The Legal Insider in Collaboration With I.E.C. University, Sol National Virtual Moot Court Competition, 2020

THE LEGAL INSIDER IN COLLABORATION WITH I.E.C.
UNIVERSITY, SOL
NATIONAL VIRTUAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2020
THE LEGAL INSIDER IN COLLABORATION WITH I.E.C. UNIVERSITY, SOL

Before
The Hon’ble High Court of Mandas
WINCROP EARTH MOVERS Ltd. V MR. PINK PANTHER

AND
WINCROP EARTH MOVERS Ltd. V JOHN KUMBLE
AND
JOHN KUMBLE V MR. PINK PANTHER
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE JUDGES OF THE HIGH COURT OF MANDAS
[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT/PETITIONER]
1
TEAM CODE-31
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………………iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES …………………………..………………………………………...iv
TABLE OF CASES ………………………………………………………………………….v-vi
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION………………………………………………………........vii
SUMMARY OF FACTS …………………………………………………………………...viii-ix
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ………………………………………………………………….....x
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT………………………………………………………….…xi-xii
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ……………………………………………………………............1
[1.] MR. PINK PANTHER IS LIABLE FOR LEAKING THE CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION THAT HARMED THE COMPANY……………………………………...1
[1.1] Mr. Pink Panther is Negligent for the Act…………………………………………...1-3
[1.2] The Breach of Duty to Take Care…………………………………………………...3-4
[1.3] Mr. Panther is Negligence by The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur…………………4-5
[1.4] Ignorance of Law is not an Excuse…………………………………….....................5-6
[2.] JOHN IS LIABLE FOR ACCESSING THE DATABASE OF WEML COMPANY…7
[2.1] John Kumble Is Liable Under Section 72 And Section 72A Of The Information
Technology Act, 2000…………………………………………………………………………..7-8
[2.2] Case Laws towards Mala Fide act:………………………………………………….8-9
[2.3] Case Law on Not Having Good Faith:…………………………………………….10
[2.4] Subsequent Act Cannot Clock the Former Act………………………………….10-11

