Hidden Transcripts from “Below” in Rural Politics of

the Philippines: Interpreting the Janus-facedness

of Patron-Client Ties and Tulong (Help)

Soon Chuan Yean*

This paper argues that ordinary people often contest rather than submit to the
powerful elites to gain material interests and political favoritism. Ordinary people
are both shrewd and critical in making judgments and evaluations on politicians as
well as the (unequal) relation of powers. Based on fieldwork interviews in the
Philippines, this paper identifies the perception of (local) politics from ordinary
people’s point of view in a seemingly mundane political environment. If the political
economic imperative of tulong, or help, is decoded to include its social meanings,
functions, and cultural connotation, it reveals the Janus-facedness of patron-client
ties that allows for a negotiation of power relations between clients and patrons.

Keywords: Janus-facedness, local politics, ordinary people, patron-client ties,

Tanauan City, tulong

Introduction

A review of Philippine political studies reveals the researchers’ emphasis on the role of
the powerful gentry—political and economic elites—and silencing of the powerless
people’s voices to understand the structure of Philippine politics. The bases of the
arguments emanate from facets of Philippine political culture such as kinship relations,
compadre (godparents)-ism, utang na loob (debt of gratitude), hiya (shame), and walang
hiya (shameless), functioning under the rubric of patron-client ties (Agpalo 1969; Lande
1965; Hollnsteiner 1963), which allows for a hierarchical arrangement between the elites
and the masses.1) According to traditional arguments, elites retain control over political
offices and the economy, while the masses are passive, submissive, and dependent on
their patrons. Hence, the elites dominate political change and development while the
masses—either susceptible to material inducement or subscribing to guns, goons, and
gold—are mere followers, inarticulate in political contestation.

* 孫傳煙, School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 11800 Penang, Malaysia
e-mail: chuanyean@usm.my
1) “Ordinary people,” “masses,” “the poor,” and “subordinates” will be used interchangeably in this paper.

Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, August 2012, pp. 273–299 273
© Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University
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N Chuan Yean

This paper argues that the masses are indeed critical and do contest for social claims.
The analysis of election results (electoral politics, political affiliations), relationships
between patrons and clients through formal institutions (political factions, machine poli-
tics), or the political culture that ties two parties may not suffice to grasp how the masses
“do” politics. This paper asserts that there are essential political features that require
researchers to excavate the taken-for-granted political modalities and locate the “hidden”
transcript (Scott 1990) of the masses outside the realm of formal political structures.
Furthermore, patron-client ties in rural areas are Janus-faced. To the rural folks,
on one hand pulitika (loosely translated as “politics”) is “dirty”: patron-client ties function
mostly during elections for manipulations such as vote-buying and -selling, and patron-
client relations serve both actors’ vested interests. On the other hand, the masses do
articulate responsible leadership, social justice, development, and so on. This latter
discourse of “good” politics does not manifest in the realm of formal politics but is “hid-
den” in the realm of everyday politics.
A sociocultural and socio-political analysis on tulong, or help, may be a useful way
to understand how and why the masses subscribe to patron-client ties and engage or
challenge a set of “rules of conduct” in their own community. The concept of tulongg is
discussed because of its constant usage throughout the interviews. Even though there
is no consistency or inclusive usage of “tulong” across all the interviews, the term’s
nuances have somehow manifested in other social practices such as magandang loob
(good inner being) in the realm of everyday politics.
This paper starts by clarifying several concepts and then outlines studies on Philip-
pine politics, focusing on patron-client relations. Most political studies on the Philippines
use the patron-client framework as a useful and convenient model to understand political
changes and structures. From here, I identify two distinct groups of scholars. One
advocates the patron-client framework as the building block of Philippine politics and
then expands the framework to include the patrimonial character of the Philippine state,
its “imperfect” democratization process, and its weak institutions. The other group of
scholars critically disengages from the patron-client framework and uses more cultural,
linguistic, sociological, and anthropological approaches to locate other political features
in Philippine society. Following the second group of approaches, this paper will showcase
other political mechanisms that are at work in a rural setup.

Clarification of Concepts

This research is a study of local people’s political perceptions. “Local” here means that
 Hidden Transcripts from “Below” in Rural Politics of the Philippines 275

the main focus of the research is at the micro level—personal experiences, personal
memories, fragmented actions within particular contexts. (This is the reason the paper
gives paramount attention to the interviews as primary data.) In a limited sense, this
paper takes the localization of knowledge as a way to understand the construction of
politics using a bottom-up approach. This paper follows Benedict Kerkvliet’s (1991; 1995)
definition of politics as everyday politics: “unorganized and informal discourse and activ-
ity of everyday politics where people come to terms with and/or contest norms and rules
regarding authority, production, and the allocation of resources” (Kerkvliet 1995, 418).
Kerkvliet argues that the patron-client framework is not sufficient to understand Philip-
pine political structures. His own research in Nueva Ecija indicates that subordinated
villagers are antagonistic toward their patrons—not in open confrontation but often in an
“indirect, non-confrontational, and hidden” way (ibid.). Following Kerkvliet’s approach,
this research introduces another possible framework for understanding clients’ political
discourse by articulating the concept of tulongg as a hidden transcript of the poor to claim
for moral politics.
“Moral” here refers to an idea, i.e., tulong—or,
g to borrow Kerkvliet’s words, “rule
of conduct” (Kerkvliet 1991, 10)—that is familiar to the people. In his study of peasant
politics in Malaysia James C. Scott (1985) differentiates tolong, or help, into several cat-
egories to remind readers of the hidden transcript of peasants when receiving assistance
from landlords. Scott argues that tolong entails the reciprocity of the provider with the
receiver and vice versa. If tolongg turns into sedekah (alms), then the receiver forever
becomes a debtor to the giver. This is different from zakatt (an Islamic taxation practice),
which is a form of rights. Many peasants, as far as possible, avoid receiving tolongg as alms
in order to escape being in the debtor position in the hierarchy of patron-client relations.
As will be indicated below, tulongg that functions in patron-client relations is Janus-faced:
on one hand, the realm of formal politics (election campaigns) entails “dirty” politics; on
the other hand, in the realm of everyday politics tulongg that encompasses loob (inner
being) is acceptable and is to be preserved and manifested. Loob shifts its validities from
time to time in different contexts; it is not static or unbounded; and it is micro-oriented.
In sum, “morality” as referred to in this paper embeds the nuance of compatibility of loob
between the patron and the client, an internal equilibrium of a sort.

Accentuation of Tulong
n : Public Sphere, Culture, and “Soul Stuff”

Sociologically speaking, tulongg is a functional social practice that exists anywhere and at
any time and involves more than one individual to perform. In the barangays (loosely
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N Chuan Yean

translated as villages) in which this researcher resided, it was an exchange practice in a

variety of social contexts such as funerals, weddings, elections, voluntary work, payment
of hospital bills, religious ceremonies, and many more situations. The political modality
of tulong cannot be taken exclusively as the political culture of the masses, nor does tulong
serve as a political ideology for the masses to engage in a social movement for revolt.
The tricky question that arises is, how does tulongg as a social function in a barangay
become a political discourse among the poor? To answer this, we need to categorize
tulong as a sort of cultural system.
Studying political discourse in the cultural domain “entails probing the social mean-
ings of the languages used by ordinary people, their cultural practices, their social sym-
bols and ideas, and their religiosity” (Soon 2008). Stuart Hall (1997) indicates that culture
serves as a system of representation that produces meaning. Such meaning is under-
stood, constructed, and sometimes shared by different social classes of people in different
public spheres through language to express thoughts and feelings or emotions (Kusaka
2009).
In the rural setup in Barangay Angeles,2) tulongg as a cultural system is taken as a
“submission” by clients to patrons; the latter are seen as “men of prowess.” This is akin
to O.W. Wolters’s (1999) definition of “men of prowess” as possessing the cultural ele-
ment of “soul stuff” that attracts followers. Wolters’s definition of “soul stuff” includes
the qualities of the leader that represent his high level of spiritual development and thus
capacity for leadership. A “man of prowess” needs to constantly project this “soul stuff”
to his followers so that the latter can recognize his spiritual endowment and then par-
ticipate in it. The recognition of a man of prowess comes about “not only because his

