in the region, and if the crisis were to devolve into an armed conflict, negative
economic and humanitarian impacts in West Africa could be significant. Also indirectly at stake
are broad, long-term U.S. efforts to ensure regional political stability, peace, democratic and
accountable governance, state capacity-building, and economic growth in West Africa—along
with several billion dollars worth of investments that the United States has made in the sub-region
to achieve these goals.
The United States has supported the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire since 2002, both politically
and financially, with funding appropriated by Congress. It aided in the 2003 deployment of the
former Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
(ECOMICI), a military intervention force. It also contributed 22% of the cost of a 2003-2004
U.N. military monitoring and political mission, the U.N. Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI), and
continues to fund about 27% of the cost of the ongoing U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
(UNOCI), a multi-faceted peacekeeping mission that succeeded MINUCI.

Côte d’Ivoire: Country Background

Côte d’Ivoire, a former French West African colony of 21.1 million people that is nearly as large as New Mexico, was
politically stable for most of its post-independence period. It had among the strongest economies in the region,
attracted significant foreign investment, notably from France, and was a top world producer of cocoa and coffee,
among other exports. It remains the world’s largest cocoa producer. Its economic success was built on pro-
agricultural policies, often favorable export prices, expanding production, and the labor, in the southern cocoa belt, of
migrants from its northern regions and northern neighbors. They worked cheaply in exchange for jobs, land, and
farming rights in the south, where a dynamic multi-ethnic society evolved. Significant numbers of military officers were
integrated into provincial civilian administration, and promotion through the ranks was reportedly dependant on
political loyalty. The military played no central institutional role in domestic affairs, however, and did not threaten the
ruling regime. National defense was largely entrusted to France, with which Côte d’Ivoire maintained a mutual defense
pact, among other defense agreements. These outcomes were largely the legacy of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, president
from 1960 until his death in 1993. His policies emphasized social inclusion, cooperation, and reinvestment of national
wealth in the economy. His semi-authoritarian-style regime was marked by stability, and although it coercively
suppressed political opposition parties, a transition to multi-party politics occurred late in his tenure.
In the mid-1980s, calls for democratization, episodic social unrest, and political tensions emerged, spurred by long-
term cocoa price and production declines, growing national debt, austerity measures, and decreasing access to new
tree cropping land. While resource scarcities underlay these tensions, social competition increasingly began to be
expressed in terms of ethnic, regional, and religious identity. The large, mostly Muslim populations of immigrant
workers and northern Ivoirians resident in the south faced increasing resistance by southerners and the state to their
full participation in civic life and citizenship. Houphouët-Boigny’s death generated rivalries over political power and
leadership succession rights, and his successor, Henri Konan Bédié, used these divisions to rally political support,
making use of a xenophobic, nationalist ideology known as Ivoirité. It defined southerners as ‘authentic’ Ivoirians, in
opposition to ‘circumstantial’ ones, i.e., northerners and immigrants. It helped fuel increasingly volatile national politics
encompassing electoral competition; military, student, and labor unrest; conflict over land rights; and periodic mass
protests, some violent, over economic issues. These developments also presaged subsequent political developments:
the ouster of Bédié in a 1999 military coup by General Robert Guéï; the election in 2000 of Laurent Gbagbo, the
current president; and a 2002 military rebellion which led to a civil war, dividing the country between a rebel-held
north and a government-controlled south, and prompting a lengthy, ongoing political impasse over how to reunify the
country. A series of internationally supported peace accords, the most recent signed in 2007, laid out a roadmap for
disarmament, national reunification, elections leading to a return to democratic governance after years of political
crisis, but all have remained only partially implemented.
In response to the expansion of UNOCI authorized by the U.N. Security Council on January 19,
2011, Congress may be asked to appropriate increased levels of funding for the operation.
Similarly, if ECOWAS mounts a new military intervention—which the organization has
contingently planned, but deferred for the time being—the Administration may request
Congressional appropriations to support such an action, as past administrations have for several
previous ECOWAS interventions. Lastly, if a renewed armed conflict erupts in Côte d’Ivoire,
whether as a result of external intervention or civil war, Congress is likely to be asked to fund
emergency humanitarian interventions to aid war-affected civilians and refugees. Under any of
the scenarios outlined above, with respect to possible future efforts to consolidate peace if the
crisis is resolved, Congress may consider new funding and related oversight activities—or may
decide that none should be provided at all, given competing, pressing U.S. priorities. Apart from
any consideration of possible crisis-related aid, Congress is likely to monitor U.S. efforts to help
resolve the Ivoirian crisis because of the implications of such efforts for bilateral and regional
U.S. policy goals.
Post-Electoral Crisis
On November 28, 2010, a presidential election runoff vote was held between the incumbent
president, Laurent Gbagbo, and former Prime Minister Alassane Dramane Ouattara, the two
candidates who had garnered the most votes, 38% and 32%, respectively, in a generally peaceful

but long-delayed first-round presidential poll held on October 31, 2010. Both candidates claim to
have won the runoff vote and separately inaugurated themselves as president and appointed
cabinets, forming rival governments. Both claim to exercise national executive authority over
state institutions and have taken steps to consolidate their control.
Competing Electoral Victory Claims

Ouattara, popularly known by his initials, ADO (pronounced ahh-doh by Ivoirians), bases his
victory claim on the U.N.-certified runoff results announced by Côte d’Ivoire’s Independent
Electoral Commission (IEC). These showed that he won the election with 54.1% of votes cast,
primarily by a predominantly Muslim, northern electorate, augmented by portions of the ethnic
Akan-centered political base of the candidate who took third-place in the first round, Henri
Konan Bédié, a former head of state. The results showed Gbagbo winning 45.9% of votes, mostly
drawn from the south, notably including Krou ethnic group areas in the south-center and west,
some central-east Akan areas, and southeastern Lagoon ethnic group areas. Most of the
international community, including the United States, has endorsed the IEC poll results as
accurate and authoritative, and demanded that Gbagbo to accept them and cede the presidency to
Ouattara.2 Gbagbo, however, appealed the IEC decision to Côte d’Ivoire’s Constitutional
Council—stacked with members mostly nominated by Gbagbo or his close ally, Mamadou
Koulibaly, the President of the National Assembly—which reviewed and annulled it.3 Citing
voting irregularities, electoral violence, and a failure by the IEC to formally announce poll results
within a legally mandated three-day period, the Council nullified poll results in seven northern
departments and proclaimed Gbagbo president. It ruled that he had received 51.5% of votes,
against 48.6% for Ouattara. The Council’s decision allocated 2.05 million votes to Gbagbo
(52,518 more votes than he had garnered during the first round), while it awarded Ouattara 1.94
million votes (544,492 fewer votes than he had won during the first round). 4
Gbagbo, citing the Constitutional Council’s constitutionally authorized decision, asserts that he is
the legally elected president and has rejected international calls to step down. His victory claim
has been widely rejected internationally, however, because the Special Representative of the U.N.
Secretary-General’s (SRSG) for Côte d’Ivoire, Choi Young-Jin—based on an independent tally
process carried out entirely separately but in parallel to that undertaken by the IEC—“certified the
outcome of the second round of the presidential election, as announced by the… IEC, confirming
Mr. Ouattara as the winner.”5 SRSG Choi concluded that based on his certification, which was
2
For details, see “International Reactions” section, below. In mid-December, the U.N. Secretary-General made a
statement reflecting this international consensus. He stated that “the results of the election are known. There was a clear
winner. There is no other option. The efforts of Laurent Gbagbo and his supporters to retain power and flout the public
will cannot be allowed to stand. I call on him to step down and allow his elected successor to assume office without
further hindrance. The international community must send this message — loud and clear. Any other outcome would
make a mockery of democracy and the rule of law.” UNSG, “Secretary-General’s Remarks at UNHQ Year-End Press
Conference,” December 17, 2010.
3
Under the Ivoirian constitution, the Constitutional Council is charged with judging the legality of national presidential
and legislative nominations and elections and with determining the final results of the presidential elections, including
by deciding the outcome in cases of disputes pertaining to the outcome of such elections, among other duties.
4
IEC, Second Tour de l’Election du President de la Republique de Côte d’Ivoire, Scrutin du 28 Novembre 2010,
Resultats Provisoires par Centre de Coordination, December 2, 2010; and Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision No CI-
2010-Ep-34/03-12/CC/SG Portant Proclamation des Resultats Definitifs de l’Election Presidentielle du 28 Novembre
2010 au Nom du Peuple de Côte d’Ivoire, December 3, 2010.
5
UNOCI, “Presidential Elections,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/elections.shtml

“conducted without regard to the methods used and result proclaimed by either the IEC or the
Constitutional Council… the Ivorian people have chosen Mr. Alassane Ouattara with an
irrefutable margin as the winner over Mr. Laurent Gbagbo.” Gbagbo’s claim has also been
rejected because Choi, after closely examining the Constitutional Council’s proclamation
negating the IEC decision “certified that … [it] was not based on facts.”6
The decision of the Constitutional Council was widely viewed internationally and by the Ivorian
opposition as having been motivated by partisan bias. The Council’s decision was preceded by
what appears to have been a coordinated effort by Gbagbo supporters to discredit selected runoff
poll results before they were announced by the IEC—once it had become clear, based on partial
preliminary poll results, that Gbagbo would likely not win the poll—and to disrupt or extend past
the three-day deadline IEC validation of the results, creating a rationale for the Council’s review
and rejection of the IEC’s determination. On December 1, a Gbagbo-nominated IEC member,
Damana Adia Pickass, seized and tore up the provisional IEC results on live television just as the
IEC spokesman, Bamba Yacouba, was about to publicly announce them. The incident disrupted
the workings of the IEC and reportedly caused it to miss its legal deadline for announcing the
results, creating the basis for Council review. 7
The Council’s decision was also viewed skeptically because it resulted in the statistically highly
unlikely annulment of the 597,010 votes, a number equivalent to 10.4% of all registered voters or
13% of all votes cast during the runoff. 8 Furthermore, all of the annulled districts were located in
major population zones of in northern Côte d’Ivoire, which is considered an Ouattara electoral
stronghold and is largely controlled by the northern rebel Forces Nouvelles. Some observers also
contend that under Article 64 of the national electoral code, the Council had the authority to
cancel the entire election, but not part of it, and to order new elections in the case of a
cancellation. The president of the Council, however, has contended that electoral precedent gave
the Council the authority to order a partial cancellation; he cited as the basis of such authority the
partial cancellation of 1995 presidential election results. He has also contended that new elections
were not necessary because only 13% of votes were affected—even though the cancellation of
these votes had the material effect of reversing the election’s outcome—and asserted that a new
election would only have been required if 30%-40% of votes had been dismissed. 9 Appendix A
“Background on the Election” discusses the first and second round polls and the lengthy, highly
contested peace and pre-election processes that preceded it.
6
Y.J. Choi, U.N. SRSG, “Statement on the Second Round of the Presidential Election Held on 28 November 2010,”
December 8, 2010
7
Tim Cocks and Loucoumane Coulibaly, “Ivory Coast President Party Says Rebels Rigged Poll,” Reuters, December
1, 2010; Scott Stearns, “Ivory Coast Electoral Commission Misses Presidential Deadline,” VOA, December 1, 2010;
and BBC News, “Gbagbo Ally Tears Up Ivory Coast Run-Off Results,” December 1, 2010.
8
CRS calculations based on Constitutional Council and IEC-reported vote numbers.
9
AU PSC, Report of the High Level Panel.

U.N. Certification of Election Process

SRSG Choi was designated to serve as an independent election certifier of the presidential election by the U.N.
Security Council (UNSC), in accordance with several UNSC resolutions, most notably Resolution 1765, of July 16,
2007, underpinned by a request of the Ivorian signatories of the 2005 Pretoria Agreement, as amended.10 The
Pretoria Agreement was one of several partially implemented peace agreements that were incorporated by reference
into the March 4, 2007, Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA).11 The electoral preparation processes that
preceded and enabled the October/November presidential poll to be held were carried out in accordance with the
OPA. Choi certified all the key stages of the pre-poll day electoral process based upon a framework and criteria
designed in consultation with all the Ivoirian parties and other stakeholders, such as the U.N. Security Council and the
OPA Facilitator, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso.
Choi, who in his certification statement declared that “the second round of the election was… generally conducted in
a democratic climate,” rejected what he described as the “two essential arguments” informing the Constitutional
Council’s decision. The first related to “the use of violence in nine departments in the North which prevented people
from voting.” He rejected this contention on the basis that the overall voter participation rate of 81% indicated that
there was not “sufficient violence to prevent people from voting.” He also noted that a UNOCI aggregation of “all the
reports on violence” indicating the “intensity, frequency and location of violence” showed that “there were fewer
violent acts in the North [where the Council rejected seven districts] than in the West.” A mapping of election
violence and electoral irregularities produced by the Ivorian media outlet Abidjan.net indicates that such incidents
were less frequent in the north than in southern and western regions and other areas where returns were favorable
to Gbagbo and were not dismissed by the Constitutional Council. Choi also later asserted that while his certification
of the runoff vote had taken into account all claims lodged by Gbagbo, the Constitutional Council had taken into
account complaints not made by Gbagbo and cancelled results from departments where he had not contested the
voting results or process.12
The IEC’s voter participation figures bore out the assertion that the average voter participation rate was as high in
northern areas at issue as in most other areas of the country, and surpassed those in several southern regions. Choi
also rejected the Council’s second core rationale for overturning the IEC’s decision, which focused on allegations that
“the tally sheets in [...some] departments ... lacked the signature of the presidential camp’s representatives.” He
rejected this contention on the basis that he had “reviewed all the tally sheets in the concerned departments and
eliminated all those which lacked the signature of President Gbagbo’s representatives,” and stated that the “upshot
was that, even such an exercise did not alter in any significant way the outcome of the second round.”13 He later
reported that 10% of tally sheets, corresponding to about 60,000 votes, were not signed by party representatives of
Gbagbo, a number too small to materially affect the electoral outcome. He also stated that such party signatures were
not legally required; under the Ivoirian electoral code, he stated, only the signatures of the President and assessors of
local polling offices are required to certify the tally sheets.14
10
The accord was signed in April 6, 2005 and amended by the signatories, after an implementation review, on June 29,
2005.
11
The OPA superseded all prior peace accords, but in many instances these earlier accords remained operative because
the OPA incorporated provisions by reference. A number of legal reforms relating to election administration,
citizenship, and related matters were also based upon and enacted based upon provisions within these accords.
12
AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), Report of the High Level Panel of the African Union for the Resolution of the
Crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, PSC/AHG/2(CCLXV), March 11, 2011.
13
Choi, “Statement on the Second Round…”; Y.J. Choi, U.N. SRSG, “Statement on the Certification of the Result of
the Second Round of the Presidential Election Held on 28 November 2010,” December 3, 2010; IEC, Second Tour de
l’election …”; and Abidjan.net, “Localisation des Incidents lors du Scrutin,” Côte d’Ivoire 2010 - Elections
Présidentielles, December 5, 2010, via Carter Center communication.
14
AU PSC, Report of the High Level Panel.

International Recognition of Ouattara Resisted by Gbagbo

SRSG Choi’s certification of the IEC-announced runoff results and the build-up of international
pressure on Gbagbo to stand down have infuriated President Gbagbo and his political supporters
and ratcheted up political tension and violence (see “Political Tension and Violence,” below.) The
Gbagbo government asserts that the international community’s rejection of the Constitutional
Council’s decision and its efforts to force him to concede the presidency infringe on Ivorian
national sovereignty and the constitutional rule of law—even though the Gbagbo government,
among other signatories of the 2007 and prior peace agreements, had agreed to the United
Nations’ electoral certification mandate. 15 The Gbagbo government has accused UNOCI of
collaborating with the rebel FN and on December 18 demanded that UNOCI peacekeepers—
along with a French force that supports UNOCI—immediately leave the country.16 On December
20, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) rejected the demand by extending the mandate UNOCI
until June 30, 2011 and authorizing a temporary plus-up of its size. A U.N. spokesman was
quoted as stating that Gbagbo’s call was irrelevant and without effect because he is not
recognized by the United Nations, African regional organizations, or most governments as the
duly elected leader of Côte d’Ivoire.17 Ouattara supports a continuing UNOCI role. On March 10,
after Ouattara had departed Côte d’Ivoire in a U.N. aircraft to attend an African Union meeting in
Ethiopia, Gbagbo ordered a ban on flights by U.N. and French military aircraft. The order was
rejected as illegitimate by the United Nations and had no practical effect.18
UNOCI
In late January 2011, UNOCI had an authorized strength, through mid-2011, of 10,650 personnel, but had not fielded
this large a contingent; it had a deployed field strength of 9,024 troops and police. The mission has been temporarily
supplemented by several hundred additional troops from the neighboring U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). It was
attempting to obtain additional troops to meet its authorized personnel cap.19 UNOCI is a multi-faceted mission. It
monitors military aspects of peace accords and an arms embargo; assists with disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration of armed groups and parties to the conflict; provides support for security sector reform, humanitarian
aid deliveries, the re-establishment of state administration and law and order; adherence to human rights laws; aids
efforts to conduct free and fair elections and related processes of citizen identification and voter registration; and
protects U.N. personnel and assets. U.N. sanctions, including diamond export and arms import embargoes and a
selective travel ban and assets freeze also were imposed in order to spur the conflict resolution process. In early
March, two helicopter gunships arrived, and a third was en route; they were seen as enabling UNOCI to more
forcefully address military attacks on its forces or persons or property under its protection.
15
Use of the term “Gbagbo government” refers to the de facto, self-defined Gbagbo-headed administration that is
active alongside the similarly defined Ouattara government. The term is not used to imply that the Gbagbo
administration is a de juris government, but rather that it is one of two competing entities that claim state power.
16
Television Ivoirienne, “Government Communiqué on the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire,” December 18, 2010, via
BBC Monitoring Africa; Tim Cocks, “Gbagbo Ally Accuses West of Wooing Ivorian Military,” Reuters, December 12,
2010; and Marco Chown Oved, “Gbagbo Orders UN Peacekeepers to Leave Ivory Coast,” AP, December 18, 2010
17
UNSC, “Security Council Extends Mission in Côte d’Ivoire Until 30 June 2011, Strongly Condemns Attempts to
Usurp Will of People, Urges Respect for Election Outcome,” SC/10132, December 20, 2010; and VOA, “UN
Spokesman: Gbagbo Not Ivory Coast President,” December 18, 2010.
18
BBC, “Ivory Coast’s Laurent Gbagbo Bans UN and French Flights,” March 10, 2011; Marco Chown Oved, “Gbagbo
Vows to Block UN Flights in Ivory Coast,” AP, March 10, 2011; and UNNS, “Human Rights in Côte d’Ivoire
Deteriorating, Warns Top UN Official,” March 10, 2011.

The Gbagbo government and its supporters have taken an uncompromising stance with regard to
what they see as Gbagbo’s legally binding, incontrovertible electoral win. They have pursued
diverse efforts to ensure that he remains president. These efforts have included attempts to ensure
support among civil servants and the military by asserting control over various revenue and credit
streams to ensure salary payments; attempts to eject UNOCI and impede its operations; violent
raids on opposition strongholds; and pursuit of an international public relations campaign to
promote the Gbagbo case.
The public relations campaign has included a grassroots media outreach effort by Gbagbo
supporters, who have distributed government and pro-Gbagbo press articles and blogs, in some
cases promoting vitriolic rumors and conspiracy theories. The latter have included various alleged
French and/or foreign mercenary-backed plans to oust Gbagbo, in some cases with putative U.S.
assistance, and allegations of military collusion between the FN and UNOCI. Coverage of such
alleged collusion has reportedly featured prominently and frequently on state TV and other pro-
Gbagbo media, part of what the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has described as “an
intensive and systematic campaign” by state-owned radio-television (RTI) to promote
“xenophobic messages inciting hatred and violence [and...] religious and ethnic division between
the north and the south” and “intolerance and hatred against the UN, the AU, ECOWAS, the
facilitator of the Ivorian dialogue, as well as non-LMP leaders and supporters [i.e., persons who
do not support Gbagbo ].”20
(...continued)
19
S/RES/1962, December 20, 2010; and S/RES/1967, January 19, 2011. In this report, documents cited with the
number “S/...” are U.N. Security Council (UNSC) documents; of these citations that begin with the letters “S/RES…”
are UNSC resolutions. For the sake of brevity, except as otherwise noted, only the document number and date (at first
citation) of official U.N. documents are used herein to identify such documents, which often incorporate lengthy sub-
titles and meeting forum data. The full text of all U.N. documents cited herein can be found online via the document
symbol search box of the U.N. Official Document System, http://documents.un.org.
20
U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC), Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of
Human Rights in Côte d’Ivoire, February 15, 2011.

France’s Military Presence in Côte d’Ivoire

France has been active in the Ivoirian peace process since the start of the 2002 conflict. France’s Operation Licorne,
formed in October 2002, was initially made up of French forces already present in Côte d’Ivoire under long-standing
bilateral mutual protection military accords. The force’s initial mission was to protect French citizens and interests in
Côte d’Ivoire. It also aided other foreign nationals, including Americans, many of whom French forces evacuated from
the country in late 2002. In December 2002, the French force began to act as a “blockade” force between the north-
south line dividing the national army and rebel fighters in western Côte d’Ivoire. In February 2003, Operation Licorne
was authorized by the U.N. Security Council (per Resolution 1464), along with a now-defunct ECOWAS force later
known as ECOMICI, to guarantee the security and freedom of movement of their personnel, protect civilians facing
immediate threats, as feasible.
Operation Licorne helped suppress an attempted Ivorian government resumption of the armed conflict in November
2004 after the air force, attempting to target FN positions, attacked a French post in Bouaké, in northern Côte
d’Ivoire, resulting in nine French deaths and the killing of a U.S. civilian. The French retaliated by bombing the Ivorian
air force, destroying almost all of it. Licorne was also involved in protecting French citizens and property during
violent riots that targeted UNOCI and French troops and civilians after the attempted resumption of conflict.
Licorne, which at its largest size included 4,000 personnel, currently consists of 900 soldiers based in Abidjan. Licorne
conducts patrols in Abidjan, some with UNOCI forces, and provides technical support, primarily maintenance, to
UNOCI. It is also mandated with protecting a reported 15,000 French citizens resident in Côte d’Ivoire. The Licorne
force includes mechanized infantry, military police trained in riot control, engineers, and a special forces detachment.
It operates eight helicopters and is backed by Operation Corymbe, a standing contingent French naval presence in the
Gulf of Guinea comprised of an amphibious helicopter carrier equipped with a 50-bed hospital, and can be reinforced
on as-needed basis by French standby forces based in Gabon and Senegal.21
The Gbagbo camp’s information campaign has also employed the use of official Ivorian
government websites and foreign lobbyists to make the government’s case. In the United States, a
short-lived, now abandoned effort by Lanny J. Davis, a Washington lobbyist and former special
counsel to former President William J. Clinton, garnered substantial attention.22 To counter the
Gbagbo side’s efforts and promote its views on various issues, the Ouattara government has hired
two U.S. firms to represent its views and interests in the United States. 23 It has also reportedly
established a television station that broadcasts from the Golf Hotel in Abidjan, where the Ouattara
government is based and resides under the protection of a reported 800 UNOCI troops.24
21
Government of France, email to CRS December 23, 2010, and information provided in February 2004 and December
2005; S/2010/600; and S/2004/962, December 9, 2004.
22
Two Davis-owned firms worked for the Gbagbo administration for a brief period in December 2010 to “present the
facts and the law as to why there is substantial documentary evidence that ... Gbagbo is the duly elected president as a
result of the Nov. 28 elections” and to help find “a peaceful resolution and mediation for the current conflict …
consistent with Côte d’Ivoire constitution and laws.” Davis’s firms produced a website,
http://www.ivorycoastelection.org, which laid out the government’s views on the election crisis. Davis quit his Côte
d’Ivoire commission in late December, citing the failure of an attempt by President Obama to telephone Gbagbo (see
below), Gbagbo’s failure to heed Davis’s advice, and Davis’s inability to contact Gbagbo directly. Ben Smith, “Davis
Resigns Ivory Coast Contract,” Politico, December 29, 2010; and Helene Cooper and Eric Lichtblau, “American
Lobbyists Work for Ivorian Leader,” New York Times (NYT), December 22, 2010.
23
They include Jefferson Waterman International and Covington & Burling LLP. The former is providing “advocacy
and consulting services related to Ivorian national interests, including economic, financial, military, security, trade,
investment and public relations” on behalf of Ouattara. The latter is providing “advice on international legal and policy
matters related to the outcome of the recent presidential elections in Côte d’lvoire, including the refusal of Mr. Laurent
Gbagbo to leave office in accordance with the result certified by the United Nations.” Since 2007, Ouattara has retained
another firm, LTL Strategies, to represent his views when visiting the United States. Quotations from firms’ Foreign
Agents Registration Act registration statements.
24
Television Ivoirienne, “Côte d’Ivoire: Gbagbo Minister Briefs MP’s About Pro-Ouattara Radio, TV,” via BBC
Monitoring Africa, February 23, 2011.

Gbagbo has also pursued a series of alternative actions that might allow him to remain a key
government leader if he is forced to cede the presidency. He has suggested that he might be
willing to entertain a negotiated solution to the crisis and has called for Ouattara and himself to
“sit down and discuss” a way out of the crisis with him. 25 A key Gbagbo ally has suggested that a
potential outcome of such negotiations might include a power-sharing deal, such as the formation
of a government of national unity (GNU), although ECOWAS and other international
interlocutors—including the United States—have rejected such an outcome. The Ouattara camp
rejected the possibility of a GNU until January 10, when the Ivoirian ambassador to the United
Nations, an Ouattara appointee, stated that Ouattara would be willing to form a unity government
that would include members of Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) party, if Gbagbo agreed to
step down and recognize Ouattara as the legitimately elected leader of Côte d’Ivoire.26
Gbagbo has also invited renewed international mediation to negotiate a resolution of the crisis
(see “Regional Diplomacy,” below). On December 21, he addressed the Ivorian nation on TV and
stated that he was “ready—respecting the constitution, Ivorian laws and the rules that we freely
set for ourselves—to welcome a committee of evaluation on the post-election crisis in Ivory
Coast.” He stated that such an assessment should be led by the African Union, with the
participation of the United Nations, EU, ECOWAS, the Arab League, United States, Russia,
China, and “Ivoirians of goodwill.”27 The United States, along with most major governments and
international organizations, rejected Gbagbo’s proposal, asserting that such an evaluation “has
already been done,” by the IEC and through the U.N. certification process. In discussions with a
visiting ECOWAS heads of state in late December, Gbagbo also reportedly demanded a vote
recount and, were he to depart his post, a grant of amnesty for any criminal charges that he may
face as a result of post-electoral human rights abuses associated with his control over state
institutions and security forces and his refusal to cede the presidency. 28
25
Xinhua, “Roundup: Côte d’Ivoire’s Electoral Crisis a Tough Nut To Crack,” December 12, 2010. See also State
Department, “Daily Press Briefing,” January 4, 2011; Cooper and Lichtblau, “American Lobbyists …”
26
Tim Cocks, “Ouattara Offers Unity Govt If Gbagbo Steps Down,” Reuters, January 10, 2011, among others.
27
Florence Villeminot, “Gbagbo Calls for International Review of Electoral Crisis,” France 24, December 22, 2010.
28
State Department, “Daily Press Briefing,” December 8, 2010, and December 22, 2010; Marco Chown Oved,
“Neighbors Put Ivory Coast Military Option on Hold,” AP, December 29, 2010.

