Hindu Minorties 2
Hindu Minorties 2
Hindu Minorties 2
Note
There are no internationally agreed definitions of what
constitutes a minority. MRG's work focuses on non-dominant
ethnic, linguistic or religious communities. The use of the
term 'minority' in this report is not be taken as disregarding
the right to self-identification and the legitimate desire of
religious communities not to be identified as minorities.
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Photo A Christian boy traumatised after his village, Shantinagar, was attacked. Piers Benatar/Panos Pictures. Religious
Minorities in Pakistan is published by MRG as a contribution to public understanding of the issue which forms its subject. The
text and views of the author do not necessarily represent in every detail and in all its aspects, the collective view of MRG.
Religious Minorities in Pakistan
By Dr Iftikhar H. Malik
Contents
Map 2
Preface 3
Politics of pluralism 4
Minorities in Pakistan 10
Conclusion 26
Recommendations 28
Notes 30
Bibliography 32
RUSSIA
KYRGYZSTAN
UZBEKISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN CHINA
N.W.F.P.
JAMMU I
nd
& us
Peshawar
AFGHANISTAN KASHMIR
Islamabad
Rawalpindi
Gujranwala
Lahore
Faisalabad
PUNJAB
Quetta Multan
PA K I S TA N
Bahawalpur
s
BALOCHISTAN
du
In
IRAN
Sukkur
SINDH
INDIA
Hyderabad
Karachi
Arabian Sea
International boundary
Provincial boundary
Disputed boundary
0 100 200 300 400 Miles
The boundaries shown on this map do not imply any official endorsement,
they are for illustrative purposes only.
Recent massacres of religious minorities in Pakistan have introduce Islamic law have resulted in discrimination
focused new attention on the predicament of minorities against women. At the time of writing this report, there
in a country which is generally perceived to be a homo- continue to be incidents of extreme violence against
geneous Muslim nation. This report describes Pakistan’s women based on local, customary or tribal law. Women
ethnic and religious minorities, and highlights its rich cul- remain a vulnerable group in Pakistan with inadequate
tural diversity. There are five major ethno-regional legal protection to safeguard their rights.
communities in Pakistan: Baloch, Muhajir, Punjabis, Events within and beyond the region have influenced
Pushtuns and Sindhis, as well as several smaller groups. developments in Pakistan. The decision of the military
There are also religious and sectarian groups such as regime to join the USA-led coalition against terrorism has
Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, Kalasha, Parsis and Sikhs, provoked popular resentment and an internal backlash by
and Shia Muslim sects including Ismailis and Bohras. extremist groups with renewed violence in many parts of
Almost half of Pakistan’s history as a modern nation the country. Efforts to rein in militant elements and pro-
has seen military rule. In analysing the status of Pakistan’s vide security for all citizens, particularly minorities, seem
religious minorities, this report details the challenges they inadequate and ineffective. Against this background, the
face as citizens. The role of the military, the political use need to ensure protection of minority rights is com-
of religion by governments and a weak civil society, all pelling. Pakistan is yet to ratify the International
pose enormous challenges to minorities in Pakistan. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Interna-
Demands for greater autonomy by the major ethnic tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
groups have, over the years, provoked severe government Rights, among other human rights instruments.
repression. At the same time, non-Muslim minorities have This report on minorities in Pakistan is therefore time-
continued to be the victims of particularly harsh religious ly and of direct relevance to the international community
laws. The system of separate electorates, which was in and agencies concerned about South Asia in general and
place until recently, confined non-Muslims and some Pakistan in particular. It is hoped that this report will
Muslim groups to second-class citizenship, and under- enhance and deepen understanding regarding religious
mined their claim for equal rights. Successive minorities in Pakistan, and the need for the protection of
constitutional amendments and other legislation – partic- minority and gender-based rights across communities. The
ularly during the Zia ul-Haq government – deprived author, Dr Iftikhar Malik, links the marginalization of
Ahmadis of religious freedom. Pakistan’s minorities with its socio-cultural and political
An amendment to Pakistan’s Penal Code decreed the history. With general elections due this year, it is hoped
death penalty for anyone denigrating the name of the that a government with a new democratic mandate will
Prophet Muhammed. Indiscriminate and pernicious use review all discriminatory legislation, uphold the principle
of this blasphemy law, particularly against Christians and of equal citizenship enshrined in Pakistan’s original Consti-
Ahmadis, continues to violate their rights as citizens. tution and take effective action to curb sectarian violence.
Minorities in Pakistan also continue to be victims of sec- Defending the principles of equal citizenship and
tarian violence by extremist Sunni groups. There have non-discrimination, and disallowing the use of religion
been frequent clashes between Sunni and Shia groups to violate the rights of non-Muslim and non-dominant
across the country. In the province of Sindh, Sindhi- Muslim citizens, must be priorities for any new govern-
Muhajir clashes have claimed hundreds of victims. ment. This is perhaps the only way to protect Pakistan’s
Legislation and action by successive governments has ethnic and religious diversity, and the security of future
failed to put an end to sectarian violence. generations.