2) Barangay Angeles (Note: This is a pseudonym for the barangay, to protect the privacy of residents)
is 9 kilometers from Tanauan City ((poblacion area). Originally, Angeles was part of the bigger
Barangay Janopol, but in 1964 the latter was divided into two other barangays, resulting in three
barangays: Barangay Janopol Oriental, Occidental, and Angeles. The population of Barangay Angeles
is 1,853, consisting of 966 males and 887 females. They are gathered into 390 households with a
total of 325 houses built; 264 households are Katoliko (Catholic), and 31 are Born Again (Christians).
The socioeconomic landscape of Angeles can be categorized into two major parts. Purok (pre-
cincts) I to VI is considered to be a relatively well-to-do residential area, while Purok VII is a rela-
tively poor area. However, this does not mean that Angeles is a barangay full of landowners, big
businesspeople, or the like. On the contrary, the majority of barangay folks in Angeles are poor.
The majority of households have at least one person in the family working abroad as an OFW
(Overseas Filipino Worker): either as a domestic helper or as a seaman. Others are farmers or
fishermen, though the majority of the younger generations, especially females, work in a factory
after graduating from high school. There are two types of residents: the Tagalogs and the Bicolanos.
The former are those who were born in Tanauan City, while the latter are those who migrated from
the Bicol region and married locals. (In Tanauan City Tagalogs comprise 113,438 or 97.18 per cent
of residents, while Bicolanos comprise 1,272 or 1.09 per cent.)
 Hidden Transcripts from “Below” in Rural Politics of the Philippines 277

entourage could expect to enjoy material rewards but also . . . because their own spiritual
substance, for everyone possessed it in some measure, would participate in his, thereby
leading to rapport and personal satisfaction” (ibid.d , 19).
Quite similar to Wolters’s analysis of men of prowess and the spiritual (not just
material) relationship they build with their followers, this paper will indicate that ordinary
people in the barangay can—and do—view tulongg from the politicians as some kind of
“spiritual merit” coming from the loob. In other words, clients seek an equal status with
their patrons, a quest that is manifested in the feeling (i.e., good inner being or magandang
loob) that the latter are consistently exercising respect and justice when providing tulong
to the needy. This enables clients to reconstruct relations of hierarchy into a more
equalized customary relationship. People’s “submission” to become part of the elite’s
“entourage” can be traced to their understanding of “soul stuff,” which in the context of
tulongg in the Tagalog language is analogous to the power built up in the loob.
That is to say, viewed from the perspectives mentioned above, when tulongg is taken
as a cultural system of representation among the poor, ordinary people’s discourses are
hidden in the realm of everyday politics. To locate this political discourse in the realm
of conventional political institutions, one can only identify the common perception of the
poor, which is not fully representative of their desired values and ideas. When put in the
public sphere, social practices of tulongg become pulitika that function under patron-client
ties. Deriving from “bad” politics, the patron-client relationship turns into a discourse
that is constantly being challenged, evaluated, and reaffirmed of its meaning and value.
The critical acceptance or rejection of tulongg among the masses shifts its realm of con-
testation between election time and everyday life to articulate the masses’ desires and
visions in a nonconfrontational manner that is critical to patrons.

Studies on Patron-Client Ties

There are a number of publications that discuss Philippine political change, development,
and structures by looking through the lens of the patron-client ties framework. In gen-
eral, there are two approaches. According to one approach, patron-client ties perpetuate
underdeveloped Philippine institutions due to the oligarchic and patrimonial structure of
Philippine society. The other approach notes that there are other important political
factors—such as ideology, issues, development, and emotional pursuits (such as the
loob)—that are at play between the subordinated and superordinate and argues that the
ties are antagonistic and manifest another political discourse of their own from the bottom
up.
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Several publications subscribe to the view that modern Philippine politics began
with the United States’ introduction of political institutions (Steinberg 1972; Cushner
1976; Phelan 1976; Fegan 1982; Larkin 1993; Cullinane 2003; McCoy and de Jesus 2001).3)
Benedict Anderson (1996) observes that in the first decade of the twentieth century, the
United States brought in its model of a political system that it deemed essential to liber-
ate its colony. The linguistic, property, and literacy qualifications were set so high that
only 14 per cent of the adult population was entitled to vote (ibid.). Thus, a group of
political elites emerged from the mid-nineteenth century who gained their wealth during
the Spanish period through the control of land for the production of export crops
(Steinberg 1972; Cushner 1976; Phelan 1976; Fegan 1982; Larkin 1993; May 1993;
Cullinane 2003; McCoy and de Jesus 2001).
Earlier political scientists such as Carl H. Lande (1965) and other scholars
(Hollnsteiner 1963; c.f. Grossholtz 1964; Agpalo 1969; Wurfel 1988)4) began to illustrate
the polity in the Philippines as constructed through patron-client relationships, kinship
networks that formed the basic units of factions that served as the building blocks of
political organizations. Clients were dependent on patrons, and their survival was secured
through their performance of a “debt of gratitude” or utang na loob and shame or hiya.
Such a relationship—reciprocity and “debt of gratitude”—allowed patrons to attract their
own followers, through maneuvering if not manipulation, who subsequently transformed
into factions during election time to engage in power struggles. In essence, Philippine
political structures remained in the hands of the elites to manipulate electoral institutions
for political interests with no genuine political participation, ideology, or representation.

3) One of the most comprehensive studies on the history of the emergence of Philippine elites during
the Spanish and American periods, and the involvement and changing relationship of the economic
landlords with political elites, is Alfred McCoy and Ed. C. de Jesus, Philippine Social History: Global
Trade and Local Transformations (2001). More specific case studies on the history of political elites
are Michael Cullinane’s Ilustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898–1908
(2003) in Manila and Cebu, and John A. Larkin’s The Pampangans: Colonial Society in a Philippine
Province (1993).
4) Hollnsteiner’s work is very similar to Lande’s in that both contend that Philippine social structures
with the characteristics of kinship system, compadre, utang na loob, and reciprocity behavior manage
to construct a smooth relationship between the elites and the masses. Hollnsteiner’s study focuses
on the elites’ perspective on how they construct a relationship with the masses through kinship
networks and a compadres system within the Hulo society in the province of Bulacan, whether it
is during elections or within community associations. Using a slightly different approach, Jean
Grossholtz views the following as components of the Philippine political culture and system:
bargaining power or quid pro quo, fear of hiya (shame) and gaba (curse), respect for elders, person-
alism, a strong family system, superordinate-subordinate relationships, and pakiusap (an act of
request as a means of communication), or a means of communication—via saints—between God
and men.
 Hidden Transcripts from “Below” in Rural Politics of the Philippines 279