Control of Information
In addition to asserting its case internationally and suppressing ant-Gbagbo demonstrations, the Gbagbo
administration undertook efforts to control the flow of information reaching the Ivorian population immediately after
the disputed runoff. On December 2, after the IEC’s announcement of Ouattara’s electoral win, the National Council
of Audiovisual Communication (CNCA), which regulates media broadcasting, banned coverage of the Ivorian political
crises by foreign radio and TV channels in the country, as well as the U.N.-run ONUCI FM. It also jammed selected
radio broadcasts, including ONUCI FM, and in February 2011 unsuccessfully ordered it off the air. It enacted the TV
ban by ordering the local affiliate of the French satellite TV services provider Canal+ to suspend targeted
transmissions, and Canal+ complied with the order. SMS cell phone text messaging services were also suspended after
the runoff. The two main TV stations, both state-owned, have also been broadcasting content favorable to Gbagbo
and critical of UNOCI, and certain foreign governments, such as those of France and the United States.
Contention over control of media has involved violence in some cases. One of the most notorious post-elections
human rights abuse cases involved a December 16 attempt by a mass of pro-Ouattara demonstrators to take over
Radiodiffision Télévision Ivorienne (RTI), the state media broadcaster, which has been broadcasting stridently pro-
Gbagbo messages since the election. The crowd’s action was violently suppressed by security forces, which opened
fire on the crowd, killing an estimated 20 or more persons and injuring many more. RTI has also been the target of
attempts to hinder broadcasts; in late December, its TV signal was not available in some areas of the country, and was
dropped from satellite rebroadcast in the West Africa sub-region.29
There have also been raids on numerous opposition-affiliated newspapers and printing presses, and at least nine
foreign journalists have been detained during the post-electoral period. Local journalists have also faced coercive
threats, detention, and beating by security forces. Some of the Gbagbo government’s actions were partially reversed;
opposition newspapers were publishing, and some formerly jammed banned radio stations began broadcasting anew.
There have also been new incidents of censorship and indications that the Gbagbo administration is seeking to impose
greater regulatory control over the press. Harassment of and threats against journalists have also continued,
prompting nine independent or pro-Ouattara newspapers to suspend operations in early March 2011, although eight
later resumed operation. Ouattara supporters have also been accused by a the international and Ivoirian branches of
the Committee to Protect Journalists of taking actions to “exact reprisals on their critics in the press,” and pro-
Ouattara press outlets, like those favorable to Gbagbo, have been accused of publishing highly partisan, biased, and
often false or conspiracy-centered information.30
Political Tension and Violence

The contested election outcome has heightened political tension and sparked political violence,
including numerous killings in Côte d’Ivoire, and has put the self-proclaimed Gbagbo
government at odds with the U.N. Security Council, regional organizations, and key donor
29
Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Côte d’Ivoire: Pro-Gbagbo Forces Abducting Opponents,” December 23, 2010;
Marco Chown Oved, “Ivory Coast State TV Signal Cut Off In Some Areas,” Associated Press (AP), December 23,
2010; VOA “UN Radio Defying Incumbent Ivorian Government Broadcast Ban,” February 11, 2011; and RSF, “State
TV Signal No Longer Being Carried by Intelsat,” December 25, 2010.
30
Television Ivoirienne, “Government Communiqué…”; BBC, “Ivory Coast: Laurent Gbagbo Bans UN Radio
Broadcasts,” February 10, 2011; U.N. News Service (UNNS), “Côte d’Ivoire: UN Demands End To New Hostile
Campaign From Defeated President,” January 5, 2011; Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), “Election in Dispute,
Ivory Coast Bans News Broadcasts,” December 3, 2010; Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), “Côte d’Ivoire
ALERT: Media Regulator Bans Foreign Media From Covering Political Crises,” December 7, 2010; Reporters Sans
Frontiers (RSF)/International Freedom of Expression eXchange network (IFEX), “Local and International Media Hit
By Battle Between Rival Camps For Control of News,” December 17, 2010; Open Source Center (OSC), “Côte
d’Ivoire—Ivorians Able To Access Media Despite Ban,” December 9, 2010; RSF, “Ivorian Media Fuel Anti-French
Hostility,” December 4, 2010; MFWA, “Two Detained TV Journalists Tortured Severely,” February 8, 2011; CPJ,
“Ivory Coast Using Media Regulation To Censor Critics,” February 10, 2011; Tim Cocks, “Ivorian Pro-Ouattara
Newspapers Shut After Threats,” Reuters, March 1, 2011; Reuters, “BBC, Radio France International Go Off Air in
Ivory Coast,” March 2, 2011; Television Ivoirienne, “State Security ‘Comes Before All Freedoms’- Ivorian Pro-
Gbagbo Minister,” via BBC Monitoring Africa, February 17, 2011; and Tim Cocks, “Ivory Coast’s Media War Turns
Nasty,” Reuters, March 13, 2011, among others.

governments involved in monitoring, vetting, or helping to administer the electoral process.

President Gbagbo and his administration are the targets of intense and wide-ranging diplomatic,
political, financial, and threatened military international pressure aimed at forcing Gbagbo to
concede the election and had state power over to Ouattara (see “International Reactions,” below)
According to UNOCI, the security situation is “very tense and unpredictable;” as a result, the
United Nations temporarily relocated its non-essential staff to Gambia on December 6, 2010.31
There have been limited armed clashes between security forces that support each camp—which
reportedly include the bulk of the national military and police forces, in the case of Gbagbo, and
the military wing of the rebel FN in the case of Ouattara. The outer perimeter of the U.S. embassy
in Abidjan was slightly damaged by “an errant rocket-propelled grenade” during one armed
exchange.32 There have also been a spate of extrajudicial killings, other human rights abuses by
state security forces during operations to suppress public demonstrations by Ouattara supporters,
as well as attacks on and abductions of Ouattara and Gbagbo partisans by groups of unidentified
armed men, described as ‘death squads.’
Casualties and Rising Threat Level

As of March 24, 2011, U.N. estimates had confirmed at least 462 post-electoral political killings
by supporters of both presidential claimants, and killings, rapes, and abductions were all
increasing. 33 The United Nations attributed most of these deaths to “extra-judicial killings
committed by elements of the security forces loyal to Laurent Gbagbo.” Most were related to
post-elections and related political tension, although some were related to communal clashes over
issues that, while not directly tied to the electoral outcome and having unrelated proximate
causes, were likely aggravated by unresolved political issues, such as contended land or residency
rights.34 The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, has also documented
continuing reports of abductions, illegal detention and attacks against civilians. All of these
developments were described in a report by Pillay on the human rights situation in Côte d’Ivoire
through January 31, 2011.35 On March 3, state security forces killed seven unarmed female
protesters; six died on-site and one at a hospital after the shootings. Video of the fatal protest has
been distributed on the Internet. Part of a follow-up protest was fired on by state security forces,
resulting in four fatalities, and a smaller, related rally was broken up by pro-Gbagbo youth
militants “armed with machetes and firing automatic weapons into the air.”36 President Obama
31
UNOCI, “Presidential Elections,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/elections.shtml.
32
Tim Cocks and Ange Aboa, “Ivorian Troops, Rebels Clash in Abidjan,” Reuters, December 16, 2010; Reuters, “UN
Moving Nonessential Staff Out of Ivory Coast,” December 6, 2010; and State Department, “Daily Press Briefing,”
December 16, 2010.
33
UNNS, "Death Toll From Post-Electoral Violence in Côte d’Ivoire Rising, UN Reports," March 24, 2011; and
UNNS, “Human Rights in Côte d’Ivoire Deteriorating, Warns Top UN Official,” March 10, 2011.
34
According to U.N. report “on 3 January, at least 35 people were killed and more than one hundred were wounded,
and 230 houses were burnt down in inter-ethnic violence between heavily armed Dioula and Gueré militias allegedly
aided, in the case of the latter, by Liberian mercenaries. The incident occurred after a female trader of the Dioula ethnic
origin was shot and killed in an ambush by a group of highwaymen composed of Gueré youth.” Tensions between
immigrant Dioula and indigenous Gueré have long been motivated by factors such as rights to land and residency
rights. UNHRC, Report of the High Commissioner.
35
UNNS, “Human Rights Situation in Côte d’Ivoire Getting Worse, Says UN Report,” February 24, 2011; UNHRC,
Report of the High Commissioner; and U.N. Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Côte
d’Ivoire: UN Experts Deeply Concerned with Gross Human Rights Violations Which May Amount to Crimes Against
Humanity,” December 31, 2010.

and other top U.S. officials have condemned the shootings and called for the perpetrators of this
and other violence to be held to account for their actions. Similarly, France has called for a U.N.
inquiry into the ongoing political violence in Côte d’Ivoire.37 In late March, a residential area in
Abidjan was shelled, resulting in between 25 and 30 deaths.
The total number of fatalities and abuses resulting from post-electoral violence is likely higher
than the total documented by the United Nations; additional killings, detentions, and abuses were
reported prior to the period covered by the U.N. assessment, and have since continued. In
addition, the national military reportedly does not release numbers of its own casualties or
civilians killed by its members.38 Reporting by non-governmental human rights monitoring
groups, such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (AI), mirrors U.N.
findings regarding a post-electoral rise in human rights abuses. HRW and AI have, in particular,
drawn attention to a rise in apparently politically motivated use of rape as a means of
intimidation.39 In mid-March 2011, HRW stated that
The three-month campaign of organized violence by security forces under the control of
Laurent Gbagbo and militias that support him gives every indication of amounting to crimes
against humanity. [...] The killing of civilians by pro-Ouattara forces, at times with apparent
ethnic or political motivation, also risks becoming crimes against humanity should they
become widespread or systematic.40
There have also been reports of mass graves. UNOCI attempted to investigate reports of three
such graves, one in Abidjan, one in the south-central town of Gagnoa, near Gbagbo’s place of
origin, and one in the town of Daloa, but was prevented from accessing the sites by state security
forces, some in mufti, a “clear violation of international human rights and humanitarian law,”
according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay.
(...continued)
36
Loucoumane Coulibaly and Ange Aboa, “Ivorian Forces Kill 7, Post-Election Toll Hits,” March 3, 2011. See also
Rukmini Callimachi and Marco Chown Oved, “Video Shows Women Gunned Down in Ivory Coast,” AP, March 4,
2011; YouTube video posted by Ludox225, “Tueries à ABOBO mars 2011 Côte d’Ivoire.mp4,” March 4, 2011; State
Department, “Violence in Côte d’Ivoire,” [Press Statement by Secretary of State], March 4, 2011; and Media Coulibaly
and Tim Cocks, “Gunfire Erupts in Abidjan, Gbagbo Forces Kill 4,” Reuters, March 8, 2011.
37
White House, “Statement by President Barack Obama on the Violence in Côte d’Ivoire,” March 9, 2011; State
Department, “Violence in Côte d’Ivoire,” [Press Statement by Secretary of State], March 4, 2011; and Radio France
Internationale (RFI), “France Calls For Côte d’Ivoire Inquiry After Women Killed,” March 4, 2011.
38
Loucoumane Coulibaly and Charles Bamba, “Ivorian Rebels Seize Town,” Reuters, February 25, 2011.
39
UNNS, “UN Envoy Urges Protection From Sexual Violence Amid Côte d’Ivoire Crisis,” January 27, 2011; AI, Côte
d’Ivoire Mission Report, February 22, 2011; and HRW, “Côte d’Ivoire: Violence Campaign by Security Forces,
Militias,” January 26, 2011, among others.
40
HRW, "Côte d’Ivoire: Crimes Against Humanity by Gbagbo Forces," March 15, 2011.

Chronology: Key Events Leading to the Current Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire
1960: Côte d’Ivoire becomes independent of France under President Felix Houphouët-Boigny, who holds power until
his death in 1993. His semi-authoritarian regime creates a liberal, market-based and prosperous economy in south.
1990: Opposition parties legalized; Houphouët-Boigny wins Côte d’Ivoire’s first multiparty presidential election,
beating Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivoirian Popular Front (FPI).
1993: Henri Konan Bédié succeeds Houphouët-Boigny as president.
1995: Bédié re-elected in poll boycotted by opposition parties protesting candidacy restrictions and reported
electoral manipulation.
1998: Constitutional changes affecting electoral laws, seen as favorable to the incumbent, passed.
1999: In July, former Prime Minster Alassane Ouattara returns home to vie against Bédié for president in 2000. His
bid highlights ethnic, regional, and religious political divisions within the national polity. In December, a military pay
protest turns into a coup led by Robert Guéï, ousting Bédié.
2000: Throughout year, electoral tensions rise, notably regarding national identity card distribution process, reported
harassment of northerners, and presidential candidacy of Guéï. Several incidents of military restiveness occur, and use
of military in domestic crime suppression leads to abuses. Constitutional changes approved by July referendum, widely
boycotted in north, requiring both parents of presidential candidates be Ivoirian-born citizens.
State of emergency imposed before widely boycotted presidential election on October 22. Vote count is suspended
and Guéï claims to have won the election. Gbagbo, the majority vote winner, organizes anti-Guéï protests. Guéï flees.
Rival political party post-poll violence ensues, but Gbagbo’s win is ratified by Supreme Court. Controversial legislative
election held in late 2000, but violence over claimed political disenfranchisement forces poll suspension in north.
2001: Government, albeit criticized over its human rights and judicial records, sponsors inter-party National
Reconciliation Forum.
2002: In September, a military pay and conditions-of-service mutiny by soldiers, primarily of northern origins, turns
into attempted coup d’état. After clashes with loyalist forces in south, rebel units withdraw and rapidly take control of
the northern half of the country. They form a political movement, later called the Forces Nouvelles, and eventually
establish a basic administrative state in areas they control. Fighting decreases in late 2002 but continues into early
2003. Regional and international peace mediation ensues.
2003-2010: A series of partially implemented key peace accords, each building on elements of preceding ones,
signed: the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (2003); the Accra III Agreement (2004); the Pretoria Agreement (2005); and
Ouagadougou Political Agreement (2007). Elections are repeatedly delayed due to contestation over peace process,
notably regarding the sequencing of disarmament, citizen and voter identification, and elections.
An initial U.N. political and military monitoring mission created in 2003 is replaced by the U.N. Operation in Côte
d’Ivoire in April 2004. A 2004 government attempt to attack north results in nine French fatalities and one U.S. citizen
death, prompting a French military retaliation. Violent anti-French protests follow.
Gbagbo’s electoral term ends in 2005, but under emergency constitutional powers, underpinned by international
community support for the ongoing peace process and the formation of a unity government, he retains power,
pending elections. Electoral, disarmament, and state reunification processes proceed slowly due to political disputes.
Elections are finally held in late 2010, but result in a contested outcome and the current political crisis.
The rise in tension and violence prompted a number of international diplomatic missions to
evacuate personnel and, in some cases, private citizens, from Côte d’Ivoire. Several governments
have advised their citizens not to travel to the country and to depart it if they are there. Citing “the
deteriorating political and security situation ...and growing anti-western sentiment” the State
Department warned U.S. citizens to avoid travel to Côte d’Ivoire, and on December 20, 2010,
ordered the departure of all non-emergency embassy personnel and family members.41 It was also
41
These include the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Nigeria, and Portugal. State
Department, “Travel Warning Côte d’Ivoire,” December 19, 2010; and Marco Chown Oved, “Ivory Coast Opposition
(continued...)

prompting large numbers of Ivoirian citizens and residents to flee to neighboring countries,
primarily Liberia, as refugees, or to become internally displaced within Côte d’Ivoire. See
“Humanitarian Effects and Responses,” below.
Violence Escalates and the Threat of War Rises

Extensive recent fighting in the west, Abidjan, and in a growing number of other areas suggests
that a new Ivoirian civil war is now under way. A growing number of indicators had previously
signaled that such an outcome was a distinct possibility, and possibly “imminent.”42 An early
indicator of such a possibility was the substantiation by the United Nations of reports that in the
immediate post-electoral period, pro-Gbagbo troops were assisted by mercenaries from Liberia,
and possibly from other countries. This was viewed as worrying because of Liberia’s history of
severe wartime human rights abuses and because such irregular forces might be difficult to
prosecute, for varying reasons, if they were accused of crimes. Another indicator was a reportedly
sharp rise in militia recruitment by pro-Gbagbo and pro-Forces Nouvelles elements and the
formation of a new pro-Gbagbo militia called the Force de Résistance et de Libération de la Côte
d’Ivoire (FRLCI). In February 2011, the United Nations had reported that a nominally
demobilized militia known as the Compagnie des Scorpions Guetteurs and as the Front de
Libération du Grand Centre (i.e., Company of Scorpion Spotters/Watchmen or Liberation Front
of the Great Center, one of a number of former pro-Gbagbo militias) has been reactivated with a
mission of undertaking infiltration and reconnaissance of Forces Nouvelles areas prior to an
multi-pronged attack. According to the United Nations, some pro-Gbagbo youth groups and
militias are being armed. Such actions are reportedly coordinated by high-ranking state officials
and pro-Gbagbo militia, youth group, and political party leaders.43
Such groups, including an ultra-nationalist, frequently xenophobic pro-Gbagbo youth group

known as the Young Patriots, have reportedly coordinated with state security forces, in particular
to identify and target putative opposition-affiliated “individuals to be arrested, abducted or
assassinated and their residences.”44 Young Patriots, “often armed with machetes, clubs or guns,”
have reportedly “set up roadblocks all over the main city in Abidjan after a call by [Young
Patriot] leader Blé Goudé to hunt pro-Ouattara rebels and obstruct U.N. staff, whom he accuses of
backing them.” Police and other state security forces, in league with youth gangs, also reportedly
looted the homes and property of multiple Ouattara government officials on March 6. Pro-
Ouattara youth groups are reportedly carrying out similar actions, and militant supporters of both
presidential claimants are, in some cases, carrying out attacks on individuals and communities
based on their targets’ presumed ethnicity and putative political affiliation. There have been
(...continued)
Wants Gbagbo Gone by Force,” AP, December 22, 2010, among others.
42
March 3 press release by the International Crisis Group discussing its report, Côte d’Ivoire: Is War the Only Option?,
March 3, 2011, the executive summary of which states that the “most likely scenario in the coming months is armed
conflict involving massive violence against civilians, Ivorian and foreign alike, that could provoke unilateral military
intervention by neighbours, starting with Burkina Faso.”
43
UNHRC, Report of the High Commissioner. See also Alphonso Toweh, “Liberian Mercenaries Hope For Work in
Ivory Coast,” Reuters, December 31, 2010; and HRW, “Côte d’Ivoire: Leaders Should Prevent Abuses by Their
Forces,” February 24, 2011.
44
UNHRC, Report of the High Commissioner.

reports and visual media evidence documenting live burnings of beaten victims, among other
atrocities.45
Foreigners have also become an increasing target of pro-Gbagbo supporters angered by

international rejection of Gbagbo’s claimed election and financial pressure on the Gbagbo
administration, state media propaganda alleging that UNOCI and various foreign governments are
collaborating with the FN, and related factors. On March 1, Young Patriots reportedly “rampaged
through the business district of Abidjan… pillaging shops owned by foreigners.” United Nations
staff were also reportedly “attacked and robbed by pro-Gbagbo gangs” in the week prior to the
rampage.46
Fighting in Abidjan has been frequent. It was reportedly first initiated by state security forces
loyal to Gbagbo, which launched repeated raids on putative opposition strongholds in Abidjan.
These raids, which reportedly have been associated with numerous extralegal detentions and
extrajudicial killings, appear to be spurring retaliatory violence.47 On February 23, 2011, a
security force element conducting a such raid was ambushed by counter-assailants using small
arms, resulting in the deaths of between 20 and 30 members of the raiding team and an extended
firefight. The assailants were not identified, but were reported to be members of a Forces
Nouvelles-affiliated fighting cell that calls itself the Movement for the Liberation of the Peoples
of Abobo-Anyama (MLP-2A). The militia’s name refers to the densely populated northern
neighborhoods of Abobo and Anyama, where about 1.5 million residents, many northerners and
foreign migrant workers, live. A similar armed anti-Gbagbo element, dubbed the “Invisible
Commando,” is also reportedly active. Some prior raids had been resisted by residents of the area,
but the February 23 clash signaled a significant escalation in violence and the most lethal clash up
until that date in Abidjan between state security forces and armed elements opposing them,
assisted by local youths and some defectors form the national military. A large area of Abobo
known as PK-18 is now under the control of FN-linked elements that observers view as
supportive of Ouattara, but which may be loyal to a former FN commander, Ibrahim “IB”
Coulibaly.48
The February clashes appear to have spurred a rise in such confrontations; multiple gun fights
between Gbagbo and Ouattara forces reportedly occurred during the last week of February 2011,
and the fighting spread to other areas of the city on March 2.49 On March 7, pro-Ouattara fighters
45
Corpses of victims of violence are also reportedly burned inside of tires in order to dispose of them, due to a shortage
of undertaker service access. Marco Chown Oved, “Houses Looted By Police in Ivory Coast,” AP, March 6, 2011;
John James, “Ivory Coast’s Descent Into ‘Madness’,” BBC, March 10, 2011; and U.N. IRIN, “Côte d'Ivoire: Paul –
‘People Burn Tyres With the Bodies to Defuse the Smell,’” March 4, 2011.
46
Ange Aboa and Tim Cocks, “Ivorian Pro-Gbagbo Groups Rampage Against Foreigners,” Reuters, March 1, 2011.
47
According to the United Nations, state security forces that have been involved in such operations include elements of
the Compagnie Républicaine de Sécurité (CRS), the Centre de Commandement des Opérations de Sécurité (CECOS),
the Garde Républicaine, the Brigade Anti-Emeute (BAE), the Brigade du Maintien de l’Ordre (BMO), the national
Gendarmerie and the Navy, aided by civilian militia and youth groups, as well as by English-speaking “mercenaries.”
UNHRC, Report of the High Commissioner.
48
Coulibaly, a former Ivoirian soldier and a one-time FN leader sidelined by Prime Minister Guillaume Soro.
Coulibaly has been associated with various past coups or coup attempts, and some observers believe he may have been
associated with a rocket attack on an aircraft carrying Soro. Africa Confidential, “Côte d’Ivoire: Peering into the
Abyss,” March 4, 2011; and Reuters, "Ivorian Abidjan Insurgents Say Don't Back Ouattara," March 27, 2011.
49
Reuters, “Ivory Coast Fighting Spreads to Southern Abidjan,” March 2, 2011; Marco Chown Oved and Rukmini
Callimachi, “Official: At Least 20 Security Forces Killed,” AP, February 23, 2011; HRW, “Côte d’Ivoire: Leaders
Should Prevent”; and Rukmini Callimachi, “Ivory Coast Rebels Seize Control of 30-mile Strip,” AP, March 7, 2011.

in control of Abobo reportedly attacked a village “populated by the largely pro-Gbagbo Ebrie
tribe” that is located within the Abobo area under their control, killing three persons and
wounding 30.50 On March 14, following a weekend attack by pro-Gbagbo forces on Abobo aimed
at expelling pro-Ouattara forces from the neighborhood, gun battles erupted for several hours in
Abidjan neighborhoods south of Abobo, near the central business district and in other generally
pro-Gbagbo areas, including near the home of the national army chief of staff, Phillipe Mangou.
The ongoing clashes in Abidjan and elsewhere prompted Mangou to state on March 15 that pro-
Gbagbo forces were prepared to go to war.51
Another key sign that rising conflict was burgeoning into a large-scale armed civil conflict was
the February 25 seizure from a pro-Gbagbo militia, the Front for the Liberation of the Great West
(FLGO), of several villages in western Côte d’Ivoire by FN elements. About a week later, the FN
also seized additional nearby territory in the western Montagnes region and the town of Toulépleu
in the neighboring Moyen-Cavally region, to the south of Montagnes, and in mid-March took
control of the town of Doké 20 miles to the east. Possession of this territory—provided that the
FN can hold it—would give the FN control over much of the Ivoirian border with Nimba county
in neighboring Liberia, where both pro-Gbagbo and Ouattara armed elements have reportedly
been recruiting ex-combatants from the Liberian civil war. In early March, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also reported that there was “heavy fighting… in and
around Duékoué on the road to Man.”52 By late March, fighting in the west had expanded toward
the center and east of the country. There were reports that FN forces had taken control of two key
towns, Duekoue, in the west, and the central town of Daloa, and seized two smaller towns in the
east near the Ghanaian border.53 Such fighting has prompted multiple humanitarian agencies to
temporarily withdraw their workers from the west.
An additional possible harbinger of resurgence of military conflict were reports of possible

violations of a long-standing U.N. prohibition on the export of arms and other military materiel,
notably attack helicopters, to Côte d’Ivoire; see “Possible Violations of the U.N. Arms Embargo:
Recent Developments” text box, below. In late March, UNOCI reported that pro-Gbagbo state
security forces “were repairing an MI-24 attack helicopter”—possibly an aircraft that had been
damaged by France in 2004—and preparing multiple rocket launchers. The assertion followed
reports that heavy weapons were increasingly being used within Abidjan. 54
The prospect of renewed armed conflict had earlier been spurred by repeated calls by Ouattara
aides for Gbagbo to be removed from office by force, and by a December 24 threat by ECOWAS
to undertake such an action. While the regional body later deferred military intervention, pending
further negotiation, as of mid-January 2011, the proposal remained the focus of active military
planning (see section entitled “Threat of Military Intervention to Oust Gbagbo”).55 Similarly,
50
Reuters, “Ivorian Village Attacked, 3 Killed-Gbagbo Ministry,” March 7, 2011.
51
Ange Aboa and Tim Cocks, “Ivorian Gunmen Move Close to Central Abidjan,” Reuters, March 14, 2011; and Ange
Aboa and Media Coulibaly, “Shooting at Pro-Gbagbo Abidjan Roadblock Kills 4,” Reuters, March 15, 2011.
52
Ivoirian “regions” (e.g., Moyen-Cavally and Montagnes) are jurisdictions akin to provinces or states. Coulibaly and
Bamba, “Ivorian Rebels Seize Town”; Ange Aboa, “Ivorian Rebels Take Third Town in West,” Reuters, March 7,
2011; Callimachi, “Ivory Coast Rebels Seize”; UNHCR, Côte d’Ivoire Situation Update CIV+5, March 4, 2011; and
VOA News, “Ivory Coast Rebels Take Over Another Town,” March 13, 2011; among others.
53
Ange Aboa and Tim Cocks, "Two Towns Fall, Civilians Killed in Ivory Coast War," Reuters, March 29, 2011.
54
Tim Cocks, "I.Coast's Gbagbo Readying Rockets, Helicopter - UN," Reuters, March 22, 2011
55
BBC News, “UN Chief Warns Situation in Ivory Coast Could Become ‘Critical’,” December 22, 2010; Marco
Chown Oved, “Ivory Coast Opposition Wants Gbagbo Gone by Force,” AP, December 22, 2010; Agence France Presse
(continued...)

while Ouattara has repeatedly called for a peaceful resolution of the crisis, notwithstanding the
statements of his aides, in March 2010, an FN spokesman stated that the rebel movement saw “no
other option but force” to make Gbagbo leave power.56
Threats to International Mandates and Accountability

The increasing tension and a rise in anti-UNOCI sentiment, which has taken the form of public
demonstrations spurred by pro-Gbagbo media and party militants, has resulted in multiple
physical attacks on UNOCI peacekeepers and has hindered their movement. In several cases,
such actions have been aimed at interfering with UNOCI protection of the Ouattara government,
which is currently based in the Golf Hotel in Abidjan. On February 28, 2011, pro-Gbagbo youth
reportedly abducted two UNOCI peacekeepers, who were then detained at a state Republican
Guard base for several hours before being released. 57 Such actions prompted U.N. Secretary-
General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon to warn that
any attack on UN forces will be an attack on the international community and those
responsible for these actions will be held accountable. Any continued actions obstructing and
constricting UN operations are similarly unacceptable. UNOCI will fulfill its mandate and
will continue to monitor and document any human rights violations, incitement to hatred and
violence, or attacks on UN peacekeepers. There will be consequences for those who have
perpetrated or orchestrated any such actions or do so in the future.58
The threat also prompted the UNSC to increase the size of UNOCI in early 2011 (see text box
entitled “UNOCI,” above). In late December, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Navi Pillay, stating that “no longer can heads of State, and other actors ...commit atrocious
violations and get away with it,” wrote to Gbagbo “reminding him of his duty under international
law to refrain from committing, ordering, inciting, instigating or standing by in tacit approval of
rights violations.” Similar letters were sent to the heads of key Ivorian security services.59 The
International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor is reportedly monitoring violence against civilians
and against UNOCI peacekeepers, as well as speech advocating or resulting in mass violence, and
has threatened to prosecute those who, under international law, abet or cause violence.60 He
specifically cited Charles Blé Goudé as an example of a person whose public speech might, if
warranted, potentially be prosecuted. Blé Goudé, Gbagbo’s Minister of Youth, is a leader of some
of Gbagbo’s most militant supporters.61
(...continued)
(AFP), “Military Intervention in ICoast Ruled Out Now: Cape Verde,” December 29, 2010; ECOWAS, “Extraordinary
Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government on Côte d’Ivoire,” December 24, 2010.
56
Reuters, “Ivorian Rebels Say Only Force Can Remove Gbagbo,” March 10, 2011.
57
Anita Snow, “UN Probing Ivory Coast Helicopter Report,” AP, February 28, 2011.
58
U.N., “Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on the Situation in Côte d’Ivoire,”
December 18, 2010.
59
UNNS, “Any Attack…”
60
ICC, “Statement by ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire,” December 21, 2010;
see also HRW, “Côte d’Ivoire: Pro-Gbagbo Forces Abducting…”
61
Blé Goudé, Gbagbo’s nominee as Minister of Youth and Employment, heads the Young Patriots, a youth
organization that has in the past undertaken militia-like actions and engaged in protests, some violent, and attacks. He
is one of three persons who in 2004 were made subject to U.N. travel restrictions and asset freezes. He is accused by
the U.N. of “repeated public statements advocating violence against United Nations installations and personnel, and
against foreigners; direction of and participation in acts of violence by street militias, including beatings, rapes and
(continued...)

