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SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF
HISTO RY
What is it and why study it?

Introduction: the two branches of philosophy of history:

speculative and analytic
When the famously ‘enlightened’ Frenchman, Voltaire, coined the term
‘philosophy of history’, he meant something akin to what we might now call ‘critical
cultural history’. In his 1769 Essay on the Customs and the Spirit of Nations he
surveyed ancient and classical cultures (primarily in terms of their customs and
religions), including China and India, as well as feudal times in Europe up to the
reign of Louis XIV (1643–1715). Rather than present this huge historical vista as
some kind of inherently meaningful pattern or story, his intention was to extract
morally useful lessons from such ‘history’ (for example, to downplay sentimental
or overawed respect for tradition and authority, and to highlight moral short-
comings and absurdities in his own society, thereby raising not only the present but
also the future, ‘in the light of history’). In short, he was interested in this approach
to ‘history’ because of the new perspective it offered regarding human progress. His
own views on the latter could be pretty gloomy, and how much hope his
‘philosophical history’ gave him for the better future he desired is a doubtful matter.
But one thing is clear – he meant his readers to think about history, not simply to
read and research it ‘for its own sake’ as a residue of interesting facts and events.
A second aspect to Voltaire’s ‘philosophy of history’ was closely related to the
above, namely, his awareness that the method of study required for such a ‘history’
at least needed to be rational – that is, able to sidestep superstition and religious
orthodoxy and to examine long-held beliefs. Therefore he recognised the need to
attend to how the historian works on his material and how he thinks about what
he is doing – that is, an aspect of his ‘philosophy of history’ concerned history as a
discipline or method, in addition to ‘history’ as ‘what happened’. In the event,
however, his own views on the discipline of history were not especially innovative.1
Embryonic as Voltaire’s coining of the phrase was, the essentials are already
there to explain what ‘philosophy of history’ is. Leaving aside temporarily the term
‘philosophy’, we see that philosophy of history is concerned with the two different
meanings of the term ‘history’. On the one hand it treats of it as meaning past
events, circumstances, and facts – in other words, ‘history’ as the material or ‘object’

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to be studied; and on the other hand it treats it as the academic discipline which
studies the former. In short, the meaning of the term ‘history’ is twofold, and can
be expressed by saying that history as object is what the subject of history studies.
Philosophy of history is concerned with both versions of ‘history’, thus consisting
of two branches. Where it treats of history as ‘object’, it is usually called speculative
(or substantive) philosophy of history, and where it treats it as a ‘discipline’ it is best
called analytic philosophy of history.

‘Philosophy’
The other term involved in our subject-matter is ‘philosophy’. This is a term which
has become more precise than in Voltaire’s time, when it simply meant something
like ‘thoughtful knowledge’ – and it is perhaps partly because of this that the term
is intimidating to some. For example, doubtless some scientists are neglectful of
philosophy of science because they are nervous of ‘philosophy’, just as some
historians are de-motivated regarding ‘philosophy of history’. But here we can
return to our glimpse at Voltaire, for a third aspect to his philosophy is that he
meant his readers to think rationally about both the material and the discipline of
history – and there is a reassuring sense in which that is almost ‘all’ what we call
‘philosophy’ is, namely, to think rationally about something. All we need add is that
such thinking only becomes ‘philosophical’ when there is not already a recognised
‘method’ for finding answers to questions – in other words, where the matter under
scrutiny does not fall under existing academic disciplines or other accepted ‘rules’
of thought. For example, we now have scientific disciplines to approach such
questions as ‘what is illness?’, ‘what are stars?’, and ‘where did mankind come from?’,
(respectively, medicine, astronomy, and biology). Likewise, other disciplines such
as social sciences, languages, and indeed history provide accepted approaches to
different questions. Also, apart from academic disciplines, we have familiar ways
of tackling questions such as ‘when is the next flight to New York?’, ‘why did you
spend so much money?’, and ‘where are my gloves?’. In all these cases we do not
‘philosophise’. What this shows is that philosophy approaches those issues for
which, in the absence of existing ‘rules’, we simply have to rely on our capacity to
‘think out’ a problem as best (‘rationally’) as we can. Thus it is that over the
millennia ‘philosophers’ have pondered about justice, happiness, dreams, art,
motion, the State, and much more. It is true the emergence of modern science and
social studies has diminished the area of philosophical enquiry, but plenty of
‘inaccessible’ questions remain for philosophy to flourish (for example, perennial
moral issues), as well as new ones emerging. Not least among them are whether
there is such a thing as ‘world-history’ in any meaningful sense, (thus, ‘speculative
philosophy of history’) and whether the practice of the subject, ‘history’ – i.e., the
discipline of history – is fully valid, (thus, ‘analytic philosophy of history’).
In short, (and contrary to many philosophers who ‘philosophise’ precisely about
‘what is philosophy?’ – the answer is provided by the history of thought), there is
no mystery enveloping ‘philosophy’ making it an esoteric subject which, for example,

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scientists and historians should respectfully leave to ‘the experts’. It has no special
subject-matter of its own (unlike all other viable academic disciplines), neither any
special method (again, unlike all other viable disciplines). Rather, it simply means
seeking knowledge or understanding, through the exercise of reason, of those
matters otherwise inaccessible via known paths or rules of enquiry – and in the
sense that this means trying to think something through ‘on our own’, it is a
uniquely ‘democratic’ activity, open to everyone.
All this, however, is not to say philosophy is easy. Many brilliant thinkers adorn
its history, and we tread respectfully in their wake to avoid thinking and saying silly
things. Also, their reflections and arguments amongst each other over time have
generated a special vocabulary better to denote certain recurring complex and/or
abstract ideas, and not only is it as well to become familiar with some of this
vocabulary in order to understand their writings, but its persistence shows its
usefulness to our own efforts to ‘think things through in a rational way’.

