NATRES CASES

Oposa v. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993)

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing
their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against
Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered
ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or
appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.”
They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut
and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of
the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors
and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to
“prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests.”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the
future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.

Concerned Citizens vs. MMDA (G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008)
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several government agencies,
among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the
Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen
way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically PD 1152. Respondents, as
plaintiffs, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the
RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the defendant-government

agencies to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the cleaning of specific
pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Apart from raising concerns
about the lack of funds, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is
not a ministerial act, which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the
cleanup of specific pollution incidents?
(2) Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up and
rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

RULING:
(1) No. PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned
ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations
when a specific pollution incident occurs. The underlying duty to upgrade the quality
of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding

petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot
escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the
Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.
(2) Yes, petitioners may be compelled. The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste
disposal is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in
its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be
characterised as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power
or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their
judgment or conscience.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the conclusion that
these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform
certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation,
protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not
to perform these duties.

The petition is DENIED.

Carino vs. Insular Government (212 U.S. 449,1909)

FACTS:
An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held
the land as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs.
There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for registration.
The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under the
Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit
private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the
Regalian Doctrine.

RULING:
Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land. The
United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:

“It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or
memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the
Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.” There is an existence of native
title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of
ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish
Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia

Cruz vs. NCIP (G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000)

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus
as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail
certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well
as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA,
there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as
owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large
scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title,
which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from
the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their
ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.

Maynilad vs Secretary of the DENR, G.R. Nos. 202897/206823/207969, August 6,

2019
FACTS:
The Regional Office of DENR charged Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS) and its concessionaires for violation of and non-compliance with
Section 8 of the Clean Water Act for failing to provide, install, operate, and maintain
adequate Wastewater Treatment Facilities (WWTFs) for the sewerage system.

MWSS averred their compliance with the law while Maynilad and Manila Water
asserted the supremacy of the Concession Agreement/s executed with MWSS. They
also cited Section 7 of Clean Water Act, which first requires the DPWH to prepare
and effect a national program on sewerage and septage management to guide the
MWSS and/or its concessionaires in implementing the law.

The Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (SENR) ruled in favour of the
DENR citing the ruling in the case of MMDA vs. Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay, that “strict compliance with the Clean Water Act is a necessary given, and the
five-year periodic view stipulated in the Agreements between petitioners should have
considered and factored in the requirements of the Clean Water Act.

The CA agreed with the SENR in holding the water concessionaires accountable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in its decision and order for petitioners to comply with
the provisions of the Clean Water Act.

RULING:
No. The SC agreed with the CA and told MWSS and its water concessionaires to stop
making excuses. The Highest Court noted: “the meat of this case is the fact of delay
(the petitioners) in complying with the mandate under Section 8 whereas the matter
involved in MMDA vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay is the urgency of
rehabilitation of Manila Bay.”

The SC rectifies the assumption that the case of Maynilad v. DENR amended Section
8 of the Clean Water Act, discussing the concessionaires’ delayed compliance past the
effectivity of the Clean Air Law, which the petitioners failed to notify the Congress.
Petitioners cannot alter the law and court instruction by mere stipulation in the private
contract. To hold these entities accountable, the SC introduced the Public trust
doctrine which holds that specific natural resources belong to all and cannot be
privately owned or controlled because of their inherent importance to each individual
and society.

Resident Marine Mammals of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape v. Reyes, GR.
No. 18077/181527, April 21, 2015
FACTS:
This case arose when DOE and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. Ltd. (JAPEX)
entered into an agreement for the exploration, development and production of
petroleum resources at the offshore of Tanon Strait. The Resident Marine Mammals,
through the Stewards, “claimed” that they have the legal standing to file this action
since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit. Citing Oposa
v. Factoran, Jr., they asserted their right to sue for the faithful performance of
international and municipal environmental laws created in their favor and for their
benefit. In this regard, they propounded that they have the right to demand that they
be accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral international instruments that
the Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.
The Stewards contended that there should be no question of their right to represent the
Resident Marine Mammals as they have stakes in the case as forerunners of a
campaign to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait and as
stewards of the environment since the primary steward, the Government, had failed in
its duty to protect the environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine. They also
contended that the Court may lower the benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of
epistolary jurisdiction. Public respondents argued that the Resident Marine Mammals
have no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an
action to be either natural or juridical persons. They also contested the applicability of
Oposa, pointing out that the petitioners therein were all natural persons, albeit some of
them were still unborn.