Similarly, the status of women in Pakistan has been
the subject of much debate and controversy. Efforts to
Mark Lattimer
Director
August 2002
Pakistan is an immensely plural country characterized by communities.3 Consequently, several reform movements
religious, sectarian and ethno-linguistic diversities. It is an emerged that led to new groups among the Hindu, Mus-
overwhelmingly Muslim community with more than 90 lim, Sikh and other religions.
per cent of its 142 million 1 inhabitants adhering to Islam, Ecologically, Pakistan is characterized both by diversity
yet they belong to several doctrinal groups. Sunni Muslims and unity. Within the Indus Valley–Himalayan ecosystem,
are in the ascendant, with Shia Muslims and Zikris facing there are various sub-systems: mountains in the extreme
discrimination. In 1974, the Pakistani National Assembly north, the tropical middle plains and the arid south-west.
declared Ahmadis – also called Qadianis – a non-Muslim These different terrains – accounting for the Karakoram,
minority. There are several Christian denominations, Hindu Kush and Suleiman mountains; Punjab and upper
Bahais, Buddhists, Hindus, Jains, Kalasha, Parsis and Sikhs Sindh’s plains; and Balochistan’s deserts – retain agrarian
who identify themselves as as non-Muslim Pakistanis. and pastoral communities, although demographically the
While most Pakistanis converse in or understand Urdu alluvial plains account for more than 70 per cent of the
– the national language – it is the first language of only c. country’s population. The urban centres of Faisalabad,
10 per cent of the population, while others speak regional Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta have ethnically
languages such as Balochi, Punjabi, Pushto and Sindhi, mixed communities, but in the rural and tribal areas the
among others. The Urdu-speakers are mainly immigrants local caste-based hierarchies dominate. The urban areas
from India or their descendants who, at the time of parti- account for c. 40 per cent of Pakistan’s population. The
tion in 1947, opted for this predominantly Muslim provinces of Punjab and Sindh are the most densely pop-
homeland and left the Hindu-majority India. Partition ulous, due to their growing urban economies and
and more recent migrations have greatly contributed to long-established agricultural potential. The North-West
Pakistan’s socio-cultural and ethnic plurality. Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan remain
sharply divided between tribal and urban communities.4
Migrations and diversity In addition to linguistic and regional diversities, there
are demographic changes in Pakistan’s recent history that
Around 2500 BCE, present-day Pakistan was the heartland make it harder to demarcate clear-cut ethnic boundaries.
of the Indus Valley civilization. This included invaders and Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, following the Green
immigrants from the neighbouring western regions and Revolution,5 and with greater social mobility and eco-
elsewhere who had migrated into the region. Around c. nomic interdependence, the ethnic boundaries have
1500 BCE, the Dravidians – generally believed to be the become further blurred. Thus, despite the apparent
indigenous peoples of the Indus Valley – were overpowered homogeneity each of the four provinces of Pakistan –
by Aryan invaders from Central Asia who established the Balochistan, NWFP, Punjab and Sindh – their towns and
‘Hindu’ Vedic era.2 Subsequently, this region became the cities have become immensely plural. Interestingly, the
centre of the Buddhist and Zoroastrian civilizations, latterly ‘traditional’ ethnic movements like those for‘Pushtoon-
to be recaptured by the Hindu ruling dynasties. The Greek istan’ (a separate homeland for Pushtuns), and ‘Greater
invasion in the early-fourth century BCE was followed by Balochistan’ (a separate state inclusive of Balochi regions
invasions of various Central Asian tribes until the Arabs, in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan) have subsided, while
Iranians and Turks established a 1,000-year Muslim period new ethnic configurations have evolved, such as the
in South Asia. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Muhajir identity of Urdu–speakers 6 in urban Sindh, as
Sikhism – a religion proposing a kind of synthesis between espoused by the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM).