In response to the rising danger faced by UNOCI peacekeepers, including a threat by Blé Goudé
to attack the Golf Hotel, Ban—reiterating a December 17 statement—warned that “UNOCI is
authorized to use all necessary means to protect” its personnel, Ouattara government officials,
and other civilians at the hotel. He said an attack on it “could provoke widespread violence that
could reignite civil war.” 62 U.N. and foreign government officials have subsequently and
repeatedly made similar statements.
Humanitarian Effects and Responses

As of early March 2011, rising violence in Abidjan had prompted as many as some 250,000 urban
residents, primarily of the Abobo and surrounding neighborhoods of Abidjan, to flee elsewhere
for safety, primarily in and around the metropolitan area. More than 60,000 persons had also been
internally displaced in western Côte d’Ivoire due to fighting between the FN and pro-Gbagbo
fighters. As of late March 2011, as a result of fighting in western Côte d’Ivoire, nearly 102,000
Ivoirian refugees had fled into neighboring Liberia, where they were formally registered with
U.N. agencies and more were arriving daily. There were also over 4,888 refugees in other nearby
countries, including over 2,500 in Guinea, and the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs)
was estimated at between 700,000 and 1 million by U.N. agencies.63 The conflict was also having
negative humanitarian effects in other parts of the country. In early March, electrical power to
northern Côte d’Ivoire was reportedly cut for about a week as part of state military operations
targeting FN-held areas—although a Gbagbo spokesperson also attributed the cuts to the financial
embargo on the country. The stoppage cut off electrically pumped piped water flows, and
reportedly crippled hospital operations and forced residents to use water from unsafe sources. In
other parts of the country, social workers, such as teachers and health workers, were absent from
work after not receiving their salaries, food and other consumer goods’ prices were spiking due to
economic disruptions, and medical drug distribution was severely hampered. 64
Refugee numbers in Liberia have grown rapidly, but a small portion are believed to fluctuate in
response to conditions in Côte d’Ivoire; household heads, for instance, sometimes return
temporarily to tend to property or farms. During some periods, the rapid inflow of refugees has
caused the UNHCR to suspend individual registration and temporarily adopt a rapid emergency
(...continued)
extrajudicial killings; intimidation of the United Nations, the International Working Group (IWG), the political
opposition and independent press; sabotage of international radio stations; obstacle to the action of the IWG,
…UNOCI, the French Forces and to the peace process.” Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution
1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire, “List of Individuals Subject to Paragraphs 9 and 11 of Resolution 1572 (2004)
and Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1643 (2005),” n.d.
62
U.N., “Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson…” SRSG Choi also stated of UNOCI that “we are heavily armed
and present and preparing ourselves... They will be defeated, they will be repulsed. There is no doubt about this.” See
UNNS, “Any Attack…”; and Christophe Koffi, “Ivory Coast Youth Leader Urges Assault on Gbagbo Rival’s HQ,”
AFP, December 29, 2010.
63
UNHCR, “At Least 20,000 Flee Fresh Violence in Côte d’Ivoire Capital, Abidjan,” February 25, 2011; UNHCR, “As
Some 30,000 Flee to Liberia, UNHCR Urges Help for Civilians in Besieged Abidjan District,” March 1, 2011; Africa
Confidential, “Côte d’Ivoire: Peering into the Abyss,” March 4, 2011; UNHCR, Côte d’Ivoire Situation Update CIV+5,
multiple February and March 2011 updates; and UNNS, "Up to 1 Million People Driven from Homes by Violence in
Côte d’Ivoire, UN Reports," March 25, 2011.
64
Reuters, “Power, Water Back in Ivory Coast’s Rebel North,” March 5, 2011; and U.N. Integrated Regional
Information Networks (IRIN) News Service, “Côte d’Ivoire: The North Unplugged,’ March 2, 2011, and series of early
2011 IRIN News briefings on the effects of the crisis, available at http://www.irinnews.org >> Africa >> Côte d’Ivoire.

registration system. An anticipated continuing large inflow of refugees had prompted the UNHCR
to contingently plan to address the emergency needs of 250,000 refugees and to identify
additional potential camps and host communities where this population could stay. Such refugee
and IDP inflows are severely straining local communities’ supplies of food and water.65 Key
challenges included protection, “registration and documentation of a very mobile population next
to porous borders” in an insecure, widely dispersed, inaccessible rural zone; and the need to
address “vulnerabilities in an environment already characterized by limited access to basic
services for local populations.” Notwithstanding these challenges, the UNHCR and the World
Food Program (WFP), together with Liberian authorities and a variety of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), were channeling refugees to camps and providing water, sanitation, and
emergency food and shelter to them. The UNHCR is also attempting to ensure that a
humanitarian corridor be established to enable civilians to reach safer place and to allow
humanitarian agency access to affected populations.66 The United States is channeling aid toward
these emergency humanitarian needs.
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance

U.S. assistance for refugees and communities hosting refugee populations generated by the
Ivoirian crisis or facing resource constraints due to refugee influxes is being provided
collaboratively by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID). The State Department’s Population, Refugees, and Migration Bureau (PRM) is
providing refugee aid in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and in other countries in the region, while
USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and USAID’s country mission,
USAID/Liberia, are assisting host and other affected communities in Liberia. OFDA was
expected to provide additional assistance in Côte d’Ivoire in response to a mid-March complex
emergency disaster declaration. USAID’s Office of Food for Peace (FFP) is providing food aid
for both refugees and host communities, which are typically poor, in both Liberia and Côte
d’Ivoire. The overall value of recent, current, or planned U.S. emergency humanitarian responses
to the Ivoirian crisis totaled about $28.6 million as of mid-March. Much of this aid was expected
to be channeled through U.N. or other international humanitarian organizations, significantly
boosting funding for the overall humanitarian response.
On January 4, 2011, following a late 2010 field assessment of the impact of Ivoirian refugees
inflows on local Liberian host communities, the U.S. ambassador to Liberia issued a complex
emergency disaster declaration. This action enabled the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA) of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide aid
these communities, worth an initial $100,000. In mid-March, OFDA was reviewing proposals
from several NGOs focused on possible increases in assistance for Liberian host communities
impacted by the refugee influx. OFDA has separately provided $800,000 to UNICEF in support
of emergency services for host communities. OFDA was expected to provide additional
assistance in Côte d’Ivoire, pending a field-based needs assessment, in response to the March 13
declaration of a complex disaster emergency by the U.S. ambassador in Abidjan. 67
65
Alphonso Toweh, “Refugee Upsurge Brings Ivorian Woes to Liberia,” Reuters, March 15, 2011.
66
UNHCR, Côte d’Ivoire Situation Update CIV+5, March 4, 2011. See also Nebehay, “450,000 Flee.”
67
The assistance is being programmed through USAID/Liberia to the NGOs EQUIP Liberia and the International
Rescue Committee “to support emergency health, protection, and water, sanitation, and hygiene activities in affected
areas of Liberia.” USAID, “Most Recent Disaster Declaration: Complex Emergency, 1-04-11,” online notice; and
USAID responses to CRS inquiries, March 14 and 15, 2011.

On March 7, 2011, President Obama authorized PRM to provide $12.6 million in FY 2011
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) to address “unexpected and urgent
refugee and migration needs... related to humanitarian needs resulting from the recent unrest in
Côte d’Ivoire.”68 This PRM-administered ERMA assistance is slated to support refugee assistance
in Liberia ($9.4 million) and in Côte d’Ivoire and neighboring countries other than Liberia (about
$3.2 million). 69
FFP has provided about $3.1 million in assistance in Liberia in support of WFP emergency
operations (EMOPs) in support of refugees and targeted segments of host communities, and in
early March had provisionally approved an additional $7.5 million in such aid in Liberia. It had
also provisionally approved $4.5 million for a WFP EMOP in Côte d’Ivoire focused on support
for IDP and host community needs. USAID/Liberia has scaled up existing health programs in
communities affected by Ivoirian refugee inflows, primarily to address respiratory and digestive
illness treatment and the provision of water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services.70
International Reactions
Much of the international community—with at least one exception and some qualifications
among African governments—has rejected Gbagbo’s claim of electoral victory and endorsed
Ouattara as the legally elected president of Côte d’Ivoire. In response to Gbagbo’s refusal to cede
the presidency to his rival, the international community is pursuing a range of coordinated and
bilateral efforts aimed at forcing him to abide by the results of the election. These include
diplomatic isolation and non-recognition of the Gbagbo government; personal travel and financial
sanctions against members of the regime; constriction of credit and access to state financial
assets; and the threat of military action to enforce the electoral outcome. In late March there were
calls for the imposition of expanded U.N. and European Union sanctions targeting the Gbagbo
regime.
International Multilateral and Bilateral Responses

On December 7, 2010, the regional body ECOWAS, endorsing the IEC-announced poll results as
certified SRSG Choi, recognized Ouattara as President-elect of Côte d’Ivoire and called on
Gbagbo to abide by the results “and to yield power without delay,” and suspended Côte d’Ivoire’s
68
White House, “Presidential Memorandum-Unexpected Urgent Refugee and Migration Needs Related to Côte
d’Ivoire,” Presidential Determination No. 2011-7, March 7, 2011.
69
The $9.4 million tranche is to be allocated to the UNHCR for multi-sectoral refugee assistance ($7.8 million); to a
WFP Special Operation focusing on logistics augmentation, including critical road repair and increased U.N.
warehousing and trucking capacity ($600,000); and to various NGOs, in coordination with the UNHCR, to address
assorted refugee aid needs ($1 million). The $3.2 million tranche is slated to be allocated to the UNHCR “for IDP
protection activities (e.g. border monitoring, IDP registration and protection monitoring, IDP camp management) and
contingency planning for refugee flows to Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso” ($2.5 million); and to the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) for refugee transportation and IDP camp coordination programs in
Côte d’Ivoire ($700,000). State Department/PRM response to CRS inquiry, March 8, 2011.
70
The $7.5 million aid tranche in Liberia was slated to support the 180-day food needs of an estimated 150,000 Ivoirian
refugees and 36,000 host community members, while the $4.5 million tranche in Côte d’Ivoire was for support of the
180-day food needs of about 130,000 IDPs and host community populations impacted by the crisis in multiple parts of
the country. USAID response to CRS inquiry, March 14, 2011.

participation in the organization “until further notice.” 71 On December 9, the AU Commission

(AUC) Peace and Security Council (PSC)—which typically defer to sub-regional bodies’
decisions regarding events in their jurisdictions—endorsed the December 7 ECOWAS decision
on Côte d’Ivoire and suspended the participation of the country “in all AU activities, until such a
time [as] the democratically elected President effectively assumes State power.”72
The UNSC, in turn, endorsed the decisions of ECOWAS and the AU. On December 8, a day after
a UNSC meeting in which the Council heard the report of SRSG Choi on the election, 73 the
UNSC released a press statement on Côte d’Ivoire in which Council members, “in view of” the
ECOWAS endorsement of “Ouattara as President-elect,” called on “all stakeholders to respect the
outcome of the election.”74
Following a December 18 statement by a U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Department spokesman

denying Gbagbo’s status as president and the U.N. Security Council’s implicit recognition his
status two days later, on December 23, the 192 member states of the United Nations officially
recognized Ouattara as the legal president. Acting through a consensus vote, the U.N. General
Assembly accepted Ouattara’s election by formally recognizing a team of diplomats sent by
Ouattara to be the country’s official representatives. The new Ivorian U.N. ambassador is
Youssouf Bamba, a veteran diplomat, who officially took up his post on December 29.75
Several governments that recognize Ouattara’s election have also bilaterally dropped recognition
of the Gbagbo government; Ouattara has written to at least 20 governments requesting such an
action. In late December, as pro-Ouattara protesters occupied the Ivorian embassy in Paris, the
French government stated that it had “taken note” of Ouattara’s dismissal of the Gbagbo-
designated ambassador to France, and pledged to recognize an envoy named by Ouattara. The
French government also reportedly “grounded a plane belonging to Gbagbo at an airport in
France in response to a request by” Ouattara.76 Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), Belgium, and
71
ECOWAS, “Final Communiqué,” ECW/CEG/ABJ/EXT/FR. /Rev. 2, December 7, 2010.
72
AU PSC, “Communiqué,” PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCLII), December 9, 2010.
73
At the meeting, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations (USUN) Susan E. Rice, acting as UNSC
president, stated that “the participation of the representative of Côte d’Ivoire in this meeting without objection is not
intended to be viewed and should not be understood as an acknowledgment of the legitimacy of his Government.”
Russia objected to the assertion. S/PV.6437, December 7, 2010; AFP, “Russia ‘Quibbling’ Over UN I.Coast Statement:
US,” December 7, 2010; and UNSC, “Opposition Man’s Win ‘Irrefutable’, Top United Nations Official in Côte
d’Ivoire,” SC/10102, December 7, 2010.
74
UNSC, “Security Council Press Statement on Côte d’Ivoire,” SC/10105, December 8, 2010. Issuance of the
December 8 statement, which did not reference a direct UNSC decision explicitly endorsing Ouattara’s election, came
after “five days of intense negotiations to come to a unified position on the outcome of the elections” attributed to
“Security Council member Russia’s refusal to interfere in domestic elections.” Russia reportedly “blocked a proposed
statement saying the United Nations had exceeded its mandate by calling Ouattara the winner of the November 28
runoff vote.” VOA, “UN Security Council Recognizes Ouattara As Ivory Coast President-Elect,” December 8, 2010;
and AFP, “Russia ‘Quibbling’…”
75
On December 20, the Security Council urged universal recognition of “Ouattara as President-elect of Côte d’Ivoire
and representative of the freely expressed voice of the Ivorian people...in view of ECOWAS and African Union’s
recognition ...[and] as proclaimed” by the IEC. The General Assembly’s action—which by default rescinded the
credentials of Gbagbo’s U.N. Ambassador, Alcide Djedje, a Gbagbo advisor and his newly selected foreign minister—
was opposed ex post facto by Namibia and Nigeria on technical grounds. They cited a need to study the resolution at
issue, a report by the U.N. Credentials Committee. Djedje and his staff had previously departed New York, reportedly
taking with themselves the Ivorian U.N. mission’s computer hard drives. AP, “UN Recognizes Ouattara as Ivory Coast
President and Accepts Credentials of His UN Ambassador,” December 23, 2010, among others.
76
AFP, “France to Recognise Ouattara’s I.Coast Ambassador: Official,” December 27, 2010; and Thibauld Malterre,
(continued...)

several other EU countries have also announced that they would only accept ambassadors named
by Ouattara.77
The Gbagbo government has attempted to retaliate against some governments that have dropped
recognition of his government and rejected his envoys by doing the same in return. It has declared
the British, Canadian, and French ambassadors persona non-grata and asked them to leave the
country. Canada and France responded by saying the request was without merit as Canada does
not recognize Gbagbo as president, while the UK ambassador was not immediately affected, as he
is regionally based, in Accra, Ghana.78
Regional Diplomacy
The AU and ECOWAS have each held several high-level meetings to address the crisis and
dispatched multiple diplomatic delegations to Côte d’Ivoire in order to diffuse tensions and
convince Gbagbo to respect the results of the election and cede the presidency. The most recent
AU effort to end the crisis was undertaken by a heads of state panel, dubbed the “Panel of Five,”
advised by a team of technical experts led by AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane
Lamamra. The panel was viewed as holding a charge that would test the credibility of the AU vis-
à-vis the Ivoirian crisis and the strength of its dedication to democratic principles, given that prior
regional mediation efforts to resolve the crisis and to ensure Ouattara’s effective assumption of
executive powers, in accordance with AU and ECOWAS endorsements of his election, had
produced few tangible results.79
(...continued)
“Gbagbo Rivals Take Over Ivory Coast’s Paris Embassy,” AFP, December 27, 2010.
77
State Department, “Daily Press Briefing,” December 29, 2010; Martin Vogl. “WAfrica bank Head Resigns Over
Ivory Coast,” AP, January 22, 2010; and AFP, “Canada No Longer Recognizes ICoast Envoy,” December 29, 2010.
78
Rukmini Callimachi, “Official: Ivorian Government Expelling British and Canadian Ambassadors,” AP, January 6,
2011; Rukmini Callimachi, “Official: Ivorian Government Expelling British and Canadian Ambassadors,” AP, January
6, 2011; and U.S. Embassy-Abidjan, “Daily Press Review,” December 29, 2010.
79
The panel was also seen as a key barometer of the integrity and strength of AU support for one of its core founding
principles, the primacy democratic choice and governance; had the panel compromised regarding its demand that
Gbagbo cede power by supporting a mediated outcome allowing him to maintain power, its fidelity to that principle
might have been brought into question. Martin Roberts, “AU Mediators Arrive in Côte d’Ivoire for Discussions with
Rival Presidents,” IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, February 7, 2011. See also Africa Confidential, “Côte d’Ivoire:
Peering into the Abyss,” March 4, 2011.

AU and ECOWAS: Mediation Missions Prior to the High-Level Panel

Prior to the AU’s appointment in late January 2011 of the Panel of Five, ECOWAS and the AU had deployed a series
of meditation missions aimed at resolving the crisis. On December 4, the same day on which Gbagbo and Ouattara
each inaugurated themselves, the chair of African Union Commission, Jean Ping, requested that former South African
President Thabo Mbeki travel to Abidjan to mediate a peaceful outcome to the dispute between the two men.
Mbeki—a principal behind the signing of the 2005 Pretoria Agreement, an antecedent to the OPA of 2007—flew to
Côte d’Ivoire the next day and was permitted to land, even though the country’s borders were closed due to post-
electoral violence. He met SRSG Choi and the two election rivals separately, but failed to change the stance of either
man and left the country after making a generic call for peace and democracy, but without issuing a major
statement.80
Other indications of discord among AU member states had included Gambia’s recognition of the legality of Gbagbo’s
election and its opposition to a possible ECOWAS military intervention and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s
call for an investigation of the poll process and rejection of the validity of international recognition of Ouattara and
rejection of Gbagbo’s claimed win. Some press reports had also implied that statements of support for a negotiated
end to the crisis and in opposition to regional military intervention in Côte d’Ivoire by Angola, traditionally seen as a
strong Gbagbo ally, signaled Angola’s backing for Gbagbo. Angola, however, has not overtly backed Gbagbo; its
government has not recognized an official Ivoirian election winner, and it reportedly refused a February request from
the Gbagbo administration for funding assistance. The positions of Angola and South Africa suggest that a claim by
Gbagbo’s minister of foreign affairs, Alcide Djedje, that Angola, Uganda, South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, and Ghana support Gbagbo’s continued tenure, are overblown, or in several cases, lack
credibility.
On December 18, AU Commission chairman Ping, AU PSC Chair Lamamra, and ECOWAS Commission President
Gbeho met with Gbagbo. They reiterated the AU and ECOWAS position that the two organizations recognize
Ouattara as president-elect, and that Gbagbo should immediately hand over power to Ouattara to prevent renewed
conflict and loss of life. They also offered to help resettle Gbagbo outside of Côte d’Ivoire.81 In late December and
early January 2011, ECOWAS dispatched two heads of state delegations, discussed below (see “Threat of Military
Intervention to Oust Gbagbo”) to deliver a joint ECOWAS ultimatum to Gbagbo demanding that he step down be
forced out by military means. The second delegation was joined by Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, the premier
of a country that underwent its own divisive, violent election in 2007, which was resolved by an often contentious
power-sharing agreement. Odinga was appointed by the AUC’s Jean Ping to monitor and help negotiate an end to the
crisis on December 27, following Mbeki’s fruitless mission. Odinga had previously taken a forceful line in demanding
that Gbagbo—whose electoral claims he termed a “rape of democracy”—“be forced out, even if it means by military
force.” Odinga had also called for the AU to “develop teeth” instead of “sitting and lamenting all the time,” or risk
becoming “irrelevant.” He reiterated his call for the use of force to oust Gbagbo after Gbagbo’s delegates rejected a
March 10, 2011 AU proposal calling for Gbagbo to cede power. 82 Odinga again traveled to Abidjan on January 17 for
consultations which he described as being aimed at negotiating talks between the two electoral rivals, a possibility that
an Ouattara aide rejected unless Gbagbo agrees to cede power. His visit was followed by a consultative visit by the
AU chairman, Malawian President Bingu wa Mutharika.83
AU High-Level Panel
The AU high-level panel, appointed by the AU PSC in late January 2011, was made up of the
presidents of South Africa, Chad, Mauritania, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Chad, along with AUC
chairman Jean Ping and ECOWAS Commission president Victor Gbeho. In early February the
80
Al Jazeera, “Mbeki Fails to End Ivorian Crisis,” December 6, 2010, among others.
81
AFP, “ECOWAS Sends Letter…”; State Department, “Daily Press Briefing,” December 17, 2010; RFI, “France, US,
EU Put Financial Squeeze on Gbagbo,” December 19, 2010; and AFP, “African Union Mediator Arrives in Ivory
Coast,” December 17, 2010.
82
AFP, “Kenya PM Says I.Coast’s Gbagbo Should Be Forcibly Removed,” December 17, 2010; AFP, “Kenya’s
Odinga Named AU Lead Monitor on I. Coast Crisis,” December 27, 2010; and David Clarke, “Summit-Time for
Outside Force in Ivory Coast-Odinga,” Reuters, March 10, 2011.
83
Ange Aboa, “Ivory Coast Mediator Hints at Talks Between Rivals,” Reuters, January 17, 2011; and Emmanuel
Peuchot, “AU Chief Meets Ivory Coast Presidential Rivals, AFP, January 25, 2011.

panel deployed its technical team to Abidjan to consult with the opposed parties and, after
conferring in Mauritania, met with the parties in Abidjan on February 21, a day on which at least
six persons were reported killed in a state security force raid on opposition residential areas. One
panel member, Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré, the former OPA facilitator, did not join the
panel during its trip to Abidjan due a threat of attack on his person by the Young Patriots, who
view him as partial toward Ouattara.
On February 28, the PSC extended the panel’s mandate until the end of March, requesting that it
“formulate… a comprehensive political solution... to submit to the Ivorian parties.”84 In early
March, Ping traveled to Abidjan on behalf of the panel to consult with the two presidential
claimants and invited them, along with Paul Yao N’Dre, the head of the Ivoirian Constitutional
Council, to a March 10 AU PSC meeting, at which the panel presented its conflict resolution
findings and recommendations. Ouattara attended the meeting, held in Ethiopia, but Gbagbo did
not; instead, he sent two delegates, the leader of his FPI political party, Pascal Affi N’Guessan,
and his foreign minister Alcide Djedje. N’Dre did not attend.The AU high-level panel’s report,
presented to the PSC at the meeting, reviewed the election, the pre-electoral process and political
environment, and the post-electoral crisis, and laid out a range of recommendations for resolving
it. The panel reaffirmed Ouattara’s election win and recommended that Gbagbo step down; called
on the Constitutional Council to swear in Ouattara as president; recommended that a national
unity government be formed; and called for the establishment of a national peace and
reconciliation process based on the Ouagadougou Political Agreement.
It also found that what it termed the partisan composition and “dysfunction” of the IEC and the
Constitutional Council had provided the basis for the contended electoral outcome. It reserved
particular criticism, however, for the Constitutional Council; it sharply questioned the procedures
by which the Council had reached its determinations on the outcome of the election and the basis
of the legal authority under which it had acted. The panel called especially “disturbing” the
Council’s decision to cancel nearly 600,000 votes, or what it said was 13% of the total, “just
enough to reverse the results,” while simultaneously arguing that this action was not likely to
affect the fairness of the poll. The panel also observed that former President Gbagbo had held
office for a decade, a period corresponding to the maximum term that he could have served had
he been constitutionally elected to two successive terms of five years—and had thus enjoyed a
lengthy opportunity to promote peace and reconciliation, an outcome that the panel’s report
stressed not been achieved. 85
84
AU, Communiqué of the 263rd Meeting of the PSC on Côte d’Ivoire [press release],” February 28, 2011. See also
APA, “AU Experts on Côte d’Ivoire Leave Abidjan,” February 10, 2011; and Marco Chown Oved, “6 Killed as Army
Opens Fire in Ivory Coast; African Union Panel Arrives,” AP, February 21, 2011.
85
AU, Report of the High Level Panel of the African Union for the Resolution of the Crisis In Côte d’Ivoire,
PSC/AHG/2 (CCLXV), March 10, 2011.