In a slightly different light, separating themselves from the above assumptions on

the elites, who were mainly from the landed class, modernization theorists such as K. G.
Machado (1971; 1974a; 1974b; c.f. Kimura 1997; Kawanaka 1998) argue that Philippine
politics has taken a shift from personal and kinship networks to political machinery. Due
to socioeconomic and organizational changes, increasingly intense national political
competition in rural communities, and growing mass participation, politics is no longer
confined to traditionally wealthy families but also run by politically skilled leaders or “new
men” from less wealthy and less well known family backgrounds (Machado 1974b, 524).
The emergence of a new leadership is among middle-class men from barrio (district or
neighborhood) families who are more likely to respond to demands from national and
d , 525). To compete for votes, the political machinery plays a
provincial politicians (ibid.
vital role through the provision of immediate material rewards and inducements such as
pork barrel programs.
Discussions of factors that have contributed to changes in Philippine politics have
taken another shift toward looking at Philippine politics as an “elite democracy.” To
Benedict Anderson (1988), Amando Doronila (1985), and Paul D. Hutchcroft (2000), the
Philippines remains “underdeveloped” due to the proliferation of “oligarchic elites” or—a
term coined by John T. Sidel (1999; c.f. McCoy 2002)—“local bosses” who use guns,
goons, and gold and have total control over the weak democratic state both in Malacañang
and in the provinces. Other scholars, such as Nathan Quimpo (2009), observe that the
Philippines has become a predatory regime rather than a predatory state in which politi-
cal families with business networks continue to plunder the nation. The existence of
such a regime, accompanied by the unchanged nature of patron-client ties within society,
allows the functioning of informal institutions (Putzel 1999) and contributes to the weak
nature of Philippine democratic institutions (Case 1999); the latter are susceptible to
constant electoral fraud, corruption, and rampant vote-buying and -selling at the local and
provincial levels (c.f. Coronel 2007).
The “elite democracy” approach takes into account the role of violence, coercion,
intimidation, and monetary inducements that enable the elites to manipulate formal
democratic procedures to suit their personal political interests. Elections are instru-
ments used by political elites to obtain public office and a way for the elites to make the
masses feel “incorporated” within their “tutelage.” Such “incorporation” is practiced
through intimidating voters, employing violent tactics, and using the Philippine con-
stabulary, army, police forces, political leaders (and patrons) or entrepreneurs, and other
institutions to obtain positions in public office.
The study of Philippine politics in the aftermath of the 1986 People Power Revolu-
tion, such as the above, focused much attention on the community of elites, the patrimo-
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N Chuan Yean

nial state, and the latter’s relations with Philippine society. The study of the president
as an institution to dominate politics, especially during Marcos’s regime (Thompson 1996;
Youngblood 1993), once again came to the fore. Slightly different from the patron-client
ties framework but elite-oriented nonetheless, politics has been integrated at the national
level, or more specifically in the hands of the president.
A few studies have attempted to explain the phenomenon of Joseph Estrada, who
was the president of the Philippines from 1998 to 2001. One explanation for his popular-
ity is the populist leaders’ thesis, which looks at a combination of factors such as the
failure of neoliberal economies, Estrada’s popularity through his movies as “saviour of
the poor” (c.f. Rosario 2004), his pro-poor programs, and his image as belonging to the
“other” elites from the oligarchs (Rocamora 2009; c.f. Polo 2002). The other reason for
his popularity, according to Abinales and Amoroso’s (2005) argument, is the decline of
nongovernmental organizations’ reputation as the voice of the public, their inefficient
management, and the failure of the left to provide an alternative political discourse, which
gave the people reasons to pin their hopes on different yet popular leaders. Estrada was
popular despite the allegations of corruption in his administration, his incompetence, and
so on.
When Estrada was convicted for corruption, Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(GMA) took up the job. She was reelected as president in 2004. Various studies have
categorized GMA’s administration as the most corrupt, most autocratic, and most un-
democratic since Ferdinand Marcos’s regime (Coronel 2007; Abinales 2008; 2010;
Thompson 2010). Abinales’s article “The Philippines: Weak State, Resilient President”
(2008) describes Philippine politics as having unchanged weak institutions, such as the
Commission of Elections (COMELEC), that subscribe to electoral fraud under a strong
and powerful presidential influence. GMA’s influence over the COMELEC was evident
in the 2004 general election, when she stood against another popular leader, Fernando
Poe Jr. Her control over the army, police, national economic agencies, and judiciary
helped her crush her enemies, such as journalists, the left, and the Muslim South (ibid.).
In Abinales’s view, GMA’s main political control did not derive from central Manila,
where the voices of the opposition were loud. It was at the periphery, namely at the
provincial and local government levels, that GMA’s presidency was sustained. Political
control in the Philippines is still predominantly in the hands of the political elites, only
now it is located not at the centre but in the periphery. All politics is “local” (ibid., 302).
Another group of scholars ranging from historians and political scientists to anthro-
pologists and sociologists provide a different perspective on patron-client ties, and some
have gone beyond the framework to provide alternative approaches to viewing Philippine
politics.
 Hidden Transcripts from “Below” in Rural Politics of the Philippines 281

The historian Reynaldo C. Ileto (1999a) argues that Philippine social structures and
values have been reduced to patron-client ties: vertical, oppressive, manipulative, repres-
sive power in a top-down fashion. He points out that the “orientalization” of “Philippine
social values” has resulted in a dichotomized concept of “the masses” and “the elites.”
The “masses” are seen as passive, ignorant, submissive to negative “Filipino social
values” and dominated by the “elites” who are capable of manipulating such values and
control of offices. In his critical overview on the literature of Philippine politics and
society, Ileto concludes that there is an overlooking of the realities “in which power flows
from the bottom up, as well, and in which indebtedness is not simply a one-way, oppres-
d , 49). In citing Mojares’s work on the
sive, relationship but rather a reciprocal one” (ibid.
Osmeña political family in Cebu City, Ileto agrees that pulitika (or politics) is “constantly
changing in scope and meaning . . . also made by the community” (ibid., 62). More impor-
tantly, the theater of politics is constructed not merely by the orators but by the crowds
(Ileto 1999b).
Kerkvliet offers another critical review on patron-client ties (1991; 1995; 1996;
2000). He states that Philippine politics emanates from “below” and that politics is
embedded in the realm of everyday life experiences. He argues that the patron-client
framework is not sufficient to understand Philippine political structures and that clients
are indeed critical, antagonistic, and demanding. Relationships between clients and
patrons are not smooth and are always in contestation. However, such resistance and
contestation do not manifest openly and can hardly be traced in the realm of formal
political institutions such as electoral politics—rather, the subaltern’s politics is “indirect,
non-confrontational, and hidden” (Kerkvliet 1991).
The works by Michael Pinches (1991) and Benedict Kerkvliet (1991) on subordi-
nated groups in Quezon City, Manila, and the peasantry in Talavera, Nueva Ejica Province,
respectively demonstrate that subordinated groups’ claims are not limited to subsistence
needs (such as minimum wage, food, or shelter for survival) but also revolve around
issues of dignity, respect, and quality of life as human beings. Both works bring to light
other ways of interpreting patron-client ties to go beyond material inducements or poli-
tics of fear and instead hinge upon a politics of respect and dignity and the masses’
articulated desire for politicians who are issue-oriented and struggle for democracy.
Subordinated groups do maintain ties with patrons for material survival, but at the same
time they are critical of the social hierarchy and the ways that patrons treat them.
In quite a similar trajectory, Mark Turner’s (1991, 19) study of Zamboanga City
argues that politicians also engage in a politics of moral order—moral standing and integ-
rity—that goes beyond the patronage politics of the patron-client ties framework.
Employing cultural, linguistic, and anthropological approaches, Resil Mojares’s (2002)
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study of the Osmeña family of Cebu indicates that politics should not be seen as “rulers,
leaders, and big men” and the “subordination of issues to particularistic concerns,”
because of its constant change in scope and meaning. The Osmeñas’ electoral campaigns
define politics in terms of “crusades,” which use “primordial symbols of democracy,
autonomy, and progress” (ibid. d , 336).
In contrast to traditional patron-client models, the historical, political-anthropological,
cultural, and sociological approaches look at the perspective of the masses, locating
politics beyond the formal electoral system and political offices. While recognizing
patronage politics and elite dominancy, they also indicate the nonmaterial elements of
politics, particularly language and culture, that “patrons” use in connection with issues
pertaining to development and democracy so as to manifest a rhetoric that is acceptable
to their “clients.”
From the above tour of Philippine political studies, we can summarize that the
political economy and modernization approaches place politics in the formal institutional
realm—such as elections and presidential dominance—and the Philippine state remains
weak and vulnerable to elite manipulation while voters or “clients” are susceptible to
monetary inducement at the hands of political elites. At the same time, when politics is
analyzed as everyday politics, relations between patrons and clients are not cordial. Phil-
ippine politics, especially viewed from the bottom-up approach, is issue-oriented and is
about social justice, free and fair elections, respect, and dignity. “Clients” are indeed
critical and do articulate grievances and their vision for a better society.
The focus of this paper is to expand further the second group of approaches to
include other features that underpin values such as equality, responsiveness, and caring
at the village level. My field research in barangays—one village and one town—indicates
that the meaning of politics can be identified in two contesting aspects, which makes the
patron-client relationship Janus-faced. When one is talking about politics in the institutional
realm—such as elections—patron-client ties are subject to “dirty” politics, including
vote-buying, electoral fraud, and elite manipulation, which according to the villagers’ inter-
pretation stands as pulitika. The other contested meaning of politics (thus patron-client
ties) includes social justice, responsibility, and caring in the realm of everyday politics.

