Moral Leadership? Be Careful What You Wish For: Bert Spector

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Moral leadership? Be careful ! The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/1742715017736659
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Bert Spector
Northeastern University, USA

Keywords
Leadership, good, bad, moral

“As I said on, remember this, on Saturday, we condemn in the strongest possible terms this
egregious display of hatred, bigotry and violence. It has no place in America . . . But you also
had people that were very fine people on both sides” (Trump, 2017).
Those words from Donald Trump, with their insistence that “very fine people” had
formed common cause with Nazis, members of the Ku Klux Klan, and other assorted
white nationalist groups on August 11 and 12, 2017 set off an understandable firestorm
of denunciation and repudiation. His response was “miserable” (Remmick, 2017: 28) and
“uniquely destructive” (Heer, 2017). Even his own Secretary of State suggested that Trump
was stating his personal values rather than the country’s (Gearan, 2017).
This censure, while far from universal – a majority of Republicans responded positively
to Trump’s post-Charlottesville comments, while white supremacists and nationalists
expressed support and appreciation (Allen, 2017; Sharman, 2017) – ran both deep and
wide. Questions were raised about Trump’s character (“He’s a weasel,” Dowd, 2017) and
his mental state (“extreme narcissism” causing an “inability to understand reality,”
Lefkowitz, 2017). Focus was placed on his character, labeling him as “vile and degenerate”
(Brinkley, 2017), arguing that his presence in the White House had caused a “moral vac-
uum” (Brooks, 2017) because Trump was a “moral cavity” (Blow, 2017).
Some of the outrage turned to an argument that Trump had failed the test of “moral
leadership” (Kaufman, 2017). His actions had done “moral damage” (Gerson, 2017).
He had “relinquished what presidents from Roosevelt to Reagan have regarded as a cardi-
nal duty of their job: set a moral course to unify the nation” (Landler, 2017). Trump had
“utterly failed to offer moral leadership” (Hohmann, 2017). The country was in “desperate
need” of “moral leadership to take us beyond tribalism and ignorance” (Dowd, 2017).
It is possible to find Trump’s behavior reprehensible and dangerous, even to judge his
actions as being immoral, and still be troubled by that under-examined construct of “moral

Corresponding author:
Bert Spector, International Business & Strategy, D’Amore-McKim School of Business, Northeastern University, Boston,
MA 02176, USA.
Email: b.spector@northeastern.edu
2 Leadership 0(0)

leadership.” This essay seeks to further such an examination by exploring the potential
hazards of moral leadership.

A construct in search of a definition


At the core of all definitions of morality lies a distinction between “good” and “bad.”
The particular responsibilities of leaders in shaping the moral judgment of followers on
what is, in fact, good and bad, right and wrong lies at the core of any notion of moral
leadership. But more precisely, what do advocates of moral leadership have in mind? It is
often impossible to know for sure; it may be that they do not know themselves.
Vagueness may be acceptable, or at least expected, in popular press outlets.
Unfortunately, serious literature on leadership and morality often falls short as well.
A, 1994 examination of moral leadership in business organizations avoided offering a def-
inition of the term heralded in the title, opting instead to define, mainly through example,
moral decisions that managers face in the course of conducting business (Hosmer, 1984).
A more recent examination of moral leadership in the field of international relations likewise
failed at that basic definitional task, relying instead on proxies such as ethics, values, and
social responsibility (Rhode, 2006).
Related constructs – servant leadership, ethical leadership, caring leadership, and lead-
ership with integrity among them – rely largely on a sense of genuineness on the part of
leaders and trust-building among leaders and followers (Avolio et al., 2009; Flynn and
Clarke 2011; Greenleaf, 1977; Heifetz, 1994; Yiannis, 2014). These are significant and legit-
imate attempts to broaden the definition of leadership beyond a matter of short-term per-
formance metrics.1 Moral leadership, however, is far from the best way to move beyond the
confines of over-quantification.
Frequent, careless use of a term has an impact. Ideas, and the way they are expressed,
matter. Repetitive use of “moral leadership” by individuals possessed of some combination
of economic, cultural, and/or social capital can create a “regime of truth” that seeps into the
broader dialogue, shaping values and setting expectations (Foucault, 1977: 30). If people
believe that moral leadership is precisely what is missing in their leaders, it is possible that
they will seek that quality in future aspirants without agreeing on precisely what they are
looking for or wrestling with the potential hazards of the search.
Moral leadership can and has been employed as a synonym for moralism, which is
defined as an intertwining of moral judgments with an attempt to convert those who hold
contrary values (Driver, 2005). Religious evangelists and other moral guardians often posi-
tion themselves as moral leaders, calling for laws and regulations intended to impose their
own values on others (Balmer, 2006). Thus does moralism devolve into a competition
among powerful or power-seeking groups attempting to assert their definitions of moral
and immoral behavior on society (Morone, 2003). Of course, this is not what all advocates
of moral leadership have in mind.
Some proponents specifically reject any suggestion that the two concepts – moral lead-
ership and moralism – are related. But their attempts to segregate moral leadership and
moralism are unconvincing, and the borders they construct between the two constructs are
porous. To appreciate the defects in the attempted distinction, we should consider the
position laid out by the scholar most associated with the advocacy of moral leadership,
political scientist James MacGregor Burns. His 1978 Leadership presented a full-bodied
argument in favor of moral leadership.
Spector 3