Islamic Sufism and Hinduism – emerged in Punjab (in the
heart of the Indus Valley) and established its holy places in Partition and demographic
Amritsar and Lahore. The advent of the European powers
added a new dimension to the South Asian sub-continent
changes
with missionaries introducing various Christian denomina- In 1947, Pakistan’s independence led to c. 14 million
tions. The interaction between the Indian and European people moving across the borders, with Pakistan receiving
cultural groups, and the primacy of British power, led to more than 8 million Muslims from all over India. Most
serious soul-searching among the South Asian religious came to West Pakistan (present-day Pakistan) with l.2
From its inception, Pakistan inherited a strong bias for of his political edifice.19 After him came General Yahya
administration over governance and political develop- Khan, who imposed the second era of martial law. Doing
ment. The civil bureaucracy, emboldened by its away with the One-Unit Scheme and restoring the uni-
unilateralist hold, coopted the military within the first few versal franchise, he promised to hold party-based elections
years of Pakistan’s existence. This elite’s contempt for in 1970. When the results gave the Awami League of
politicians and constitutional primacy knew no bounds. Shaikh Mujibur Rahman – who planned to introduce a
In the colonial tradition, it offered noisy politicians a sub- decentralized system – an absolute majority, the military
ordinate role or suppression.18 The dented political culture junta refused to transfer power. Instead, the regime pur-
was further damaged by the frequent military takeovers. sued a brutal crackdown on East Pakistanis and a civil war
The early efforts (1949–56) to develop a consensus- ensued, leading to East Pakistan becoming the independ-
based Constitution were either routinely thwarted or ent country of Bangladesh.20
substituted with centralizing measures such as the One- Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, an Oxford-educated landowner
Unit Scheme of 1955. Rather than accepting the principle from Sindh and a former minister in Ayub Khan’s admin-
of one person one vote, East Pakistan’s majority was istration, emerged as the majority party leader in Punjab
anulled. East Pakistanis, with their more homogeneous and Sindh. He had founded the Pakistan People’s Party
and larger population, were marginalized – economically, (PPP) in 1967 after being dismissed by Ayub Khan, and
socially and politically. Under the One-Unit Scheme, promised socialist reforms for the underprivileged. How-
West Pakistan’s four provinces were amalgamated into a ever, in Balochistan and NWFP, the PPP did not enjoy
single unit ‘West Pakistan’ and parity between the two any major following and ethno-regional parties like the
wings of the country was introduced. This not only Awami National Party (ANP) of Khan Abdul Wali Khan
antagonized the majority in East Pakistan but also and the religio-political parties such as the Jamiat-i-
angered Balochistan, NWFP and Sindh. Punjab, the sec- Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) carried the day, and eventually
ond largest province of Pakistan after East Bengal, formed the provincial government. After the debacle in
emerged as the power hub – fuelling fear of ‘Punjabi East Pakistan, Yahya Khan was compelled to resign in
domination’. The central government’s declaration of favour of Bhutto, who became the first civilian martial
Urdu as the national language soon after independence, law administrator/President. He rose to power because his
without giving similar status to Bangla – the majority lan- PPP held the majority of seats in West Pakistan and the
guage – caused a stir in East Pakistan, where people felt generals wanted him to lead a dispirited nation.
ignored by the Punjabi- and Urdu-speaking ruling elite in He initiated Pakistan’s nuclear programme and built
the centre. These issues could have been resolved through closer relations with the Muslim world. Most of all, in
constitutional consensus, democratic institutions and elec- 1973, he led the efforts to introduce a fully fledged parlia-
toral politics, but there were no such arrangements in mentary-style Constitution for the country. Promising a
place, and soon the army began to intervene as a central- universal franchise, joint electorates for all and special
izing and depoliticizing force. seats for women, the document allowed a modicum of
The first military takeover took place in October provincial autonomy and reflected a consensus across a
1958, when General Ayub Khan seized absolute power. spectrum of political parties. However, in 1974, in his
Later, he introduced the 1962 Constitution. His adminis- pursuit of further popularity among the religious ele-
tration allowed only a limited space for pliant politicians. ments, Bhutto declared the Ahmadis to be a non-Muslim
This was via indirect elections for the representatives to minority (see p. 17). Despite this, Bhutto still could not
the Assemblies within the One-Unit Scheme, and inter- win over the religious lobbies who were waiting for an
wing parity. The centralized system served Ayub Khan’s opportunity to topple him. His populist tendencies,
interests. It did not allow universal participation of Paki- nationalization of vital economic sectors and strengthen-
stanis and, despite a liberal veneer, failed to reflect the ing of the armed forces began to work against him.
country’s plurality. The tensions between East and West Following the contentious elections of 1977 a massive
Pakistan increased, and so did the ordinary citizen’s mar- public protest ensued.21 Bhutto was slow to reach agree-
ginalization. General Ayub Khan was overthrown through ment with the opposition and unwittingly allowed the
public protest in March 1969, and with him came the fall army to move in. General Zia ul-Haq struck on the night
Pakistan’s population is generally estimated to be c. 142 various professions in the service sector. The church
million, although according to the official census reports organization is very similar to other South Asian coun-
it is c. 137 million. According to the census of 1981, out tries with a definite Pakistani cultural and linguistic
of a total of 84,253,644, Muslims accounted for embodiment, and there are converts, descendants of con-
81,450,057; followed by 1,310,426 Christians; and verts, Anglo-Indians/-Pakistanis, and Western
1,276,116 Hindus. Ahmadis accounted for 104,244; Par- missionaries. Hindus are equivalent in number to the
sis 7,007; Buddhists 2,639; Sikhs 2,146; and ‘others’ Christians, with almost 4 per cent of the population.