The Janus-facedness of Patron-Client Ties:

The Discourse of Tulongg as Hidden Transcripts from “Below”

Patron-client ties are Janus-faced. To understand this phenomenon, one is required to

understand the language used by the masses and differentiate nuances in different con-
 Hidden Transcripts from “Below” in Rural Politics of the Philippines 283

texts. When politicians provide help to the people or simply perform the act of gawa
(action, works) in the context of pulitika, tulongg is at the “dirty” end of politics. Con-
versely, when tulongg is integrated with the sentiment of loob, the patron is seen as the
provider of genuine tulong. When the Janus-facedness of patron-client relations is decon-
structed, we are able to comprehend the masses’ rationale in supporting politicians.

Pagkikilatis/Kalkulasyon through Gawa/Pangako 5)

Ate May: Abe, makikita mo . . . katulad ko, ako minsan kinikilatis ko rin tao kung siya ay magagawa.
Kilala mo naman sa atin, sa mga mukha. Kilala mo ang may magagawa, kilala mo rin ang wala.
Iyon ang aking na laang ano. Dahil mahirap din namang manghula. Mahirap din ang ikaw ay
kuwan./Katulad ng mga mayor, iyan, katulad ni Corona, kilala mo na siya ay mabait. Sa pagmumukha
niya, kilala mo. Marami siyang maa-attract sa kanya na siya ay iboto. Kung siya ay sa paglapit niya
ay siya ay masungit, hindi siya iboboto. Pero marami pa ring bumoto sa kanya. Nanalo eh. Dahil
alam mo, pagka ang isang, ang isang mga kuwan ay minsan mangangako at wala namang nagagawa,
sa susunod, hindi na uli maiboboto.6)
[You will see . . . like me, I scrutinize a candidate to see if he/she can do something good. You
know [from] their faces. You know if someone can do something or not. It’s difficult to guess./
Like Corona, you know that he is a good man. You know it in his face. If, when you approach him and
he’s hot-tempered, no one will vote for him. But a lot of people did. He won. If a candidate prom-
ises to do something but doesn’t keep those promises, no one will vote for that candidate again.]

Tito Catapang: Maraming mapagkunwari eh. Kung tutuusin pag nagpangita kayo akala mo talagang
totoong-totoo. Syempre, nahahalata mo naman ang sino dito ang talagang magaling na tao at hindi./
Parang babatayan mo sa klase ng, iyon nga, ng mga galaw nila.7)
[There are many fakes. Sometimes when you meet them, you think they’re sincere. Of course,
you will be able to see which one is a good person and which is not./You will base it on the kind of
actions they do.]

Alberto: Sa gawa makikita ang isang kuwan. Huwag kang maniniwala sa pangako dahil iyong
pangako wala iyon. Pag nasabi iyon sa ngayon, bukas wala na iyon. Parang pinangakuang pag-ibig,
makahalik lang, ano? Sabi sa dalaga mahal na mahal kita ngayon lang araw na ito, bukas hindi na.
Ano, di ba ganon ang nanliligaw, ano? 8)

5) The transcriptions in this section are verbatim and do not follow the proper grammatical structure
of the Tagalog language system, so as to preserve the originality of the interviews. The author
would like to thank Ms. Charmaine for her assistance with translations and transcriptions. The
names of the interviewees, the barangays, and precinct are pseudonyms.
6) Ate May (former canteen owner). Interview by author, February 18, 2005, Barangay Angeles,
Tanauan City.
7) Tito Catapang (former vendor). Interview by author, February 24, 2005, Barangay Angeles, Tanauan City.
8) Alberto (farmer). Interview by author, April 18, 2005, Barangay Angeles, Tanauan City.
284 SOON
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[You can see it in their actions. Don’t believe in promises, because they mean nothing. If a prom-
ise is made today, it’ll be gone tomorrow. It’s like a promise of love just to get a kiss in return,
right? The man says to the woman, “I love you very much” today—just today, but not tomorrow.
Isn’t that how you court someone?]

The interviews with Ate May, Tito Catapang, and Alberto refer to the campaign
period, when there was a possibility that promises made by a candidate would not be kept
and also that promises were uncertain for they were merely ad hoc strategies by politi-
cians to gain support. Arguably, a politician can enhance his/her image by making pangako
(promises). However, people know that politicians’ pangako may be made to simply
“court” voters. This is indicated in Alberto’s metaphor that giving promises is similar
to courting a woman: promises are mere rhetoric.
As we can see from the above statements, kilatis (scrutiny) and kalkulasyon (calcu-
lation) serve as the twin bases for discerning and judging the moral fabric of a leader—in
this case, the mayor. Ordinary people’s calculations are not made irrationally or in a
sloppy fashion, but are arrived at through gawa (work, an action, or a result of work, task,
duty) that can be seen ((kita) and pangako (promises) that can be heard. Judgments about
the intentions of superordinates are made concrete by reading their bodily gestures and
facial expressions (pagmumukha
( ). The scrutiny is directed toward the leader’s loob (inner
being) and is expressed in the description of the qualities of a human being—whether
he is a good person (mabait/magaling na tao), hot-tempered (masungit), or a fake
(mapagkunwari).
In order for gawa—mostly related to local development projects such as agrarian
funding, provision of pesticides, school building, barangay basketball courts, health care,
scholarships, jobs, and so on—to be appreciated or felt, a leader is required to have a
sincere loob. The mayor’s gawa, as indicated in the interview above, is appreciated only
when the loob of the person is scrutinized: whether he or she is a good person, a hot-
tempered person, or a fake/deceiver. A gawa that is without the element of loob is just
a mechanical action, occurring in the realm of formal politics, i.e., public life and local
development. It remains an emotionless gawa that can only be seen ((kita) but not felt,
which potentially can be used against voters during election time. To appreciate the
gawa, it has to be scrutinized according to whether or not there is an association of loob.
When this connection is achieved, then gawa becomes real, the public activity becomes
linked to the state of a person’s loob, i.e., whether it is mabait, masungit, mapagkunwari,
or talagang totoong-totoo (true, sincere).
Hence, making a decision based on a politician’s pangako is never sufficient in ordi-
nary people’s perception. As indicated above, rather than relying on a politician’s pangako,
people judge the politician through the gawa. Gawa will not be appreciated if the politi-
 Hidden Transcripts from “Below” in Rural Politics of the Philippines 285

cian’s loob is tainted with insincerity. One person’s ability to scrutinize another person’s
loob through gawa can be reached only when both their loob correspond with each other
or, in ordinary people’s language, when they “feel” (nararamdaman) the loob.