Celebrating the potential of moral leadership


If the concept of moral leadership is seriously under-defined in most literature, Burns’
Leadership is an important exception. In the four decades following his books’ publication,
Burns’ advocacy of moral leadership, which he equated with transforming leadership, grew
to become the most popular approach to and source of leadership research (Antonakis,
2012). His position that transformational leadership offered the opportunity for moral uplift
became central to the torrent of scholars who quickly followed him, even those extolling the
power of morality within business organizations (e.g. Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999). Authors
continue to accept, uncritically, the proposition that moral leadership represents a desirable
alternative to hard-nosed realism (Becker, 2007, 2009; Kelly, 2004; Springett, 2004).
Burns’ original construct arose in the context of a mid-20th-century world made up of
leaders thought to be morally admirable (Franklin Roosevelt, Mahatma Gandhi, and John
Kennedy, most prominently) and morally despicable (Hitler, most obviously). Leadership
refocused discourse away from attention to local and small-group dynamics and toward the
leader-statesmen of large social groups and movements, and of nations (Spector, 2016).
Burns’ call for transforming leaders to act as moral agents informed the next generation
of leadership scholars and powerfully shaped leadership development programs in industry
and academics (Tourish, 2013; Wilson, 2016).
A definition of and argument for moral leadership, formed the core of his work.
Moral leaders forged a relationship with followers based on “mutual needs, aspirations,
and values” (Burns, 1978: 4). Needs were mutual because an understanding of good and
bad was shared. This was not, he insisted, moralism. Leaders and the led entered into a
morally-informed social contract with full consent and awareness of available alternatives.
Moral leaders avoided “mere preaching, or the uttering of pieties, or the insistence on
social conformity” (Burns, 1978: 4). Instead, they raised “the level of human conduct and
ethical aspiration of both leader and led” (Burns, 1978: 20). Coercion played no role in the
process of moral elevation, and the end-state of enlightenment was mutually beneficial to all
parties.
Burns’ prescription for moral leadership rested on two fundamental but dubious
assumptions:

1. He maintained a normative position that held out a vision of universally agreed-upon


enlightenment principles and values (and Burns explicitly intended for “enlightenment,”
small-e to be taken to mean “Enlightenment,” capital-E).
2. He insisted that the transformative process of moral elevation depended not on the power
of leaders, but rather on shared enlightenment between the leader and the led in which all
moral needs would be met equally.