As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenged their claim of
legal standing on the ground that they are representing animals, which cannot be
parties to an action. Moreover, the public respondents argued that the Stewards are not
the real parties-in-interest for their failure to show how they stand to be benefited or
injured by the decision in this case. Since the petition was not brought in the name of
a real party-in-interest, it should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the counsel serving as stewards have standing in the protection of the
Marine Mammals in the subject Agreement.

RULING:
Ruling in favor of the petitioners. The Supreme Court held that inanimate objects are
sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a fiction found useful
for maritime purposes. The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an
acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary corporation is a
“person” for purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it represents proprietary,
spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes. So it should be as respects valleys, alpine
meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even
air that feels the destructive pressures of modern technology and modem life. The
river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes—fish,
aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals,
including man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its
life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those
people who have a meaningful relation to that body of water—whether it be a
fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger—must be able to speak for the values
which the river represents and which are threatened with destruction. The primary
reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and
inanimate objects standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in
bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be
either natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates
the action to be brought in the name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a
representative, viz.: Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the
effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently
held that rules of procedure “may be retroactively applied to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in
rules of procedure.” Elucidating on this doctrine, the Court, in Systems Factors
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission (399 Phil. 721 (2000) held that:
“Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do
not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of
statutes. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable
to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent.” Moreover, even before the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, the Court had already taken a
permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, the
Court allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn “based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned.” Furthermore, the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty
to refrain from impairing the environment. In light of the foregoing, the need to give
the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules,
which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties
in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The
Stewards, Ramos and Eisma Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be
possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals,
are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.

Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc, G.R. No.
189185, August 16, 2016
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of
2007 which imposes a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all
agricultural entities within Davao City. Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the said
ordinance and took effect on March 23, 2007 after its publication in the newspaper
Mindanao Pioneer which after 3 months shall be strictly enforced.

Then the Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two
of its members filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the
ordinance.The residents living within and adjacent to banana plantations in Davao
City led by Wilfredo Mosqueda, joined by other residents of Davao City, (Mosqueda,
et al.) submitted their Motion for Leave to Intervene and Opposition to the Issuance of
a Preliminary Injunction.

The RTC then declared the Ordinance valid and constitutional. PBGEA, et al.
appealed and the reversed the judgment of the RTC. The City of Davao and the
intervenors filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but the CA denied the
motions.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Ordinance 0309-01 is unconstitutional on due process and equal
protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive.

RULING:
Yes. Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause

Equal protection neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things
without distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which
it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal
protection envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. In
other words, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2)
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
equally applicable to all members of the class. The total ban on aerial spraying runs
afoul with the equal protection clause because it does not classify which substances
are prohibited from being applied aerially even as reasonable distinctions should be
made in terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial effects of liquid substances to the
public health, livelihood and the environment.

Merida vs PP, G.R. No. 158182, June 12, 2008

FACTS:
A certain Tansiongco discovered that Sesinando Merida cut a narra tree in his private
land, the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to the punong barangay
who summoned petitioner to a meeting. During that meeting, Merida made
extrajudicial admissions that he did cut the tree but claimed that he did so with the
permission of one Vicar Calix, who, he alleges, bought the Mayod Property from
Tansiongco. Tansiongco again reported the matter, this time with the DENR. Merida
made the same extrajudicial admissions. Tansiongco filed a complaint with the
Provincial Prosecutor charging Merida with violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705.
The Prosecutor found probable cause and filed the information with the trial court.
The trial court found Merida guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s judgment.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case considering that it was
filed by private individual and not by a DENR forest officer.
(2) Whether Merida is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705

RULING:
(1) Yes. The trial court acquired jurisdiction. According to the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the list of cases which must be initiated by the complainant does
not include cases concerning Section 68 of PD No. 705. Moreover, “Section 80 of PD
No. 705 does not prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint before any
qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended.”
(2) Yes. Merida is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705. Merida constantly
represented to the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property.
Therefore, his extrajudicial admissions are binding on him.