Utang and Loob vis-à-vis Utang na Loob

When discussing patron-client ties, we cannot run away from the values of utang na loob
(debt of gratitude). In conventional political studies, the concept of loob (inner being) has
always been linked to the social practice of utangg (debt). A dyadic relationship is main-
tained wherein utang na loob is a hierarchical exchange of gifts between a landlord and a
tenant, a superordinate and a subordinate. Failure to reciprocate invites hiya (shame),
or the stigma of being walang hiya (no shame). Subordinates can never really be dis-
charged from their debt to the superordinates, and therefore choices are made in
accordance with the former’s own powerlessness that creates scope for manipulation by
superordinates.
There is more to utang na loob than is presented in conventional political studies,
however. This section demonstrates how ordinary people interpret utang na loob, seen
as a sociocultural practice in multifaceted ways in relation to the practices of tulong. The
interview below showcases precisely the aforementioned “sincere” criteria in an ideal
utang na loob relationship, as gleaned from the conversation I had with Kuya Bong on the
2004 elections:

Eh syempre, hindi naman natin, hindi nating maaaring sabihin na si Sonia kaya hindi nanalo
masamang tao. Hindi naman. Syempre iyong, komo ang kilala namin na sapul ay si Corona, syempre,
unang-una eh kami’y nakinabang na noong una niyang term. Eh syempre, mayroon na kaming
konting utang na loob sa kanya. Sa bagay, kay Sonia, ganon din dahil itong, halimbawa, may anak
ako na nagtatrabaho, halimbawa, sa Yazaki. May utang na loob din ako, pero iba, iba naman ang
klaseng utang na loob ko doon kay Torres dahil iyong aking anak kung nagtatrabaho man doon,
nakikinabang sila, ano? Hindi katulad ng kay Corona na siya ay aming ibinoto na ang kapalit naman
ng kay Corona ay iyong buong puso naman niya na ibinibigay sa amin na wala namang kapalit.
Syempre, saan ka naman lalagay? . . . Ayan, katulad ng mga lambat na iyan; marami kami dito
binigyan, walang siningil kahit singko. Ang hinihiling nga niya pag may miting, kinakailangan eh
lahat naroon para maunawaan, para malaman. . . .9)
[Of course, we can’t say that the reason why Sonia (Sonia Torres Aquino, Mayor Corona’s rival in
the 2004 election) lost is because she’s a bad person. It’s just that we knew Corona from the very
beginning because we’ve been able to benefit from his first term. Of course, we have a debt of
gratitude to him. I have a child who works in Yazaki. I also have a debt of gratitude to Sonia, but

9) Kuya Bong (fisherman). Interview by author, March 16, 2005, Barangay Angeles, Tanauan City.
286 SOON
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it’s a different kind of debt because as my child works there, she [also] benefits from it, right? In
the case of Corona, we voted for him because he gives wholeheartedly without expecting anything
in return. Of course, there’s never any doubt that we would support him. We would support Corona
because he doesn’t ask for anything in return. . . . Like those [fishing] nets there, there are a lot
of us here who were given those, and he never asked for anything in return. He only asks that we
attend meetings so that we all know and understand. . . .]

The use of utang na loob in this interview reveals the multilayered meanings of utang
and loob. The importance of utang, and the appreciation of loob, are given different
weights and judged at different levels. At one level, we note that the provision of employ-
ment to Kuya Bong’s daughter by Sonia Torres Aquino simultaneously benefited
(nakikinabang) the employer (the company owned by Sonia’s brother). Furthermore,
Kuya Bong’s support of Corona is determined according to whether or not the latter is
doing ((gawa) his tasks well as a politician. In such cases, utang na loob does not con-
note gratitude, as is usually assumed. In the first instance, even if a job is provided, the
“debt” (utang) has already been repaid in the form of labor services where both parties
eventually benefit. In the second instance there is the recognition on the part of the
“debtor” that it is the obligation of a politician to perform ((gawa) his/her responsibilities
as a civil servant to the people. There is an exchange of gifts involved—an act of reci-
procity based on the payment and repayment of utang—in g this case fishing nets. How-
ever, the loob of Kuya Bong appears not to be compromised at all. Kuya Bong has
assessed the “gratitude” or loob side of the material help, the tulong, by recognizing in it
the sentiment of moral duty on the part of his superordinate, that is, the mayor (Corona),
who does not ask for anything in return except attendance at meetings. Kuya Bong is
weighing the qualitative return between Sonia and Corona. Both provide help but of
different types. Sonia’s help consists of a mutually beneficial calculation of interests
written into her job description, while Corona’s help contains the moral duty of a civil
servant to the people.
In the previous section, we discussed how gawa becomes tulongg when it is accom-
panied by a sentiment from the loob. Let us extend the discussion of gawa further in the
context of tulong and utang na loob. The gawa and the tulongg carry different connotations.
On one hand, we have the gawa: the material aspect of an activity that can be seen or
touched, or the physical reality of the politician’s performance as a public servant. There-
fore, the gawa can be regarded as mere utangg that can be repaid through, for instance,
labor services. Tulong, on the other hand, is the nonmaterial dimension of help that
resides in the feeling ((pakiramdam) of one’s inner being—the loob—being manifested in
the physical reality. Therefore, tulong is associated with loob and cannot be measured in
terms of material repayment. In the context of utang na loob, when support is given to
 Hidden Transcripts from “Below” in Rural Politics of the Philippines 287

a leader, it is the mutual respect of each other’s loob, not the utang, that is being recog-
nized and reciprocated.
Deriving from Kuya Bong’s experiences of gawa with Corona and Sonia, the utang
in terms of economic beneficence is not omnipotent. The goodness of a leader is not
significantly measured by the economic advantage or “survival of means of production”
that results from an exchange of gifts. Ordinary people negotiate and reciprocate their
support to a politician through their appreciation of the loob of the person (tao) or leader.
Yielding to the loob of a leader comes about, however, only after scrutiny based on a
sustained observation of that person’s deeds. It is the moral sentiment of the loob mani-
fested in the act of gawa, such as not asking for anything in return—walang
— kapalitt (no
return) or walang kabayaran (no payment)—that people look for and appreciate. This
serves as a gauge for the sense of humanity ((pagkatao) in a politician that can be felt
(maramdaman) by constituents. When the workings of a leader’s loob can be “felt,” then
gawa becomes genuine tulong. Speaking of utang na loob, it was Corona’s tulong, rather
than Sonia’s gawa, that Kuya Bong was referring to. Kuya Bong’s utang na loob came
about as a response to Corona’s mabait/magandang loob (kindheartedness/good inner
being) that he appreciated and therefore reciprocated in terms of loob (through his support
to Corona), more than the obligation to repay the economic component of the debt or the
fear of the social stigma of hiya (shame).
“Utang,” in fact, becomes a modifier when connected by the ligature “na” to “loob”:
it becomes the adjective “utang na loob,” illustrating the noneconomic nature of the cur-
rency of the utang. The utang na loob in Kuya Bong’s language of reciprocity underlies
the modified “loob” within the act of tulongg manifested by a person (tao)—whether a
politician or non-politician—thereby making the economic utang, the modifier, meaning-
ful to ordinary people. Therefore, to understand why ordinary people appreciate help
from a politician in the context of utang na loob, one has to differentiate between the gawa,
which produces a mechanical exchange of debt, and the tulong, which manifests the
“emotional,” immaterial, and much more important side of utang.
The analysis above indicates that loob serves as an emotional platform for ordinary
people to scrutinize their leaders beneath their surface acts. The social practices of
pagkikilatis/kalkulasyon
/ (scrutinization/calculation) in gawa and pangako prove to be fun-
damental concepts in understanding how ordinary people negotiate political relationships
with their leaders. Deriving from utang na loob, especially of the loob that lies within and
informs the utang, ordinary people are looking for a “harmonization” of loob that can be
felt (maramdaman). When this is reached, ordinary people see politics, which operates
in everyday politics, as being about magandang loob (goodwill), mabaitt (goodness), justice,
respect, and genuineness.
288 SOON
N Chuan Yean

Through our previous discussion of the bases for scrutiny from the perspective of
ordinary people, we can appreciate the local concepts that enable us to understand ordi-
nary people’s distaste for conventional politics and how the field of meaningful politics
can be different from that of pulitika, which is seen as dominated by the elites, especially
at election time. More important is that the masses’ understanding of patron-client ties
is Janus-faced, a view that conventional political studies would subscribe to: factional
contests, the culture of indebtedness, playing out of ambitions, and power struggles. We
now turn to the discussion of pulitika as interpreted by the masses.