AU High-Level Panel Recommendations 86

Asserting that the crisis cannot be resolved solely on the basis of a mechanical application of majority rule, the AU
panel recommended that:
• Ouattara, “in consultation with the members of the Permanent Consultative Framework (PCF) of the
Ouagadougou Political Agreement [OPA],” establish a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation and
appoint a prime minister to head it, along with ministers of defense and of interior;
• the new government include Gbagbo supporters and members of other Ivoirian political parties and civil society,
and that it establish a National Security Council (NSC) to supervise disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration processes, new national army, and a “High Council of the Republic (HCR), which will include the
members of the PCF and other personalities, to steer and guide national reconciliation”;
• “outstanding aspects” of the OPA “and other related reforms,” in particular those relating to national
reunification and security sector reform processes, be implemented “as a matter of priority”;
• the “normative and institutional framework governing elections, including the IEC and the Constitutional Council
be reformed “on the basis of the broadest possible consensus and in close consultation with the HCR, building
on the lesson learnt” during the 2010 election;
• legislative elections be conducted as soon as recommended elections reforms are complete;
• a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) be established “to conduct a genuine national reconciliation
process”;
• an amnesty law be adopted covering “all acts and offences committed in relation with the post-electoral crisis”
and providing “full immunity for all those who held the office of President of the Republic or that of Prime
Minister, as well as senior officers of the Armed Forces and Security Services”; and that
• that all international sanctions “imposed on Côte d’Ivoire and Ivorian personalities” be lifted “as soon as”
Ouattara is sworn in, with the caveat that new sanctions be imposed on those who reject and hinder the
implementation of any eventual AU-vetted crisis resolution agreement.
The panel also recommended that national reconciliation activities include a series of efforts to build trust and bridge
divides created by “instrumentalization the identity issue” (i.e., the politicization of ethnicity, religion, rights of
residence and citizenship) over the preceding decade,87 along with the immediate adoption of “measures... to
promote calm” to ensure that:
• media “under the control of the Parties refrain from disseminating messages instigating hatred and violence”; and
that
• the blockade of the Golf Hotel be immediately lifted.
Lastly, the panel called for strong international support for the implementation of any eventual agreement derived
from its recommendations, to include:
• the rapid deployment of a team of AU and ECOWAS “civilian and military observers” to work in concert and in
close collaboration” UNOCI to “monitor the implementation of an Agreement”; and
• the establishment of a “Monitoring Committee comprising the AU, ECOWAS and the United Nations, as well as
the Parties,” to be charged with overseeing implementation of an eventual agreement.
AU Panel Recommendations: Prospects and Significance

Efforts to implement the high-level panel’s recommendations and to generate an outcome that is
satisfactory to both sides are likely to face great difficulties because of the intransigence of the
86
Except as noted, all quotations in this text box are citations to Annex VII of the panel’s report, entitled “Proposals for
an Overall Political Solution to the Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire.”
87
AU, Report of the High Level Panel.

two parties. The Gbagbo camp has strongly and repeatedly rejected the panel’s recommendations,
asserting that they are unacceptable because they are not in accordance with the Constitutional
Council’s ruling in favor of Gbagbo’s election. 88 In light of Gbagbo’s posture and other
indications that the two sides remained entrenched and unwilling to compromise, some press
analyses on March 11 concluded that the panel’s efforts had failed. Such analyses may have been
premature, since the panel’s recommendations had not been formally adopted, but they accurately
underlined the poor prospects for implementation—and appeared prescient when on March 27,
Ouattara rejected the appointment of José Brito, a former Cape Verde foreign affairs minister as
the AU High Representative for Côte d'Ivoire. Brito was appointed to implement the panel’s
recommendations, but Ouattara asserted that Biro was not suitable because he was not a former
head of state and because he has alleged personal and political ties to Gbagbo.89
An additional complicating factor was Ouattara’s selective interpretation of what the panel had
called for. He accepted the need or a cross-party government “in a framework of reconciliation…
because I want peace,” but rejected the notion that it would, at its core, be a power-sharing
government with Gbagbo or his close allies.90 He instead emphasized that he would remain firmly
in control of the unity government called for by the panel and implementation of the provisions
that it calls for, stating:
I will form which will include members of other parties that I will select... It is different to
say that it is a National Unity Government as if ministers will be opposed to me, that is not
the case... I will take the best people in Côte d’Ivoire to run a disaster situation [in
which]....the economy is completely down and the social indicators are worse than we have
seen since independence. So I want to have a strong team, a team of competent people from
all parties and from the civil society but I will select them… Gbagbo will have an honorable
exit and thereafter when he comes to see me we’ll discuss that.91
Ouattara also did not appear to overtly endorse or address the panel’s other recommendations,
regarding further implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, establishment of a
TRC, passage of an amnesty, and related measures.
Notwithstanding these challenges, the panel was seen as having achieved a notable success by
having prominently advocated a single, cohesive AU approach toward resolving the crisis. This
outcome was seen as important in light of multiple press reports suggesting that splits regarding
the appropriate conflict resolution strategy had emerged among AU member states, potentially
threatening largely unified international efforts to resolve the crisis and providing implicit support
for Gbagbo’s position. South African President Jacob Zuma’s agreement to join his fellow
panelists in making their recommendations was especially noteworthy in this respect, since South
88
Reuters, “Gbagbo Camp Rejects AU Plan for Ivorian Crisis,” March 10, 2011; BBC, “Ivory Coast’s Laurent Gbagbo
Bans UN and French Flights,” March 10, 2011; David Clarke, “Summit-Time for Outside Force in Ivory Coast-
Odinga,” Reuters, March 10, 2011; and Francois Ausseill, “Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo Rejects AU mediation’s Proposal,”
AFP, March 10, 2011.
89
Tim Cocks And Loucoumane Coulibaly, "Ouattara Rejects Au Envoy For Ivorian Crisis," Reuters, March 27, 2011;
VOA, "Ouattara Rejects New Ivory Coast Mediator," March 27, 2011; and AU, "Appointment of the High
Representative of the African Union for Cote d’Ivoire," March 26, 2011.
90
He was quoted as saying “You can’t have people elected and say you have to share power... How can I share with
someone who has been in power for 10 years and whom Ivorians didn’t vote for? It’s illogical.” Tim Cocks and Aaron
Maasho, “Fears of Ivorian Conflict Grow As Mediation Fails,” Reuters, March 11, 2011.
91
Scott Stearns, “Aide Says Gbagbo Rejects AU Endorsement of Ouattara as Ivory Coast Leader,” VOA, March 11,
2011.

Africa’s prior stance had been viewed as a possible obstacle to that end. The Zuma government
had issued equivocal statements on the crisis—it variously endorsed ECOWAS’s findings in favor
of Ouattara’s election but also questioned the validity of the election outcome and called for an
undefined mediated outcome—and had taken other actions that that some analysts interpreted as
unilateral actions to address the crisis.92
Other indications of discord among AU member states had included Gambia’s recognition of the
legality of Gbagbo’s election and its opposition to a possible ECOWAS military intervention and
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s call for an investigation of the poll process and rejection
of the validity of international recognition of Ouattara and rejection of Gbagbo’s claimed win.93
Some press reports had also implied that statements of support for a negotiated end to the crisis
and in opposition to regional military intervention in Côte d’Ivoire by Angola, traditionally seen
as a strong Gbagbo ally, signaled Angola’s backing for Gbagbo.94 Angola, however, has not
overtly backed Gbagbo; its government has not recognized an official Ivoirian election winner,
and it reportedly refused a February request from the Gbagbo administration for funding
assistance. The positions of Angola and South Africa suggest that a claim by Gbagbo’s minister
of foreign affairs, Alcide Djedje, that Angola, Uganda, South Africa, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, and Ghana support Gbagbo’s continued tenure, are
overblown, or in several cases, lack credibility in several instances. 95
92
Emma Thomasson, “U.N. Chief Worried About AU Rift Over Ivory Coast,” Reuters, January 28, 2011; Bashir
Adigun, “ECOWAS Criticizes S.Africa Warship Off West Africa,” AP, February 8, 2011; and Colum Lynch, “On
Ivory Coast Diplomacy, South Africa Goes Its Own Way Wednesday,” Turtle Bay [U.N.-focused blog], February 23,
2011, among others.
93
Felix Onuah and Elias Biryabarema, “African States at Odds on Ivory Coast Crisis,” Reuters, January 25, 2011;
Gambian Presidency, “Government Issues Strong Reservations About ECOWAS Decision to Compel President
Laurent Gbagbo To Relinquish Power,” December 28, 2010; Angola Press Agency, “Executive Confident About
Peaceful Solution for Côte d’Ivoire,” January 14, 2011; Kemo Cham, “Gambian Leader Expresses Support for
Gbagbo,” AfricaNew.com, December 31, 2010; and Loucoumane Coulibaly and Ange Aboa, “Ivorian Forces Kill 7,
Post-Election Toll Hits,” March 3, 2011.
94
Angola had maintained a close alliance with Gbagbo largely because Ouattara, while prime minister under the late
Félix Houphouët-Boigny, had reportedly supported the rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) during its long civil war fight against the Angolan government led by President José Eduardo dos Santos.
During Gbagbo’s tenure, by contrast, UNITA was no longer permitted a presence in Côte d’Ivoire, and the Gbagbo
government reportedly halted an arms shipment to UNITA and allowed Angolan security officials to abduct and
repatriate UNITA supporters present in Côte d’Ivoire. Vasco Martins, An Unshaken Alliance: Angola’s Stance in the
[sic] Côte d’Ivoire, Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security, March 2011.
95
The Statesman (Ghana), “Exposed: Mills Supports Gbagbo, Foreign Minister Reveals,” March 9, 2011

South Africa’s Changing Stance Toward Resolving the Ivoirian Crisis

In early 2011, President Zuma reportedly stated that he believed that poll discrepancies had marred the Ivoirian vote
and that he favored AU mediation to end the crisis, despite his government’s earlier release of a statement endorsing
an ECOWAS communiqué recognizing Ouattara as President-elect and calling for Gbagbo “to yield power without
delay.” South Africa’s ambiguous stance was again reflected in comments by the South African foreign affairs minister,
Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, who in mid-February called the election results “‘inconclusive,’ and repeatedly refused to
say who South Africa believed won.” While the minister also insisted that South Africa was neutral and held “no brief
for any faction in Côte d’Ivoire” her comments, together with those of Zuma, prompted some analysts to conclude
that South Africa had not recognized Ouattara’s election and was therefore implicitly pro-Gbagbo.96
Another key indicator of a possible South African unilateral tack in efforts to resolve the crisis was its government’s
deployment of a frigate off the West African coast in January 2011. This action was reportedly viewed by ECOWAS
as interfering in the AU high-level panel’s work and, by some analysts, as a potential sign of military support for
Gbagbo. The South African government, however, denied such claims. South Africa’s ambassador to Nigeria stated
that “South Africa will never, ever intervene without consulting the regional bloc, in this case ECOWAS, and … we
will never do anything that has not been authorised or mandated by the African Union.”97 Despite such reassurances,
questions remained over South Africa’s intent in deploying the warship. The South African newspaper Mail and
Guardian reported that the South African government had deployed the ship “on a periodical routine training cruise
along the West Coast of Africa since early January 2011 to train junior naval officers [...as] part of the Inter-
Operability West Exercise with other navies of the west coast countries to promote interoperability of the vessels.”
The paper also reported, however, that the government had offered numerous other rationales for the vessel’s
deployment, stating that it had been sent to he region, inter alia, in order to:
• “evacuate South Africans in Côte d’Ivoire in the event of widespread civil disorder”;
• function as a possible neutral “negotiating venue for the principals of the presidential dispute”;
• provide “possible assistance that may be required by the department of international relations and cooperation
during the African Union panel negotiations pertaining to the Ivory Coast”;
• ensure a South African military presence should the situation in Côte d’Ivoire deteriorate; and
• “serve as a floating hospital during a military intervention and help to transport supplies and spares for smaller
vessels.”
The paper also reported that the “ship will be well placed to intervene if the AU instructs the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) to deploy East African forces, which can only be brought in by sea.”98
Threat of Military Intervention to Oust Gbagbo

Meeting on December 24, ECOWAS heads of state—after determining that Gbagbo had not
heeded their December 7 demand that he cede the presidency—decided to “make an ultimate
gesture to Mr. Gbagbo by urging him to make a peaceful exit.” They dispatched a delegation
made up of the presidents from Sierra Leone, Cape Verde and Benin to deliver an ultimatum
96
Jon Herskovitz, “S.Africa Sees ‘Discrepancies’ in Ivory Coast Vote,” Reuters, January 21, 2011; South African
Government, “Media Statement by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation on the Situation in Côte
d’Ivoire,” December 8, 2010; and Donna Bryson, “S.Africa Says Ivory Coast Elections ‘Inconclusive’,” AP, February
17, 2011.
97
AFP, “S.Africa Criticized For Sending ‘Warship to Ivory Coast’,” February 8, 2011. See also Ashir Adigun,
“ECOWAS Criticizes S.Africa Warship Off West Africa,” AP, February 8, 2011, among others.
98
Mandy Roussouw, “Navy’s Most Trusted Vessel Deployed to Côte d’Ivoire,” Mail & Guardian, February 4, 2011.
The strategy of deploying a warship as a possible venue for talks recalled former South Africa President Nelson
Mandela’s 1997 mediation, on a docked Navy ship, between the late President Mobutu Sese Seko and his rebel
successor, the late President Laurent Kabila, both of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, then known as Zaire.
Nicholas Kotch, “Mobutu on Ship for Zaire Talks, Said Ready to Quit,” Reuters, May 4, 1997; and Reuters, “South
African “Grey Diplomat” Awaits Zairean Talks,” April 29, 1997.

reiterating the ECOWAS’s demand and offer to escort him into exile abroad. “In the event that
Mr. Gbagbo fails to heed this immutable demand,” they further decided, ECOWAS “would be left
with no alternative but to take other measures, including the use of legitimate force, to achieve the
goals of the Ivorian people.”99
The delegation met with Gbagbo and Ouattara on December 28, but Gbagbo did not meet the
ECOWAS demand for him to step down. He reportedly demanded a vote recount and an amnesty,
were he to cede the presidency. After the delegation departed Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS leaders
decided to defer immediate military intervention in favor of further negotiation, but regional
military leaders met to plan and coordinate a possible deployment, as the heads of state had
mandated. 100 The same delegation, joined by Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, the
designated AU mediator, and ECOWAS President Gbeho, met with Ouattara and Gbagbo on
January 3, and again demanded that Gbagbo cede power; emphasized that power-sharing deal
was not feasible; and offered to provide amnesty to Gbagbo if he stepped down. No apparent
headway resulted. The talks were described by an anonymous diplomat as “failure No. 2,”
although Gbagbo “agreed to negotiate a peaceful end to the crisis without any preconditions” and
pledged that he would lift a blockade of the hotel where the Ouattara government is housed under
armed UNOCI and FN protection. As of late January, he had fulfilled neither pledge. 101
Prior to the departure of the second delegation, a Nigerian defense spokesman, speaking on
December 31, stated that ECOWAS military chiefs from several member countries had “prepared
plans to ‘forcefully take over power’ from” Gbagbo using a grouping of troops called the
ECOWAS standby force, said to consist of 6,500 troops, if diplomatic efforts to pressure him to
cede the presidency fail. A further logistics meeting was held in mid-January 2011 in Mali to
“finalize when troops would be deployed and how long they could remain in the country.” The
chiefs of staff were also slated to travel to Bouaké, in north-central Côte d’Ivoire, a possible
intervention staging point. Ghana, however, later declined to participate in a potential
intervention, citing an overburden of international peacekeeping deployments in other regions, a
preference for “quiet diplomacy,” and the presence of an estimated 600,000 or so Ghanaians in
Côte d’Ivoire.
Nigeria is also thought to have domestic security concerns of its own that might preclude it from
contributing forces. On December 31, the United Kingdom announced that it would politically
support use of force by ECOWAS in the UNSC, but did not offer or commit any troops for such a
purpose. The UK has also prepared military contingency plans with the French, but the objective
of such plans, which may pertain to evacuations of foreign citizens, has not been described
publicly. 102
99
ECOWAS, “Extraordinary Session…,” December 24, 2010.
100
Marco Chown Oved, “Delegation Leaves Ivory Coast Without Gbagbo,” AP, December 28, 2010; and Oved,
“Neighbors Put…”; and AFP, “Military Intervention in ICoast Ruled Out Now: Cape Verde,” December 29, 2010.
101
AU-ECOWAS, “Joint AU-ECOWAS mission to Côte d’Ivoire Communique,” January 4, 2011, via African Press
Organization. Limited access to the hotel has prompted UNOCI to resupply the hotel by helicopter. Adam Nossiter,
“Ivory Coast Leader’s Rival Remains Under Blockade,” NYT, January 6, 2011; UNSC, Security Council Press
Statement on Situation in Côte d’Ivoire,” SC/10149, January 10, 2011; and Al Jazeera, “Kenya PM Warns of Côte
d’Ivoire War,” January 7, 2011.
102
Aljazeera.net, “Plan to Force…” See also Tim Castle, “UK Says Would Back Force to Oust I.Coast’s Gbagbo,”
Reuters, December 31, 2010; Ola Awoniyi, “W.African Defence Chiefs Plan I.Coast Intervention,” AFP, December 29,
2010; Francis Kokutse, “Ghana President Says ‘No’ to Troops in Ivory Coast,” January 7, 2011; and AFP, “Ouattara:
West Africa ready to intervene in I.Coast,” January 19, 2011, among others.

It is not clear how an ECOWAS intervention would operate, particularly in relation to the UNOCI
and French forces that are already present on the ground. The Ouattara camp has called for a
special forces commando operation to rapidly remove Gbagbo quickly, which it asserts can be
done “without much damage” because “Gbagbo’s location can be quickly identified by a team of
elite troops because he ‘is essentially at his residence or at the presidential palace’.” The possible
danger to civilian lives resulting from such an operation could be substantial, however, given the
large population that supported Gbagbo’s election, the militancy of a core of Gbagbo’s support
base and the presence of a large, highly ethnically and regionally mixed civilian population in
Abidjan. Key Gbagbo supporters have stated that they would respond in kind to any attempt to
attempt to oust Gbagbo by force of arms, and that such an attempt would spark a war.103
A further effort to drive home ECOWAS’s demand to Gbagbo was delivered by Nigeria’s former
military head and President Olusegun Obasanjo on January 8. His presence, given his reputation
as a forceful, uncompromising interlocutor, was interpreted as underlining the putative
seriousness of ECOWAS’s threat. An Ouattara aide was quoted as stating that “In diplomacy you
can say things very nicely. Or you can say it by being mean. He is here to say it in the mean way.”
Despite such perceptions, no breakthroughs were reported as a result of Obasanjo’s trip.104
U.N. Sanctions
On October 15, 2010, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1946, renewing an arms embargo on Côte
d’Ivoire, targeted financial assets freeze and travel restrictions first authorized under UNSC
Resolution 1572 of November 15, 2004, and a ban on the import of rough diamonds from Côte
d’Ivoire, first authorized under UNSC Resolution 1643 of December 15, 2005.105 On January 6,
2011, USUN Permanent Representative Rice stated that, following the imposition of targeted U.S.
and EU sanctions on Gbagbo and associates of his regime, “to the extent that [...the political
situation] remains stalled, I think we are obliged to look at whether it [the U.N. sanctions regime]
needs to be augmented and invigorated.”106 In late March 2011, France and Nigeria, backed by
ECOWAS, proposed expanded U.N. travel and asset freeze sanctions targeting members of the
Gbagbo administration and imposing a ban on heavy weapons in Abidjan.107
103
Rukmini Callimachi, “Ivory Coast Election Winner Wants Rival Ousted,” AP, January 6, 2011; and RFI, “We Are
Ready to Resist, Says Gbagbo Party Leader,” January 8, 2011.
104
Rukmini Callimachi, “Nigeria’s Obasanjo Meets with Ivory Coast Rivals,” AP, January 9, 2011, among others.
105
S/RES/1572, November 15, 2004; S/RES/1643, December 15, 2005; and S/RES/1946, October 15, 2010.
106
USUN, “Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, to Members
of the UN Press on Sudan and Côte d’Ivoire,” January 6, 2011.
107
Louis Charbonneau and Patrick Worsnip, "France Asks UN council to Sanction I.Coast's Gbagbo," Reuters, March
25, 2011; Reuters, "ECOWAS Calls for Strict UN Sanctions on Ivory Coast," March 24, 2011

Possible Violations of the U.N. Arms Embargo: Recent Developments

In early 2011, U.N. sanctions monitors—known formally as the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire, a subsidiary of the
UNSC Committee initially established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) —were reportedly investigating possible
deliveries of military weaponry supplies to the Gbagbo administration, in violation of UNSC Resolution 1572 (2004)
and later resolutions. In the past, U.N. monitors have investigated alleged violations of Resolution 1572 and other
U.N. sanctions by both the Gbagbo government and the FN. One of the 2011 probe cases pertained to an alleged
Group of Experts report on possible weaponry deliveries to the airport at San Pedro, a southern Ivoirian port city
controlled by forces loyal to Gbagbo, but press accounts of the report differ. According to an AFP account, the
report states that deliveries were made in mid-December and consisted of “light weapons cargoes from Zimbabwe”
flown to San Pedro by aircraft arriving from Angola, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe.108 A separate Reuters
account of the Group’s report also refers to “the arrival of light weapons cargoes from Zimbabwe,” but describes the
report’s references to Angola and Cape Verde differently, and does not mention Sao Tome. It states that the “report
spoke of a ‘suspected cargo delivery from Angola,’ involving two Soviet-manufactured Sukhoi-27 fighter jets and a
Soviet-made MIG-25 interceptor and reconnaissance bomber, spotted at San Pedro airport in Cape Verde, and a
Russian cargo plane seen at Abidjan in January.” The Group’s report allegedly does not directly implicate the Gbagbo
government in the suspected shipments, but states that UNOCI has “received information that the ‘same (Russian
cargo) aircraft had supplied equipment to the Ivorian government in 2005’.”109 Another key case, one of 11
“suspicious activities” reported by the monitors, pertains to the possible delivery in fall of 2010 of 10 large wooden
crates “which may contain trucks or tanks” and were under military protection.110 Zimbabwean officials have
reportedly denied sending arms.111
A February 28, 2011, claim by U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon alleging that Belarus, in violation of a U.N. arms
embargo on Côte d’Ivoire, had supplied the first of three attack helicopters—which was denied by Belarus—also
raised fears of greater conflict. Ban’s claim regarding the delivery of the equipment was based on an intelligence
report from a U.N. member state, reportedly the United States, which was later determined to have been erroneous.
While Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General of the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Department, confirmed that no
delivery had taken place, there remained a strong possibility that the alleged deal, part of a reported $100 million
arrangement brokered by a French national, had been planned and was under way. U.N. sanctions monitoring experts
had also placed the airport at Yamoussoukro—the putative destination of the alleged helicopter transfer—under
surveillance due to other indications of a possible delivery of military materiel to the airport. Group of Experts team
members sent to investigate the reported delivery of the aircraft, however, to the airport were shot by Ivoirian
military elements guarding the airport and “forced to withdraw” from their observation point, leaving the team unable
to prove or disprove whether the aircraft or other military supplies had been delivered to the airport. Despite this
outcome, the incident was viewed as an indication that the United Nations is closely monitoring for and will respond
to alleged sanctions violations. Information regarding the financial dealings of the alleged interlocutors in various
alleged transfers that are under investigation also may provide the Group of Experts means of further investigating
these cases and potentially others in which some of the same actors may be involved.112
In late March, UNOCI reported that pro-Gbagbo state security forces "were repairing an MI-24 attack helicopter and
readying BM21 multiple rocket launchers."113
European Union Sanctions

On October 29, 2010, in accordance with the UNSC Resolution 1946, the EU renewed an arms
embargo on Côte d’Ivoire, targeted financial assets freeze and travel restrictions, and ban on the
108
AFP, “UN Suspects Zimbabwe Over I. Coast Arms Embargo,” March 4, 2011.
109
Louis Charbonneau, “UN Probes Zimbabwe Arms Sent to Ivory Coast,” Reuters, March 3, 2011.
110
AFP, “UN Suspects Zimbabwe.”
111
Alex Bell, “ZANU PF Denies Sending Arms to Ivory Coast,” SW Radio Africa, March 7, 2011.
112
UNNS, “Ban Calls for Compliance with Arms Embargo in Côte d’Ivoire,” February 28, 2011; Louis Charbonneau,
“UN Admits Error on Belarus Helos to I.Coast Claim,” Reuters, March 2, 2011; Anita Snow, “UN Probing Ivory Coast
Helicopter Report,” AP, February 28, 2011; AFP, “UN Suspects Zimbabwe”; Charbonneau, “UN Probes Zimbabwe
Arms”; and Reuters, “Ivorian Troops Shot at Arms Investigators: UN,” March 1, 2011among other sources.
113
Tim Cocks, "I.Coast's Gbagbo Readying Rockets, Helicopter - UN," Reuters, March 22, 2011

import of rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire. 114 On December 22, 2010, the Council of the
European Union adopted a decision imposing a visa ban “on former president Laurent Gbagbo
and 18 other individuals.” On December 31, it extended the ban on an additional 59 “persons who
are obstructing the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire and are jeopardising the proper outcome of the
electoral process.”115 On January 14, amending its October 29, 2010, decision, the EU Council
imposed an asset freeze on “85 individuals that refuse to place themselves under the authority of
the democratically elected president, as well as of 11 entities that are supporting the illegitimate
administration of Laurent Gbagbo” and also imposed a visa ban on the 85 individuals. The
entities targeted reportedly include Côte d’Ivoire’s two main ports, which play a key role in
enabling the export of cocoa, a key source of revenue for the Gbagbo government, and the order
prevents them from new financial dealings EU-registered vessels. The sanctions could shut down
the national oil refinery, which may be unable to buy crude to supply its operations.116 In late
March 2011, the EU was reportedly considering imposing new financial and potentially other
types of sanctions on the Gbagbo administration.117
Constriction of Gbagbo Administration Access to Finance

Several multilateral financial institutions, in light of growing international recognition of the
Ouattara presidency, have taken steps to halt the flow of credit and official assistance to the
Gbagbo regime, in part to remove his ability to maintain the loyalty of the military and civil
service by paying their salaries.
On December 6, the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank jointly stated that
that they “support the efforts being made by the African Union and the international partners to
bring this crisis... to a quick and peaceful resolution.”118 On December 22, 2010, the World Bank
reported that it had “currently stopped lending and disbursing funds to the Ivory Coast” and
closed its office in Côte d’Ivoire. The statement also said that both the World Bank and the AfDB
“have supported ECOWAS and the African Union in sending the message to President Gbagbo
that he lost the elections and he needs to step down.”119 As of January 10, the AfDB had not
issued any further public statements on the Ivorian crisis since issuing the joint statement with the
World Bank, but U.S. Treasury officials who liaise with the World Bank and AfDB reported to
CRS that the AfDB “has stopped processing new operations or disbursing funds on existing
projects.”120
114
S/RES/1572; S/RES/1643; and S/RES/1946.
115
Council of the European Union, “Côte d’Ivoire: Council Adopts Visa Ban List,” 18206/10, December 22, 2010, and
“Côte d’Ivoire: Council Extends Visa Ban List,” 18261/10, December 31, 2010.
116
Council of the European Union, “Côte d’Ivoire: Council Adopts Assets Freeze and Designates Additional Persons
and Entities Subject to Restrictive Measures,” 5361/11, January 14, 2011. See also Reuters, “EU Ships Banned From
Deals With Ivory Coast Ports,” January 17, 2011; and Reuters, “I.Coast State Oil Firm Sees EU Sanctions Hurting,”
January 21, 2011.
117
Reuters, "EU Weighs New Sanctions on Ivory Coast's Gbagbo," March 28, 2011.
118
AfDB, “Joint World Bank – African Development Bank Statement on the Situation in Côte d’Ivoire,” December 5,
2010.
119
World Bank, “World Bank Statement on Côte d’Ivoire,” 2011/278/AFR, December 22, 2010.
120
U.S. Treasury officials also noted that Côte d’Ivoire hosts the AfDB’s permanent headquarters, which the AfDB
vacated in 2003 when civil war began. The AfDB is now temporarily located in Tunis, Tunisia. They also observed that
that, technically, the World Bank and AfDB have suspended ongoing and new funding to Côte d’Ivoire, rather than
formally or permanently terminated activities, as might be connoted by the term “stopped,” as used in the World
(continued...)