I
[3.] THE ACTIONS OF MR. PINK PANTHER ARE CONCLUSIVE TO STATE THAT
IS WAS A DEFAMATORY ACT…………………………………………………………11
[3.1] Intentional Act of Mr. Pink Panther………………………………………………..11
[3.2] Conclusive Proof……………………………………………………………………12
[3.3] Facts Admitted Need Not Be Proved……………………………………………13-15
[3.4] Good Faith……………………………………………………………………………15
[4.] THE HIGH COURT HAS THE POWER TO TAKE UP ANY CASE FROM A
SUBORDINATE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIGO………………………………………………………………………………………16
[4.1] Article 227 of the Constitution of Indigo………………………………………...16-17
[4.2] Article 227 Has Power of Superintendence …………………………………..…17-18
[4.3] District Courts play the Supplemental Role of High Court…………………………18
[4.4] Article 227 is a Basic Structure of the Constitution…………………………….18-19
[4.5] Jurisdiction of High Court in Case of Grave Injustice of Failure of Justice……….19-20
[4.6] Article 227 of the Constitution Has Width and Vigour Unprecedented……………..20
PRAYER…………………………………………………………………………………….….21
II
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
¶ Paragraph
COVID-19 Coronavirus 2
DPIIT Department of Promotion of Industry and International Trade
WEML Wincrop Earth Movers Ltd.
FIR First Information Report
§ Section
IT security Information and Technology Security
PIL Public Interest Litigation
AIR All India Reporters
Anr. Another
Art. Article
Co. Company
Corp. Corporation
Ltd. Limited
IPC Indian Penal Code
SARS-Cov-2 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Corona Virus 2
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
III
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CONSTITUTIONS
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1960
STATUTES
INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872
THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1862
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1974
THE INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908
BOOKS
1. M.P. JAIN , INDIAN CONSTITUTION LAW (10THEDN., 2018)
2. V.N. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (11THEDN., 2018)
3. VAKUL SHARMA, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW AND PRACTICE (6 TH
EDN., 2017)
4. DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (8 TH
ED. 2007).
5. R.K. BANGIA, LAW OF TORT (25THEDN., 2020)
6. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, LAW OF TORT (26THEDN., 2018)
7. AVTAR SINGH, LAW OF TORT (4THEDN., 2020)
WEBSITES
1. http://www.scconline.com
2. http://www.manupatrafast.com
3. http://www.judis.nic.in
MISCELLANEOUS
BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10THedn, 2014)
LIST OF CASES Page No.
IV
1. AG v. Shiv Kumar Yadav, (2016) 2 SCC 402………………………………………..19
2. Avtar Singh v. Gurdial Singh, (2006) 12 SCC 552 ……………………………..……14
3. Achutrao Haribhau’s Khodwa v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1992 SC 933…………..5
4. Balkrishna Hari Phansalkar v. Emperor,AIR 1933 Bombay 1…………………..……20
5. Bhuman Singh v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd, (2009) 5 SCC 136………….….14
6. Blyth v. Brimingham Waterworks Company (1856) 11 Ex.781………………………2
7. Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863)……………………………………..……..5
8. Donaghue v. Stevenson (1932) AC 562……………………………………………….1
9. Gannmani Anasuya v. Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary, (2007) 10 SCC
296………………………………………………………………………………...........14
10. General Officer Commanding v. Additional Director General ,(2012) 6 SCC
228…………………………………………………………………………………...…10
11. Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier Co. (1866) L.R. 1 C.P. 600. ………………………2
12. Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Ltd, 1935 AC 85…………………………………..4
13. Hayes v. Peters , 645 S.E.2d 846 ( N.C.Ct.App. 2007)…………………………….….5
14. Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 2 SCC 688……………….………..20
15. Karkhane Niyamit v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax , (2016) 3 KCCR(SN)
340…………………………………………………………………………………….....6
16. Madras bar Association v. Union of India, (2014) 10 SCC1 ……………..…………19
17. M.S. Grewal v. Deepchand Sood , AIR 2001 SC 3660……………………………….2
18. Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Subhagwanti, AIR 1966 SC 1750………………3,4
19. Mutha Associates v. States Of Maharashtra,(2013) 14 SCC 304……………………....9
20. Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2111………………………….2
21. Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel, (1996) 4SCC 332…………………………………….6
22. Ramjit Singh Kardam v. Sanjeev Kumar , (2020) 0 AIR (SC) 2060………………….10
23. Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cemen,t (2008) 14 SCC 58………………….…18
24. Santosh v. State of Maharashtra , (2015) 7SCC 641………………………………….11
25. Sameer Suresh Gupta Tr. Pa Holder v. Rahul Kumar Agarwal, (2013) 9 SCC
374……………………………………………………………………………………...19
26. Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC 545……………………………14
27. Sewakram Sobhani v. R K Karanjia, Chief Editor, Weekly Blitz, (1981) 3SCC…….15
V
28. State of Punjab v. Modern Cultivators, Ladwa , 1965 AIR17, 1964 SCR(8)
273………………………………………………………………………………………5
29. State of Bihar v. P P Sharma , (1992) Supp.1 (1) SCC 222………………………….10
30. State of Bihar v. P P Sharma , las, (1992) Supp .1 SCC 222…………………………11
31. Stansbie v. Troman (1948) 2KB 48……………………………………………………3
32. Suraj Jagannath Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra , (2020) 2 SCC 692…………………11
33. Swadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd . v. Government of Uttar Pradesh , (1975) 4 SCC
378………………………………………………………………………………………6
34. Thomas v. Quatermain (1887) 18 Q.B.D. 694…………………………………………2
35. Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India,(1991) 4 SCC 584……………..………2
36. Umaji Keshao Meshram and Ors. v. Smt. Radhikabai and Anr.,(1986) Suup. SCC
401……………………………………………………………………………………...20
37. Waryam Singh & Anr. v. Amarnath&Anr., (1954) SCR 565…………………………..21
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
VI
CIVIL APPEAL NO.----------------------OF 2020
The Hon‟ble high court of Mandas has Jurisdiction to hear the appeal and adjudicate over the
matter under article 227 of the Constitution of Indigo, 1950. Article 227 says that, determines
that every high court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction (except a court formed under a law related
to armed forces). The High Court can issue directions to the subordinate courts under this article
and the courts are bound by it.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
VII
The Republic of Indigo is a developing nation that is currently under lockdown due to the
pandemic COVID-19.
Wincrop Earth Movers Ltd. (WEML) is a heavy manufacturing industry. The company recently
collaborated with Mr. Wuhan Smith, to make self-driven trucks and cranes for industrial use.
The innovative intelligence team which led the whole concept and design for these advanced
engines and machines was led by Mr. Pink Panther.
Due to the surge in infected cases of COVID-19, the whole nation was put under lockdown by
the Prime Minister of Indigo from 1st of February 2020 until further notice indefinitely. Because
of the lockdown many companies including WEML also faced losses and subsequently started
laying off its employees. John Kumble was one such employee in Mr. Pink Panther’s team who
was an IT professional living in Sonar City. He could not work due to suffering from COVID-19
and was soon served with a notice of one month to resign from WEML on 15 th of February 2020.
When John tried to contact his superior to make them understand that his inability to work while
being infected with Covid-19 from home was not his fault, they ignored his phone calls for three
consecutive days.
John later found himself trying to access the private database, he got past the security systems
first as he could easily break it down, where he found the malware that was accessing all the data
and redirecting it to another server. On 19th of March 2020, John finally got in contact with his
superior Mr. Panther and informed him about the malware that he noticed on their private server.
Mr. Panther informed the IT Security Team of the issue that was informed to him and asked that
they fix the same. Due to this act of righteousness, on Mr. Panther’s recommendation, John was
offered his job back on 25th of March 2020.
Mr. Ghosh told his office to investigate the matter. Meanwhile, Mr. Panther joined Mechons Inc.
company on the 1st May 2020, as soon as he found an opening there. They offered him a pay rise
and made him the executive officer in the Technologies department.
On the 10th of May, 2020 when Mr. Sameer Ghosla received the report from the message action
apartment he found out that the client list had been leaked from their private and secure database
VIII
due to malware that allowed an outsider to steal their data easily. Mr. Ghosla questioned the
security department who told them about the breach in the system and came to know that Mr.
Panther was the last person who knew about this and he had recently joined Mechons Inc. which
was a supporter to WEML’s rival Barry's Engines. Mr. Ghosla on behalf of the company filed a
case in District Court against Mr. Panther on grounds of sharing sensitive and confidential
information and insider trading against him and said that he would drag him to court for this.
Mr. Panther in the agitation of the case filed against him made a remark in the public media.
On 30st June 2020, the Hon’ble Court concluded that only the knowledge of the situation of the
breach on the company’s system does not amount to Mr. Panther’s intent of leaking confidential
information that would harm the company and dismissed the case stating that in the matter of
fact, no conclusive evidence exists and the petition did not hold any reasonable ground to make
Mr. Panther liable.
In the aftermath of the media report, on the 5 th of July 2020, the company let go of John because
he was allegedly responsible for accessing the company's private system. Subsequently, two
weeks later the company filed a case against John for breaching their private database system.
John Kumble was unable to get a job for months due to the COVID-19 situation. It was also due
to the negative remark by Mr. Panther that he could not land a job anywhere he tried. On 20th of
August, John filed a case against Mr. Panther for publicly defaming him and depriving him of his
livelihood. On 10th of September 2020, WEML appealed to Hon’ble Mandas High Court against
the decision of the Court of Sessions. Considering the issue of a dispute being around the breach
in WEML, the High Court of Mandas issued a notice under Article 227 of the Constitution of
Indigo to the Court of Sessions and took up the matters for adjudication. The High Court of
Mandas has clubbed the Appeal and the petition of defamation and infiltration of data and fixed
31st of October 2020 as the date of hearing.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
IX
[1].
WHETHER MR. PANTHER IS LIABLE FOR LEAKING CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION THAT HARMED THE COMPANY?
[2].
IS JOHN LIABLE FOR ACCESSING THE COMPANY’S DATABASE OR NOT?
[3].
WHETHER THE ACTIONS OF MR. PANTHER ARE CONCLUSIVE TO STATE THAT
IT WAS A DEFAMATORY ACT OR NOT?
[4].
WHETHER THE HIGH COURT HAS THE POWER TO TAKE UP ANY CASE FROM
A SUBORDINATE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIGO OR NOT?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
X
At the outset, it is submitted that the Constitution of India is analogous to the Constitution of the
Republic of Indigo.
[1]. WHETHER MR. PANTHER IS LIABLE FOR LEAKING CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION THAT HARMED THE COMPANY?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court of Mandas that, Mr. Pink Panther is liable for
leaking the confidential information that harmed the company, under the Law of Tort Negligence
[1.1] and the Duty to take Care [1.2]; duty must be done by the delinquent person. Furthermore,
there is a consequential harm to the plaintiff, for instance, the harm caused to his reputation and
financial loss. Therefore, the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur also applies in that matter [1.3]. It is
also a settled rule that ‘ignorance of law is not an excuse’ [1.4].
[2.] IS JOHN LIABLE FOR ACCESSING THE COMPANIES DATABASE OR NOT?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that John Kumble is absolutely liable for
accessing the company’s database. Admittedly John Kumble is the IT person of the company
with responsibility of database of the company. He has entrusted the work of database to handle
to care and caution and he is not supposed make any peeping in the database of security system
but he himself accessed the private database of the company which is a malafide act. The act
done by John of his malfunctioning may be that he could find out about the malware accessing
all the data and redirecting it to another server is of his luck favouring him but his intention was
someway other and the luck gives him favour. Therefore, the first act done by John breaching the
security system by past with security system is a commission of offence under S. 72 as well as S.
72A of Information Technology Act, 2000 [2.1]which cannot be waived by the subsequent
conduct of John informing the superior by taking into consideration that it is his good conduct.
When wrong is committed he is to face the consequences. John Kumble’s act of breaking the
security system is mala fide [2.2] for which he is liable for Section 72 and 72 A of the
Information Technology Act, 2000. The act done by John Kumble was not in good faith [2.3]
because of his absence of honesty etc.
IS WAS A DEFAMATORY ACT?
XI
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the actions of Mr. pink panther are
conclusive to state that it was a defamatory act because The statement of admission of Mr.
Panther is a conclusive proof because the admission itself is one fact which is declared by
Section 58 of the Evidence Act that facts admitted need not be proved and it is crystal clear that
the name of John Kumble was deliberately used by Mr. Panther with a view to lower down the
reputation of Mr. John Kumble in the society and damages his goodwill.
INDIGO?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court of Mandas that high court has the power to take
up any case from subordinate court under article 227 because The Hon’ble Mandas High Court
clubbed all the cases including the pending case of lower court for the purpose of properly
adjudicating the matter and the notice was issued under Article 227 of the Constitution of Indigo
means call for the records of lower court. The call for records from the lower courts is
empowered by Article 227 as well as there is a power of superintendence under Article 227 of
the Constitution conferred on every High Court over all courts and tribunals throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction is very wide and discretionary in nature
and Hon’ble High Court of Mandas has ample jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution
of Indigo to call for all the records pending in the subordinate courts and clubbed together.
XII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
[1.] MR. PINK PANTHER IS LIABLE FOR LEAKING THE CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION THAT HARMED THE COMPANY
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Mr. Pink Panther is fully responsible for
leaking the confidential information for which the company suffered loss because the attitude
and conduct of Mr. Pink Panther joining the Mechons Inc. Company is the conclusive proof of
his involvement in the leaking of confidential information. It can be safely presumed from the
facts that in spite of John’s effort to inform Mr. Panther, he did not allow reaching him by
avoiding the situation and took a plea that he thought it as a prank e-mail. He did not even make
a call to John to confirm doubt of prank call. It is a settle law that ignorance of law has no
excuse. It is the negligent act of Mr. Panther for which he is fully responsible for the loss of
company.
[1.1]. MR. PINK PANTHER IS NEGLIGENT FOR THE ACT