The Interpretation of Pulitika

The masses, or “clients,” are indeed a critical component of patron-client ties. The
masses do realize the consequences of receiving help from patrons and the consequences
during election time. In the context of pulitika, the Janus-facedness of patron-client ties
is in the realm of “bad” politics. The analysis of concepts such as gawa versus pangako
helps us to understand the meaning and nuances of politics from the perspective of ordi-
nary people. This manifestation of politics among the masses is not seen in the realm of
formal politics or in front of politicians. The way I understand it, the public transcript
that the masses manifest at the level of pulitika is “games” played with politicians; the
masses tread cautiously so as not to reveal their intention (in this context their preferred
candidate) and at the same time exploit the election campaign for short-term interests.
The conversation below pertains to how pulitiko (politicians) behave in the context
of pulitika. This conversation was held when electoral candidates came to meet people
(specifically women’s groups) during the campaign period. Through the help of liders
(leaders), meetings were organized and political messages were slipped into the meeting
agendas to court for votes.

Ate Jul: Oo, mga sinasabi sa mga member, o, dalin natin si ganito. Kasi may lider kami, o, ang
dadalin natin si ganito. May sasabihin sa iyong dala. Eh pero, kami syempre, hindi ka naman
pwedeng sumagot na aba’y hindi. Hindi pwede. Kaya lang ang tinatanong namin iyong puso namin.
Kahit pa ba kami utusan mo, syempre, tango ka lang dyan nang tango. Pulitika din ang gagamitin
mo dyan eh! Hindi ka pwedeng, ayaw ko sa kanya. Baka mamaya . . .
[Yes, they tell their members to support a particular candidate. Of course, you can’t say no. We
just ask our hearts. Even if you order us, of course, we just say: “We also use politics!” You
can’t explicitly say you don’t like the candidate. Maybe next time . . .]

Ate Liz: Pagdating ng araw na—

[When the time comes—]
 Hidden Transcripts from “Below” in Rural Politics of the Philippines 289

Ate Jul: Ito lang ang tatanungin mo, ang ballpen kasi ikaw naman ang magsusulat. Ikaw ang
magsusulat, eh di ang, kahit pa ba sabihin sa iyo, kung hindi mo gusto iyong ano, eh di isulat mo iyong
kursunada mo.
[You’ll be the one to write, not your ball pen. So no matter what they tell you, you just vote for
whomever you want.]

Ate Liz: Pag magkakaharap, sige ho. Pagdating ng araw . . .

[If you’re faced with each other, OK. But when the time comes . . .]

Ate Jul: Pag hindi ka kasi naging matalino, wala eh. Kasi kung umayon din lang naman tayo nang
umayon tapos wala din, wala din namang naitutulong, nakakasama lang ng loob eh. Ay, di mabuti
pang iboto mo iyong kursunada mo. Kahit walang maitulong, kahit papano hindi sasama ang loob
mo dahil ikaw ang bumoto ng kursunada mo. Ay, mahirap kasi iyong patuturo ka sa pagboto tapos,
syempre, pangako iyan nang pangako. Aasa ka doon sa mga pangako. Tapos ang ibinoto mo pagdating
ng oras na nakiusap ka eh hihindian ka, wala. Sasama lang ang loob mo.
[If you’re not smart, nothing will become of you. If we only say yes and not think about it, and in
the long run the candidates we hastily voted for don’t really help us, we’ll just feel bad. So it’s
better to vote for whomever you like. Even if that person isn’t able to help you, you won’t feel bad
because you only have yourself to blame. It’s hard to be carried away by promises. Of course, you
will get your hopes up for the promises. Then the person you voted for will turn you away when
you ask for help. You’ll just feel bad.]

Ate Liz: Mahirap nang sumama sa agos.10)

[It’s hard to get carried by the tide.]

Pulitika, as an English loanword, literally means “politics” but connotes a nuance

that does not involve the scope of politics, i.e., consensual democracy and civic life. From
the conversation above, pulitika is equated with false promises. In pulitika, favors and
material incentives are given by a candidate to court for votes. Similar to our discussion
on the difference between pangako and gawa, a candidate usually gives promises only to
influence voters. Favors, help, and promises that are provided during election time are
not similar to the tulongg (help) that is extended in everyday life. In the local expression,
pulitika is similar to someone who is seen crawling under the cover of night and slipping
bribe money under the door: ““Ang iba pa nga dyan nagbibigay ng pera, ang tinatawag na
gapang sa gabi, abot sa pinto (Some others give money; it’s what is called crawling in the
night, until the door).”11)
Ate Jul is cautiously aware of the promises and favors given during election time.
She is also aware of the consequences of being open and honest with leaders on her choice

10) Conversation between Ate Liz (sari-sari store owner) and Ate Jul (farmer). Interview by author,
April 14, 2005, Barangay Angeles, Tanauan City.
11) Tatay Bending (canteen helper). Interview by author, March 4, 2005, Barangay 1, Tanauan City.
290 SOON
N Chuan Yean

of candidates. To her, these are mere strategies within pulitika that do not bring guar-
antees or security to the people after election. In her perception, pulitika is deceitful and
does not ensure security. Thus, one is required to be matalino (smart) in order not to
be disappointed after elections. The help given in the context of pulitika does not involve
the loob, as we have discussed in previous sections—i.e., it does not manifest magandang
loob. It is merely a pure political stratagem to win votes. And interestingly, Ate Jul is
also playing political games.
The ideal way of “doing” politics is to vote for someone according to one’s scrutiny
of the politician and their inner being/self (loob): ““Kaya lang ang tinatanong namin iyong
puso namin (We just ask our hearts).” The reference to the loob expressed in puso high-
lights how ordinary people’s “feelings” operate in politics (not pulitika), such as, for
example, their assessment of politicians through the feeling of their distance (malayo) or
closeness (malapit) in order not to be disappointed and to be able to ask for tulongg later
on. When someone says, quoting from the interviews above, “You’ll be the one to write,
not your ball pen. So no matter what they tell you, you just vote for whomever you want”
or “Even if that person isn’t able to help you, you won’t feel bad because you only have
yourself to blame,” this indicates that one has the ability to scrutinize whoever is con-
sidered to be a mabait na tao (good person) and it is important to vote for someone who
is trustworthy. If tulongg is not provided, at least the loob or the self ((sarili) will not be
tainted by guilt and disappointment.
In this regard, the kind of voting behavior that is based on the blind acceptance of
blank promises and receiving favors as unscrupulous “clients” during elections pollutes
people’s loob, and the consequence will be the negligence of the welfare of people; in
short, a sinister pulitika is at work, which leads to future disappointment, and so we must
try to avoid being pulled in.
Another dimension of pulitika is the employment of tactics and strategies. The
relationship between a candidate and a voter is based on a cautious calculation of strategies
to avoid being stigmatized as walang hiya (shameless) in trying to secure future benefits.
This is also expressed in the abovementioned conversation between Ate Liz and Ate Jul.
We can see Ate Liz’s calculation of the possibility of future consequences—“Pagdating
“
ng araw na . . . (When the time comes . . .)”—which means that even though she does
not like a candidate, she will still reserve a space for negotiating a future relationship
with that politician, which means having to avoid making negative comments explicitly
to a candidate. In pulitika, both parties (candidate and constituent) are playing strategic
games with their requisite tactics: ““Kahit pa ba kami utusan mo, syempre, tango ka lang
dyan nang tango. Pulitika din ang gagamitin mo dyan eh (Even when we are being given
orders, of course, we just nod and nod [in assent]. We also use politics in that case)!”
 Hidden Transcripts from “Below” in Rural Politics of the Philippines 291

Finally, pulitika is perceived as a game that politicians introduce and which people
play along with. Like children they form camps and go with one or the other leader, but
after the game is over the losers disappear. In other words, pulitika is not a serious
undertaking by the community at large. But if it is just a game, who ultimately benefits
from it?