Momongan vs Judge Omipon, AM No. MTJ-93-874, March 14, 1995

FACTS:
Dionisio Golpe was apprehended by police officers while he was driving his truck
loaded with illegally cut lumber. It was later found that a certain Basilio Cabig owned
the logs. Thus, a complaint was filed against him. Judge Rafael Omipon, the
respondent in this case, “found that a prima facie case exists against Cabig but he
ordered the release of the truck inasmuch as the owner/driver, Golpe, was not charged
in the complaint.” Augustus Momongan, the Regional Director of the DENR, filed the
present complaint against Judge Omipon alleging that his order releasing the truck
used in the transport of illegally cut forest products violated Section 68 and 68-A of
PD No. 705 and AO No. 59, Series of 1990. Momongan further claims that Judge
Omipon is devoid of authority to release the truck despite the non-inclusion of Golpe
in the complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether Judge Omipon had authority to release the assailed truck and thus be free
from any disciplinary sanction.

RULING:
Yes. Judge Omipon had the authority to order the release of the truck. Although the
DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representatives have the power to confiscate
any illegally obtained or gathered forest products and all conveyances used in the
commission of the offense, based on Section 68-A of PD No. 705 and AO No. 59, this
power is in relation to the administrative jurisdiction of the DENR. The act of Judge
Omipon of releasing the truck did not violate PD No. 705 and AO No. 59 because his
act did not render nugatory the administrative authority of the DENR Secretary. “The
confiscation proceedings under Administrative Order No. 59 is different from the
confiscation under the Revised Penal Code, which is an additional penalty imposed in
the event of conviction.” Momongan assails that Judge Omipon should have turned
over the truck to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO). Judge Omipon however had no mandatory duty to do so, and should
therefore not be visited with disciplinary action.

Provident Tree Farms, Inc. Vs Hon, Btario, GR No. 92285, March 28, 1994
FACTS:
Section 36 of the Revised Forestry Code provides incentives for Philippine
corporations engaged in industrial tree planting, like petitioner Provident Tree Farms,
Inc. (PTFI). One of these incentives is a qualified ban against importation of wood
and wood-derived products. A.J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported matches
from other countries in violation of the said importation ban. Consequently, PTFI filed
a complaint against the Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter from
making the prohibited importations. AJIC filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the
Commissioner of Customs under Section 1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code and
not the regular court, has “exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality of an
importation or ascertain whether the conditions prescribed by law for an importation
have been complied with...xxx” At first, the motion was denied but upon
reconsideration, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case on the
ground that it had “no jurisdiction to determine what are legal or illegal importations.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction in the case at bar.

RULING:
No. The trial court has no jurisdiction. Since the incentive involves a ban against
importation of wood, wood products or wood derived products, such incentive is to be
enforced by the Bureau of Customs which has exclusive and original jurisdiction over
seizure and forfeiture cases. “[I]n fact, it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to
exercise jurisdiction over prohibited importations.” “To allow the regular court to
direct the Commissioner to impound the imported matches, as petitioner would, is
clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over
seizure and forfeiture cases. An order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit must
inevitably be based on his determination and declaration of the invalidity of the
importation, hence, a usurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In other words, the reliefs directed against the
Bureau of Customs as well as the prayer for injunction against importation of matches
by private respondent AJIC may not be granted without the court arrogating upon
itself the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.” Even though no procedure
is outlined for the enforcement of the import ban, this does not diminish the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over the subject matter. “The enforcement of
statutory rights is not foreclosed by the absence of a statutory procedure.”

Mustang Lumber, Inc. Vs CA, GR. No. 104988, May 19, 1998
FACTS:
An organized team of foresters and policemen apprehended the truck belonging to
Mustang Lumber, Inc. which contained lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes
and dimensions. The driver was unable to produce the necessary legal documents,
thus, the team seized the truck. Afterwards, the team obtained a search warrant to
inspect the premises of Mustang Lumber. During the search, the team found more
lumber in the lumberyard without the necessary papers. Thus, the lumbers were
confiscated. Secretary Factoran ordered the disposal of the confiscated lumber. A
complaint against Mustang Lumber’s president and general manager was filed in
court. Mustang Lumber filed a motion to quash on the ground that “the information
does not charge an offense. According to Mustang Lumber, the possession of lumber
as opposed to timber is not penalized under Section 68 of PD No. 705.

ISSUE:
Whether possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is penalized in Section 68 of PD
No. 705.