Thus did moral leadership avoid the hazards of moralism. There was no need for power-
based imposition because the moral values of enlightened leaders and followers coincided.
If either or both of these assumptions are foundationally flawed, then the argument on
behalf of moral leadership collapses; the division between moral leadership and moralism
disappears. And flawed they were.
Assumption #1 – The normative nature of moral good. Burns had no doubt that moral
leaders intended to transform society toward a universally recognized state of moral grace.
An assertion of moral goodness as a universally recognized and desired end-state is
4 Leadership 0(0)

basic to any positive construction of moral leadership. If we are to accept that leaders are
helping to lead their communities toward mutual enlightenment, we must believe the
universe offers a definition of what those enlightened values are; a definition that all
parties accept.2
Burns’ moral absolutism reflected a categorical imperative suggesting unconditional prin-
ciples of rights, the avoidance of harm, and fair treatment (Hitlin and Vaisey, 2010).
“Enlightenment values of liberty and equality” would ensure “meaningful opportunity for
the pursuit of happiness” (Burns, 2003: 27–28). And his insistence on a normatively defined
end-state for moral development that all parties to the social contract sought was echoed by
subsequent advocates.
Take Safty’s position that “leadership should mean a set of values dedicated to promot-
ing human development.” Safty insisted on an objective “common good” to which “people
in a democratic environment, both at the national and international levels” could and
should be led (Safty, 2003: 84).3 Burns had written that moral leadership would help
“make conscious what lies unconscious among followers [emphasis in the original]” (Burns,
1978: 40). The defining characteristic of moral leadership became the leader’s role in moving
society toward this common good.
But . . .
Questioning Assumption #1 – What happens to moral leadership if moral absolutism is
abandoned. What if the universe is neither moral nor immoral, neither just nor unjust?
In that case, the universe simply is. Morality becomes a dependent variable, constructed
through the “actions, judgments, negotiations, and other kinds of expressions” of individ-
uals in constant interaction with each other and with their ever-dynamic world (Christen
and Alfano, 2001: 6). There will always be multiple competing interests. Interactions
between proponents and opponents lead to a prevailing but often unstable definition of
morality. The notion that there is some objective definition of moral goodness that tran-
scends personal interests and to which all stakeholders consent is simply a fantastic human
conceit (Nagel, 1988).4
Now, matters of defining the content of the desired good society and determining what
constitutes moral behavior become open to debate, contention, and construction. Moral
entrepreneurs campaign and compete in their attempts to allocate normal and deviant labels
(Becker, 1963). Definitions shift. Societal and institutional change occurs in any and all
directions. Individuals have the right to label these directions as positive or negative,
good or bad. But in any case, change is neither inevitable nor permanent.
Herein lies the first fallacy of the insistence that moral leadership is something quite apart
from moralism. Absent the anchoring construct of a moral universe moving toward justice,
moral leadership amounts to an attempt to move society in one direction or another, toward
or away from competing definitions. In that way, moral leadership teeters dangerously
toward moralism, with power always helping to separate winners from losers. Advocates
of moral leadership, Burns foremost among them, have an answer to that danger: moral
leadership does not depend on power.
Assumption #2 – Moral leadership operates without recourse to power. Burns’ second
assumption that moral leaders would help achieved the desired end-state without recourse
to institutional power – what he referred to as “naked power” (Burns, 1978: 19) – lay at the
heart of his brief on behalf of transforming leadership. He wanted leadership to be under-
stood, yes, as “an aspect of power,” but also as “a separate and vital process in itself”
(Burns, 1978: 18). Power is not needed when a pre-existing consensus concerning
Spector 5