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the defendant hereinafter Mr. Panther is
liable for the act of tort of negligence. The act is that when Mr. John tried to contact his superior
to inform them about the confidential and sensitive data was getting redirected, (which includes
the client list) they constantly ignored his calls and dismissed his emails as a prank. 1
Furthermore, Mr. Panther should have taken quick action on that, but he did not, and therefore
the concept of tort of negligence arises and he is obliged to observe a duty of care towards
plaintiff.2 In the case of Donoghue vs. Stevenson, 1932 AC 562, the court affirmed that
negligence is a tort. A plaintiff can take civil action against a respondent if the respondent’s
negligence causes the plaintiff injury or loss of property. Previously, the plaintiff had to
demonstrate some contractual arrangement for negligence to be proven, such as the sale of an
item or an agreement to provide a service. Since Donoghue had not purchased the drink, she
could prove no contractual arrangement with Stevenson yet Lord Atkinson’s judgment
established that Stevenson was still responsible for the integrity of his product.
1
Fact sheet ¶ 9
2
Donaghue v Stevenson (1932) AC 562
1
“Negligence is the breach of a legal duty to take care which results in damage, undesired by the
defendant to the plaintiff.” and Negligence in common parlance means and implies failure to
exercise due care, expected of reasonable and prudent person. 3 It was a breach of duty and
negligence in law ranging from inadvertence to shameful disregard of safety of others. 4 In short,
it is want of attention and doing something, which a prudent and reasonable man would not
do.5“Negligence means more than headless or careless conduct, whether in commission or
omission; it properly connotes the complex concept of duty, breach, and damage thereby suffered
by the person to whom the duty was owed.” In the case of Blyth v. Brimingham Waterworks
Company the concept of negligence is defined. 6 The court held that “negligence is omission to
do something which a reasonable man guided upon those considerations which ordinarily
regulate human affairs, would do, or doing something which prudent and reasonable man
would not do.” The defendant had done all they reasonably could have done to prevent the
damage, so there was no liability. The breach of duty may be occasioned either by not doing
something which a reasonable man, under given set of circumstance, would do, or, by doing
some act which a reasonable prudent man would not do.7
In the case Union Carbide Corporation vs. Union of India 8 the court held that, the govt. of India
should take highly safety ingredient, which was not taken there were three safety system but all
three are not in working condition. First was the vent gas scrubber, which was considered the
main line of defense it was not in operation condition. Then second one the workers tried turning
on the flare tower to burn off toxic gas. This system was not in working condition as a piece of
pipeline leading to the tower had been removed for maintenance. Third one then workers tried
Transferring the MIC from the tank into the nearby spare tank. The gauge of the spare tank
indicated that the tank already contained something. So this gauge indicator was found defective
later on. On the all point of ingredient the Union Carbide factory did not have the safe storage of
these highly toxic gases, and lack of emergency services and they have not many trained
3
Grill v General Iron Screw Collier Co. (1866) L.R. 1 C.P. 600.
4
Thomas v Quatermain (1887) 18 Q.B.D. 694
5
M.S. Grewal v Deepchand Sood, AIR 2001 SC 3660.
6
Blyth v Brimingham Waterworks Company (1856) 11 Ex. 781
7
Poonam Verma v Ashwin Patel & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2111
8
Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584.
2
professionals in that factory. So on that the court found that the union carbide company is liable
for part of tort of negligence.
[1.2] THE BREAH OF DUTY TO TAKE CARE