RULING:
Yes. The possession of lumber is covered by Section 68 of PD No. 705. While the
Revised Forestry Code does not contain any definition of timber or lumber, it does
define forest products. The definition of Processing Plant includes lumber, to wit:
“[p]rocessing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine
used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer,
plywood, wallbond, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products.” “This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In
the 1993 copyright edition of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, lumber
is defined, inter alia, as ‘timber or logs after being prepared for the market.’ Simply
put, lumber is a processed log or timber.”

Aquino vs PP, GR. No. 165448, July 27, 2009

FACTS:
Sergio Guzman applied for a permit with the DENR to cut down 14 dead Benguet
pine trees within the Teachers’ Camp in Baguio City for the repairs in Teachers’
Camp. Before the permit was issued, a team composed of members from the CENRO
and Michael Cuteng, a forest ranger, conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut.
Afterwards, the DENR issued a permit allowing the cutting of 14 trees. Sometime
after, certain forest rangers received information that unauthorized cutting of pine
trees were taking place at the Teachers’ Camp. When they visited the site, they found,
among others, Ernesto Aquino, Santiago, and Cuteng. Santiago was one of the
sawyers and Aquino was the one appointed to supervise the cutting. The forest rangers
discovered that the trees cut were beyond the number allowed by the permit.
Consequently, the forest rangers filed a case against all those present in the site for
violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705. The trial court decided to convict Aquino,
Santiago and Cuteng and acquitted the others. When Aquino, Santiago and Cuteng
appealed the case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment only as to Aquino.
Therefore, Santiago and Cuteng were acquitted from the charge. Aquino appealed
with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Aquino, who supervised the cutting of the pine trees, is guilty of
violating Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.

RULING:
No. Aquino is not guilty of violating Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code. Section
68 of the Revised Forestry Code provides two distinct and separate offenses: (a)
Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority; and (b) Possession of timber or other forest products without
the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations. The aforesaid
provision clearly states that it “punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collector
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority.” In the case at
bar, Aquino was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the pine trees.
He was merely the person charged by the CENRO to supervise the implementation of
the permit. He was also not the one in possession of the cut trees because the lumber
was used by Teachers’ Camp. Although Aquino may have been remiss in his duties
when he failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting trees more than what was covered
by the permit, this fact could only make him administratively liable. “It is not enough
to convict him under Section 68 of PD No. 705.”

Taopa vs PP, GR. No. 184098, November 11, 2008

FACTS:
The Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Virac
apprehended a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver. Upon
investigation, the driver pointed to Amado Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco as the owners
of the seized lumber. Subsequently, Taopa and Ogalesco were charged with violating
Section 68 of PD No. 705. The trial court convicted all of them of the charge but only
Taopa and the driver appealed the conviction. The Court of Appeals acquitted the
driver but affirmed the conviction of Taopa. Taopa filed this petition assailing that
“the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the seized lumber as
he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.”

ISSUE:
Whether Taopa is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705.

RULING:
Yes. Taopa is guilty because he had constructive possession of the forest products.
The lower court found that “the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa’s
house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by [the
driver] up to where thetruck and lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopa’s (and
Ogalesco’s) exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck.”
Their acts constituted the offense penalized under Section 68 of PD No. 705, which is
the possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal
documents.

Monge vs PP, GR No. 170308, March 7, 2008

FACTS:
The barangay tanods in Iriga City found petitioner Monge and Potencio transporting
three pieces of mahogany lumber. When asked for the necessary permit from the
DENR, Monge and Potencio were not able to give one. Both of them were charged
with violation of Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines providing
for the criminal offense of cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other
products without license. Both Monge and Potencio pleaded not guilty during the
arraignment. During trial, Potencio was discharged as state witness testifying that it
was Monge who owned the lumber, and that the latter merely asked him to help him
transport it from the mountain. The trial court found Monge guilty. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals, Monge questioned the discharge of Potencio as state witness since
“the latter was not the least guilty of the offense and that there was no absolute
necessity for his testimony.” The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the decision of the trial court. Hence, Monge filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether Monge is guilty of violating Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.

RULING:
Yes. Monge is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended by EO No.
277. The mere possession of Monge and Potencio of the lumber without the required
permit had already consummated their criminal liability under Section 68 of the
Revised Forestry Code. The Revised Forestry Code “is a special penal statute that
punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum.” Regardless of the good faith of Monge,
the commission of the prohibited act consummated his criminal liability. Good faith,
which is the absence of malice or criminal intent, is not a defense. It is also immaterial
as to whether Potencio or Monge owned the lumber as the mere possession thereof
without the proper documents is unlawful and punishable.