As of January 10, 2011, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had not publicly issued any post-
electoral notices pertaining to decisions on whether it is currently working with either the self-
asserted Gbagbo or Ouattara government, or regarding any change in the status of its relations
with Côte d’Ivoire, as the IMF had not formally polled its members regarding these issues, which
is the procedure through which it makes such determinations. However, a U.S. Treasury official
informed CRS that as of the same date, the IMF was engaging with neither government.121
On December 23, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), the supervisory
body of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), a regional central bank, recognized
Ouattara as the legitimately elected president of Côte d’Ivoire, and gave him authority over
UEMOA-related activities and BCEAO transactions. 122 UEMOA member countries use a
common currency, the West African Communauté Financière de l’Afrique (CFA) franc. The CFA
is backed by the BCEAO, pegged to the Euro and is supported indirectly by the French treasury.
The effect of this action is unclear; on December 23, the Associated Press reported that
several banks in downtown Abidjan posted notices in their windows saying that they would
not be cashing civil servant paychecks because they hadn’t received a guarantee from the
government that they would be reimbursed. Lines of impatient civil servants formed outside
the banks, but just after noon the notices were removed and one by one people started
receiving their money.123
Despite such pressure, in January and February 2011,Gbagbo officials had reported that they had
access to funding sources, reportedly including customs, tax, cocoa, and oil revenues, to pay
government salaries, but were reportedly strongly pressuring banks, commodity traders, and other
businesses to ensure funding flows in the form of credit and other payments, to the Gbagbo
government. According to the United States ambassador to Côte d’Ivoire, Phillip Carter, Gbagbo
has been extorting local businesses to pay in advance their taxes, to pay things forward –
contracts forward, putting increasing pressure on a variety of companies that are involved in
natural resources, be it coffee, cocoa, petroleum, timber, whatever, to pay forward. They’re
resisting.124
In mid-January 2011, the Ouattara camp complained that, despite the BCEAO’s recognition of
Ouattara as the legitimate president, the bank was continuing to channel cash to the Gbagbo
government, as some news reports had previously suggested. Such charges have been denied by
the BCEAO. The Ouattara camp has been attempting to cut funding to Gbagbo in several ways.
On January 10, the Ouattara government issued a list of 16 Ivorian treasury, banking, and cocoa
officials it wanted sanctioned for backing Gbagbo. 125 The head of BCEAO, Philippe-Henry
(...continued)
Bank’s December 22 statement. U.S. Treasury, January 10, 2011, response to a CRS inquiry.
121
U.S. Treasury response to CRS inquiry, January 10, 2011.
122
West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), Communiqué de Presse de la Session Extraordinaire du
Conseil des Ministres de l’UEMOA, December 23, 2010.
123
Marco Chown Oved, “Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo Loses Access to State Funds,” AP, December 24, 2010.
124
State Department, “Briefing by U.S. Ambassador to Côte d’Ivoire Phillip Carter,” February 4, 2011; see also Adam
Nossiter, “Cut Off, Ivory Coast Chief Is Pressing for Cash,” New York Times, January 17, 2011.
125
The Ouattara list reportedly included “the head of the cocoa regulating body Gilbert Ako, the head of the local
branch of the West African central bank, Denis N’Gbe, four treasury officials and local directors of several other banks,
including Ecobank Côte d’Ivoire and Standard Chartered,” and the national oil refinery director was also on the list.
Reuters, “Ouattara Urges Sanctions on Ivorian Finance Officials,” January 10, 2011. See also Adam Nossiter, “Cut Off,
(continued...)

Dacoury-Tabley, a reported Gbagbo ally, resigned on January 22 after being accused of not
cooperating with Ouattara. In late January, in retaliation for UEMOA’s action, the Gbagbo
administration seized BCEAO’s local offices and assets. 126
On February 9, the Gbagbo administration seized the Bourse Regionale des Valeurs Mobilieres, a
West African regional stock exchange, and in mid-February 2011 it ceased operations in Abidjan,
along with several major foreign banks. They suspended operations in Côte d’Ivoire due to
security fears and pressure by the Gbagbo administration on them to continue to service its credit
needs. These developments contributed to a further paralysis of the increasingly cash-strapped
banking sector. Affected banks included Standard Chartered Plc, Citigroup Inc., BNP Paribas SA
and Societe Generale SA. In the wake of these banks’ officers’ departure from the country, the
Gbagbo administration seized the banks’ local holdings, although it was not clear what assets,
apart from office space and other tangible property, the government might be able to liquidate.127
The Gbagbo government has also partially nationalized the cocoa and coffee sectors and possibly
gold mining operations, and may seize cocoa stocks that remain unexported due to firms’
compliance with EU sanctions.128
By early March 2011, the financial pressures on the Gbagbo government appeared to be gradually
reducing its ability to finance its operations. In late January 2011, it was reportedly able to
successfully make its second monthly post-election state salary disbursement, but was reportedly
only able to make 62% of February salary payments by early March.129
On December 31, Côte d’Ivoire technically defaulted on a sovereign bond repayment, reportedly
because the Ouattara government claimed that the state lacks funds to make the payment and
because the Gbagbo government did not make payment. The debt at issue was a $29 million
initial “coupon” payment on an outstanding $2.3 billion Eurobond issue. However, the issue gives
Côte d’Ivoire a 30-day grace period, preventing it from falling into sovereign debt default status
until February 1, and on January 11, the Gbagbo government pledged to make the coupon
payment by February 1.130 Further access to international bond markets for either a Gbagbo or an
Ouattara government, however, may prove difficult because the national debt was reportedly
twice previously restructured due to past defaults.131
(...continued)
Ivory Coast Chief Is Scraping for Cash,” NYT, January 17, 2011, and Tim Cocks, “Ivory Coast Strife Draws in
W.Africa Central Bank,” Reuters, January 14, 2011.
126
Martin Vogl. “WAfrica bank Head Resigns Over Ivory Coast,” AP, January 22, 2010; and Diadie Ba, “W.African
Currency Zone Worried About Ivorian Fall-Out,” Reuters, February 1, 2011, among others.
127
The bourse later reopened after being transferred to Bamako, Mali. Ange Aboa and Loucoumane Coulibaly, “Ivory
Coast’s Gbagbo Vows To Nationalise Banks,” Reuters, February 17, 2011, among others; Olivier Monnier, “West
Africa Exchange Closes Indefinitely After Gbagbo Seizure,” Bloomberg, February 16, 2011; and Economist
Intelligence Unit, "Côte d’Ivoire," Country Report, March 2011.
128
John James and Ousmane Attai, “Ivory Coast Exporters Threatened,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2011; and
Ivoirian Presidency, “Ordonnance Relative aux Dispositions Nouvelles d’Achat et Exportation du Café et du Cacao,”
Ordonnance N° 2011-75, March 6, 2011.
129
Tim Cocks and Laurent Prieur, “Ivory Coast Pays Gov’t Workers, AU Mediators Stall,” Reuters, March 4, 2011;
and Reuters, “Lack of Funds to Bring Down I.Coast’s Gbagbo-France,” March 9, 2011.
130
Reuters, “Ivory Coast Gbagbo Ministry Confirms Bond Pledge,” January 11, 2011.
131
Clare Connaghan, “Debt Default Looms for Ivory Coast,” Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2011, Aljazeera.net, “Plan
to Force Out Gbagbo ‘Ready’,” December 31, 2010, via BBC Monitoring Africa; and Mark Bohlund, “Côte d’Ivoire
Misses Coupon Payment, Sovereign Default Looming,” IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, January 5, 2011.

Ouattara’s Cocoa Export Ban

On January 24, in an effort to prevent further revenue flows to the Gbagbo administration, Ouattara issued a one-
month ban on cocoa exports (which the Obama Administration endorsed) and in late February extended it by two
weeks. Another extension was anticipated by analysts, although it is not clear how effective the ban has been. The
initial ban spurred a one-day 4% price rise in cocoa futures, but was seen as likely having a limited short-term impact
on cocoa supplies because (1) purchases contracted prior to January 23 can be shipped; (2) the ban went into effect
after the annual peak export period; and (3) buyers reportedly increased purchases prior to the ban given ongoing
Ivoirian political volatility. A sustained ban, however, was seen as likely to prompt higher prices, and world markets
reacted with alarm to a worsening of political and security conditions and Ouattara’s extension of the ban in late
February 2011. Global prices hit 32-year active trading price records in the $3,775-plus per tonne range in early
March 2011. Black market exports to Ghana and other countries, such as Liberia and Togo via Burkina Faso, are
reportedly growing. Smuggling may increase if sellers cannot guarantee legal formal sector export sales through the
main ports. Ghanaian officials view their cocoa exports as being of a premium grade, and worry that a blending of
illegal cocoa imports from Côte d’Ivoire with Ghanaian cocoa stocks may depreciate the quality of Ghanaian exports.
Ghanaian officials are also concerned that the earnings from black market trade flows may flow into the coffers of the
Gbagbo administration, furthering its ability to continue to operate. In early 2011, large international cocoa buyers
were wary of the uncertain legal environment relating to cocoa exports, and had an incentive to comply with the ban
in order to avoid future negative relations with the EU, as well as with Ouattara, should he formally assume power.
Activists are pressuring large international cocoa buyers to heed the ban. One of the largest U.S. buyers of Ivoirian
cocoa, Cargill, immediately suspended purchases after the ban was imposed, and U.S.-based Archer Daniels Midland,
along with the Swiss-based Barry Callebaut AG, later followed suit. In late February, Ivorian farmers were reportedly
facing challenges in financing and storing the next crop, due to for harvest in April and May, given international
pressure on the banking sector and because ports and warehouses were already filled with about 475,000 tons of
unexported stocks. Poor storage conditions reportedly threatened to spoil these holdings. A March 8 public
statement by Gbagbo, in which he threatened to nationalize the cocoa sector and potentially expropriate warehoused
stocks owned by firms that do not export them by the end of March, possibly for export to Asian or other markets,
reportedly caused alarm within the international cocoa industry. A government spokesman later stated that only
cocoa equivalent to the value of taxes owed by companies on export-destined cocoa that had not been exported by
late March would be seized. A State Department spokesman said the plan “amounts to theft” and called it another
“desperate act” by Gbagbo “to cling to power.”132
In the face of the BCEAO move, pro-Gbagbo activists have advocated that Côte d’Ivoire drop as
its currency the CFA, and adopt a new national currency, reportedly dubbed the MIR, the French
acronym for “Ivorian currency of the resistance.” In part, the move would be a symbolic strike at
France, which the Gbagbo regime and its supporters have accused of various acts of sabotage
aimed at ousting Gbagbo from power. The CFA is the currency of UEMOA countries, which is
backed by the BCEAO, pegged to the Euro, and supported indirectly by the French treasury.133
One observer has proposed a further measure to prevent the Gbagbo regime from seeking further
alternative sources of credit on the private market. Todd Moss of the Center for Global
Development, a former State Department African affairs official, has suggested that the African
Union, publicly backed by major donor governments, issue a “declaration of non-transferability”
regarding new loans to the Gbagbo regime. Such a declaration would assert that such loans
132
Oral communication from Ghanaian official, February 24, 2011; Reuters, “ICE cocoa at Fresh 32-Year High on
I.Coast Unrest,” March 1, 2011; Caroline Henshaw, “Cocoa Prices Jump As Ivory Coast Extends Export Ban,” Dow
Jones, February 22, 2011; State Department, “Daily Press Briefing,” January 24, 2011; and Caroline Henshaw, “Ivory
Coast Cocoa Export Ban Brings Price Spike,” Wall Street Journal Online, January 25, 2011; Ange Aboa, “Industry
Alarmed by Gbagbo Grab at Ivorian Cocoa,” Reuters, March 8, 2011; and Marco Chown Oved, “Ivory Coast Govt Will
Seize Unexported Cocoa,” AP, March 9, 2011, among others.
133
Honore Koua, “Isolation Drives Country to Contemplate Dumping the CFA Franc,” The East African, January 3,
2011; Selay Marius Kouassi, “I. Coast Contemplate New Currency,” AfricaNews, January 3, 2011; and APANEWS,
“Côte d’Ivoire Announces Plans to Introduce New Currency,” December 30, 2010.

“would be considered illegitimate and invalid” and thus not subject to repayment by the Ouattara
government.134
U.S. Diplomatic and Policy Responses
U.S. Stance
On December 3, 2010, President Obama publicly congratulated Ouattara on his electoral victory,
and stated that the IEC, “credible and accredited observers, and the United Nations have all
confirmed this result and attested to its credibility.” He urged “all parties, including incumbent
President Laurent Gbagbo, to acknowledge and respect … the will of the electorate.” He also said
that the “international community will hold those who act to thwart the democratic process …
accountable for their actions.” His statement mirrored a similar one delivered a day earlier by a
National Security Council (NSC) spokesman.135 On December 23 Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton stated that “President Alassane Dramane Ouattara is the legitimately elected and
internationally recognized leader of Côte d’Ivoire.”136 A variety of other top U.S. officials have
made similar statements.
President Obama and other top U.S. officials have also condemned the use of deadly force against
unarmed protesters. On March 9, 2011, President Obama, mirroring a March 4 statement by
Secretary of State Clinton, said he was “appalled by the indiscriminate killing of unarmed
civilians during peaceful rallies, many of them women” by “security forces loyal to former
President Laurent Gbagbo.”137 He said that the
United States remains deeply concerned about escalating violence, including the deepening
humanitarian and economic crisis and its impact in Côte d’Ivoire and neighboring countries.
All armed parties in Côte d’Ivoire must make every effort to protect civilians from being
targeted, harmed, or killed. The United States reiterates its commitment to work with the
international community to ensure that perpetrators of such atrocities be identified and held
individually accountable for their actions.
Notwithstanding U.S. recognition of Ouattara’s election, the United States continues to view the
self-declared Gbagbo government as legally responsible for any actions that it may take in
exercising executive authority over state institutions.138 Such actions might include the issuance
of command and control directives to elements of the state security forces, some of which have
reportedly committed post-election human rights abuses, or the inappropriately partisan, private,
134
Todd Moss, “How the International Bond Market Might Influence Côte d’Ivoire,” CGD, December 29, 2010.
135
White House, “Statement by the President on the Election Results in Côte d’Ivoire,” December 3, 2010; and White
House, “Statement by NSC Spokesman Mike Hammer on the elections in Côte d’Ivoire,” December 2, 2010.
136
State Department, “Remarks/Special Session of the Human Rights Council on the Situation in Côte d’Ivoire,”
December 23, 2010.
137
White House, “Statement by President Barack Obama on the Violence in Côte d’Ivoire,” March 9, 2011; and State
Department, “Violence in Côte d’Ivoire,” [Press Statement by Secretary of State], March 4, 2011.
138
On January 4, 2011, a State Department spokesman stated that Gbagbo “is responsible for what has occurred in Côte
d’Ivoire over the past few weeks,” and on January 5 added that “We decry the violence that has resulted in deaths and
injuries of citizens of Côte d’Ivoire. We believe they’re politically motivated. We believe that the Government of
President Gbagbo is fully responsible.” State Department, “Daily Press Briefing,” January 4, 2011, and January 4,
2011; and CRS discussion with State Department official, January 5, 2011.

or extralegal use or abuse of fiscal or other state resources. The United States has, however,
formally accepted the credentials of a new Ivoirian ambassador to the United States, Daouda
Diabate. Diabate, appointed by President Ouattara, arrived to take up his post in early February
2011. The United States had previously recognized President Ouattara’s recall of Gbagbo’s
designated ambassador to the United States, Yao Charles Koffi, and recognized as his interim
replacement as charge d’affaires of the Côte d’Ivoire embassy in the United States, Kouame
Christophe Kouakou, the former Deputy Chief of Mission under Koffi. From the U.S.
perspective, Koffi’s status as ambassador was formally terminated on December 30, although
efforts to achieve this end began in mid-December, when Ouattara made his recall. 139
Presidential and Other High-Level Efforts to Pressure Gbagbo to Step Down

The United States has attempted to directly communicate with Gbagbo to urge him to abide by
the results of the election and cede power to Ouattara, with little success. President Obama
reportedly tried to telephone Gbagbo twice in December, the first time prior to Gbagbo’s self-
inauguration and the second about ten days later, but his calls were refused. 140 After the first call,
on December 5 he reportedly sent a letter to Gbagbo outlining the U.S. position regarding
Ouattara’s election.141 In the letter, reportedly sent on or about December 10, he invited Gbagbo
to the White House “for discussions ... on ways to advance democracy and development in Côte
d’Ivoire and West Africa” should Gbagbo cede power. Gbagbo reportedly received but did not
respond to the letter, which also stated that President Obama “would support efforts to isolate
Gbagbo and hold him to account if he refused to step down.”142 A second, “more detailed” letter
was sent to Gbagbo sent by Secretary of State Clinton, reportedly suggested that “Gbagbo could
move to the United States or receive a position in an international or regional institution if he left
peacefully.”143
These efforts appear to be part of a U.S.-supported international strategy to provide Gbagbo with
a “soft landing,” a euphemism for voluntary exile under international pressure. 144 “Similar
inducements” to those outlined in President Obama and Secretary Clinton’s letters were
reportedly proffered by France and other African countries.145 A letter from Nigerian President
139
Reuters, “U.S. Accepts Ouattara Ivory Coast Envoy,” February 11, 2011; Nico Colombant, “New Ivory Coast
Ambassador Arrives in US,” VOA, February 8, 2011; State Department, “Daily Press Briefing,” December 29, 2010;
and State Department information provided to CRS.
140
Lanny J. Davis, a former Gbagbo Washington lobbyist, claimed to have been instrumental in attempting to arrange a
call between Gbagbo and Obama. Smith, “Davis Resigns…”; and Cooper and Lichtblau, “American Lobbyists …”
141
Eric Lipton and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “In Ivory Coast, Bid to Ease Out Defiant Leader,” NYT, December 31, 2010;
Shiner, “Obama Joins African Leaders…”; Julie Pace, “With Personal and Political Motivation, Obama…”; and VOA,
“Clinton: Ivorian President Should Yield Power to Successor,” December 9, 2010.
142
Shiner, “Obama Joins African Leaders in Pressing Gbagbo…”; and Reuters, “Obama Dangled White House Visit to
Ease Ivorian Row,” December 9, 2010.
143
Mary Beth Sheridan, “U.S. Imposes Sanctions to Press Ivory Coast Leader to Step Aside,” Washington Post,
January 9, 2011.
144
“Soft landing” is a term that U.S. officials have in the past used to describe efforts to pressure leaders whose
continued tenure, typically after periods of significant political volatility, has appeared untenable, and whose efforts to
cling to power have imperiled democratic transitions or threatened to generate significant political violence or armed
conflict. The term was used, for instance, to describe efforts to pressure the departure into exile of the late President
Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire or former Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, among others.
145
Sheridan, “U.S. Imposes Sanctions ...”

Goodluck Jonathan, acting for ECOWAS, that was given to Gbagbo on December 17 reportedly
contained an offer of asylum by an unnamed African country.146
The effort has been portrayed by U.S. officials not as an outright offer to Gbagbo of asylum in the
United States, but as a proffer of assistance to help arrange exile, with the condition—a measure
meant to pressure him to accept the proposal—that if Gbagbo agrees to step down, he must do
soon. The effort was also qualified by a second condition designed to motivate Gbagbo to help
prevent any further human rights abuses. Any potential additional abuses by forces under his
control, or other acts for which Gbagbo might be held accountable under international justice
mechanisms, might lead to the offer being withdrawn; the proposal gives Gbagbo a “window of
opportunity” to act in accordance with international demands, but a finite one defined by events
on the ground.147
No publicly stated decision has been announced on whether the United States—which provides
limited security sector assistance to ECOWAS, in part focused on its stand-by force, and funds a
military advisor who is based at ECOWAS’s military headquarters—would support an ECOWAS
military intervention in Côte d’Ivoire. However, an ECOWAS delegation that was sent to the
United States to consult with U.S. and U.N. officials, reportedly including with respect to possible
external support for an ECOWAS military intervention, met with the U.S. National Security
Advisor, Tom Donilon on January 26. A White House statement on the meeting did not address
the issue of possible U.S. military support for ECOWAS. It stated that “Mr. Donilon expressed
strong support for the efforts of ECOWAS to facilitate a peaceful transition of power in Côte
d’Ivoire,” and that he and the delegation “reaffirmed their shared commitment to see” Ouattara
take “his rightful role as President of Côte d’Ivoire, and their shared resolve to see former
President Laurent Gbagbo cede power.” Participants also “discussed the importance of
maintaining international unity on this point” and agreed to continue to closely coordinate their
responses to the crisis.148
U.S. Visa Restrictions

On December 21, in order to pressure Gbagbo to cede power, the United States imposed travel
restrictions on members of Laurent Gbagbo’s regime and “other individuals who support policies
or actions that undermine the democratic process and reconciliation efforts in Côte d’Ivoire.” The
restrictions reportedly target affected persons by revoking “existing visas to the United States and
prohibit new visa applications from being accepted.” The list of affected persons is not public,
and it is unclear whether Gbagbo himself was on the list, in part in light of President Obama’s
invitation to him, or whether his cabinet members were affected. According to the State
Department website America.gov, a State Department spokesman was quoted as stating that
“there are dozens of individuals being targeted and the list ‘will go up’ to potentially include
Gbagbo’s Cabinet ministers and others who are continuing to help him remain in power.”149
146
Andrew Quinn, “Ivory Coast President Offered Exile in Africa - US,” Reuters, December 17, 2010; AFP,
“ECOWAS Sends Letter to Gbagbo Calling On Him To Quit Power, December 17, 2010; and State Department, “Daily
Press Briefing,” December 17, 2010.
147
Lipton and Stolberg, “In Ivory Coast, Bid to Ease Out...”; Quinn, “Ivory Coast President Offered Exile...”; and State
Department, “Daily Press Briefing,” January 4, 2011.
148
White House, “Readout of the Meeting of the National Security Advisor with the Delegation from the Economic
Community of West African States,” January 26, 2011.
149
Stephen Kaufman, “U.S. Applies Travel Restrictions on Côte d’Ivoire’s Gbagbo,” America.gov, December 21,
(continued...)

U.S. Targeted Financial Sanctions

On January 6, 2011, acting under Executive Order 13396 (EO 13396), the U.S. Treasury
Department imposed targeted financial sanctions on Gbagbo; his wife, Simone Gbagbo; and
senior Gbagbo associates and advisers Desire Tagro, Pascal Affi N’Guessan, and Alcide Ilahiri
Djedje. The sanctions prohibit U.S. persons “from conducting financial or commercial
transactions with the designated individuals” and freeze “any assets of the designees within U.S.
jurisdiction.” They were imposed because of Gbagbo’s “refusal to accept the CEI’s [IEC] election
results... and relinquish his authority,” aided by the other designees “directly or indirectly” were
“determined to constitute a threat to the peace and national reconciliation process in Côte
d’Ivoire,” which EO 13396 seeks to deter. The intention of the move was to isolate Gbagbo “and
his inner circle from the world’s financial system and underscore the desire of the international
community that he step down.”150
Congressional Responses
On February 10, 2011, Representative Payne introduced H.Res. 85, entitled Supporting the
democratic aspirations of the Ivoirian people and calling on the United States to apply intense
diplomatic pressure and provide humanitarian support in response to the political crisis in Côte
d’Ivoire. As of March 10, the resolution had 44 co-sponsors.
There have been few other public congressional responses to the Ivoirian crisis. On December 7,
Representative Donald M. Payne, then the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa and Global
Health of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (111th Congress), called on Gbagbo, “in the
manner befitting of a statesman, to peacefully transfer power to President-elect Ouattara.” He also
expressed deep concern “over the reports of the deadly attack against the opposition headquarters
committed by paramilitary forces, and of violent outbursts between supporters of the ruling
Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) and the opposition Rally of the Republicans (RDR).” He urged
Gbagbo “to immediately rein in his security forces and all paramilitary groups to prevent further
bloodshed and suffering at the hands of the Ivorian people,” and stated that “it is absolutely
critical at this juncture that the rule of law, suspension of violence, and the will of the people be
upheld to prevent a major crisis.” On March 3, 2011, in a guest column for AllAfrica.com,
Representative Payne strongly criticized Gbagbo’s effort to stay in power. He wrote that the
Gbagbo “regime and its supporters are waging a continuing campaign of terror against a large
numbers of Ivorians, United Nations peacekeepers, and foreign businesses and residents in the
country.” He concluded that “Gbagbo is clearly willing to push his country and its neighbors into
a state of political anarchy and economic disarray in order to maintain his grasp on political
power.” 151
(...continued)
2010; and State Department, “Côte d’Ivoire: Travel Restrictions,” PRN 2010/1847, December 21, 2010.
150
Executive Order (E.O) 13396, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Côte d’Ivoire,”
was issued by former President George W. Bush on February 7, 2006, and between that date and addition of Gbagbo
and associates in early 2011, designated three individuals. It was issued, in part, to implement UNSC Resolution 1572
of 2004. U.S. Treasury, “Treasury Targets Former Côte d’Ivoire President Laurent Gbagbo and Members of his Inner
Circle, January 6, 2011; E.O. 13396; and U.S. Treasury, An Overview of the Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions, n.d.
151
HFAC, “Congressman Donald Payne Calls on Gbagbo to Respect the Will of the Ivorian People,” December 8,
2010; and Donald M. Payne, “Côte d’Ivoire: On the Brink of War,” via AllAfrica.com, March 3, 2011.