One very important condition for the liability in negligence is that the plaintiff must prove that due
to the negligence the defendant is not able to perform his duties 9. Here Mr. John found himself
trying to access the private database, he got past the security system first as he could easily break it
down.10
The question is to how someone can access easily into the very high profile multinational company
such as WEML. There was a duty upon Mr. Panther to put a strict security system. Furthermore,
Mr. Panther is liable for breach of duty to take care, and the duty must be towards the plaintiff. He
should have improved the security system.
The word “duty” connotes the relationship between one person and another imposing on the one
an obligation, for the benefit of another to take reasonable care in all circumstances.11 The first
element of negligence involves the imposition upon a person, a duty of care. This duty seems
necessarily from the relationship between the parties.
It is not ample that the defendant owes a duty to take care of. A duty should be there, according to
which, the defendant should owe a duty of care towards the plaintiff 12, in the case of Stansbie vs.
Troman, Stansbie argued there was no duty upon him to keep the house secure against thieves.
Certain obligations rested upon him under the agreement with Troman, but it was beyond the
scope of these contractual obligations to impose a duty to lock the house when he left it. If the
house was unoccupied, he would be under such a duty but Troman’s home was occupied and,
therefore, the obligations to secure the property rested with Troman. Even if there was a duty
incumbent upon him, the theft was conducted by a third party such that there was a break in the
chain of causation, and the losses could not be said to stem from the breach. Troman contended
the contractual agreement imposed a duty on Stansbie to take reasonable care regarding the state
9
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Subhagwanti, AIR 1966 SC 1750
10
Fact sheet ¶ 9
11
Christopher Walton and Roger Cooper (eds.), Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence (Sweet & Maxwell, London,
2006).
12
Stansbie v Troman (1948) 2 KB 48
3
of the premises when he left them. Stansbie was in breach of duty by leaving the door unlocked,
and as a direct result of this breach, a thief entered the property and stole valuable items.
Stansbie was liable for the cost of the stolen items. He was under a duty to take reasonable care
when he left the premises unoccupied. Leaving the house unoccupied for two hours with the door
unlocked amounted to a failure to take reasonable care and as a direct result, Troman suffered
losses for which Stansbie was liable.
In this case Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Ltd.13 the court held that from a retailer, the plaintiff
purchases two sets of woolen underwear. After wearing it, he suffers from a skin disease. This
problem occurs due to the excess amount of sulphates present in the wool and not removing it at the
time of washing it due to the negligence at the time of washing it. In this case, the manufacturers are
completely liable as they are not able to perform their duty correctly.
In the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Subhagwanti14, in this case court held that, a
number of persons died due the collapsing of a clock-tower in the heart of the Chandni Chowk,
Delhi. The normal lives of such structures are normally 40-45 years but the tower was around 80
years old. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi is held liable as it is under their hands and they are
not able to take care and perform their duties efficiently.
[1.3] MR. PANTHER IS NEGIGLENCE BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA

LOQUITUR
Mr. Panther is liable under the negligence of doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur. The doctrine stated
that “the thing speaks for itself.” The concept allows a plaintiff in a case to establish a rebuttal
presumption of negligence by using circumstantial evidence. In doing so, negligence is presumed
because there is no other reasonable explanation for what happened. However, under res Ipsa
Loquitur, the defendant’s negligence may be presumed and thus does need not be proven 15.
Furthermore, Mr. Panther is negligently held by the above explanation, the damage is being
under the direct control of the defendant or his representative, he has a duty to take care of each
and every aspect of the act which is on that position, and he should check the security system and
check the phone calls or e-mails. On that point any and how he breached the duty, and there were
13
Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd., 1935 AC 85
14
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v Subhagwanti, AIR 1966 SC 1750
15
Hayes v Peters, 645 S.E.2d 846 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
4
injury happened because of their breach to the plaintiff. Because of that the WEML companies’
reputation is harmed and turned down into huge amount of loss (money & client).
The elements of Res Ipsa Loquitur are:

1) The defendant was in exclusive control of the situation or instrument that caused the injury;
2) The injury would not have ordinarily occurred but for the defendant’s negligence; and
3) The plaintiff’s injury was not due to his own action or contribution.
In the case of Byrne v. Boadle16, The facts of the case were that in 1863 in England, a barrel of
flour fell from a two-storey building and hit the plaintiff’s head, but the plaintiff could not
acquire direct evidence against defendant to allege negligence on his part. Moreover, barrels of
flour don’t ordinarily fall from warehouse windows in the absence of negligent conduct of the
people running that warehouse. But the court held the judgment for the plaintiff and opined that
the circumstances were different in this case, and there could be a presumption of negligence.
In the case of State of Punjab v. Modern Cultivators, Ladwa, 17The facts of this case were that
plaintiff Modern Cultivators suffered losses due to flooding of its land as a result of a breach in a
canal belonging to the State of Punjab. The Trial Court awarded damages and decreed the suit
which was upheld by the First Appellate Court and in Second Appeal by Hon’ble High Court.
However, High Court reduced a number of damages. Both the parties approached Hon’ble
Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court held the defendant was negligent by applying the rule
of Res Ipsa Loquitor.
In the case of Achutrao Haribhau’s case 18, the patient was admitted for a minor operation, during
which a mop was left in the abdomen, leading to peritonitis and death. The Supreme Court held
this is a case in which the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur clearly applies.
[1.4] IGNORANCE OF LAW IS NOT AN EXCUSE
It is a settled principle that ignorance of law is not an excuse. Therefore, it is humbly submitted
before the Hon’ble Court that it is the negligent act of Mr. Pink Panther for which he is fully
responsible for the loss of the company. In this regard the appellant relied upon the following
decisions:
16
Byrne v Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
17
State of Punjab v Modern Cultivators, Ladwa, 1965 AIR 17, 1964 SCR (8) 273
18
Achutrao Haribhau’s Khodwa v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1992 SC 933.
5
In Swadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd. v Government of Uttar Pradesh 19, their lordships in
paragraph 3 held as follows, “Every individual is deemed to know the law of the land. The Court
merely interprets the law and do not make law. Ignorance of law is not an excuse for not taking
appropriate steps within limitation…”
In another case of a division bench judgement passed by Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in
Karkhane Niyamit v Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax20, their lordships held in paragraph
11 that, “Merely because the parties were unaware of the law does not mean that courts can
ignore the law and provide to the contrary.”
In the case of Poonam Verma v Ashwin Patel21 their lordships held in paragraph 42 that, “…
where a person is guilty of negligence per se, no further proof is needed…” In the said
judgement in paragraph 40 their lordships held that, “Negligence has many manifestations- it
may be active negligence, collateral negligence, comparative negligence, concurrent negligence,
criminal negligence, continued negligence, hazardous negligence, willful or reckless negligence
or negligence per se, which is defined in Black’s Law dictionary as under:-
Negligence per se: conduct whether of action or omission, which may be declared and treated as
negligence without any argument or proof as to the particular surrounding circumstances, either
because it is in violation of statute or valid municipal ordinance, or because it is so palpably
opposed to the dictates of common prudence that it can be said without hesitation or doubt that
no careful person would have been guilty of it. as a general rule, the violation of a public duty,
enjoyed by law for the protection of person or property, so constitutes.”
Therefore, relying upon the decisions of the above noted case laws of the Supreme Court and the
High Court of Karnataka, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Mr. Pink Panther
has willfully discarded the e-mail sent by his team assistant, John Kumble, for which the
company suffered loss as a result of his negligence. Mr. Panther cannot escape by saying that he
was ignorant about the consequence of his willful avoidance by pretending it to be prank e-mail.
[2.] JOHN IS LIABLE FOR ACCESSING THE DATABASE OF WEML COMPANY
19
Swadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd. v Government of Uttar Pradesh, (1975) 4 SCC 378
20
Karkhane Niyamit v Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, (2016) 3 KCCR (SN) 340
21
Poonam Verma v Ashwin Patel, (1996) 4 SCC 332
6
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Mr. Pink Panther was working in WEML
Company as an engineer and Mr. John Kumble was working under him in the company as an IT
professional having quality of expert in IT profession who can easily break security systems of
private database. Because of this quality John Kumble, he grew a tendency of entering into
private database by breaking down security systems. Thereby he broke the security system of
WEML and found that some malware was there in accessing all the data of the company
redirecting into another server. This work was entrusted to him by the company and by a
malafide intention without knowing the consequences he has done it. Admittedly John Kumble is
the IT person of the company with responsibility of database of the company. He has entrusted
the work of database to handle to care and caution and he is not supposed make any peeping in
the database of security system but he himself accessed the private database of the company
which is a malafide act. The act done by John of his malfunctioning may be that he could find
out about the malware accessing all the data and redirecting it to another server is of his luck
favouring him but his intention was someway other and the luck gives him favour
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that John Kumble is fully liable for accessing
the company’s database by breaching the security system. He being the IT person of the
company is fully responsible for every malware of the database. But he ignored his duty. More
so, while he is entrusted with the responsibility of security system, he was not properly doing his
work with care and caution for which the security system was leaked redirecting it to another
server. John was not keeping himself alert for any kind of threat of malware for which the data
was able to redirect to another server.
The act done by John Kumble for breaching the security system was not on good faith but with
his mala fide intention which cannot be covered by subsequent conduct of John that he informed
to his superior.
[2.1] John Kumble Is Liable Under Section 72 And Section 72A Of The Information
Technology Act, 2000.
The Section 72 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 reads as follows: “Save as otherwise
provided in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, if any person who, in pursuance
of any of the powers conferred under this Act, rules or regulations made thereunder, has secured
7
access to any electronic record, book, register, correspondence, information, document or other
material without the consent of the person concerned discloses such electronic record, book,
register, correspondence, information, document or other material to any other person shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may
extend to one lakh rupees, or with both”
Also, Section 72 A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 reads as follows: “Save as
otherwise provided in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, any person including
an intermediary who, while providing services under the terms of lawful contract, has secured
access to any material containing personal information about another person, with the intent to
cause or knowing that he is likely to cause wrongful loss or wrongful gain discloses, without the
consent of the person concerned, or in breach of a lawful contract, such material to any other
person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with
fine which may extend to five lakh rupees, or with both.”
Going through the act and omission of John Kumble towards the breaking of security system it
finds place that he was entrusted with the security system of the company, but in spite of keeping
the same as safely, he himself accessed in the security system without the knowledge of the
company which amounts to commission of offence under Section 72 and Section 72 A of the
Information Technology Act, 2000.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the petitioner has relied upon the following
case laws:-
[2.2]Case Laws towards Mala Fide act:
In the case of Electronics Trade and Technology Development Corp. ltd. Secunderabad v Indian
Technologists and Engineers (Electronics) P. ltd. & Anr.22 In paragraph 3, their Lordships held
that, “... he has instructed their Bank to stop payment only with the mala fide intention of
escaping from the liability under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. He has so instructed
their bank so he has no funds to their credit. Hence, the accused is liable for offence under
Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act.”
22
Electronics Trade and Technology Development Corp. ltd. Secunderabad v Indian Technologists and Engineers
(Electronics) P. ltd. & Anr, (1996) 2 SCC 739
8
Relying upon the ratio of the above noted case in our case in hand it appears that John Kumble’s
act of breaking the security system is mala fide for which he is liable for Section 72 and 72 A of
the Information Technology Act, 2000.
In the case Mutha Associates v State of Maharashtra23 their Lordships in paragraph 40 held as
follows, “...50. Malafide means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper
motive or ulterior purpose. The administrative action must be said to be done in good faith if it is
fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. An act done honestly is deemed to have
been done in good faith.”
Relying upon the ratio of the noted case law, it is humbly submitted in our instant case that the
act done by Mr. John is of his ultra vires act because he was not entrusted to peep into the
security system but he has done it beyond his jurisdiction. Therefore, it cannot be said that he has
done it honestly and his good faith is not there. As such he is liable for that.
In the case between Ramjit Singh Kardam v Sanjeev Kumar24 their Lordships held in Para 59
(26.1) while discussing about the term malice that, “...in State of Bihar v P P Sharma, (1992)
Supp. 1 (1) SCC 22225, this court summed up the law on the subject in the following words: (SCC
p. 260 paras 50-51)
“50. ‘Mala fides’ means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive
or ulterior purpose...”
In our instant case the act done by John for accessing the company’s database is clearly a mala
fide because he has done it without having any good faith and personal bias an also improper
motive. Therefore, he is fully liable for his improper act.
[2.3] Case Law on Not Having Good Faith:
In the case of General Officer Commanding v Additional Director General 26 their Lordships in
paragraph 44 held as follows, “...the expression has several shades of meanings. In the popular
23
Mutha Associates v State of Maharashtra , (2013) 14 SCC 304
24
Ramjit Singh Kardam v Sanjeev Kumar, (2020) 0 AIR (SC) 2060
25
State of Bihar v P P Sharma, (1992) Supp. 1 (1) SCC 222
26
General Officer Commanding v Additional Director General, (2012) 6 SCC 228
9
sense the phrase ‘in good faith’ simply means honestly, without fraud, collusion or deceit, really,
actually, without pretence and without intent to assist or act in furtherance of a fraudulent or
otherwise unlawful scheme...Although the meaning of ‘good faith’ may vary in context to
different statutes, subjects and situations, honest intent free from taint of fraud or fraudulent
design, is a constant element of its connotation.”
Now applying the ratio of the above noted case law it is crystal clear that the act done by John
Kumble was not in good faith because of his absence of honesty etc.
In the case or State of Bihar v P. P. Sharma, Ias 27 their Lordships in paragraph 50 held as
follows, “...malafide means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper
motive or ulterior purpose. The administrative action must be said to be done in good faith if it
in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. An act done honestly is deemed to
have done in good faith.”
Now, applying the ratio of the above noted case in our instant case it is crystal clear that
whatever done by Mr. John Kumble was neither negligently nor honestly, but he had done it ultra
vires. Therefore, he is completely liable for the offence under Section 72 and 72 A of the
Information Technology Act, 2000.
[2.4] Subsequent Act Cannot Clock the Former Act