Paat vs CA, GR. No. 111107, January 10, 1997

FACTS:
Private Respondent Vicente Guzman’s trucks was seized by the DENR because the
driver could not produce the required documents for the products found in the truck.
Consequently, the truck was confiscated and Guzman was given 15 days within which
to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited in favor of the DENR.
Guzman failed to do so. Thus, the Regional Executive Director of the DENR
sustained the confiscation of the truck. Guzman filed a letter of reconsideration but it
was denied. Subsequently, the case was brought to the DENR Secretary pursuant to
the stipulation in the letter that if denied, it should be considered as an appeal to the
Secretary. Pending resolution of the appeal, Guzman filed a suit for replevin against
the petitioners. In turn, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss assailing that there
was no cause of action for Guzman’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The
trial court denied the motion and granted a writ of replevin. Petitioners filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals which sustained the trial court’s order. Hence,
the petitioners filed this appeal.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
(2) Whether the Secretary of DENR and his representatives are empowered to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances transporting illegal forest products.
(3) Whether the seizure of the truck was illegal considering the fact that the Executive
Director admitted that the truck was not used in the commission of the crime.

RULING:
(1) Yes. Guzman failed to exhaust administrative remedies. By virtue of Guzman’s
letter of reconsideration “[i]t was easy to perceive then that the private respondents
looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to
him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available
and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without
violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek the court’s
intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the
pendency of an administrative proceeding.”
(2) Yes. Administrative officers of the DENR have the power and authority to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products. Section
68-A of PD No. 705 gives them authority to perform such acts. “The phrase in the law
which states ‘to dispose of the same’ is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting
conveyances in favor of the government in the construction of statutes.” The only
limitation is that it should be made “in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or
policies on the matter.”
(3) No. The confiscation was legal. The private respondents misinterpreted the
intention of the petitioners. What the petitioners meant when they stated that the truck
was not used in the commission of the crime is that it was not used in the commission
of the crime of theft. “Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was
being used in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of PD
No. 705 as amended by EO No. 277.” EO No. 277 provides that “the act of cutting,
gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority
constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.”

Dagudag vs Paderanga, AM No. RTJ-06-2017, June 19, 2008

FACTS:
The Region VII Philippine National Police Regional Maritime Group (PNPRMG)
received information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines, Inc. was
shipping container vans containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to
Cebu. The shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid
inspection by the DENR. Upon inspection, the crew of MV General Ricarte failed to
produce the Certificate of Origin and other pertinent transport documents covering the
forest products, as required by DAO No. 07-94. After due notice, the illegal forest
products were confiscated in favor of the government. In a complaint dated March 16,
2005 and filed before Judge Paderanga, a certain Roger Edma (Edma) prayed that a
writ of replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen. Dagudag,
and others to deliver the forest products to him and that judgment be rendered
ordering the defendants to pay him moral damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation
expenses. During the hearing for the writ of replevin, Judge Paderanga showed
manifest partiality in favor of Edma. Judge Paderanga issued a writ of replevin
ordering Sheriff Reynaldo Salceda to take possession of the forest products. Gen.
Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court Administrator an affidavitcomplaint
charging Judge Paderanga with gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming
of a judge.

ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of the writ of replevin is proper.

RULING:
No. The issuance of the writ of replevin was improper. Judge Paderanga should have
dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First,as cited in Factoran, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts
cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies. Similarlyin
Dy v. Court of Appeals and Paat vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that a
party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. In
the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He
went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of PD
No. 705, as amended, states that (1) all actions and decisions of the Bureau of Forest
Development Director are subject to review by the DENR Secretary; (2) the decisions
of the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and (3) the courts cannot
review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a special civil action for
certiorari or prohibition. In Dy, the Court held that all actions seeking to recover forest
products in the custody of the DENR shall be directed to that agency – not the courts.
Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of
cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. The DENR is the
agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for replevin
itself stated that members of DENR’s Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest
products and brought them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office. This should have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had
custody of the forest products. Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis
and thus cannot be the subject of replevin. There was a violation of the Revised
Forestry Code and the DENR seized the forest products in accordance with law.