101,009. Because of a de-emphasis on family planning, There are several castes among the Hindus, besides eth-
and the arrival of millions of Afghan and some Iranian nic diversity. Over 65 per cent of the minority
refugees, population growth within the country has been population are young people, and the average literacy
immense. In 1990, it was estimated that the minorities rate in a few cases is higher than the national average;
were 3.1 per cent of the total population. According to however, the other facts are not so pleasing.
these estimates, there were 1,769,582 Christians in Pak- As already mentioned, for the smaller religious minori-
istan; 1,723,251 Hindus; 9,462 Parsis; 3,564 Buddhists; ty communities – including Buddhists and Jains – there
and 2,898 Sikhs, while the ‘others’ collectively were esti- are no statistics, and little reliable information. They are
mated to be 13,640. The total figure for the minority known to be tiny groups who prefer to remain out of the
population was c. 3,663,167. Two years later, the aggre- public eye.
gate figure stood at 4,267,463; with Christians and Ahmadis have been the focus of attention due to the
Hindus almost equal at 2,061,306 and 2,007,743, respec- issue of their faith. Intermarriage and open social interac-
tively. The Ahmadis, Parsis, Buddhists, Sikhs and others tion remain minimal. Many Ahmadis neither openly
were estimated to be 163,982; 11,021; 4,150; 3,374; and profess their identity nor congregate visibly, so as to avoid
15,888, respectively. It is interesting to note that even the hostile attention.
Parsis, despite some outward migration, had registered a The Ahmadis are divided into the Lahori and Qadiani
slight increase.23 The census of 1998 showed the minori- groups. Both the leadership – London-based – and the elite
ties nearing 11–13 million. Ahmadis, Christians and of the movement are predominantly Punjabi, with smaller
Hindus claim to have a population of 4 million each. communities in other provinces. Most Ahmadis are from
It is crucial, however, to note that, given the disad- central Punjab but are scattered across towns and cities.
vantages and stigmatization, communities do not like to After their designation as a non-Muslim minority, many
be identified as minorities so the above-mentioned figures moved to Europe and elsewhere, although their cultural,
may be an under-estimate, as some people may not have family and language links with the Punjab remain strong.
chosen to identify their ethnic or religious background. Most of their propagation activities have shifted to the
There are generally no population figures available for West. Their television programmes, largely beamed from
Pakistan’s smaller minority communities. Overall, London, in English, German, Urdu and other languages,
minorities represent c. 8 per cent of the total population. generally centre on religious issues, with Urdu programmes
Pakistani minorities consist of Ahmadis, Bahais, Bud- on MTA (Muslim Television Ahmadiyya) focusing on the
dhists, Christians, Hindus, Jains, Kalasha (of Chitral), leader, Mirza Tahir Ahmad, and his teachings. Their publi-
Parsis and Sikhs. Except for the Ahmadis, they all agree cations view their designation as a minority as politically
on their being non-Muslim. Within these communities motivated. However, they do not dispute the claim of
there are caste-based, class-based and denomination- Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of the movement, to
based divisions; along with age, ethnic, gender, rural and be the Messiah/Mahdi or Mehdi-i-Mauood (the promised
urban distinctions. Any superficial categorization is open prophet). Founded in 1889, the movement initially
to dispute. For example, among the 4 per cent of the remained confined to the Punjab and some of its leaders,
Pakistani population who are Christian, there is an like Sir Zafrullah Khan, played a very important role in the
almost 50-50 divide between the Catholic and the freedom movement, but then the tables were turned on
Protestant denominations. Cities like Peshawar, and areas them with the demand to designate them as a minority.
of Bahawalpur, Hyderabad, Rawalpindi and Quetta, have The Sikhs are again mostly Punjabis with smaller tra-
always had a sizeable number of Christians engaged in ditional communities in Karachi and NWFP. There are a
Zia ul-Haq’s constitutional however, explained: ‘Nothing in this Part shall affect the
personal laws of non-Muslim citizens or their status as
amendments citizens.’ Article 228 (1–3) concentrates on the composi-
tion of the Council of Islamic Ideology, its total
The sweeping legislation, introduced by Zia and further membership and their qualifications, including that of its
incorporated into the Constitution through the Eighth woman member and others representing the various doc-
Amendment – without the proper procedures as laid down trinal sections.
in the Constitution – changed the entire spectrum of poli- The Zia-led amendment in Article 260 of the Consti-
cies and attitudes towards minorities and women. Zia’s tution is crucial. It declares Ahmadis to be a non-Muslim
own religiosity, his effort to woo religious parties like the minority. Its clause C observes:
JI and JUI, and his strategy to counter the revolutionary
impact from neighbouring Iran all underwrote his amend- ‘In the Constitution and all enactments and other
ments. Operating as the chief martial law administrator by legal instruments, unless there is anything repugnant
virtue of his being chief of the army staff, his assumption in the subject or context,
of the presidency, the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in [a] “Muslim” means a person who believes in the
April 1979, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute
1979, all allowed him to acquire maximum powers. For and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of
the first time, a military-clerical nexus was installed in Pak- Muhammad (peace be upon him), the last of the
istan. Zia favoured Sunnis over Shias and scripturalists prophets, and does not believe in, or recognize as a
over the syncretists. Thus, the introduction of ushr, zakat prophet, or religious reformer, any person who
and other Islamic taxes caused considerable uproar from claimed or claims to be prophet, in any sense of the
Shia groups, eventually leading to an official concession to word or of any description whatsoever, after Muham-
them. Zia harshly suppressed political parties like the PPP mad (peace be upon him) and;
and other pro-democracy clusters, and tried to consolidate [b] “non-Muslim” means a person who is not a Mus-
his own loyalists within the religio-political elements, lim and includes a person belonging to the Christian,
offering himself as their head. He posed as the Amir ul Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist or Parsi community, a person
Momineen (leader of the faithful), with the help of a pliant of the Qadiani group or Lahori group (who will call
media controlled by his generals. themselves “Ahmadis” or by any other name), or a
Zia set about redirecting the ideological direction of Baha’i, and a person belonging to any of the sched-
Pakistan. For example, while laying down the foundation uled castes.’