In the case between Suraj Jagannath Jadhav v State of Maharashtra28 their Lordships in Para 5
(5.2) (15) held that, “...in the instant case, the accused was in his complete senses, knowing fully
well the consequences of his act. The subsequent act of powering water by the accused on the
deceased also appears to be an attempt to clock his guilt since he did it only when the deceased
screamed for help. Therefore, it cannot be considered as a mitigating factor. An act undertaken
by a person in full awareness, knowing its consequences cannot be treated on a par with an act
committed by a person in a highly inebriated condition where his faculty of reason becomes
blurred...”
27
State of Bihar v P. P. Sharma, Ias , (1992) Supp.1 SCC 222
28
Suraj Jagannath Jadhav v State of Maharashtra, (2020) 2 SCC 692
10
Relying upon the decision of the above noted case law in our instant case it is crystal clear that
John Kumble is completely liable for his act of unauthorised accessing the company’s database
which he cannot cover of his guiltiness by doing his subsequent act of information to his
superior.
In the case between Santosh v State of Maharashtra29 their Lordships in Para 14 held that, “...In
the instant case the accused was in his complete senses, knowing fully well the consequences of
his act. The subsequent act of powering water by the accused on the deceased also appears to an
attempt to clock his guilt since he did it only when the deceased screamed for help. Therefore, it
cannot be considered as a mitigating factor. An act undertaken by a person in full awareness,
knowing its consequences cannot be treated at par with an act committed by a person in a highly
inebriated condition while his faculty of reasons become blurred...”
Applying the decision of the above noted case it is clear that John cannot be allowed to take
advantage of his subsequent act of informing his superiors about the malware of database
system.
IS WAS A DEFAMATORY ACT
[3.1] Intentional Act of Mr. Pink Panther
The petitioner humbly submitted that the case is based on the publication of public media
whereby Mr. Panther made a statement against Mr. John Kumble. It is an admitted fact that the
statement is made by Mr. Panther. The statement is as follows, “I am not responsible for all this
nonsense and they were framing me wrongly just because they wanted to get back at me since I
resigned from that toxic workplace, I didn't even know about the breach until I was told by an
employee who was initially fired and wanted to check for himself whether it was true or not, that
employee was named John! He informed me about the malware I did not know about, he told me
that it needs to be fixed. I am not responsible for this.”
From this statement, it is crystal clear that the name of John Kumble was deliberately used by
Mr. Panther with a view to lower down the reputation of Mr. John Kumble in the society and
29
Santosh v State of Maharashtra, (2015) 7 SCC 641
11
damages his goodwill. He could have kept silent from naming any person. Because Mr.
Panther’s intention was not good towards John and with a view to harm him he intentionally took
the name of John Kumble to damage him. If the statement was made by Mr. Panther with a view
to make himself exonerate then he ought not to have blamed anybody. But he blamed John
Kumble. From these activities of Mr. Panther it is clear that he intentionally took the name of
John Kumble to harm and damage his reputation in the society for which John suffered and
unable to secure any job for himself. Apart from this the ill motive of Mr. Panther can be
gathered from the subsequent act of Mr. Panther that while WEML company was in distress he
instead of saving the company joined in a new company Mechons Inc. which is a supporter to
WEML’s rival Barry’s Engines. So it can safely be presumed that the publication made in the
social media by Mr. Panther against John Kumble is intentional to save himself to show off he is
not liable for the harm caused to the company. Mr. Panther made the statement so tactfully and
with all cautions to save himself by blaming Mr. John with all mala fide intention to damage
John knowing it fully that it will cause harm to the reputation of Mr. John. Therefore, the only
statement of Mr. Panther is sufficient to prove that the statement is made by Mr. Panther with a
mala fide intention against Mr. John which is conclusive proof of defamation by way of own
admission.
[3.2] Conclusive Proof
The Section 4 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 defines the conclusive proof as follows:
“”Conclusive proof”.—When one fact is declared by this Act to be conclusive proof of another,
the Court shall, on proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved, and shall not allow
evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it.”30
Admittedly, Mr. Pink Panther made a remark in the public media by saying that “I was told by an
employee who was initially fired and wanted to check for himself whether it was true or not, that
employee was named John.” If this statement is considered then it is the only statement of the
own admission of Mr. Panther defaming Mr. John Kumble. It is, therefore, conclusive proof of
making the statement against John whose fact is declared by John Kumble as an admission and
the law says that admission does not need to be proved. Thereby, it is a conclusive proof.
30
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
12
The statement of admission of Mr. Panther is a conclusive proof because the admission itself is
one fact which is declared by Section 58 of the Evidence Act that facts admitted need not be
proved.
[3.3] Facts Admitted Need Not Be Proved
The Section 58 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is defined as follows: “Facts admitted need
not be proved. —No fact need to be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their
agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any
writing under their hands, or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time they are deemed
to have admitted by their pleadings: Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the
facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.”31
The petitioner relied upon the following case laws:
In the case of Seth Ramdayal Jat v Laxmi Prasad32 in Para 20, their Lordships held that,
“...Section 58 of The Indian Evidence Act reads as follows…….in view of the aforementioned
provision, there cannot be any doubt or dispute that a thing admitted need not be proved…”
In another case of Avtar Singh v Gurdial Singh33 their Lordships in Para 14 held that, “…
admission, evidence, it is well known, forms the based evidence. It may be that admission does
not create any title, but the nature of land can form subject matter of admission.
Section 58 of the Evidence Act postulates that things admitted need not be proved…”
In the case between Gannmani Anasuya v Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary 34 their Lordships in
Para 23 held that, “…on terms of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a thing admitted
need not be proved…”
31
Ibid
32
Seth Ramdayal Jat v Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC 545
33
Avtar Singh v Gurdial Singh, (2006) 12 SCC 552
34
Gannmani Anasuya v Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary, (2007) 10 SCC 296
13
In the case between Bhuwan Singh v Oriental Insurance Company ltd35 in Para 20 their
Lordships held, “It is now well-settled in view of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act that facts
admitted need not be proved.”
Now, relying upon the decisions of the above cited case laws the petitioner humbly submitted
that from all the facts and circumstances it is well established that the statement made by Mr.
Panther in the social media is only to damage and defame John Kumble and the statement alone
is sufficient to hold that it is a conclusive proof by way admission that the same is proved
conclusively in the case.
The word defamation is defined in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as, “Whoever, by words either
spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any
imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe
that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases
hereinafter expected, to defame that person. Explanation 1.—It may amount to defamation to
impute anything to a deceased person, if the imputation would harm the reputation of that person
if living, and is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives.
Explanation 2.—It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or
an association or collection of persons as such. Explanation 3.—An imputation in the form of an
alternative or expressed ironically, may amount to defamation. Explanation 4.—No imputation is
said to harm a person’s reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation
of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of
that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes
it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally
considered as disgraceful.”36
Now, it can be seen from the statement of Mr. Panther that the aim and object of Mr. Panther to
make the statement is gather a good will for himself by damaging Mr. John so that he could
acquire a good job in any company and he did so because by the statement damaging John he
was able to procure a good job in Mechons Inc. company. Therefore, his intention to make the
statement is clear that he with a view to harm John deliberately made the statement knowing or
35
Bhuwan Singh v Oriental Insurance Company Ltd, (2009) 5 SCC 136
36
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
14
having reasons to believe that such imputation will harm John about the reputation wherein John
was at a distress. Therefore, John is totally liable of making the statement of his defamatory
works.
In this regard the petitioner relied upon the following case laws:
Sewakram Sobhani v R K Karanjia, Chief Editor, Weekly Blitz 37 their Lordships in Para 29 held
that, “...Section 499 defines defamation. It is defined as follows: Whoever, by words either
spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any
imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe
that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases
hereinafter expected, to defame that person.
[3.4] Good Faith
In the same case law at Para 30, their Lordships held that good faith has been defined in Section
52 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as, ““Good faith”.—Nothing is said to be done or believed in
“good faith” which is done or believed without due care and attention38.
The definition is expressed in negative terms. Normally proof of an exception lies on the person
who claims it, but the definition of the expression good faith indicates that lack of good faith has
been made a part of the offence which the prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt.
On the other hand the mere proof by the accused of the report to be an authentic document is
enough, it will create a doubt in the mind of the court as to lack of good faith on the part of the
accused…”
Applying the ratio of the above noted case in our case in hand, since, Mr. Pink Panther has not
brought any evidence to say that he has not made any statement in the social media and his
activities proves that he has not told the statement in good faith.
In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case the petitioner humbly submits that the
statement of Mr. Pink Panther is conclusive proof of defamation.
37
Sewakram Sobhani v R K Karanjia, Chief Editor, Weekly Blitz (1981) 3 SCC 208
38
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
15
INDIGO
Behind the facts of raising the Issue No.4 in the Mandas High Court is that in the district court a
case was lodged by WEML against Mr. Panther through its director Mr. Sameer Ghosla on the
ground of sharing sensitive and confidential information and insider trading against him.
Mr. Panther while contesting the case made remark in the public media that he is not responsible
for all this work and the company wrongly implicated him because of his resignation from the
company wherein he does not know about the breach until he was told by john Kumble about the
malware for which he is not responsible for this. Mr. Panther won the case in the district court
for which the company filed an appeal against Mr. Panther.
Meanwhile after filing of the appeal WEML Company filed a case against John Kumble for
breaching the private database system.
Thereafter, John Kumble also filed a case against Mr. Panther for publicly defaming him and
depriving him of his livelihood because he was not getting any job in another company for the
remarks made by Panther in public media.
Thereafter while the Hon’ble Mandas High Court took up the appeal, issued a notice under
Article 227 of the Constitution of Indigo to the Court of Sessions and took up the matter for
adjudication and clubbed the appeal and the petition of defamation and infiltration of data.
[4.1] Article 227 of the Constitution of Indigo
Now, the Article 227 of the Constitution of Indigo reads as follows:
Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court