Alvarez vs PICOP, GR No. 162243, November 29, 2006

FACTS:
PICOP, through Bislig Bay Lumber Company, Inc. (BBLCI), was granted a Timber
License Agreement (TLA). Former President Marcos issued a presidential warranty to
BBLCI confirming the TLA’s boundary lines of BBLCI’s concession area. The TLA
was renewed for another 25 years after its expiration. When the TLA was about to
expire, PICOP applied for an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) to
convert the said TLA under Section 9, Chapter III of DENR Administrative Order
No.99-53.In a Report made by the Performance Evaluation Team, it was found that
PICOP committed several violations of existing DENR rules and regulations
governing the subject TLA, including non-submission of the required 5-year forest
protection plan and 7year reforestation plan. When the Report was forwarded to the
Forest Management Bureau (FMB), it was also found that PICOP has unpaid and
overdue forest charges under the subject TLA. In light of this Report, the DENR
informed PICOP that there has to be a Technical Working Committee (TWC) to assist
in the transition of the conversion from TLA to IFMA, instead of granting the latter
outright. PICOP understood such letter to have converted the TLA to an IFMA.PICOP
insisted on the conversion of the TLA into an IFMA and filed a petition for
mandamus against DENR Secretary Alvarez. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor
of PICOP. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on appeal. The National
Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) sent a letter informing the DENR
Secretary that PICOP’s TLA is in conflict with the ancestral domains of the Manobos,
and PICOP did not obtain an NCIP certification over the area covered by the TLA. It
was recommended that the 1-year permit granted to PICOP be revoked.

ISSUE:
Whether there was compliance with the requirements for the conversion of TLA into
an IFMA.

RULING:
No. There was no compliance with the requirements for the conversion of the TLA.

Alvarez vs PICOP, GR No. 162243, December 3, 2009

FACTS:
In its Motion for Reconsideration, PICOP alleged that it already complied with the
administrative and statutory requirements for the conversion. PICOP also argued that
the requirement of Sanggunian approval under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local
Government Code, which refers to projects implemented by government authorities
and government-owned and -controlled corporations, do not apply to PICOP as its
activity is a purely private endeavour.

ISSUE:
Whether the writ of mandamus should have been issued.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed and reiterated its findings in the preceding case.
First, the 1969 Document, on which PICOP hinges its claim that its TLA should be
converted to an IFMA, is not a contract; thus, the provision on non-impairment of
contracts do not apply. Timber licenses are privileges granted by the government
which may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded when national
interest requires. Second, PICOP still did not comply with the requirements for the
conversion of its TLA. As regards acquiring the approval of the Sanggunian
concerned, PICOP’s contention that its activities under the TLA are a purely private
endeavour, is incorrect. All projects relating to the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources are state projects and can never be a purely private
endeavour. Considering that PICOP failed to comply with the requirements for its
conversion, the writ shall not issue.

Arigo vs. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014

FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance
for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to
arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for
Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea,
the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and
there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the
USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude
as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros
Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi,
which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
(2) Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS
Guardian.
(3) Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:
(1) YES. Petitioners have legal standing. Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and
substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized
grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the
controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society,
or of paramount public interest.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of
citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this
Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and
future generations.
(2) YES. The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and
its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the
USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official
military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials
will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the
suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity
therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of
respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position
that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in
violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the
matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign
immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates
an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and
regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters
and the territorial sea.
In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy
sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for
compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the
territorial sea immediately.
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the
coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government
ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the
coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of
this Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31,
nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry
into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in
which the above provisions may apply.
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the
US?
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as
a matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary
international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was
centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI)
which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing
out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’ acceptance of customary
international rules on navigation.”
The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a
Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
“international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian
grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively
supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk
from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting
our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising
leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive
for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine
environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS
Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis,
directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and
elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures
consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine
environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond
dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the
jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag
States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws
and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by
their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes
under Article 31.
(3) NO. The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of
a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules
that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law
is to be filed separately.
The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond
the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of
State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which
have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery
of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in
a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the
same violation of an environmental law.

OPTION 2:
FACTS:
In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran aground on an area near the
Tubbataha Reefs, a marine habitat of which entry and certain human activities are
prevented and afforded protection by a Philippine law. The grounding incident
prompted the petitioners to seek for issuance of Writ of Kalikasan with TEPO from
the SC. Among those impleaded are US officials in their capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy. As petitioners argued, they were impleaded because there
was a waiver of immunity from suit between US and PH pursuant to the VFA terms.
Petitioners claimed that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the
USS Guardian violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology
since these events caused and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect other provinces surrounding the Tubbataha Reefs. Aside from
damages, they sought a directive from the SC for the institution of civil,
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental
laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident. They also prayed for
the annulment of some VFA provisions for being unconstitutional.