of the Islamic courts, he introduced Chapter 3A on Sharia
courts. Article 203 (D), states: In other words, the state had defined the religions of its
citizens in addition to offering an exclusionary definition
‘The court may, [either of its own accord or] on the of Islam. Within a few decades of its formation, the Pak-
petition of a citizen of Pakistan or the Federal Gov- istani establishment had shifted from supporting equality
ernment or a Provincial Government, examine and to a front-line role in defining citizenship with reference
decide the question whether or not any law or provi- to ‘majoritarian’ Islamic parameters. The second amend-
sion of law is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, ment (1974) declared the Ahmadis a non-Muslim
as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the minority, which they never accepted as they claim to be
Holy Prophet, hereinafter referred to as the Injunc- Muslims. However, they became the main focus of vic-
tions of Islam.’ timization at different levels and eventually many
Ahmadis left Pakistan for Europe and North America. A
In other words, the Sharia Courts and their verdicts were few separate seats in the Assemblies had been allocated to
superimposed on the country’s elected institutions. Part Ahmadis, along with other non-Muslim minorities, but
IX of the 1973 Constitution focuses on further Islamic they have boycotted the elections. Other than one seat in
provisions. Article 227 calls for all existing laws to be the National Assembly, Ahmadis were allotted three seats
brought in line with the ‘Injunctions of Islam’. Clause 3, in NWFP, Punjab and Sindh.
legal exclusion Again, Zia was trying to appease the Islamicists. The
Penal Code Section 295–C was rushed through via the
The Zia regime’s various amendments and additions to Criminal Law (Amendment) Act III of 1986, and stipu-
the Penal Code resulted in severe socio-legal discrimina- lated:
tion against minorities. The stringent rules meant to
counter blasphemy against the Qur’an and the Prophet ‘ Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by
have established a unilateral system in which any male visible representation, or by any imputation, innu-
Muslim can institute litigation against an individual on endo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles
allegation of blasphemy. (This law prohibited women and the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad
minorities from initiating blasphemy cases.) The Zia law (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death,
of evidence (Qanoon-i-Shihadah) – equating the evidence or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to
of two women or two non-Muslims to that of a single a fine.’
male Muslim – further disempowers non-Muslims and
women, while making it easier for Muslim men to pursue A lawyer challenged this section on the grounds that the
legal proceedings against the accused party. The original only punishment for blaspheming against the Prophet
Blasphemy Laws were designed by the British and intro- must be the death penalty. The Federal Sharia Court, in
duced in 1885 to outlaw the inflaming of religious hatred. October 1990, upheld the petition and gave a verdict in
These laws became part of the Pakistan Penal Code as favour of the death penalty. Thus, any blasphemy case
Section 295 and, in its original incarnation, it had noted: with reference to the Prophet, since 1990, may carry the
death penalty. In 1994, on a private petition regarding the
‘Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of Penal Code 295–C, the Lahore High Court, found that it
worship, or any object held sacred by any class of per- did not contravene the Constitution. Earlier, in February
sons with the intention of thereby insulting the 1994, the Chief Justice-led Pakistan Law Commission
religion of any class of persons or with the knowledge found that this anti-blasphemy clause was being frequent-
that that class of persons is likely to consider such ly misused by the police and felt that the clause could
destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to further inflame communal tensions. The Commission, led
their religion, shall be punished with imprisonment by the then Chief Justice, Nasim Hasan Shah, had recom-
of either description for a term which may extend to mended its review by the Islamic Ideology Council, and
two years, or with a fine, or with both.’ Benazir Bhutto’s government agreed to amend its opera-
tion. However, following nationwide demonstrations,
In 1927, when communal riots occurred in India, especially after official statements on the issue in July
another clause was promulgated under the title Section 1994, the PPP regime backtracked.
295–A. Accordingly: These three anti-blasphemy clauses have been used
against both Muslims and non-Muslims. In many cases,
‘Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of people have been subjected to trials – although the rea-
outraging the religious feelings of any class of the citi- sons may be anything other than religious. The anti-
While Christians may face anger for political and eco- who may be in need of most support in Pakistan, because
nomic reasons, compounded by factors rooted in ‘land they suffer from stigmatization and a lack of proper sup-
grabbing’ or racism, Hindus often suffer due to the Indo- port networks.