Tatay Bending: Iyon ang mga nakakaintindi sa pulitika. Dito sa bayan eh ang pulitika eh parang
ano laang, iyong parang laro laang ng mga bata, a kanya-kanyang bata. O, bata ko iyan. O, bata
ko ito. Sama ka sa amin. Eh di hati tayo. Ganyan lang iyan eh. Pagkatapos naman ng botohan eh
matatalo iyong isa. O, ano? Saan ang bata? [Laughs]
[They (the candidates) understand politics. Here in town, politics is like a game for children—
each with his/her own children to support. That’s my kid. That one’s my kid. Come with us. We
share. That’s the way it is. After the elections and one loses, what now? Where’s your kid?
[Laughs]]

Tatay Bending: Noong una, mayroon. Eh sa ngayon, eh ang mga ano naman ngayon, kumbaga sa
ano eh botohan, hindi pantay, hindi patas ang laro r .
[At first, it (politics) could make a difference. But now, voting isn’t equal. The game isn’t played
on an equal footing.]12)

The perception of pulitika as a game of politicians that temporarily draws in ordinary

people is more vividly shown in the dialogue below on Tatay Bending’s experiences with
politicians.

Woman: Hindi kasi naboto si tiyo eh.

[Uncle does not vote.]

Tatay Bending: Nadala ako. Dahil sa aking anak, dahil sa aking anak na napagbintangan ng
marijuana. Kaya ako’y nagalit eh dahil sa nagkasakit na ang aking anak eh kinuha pa. Noong
kinuha, nailabas naman ng kapitan dyan sa barangay dos. Naiuwi, eh di nagkasakit. Naggawa ng
bahay doon sa ilog na para hindi siya maligalig. Ngayon eh — sa paa, nagkasakit, kinukuha na
ulit ng pulis. Sabi namin eh huwag muna, magpapagaling muna. Hindi ika, sandali laang, kakau-
sapin laang. Eh mahina na, wala nang boses. Aba, eh ikinulong! Hindi man lang, pupunta sa center
eh. Hindi na makalakad, hindi na makahakbang, ganyan. Eh pagka ganyan, naupo, nagpapahinga.
May posas pa. Paano kang matutuwa noon? Lalagyan pa ng posas eh ang lapit-lapit naman ng
center. Bago sasabihin ng pulis eh iyon daw eh kanilang —. Kalokohan iyan! Hindi na nga
makalakad, lalagyan mo pa ng posas.
[I learned my lesson. It’s because of my son who was accused of (possessing) marijuana. I got so
angry because they took my son away even though he was sick. When he was taken, the captain
of the barangay bailed him out. He was brought home, and he got sick. There was a house there

12) Tatay Bending (canteen helper). Interview by author with a woman and Tatay Bending, March 4,
2005, Barangay 1, Tanauan City.
292 SOON
N Chuan Yean

near the river, which was built so he wouldn’t cause trouble. Now — (mis-recording), when he
was sick, the police took him away again. We told them (the police) to wait until my son was bet-
ter. They said they’d take him for just a little while, only to talk. My son was so weak, he didn’t
even have a voice (he couldn’t talk). He was jailed! He wasn’t even allowed to go to the (health)
center. He couldn’t walk, couldn’t take a step on his own. When he climbed a stair, he had to sit
down and rest. He was even handcuffed. How can you be happy with that? They handcuffed him
when the (health) center was just so near. Then the police said — (mis-recording). That’s
foolishness! He couldn’t even walk, and they handcuffed him.]

Woman: So karamihan talaga ang bawal na gamot talaga hindi mo, laganap na talaga. Hindi na
masugpo eh. Ni-raid ang Maruha noon. Damay iyong anak ni tiyo. Binata, ikinulong, namayat,
namatay. Hindi nagawan ng paraan ni mayor.
[Drugs are really prevalent now. It can’t be solved. Maruha (a precinct in Barangay 1) was raided
then. Uncle’s (Tatay Bending’s) son got involved. He was unmarried, and he was jailed, got thin,
and died. The mayor wasn’t able to do anything.]

Tatay Bending: Di nagawan gawa ng dadalin sa Batangas eh. Aayaw-ayaw. Naghihingalo na eh,
dala ang ambulansya, kagkag, ay hindi na nakarating ng Batangas. Bumalik na. Wala nang pag-asa
eh. Paano ka matutuwa niyan? Tumutulong ka sa kanila eh, tapos ngayon eh wala ring nangyari.
O, di tapos na.
[They were supposed to bring him to Batangas (City). When he was on the verge of death, they
put him in an ambulance and rushed him to Batangas, but they weren’t able to get there. They
came back. It was hopeless. How can you be happy with that? You help them (the politicians),
but nothing happened. There, it’s finished.]

Woman: Nadala na si tiyong bumoto.

[Uncle learned his lesson about voting.]

Tatay Bending: Pagka ako’y pinipilit, eh di kayo na ang bumoto. Huwag mo na akong isasali dyan.
May pera eh. Matatapakan ka.13)
[When I’m being forced, I tell them to go ahead and vote. Don’t involve me there. They have
money. They will step on you.]

One perspective on the above narrative would be that the incident was an excep-
tional case as it involved death, and therefore the resentment was at a more personal
level of emotional assertion, not necessarily a spelling out of ordinary people’s under-
standing of pulitika. Nevertheless, the fact that Tatay Bending had been turned away
from help at a particularly critical time is connected by him with the meaning of pulitika
in general. The incident has taught him to stop voting, i.e., to abandon that system of
politics altogether. Pulitika connotes a negative domain that cannot guarantee one’s

13) A woman and Tatay Bending (both canteen helpers). Interview by author, March 4, 2005, Barangay
1, Tanauan City.
 Hidden Transcripts from “Below” in Rural Politics of the Philippines 293

(especially the poor’s) welfare, similar to pangako seen as rhetoric during election time.
Elections are just a temporary space for politicians to court for votes and fulfill their desire
for power. In pulitika, the ultimate consequence is oppression, i.e., matatapakan (to step
or suppress), blank promises, and the absence of compassion toward others (i.e., no help
was given in a time of need to save Tatay Bending’s son). Thus, pulitika is just like a
game for children—“parang
“ laro laang ng mga bata”—that perhaps benefits the rich
(mayaman) and the politicians ((pulitiko), but not the poor (mahirap).
To sum up this session, the patron-client ties that function in the pulitika context
pertain to “bad” politics that serve the vested interests of both parties, but predominantly
on the patron side. With the cultivation of ties between the two parties, interests become
loyalty and loyalty becomes “culture.” Patron-client ties take the form of “bad” politics
at the expense of people’s welfare, responsive governance, and democracy. In Ileto’s
(1999b, 160) definition:

Pulitika is the perception of politics as a process of bargaining, with implicit self or factional inter-
ests involved. The interaction between colonial power and its native words was pulitika. At
another level, it refers to the practices by which leaders cultivate ties of personal loyalty and
indebtedness to them, or simply attract votes.

According to Resil Mojares (2002, 338) pulitika “. . . is imaged in terms of elite factional
competition (inilungay sa katungdanan), manipulation (maneobra), spectacle, and dis-
simulation.”
Both definitions of pulitika above reverberate with the perceptions of ordinary
people in the barangay regarding pulitika—that it is a game dominated by the elites, the
mayaman, and the pulitiko, introduced during election times to involve the people in
politics and to employ various stratagems with which to court for votes. In sum, to study
popular politics, we are required to extend the scope of politics to include pulitika but to
go beyond it as well. To understand what politics really means to the people, we need
to incorporate the politics of emotion in their everyday lives and realign our analytical
sights to the all-important idiom of loob, expressed in various social concepts such as
magandang loob, mabait, and utang na loob as previously shown.