On December 21, Senator Kerry stated that he welcomed “the State Department’s announcement
of travel sanctions against members of Laurent Gbagbo’s administration in Côte d’Ivoire for their
refusal to recognize the results of the legitimate, democratic election on November 28.” He also
stated that, in the wake of “violent attacks against civilians and supporters” of Ouattara, “it is vital
that all parties involved in the present standoff respect human rights, maintain a constructive
dialogue, restore telecommunications networks to allow the free flow of information, and abide
by the standards of international law.”152
U.S. Relations, Assistance, and Elections Support

U.S.-Ivoirian relations were traditionally cordial, but became strained after the 1999 ouster of
former president Henri Konan Bédié in 1999 in a military coup by the late General Robert Guéï,
and remained so during President Gbagbo’s tenure. The United States recognized Gbagbo as the
de facto leader of Côte d’Ivoire, but viewed the 2000 election that brought him to power as
operationally “flawed” and “marred by significant violence and irregularities,” and as illegitimate
because it was organized by a government that came to power by undemocratic means.153
Since the ouster of Bédié, Côte d’Ivoire has been subject to a restriction on bilateral aid that
prohibits the use of foreign operations funds—with some exceptions for selected non-
governmental organization, human welfare, and humanitarian needs programs—to a country
whose democratically elected head of government is deposed by a military coup d’état.154 The
United States has also imposed personal sanctions on selected persons viewed as threatening the
peace process in Côte d’Ivoire (see previous discussion of U.S. visa restrictions and financial
sanctions). U.S. bilateral engagement was also reduced as a result of the 2002 conflict by the
suspension and later closure of a country Peace Corps program in 2002 and 2003. After the
northern rebellion in October 2002, 133 Peace Corps volunteers were evacuated by U.S. and
French forces, and the program was suspended. The country office closed in May 2003.
The United States has repeatedly pressed the parties to the Ivorian conflict to durably and
comprehensively resolve their conflict, and has attempted to foster a transition to peace and
democracy by diplomatically and otherwise supporting implementation of the OPA and prior
peace accords. The United States provided about $9 million in assistance to help ECOMICI
deploy in 2003 and financially and politically supports the UNOCI mission ($81 million, FY2009
actual; $128.6 million, FY2010 enacted; and $135 million, FY2011 request. It has also funded
limited election support activities (see text box).
The United States is providing emergency assistance to respond to the humanitarian impact of the
post-election crisis; these efforts are discussed in the “Humanitarian Effects and Responses”
section, above. In addition to this aid, Côte d’Ivoire has received limited U.S. food aid and
substantial HIV/AIDS and health-related assistance in recent years ($107 million in FY2009 and
152
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Chairman Kerry On U.S. Travel Sanctions Against Members of the Gbagbo
Administration In Côte d’Iviore [sic],” December 22, 2010.
153
State Department, “Côte d’Ivoire,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, February 23, 2001.
154
The aid restriction was first imposed in accordance with Section 508 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, FY2000, a component of P.L. 106-113. Similar restrictions have been
imposed in each subsequent fiscal year.

an estimated $133 million in FY2010, with $133 million requested in FY2011).155 Another policy
concern is trafficking in persons. The State Department reports that Côte d’Ivoire is a source,
transit, and destination country for women and children trafficked for forced labor and
commercial sexual exploitation. There are several U.S. anti-trafficking programs in place.
U.S. Democratization and Election Support

The Carter Center, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
have supported a variety of election-related activities. From 2009 through 2010, NDI supported “participatory and
peaceful elections in Côte d’Ivoire by reinforcing mechanisms for mitigating election-related conflict and by assisting
women leaders and activists to participate in the election process.” Some of the work focused on youth leader
election conflict prevention and mitigation efforts. In May 2010, NDI also sponsored a series of training to boost
female political candidacies, and n October 2010, NDI sponsored the an inter-party effort to promote a 2008 NDI-
assisted inter-party code of conduct, and a ceremony in which the 14 presidential first-round candidates signed onto
the code. NDI also sponsored diverse activities from 2003 to 2009 in support of national reconciliation and the
reestablishment of non-violent political processes, such as training on public policy and communication skills for
political parties (starting in 2003); organizational capacity building for political parties (starting in 2005); and on “the
roles and responsibilities of parties in a democratic political system,” accompanied by support for an inter-party
information resource center (in 2006 and 2007). In 2008, it also implemented a USAID-funded program to increase
the capacity of political parties to monitor the electoral process. NDI’s activities in Côte d’Ivoire were supported by
$600,000 in NED funding in 2009, and $550,000 from the NED in 2010. 156 NDI and the International Foundation for
Electoral Systems (IFES) received about $.7 million in funding in 2007 and 2008 to support political party monitoring
of the citizen identification process and voter registration (NDI), and civic education and IEC capacity building
(IFES).157
The Carter Center monitored, publicly reported on, and issued diverse recommendations relating to the Ivorian
political process, between late 2008 and late 2010, although its election-related activities are slated to continue
through March 2011. Much of its work in 2009 and 2010 focused on the citizen identification and voter registration,
verification, and challenge processes. In 2010, the Center also monitored the two presidential votes, issued detailed
assessments of events during and preceding polling day. These activities and subsequent ones running through March
2011 have been subsidized by $.74 million in State Department Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Bureau (DRL)
funding.158
NED, which sponsors activities and organizational capacity-building of selected non-governmental organizations,
sponsored a range of election-related and political participation-focused activities in 2009 and 2010. In 2009, these
included support of activities focusing on the promotion of female participation in politics, including as candidates;
local conflict resolution; “peace and non-violence during the presidential elections using community radio and voter
education campaigns”; youth and ex-combatants engagement in political party activities and political processes; and
compliance with a media code of conduct during the presidential elections. NED also supported selected NDI
activities (see above). In 2010, NED continued to support community radio non-violence and voter education
campaigns and expanded female political participation, as well as women’s rights during the electoral period, trained
and deployed about 1,020 national election observers, and otherwise supported increased civil society organization
engagement in election monitoring. NED funding for these activities totaled about $1.9 million.159
According to the State Department’s FY2011 foreign operations Congressional Budget

Justification—which was issued prior to the crisis—if Côte d’Ivoire’s political situation is
155
State Department, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2011.
156
NDI, “NDI Programs in Côte d’Ivoire,” October 18, 2010; and NDI response to CRS inquiry, October 20, 2010.
157
USAID response to CRS inquiry, October 18, 2010.
158
Carter Center, Waging Peace: Côte d’Ivoire; and State Department DRL response to CRS inquiry, January 13,
2011.
159
NED, “Côte d’Ivoire,” Where We Work; and NED response to CRS inquiry, October 20, 2010.

resolved “to such an extent that U.S. assistance can help restore stability and promote good
governance,” the Administration of President Barack Obama would seek to
promote credible and peaceful elections [e.g., parliamentary or local ones], support a deep
and broad nationwide reconciliation process, restore the rule of law and combat impunity,
raise public awareness of the costs of corruption, expose Ivoirian youth to nontraditional
ideas of civil society, help young political leaders develop new approaches and adopt better
political platforms, fight trafficking in persons, stem the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and increase
economic productivity.
In addition to $133.3 million in Global Health and Child Survival (GHCS) funding mentioned
above, the FY2011 State Department budget request envisions the provision of $4.2 million in
Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance for conflict mitigation and reconciliation, good
governance, political competition and consensus-building and civil society support, along with
$40,000 in International Military Education and Training aid.
Outlook
As of late-March 2011, both the Ouattara and Gbagbo camps were rigidly adhering to their
respective positions, and mediation by regional bodies, such as ECOWAS and the AU, had
yielded few concrete prospects for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. While the ECOWAS threat
of military intervention had been shelved indefinitely, there were an increasing number of calls
for expanded sanctions on the Gbagbo administration aimed at forcing it to cede power. There
were also signs that the armed forces and militant supporters of each side were actively
employing armed force to ensure that their respective candidates maintained or gained control of
state institutions; territorial military battles in the west, FN seizures of multiple towns, extensive
armed clashes in Abidjan, and a range of other indicators suggested that a renewed civil war had
begun. The international community, wary of such developments, had prepared for a possible
uptick in conflict. The UNSC has increased the size of UNOCI, and foreign governments have
prepared contingency plans for the evacuation of foreign citizens from Côte d’Ivoire in the event
of armed conflict and in the face of growing anti-foreigner sentiments among some sectors of the
population.
The burgeoning of armed conflict war dampened the possibility that the crisis might be resolved
through political means. Even if such a resolution is achieved, however, Côte d’Ivoire is likely to
remain tense and highly politically unstable for some time. If Gbagbo is ultimately forced to cede
the presidency—as would appear to be a distinct possibility, given the extent and strength of
international opposition to his continued incumbency—his supporters, nearly half of the
population and, in particular, his large corps of militant supporters, are likely to remain aggrieved
and to obstruct the political process. If, by contrast, Gbagbo continues to resist efforts to force
him to step down, the country is likely to remain divided, politically unstable, and at an extended
risk of renewed armed conflict due to resentment and feelings of disenfranchisement by
supporters of Ouattara.
A power-sharing agreement might provide a temporary respite from the immediate threat of war.
Such an outcome has been strongly rejected by international community, however, and had also
been spurned by Ouattara until January 10, when he said he would be agreeable to appointing a
coalition government that would include members of Gbagbo’s party, but not Gbagbo himself.
The recommendations proposed by the high-level AU mediation panel in mid-March incorporated

a proposal much akin to what Ouattara had said he would accept, but were rejected by Gbagbo.
Had such a proposal been successfully adopted, however, the resulting government would likely
not have resolved the political and socio-economic issues that underlie the conflict, nor have
boded well for the rule of law as it relates to democratic governance in Côte d’Ivoire.
If the crisis is resolved, Côte d’Ivoire is well-positioned to undertake a successful economic

recovery, and to reemerge as a regional economic hub; while the economy has suffered from
some degree of lack of investment due to the uncertain political situation, the cocoa economy has
performed well and the country has a fairly well developed infrastructure by regional standards.
An end to the crisis would also likely boost international political and investment confidence in
the West Africa as a whole.

Figure 1. Côte d’Ivoire: National Map with Regions
Source: CRS adaptation of U.N. Cartographic Section Map No. 4312 Rev. 2, June 2009

Appendix A. Background on the Election
The Long-Stymied Peace Process

The 2010 presidential election was the main political objective of a peace process aimed at
reunifying Côte d’Ivoire under a series of political-military agreements reached between 2003
and March 2007, when the most recent accord, the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) was
signed. The OPA incorporated key provisions of the main preceding agreements but superseded
them. 160 The election was originally slated to be held as constitutionally prescribed, in a manner
that would allow a timely transition to a new elected government at the end of President Gbagbo’s
initial five-year term on October 30, 2005. It was delayed at least six times, however, in some
cases with the explicit concurrence of the international facilitators of the various peace
agreements, and in some cases in spite of their demands, political threats, and other efforts
intended to expedite fulfillment of the agreements. 161 These delays enabled Gbagbo to maintain
his incumbency for five years after the termination of his electoral mandate and—according to
some analysts—to significantly influence the politics of the peace process in manner that allowed
him and his key allies to consolidate state power, access to resources, and shape the electoral
institutional framework to work in their favor.
Article 48: President Gbagbo’s “Exceptional” Authority

Despite the expiration of his electoral term in 2005, Gbagbo asserted a legal mandate to retain his post under Article
48 of the Constitution of Côte d’Ivoire, which allows the president of the Ivorian republic to take “exceptional
measures”—following consultation with the National Assembly President and the Constitutional Council—when “the
regular functioning of the constitutional public powers is interrupted.” Gbagbo used the measure to ensure the
continuity of his incumbency past his elected tenure, to enact numerous laws by decree, and to issue other types of
executive orders. The same constitutional provision permitted the National Assembly to continue to function past its
elected term. Gbagbo’s use of Article 48 was, in some cases, viewed as helpful to the peace process, as it allowed for
the enactment of legal reforms called for under the peace accords, while in others its use was opposed by his political
opponents. Gbagbo was also sometimes accused of hindering accord implementation by not using his executive
powers in a timely manner. In its findings on the second round poll, the Carter Center criticized the expedient
political use of legal mechanisms by both sides. It stated its regret at “the tendency of political actors to use the legal
framework not to resolve political differences by referring to the legal basis for decisions, but to sharpen them by
ignoring it when it did not suit their agenda.”162
Key accord implementation challenges pertained to the sequence and manner in which
disarmament, citizen and voter identification, voter registration, other electoral administration
tasks, and various accord-prescribed legal reforms would take place; and differences over the
scope of presidential authority. Controversy over these and other issues regularly prompted
episodes of political volatility, mass political protests that were, at times, violent, and
underpinned electoral process delays which, in turn, spurred the successive series of accords. The
root causes underlying the conflict include contention over land; internal and regional migration;
the nature of national identity; qualifications for citizenship; and the extent of foreign influence
over Ivorian political processes; security force abuses; issues of socio-economic welfare (e.g.,
160
The OPA was later amended four times, most recently in late 2008. The main pre-OPA accords were the Linas-
Marcoussis Agreement, of 2003; the Accra III Agreement, of 2004; and the Pretoria Agreement, of 2005.
161
External facilitators have included the United Nations Security Council, the African Union, ECOWAS, and foreign
heads of state, in their capacities as accord mediators.
162
Carter Center, “Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions,” November 30, 2010

power cuts and uneven access to social services); and other aggravating factors, such as
corruption and crime.
Pre-Electoral Processes: Progress and Challenges

Notwithstanding such challenges, the conduct of the October 31, 2010, first round election was
made possible because substantial headway was made in 2009 and 2010 toward completing OPA-
required election preparation tasks, despite a number of potentially catastrophic challenges to
their execution, and far less progress in attaining key non-electoral but politically critical
provisions of the OPA. Failure to complete the latter-primarily disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of ex-combatants and militia members; security sector reform; and the nationwide
restoration of state authority, all of which remained incomplete by polling day, notwithstanding
much progress-could well have once again prevented the elections from occurring (see text box).
Identification
According to U.N. reporting, in 2009 the government and the FN, substantially aided by UNOCI,
made substantial progress in completing the processes of pre-electoral citizen identification and
voter registration processes. Over 6.59 million persons were legally identified and 6.38 million
registered as voters, but 2.7 million of this number had to have their identification for voting
purposes confirmed. Citizen identification was a prerequisite of elections and was conducted
concurrently with voter registration, but was a separate objective under the OPA. The lack of
identification papers for millions Ivorian and foreign populations resident in Côte d’Ivoire was a
key issue underpinning the conflict and the years of subsequent political impasse. Lack of proof
of national identity was common due to factors such as historical discrimination; lack of
administrative capacity; lack of access of Ivorian-born, second generation immigrants to legal
identification rights and processes; and destruction and poor administration of civil registers
during and after the conflict. Persons eligible for inclusion on the voter roll included those entered
on the 2000 election voter list and any other Ivoirian citizen 18 years or older who could present
proof of birth, although according to the Carter Center, “in practice, these distinctions were not
applied and individuals seeking to be on the voter list did not have to demonstrate proof of
nationality.” This situation created the basis for disputation of the validity of entries on the voter
roll, and complicated the voter registration process, turning what was initially planned as a six-
week exercise into a two-year process. 163
Peace Process Again Imperiled: Voter Vetting and Electoral Disputes

Voter list vetting in November 2009 by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) validated a
provisional voter list that included some 5.28 million registrations (dubbed the “white list”), but
left an additional 1.03 million unconfirmed (the “grey list”). Challenges were later made to
almost half of these, and while all but 33,476 were validated, the status of the other half remained
unclear. Delays in these processes and later registration appeals, however, forced a postponement
of national elections, which had been scheduled for November 29, 2009.164 Notwithstanding the
163
S/2010/245; S/2010/537, October 18, 2010; UNSC, “Statement on the certification of the final voters list by Choi
Young-Jin, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Côte d’Ivoire,” S/2010/493, September 24, 2010; and
Carter Center, “Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions,” November 2, 2010.
164
S/2010/15, January 7, 2010; and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Côte d’Ivoire Country Report, January 2010.

delay, based on voter registration progress, the validation by the Constitutional Council on
November 19 of 14 of 20 aspirant presidential candidates, and an amendment to the remaining
electoral timeline established under the OPA , elections were forecast to be held by late February
or early March 2010.165
On February 11, 2010, however, Prime Minister Soro ordered an indefinite suspension of the
national voter registration contestation process following “tensions created by the process of
validating the provisional voter list.” This process had sown fears in some areas that courts, at the
direction of the FPI-led government, would purge opposition voters from the voter rolls.166 This
controversy arose after the then-IEC chairman, Robert Mambé, a PDCI member, reportedly
erroneously distributed 429,030 voter names to local IEC offices during what he asserted was an
internal IEC voter vetting exercise. Gbagbo’s supporters claimed that the names at issue were
primarily of persons of northern descent. After an Interior Ministry investigation, the Gbagbo
government accused Mambé of fraudulently trying to rig the voter list on behalf of the opposition,
and demanded that he resign. The opposition came to Mambé’s defense and accused the
government of trying to further delay elections and extend the president’s term. Mambé rejected
the claims of Gbagbo’s supporters and called for an independent UNOCI probe into the affair.167
The situation was further inflamed when on February 11 President Gbagbo unilaterally dissolved
the government, dismissed the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), and called on Soro to
quickly appoint a new government and propose “a new credible electoral commission.”168
Gbagbo’s actions followed weeks of growing dispute between the presidency and the IEC over
the Mambé controversy and Mambé’s refusal to resign, and invalidated the prior election
schedule, raising questions about when the long delayed presidential election would occur. The
IEC dissolution was strongly opposed by the opposition camp, which labeled it “undemocratic
and unconstitutional” and tantamount to a coup d’état.169 In subsequent weeks, demonstrations
broke out in multiple Ivoirian cities. Some were violent, resulting in around 12 fatalities. After a
mediation visit by the OPA Facilitator, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, a new IEC
was appointed on February 25, and an opposition member was later chosen as its chairman.
165
At the time that the candidates were approved, the election was still formally slated to be held on November 29,
2009; the fact that it was not held until nearly a year later caused some to question whether the candidature process
should have been reopened. While such an outcome may have permitted greater political participation, it would almost
certainly not have changed the outcome, as no candidate other than the leading three (Gbagbo, Ouattara, and Bédié)
won more than 2.57% of votes cast, and all but one garnered far less than 1% of votes. In addition, reopening the
candidature qualification process may further have delayed the vote by reigniting debate over candidate eligibility,
which was “affected by the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The agreement established preferential consideration for...
candidates from signing political parties or groups [who] were exempted from the demonstration of any legal
requirements (such as proof of citizenship, tax payment, or health certificate) other than the personal declaration and
signature of candidacy. Carter Center, “Statement…,” November 2, 2010; and S/2010/15.
166
Loucoumane Coulibaly, “Ivory Coast Suspends Registration of Voters,” Reuters, February 11, 2010; Loucoumane
Coulibaly, “Thousands Riot Over Voter Lists in Ivory Coast Town,” Reuters, February 5, 2010; and S/2010/245.
167
EIU, Côte d’Ivoire Country Report, January 2010; and S/PV.6284, January 1, 2010.
168
Although the OPA did not endow Gbagbo with the authority to dissolve the IEC, Gbagbo asserted that Article 48 of
the constitution allowed him to do so. Tim Cocks and Ange Aboa, “Ivory Coast’s President Dissolves Government,”
Reuters, February 12 2010
169
AFP, “ICoast Opposition Says Government Sacking a ‘Coup’,” February 13, 2010.

Non-Electoral Elements of the OPA: Security Reform and

State Reunification Prior to the Election
Progress toward elections under the peace process created by the OPA and preceding accords had long been
hindered by contestation over the sequencing of disarmament, among other matters. The Forces Nouvelles (FN),
while publicly supportive of the OPA’s disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) provisions, contended
that disarmament was not a prerequisite to elections. In various instances, it refused to move forward with
disarmament commitments prior to progress on various election and identification accord provisions. Although a late
2008 amendment to the OPA required FN DDR two months prior to the presidential election, election delays and
the lack of a specific announced poll date meant that the provision could not be enforced. The Gbagbo government,
for its part, periodically refused to move forward on election-related commitments in the absence of FN
disarmament. As of late May 2010, the Gbagbo government was once again “insisting on disarmament and the
reunification of the country before the elections,” after earlier agreeing to hold polls. In a late May 2010 report,
UNSG Ban stated that “many interlocutors, including the [OPA] Facilitator, advised” that the terms of the OPA “must
be tackled concomitantly in order to remove any pretexts by any of the parties for not carrying out their obligations.”
OPA implementation progress was also plagued by funding shortages, including lack of payment to former rebel
members of integrated security force units created by the OPA, a situation that held the potential to impact the
electoral process, since these units were charged providing election security. Other factors underlying “perennial
delays in the peace process,” according to Ban, included “underestimation by the parties of the time required to
implement some complex tasks; lack of capacity on the part of the national implementing institutions; logistical and
other resource constraints; and differences that emerged among the parties on the practical modalities for the
implementation of the most sensitive tasks, such as the identification operations.” He also asserted that “lack of
political will… also contributed significantly to the delays.” Ban reported that, as of November 23 2010, a “significant
number of tasks stipulated in [OPA…] that relate to disarmament and the reunification of the country remain
uncompleted, including the disarmament of former combatants of the FN and the dismantling of militia; the
reunification of the Ivorian defence and security forces; the restoration of State authority throughout the country,
including the redeployment of the corps préfectoral, the judiciary and the fiscal and customs administrators; and the
centralization of the treasury.”
While security reforms under the OPA remained substantially incomplete by polling day, increasing progress toward
these goals was made in the months prior to the polls. An FN DDR process was re-initiated in four locations
between June and August 2010. By late October, 3,629 FN soldiers identified for integration into the national army
were cantoned—albeit not on a sustained basis, due to insufficient resources, and the number of FN command zones
was also reduced from 10 to 4. DDR of former FN combatants was continuing as of November 23, 2010, when
17,601 of 23,777 combatants slated to be demobilized had undergone this process. An additional 4,000 FN soldiers
were slated join the Integrated Command Centre (ICC). UNOCI reported that demobilization resulted in the
collection of a limited number of weapons, most unserviceable. In September the government began to make
allowances payments to 1,170 demobilized FN forces in three areas; each received $200. The demobilization and
disarmament of a further estimated non-FN 20,150 militia members remained at a standstill, following the
demobilization of 17,301 militia members, in part due to demands by ex-militia groups for larger payments.
The restoration of nationwide state authority and the centralization of the treasury also remained incomplete. FN
authorities “continued to levy and collect taxes and customs revenues,” counter to the OPA, although some progress
in training and deploying new national customs officers to FN areas was made. However, the deployment had little
effect in the face of continuing FN “illegal” revenue collection. Some courts in the north that had closed during a
period of unrest in February 2010 (see below) reopened in August 2010 to handle voter registration list appeals, but
were operationally incapable to undertake criminal proceedings, severely curtailing access to justice. 170
Opposition parties then agreed to join a new government, and political tensions eased. Processes
leading up to the production of a final electoral list (which Gbagbo supporters later repeatedly
asserted needed to be “disinfected” to remove northern names, with which they claimed it was
170
UNSG quotes from S/2010/245, May 20, 2010and S/2010/600, November 23, 2010. On the issues discussed in this
textbox, see also Institute for Security Studies, Peace and Security Council Report, December 2010, AFP, “Ivory
Coast’s Ex-Rebels Vow To Disarm Before Vote,” March 15, 2010; and AFP, “I.Coast President’s Camp Says Peace
Process in Danger,” March 23, 2010.

“infested”),171 to be followed by the production and distribution of identity and voters’ cards,
began in March.
On March 17, at a U.N. Security Council meeting following renewed opposition demands for an
election, the Ivoirian delegate stated that the 429,030 voters at issue in the Mambé controversy
had to be stricken from the voter list, which he said would then have to be audited over a one-two
month period. In addition, citing a series of attacks on state and FPI facilities in FN-controlled
areas, he stated that a free vote could not be held in a “bisected territory” beset by an “atmosphere
of intimidation,” and insisted that full national reunification and complete disarmament of the FN
rebels take place prior to elections. 172 This stance prompted the opposition to accuse the
government of again attempting to delay voting. In early May there were renewed tensions after
the opposition, rejecting alleged interruptions to the electoral process and to prolonged electoral
list vetting appeals procedures, called for an expedited election and announced a protest march. It
was later postponed, however, due to fears that it would spur violence.173
2010: Electoral Processes Progress Apace

In May 2010, work toward finalization of the voter rolls, based on a late April agreement between
parties to the OPA, began anew with a resumption of the appeals process of “grey list” entries. It
was undertaken by 415 local electoral commissions and completed in June, and resulted in the
addition of 496,738 persons to the “white list,” creating a 5.78 million person voter roll. This list,
in turn, was subjected to a further appeals process involving the public display of voter sheets in
early August, which resulted in 30,293 requests for the removal of provisional voters from the
roll, and local court hearings on these petitions subsequently commenced. These hearings were
controversial, in light of allegations that elements of Gbagbo’s FPI had requested the removal of
large numbers of names from the rolls, and sparked clashes among party militants in some areas,
as well as the suspension of some court proceedings due to disputes over hearing procedures.
This process, which resulted in the deletion of 1,273 entries and the addition of 7,418 new ones,
ended in late August. A separate verification process focusing on 1.79 million “white list” entries,
ran to the parallel public court-based appeals process between June and early August. It resulted
in the temporary removal from the provisional voters list of 55,000 persons “for whom no civil
registry records could be found” or whose voter identification data did not match the civil
registry. It was decided that their cases would be adjudicated after the election. After
consultations between the main political parties, a final voters list of 5.73 million persons was
announced, and on September 9 President Gbagbo ordered by decree that national identity cards
to be issued to the listed persons. In accordance with the OPA and U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1826 July 2008, among others, SRSG Choi certified the final voters list.174
Positive momentum toward finalizing the voter rolls was accompanied by progress in setting out
an election timeline. On August 5, Prime Minister Soro announced that, as proposed by the IEC, a
first round of presidential elections would be held on October 31, 2010, and a presidential decree
171
UNOCI, “Press Review for Monday, 8 February 2010”; and U.S. Embassy (Abidjan), “Côte d’Ivoire: American
Embassy’s National Daily Press Review,” August 19, 2010.
172
S/PV.6284; and Patrick Worsnip, “UN Council Demands Ivory Coast Hold Elections Soon,” Reuters, March 17,
2010.
173
S/2010/245.
174
S/2010/537 and S/2010/493.

was signed enacting the date in law. In late August, the IEC announced a schedule for completing
outstanding elections preparation tasks, and attention turned to completing them. Key tasks
included:
the distribution of 11,658,719 identity and voters cards; the establishment of the electoral
map of 10,179 polling sites and 20,073 polling stations; the identification, recruitment and
training of 66,000 polling staff; the coordination of electoral observers; the transportation of
the electoral material; the establishment of a results tally centre; and the provision of security
for the election.175
The two month timeline for accomplishing these tasks was tight and—given Côte d’Ivoire’s
lengthy history of technical and political delays regarding accomplishment of election
administration tasks—the potential risk of further electoral delays or operational failures,
especially in remote areas, was high. In general, however, the remaining electoral process
progressed smoothly, with the exception of one significant controversy. On October 21, the IEC
announced plans to manually tabulate polling station results, rather than do so electronically, as
previously planned, after some IEC members and opposition candidates asserted that the
electronic tabulation contractor, SILS Technology, might be biased due to the close ties of a
company official to Gbagbo’s FPI party. After consultations between Choi, the representative of
the OPA Facilitator, and the IEC spurred by worries that manual tabulation would likely delay
vote counting past the legally required three-day deadline, the IEC agreed to implement the
original electronic tabulation plan. However, this process was subjected to oversight by a
committee of experts.176
Final preparations for poll day—which were the responsibility of the IEC but, as with significant
portions of earlier tasks, were substantially carried out by UNOCI—were not completed until just
prior to polling. 177 The joint distribution of voter and national identity cards by the IEC and the
National Identification Office (ONI) began on October 6. These materials were transported by
UNOCI to individual polling stations. By October 19, 83% of voter cards had been distributed in
the commercial capital, Abidjan, but only 40% had been distributed in other areas of the
country.178 Distribution of ballot boxes and other polling materials took place between October 8
and 11 October, and sensitive electoral materials—ballot papers, indelible ink, and electoral
documents—began on October 23.
A two-day training of the 66,000 polling station workers took place in the final four days prior to
the vote; most poll workers received their training less than 48 hours prior to the start of
175
S/2010/537.
176
It was made up of made up of representatives of the Prime Minister, the IEC, the OPA facilitator, a Swiss technical
advisory contractor, Crypto AG, and UNOCI. S/2010/600; U.S. Embassy Abidjan, “National Daily Press Review,”
October 25, 2010; VOA, “Ivory Coast PM Tries to Ease Concern Over Vote Count,” October 26, 2010; and Xinhua,
“Côte d’Ivoire to Set Up “Committee Of Experts” to Monitor Election Tally,” October 25, 2010.
177
UNOCI provided extensive technical and logistical assistance to the IEC and other national institutions to support
the identification and electoral processes. This included transport of electoral materials and registration agents;
refurbishment of identification and voter registration centers; training judges and registration agents. Election
administration funding to the government was provided primarily by the European Union and the U.N. Development
Program. S/2010/245; and UNOCI, “Presidential Elections in Côte d’Ivoire,” [Fact Sheet], October 25, 2010.
178
A deadline on collection of cards, delivery of which had been delayed in some places due to administrative
inefficiencies, was extended by the IEC; voters were allowed to obtain their cards on polling day. Tim Cocks, “Ivory
Coast Says Election Preparations on Schedule,” Reuters, October 21, 2010; S/2010/600; and Carter Center,
“Statement…,” November 2, 2010.

polling.179 According to the Carter Center, limited voter education outreach posters and similar
information tools were produced by the IEC, but in practice, voter education was largely
delegated by the IEC to “external actors including civil society, political parties, and the
international community,” and on polling day, little information on voting procedures was
reportedly available to voters.180 During the run-up to polling, UNOCI’s public service radio
station, covering 75% the national territory, broadcast “continuous information on the electoral
process in five national languages” and gave “equal broadcast time to all candidates for campaign
statements.”181 The limited scope of voter education, and the distribution of public education
appears to have been reflected in national variations in the incidence of invalid balloting, which
ranged from 2.34% in Abidjan to much higher levels in the remote, social services-poor north,
such as 8.58% in the northeastern Zanzan region.182
Election Security
Election security—given the importance of the poll to the peace process and threats by militia and
other elements to disrupt the electoral process—was a key challenge. The OPA had provided for
the creation of an entity known as the Integrated Command Centre (ICC), to be comprised of
8,000 mixed gendarmerie brigades and police units made up of jointly deployed government and
FN force members. Under the OPA, the ICC was to be responsible for providing security during
the elections. ICC units had few resources and limited operational capacities, however, and only
slightly more than 1,000 men, about two-thirds from the government side and about a third from
the FN, had been assigned to the ICC by prior to the election. In addition, the FN elements were
not receiving salaries, unlike their government counterparts, creating morale problems.
While responsibility for elections security formally remained a responsibility of national

authorities—and while the FN and the government deployed an additional 5,300 police and
gendarmes to the ICC at the last minute, on October 30 (2,500 and 2,800, respectively)—in light
of the ICC’s limited capacity, UNOCI played a major role in providing security for the elections
process. UNOCI’s efforts were aided by the U.N.-sanctioned French Operation Licorne military
force. To help ensure a secure election, on September 29, the UNSC passed Resolution 1942,
authorizing a six-month, 500-person plus-up of UNOCI’s military and police strength, bringing
the total force size from 8,650 to 9,150.183
Election Campaign
The two-week official electoral campaign, which was extensively preceded by technically
prohibited informal campaigning, began on October 15. The leading contenders, Gbagbo,
Ouattara, and Henri Konan Bédié, a former head of state, campaigned nationwide, while the
remaining 11 lesser candidates focused their campaigns in their political base areas. The
campaign was generally peaceful, with some limited exceptions involving “isolated acts of
179
S/2010/600; Carter Center, “Statement…,” November 2, 2010; and UN Integrated Regional Information Networks,
“Countdown to Deadlock,” December 10, 2010.
180
Carter Center, “Statement…,” November 2, 2010.
181
UNOCI, “Presidential Elections…”
182
183
S/2010/600; S/2010/245; S/2010/537; and UNOCI, “Presidential Elections…”

violence, provocation and vandalism, including tearing down campaign posters” and clashes
between party militants in several towns.184 Political tensions also arose as a result of a sometimes
provocative media environment and as a result of heated rhetoric by party supporters. UNOCI
reported that while access to state media remained uneven, and that “some opposition
candidates... denounced alleged unequal media coverage of the candidates by State-controlled
media, candidates’ access to State media significantly improved during the official electoral
campaign, in comparison to the preceding period.”185
The ruling FPI also reportedly claimed that it lacked access to FN-controlled media in the
northern part of the country, notably to the FN-controlled television station TV Notre Patrie. A
regional think tank reported that “it is clear that prior to the campaigning period some candidates
particularly the incumbent, used their advantageous positions in using public media to reach
supporters.”186 Several high-level foreign delegations toured the country during the campaign
period to monitor the campaign and urge Ivoirians to conduct a peaceful election.187 Political
parties generally appeared to observe a political party code of good conduct that 40 parties had
signed in 2008.188 Prior to the first round, members of the Houphouëtist Rally for Democracy and
Peace (RHDP) coalition, which includes the Bédié’s Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI)
and Ouattara’s Rally of the Republicans (RDR) and two other parties, mutually pledged to jointly
support whichever of their two leading candidates eventually stood against Gbagbo in the event
of a run-off vote.
The First and Second Round Polls
First Round
Voting during the first round vote on October 31—which featured a historically high 83.7% voter
participation rate, with 4.84 million voters out of 5.78 million registered going to the polls—was
generally peaceful. Polling was observed by a 14-member civil society observer group, the Civil
Society Coalition for Peace and Democratic Development in Côte d’Ivoire (COSOPCI) and some
affiliated organizations, such as the Convention of Civil Society of Côte d’Ivoire (CSCI). It was
also monitored by international observers, including the Carter Center and the European Union.189
184
185
S/2010/600.
186
Institute for Security Studies, Peace and Security Council Report, December 2010.
187
S/2010/600. In its findings on the first round electoral campaign, the Carter Center, similarly, stated its regret that
“throughout the period before the official opening of the campaign, the candidate for the presidential majority
dominated National Television (RTI), whereas Art. 30 of the Electoral Code stipulates that “parties and candidates have
equitable access to state media from the date of publication of the provisional list until polling.” Carter Center,
“Statement…,” November 2, 2010.
188
The code, signed by the political parties in April 2008, was the product of an inter-party consultation undertaken by
the U.S. National Democratic Institute, technically supported by UNOCI and the CEI. NDI, “Côte d’Ivoire: NDI Helps
Political Parties Agree to Code of Conduct,” April 29, 2008; and Carter Center, “Statement…,” November 2, 2010.
189
Other international delegations included those of ECOWAS, the African Union, the Organisation Internationale de
la Francophonie (OIF), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Caribbean and Pacific
Group of States (ACP), and official bilateral delegations from the United States and Japan; all foreign embassies were
accredited by the CEI and many observed both rounds. UNOCI, “Presidential Elections…”; S/2010/600; and email
from NED official, December 30, 2010.