Pakistani discord. They become scapegoats whenever Ahmadis have become the focus of overt attention
tensions rise. Over the decades, they have been seen as over the issue of khatam-i-nabuwwat. Their places of wor-
‘fifth columnists’. Hindu women suffer from kidnaps and ship, and, in particular, the city of Rabwah, are frequently
forcible conversions, and the community is generally attacked. Zia’s ordinances amount to yet more persecu-
depressed, under-educated and under-employed. The feu- tion.64 While Ahmadis consider their movement to be an
dal nature of Sindhi society and its collaborative effort for Islamic renaissance,65 their opponents see them
relationship with the local administration precludes the as ‘an enemy within’ who reject one of the five pillars of
possibility of any redress for Hindu grievances. The land- Islam and are also critical of Jihad. Ahmadis’ well-docu-
less peasants, nomads and Dalits among the Hindus mented but not easily available reports, reveal a large
suffer from multiple deprivation. number of Ahmadis suffering from persecution.66 For
Bahais are still a young and almost invisible communi- example, one document devoted to the cases under Penal
ty, which is confined to intellectuals who try to keep out Code Section 295–C lists 201 cases of blasphemy regis-
of the limelight. Their magazines and books are available tered between 15 June 1986 and 11 March 2001.67
in Urdu but the fundamentalists, unlike their counter- Another detailed statistical report covering the period
parts in Iran, have not yet seen them as a threat. April 1984–July 2001, lists 15 categories of persecution
Nomads, especially nomadic women, occasionally fall and the total number of cases under each one. For exam-
victim to feudal attitudes, including rape and other forms ple, 753 cases were registered on displaying kalima, 37
of violence, although the religious elements tend to ignore were booked for giving azan (the call to prayer), 379 were
them. They are seen as a class of harmless, landless and booked for posing as Muslims and 130 for using Islamic
rootless people, yet sexual stereotypes about nomadic epithets. According to the same document, 554 Ahmadis
women abound. Cases of kidnap and rape are occasionally were booked for preaching; 93 for offering prayers; 148
reported by investigating journalists from southern Pun- for distributing their periodical, Mubahala, and the entire
jab and rural Sindh. population of Rabwah had been charged with heresy
Nomads’ affinity with local Muslim communities in under Penal Code Section 298–C. The document also
rituals, their role as entertainers at different ceremonies or claims that during the same period 56 Ahmadis were
and their participation during Shias’ Muharram proces- killed; 97 attempts were made on Ahmadis’ lives; 10
sions allow them to live on the fringes of the settled places of worship were set on fire, and 21 such places
communities. were sealed up. Even the sports and congregational meet-
Ahmadis and Christians are the communities that ings at Rabwah have been banned.68 There are reports of
have most regularly documented cases of discrimination individual cases, which are not easily available to any
and oppression, both at the official and societal levels. researcher as even contact between a Muslim and an
Shias have local information – mostly anecdotal– or taken Ahmadi can easily be distorted to the detriment of the lat-
from the press, but this is not yet in a documented form. ter. Zikris too, are fearful that they will suffer the same
Most Bahais, Buddhists, Ismailis and Parsis are highly fate as Ahmadis.
educated, urban and commercial groups, with exceptional Pakistan’s insecure and non-representative ruling elite,
economic performance. Their general level of self-suffi- while seeking legitimacy, has used Islamic penal codes to
ciency and cosmopolitan contacts further ensure their establish discretionary punishments. These Hudood laws
security. These communities are comparatively less vulner- – however sanctioned under Sharia – have been imposed
able to majoritarian backlashes. Sikhs, likewise, are not on society, and vulnerable minorities, women and Mus-
perceived to pose any social, religious or economic threat lims have been falling victim. In the struggle against this
to others; and the common Muslim view of them as being malaise, the role of the various activist groups, human
‘anti-Hindu’ allows them a bit more space. The small size rights NGOs and think tanks representing the civil socie-
of the Sikh community and its diversity equally allows ty of Pakistan takes centre stage. On the one hand, these
them a sort of ‘invisibility’. It is the 4 million Hindus groups try to restrain statist unilateralism, while trying to
1. The authorities in Pakistan should institute independ- ing, including reserved seats in government and Parlia-
ent inquiries into the recent cases of large-scale killings ment, consultative bodies on the national and local
of religious groups, such as that of Christians in level covering matters of concern to minorities, and
Bahawalpur in October 2001, and in Murree and Tax- forms of cultural or territorial autonomy. The bar on
ila in the summer of 2002, and that of Shias in non-Muslims for the posts of President and Prime
Rawalpindi in February 2002. Those responsible for Minister and other high offices should be removed.
the killings should be brought to justice in accordance
with internationally recognized guidelines for fair trial. 4. Laws and constitutional provisions, which demonstra-
The police and judiciary should take urgent steps to bly result in discrimination against minorities or
prosecute those responsible for any crimes motivated women, such as the blasphemy, evidence and alcohol
by ethnic or religious hatred, including harassment, laws, the laws designating certain groups as non-Mus-
murder or crimes of sexual violence. lims, and the constitutional provisions regarding the
compliance of law with Islamic injunctions, should be
2. Independent commissions for racial, religious and gen- modified or revoked to ensure that the discrimination
der equality, or similar institutions, should be set up, ceases. The affirmation of the finality of the Prophet-
to receive and investigate complaints, to offer advice hood should be removed from passports and other
to victims of discrimination and to undertake aware- official documents.