ISSUES:
(1) W/N the US Government has given its consent to be sued through the VFA
(2) W/N the US government may still be held liable for damages caused to the
Tubbataha Reefs

RULING:
(1) No. The general rule on state’s immunity from suit applies in this case. First, any
waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not
to special civil actions such as for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan. Hence,
contrary to petitioners’ claim, the US government could not be deemed to have
waived its immunity from suit. Second, the US respondents were sued in their official
capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who have control and supervision
over the USS Guardian and its crew. Since the satisfaction of any judgment against
these officials would require remedial actions and the appropriation of funds by the
US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. Thus, the principle
of State Immunity – in correlation with the principle of States as sovereign equals “par
in parem non habet non imperium” – bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the court over
their persons.
(2) Yes. The US government is liable for damages in relation to the grounding
incident under the customary laws of navigation. The conduct of the US in this case,
when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of RA 10067 and caused
damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of
the UNCLOS. While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule
in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State
regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.
Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing
policy, the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the
“traditional uses of the oceans”, which is codified in UNCLOS. As to the non-
ratification by the US, it must be noted that the US’ refusal to join the UNCLOS was
centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS’ regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI)
which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind. Such has
nothing to do with the acceptance by the US of customary international rules on
navigation. (Justice Carpio) Hence, non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean
that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its
internal waters and territorial sea. It is thus expected of the US to bear “international
responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which
adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs.

Other Issues Claim for Damages Caused by Violation of Environmental Laws Must
be Filed Separately The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is
improper considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military
ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the
agreement. As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to
criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions. Since jurisdiction cannot be had
over the respondents for being immuned from suit, there is no way damages which
resulted from violation of environmental laws could be awarded to petitioners. In any
case, the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan provides that a criminal case against a person
charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately. Hence, a
ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the
VFA to a US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS
Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of
Kalikasan. Challenging the Constitutionality of a Treaty Via a Petition for the
Issuance of Writ of Kalikasan is Not Proper The VFA was duly concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the US as attested and
certified by the duly authorized representative of the US government. The VFA being
a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law
to abide by its terms and provisions. A petition under the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan
is not the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions.

Cenzon vs Aliping, CA-G.R. SP NO. 00029 W/K, May 6, 201

FACTS:
Petitioners filed for a TEPO and a writ of kalikasan case against Abguio
Representative Nicasio Aliping, Jr. It was alleged that the development projects could
affect the Mount Sto. Tomas watershed and threaten residents’ water supply,
particularly Baguio, a high-altitude city which has been having difficulty obtaining
potable water.

They sought to stop activities that they believed contributed to the degradation of
Mount Santo Tomas, namely: illegal tree cutting and man-made erosion due to a road
opening on the mountain side; deforestation due to expansion of vegetable gardens
and residential areas; and illegal small scale mining activities.

There have been complaints that the activities in the watershed disrupted springs
there, turning the water muddy and unfit for distribution to water consumers. The
petitioners also said the project initiated by Aliping, which involved the construction
of a road connecting several villages in Tuba to the Mount Kabuyao Highway, could
also endanger Amilang Creek, which flows into dams that act as water reservoirs.

Respondent averred that the acts he was doing was for the development of or
enhancement of the property located in Mt. Santo Tomas forest reserve and that the
property belong to his brothers. The acts include the improvement of the old building
standing on the land, the building of any structure thereon, continuing with any road
activities and concreting any part of the road.

ISSUE:
W/N the writ of kalikasan invoking intergenerational responsibility was correctly
applied in this case.

RULING:
Yes. The high tribunal noted that the petition invoked the principle of
intergenerational equity, which imposes on the present generation the duty to protect
the environment and to pass on its bounty to the coming generations.

The Court ordered Aliping to immediately take steps to mitigate the contamination of
the Amilang dams due to the erosion emanating from his road opening project.

Further, the Court also ordered the Tuba municipal government, led by Mayor
Florencio Benitez, to cease and desist from accepting applications for the issuance of
tax declarations over lands within the forest reserve, from processing applications that
have already been filed, and from issuing tax declarations that have already been
processed and approved.