(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the
territories interrelation to which it exercises jurisdiction
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the High Court may
(a) call for returns from such courts;
16
(b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and
proceedings of such courts; and
(c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such
courts
(3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and
officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practicing therein: Provided
that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause ( 2 ) or clause ( 3 ) shall not
be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the
previous approval of the Governor
(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court power of superintendence
over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces39
The Hon’ble Mandas High Court clubbed all the cases including the pending case of lower court
for the purpose of properly adjudicating the matter and the notice was issued under Article 227
of the Constitution of Indigo means call for the records of lower court. The call for records from
the lower courts is empowered by Article 227. In this regard the appellant relied upon the
following decisions.
[4.2] Article 227 Has Power of Superintendence
In the case of Ramesh Chandra Sankla v Vikram Cement40 their Lordships held in Para 81 that,
“...the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution conferred on every High
Court over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction is very wide and discretionary in nature. It can be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to
meet the ends of justice. It is equitable in nature. While exercising supervisory jurisdiction, a
High Court not only acts as a Court of law but also as a court of equity. It is, therefore, power
and also the duty of the court to ensure that power of superintendence must advance the ends of
justice and uproot injustice.”
Hence, applying the ratio of the above noted case in our instant case it is crystal clear that for the
ends of justice and uproot injustice the Hon’ble Mandas High Court clubbed all the cases
39
The Constitution of India, 1950
40
Ramesh Chandra Sankla v Vikram Cement (2008) 14 SCC 58
17
together for the purpose of proper adjudication. Hence the Hon’ble Court has not done any
wrong in call for the records from the lower court.
In the case between AG v Shiv Kumar Yadav41 their Lordships in Para 28 held that, “It will also
be pertinent to mention that power of judicial superintendence under Article 227 of the
Constitution and under Section 482, CrPC has to exercised sparingly when there is a patent error
or gross injustice in the view taken by subordinate court. The Hon’ble High Court clubbed all the
case by using this power to check failure of justice.
[4.3] District Courts play the Supplemental Role of High Court
In the case between Madras Bar Association v Union of India 42 their Lordships in Para 99 held
that, “...the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Article 226/227 and upon the
Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of
our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and tribunals may
perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Article 226/227 and 32 of
the Constitution.”
Here, in our instant case except the appeal other cases were pending in the district court which is
supplemental role and thereby the High Court of Mandas called for the records.
[4.4] Article 227 is a Basic Structure of the Constitution
In the case between Sameer Suresh Gupta Tr. Pa Holder v Rahul Kumar Agarwal43 their
Lordships in Para 7(i) held as follows, “...the High Court’s power of superintendence under
Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of
the Constitution by Constitution Bench of this court in L Chandra Kumar v Union of Indian and
therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also doubtful.”
Also, in the case between Imtiyaz Ahmad v State of Uttar Pradesh 44 their Lordships in Para 61
held that, “...It is true that this Court has no power of superintendence over High Court as the
41
AG v Shiv Kumar Yadav, (2016) 2 SCC 402
42
Madras bar Association v Union of India, (2014) 10 SCC 1
43
Sameer Suresh Gupta Tr. Pa Holder v Rahul Kumar Agarwal, (2013) 9 SCC 374
44
Imtiyaz Ahmad v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 2 SCC 688
18
High Court has over district courts under Article 227 of Constitution. Like this Court, High
Court is equally a superior court of records with plenary jurisdiction...”
Relying upon the decisions of the above cited case the appellant humbly submitted that the
Hon’ble High Court of Mandas has ample jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of
Indigo to call for all the records pending in the subordinate courts and clubbed together.
[4.5] Jurisdiction of High Court in Case of Grave Injustice of Failure of Justice
In the case between Umaji Keshao Meshram and Ors. v Smt. Radhikabai and Anr.45 it was held
that proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court
while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory.
The power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for
the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority
and not for correcting mere errors.
The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as
when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to
exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii)
the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamount to
overstepping the limits of jurisdiction.
In the case of Balkrishna Hari Phansalkar v Emperor46, the question arose before a Special
Bench: whether the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court by Section 107 of
Government of India Act 1915 can be controlled by the Governor-General exercising his power
to legislate. The occasion arose because of the resistance offered by the State Government to the
High Court exercising its power of superintendence over the Courts of Magistrates established
under Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1932. Chief Justice Beaumont held that even if power of
revision is taken away, the power of superintendence over the courts constituted by the ordinance
was still available. The Governor-General cannot control the powers conferred on the High Court
by an Act of Imperial Parliament. However, speaking of the care and caution to be observed
45
Umaji Keshao Meshram and Ors. v Smt. Radhikabai and Anr., (1986) Supp. SCC 401
46
Balkrishna Hari Phansalkar v Emperor, AIR 1933 Bombay 1
19
while exercising the power of superintendence though possessed by the High Court, the learned
Chief Justice held that the power of superintendence is not the same thing as the hearing of an
appeal. An illegal conviction may be set aside under power of superintendence but - "we must
exercise our discretion on judicial grounds, and only interfere if considerations of justice require
us to do so."
[4.6] Article 227 of the Constitution Has Width and Vigour Unprecedented
The history of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, and how the jurisdiction has
culminated into its present shape under Article 227 of the Constitution, was traced in Waryam
Singh & Anr. v Amarnath & Anr.47, The jurisdiction can be traced back to Section 15 of High
Courts Act 1861 which gave a power of judicial superintendence to the High Court apart from
and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional jurisdiction on the High
Court. Section 107 of the Government of India Act 1915 and then Section 224 of the
Government of India Act 1935, were similarly worded and reproduced the predecessor provision.
However, sub-section (2) was added in Section 224 which confined the jurisdiction of the High
Court to such judgments of the inferior courts which were not otherwise subject to appeal or
revision. That restriction has not been carried forward in Article 227 of the Constitution. In that
sense Article 227 of the Constitution has width and vigour unprecedented.
In view of the above facts and circumstances the appellant humbly submitted that the Hon’ble
High Court of Mandas has the jurisdiction to call for all the records of the subordinate court for
the ends of justice.
PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of the Issues raised, Authorities cited and Arguments Advanced, it is most
humbly and respectfully prayed that the Hon’ble High Court of Mandas be pleased to:-
47
Waryam Singh & Anr. v Amarnath &Anr., (1954) SCR 565
20
I. Allow the appeal and pass the decree in favour of the appellant declaring that Mr. Pink
Panther is liable for leaking confidential information that harmed the appellant.
&
II. Allow the appeal and pass the decree in favour of the appellant declaring that John
Kumble is liable for accessing the company’s database.
&
III. Pass an order declaring that the actions of Mr. Pink Panther in making a remark in the
public media is a defamatory act and the same is conclusive proof of defamation against
John Kumble.
&
IV. Declare, that the Hon’ble High Court of Mandas has the power to take up any case from
its subordinate courts under Article 227 of the Constitution of Indigo.
AND/OR
THE APPELLANT/PETITIONER ALSO PRAYED THAT YOUR LORDSHIPS MAY PASS A