ness-raising activities to promote the principles of
non-discrimination and understanding between differ- 5. Measures should be undertaken to ensure that minori-
ent communities. These commissions should have ties can participate in economic and public life
regional offices to cover remote rural areas. Their work without discrimination, including monitoring of
should be linked to building the capacity of the judici- recruitment practices and punitive measures against
ary and other legal institutions, including through those found to be discriminating against minority
human rights training and anti-discrimination pro- applicants. Laws should be passed and enforced, to
grammes. The authorities should undertake other criminalize the display of signs by shops or other busi-
measures to promote awareness of the value of diversi- nesses indicating that members of particular minority
ty, minority rights, and the contribution of various communities are unwelcome.
communities to the culture and history of Pakistan,
for example, by introducing new elements into school 6. Pakistan should ensure that all laws, policy and prac-
curricula. Funds must be made available to implement tice comply with its obligations under the Convention
these measures which should be devised with the full on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
and effective participation of representatives of minori- Against Women, the International Convention on the
ty groups and, for example, local inter-faith Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
committees. and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It
should take immediate steps to ratify and implement
3. The authorities should ensure that religious and other all of the remaining major human rights instruments,
minorities can participate in all aspects of public life. in particular the International Covenant on Civil and
They may consider a wide range of mechanisms for Political Rights, and the International Covenant on
ensuring participation of minorities in decision-mak- Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
1 Figure given in a statement by Ministry for Religious Affairs, 15 Pakistan’s tribal peoples in NWFP tend to be settled rather
Government of Pakistan. than nomadic. They live in small rural settlements, generally
2 Sir John Marshall established much of the prehistory of the in the border areas. They are ethnically Pushtuns, but are
Indus Valley civilization in the 1920s. For further information, divided into different clans.
see Wheeler, R.E.M., Five Thousand Years of Pakistan, Lon- 16 The sexist nature of feudal society is all too well known. See
don, Christopher Johnson Publishers Ltd, 1950; and Kenoyer, Durrani, T., My Feudal Lord, London, Corgi, 1995. For the pol-
J.M., Ancient Cities of the Indus Valley Civilization, Karachi, itics of feudal elitism and the official reluctance to
OUP, 1998. implement land reforms and agricultural tax, see Hussain, A.,
3 On the role of missionaries and the emergence of Christian Elite Politics in an Ideological State, London, Dawson, 1979.
communities in the region of Pakistan, see Malik, I.H., For the evolution of these feudal families and their repres-
U.S.–South Asia Relations, 1783–1940: A Historical Perspec- sion of landless peasants see Masud, M., Hari Report: Note
tive, Islamabad, Area Study Centre, 1988, pp. 32–63. of Dissent, Karachi, 1948.
4 The province of Balochistan accounts for 43 per cent of 17 During research in July–August 2001, many senior officials,
Pakistan’s territory but is the smallest in terms of population. especially from the army, boasted that most of the writers
Around 7 million inhabitants live in Balochistan, divided into and journalists were, in ‘our pockets’. Despite its crudity and
various Baloch and Pushtun tribes. Quetta is both a Baloch exaggeration, it remains true that the intelligence agencies
and Pushtun city with a sizeable number of Punjabis and carry a massive influence both through temptation and
Urdu–speakers. However, there are more Baloch in Karachi harassment. See, Ahmed, M., Pakistan Mein Intelligence
than in the entire province of Balochistan. Agencion Ka Siyasi Kirdar (The political role of intelligence
5 The Green Revolution entailed the mechanization of agricul- agencies in Pakistan), Lahore, Jahangir Book Depot 1993;
ture and the introduction of high-yield crops. also, Malik, op. cit., 1997, pp. 94–115.
6 Muhajirs/Muhajireen are those Urdu–speakers who emigrat- 18 For a pertinent study on Pakistan’s colonial heritage, see,
ed from India to Pakistan in 1947. Low, D.A. (ed.), The Political Inheritance of Pakistan, Bas-
7 For more on Biharis, see Whitaker, B. et al., The Biharis in ingstoke, Macmillan, 1991.
Bangladesh, London, MRG, 1982. 19 For a useful study by an insider, see Gauhar, A., Ayub Khan:
8 For conflictive pluralism in Sindh and the MQM, see Malik, Pakistan’s First Military Ruler, Lahore, Sang-i-Meel, 1993; also
I.H., State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ziring, L., The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969,
Ideology and Ethnicity, Oxford, St Antony’s-Macmillan, 1997, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1971, and Talbot, I.,
pp. 168–256. Pakistan: A Modern History, London, Hurst and Co., 1998.
9 The male children of these refugees, in most cases, ended 20 For further details see Sisson R. and Rose, L., War and
up at the religious schools – madrassahs – in Pakistan and Secession. Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh,
eventually emerged as the new political power in Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990.
Afghanistan. These students – the Taliban – quickly captured 21 For more on Bhutto’s personality and political profile see
Afghanistan and imposed their version of Islamic laws in Wolpert, S., Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, Karachi, OUP, 1994.
addition to persecuting the non-Pushtun opposition, mostly 22 Baxter, C. et al., Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of
marginalized in the north. This new phase in the civil war not Zia-ul-Haq, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1991.
only dissuaded Afghans from returning but also created a 23 Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Year Book 1994–5,
new refugee exodus Karachi, 1996, pp. 5–6.