Polling generally proceeded smoothly, in part due to the use of a single ballot and a scheme in
which each polling station served a maximum of 400 voters, although it was reportedly marred, in
some cases by technical failures.190 The vote tallying process reportedly took place transparently
and in accordance with applicable regulations. It proceeded slowly in some instances, however,
due to lack of transportation, some failures of the electronic tabulation transmission system, and
the refusal of some polling staff to transmit official results prior to receiving stipend payments.
There were a very limited, statistically insignificant number of tallying irregularities reported, and
in some instances, observers were illicitly barred from monitoring vote counting.191
Results
The three top vote-earning candidates were:
• Gbagbo, of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), running as the candidate of the
Presidential Majority (LMP) coalition, who won, 756,504 votes, or a 38.04%
vote share;
• Ouattara, of the Rally of the Republicans (RDR), who won 1,481,091 votes, or a
32.07% share; and
• Bédié, of the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), who garnered 1,165,532
votes, or a 25.24% share.
The next highest vote-earner was Mabri Toikeusse Albert, of the Union for Democracy and Peace
in Côte d’Ivoire (UDPCI), who won 2.57% of votes cast. No other candidate won more than a
0.37% vote share. Since no candidate won an absolute majority of votes cast (i.e. over 50% of
votes, as required by the Ivoirian electoral code), a second round was required. 192
The IEC released initial partial results on November 2, and on November 3, Bédié’s PDCI party
asserted that there had been irregularities and non-transparency in tallying, resulting in inaccurate
results. It called for the IEC to stop issuing provisional results and requested a vote recount. On
November 4, IEC released complete provisional results.193 The PDCI’s demand of a recount,
underpinned by protest demonstrations by PDCI supporters, was joined by the UDPCI party on
November 4 and on November 6 by the RHDP coalition, which alleged that “serious
irregularities” had occurred during the first round. The Constitutional Council reportedly claimed,
counter to the assertions of opposition applicants, that no appeals were filed within the legal time
frame. It effectively dismissed all allegations of irregularities by certifying the IEC’s announced
provisional results. After having assessed the entire first round election process, SRSG Choi
certified the Constitutional Council-vetted first round results on November 12.194
190
These included the late arrival or the absence of selected polling station staff; late delivery of polling materials; and
a widespread failure to observe polling procedures such as the securing of polling boxes with numbered ties, the
recording of tie seal numbers used, and checks of voters’ fingers for indelible ink (i.e., proof of previous voting).
191
S/2010/600; Carter Center, “Statement…,” November 2, 2010; Convention of Civil Society of Côte d’Ivoire,
Enseignements a Tirer du Premier Tour de l’Election Presidentielle, Appel aux Electeurs et aux Candidats pour le
Second Tour, November 9, 2010; and COSOPCI, et al,. Communiqué Preliminaire sur les Elections Presidentielles du
31 Octobre 2010 en Côte d’Ivoire, November 1, 2010, among others.
192
IEC, Election du President de la Republique, Scrutin du 31 Octobre 2010, Resultats Provisoires par Region et par
Departement, November 3, 2010; and Abidjan.net, “Informations sur les Candidats,” Elections Présidentielles 2010.
193
VOA, “Ivory Coast Opposition Candidate Ouattara Call for Recount,” November 6, 2010.
194
The allegations of irregularities were reportedly based on a disparity between the total number of polling stations
(continued...)

Contesting Electoral Disputes: Procedural Lacunae

The Carter Center contends that there exists a “weakness in the legal provisions for election complaints [which]
gives candidates only three days following the close of polls to submit their petition. In the event that the IEC uses all
three days to announce preliminary results, candidates may be left with little or no time to assess the results should
they wish to submit a complaint about irregularities in the results process”—a circumstance that occurred, with dire
consequences, during the second round. In addition, the Center observed, the electoral system provides little
guidance on how possible electoral irregularities are to be resolved—a shortcoming that also negatively affected
assessments of the legitimacy of the Constitutional Council’s decision-making after the runoff poll. The Carter Center
observed that “though the constitution assigns the Constitutional Council the authority to proclaim final official
results, neither the constitution nor the electoral law provides any definitional guidance on the nature of irregularities
or how the Council may consider them in the event that it annuls an election result. Constitutional Council decisions
are final and not subject to appeal.” 195
Second Round
The Constitutional Council initially scheduled the runoff vote for November 21, counter to
standing IEC plans for it to be held on November 28, but on November 9, Prime Minister Soro
announced that the cabinet had decided that due to technical and logistical challenges, the second
round would be held as originally planned by the IEC. President Gbagbo fixed the date in law by
decree. On November 10, the IEC scheduled the second round electoral campaign between
November 20 and 26. On November 7, Bédié called for his supporters to vote for Ouattara in the
second round, as per the RHDP coalition’s pre-electoral agreement, and on November 10,
Ouattara publicly promised to form a union government with Bédié if he won the runoff. In a
later debate he also pledged to appoint FPI ministers. In the second round, Gbagbo, running as the
candidate of the Presidential Majority (LMP) coalition, ran against Ouattara, who ran as the
candidate of the RHDP.
The Carter Center reported that, as in the first round campaign, technically prohibited informal
campaigning occurred prior to the official campaign period. The campaign also featured, for the
first time ever in Côte d’Ivoire, a live debate that was broadcast nationally on November 25. The
debate, a two hour and fifteen minute forum, was wide-ranging and substantive. Both candidates
used the occasion to appeal for a peaceful democratic election and use of non-violence to achieve
political ends. The first half focused primarily on differences between the two candidates’ views
of the Ivoirian conflict, the stalled peace process, and the election of 2000, in which Gbagbo
came to power. The latter portion highlighted policy differences between the two rivals and their
respective policy agendas, focusing on such issues as deficiencies in the judicial system and state
structure, military reform, and economic and social services policy. Notably, Ouattara pledged to
establish a truth and reconciliation commission if elected.196
(...continued)
(20,073) and tally sheets transmitted (19,854), which was reportedly an artifact of the merging of some adjacent polling
stations, the cancellation of some tally sheets, and the siting of some polling stations overseas. There was also a
discrepancy of 58,770 voters between the number of registered on the final voters list and the number cited in the
provisional results, which was reportedly an artifact of security and electoral personnel having voted at their polling
duty stations, rather than their registered station, which caused some polling stations to produce tallies listing more
votes than registered voters. S/2010/600.
195
196
Abidjan Television Ivoirienne Chaine Une, “Ivorian Runoff Candidates Discuss Political Programs in TV Debate -
Full Version,” via OSC, November 25, 2010.

Despite the substantive tone of the debate and the two candidates’ appeals for peace and national
reconciliation, the Carter Center reported that the runoff poll took place
against the background of a tense and often negative campaign. Long-standing disputes
about national identity issues and land ownership were … inflamed by negative political
rhetoric and fueled by a partisan media. Sporadic incidents of violence, including several
deaths, occurred in the days preceding the election and on election day itself.”
It also stated that “the run-off climate quickly degenerated with widespread communication
strategies based essentially on negative portrayals of the opposing camp and the use of politically
affiliated newspapers to spread rumors. 197
Clashes between opposed youth party militants occurred in several places in the days leading
up the poll, and at least seven people were reported killed in political violence in Abidjan on
the day before the vote, while at least two were killed in northern Côte d’Ivoire on polling
day. 198 According to SRSG Choi, during the second round, state-controlled media, as in the first
round, provided “unbalanced” coverage before and after the official electoral campaign, but
“generally guaranteed equal access to the two presidential candidates” during the campaign. He
also noted that “major political parties[‘]...newspapers... enjoyed complete freedom of press
before, during and after the election.”199
In light of the rising tension associated with the runoff vote, the government and the FN deployed
4,000 troops to join the integrated command center prior to the vote. Plans called for an additional
1,500 government soldiers to be deployed to FN-controlled areas, to be accompanied by 500 FN
soldiers, while 1,500 FN troops would deploy to government-held areas and be joined by 500
government troops. President Gbagbo also imposed a curfew after 11 PM on the day of the poll to
ensure the security of ballot box returns and freedom of movement for the security forces. 200
The Carter Center and other vote-monitoring groups reported that substantial improvements in
poll worker training and administration were made in support of the runoff poll, and that logistics
in support of the polling improved compared to those provided during the first round. The Carter
Center also reported that while “voting and counting operations were largely well-conducted by
polling station officials,” many of the same deficiencies relating to the supply and distribution of
election materials that occurred during the first poll were reiterated during the runoff. The Carter
mission also reported that an IEC order that tabulation results be publicly displayed at local
precincts was applied in only about half of the locations it monitored.
197
The Center reported that “on the eve of the campaign, Laurent Gbagbo’s spokesman set an early tone, naming
Alassane Ouattara as the instigator of the 1999 coup and 2002 armed forces rebellion. Similar messages had begun to
circulate earlier by SMS and by the screening in several areas of the country of a controversial, and later forbidden,
movie depicting crimes committed during the war ostensibly by Ouattara. The opposition was not exempt from
negative tactics, as both campaigns resorted to name-calling and party supporters from both sides were involved in acts
of violence and intimidation, in some cases, aimed at election observers.” Carter Center, “Statement of Preliminary
Findings and Conclusions,” November 30, 2010. See also “Barrister Affoussy Bamba: ‘Films of Hatred,’ New Forces
Indignant!” [New Forces Statement, November 18, 2010], Cajon Abidjan.net, via OSC, November 2-21, 2010; VOA,
“Supporters of Ivory Coast Candidates Clash,” November 19, 2010, among other press reports on runoff tensions.
198
Multiple Reuters, AP, and AFP reports, November 23-29, 2010.
199
Choi,, “Statement on the Certification …”
200
VOA, “Ivory Coast to Bolster Security for Presidential Run-Off ,” November 22, 2010; and Scott Stearns, “Ivory
Coast’s President Imposes Election Curfew,” VOA, November 26, 2010.

According to the United Nations, voting reportedly generally proceeded peacefully and
transparently, was “generally conducted in a democratic climate;” featured a voter turnout of
81.1%—nearly as high as that during the first round. There reportedly were, however, “some
incidents, which were at times violent;” “isolated disruptions,” including electoral violence; and
irregularities in a small minority of polling places.201 The Carter Center, like the European Union
(EU) observation mission, also reported witnessing acts of “potential voter intimidation in some
five percent of the polling stations visited a higher level than was reported for the first round, and
perhaps a reflection of the hardened tactics of the run-off campaign.” Similarly, its findings stated
that it had received but not witnessed “serious election day irregularities occurred after the close
of polling stations [reported to include]… cases of efforts to obstruct the physical transfer of
ballot boxes and results, the destruction of election materials, and the theft of ballot boxes.” 202
A Contested Runoff
On the runoff polling day, the Gbagbo and Ouattara camps accused one other of orchestrating
electoral irregularities, voter intimidation, or actions aimed at blocking voters from accessing
polls. Some complaints of this nature were confirmed by European Union election observers.203
This outcome was not surprising, even though the vast majority of polling had occurred without
problems. The possibility that the election would be controversial had long been predicted by
analysts, given the longstanding difficulties encountered in conducting a poll, the use of the
slogan “we win or we win” by Gbagbo supporters, and pre-election statements by supporters of
Gbagbo and Ouattara that they would never accept a win by their rival. 204
Many observers believed that Gbagbo would not have agreed to allow voting to occur unless he
felt assured of a win, for example, on the basis that he felt that the opposition would not remain
united during a runoff vote; because he believed that electoral institutions and legal process were
structured in his favor; and a belief the international community, in a desire for an end to the
Ivoirian crisis, might accept some flaws in the polling process. If this analysis is correct, the
current crisis suggests that he miscalculated regarding multiple factors: strong electoral
opposition to his continued incumbency; the strength of international support for the OPA and the
role of U.N. certification vis-à-vis Ivoirian legal processes (i.e., the role of the Constitutional
Council); and the unwillingness of the international community—to date—to alter the election
outcome through a negotiated resolution to the crisis, despite the threat of political violence.205
An early indication that the vote would, in fact, be legally contested emerged the day after
polling, when Gbagbo’s campaign manager announced plans to contest the results in at least three
heavily pro-Ouattara districts in the north.206 On December 1, the Gbagbo campaign formally
201
Choi, “Statement on the Certification …”; see also BBC Monitoring Africa, “Côte d’Ivoire: Ex-rebels Secure
Voting in Abidjan,” transcript of Television Ivoirienne broadcast on November 28, 2010, among other reports.
202
Carter Center, “Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions,” November 30, 2010.
203
Mission d’Observation Electorale en Côte d’Ivoire Union Europeenne [EUEOM], “Un Second Tour Sous Tension,”
[preliminary statement on runoff], November 3, 2010, and other EUEOM statements.
204
Adam Nossiter, “Ensconced in the Presidency, With No Budging in Ivory Coast,” NYT, December 26, 2010. See
also Roland Lloyd Parry, “Two Killed in Fresh I.Coast Election Violence,” AFP, November 28, 2010; and Reuters,
“Candidates Charge Voter Intimidation in Ivory Coast Vote,” NYT, November 29, 2010.
205
Nossiter, “Ensconced…; and Jennifer G. Cooke, The Election Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, December 7, 2010, among others.
206
Pascal Affi N’Guessan, Gbagbo’s campaign manager, was quoted as stating that “according to figures in our
(continued...)

filed five applications for the annulment of the second round of balloting in eight northern
departments “because of serious irregularities in the integrity of the poll.” These related primarily
to allegations of the absence of LMP representatives at the polls, including through acts of
kidnapping or physical obstruction; ballot stuffing; transport of ballot tally sheets by unauthorized
persons; establishment of impediments to voting; a lack of voting booths and of guaranteed secret
suffrage; and the misattribution of unearned or fictitious votes to Ouattara. The Constitutional
Council then reviewed the results and on December 3 overturned the findings of the IEC, as
discussed above, and proclaimed Gbagbo winner of the election. 207
(...continued)
possession, Laurent Gbagbo cannot lose this election.” The Ouattara camp’s equally strong opposite stance was
suggested by an Ouattara lawyer, Chrysostome Blessy, who stated that Gbagbo “cannot win, even by cheating.” Roland
Lloyd Parry, “I.Coast Fears Fresh Violence as Vote Results Roll In,” AFP, November 30, 2010; see also Reuters,
“Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo Rejects Results in 3 Regions,” November 29, 2010.
207
Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision No CI-2010-Ep-34/03-12/CC/SG…

Appendix B. Background to the Crisis
Historical Background
As discussed in the body of this report (see text box “Côte d’Ivoire: Country Overview”), in the
mid-1980s, demands for increased democratization, periodic social unrest, and political tensions
emerged. Long-term cocoa price and production declines, growing national debt, austerity
measures, and pressures on land, in particular new tree cropping land for cocoa, which
contributed to a gradual economic decline in Côte d’Ivoire, helped foster these political
dynamics. While economic decline underpinned these tensions, social competition increasingly
began to be expressed through ethnic, regional, and religious identity. The large, mostly Muslim
populations of immigrant workers and northern Ivoirians resident in the south faced increasing
resistance by southern ethnic groups and the state to their full participation in national civic life
and rights to citizenship. These developments set the stage for subsequent political developments
and contributed to the 2002 rebellion and the years of political impasse that followed.
Bédié Administration
Houphouët, who died in December 1993, was immediately succeeded by the president of
parliament, Henri Konan Bédié. He declared himself president, in accordance with provisions in
the 1990 constitution, even though then-Prime Minister Alassane Dramane Ouattara—a former
World Bank economist who had held his post since it was created in 1990—was widely seen as
Houphouët’s designated successor. Ouattara initially contested Bédié’s succession claim, but
resigned as prime minister after the French government accepted the claim and left the country,
taking up a position as Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. He
remained a key political figure, however. In mid-1994 Ouattara supporters—predominantly
northern Muslims, intellectuals, and young professionals, and defectors from the reformist wing
of the ruling Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI)—formed a new political party, the
Republican Rally (RDR) that became a vehicle for Ouattara’s later return to Ivoirian electoral
politics in 1995. Employing his influence over Houphouët’s PDCI, Bédié began to consolidate his
own power base, in part by replacing Ouattara allies with loyalists, and by assuming the PDCI
chairmanship in1994.
Bédié emphasized the close linkages and sources of continuity between his government and the
system he had inherited from Houphouët, but many observers saw him as a considerably less
effective leader than Houphouët. Bédié also ushered in a transformation of Ivoirian politics that
helped spur the later division of the country. Increasingly, Bédié was accused by critics of
blaming immigrants for many of the country’s problems, and of fueling public anti-immigrant
sentiments. He used these divisions to rally political support, making use of a nationalist ideology
known as Ivoirité. It defined southerners as ‘authentic’ Ivoirians, in opposition to ‘circumstantial’
ones, i.e., northerners and immigrants, and helped initiate the later evolution of ultra-nationalist,
xenophobic political views among some in the south. It also helped fuel increasingly volatile
national politics encompassing electoral competition; military, student, and labor unrest; conflict
over land and residency rights; and periodic mass protests, some violent, over economic and other
issues.

The 1995 Election, Candidate Eligibility, and the Nationality Issue

The Bédié government again increased its power after presidential elections in October 1995,
which were held under a controversial electoral law passed by the PDCI-dominated parliament
just prior to the elections, prompting several mass demonstrations calling for electoral
transparency. Bédié won 95% of the vote, but the electoral process and outcome was vocally
protested by opposition parties, on the grounds that the electoral law had been specifically
engineered to exclude Ouattara. The electoral law barred persons lacking “pure” Ivoirian
parentage and those who had resided abroad during the previous five years from standing as
electoral candidates. Ouattara was disqualified from standing in the poll because he had resided in
the United States while working for the IMF from December 1993, and was of alleged mixed
Burkinabe-Ivoirian descent. The opposition FPI presidential candidate Laurent Gbagbo, for his
part, withdrew from the race, alleging that the electoral process was subject to extensive state
manipulation. Despite continuing ire over the presidential election, the political environment
became less volatile after peaceful legislative elections in November that drew cross-party
participation. The PDCI won a decisive victory, taking 149 of the 175 seats; the remaining ones
were split between the FPI (9) and the RDR (14). The vote showed distinct ethno-regional
divisions in voting patterns, with the RDR gaining and the PDCI losing support in the north,
while Gbagbo’s FPI predominated in the central-west region and the PDCI in urban areas and in
central and western parts of the country.
Bédié continued to pursue efforts to consolidate his power. In January 1996, the cabinet was
shuffled; military General Robert Guéï, who had previously been relieved of his military
command post after being appointed Minister of Employment and Civil Service in October 1995,
was made Minister of Sports. In May 1996, following news reports that there had been a coup
attempt planned by restive soldiers in mid-1995, the army leadership was shaken up. Guéï was
demoted to a minor administrative post because the planned coup was attributed to elements
under his former command. The latter part of Bédié’s tenure was beset by accusations of human
rights abuses associated with security force crackdowns on the opposition; student protests;
economic pressures; and accusations of corruption by domestic critics and donor governments.
In 1998, the National Assembly passed a series of constitutional changes viewed as highly
favorable to the incumbent. They increased executive control of elections, extended the
presidential term of office, and codified in the constitution nationalities laws defining political
candidacy requirements. Candidates were required to be Ivoirian by birth, parentage, and to have
lived continuously in Côte d’Ivoire for ten years prior to running.

Ouattara and the Nationality Issue

The 1998 constitutional changes set the stage for political confrontations and conflict in later years. In late 1998, at
the funeral of Djeny Kobina, the RDR’s founder, Ouattara called for a change in the electoral nationality laws and
announced his intention to run as a presidential candidate in then-upcoming elections in 2000. In August 1999,
Ouattara, who had returned to the country in July and secured a certificate confirming his Ivoirian descent, was
nominated as the RDR presidential candidate. His nomination prompted a public confrontation between the RDR and
the Bédié government. The latter announced its non-acceptance of Ouattara’s claim of nationality, and claimed that it
regarded Ouattara as a person of Burkinabe descent, ineligible to hold public office, and vowed to halt possible
protests on his behalf. Clashes between police and Ouattara supporters followed a late September judicial police
investigation of Ouattara’s citizenship claim.
In October, a court invalidated Ouattara’s nationality certificate, prompting violent protests and detentions of RDR
supporters and several key leaders. In November, the government banned public demonstrations. In December, an
arrest warrant was issued for Ouattara while he was away from the country in France, where he had been vocally
denouncing the government’s actions. The government alleged that he had “forged” his national identity papers. As
political unrest over the Bédié-Ouattara rivalry and the nationality issue grew, the Bédié government faced increasing
opposition from diverse social groups, and became the subject of vocal public criticism over a series of corruption
scandals, on related to the alleged misappropriation of European Union health sector assistance funds. In the latter
half of 1999, popular dissatisfaction with the government grew, in the form of ongoing labor protests related to public
sector wage arrears, salary demands, and criticism of labor policies, student unrest, and military unrest over
conditions of service.
Military Coup of December 1999

Pressures on the Bédié government came to a head when disgruntled soldiers mutinied over pay
and living conditions, commandeering public buildings and firing into the air. The government
quickly promised to meet their demands, but the mutineers then altered their position, demanding
that General Robert Guéï be awarded his former Chief of Staff post, from which he had been
removed by Bédié after refusing to crack down on protesters. Guéï, who had a history of strained
relations with Bédié, had served as former Chief of Staff from 1990 until 1995 and had founded a
rapid commando intervention force that was reportedly at the center of the mutiny, then stepped
in as a “spokesman” for the soldiers on the second day of the mutiny, December 24. He
announced that the mutineers would establish a National Committee of Public Salvation (CNSP),
and that the parliament, government, the Constitutional Council and the Supreme Court were
dissolved.
Guéï promised to maintain respect for democracy, eradicate government corruption, re-
appropriate funds seized in corrupt dealings, rewrite the Constitution, and hold transparent
elections within a year. Bédié, who at first sought refuge in the French embassy, fled to France
after a sojourn in Togo. After negotiations, all major political parties, including Bédié’s PDCI,
agreed top support the “transitional” CNSP junta, which was established in early 2000. It
established a 27-member Consultative Commission on Constitutional and Electoral Matters,
composed of representatives of the main political parties, civil society and labor organizations,
and religious institutions. This entity drafted proposals for a new constitution and electoral code,
which it presented in March 2000 in anticipation of a later referendum on these proposals.
Guéï’s Leadership
As junta leader, Guéï was initially seen as a pro-Ouattara, partly due to Bédié’s opposition to
Ouattara. Many Ivoirians nursed hopes that the Guéï’s administration would bridge the growing
ethno-regional divisions in the country and usher in a rapid transition to transparent constitutional
civilian rule. Guéï’s hoped-for collegial and consensual leadership, however, developed into a

governing style based on top-down commands and a public rhetoric focused on discipline and
order. Personal political ambition also came to define his leadership. He made public statements
replete with grandiose patriotic rhetoric and flattering self-representations, casting himself as the
redeemer of common citizens’ aspirations against the machinations of corrupt politicians, leading
some to label him a narcissist. His leadership increasingly came to be seen as motivated by the
goal of eliminating perceived rivals in the military, weakening the RDR and the potential for a
strong Ouattara candidacy, and getting himself elected into office. In April 2000 he created a
political party, the Rassemblement pour le Consensus National (Rally for National Consensus)
that was expected to support his candidacy.
The Guéï government began a program to issue national identity cards to citizens and resident
permits to foreigners, as a prerequisite for voter registration ahead of elections. The issue was
considered sensitive because it was seen as providing a potential means for the state to exclude
native-born Ivoirians of northern origins and the Ivoirian-born children of immigrants from
participating in the political process. It also would enable officials to formally differentiate
between Ivoirians and non-Ivoirians, a point of controversy because ID checks of persons of
perceived northern origins and foreign West African economic migrants were reportedly often
used to threaten such persons with deportation, refusal of employment, residence, or land rights.
The rule of law also suffered in other ways. In response to public protests against rising crime, the
military undertook to arrest criminals directly, especially targeting organized gangs in Abidjan.
The use of military forces to enforce civilian criminal law, however, reportedly prompted some
members of the military to themselves engage in acts of banditry and highway robbery. Extortion
and harassment reportedly became common at military roadblocks. Military indiscipline was not
limited to soldiers’ public conduct. In March 2000, soldiers mutinied over salary demands;
officers were taken hostage and one base commander was killed.208 In July, troops mutinied over
non-payment of $9,000 allotments that they claimed they had been promised by Guéï after the
coup of the previous December. Soldiers looted, stole vehicles and weapons, and paralyzed
commerce and public services in Abidjan and the secondary cities of Bouaké and Korhogo. The
uprising was violently crushed by the gendarmerie following imposition of a curfew and after the
negotiation of a far lower allotment payment. Only a fraction of the promised payment was
subsequently made, due to government insolvency, and over 50 of hundreds of mutineers were
court marshaled. Urban infrastructure damage due to the rebellion was extensive.
Key Political Developments in 2000