DECREE FOR IMPOSING HEAVY COST AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS UNDER
SECTION 35 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 INCLUDING COST OF THE
APPEAL AND PASS SUCH OTHER ORDER/ORDERS AS YOUR LORDSHIP MAY DEEM
FIT AND PROPER IN THE BEST INTEREST OF JUSTICE, FAIRNESS, EQUITY AND
GOOD CONSCIENCE AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE APPELANT/PETITONER
AS IN DUTY BOUND SHALL EVER PRAY.
OBLIGED
DATE:_________________,2020 S/d
PLACE: MANDAS HIGH COURT Counsels for Appellant/Petitioner
21

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THE LEGAL INSIDER IN COLLABORATION WITH I.E.C.

THE LEGAL INSIDER IN COLLABORATION WITH I.E.C. UNIVERSITY, SOL

WINCROP EARTH MOVERS Ltd. V MR. PINK PANTHER

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE JUDGES OF THE HIGH COURT OF MANDAS

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT/PETITIONER]

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES …………………………..………………………………………...iv

TABLE OF CASES ………………………………………………………………………….v-vi

SUMMARY OF FACTS …………………………………………………………………...viii-ix

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ………………………………………………………………….....x

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ……………………………………………………………............1

[1.] MR. PINK PANTHER IS LIABLE FOR LEAKING THE CONFIDENTIAL

[1.1] Mr. Pink Panther is Negligent for the Act…………………………………………...1-3

[1.2] The Breach of Duty to Take Care…………………………………………………...3-4

[1.3] Mr. Panther is Negligence by The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur…………………4-5

[1.4] Ignorance of Law is not an Excuse…………………………………….....................5-6

[2.] JOHN IS LIABLE FOR ACCESSING THE DATABASE OF WEML COMPANY…7

[2.2] Case Laws towards Mala Fide act:………………………………………………….8-9

[2.3] Case Law on Not Having Good Faith:…………………………………………….10

[2.4] Subsequent Act Cannot Clock the Former Act………………………………….10-11

[3.1] Intentional Act of Mr. Pink Panther………………………………………………..11

[3.2] Conclusive Proof……………………………………………………………………12

[3.3] Facts Admitted Need Not Be Proved……………………………………………13-15

[3.4] Good Faith……………………………………………………………………………15

[4.1] Article 227 of the Constitution of Indigo………………………………………...16-17

[4.2] Article 227 Has Power of Superintendence …………………………………..…17-18

[4.3] District Courts play the Supplemental Role of High Court…………………………18

[4.4] Article 227 is a Basic Structure of the Constitution…………………………….18-19

[4.5] Jurisdiction of High Court in Case of Grave Injustice of Failure of Justice……….19-20

CIVIL APPEAL NO.----------------------OF 2020

[1]. WHETHER MR. PANTHER IS LIABLE FOR LEAKING CONFIDENTIAL

[2.] IS JOHN LIABLE FOR ACCESSING THE COMPANIES DATABASE OR NOT?

[1.] MR. PINK PANTHER IS LIABLE FOR LEAKING THE CONFIDENTIAL

[1.1]. MR. PINK PANTHER IS NEGLIGENT FOR THE ACT

[1.2] THE BREAH OF DUTY TO TAKE CARE

[1.3] MR. PANTHER IS NEGIGLENCE BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA

The elements of Res Ipsa Loquitur are:

[2.] JOHN IS LIABLE FOR ACCESSING THE DATABASE OF WEML COMPANY

[2.2]Case Laws towards Mala Fide act:

[2.3] Case Law on Not Having Good Faith:

[2.4] Subsequent Act Cannot Clock the Former Act

[3.1] Intentional Act of Mr. Pink Panther

[3.2] Conclusive Proof

[3.3] Facts Admitted Need Not Be Proved

The petitioner relied upon the following case laws:

[3.4] Good Faith

[4.1] Article 227 of the Constitution of Indigo

Now, the Article 227 of the Constitution of Indigo reads as follows:

Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court

[4.2] Article 227 Has Power of Superintendence

[4.3] District Courts play the Supplemental Role of High Court

[4.4] Article 227 is a Basic Structure of the Constitution

[4.5] Jurisdiction of High Court in Case of Grave Injustice of Failure of Justice

THE APPELLANT/PETITIONER ALSO PRAYED THAT YOUR LORDSHIPS MAY PASS A

PLACE: MANDAS HIGH COURT Counsels for Appellant/Petitioner

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