10 See Malik, I.H., Islam, Nationalism and the West: Issues of 24 For the earliest account on the Kalasha, see Robertson, G.,
Identity in Pakistan, Oxford, St Antony’s-Macmillan, 1999, chs The Kafirs of the Hindu-Kush, Karachi, OUP, 1986 (reprint);
2 and 3. The Siege of Chitral, Karachi, OUP, 1977. Many people believe
11 See Hashmi, T.I., Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia, Denver, West- that Kipling’ story, The Man Who Would be King, is about the
view, 1992; Ahmad, A., Islamic Modernism in India and Kalasha and their descent from Alexander’s troops.
Pakistan, 1857–1947, Oxford, OUP, 1967; Shaikh, F., Commu- 25 Whenever there is a conversion to Islam, the local ulama
nity and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in organize a celebratory procession. Kalasha’s extreme pover-
Colonial India, 1860–1947, Cambridge, CUP, 1989; Jalal, A., ty and lack of resources make it difficult for them to retain
The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the their collective identity. Based on a personal visit and inter-
Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge, CUP, 1985. views in Ayun, Berar, Bhamboriyat, Chitral and Rambir.
12 This could be one reason other than the pace of events why 26 Based on interviews with several Baloch intellectuals and
the Indian leaders failed to fully predict the volatility and political leaders in Balochistan and Karachi in August 2001.
migrations during Partition. The British government, led by 27 Baloch, A.G., Zikri Firqa Ki Tarikh (The history of Zikri sect),
Mountbaten, in its cavalier haste, did not develop any mech- Urdu, Karachi, 1996, p. 51. Mr Baloch is the leader of the All-
anisms or safeguards for the would-be migrants and Pakistan Muslim Zikri Anjuman. He worked for different
insecure minorities. This lapse led to mayhem. See, French, official departments before his retirement. A native of Turbat,
P., Liberty or Death? London, Flamingo, 1997, and Talbot, I., he is a widely respected Zikri intellectual and author of sev-
Freedom’s Cry, Karachi, OUP, 1996. eral popular books. Recently, he has tried to challenge
13 The Muslim League was founded in 1906. It struggled for stereotypes about Zikris.
Pakistan in British India. Since 1947 it has splintered into 28 Baloch, A.G., A Short History of Zikri Faith, Karachi, n.d., p. 2.
factions. 29 Malai, S.N.A, Asalathul Zakarin, Turbat, Tehreek-i-Pairowan-i-
14 This was borne out in a nationwide survey in 1997. See ‘Fifty Mahdi 1994, p. 1.
Years: Fifty Questions’, Herald, Karachi, January 1997 and 30 Based on interviews and also Baloch, A.G., Zikri Mazhab
later in this report. Islam kay Aiynnah Mein (Zikri faith through Islamic prisms),
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Kenoyer, M., Ancient Cities of the Indus Valley Civilization, Movement and the Partition Experience in North-west India,
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Watch.
Indonesia: Regional Conflicts and State Terror Public Participation and Minorities, Yash Ghai
Mieke Kooistra Describes the range of devices that can be used to provi-
Focuses on the conflicts in Aceh and Moluku as a means de for participation, and discusses experiences of
of highlighting some of the factors that continue to pro- constitutional and political provision for minorities and
voke and prolong conflict in Indonesia. indigenous peoples.
2001 ISBN 1 897693 93 1, 32pp, £5.95/US$10.95 2001 ISBN 1 897693 69 9, 28pp, £5.95/US$10.95
working to secure the rights of
minorities and indigenous peoples
Recent massacres of religious groups in Pakistan have minorities of religious freedom and violated their rights as
focused new attention on their predicament in a country citizens. In addition, the decision of the current military
that is generally perceived to be a homogeneous Muslim regime to join the US-led coalition against terrorism has
nation. In fact, besides five ethno-regional groups (Baloch, provoked popular resentment and an internal backlash by
Muhajir, Pathan, Punjabi and Sindhi), there are the Ahmadi, extremist groups with renewed violence against minorities.
Christian and Hindu religious groups, and a number of
smaller Islamic groups. This report aims to enhance understanding of religious
minorities in Pakistan and increase awareness of the
Pakistan has been ruled by the military for much of its need for the protection of minority and gender-based
existence. The political use of religion by governments and rights across communities. With a general election due
a weak civil society pose enormous challenges for minori- this year in Pakistan, this report is timely and of direct rel-
ties in Pakistan. Non-Muslim communities and women in evance to both the international community and agencies
Pakistan are subject to harsh religious laws. Constitutional concerned with South Asia in general, and Pakistan in
amendments and the Blasphemy Law have deprived particular.
Minority Rights Group International 379 Brixton Road, London, SW9 7DE, United Kingdom ISBN 1 897693 69 9
Tel +44 (0)20 7978 9498 Fax +44 (0)20 7738 6265
Email minority.rights@mrgmail.org Website www.minorityrights.org