enlightened moral values exists. With “naked power” removed from the equation of moral
leadership, the danger of moralism could be dismissed.
But . . .
Questioning Assumption #2 – What happens to moral leadership when power is admitted
rather than denied. Burns’ insistence that leadership was separate from power represented a
flawed construction of leadership. Power always matters. It is a dynamic without which
leaders simply cannot lead.
Individuals are embedded in multiple social groups, ranging from family units and
religious communities to business organizations and governmental institution (Hitlin
and Vaisey, 2010). These groups impose structures for and assumptions about power
and influence. Not all members of a group have equal power and similar access to
mechanisms of influence. A peer may offer moral guidance, but a hierarchically powerful
leader seeks commitment to and/or compliance with a system of values and beliefs
(Jackall, 2010).
The deployment of power does not axiomatically corrupt the outcome of its application.
Power can and often is called upon to move institutions and societies in a direction that may
be deemed more humane, more just (Foucault, 1977). It may do the opposite, of course.
Either way, the application of power by those who possess it is an expression not of moral
intervention but of dominant interests, shifting paradigms of understanding, and competing
power bases.
Moral leadership seeks to shape not behaviors but values and beliefs. Using the language
of transformation, leaders impact followers by helping “to make conscious what lies uncon-
scious” [emphasis in the original] (Burns, 1978: 40). All leadership, whether it is labeled
moral, ethical, servant, or otherwise, requires power. Burns’ assumption that transforming
followers did not rely on power solved a dilemma for him, allowing a segregation of moral
leadership from moralism.
However, when the assumption is overturned, when the impact of leadership is recog-
nized to be intertwined with institutional power, then the potential hazard of moral dem-
agoguery – the self-glorification of the individual combined with the moral condemnation of
opposition individuals and groups (Guseinov, 2004) – is rendered dangerously possible.
Neo-Nazis and racists, as well as religious fanatics intent on establishing a theocracy
cloak their methods under the rubric of moral leadership. It is now no longer such an
innocent construct.

No to moral leadership
Changes in institutions and societies represent not a development toward an inevitable end-
state of enlightened moral good, but an outcome of social arrangements and pluralistic
constructions. That is a process over which leaders dominate. Advocacy of change might
be expressed in moral terms. But the application of moral language cannot hide the power
that enables leaders to act.
Individuals develop a sense of right and wrong out of a “complex interplay of early
biological tendencies, cognitive growth, and contexts of socialization” (Lapsley and
Carlo, 2014: 2). Certainly, parents, peers, and communities offer valuable resources to
help mold moral awareness. There is no question that individuals are shaped by a complex,
dynamic array of often competing forces (Palmer, 2013).
6 Leadership 0(0)

In the final analysis, it is individuals who make judgments about whether leaders are
morally good or bad, and whether the goals they seek to advance are wrong or right. Those
who seek and/or hold positions of power and authority can and should be interrogated
about their beliefs. Consent and legitimacy are granted by followers to leaders based on a
complex, dynamic, and imperfect tangle of interests and values.
Moral judgment flows between individuals: from peer to peer and among leaders and the
led. Leaders use their power and influence to shape behaviors of others. That is part of the
remit of leadership. None of that is inherently problematic. It is the expectation that leaders
should seek to use their institutional power to shape the moral judgments of followers that
calls into question the desirability of moral leadership.
We can and should judge the words and deeds of Trump, and indeed of all leaders and
leadership aspirants, through multiple lenses: efficacy, self-interests, ethics, and morals,
among them. We can conclude that the current US president’s response to Charlottesville
was “miserable” and “vile,” and that his behavior was “uniquely destructive.” What we
should avoid doing is turning to “moral leadership” as an antidote. The distinction between
moral leadership and moralism is not nearly so clear as advocates have suggested, and moral
demagoguery presents a real danger.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to acknowledge the guidance of Maureen Kelleher and Suze Wilson.

Declaration of conflicting interests


The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.

Notes
1. Significant, perhaps, but they rely a bit on a “straw-man” argument. Reviews of leadership dis-
course (Spector, 2016; Wilson, 2016) suggest that the term has always carried a broader horizon,
though not without some debate.
2. And what of those who do not, say the Nazis and Klans members marching in Charlottesville? One
can make a moral argument and suggest these people are evil. There is also a psychological argu-
ment focusing on thwarted cognitive development (Lapsley and Carlo, 2014). In either case, the
normative view suggests that only those individuals who are damaged or flawed do not accept
enlightened values.
3. For a critique of Safty’s argument, see Grint (2004).
4. It is possible to reject absolutism without embracing moral relativism that judges morality only in
terms of its historical context. A position of moral pluralism allows for open discussion while
simultaneously asserting adherence to a social consensus on right and wrong (Donaldson and
Dunfee, 2002; Stiller, 2013).
Spector 7

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Author Biography
Bert Spector is an associate professor of International Business & Strategy and the
D’Amore-McKim School of Business, Northeastern University. He is the author of numer-
ous books and articles on leadership, management history, and organizational change,
most recently, Discourse on Leadership: A Critical Appraisal, published by Cambridge
University Press.

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