Concluding Remarks

Tulongg (help), whether it is studied through the political economist, culturalist, or struc-
turalist approach, has always been a convenient concept to describe the ties between
patrons and clients, disguised in material rewards or personal services, which are simply
294 SOON
N Chuan Yean

seen as gawa. This paper uses the approaches that stress an analysis of the lexicon of
language and sociocultural context and argues that to understand ordinary people’s poli-
tics, it is essential to decode and interpret the “hidden” political behavior of the masses
and their interpretation of tulongg not merely from a political economic aspect, but more
importantly from a sociological and cultural aspect. What is lacking is the taken-for-
granted Janus-facedness of patron-client ties, especially the interpretation of the clients’
side, their “submission” into the tulongg provided by the patron—in other words, their
acceptance of tulong.
Ordinary people’s contestations cannot be seen as a claim for power and pragmatic
interests. Rather, they are ways of asserting the people’s views of what an ideal, or at
least better, society should be. In ordinary people’s reckoning, the attachment to the
“soul stuff” of a leader is actually the act of justifying, scrutinizing, and claiming for
respect and dignity, equality, and justice that is without discrimination and is free of
corruption. Such reckoning is manifested at the level of everyday politics.
Kerkvliet (1991; 1995) rightly points out that politics or political activities can be
identified at two levels. One is the level of formalized political institutions such as elec-
tion campaigns, deliberation of legislations, public policies, governance, and so on. How-
ever, to comprehend the politics of the masses or the subordinates, another level of
politicking is useful. Kerkvliet’s concept of everyday politics—defined as an “unorgan-
ized and informal discourse and activity of everyday politics where people come to terms
with and/or contest norms and rules regarding authority, production, and the allocation
of resources” (1995, 418)—is the realm of the subalterns’ political activities. The sub-
alterns’ “hidden” political behavior is intended not to jeopardize their connection with
the patrons, whom they see as essential for their survival. This is similar to Scott’s
Hidden Transcripts (1990), which captures the behind-the-scenes political discourse in
this manner. Scott’s (1985) other works in rural Malaysia indicate the way in which
peasants do contest and resist but their practices of contestation are hidden from the
superordinate; they are nonrevolutionary and yet antagonistic to their unequal relation-
ship with the patrons. What is significant in Scott’s and Kerkvliet’s works is that they
recognize the everyday politics of the masses and understand that it is antagonistic to
the patrons in a subtle manner. The subalterns do speak and contest. Tulongg in the rural
Philippines is one such discourse that helps to understand peasants’ demands and artic-
ulations.
In rural areas of the Philippines, tulongg has always been practiced and connotes dif-
ferent meaning in different contexts. It can be in the form of votes, financial aid, services,
and so on. When tulongg is put in the context of elections, such as in the form of promises
for local development, it becomes something that is “dirty,” manipulative, and selfish.
 Hidden Transcripts from “Below” in Rural Politics of the Philippines 295

To the masses, this is pulitika and the tulongg (or gawa) is a mere stratagem of the patrons
to court for votes. Tulong in the pulitika context subscribes to the patron-client ties of
hierarchy, favoritism, debt of gratitude, and manipulation. In this context, tulongg is seen
as gawa, which refers to the context of development. Gawa does not connote “bad”
politics as in the case of pulitika. It is more the responsibility of the government to the
people, but it potentially can be used against clients in the pulitika context when it comes
to elections. However, patron-client ties are not static, nor do they remain at the “dirty”
end of politics. When gawa turns into tulongg to include the sentiment of loob, the Janus-
facedness of patron-client ties is evident in the shift toward “good” politics.
This paper does not intend to dismiss the patron-client ties framework or to consti-
tute another theoretical framework for understanding Philippine politics. While recogniz-
ing the patron-client ties at work in Philippine society, the paper also argues that there
are other political features in play—whether to construct a more responsive government
or to sustain patronage politics at the expense of democracy. Unfortunately, as has been
showcased by many incidents and events, Philippine politics remains underdeveloped—
judging from the country’s political instability, such as in the southern part of the archi-
pelago; insignificant if not stagnating economic growth; and social problems, especially
the nation’s unresolved poverty.
Some researchers might question the significance of studying the masses’ interpre-
tation of tulong, since there is a persistence of “bad” politics in the Philippines, especially
in rural areas where patron-client ties are prevalent and customary. It is difficult to
identify precisely where the political deficiency lies—with the patrons or with the voters.
It is also difficult to determine whether the voters are selling their votes for short-term
advantages and are thus disrespectful of democratic institutions. Thus far, I am only able
to provide the discourse of politics in which the people share their stories and views about
politicians. Whether these contested views will translate into votes for change is difficult
to determine. Providing answers to these issues requires a more thorough analysis and
deeper research. I am merely providing alternative ways to explain the rationale of the
masses in the realm of everyday politics, which I believe is essential to understanding
the masses’ political activities and interpreting their relationship with politicians.
However, my preliminary observation tends to support the hypothesis that the
reason the masses continue to engage in patron-client ties is because formal institutions
have failed them. What is available in the realm of formal politics is government officials
such as politicians, and relationships with them need to be cultivated. The masses know
very well that if they hope to gain from the institutional setup, the game needs to be
played well and cautiously. The Philippine masses are not passive or submissive to
“dirty” politics. Nor do they blindly submit to the patrons due to vested interests. Their
296 SOON
N Chuan Yean

political activities extend beyond this. The masses also look for responsive leadership
in the realm of everyday politics. To turn such “politics” into another institution requires
much more than this analysis can discern. Equally important, we should attempt to
understand the “politicking” of the masses and to recognize that the masses are not
ignorant, uneducated, or simply vying for material rewards and money, especially during
election time. Their socioeconomic conditions, social relational dynamics with politicians,
encounters with fellow barangay folks, and ideas of morality shape the way they “do”
politics. However, this does not mean that all things are static and bounded within a
given cultural setting or standard rules of conduct. By understanding the multifaceted
political behaviors and constant shifts of social hierarchy, we might be able to appreciate
the nonlinearity of the historical construct and complexities of a community such as in
Barangay Angeles.
Lastly, I remember during my field research when a nonpolitical figure was helping
the community, he or she would be “pushed” to become a politician, for that personality
had desirable qualities according to the people in the community. Unfortunately, when
a person became a political official, the desirable qualities were usually not sustained and
the politician fell prey to corruption and money politics. I shall conclude this paper by
quoting from an interview I conducted with a farmer to indicate his distaste for Philippine
society, which fits in with my description of people’s view against regarding pulitiko as
beacons of hope to help the community.

Mga tao dito may konsyensya dahil lahat naman maka-Diyos ang tao eh. Problema laang pag
nasingitan ng pera. Kasi ang Diyos ng tao dalawa eh. Sabi noong iba, devil. Hindi, pera. . . . Pera,
pera ang nagiging dahilan ng kasamaan. n 14)
[People here have a conscience, because everyone is religious. The problem starts when money
comes into the picture. People worship two gods. Others say it’s the devil. Isn’t it? It’s money.
. . . You wouldn’t be evil if not for money.]

Acknowledgments

The author would like to express his gratitude to the reviewers for their critical and constructive com-
ments on the earlier version of this paper.

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Interviews
Alberto. Interview by author, April 18, 2005, Barangay Angeles, Tanauan City.
Ate Jul. Interview by author, April 14, 2005, Barangay Angeles, Tanauan City.
Ate Liz. Interview by author, April 14, 2005, Barangay Angeles, Tanauan City.
Ate May. Interview by author, February 18, 2005, Barangay Angeles, Tanauan City.
A woman. Interview by author, March 4, 2005, Barangay 1, Tanauan City.
Kuya Bong. Interview by author, March 16, 2005, Barangay Angeles, Tanauan City.
Tatay Bending. Interview by author, March 4, 2005, Barangay 1, Tanauan City.
Tito Catapang. Interview by author, February 24, 2005, Barangay Angeles, Tanauan City.