In July 2000, constitutional changes were approved by an 87% margin in a referendum that
featured a 57% voter participation rate. While northerners voted strongly (68%) against the
changes, a widespread boycott of the vote in the north meant that voter turnout in that region was
low. The provisions required that both parents of presidential candidates be Ivoirian-born citizens;
previously only one parent had been required to be of Ivoirian birth. Also in July, an RDR party
event was halted by security forces and an RDR demonstration in support of French statements
cautioning against the exclusion of candidates was broken up. As the year proceeded, harassment
of Muslims and northerners by security officials reportedly increased. In August, Guéï launched a
failed bid to become the PDCI presidential candidate, and he later announced plans to run as a
“people’s candidate.” Later in August, RDR supporters and their opponents clashed after security
208
Nicholas Phythian, “Ivoirian Coup Left Legacy of Army Insubordination,” Reuters, March 30, 2000.

forces halted an RDR demonstration, and elections slated for September were postponed until
October.
As the election drew nearer, public security deteriorated. Harassment of immigrants by security
forces reportedly increased. In September, the High Council of Imams (CSI) and National Islamic
Council (CNI) warned that unfair restrictions on electoral eligibility would result in social unrest.
They also condemned official harassment of northerners and Muslims, and later called for a
boycott of the election, after Ouattara was excluded. During pre-poll voter registration,
nationality documentation restrictions prevented many northerners from registering as new
voters. On September 18, an attack on Guéï’s residence was suppressed. The attack, a putative
attempted putsch and assassination by members of the military and his own presidential guard,
was suspected by some observers to be have been mounted by Guéï himself as a pretext to purge
the military of perceived opponents and undercut political opposition to his candidacy. After the
incident, a state of emergency was declared and political meetings were banned, and a number of
predominantly northern soldiers were arrested; some were reportedly summarily executed, while
others reportedly were tortured.
In October, the Supreme Court, headed by Tia Kone, a former personal legal advisor to Guéï,
declared 14 of 19 prospective presidential candidates ineligible to run, including six PDCI
candidates. Included among them was Bédié and the PDCI’s official presidential nominee, Emile
Bombet, due to embezzlement allegations in both cases, and Ouattara. Only Guéï and the FPI’s
Gbagbo, along with three minor candidates, were allowed to run. Guéï opponents claimed that the
Supreme Court should also have banned Guéï’s candidacy because military law required him to
resign from the military six months prior to the election. Guéï had not met that requirement, and
when a newspaper reporter raised the question in an article, the reporter was beaten by the
presidential guard. A similar legal question was raised in relation to the candidacy of Gbagbo,
whose status as a state employee may have made him technically ineligible to run.
October 2000 Election

After further electoral controversies, including a suspension of U.S. and European Union (EU)
election aid and a call by the RDR and PDCI for an election boycott, polling was held on October
22. Extensive violence, which revealed how deep-seated ethno-regional and religious divisions
had become, followed the poll. On October 23, the FPI, claiming that the election had been rigged
by Guéï and that Gbagbo had won, initiated large street protests, which were joined by elements
of the security forces. In the face of Gbagbo’s claim to victory, Ouattara and the RDR demanded
that the election be re-run. This demand prompted clashes between FPI and RDR supporters,
resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries. Gbagbo’s victory was ratified days later
by the Supreme Court, which awarded him 53% of the vote. The clashes quickly took on an
ethnic and religious tone; Muslim neighborhoods, seen as hotbeds of RDR support, were attacked
by FPI supporters, and several mosques were damaged or destroyed, as was a church in
retaliation. Many members of the security forces joined in these attacks, and were later accused of
human rights abuses after 57 bodies were later discovered in Yopougon, an area outside Abidjan.
All of the victims, later identified as northern Muslims, had been shot at close range. At least 18
bodies were also pulled from the lagoon surrounding Abidjan soon after the FPI-RDR clashes.
Some of these victims were reported to have been Gbagbo supporters fired upon by members of
the presidential guard as they marched on the presidential compound. Some were reportedly
forced to jump off bridges, where many drowned. Less extensive incidents of election unrest also
occurred in several secondary cities.

Gbagbo’s Rise to Power: Analysis

Many analyses of the 200 election and the political developments preceding it interpreted Gbagbo’s win as a reflection
of Guéï’s weaknesses as a leader who had come to power by circumstance, when restive troops agreed to accept his
leadership, and who was subsequently blinded by a magnanimous self-view. According such views, Guéï was not
politically astute, and did not understand the import of the political events taking place around him—especially the
rhetoric and actions of Gbagbo, who he initially appeared to view as an ally against Ouattara and the RDR. Guéï was
reportedly convinced that he was the subject of machinations by a northerners aiming to grab power at his expense,
and later by the FPI and the PDCI and their core southern ethnic constituencies. Early in his tenure Guéï had initiated
a purge of northerners in the military, and later ended the participation of the RDR in the CNSP junta, while FPI and
the PDCI were more fully incorporated into the CNSP, while the number of public political attacks on Ouattara on
the basis of his citizenship grew. These developments appeared to strengthen Gbagbo’s hand, leaving him as the most
prominent national civilian candidate for president following the October 7 Supreme Court decision barring 14 of 19
candidates.
Some news reports suggested that Gbagbo and Guéï had agreed on a deal in which Gbagbo would become president
of parliament if he lost. Guéï’s weak political base, however, allowed Gbagbo to win the poll, in the wake of which
Guéï reportedly claimed to have been double crossed by Gbagbo. Analysis of the election and the preceding 10
months of junta rule, however, suggests that Guéï likely underestimated Gbagbo’s political ambition and his prowess
as a political operator and orchestrator of political pressure through mass protest action. While the participation of
Gbagbo’s FPI in the CNSP junta may have suggested to Guéï that Gbagbo was an ally, Gbagbo, a former union activist,
had been a key leader of large cross-party coalition street protests against the government that had been instrumental
in moving Côte d’Ivoire toward a multi-party system. Under his leadership, the FPI had been one of the first
opposition parties to organize against Houphouët, against whom Gbagbo ran in the 1990, winning 18% of the vote.
Similarly, the FPI’s coalition with RDR in 1995 to protest the structuring of electoral system in favor of the ruling
party showed him to be a shrewd but expedient political deal maker who was willing to make and break alliances to
meet his political goals.
Gbagbo’s win in 2000 can also be attributed to his skill as a political strategist. The FPI was well organized during the
October 2000 election, and was the only major party to run a candidate. The FPI deployed monitors at many polling
places, and was able to accurately track vote returns prior to the release of official results, giving legitimacy to its
claim to have won around 60% of the vote, despite electoral irregularities—including the abduction of the country’s
chief electoral officer during the vote tabulation. Gbagbo appeared to anticipate the Guéï junta’s attempt to
manipulate the election results, and when Guéï tried to claim victory, Gbagbo was able to counter his actions, cite
poll evidence allowing him represent himself as the legitimate election winner, and then rapidly mount forceful street
protests to support his claims, ultimately causing the junta to fall. His party’s domination of the course of post-
election election events, before other opposition parties could do the same, allowed Gbagbo to claim victory and
then capitalize upon it as a fait accompli. The RDR and the PDCI could do little except either accept an offer by
Gbagbo for them to join his government—or to reject it and risk being frozen out of power. The RDR, the party of
Ouattara, Gbagbo’s most prominent rival, eventually accepted Gbagbo’s election, but did not agree to join the
government, in contrast to the other two main parties, the PDCI and the PIT.
While Gbagbo was able to accede to the presidency, his win can be attributed mainly to popular resentment toward
and repudiation of the Guéï junta, rather than overwhelming political support for himself, and as a product of a flawed
electoral process of which he was the chance beneficiary. The election was widely seen as illegitimate in light of the
pre-poll prohibition on the candidacy of 14 of 19 presidential contenders—including of the two major parties,
representing an estimated 75% of the electorate in previous elections—in response to which large portions of the
electorate boycotted the poll. Only 35% of the total electorate reportedly voted, which implied that Gbagbo’s 53%
electoral margin win effectively meant that he was elected with the support of only about 19% of the total national
electorate. In addition, the pre-election process had been replete with a variety of problems, including technically
electoral preparation failures, extensive harassment of RDR supporters, and disenfranchisement of voters through
voter registration barriers and administrative inefficiencies, and polling day was marred by violence and reports that
soldiers had forced civilians to mark ballot papers in favor of Guéï. As a result of the thinness of his electoral mandate
and because the 2000 election was widely viewed as having been manipulated by the Guéï junta and plagued by pre-
poll and polling day irregularities, the legitimacy of Gbagbo’s election was arguably open to question from the day he
was elected.

Gbagbo Government Takes Power

The new government faced a number of immediate tasks that required Gbagbo to rapidly
transition from being an opposition leader whose legitimacy derived from his position as an
outsider and popular street activist to becoming a national leader capable of integrating the
diverse and conflicting interests of a divided nation. First, the government had to launch a
credible investigation into responsibility for the deaths during the elections—especially the cases
of summary mass execution.209 Its other most important immediate task was to hold a free and
fair legislative election, and to prove that the FPI was not a minority party, as its detractors
claimed, while the former ruling party, the PDCI, was under pressure to demonstrate that it
remained a viable party.
The legislative election was held with decidedly mixed success, primarily related to Ouattara’s
disqualification as a parliamentary candidate by the Supreme Court, on the basis that his
nationality certificate was technically invalid. Ouattara’s RDR boycotted the polls, rejecting what
it called the Gbagbo’s “sham reconciliation process,” and mounted protests. The RDR’s actions
had a significant effect. In Abidjan, large and violent RDR protests were held. In the north,
prefectures and constabulary stations were attacked, and the vote was widely boycotted.
Ouattara’s disqualification prompted international concern over the poll’s validity, and major
international organizations and donor governments did not deploy election monitoring missions.
Despite such obstacles, voting went smoothly nationwide, except in the north, where elections
could be held in only four of 32 electoral districts, due to attacks on election equipment and the
subjection of election officials to intimidation. In the south, by contrast, voting was peaceful but
the turnout rate was low, at about 34%. A by-election was held in the north in January 2001.
While calls by the RDR for another boycott resulted in very high abstention rate (about 87%), the
poll went forward peacefully, in part due to close supervision and heavy security, despite being
held in a tense atmosphere one week after an attempted coup.
Despite rising political tensions and social cleavages, in 2001 and 2002 there were signs that Côte
d’Ivoire was beginning to make limited progress toward national reconciliation and political
compromise. In late 2001, a National Reconciliation Forum, in which all of the major parties,
constituencies, and key leaders participated, was organized by the government. It focused on
barriers toward national unity, governance, civil-military relations, immigration, and ethno-
regional and religious divisions.
September 2002 Rebellion

Guarded optimism by many over the country’s prospects was undermined on September 19,
2002, when a military rebellion quickly turned into an attempted coup d’état against the
government while Gbagbo was on an official visit to Italy. The rebels, made up of units of
aggrieved soldiers, predominantly of northern ethnic origins, were opposed by loyalist units,
predominantly southern in their ethnic makeup.210 Although a military takeover of the key
209
This it did with mixed success. Although the government steadily increased its estimates of deaths, launched
inquiries into these human rights abuses, and welcomed foreign inquiries into such issues, several of these inquiries
faltered, and issued no substantive findings. In addition, when eight gendarmes were tried by a military tribunal for the
Yopougon killings, they were acquitted due to lack of evidence and because intimidated witnesses refused to testify in
the proceedings. Human Rights Watch, The New Racism: The Politics of Ethnicity in Côte d’Ivoire, August 28, 2001.
210
The rebellion was initially reported to be motivated by military pay grievances and working conditions. In
particular, a group of about 750 rank-and-file soldiers, who had been recruited by Guéï, were reportedly concerned over
(continued...)

government institutions and facilities was prevented by loyalist forces, the insurrection rapidly
broadened an existing national fissure between north and south. During the initial uprising, Guéï
was killed under unclear circumstances.
After clashes with loyalists near the commercial capital, Abidjan, and elsewhere, the rebel units
gradually withdrew to the central city of Bouaké and from there rapidly took control of over half
of the country. They then formed a political organization called the Patriotic Movement of Côte
d’Ivoire (MPCI, after the French), and began to articulate a political agenda and lay out demands,
and reportedly appointed provincial governors. The MPCI took control of local administration in
northern rebel-held territory, and civil and commercial life reportedly resumed a relatively routine
character after being disrupted by population shifts and displacements. The provision of social
services, however, sharply declined under rebel administration, and never recovered fully.
Periodic, sometimes fierce fighting ensued, as the government unsuccessfully attempted to retake
towns along the north-south dividing line. The MPCI also allied itself with two small rebel groups
in western Côte d’Ivoire. The groups, which reportedly included many Liberians and Sierra
Leonean combatants, announced their existence in November 2002 by seizing several towns in
the west. In late 2002, early 2003, and periodically since, the west has been the scene of armed
clashes over territory; communal violence related to immigrants’ land and residency rights; and
criminal armed violence. International peacekeepers also clashed with the western rebels in the
first several years after the rebellion.
Peace Mediation
The country remained divided and often tense in the years after the uprising, but military conflict
generally subsided after 2002, with some notable exceptions (e.g., periodic but localized armed
conflict in the west; occasional ceasefire line provocations; and a brief resumption of warfare in
late 2004). International conflict mediation efforts, notably by ECOWAS, began soon after the
rebellion, but made little progress until early 2003, when a French-brokered peace accord, the
Linas-Marcoussis Accord (LMA), was signed. It allowed Gbagbo to remain in power, but
provided for the creation of an interim government of national reconciliation (GNR) under a
“consensus” prime minister. The LMA charged the GNR with preparing for presidential elections
in 2005 and reforming the armed forces with external aid to ensure ethnic and regional balance in
the military. It required the disarming of all armed forces, the expulsion of foreign mercenaries,
and the creation of an international LMA monitoring group. An LMA annex set out a roadmap for
resolving key issues underlying the crisis. It called for reform of electoral candidacy and
citizenship eligibility rules, the electoral system, and land tenure and press laws; creation of a
human rights abuse panel; and freedom of movement and post-war economic recovery planning.
(...continued)
their anticipated dismissal by Gbagbo. This group of soldiers, known as the zinzin (crazy ones) and the bahéfoué
(sorcerers), had previously staged several protests. Several rebel leaders were members of a more politically motivated,
generally pro-Ouattara group of army officers who had deserted and taken refuge in Burkina Faso after being accused
of treasonous intents by Guéï. The northern rebels appeared to enjoy substantial popular support, and were joined by
volunteers and by traditional hunter-warriors known as dozo.

No War, No Peace
The LMA was immediately opposed—vocally and with violence, including assaults on French-
owned businesses and homes—by partisans of Gbagbo’s FPI party and elements of the military
and government. They asserted that it ceded too much power and made too many other
concessions to the rebels. Gbagbo, under pressure to repudiate the LMA, indicated that he had
signed it reluctantly under intense foreign pressure. These and later remarks hindered
implementation of the LMA, which was later amended by a series of internationally mediated
accords, though its basic provisions remained a keystone of most of these later agreements.

Factors Underlying the Rebellion

According to many analysts, the 2002 rebellion was initiated as a military protest over working conditions, pay, and
manpower reductions, but turned into a coup d’état by dissatisfied elements in the military. It is possible, however,
that the rebellion’s organizers planned to oust the Gbagbo government and simply used military terms-of-service
grievances as a subterfuge to disguise their real intentions. Even after having seized control of much of the north,
however, the rebels appeared to lack a political justification for their actions, suggesting that the political dimensions
of their efforts first crystallized after they had taken control. On the other hand, the rebels’ ability to mount a rapid,
coordinated, nationwide military action suggests that significant planning may have preceded the rebellion.
While the origins of the rebellion continue to be debated, once it had occurred, it provided a vehicle for the
expression of grievances and political demands associated with or spurred by a wide range of interdependent and
long-standing phenomena. These include:
• Long-term economic decline related to decreasing commodity prices for Côte d’Ivoire’s key export
commodities, cocoa and coffee (despite later price increases);
• Cocoa production problems, including aging tree stocks, declining access to new crop land, a continuing need for
reinvestment in the sector; corruption in the cocoa parastatal sector; and a restructuring of the cocoa marketing
system, which was liberalized in 1999;211
• Ethno-regional competition and conflict related to diverse factors, including shrinking access to arable land,
farming and residence rights, competition over employment opportunities, especially in the southern cocoa
belt—both between Ivoirians and foreigners, and between native Ivoirian groups.212 Such conflicts generated
rising ethnic chauvinism and widened the currency of populist, xenophobic political rhetoric and support for
activities carried out by militant nationalists;
• Military interference in civilian affairs and governance;
• Public corruption;
• National political leadership rivalries, in some cases reportedly aggravated by inter-personal hostilities;
• Long-term struggles over democratization, rights of political participation and expression, and conflict over
national identity and rights of citizenship;
• Periodic labor and military protests related to salary payment arrears and working conditions; and
• Student unrest related to a variety of factors, such as student assistance, democratization, and electoral politics.
Although influenced by multiple factors, one of the primary grievances cited by those in the rebel north was their
marginalization within and exclusion from the political process, most notably in relation to the repeated denial of
candidate eligibility rights to Ouattara, the most prominent politician of northern ethnic origins. Although the rebels
asserted that they were fighting for the rights of all Ivoirians—and not on behalf of northerners vis-à-vis southerners
or Ouattara specifically—Ouattara’s repeated exclusion had long fueled northerners’ political grievances and sense of
disenfranchisement, and was a key factor underpinning the rebellion’s durability.
From early 2003 through early 2007, the two sides endeavored to implement the provisions of the
LMA and subsequent peace agreements by pursuing a range of political and legal reform
processes and reaching various agreements to achieve military and militia disarmament and
demobilization. Focal issues included the sequence and manner in which disarmament, voter
registration, citizen identification, and elections would take place; the content of proposed laws
aimed at implementing the key provisions of the LMA and other agreements, and the manner in
211
Daniel Balint-Kurti, “IMF Mission Favors Raising Ivoirian Cocoa Export Tax,” Dow Jones Commodities Service,
August 16, 2002.
212
There are long-standing conflicts, for instance, between local Bété farmers and Baoulé cocoa farmers who gradually
moved west and cleared new forest areas to plant new cocoa crops after exhausting soil resources in their home areas.
Similarly, tensions between the between the Bété of the southwest—Gbagbo’s ethnic group—and the Yacouba, the
ethnic group of former military leader general Robert Guéï, increased after the rebellion.

which they would be enacted; and differences over the scope and exercise of presidential
authority.
These efforts were overseen and sometimes led by two consensus prime ministers. The first was
Seydou Diarra, appointed in 2003 after the LMA was signed. Charles Konan Banny succeeded
Diarra in December 2005 after a crisis over delayed national elections and an internationally
endorsed, non-electoral extension of Gbagbo’s tenure in office for a year. During this period,
notably under Banny’s tenure, talks and other cooperative efforts between the opposed parties
sometimes resulted in significant progress toward the key goals set forth in the various peace
accords. Such progress was, however, often interspersed with and undercut by political
backtracking and obstructionism by one or both parties, political gridlock, and frequent
accusations by one or both sides charging their opponent with undermining progress toward
peace, often spurred by incendiary political rhetoric and partisan journalism. Similarly, mediation
efforts by external governments or U.N. officials, while sometimes nominally successful, were
often criticized by one or both sides as being biased.
Armed conflict briefly flared on several occasions, most notably in November 2004, when a
government attempt to attack the north was repulsed by French and U.N. troops. This effort
included an air attack on a French base (see text box “France’s Military Presence in Côte
d’Ivoire” in body of report). Mass protests, sometimes including violent mob actions,
subsequently periodically punctuated the conflict. The political division of the country also led to
breakdowns in law and order, frequent impunity for security officials accused of human rights
abuses and other crimes, and a rise in corruption.
Due to the weak rule of law, local officials on both sides of the conflict reportedly gained access
to and at times diverted official revenues. Such funding sources have taken the form of official
taxes and fees and illicit, extortion-based payments, from such sources as domestic and
international trade in goods, travelers, state-controlled firms; agricultural commodity sales,
notably in the key cocoa sector; and illicit diamond exports. Access to such revenue streams was
long seen as undermining political support for a quick resolution of the conflict.
International Peacekeeping Role

The international community supported the LMA and later subsidiary agreements, notably
through resolutions by the U.N. Security Council. The Council first endorsed the LMA in early
2003, when it authorized two peacekeeping force deployments, one French and one by the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), dubbed ECOMICI. They were
charged with helping to implement the LMA and a May 2003 ceasefire accord; resolving the
conflict; guaranteeing their own security and freedom of movement; and protecting civilians. In
May 2003, after fighting in the west, the Security Council created a U.N. Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
(MINUCI), a political and military monitoring mission. In early 2004, the Security Council
authorized the U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), which took over MINUCI’s mandate
and incorporated the ECOMICI forces in April 2004; see textbox entitled “UNOCI” for more
information on the mission.
Peace Process of 2007

A new peace accord, the Ouagadougou Agreement, was signed in March 2007 after opposition
party-backed talks mediated by Burkina Faso’s president between President Gbagbo and FN

leader Guillaume Soro. The accord was preceded in 2006 by halting progress toward citizen
identification; voter registration; disarmament; and some other elements of the peace process, but
also by marked tension over these processes and between President Gbagbo and Prime Minister
Banny in the wake of an imported toxic waste dumping scandal. Such tension also arose over the
two leaders’ conflicting claims regarding their peace process implementation decision-making
powers, notably after the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1721, which recognized
Banny’s broad power to implement the peace process, but did not, according to Gbagbo’s
interpretation, reduce Gbagbo’s constitutional authorities.
The 2007 accord superseded but incorporated all earlier agreements. Under its provisions, FN
leader Guillaume Soro became foreign minister. The accord also renewed and amended processes
for conducting citizen identification, voter registration, elections (but mandated no election
deadline), and provided for the formation of a new transitional government; laid out procedures
for disarmament and a merging of the FN and the government military-security structures;
created a youth civic service, a political party code of conduct, and an accord monitoring organ
made up of the leaders of the top political parties; re-established state structures and authority
nation-wide; and requested the lifting of U.N. sanctions and a reduced role for international
peacekeepers, who were to be gradually replaced in certain areas by the newly merged security
forces. While many of the accord’s provisions were fulfilled, most notably the conduct of the
2010 presidential election, many key elements remain significantly unimplemented. International
reaction to the accord was generally positive but cautionary. While welcome as an Ivorian
solution to an Ivorian conflict, it gave substantial leeway to presidential authority, which was
viewed as potentially leading to contention over accord implementation, especially since it
reduced the international political and military role in the peace process, provided no sanctions
for implementation failures, and empowered only the four leading political parties.

Appendix C. Acronym Table

Table C-1. Acronyms Used in This Report
(Some from the French, per common usages)
Acronym Descriptor
AfDB African Development Bank

AI Amnesty International
AUC AU Commission
West African Communauté Financière de l’Afrique franc, a Euro-backed West
CFA
African regional currency
CNCA National Council of Audiovisual Communication, a broadcast media regulator
CNSP National Committee of Public Salvation
COSOPCI Civil Society Coalition for Peace and Democratic Development in Côte d’Ivoire
CSCI Convention of Civil Society of Côte d’Ivoire
DDR Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DRL State Department Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Bureau
ECOMICI ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire, a 2003 military intervention force
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EO Executive Order 13396
ERMA Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance
ESF Economic Support Fund
EU European Union
FLGO Front for the Liberation of the Great West
Forces Nouvelles (New Forces), the northern rebel movement; formerly the
FN
MPCI
FPI Ivorian Popular Front; political party of Laurent Gbagbo
FRLCI Force de Résistance et de Libération de la Côte d’Ivoire
GHCS Global Health and Child Survival
GNR Government of National Reconciliation
GNU Government of National Unity
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICC Integrated Command Centre
ICC International Criminal Court
IDPs Internally displaced persons
IEC Independent Electoral Commission
IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IMF International Monetary Fund
LMA Linas-Marcoussis Accord, initial north-south peace accord signed in 2003

Acronym Descriptor
Presidential Majority (La Majorité Presidentielle), a political party coalition

LMP formed to support Gbagbo during the November 28, 2010 presidential run-off
vote
U.N. Mission in Côte d’Ivoire, a 2003-2004 U.N. military monitoring and
MINUCI
political mission
Movement for the Liberation of the Peoples of Abobo-Anyama, a pro-
MLP-2A
Ouattara, Abidjan-based militia
MPCI Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire
NDI National Democratic Institute
NED National Endowment for Democracy
NGOs Nongovernmental organization
NSC National Security Council (U.S.)
ONI National Identification Office
OPA Ouagadougou Political Agreement of 2007, the most recent peace agreement
PDCI Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire, political party of Henri Konan Bédié
PRM Population, Refugees, and Migration Bureau of the State Department
PSC Peace and Security Council of the African Union
RDR Rally of the Republicans, political party of Alassane Ouattara
Houphouëtist Rally for Democracy and Peace, anti-Gbagbo opposition political
RHDP
party coalition
RTI Radiodiffision Télévision Ivorienne, the state broadcaster
SRSG Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General’s
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission
U.N. United Nations
UDPCI Union for Democracy and Peace in Côte d’Ivoire, an opposition political party
UEMOA West African Economic and Monetary Union
UK United Kingdom
UNHCR U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIL U.N. Mission in Liberia
UNOCI U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
UNSC U.N. Security Council
UNSG U.N. Secretary-General
WFP World Food Program

Author Contact Information
Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
ncook@crs.loc.gov, 7-0429

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Côte d’Ivoire’s Post-Election Crisis

March 29, 2011

Congressional Research Service

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Appendix C. Acronym Table ..................................................................................................... 72

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Introduction and Implications for the United States

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Côte d’Ivoire: Country Background

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Competing Electoral Victory Claims

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U.N. Certification of Election Process

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International Recognition of Ouattara Resisted by Gbagbo

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France’s Military Presence in Côte d’Ivoire

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Political Tension and Violence

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governments involved in monitoring, vetting, or helping to administer the electoral process.

Casualties and Rising Threat Level

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Chronology: Key Events Leading to the Current Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire

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Violence Escalates and the Threat of War Rises

Such groups, including an ultra-nationalist, frequently xenophobic pro-Gbagbo youth group

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Foreigners have also become an increasing target of pro-Gbagbo supporters angered by

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An additional possible harbinger of resurgence of military conflict were reports of possible

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Threats to International Mandates and Accountability

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Humanitarian Effects and Responses

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U.S. Humanitarian Assistance

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International Multilateral and Bilateral Responses

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participation in the organization “until further notice.” 71 On December 9, the AU Commission

Following a December 18 statement by a U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Department spokesman

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AU and ECOWAS: Mediation Missions Prior to the High-Level Panel

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AU High-Level Panel Recommendations 86

AU Panel Recommendations: Prospects and Significance

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