Speculative philosophy of history

If, then, ‘philosophy’ is more to be embraced than feared, let us look further into
that branch of philosophy of history called speculative philosophy of history. As
already intimated, this consists of thinking about the actual ‘content’ of (human)
history to see in what sense ‘it as a whole’ is explicable or meaningful. It is hence
not surprising that some who have attempted this employed the term ‘universal
history’, and that one recent scholar described it as ‘the central aspiration to afford
a total explanatory account of the past’.2 Although not all speculative philosophy
of history is so overtly ambitious, those who engage in it are variously attempting
to reach conclusions about the following kinds of questions: does history
demonstrate a single giant unfolding story? If so, does the ‘story’ have an ending?
And is that ending utopian, cataclysmic, or simply mundane? Or does history go
round in circles (‘cycles’)? Can history be divided up into distinct periods such as
‘the Dark Ages’, and if so, what are they? And what does this tell us about the
course of history? Is the history of the world necessarily a history of progress of
humanity; if so, why? If not, why not? Do ‘laws’ govern historical development, or
is it already begging the question to see history as ‘developing’? Is the course
of history determined by forces outside human control, or can individuals’ actions
make a difference? Can we learn anything from the flow of history, or is every
situation unique?
In their turn, these large questions have generated a recognisable body of
subsidiary issues. Is there such a thing as ‘Fate’? Or ‘Providence’? Has ‘human
nature’ remained the same throughout history? Can we talk of different mentalities
over the ages, such as an early ‘mythical consciousness’ as distinct from the
modern ‘scientific’ outlook? Can the history of humanity be seen as analogous
to the growth of the individual from infanthood, through childhood and youth, to
maturity, and then old age? Why is it that great cultures have invariably declined?
Is it inevitable?

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Speculative philosophy of history, then, stems from the impulse to make sense of
history, to find meaning in it, or at least some intelligible pattern. And it should
not surprise us that at the heart of this impulse is a desire to predict the future (and
in many cases to shape it). By any standards, then, this branch of philosophy of
history is audacious, and there is a sense in which the term ‘speculative’ is not only
appropriate but also carries derogatory implications for those historians and others
who insist on a solely empirical approach to the past, i.e., on ‘sticking to the facts’.
In short, to some, the very project of speculative philosophy of history can appear
misguided on the grounds that it is ‘theoretical’ in the bad sense of the term –
factually unfounded, impossible of proof, prey to imaginative flights of fancy, and
premised on an unrealistically encyclopaedic knowledge of history throughout
recorded time and over most of the globe. To others, however, it is a worthwhile
undertaking because it is so natural to a reflective being. Just as at times one gets
the urge to ‘make sense’ of one’s own life, either out of simple curiosity about its
‘meaning’, or through suffering a particularly turbulent phase, or because weighty
decisions about one’s future are looming, so some are drawn to reflect, not on
themselves, but on the history of their species – mankind.

The relevance of speculative philosophy of history

Whether speculative philosophy of history is worthwhile or, instead, a
fundamentally flawed exercise, it is surely an understandable venture. Here I revert
to the analogy of the individual’s reflections on his or her life. Firstly, attempts to
discover a theory or ‘philosophy’ of history are intrinsically interesting because
they try to make sense of the overall flow of history – even in some cases to give it
meaning. And there is a sense in which to do particularly the latter is to offer
answers to the question, ‘what is the point of life?’ (not of yours or mine, but of
human life in general). The importance of such a question is either self-explanatory
or nil, depending on an individual’s assumptions. Some see it as the ultimate
question to be answered, whereas others see it as symptomatic of an arrogant
anthropomorphism which demands that ‘life, the universe, and all that’ be reduced
to the petty model of merely human dimensions, where intention and reason are
seen as the governing principles. But that individuals differ in this way is exactly
the point, in the sense that speculative philosophy of history raises the issue directly
into the light of argument, allowing us to examine our initial assumptions regarding
the value or futility of such ‘ultimate’ questions. For example, one might ask sceptics
whether they at least accept the notion that, on the whole, ‘history has delivered’
progress in the arts, sciences, economics, government, and quality of life. If the
answer is ‘yes’, how do they account for it? Is it chance (thus offering no guarantees
for the future)? Or if there is a reason for it, what is this ‘reason’ which is ‘going on
in history’? Similarly, if the sceptics answer ‘no’, then why not? Again, is it chance?
Or is there some ‘mechanism’ underlying the course of history which prevents
overall continuous progress? If so, what is it, and can it be defeated? And as for those

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who do believe in a history which delivers progress, what do they have to say about
the immense catalogue of horrors still to be found in the world?
Whatever answers are given, whether from the enthusiast’s or the sceptic’s
viewpoint, they cannot but be interesting to us in their own right, for since we are
beings conscious of the passing of time and of the varying of events and
circumstances, we cannot but wish ‘to make sense’ of this aspect of our being-in-
the-world. In short, to be ‘conscious’ of this or that is to ‘make sense’ of it, in the
most basic sense that human-beings are of necessity perpetually, instinctively
engaged in the practice of ‘understanding’, or contriving meaning in, what they
experience. Thus it would be strange indeed if historians, whose object is the past,
did not find speculative philosophy of history intrinsically interesting, whether
impressed or not by particular examples of it.

To pursue our analogy, there is a second reason why an impulse towards speculative
philosophy of history, worthwhile or not, is at least understandable – namely, there
are certain periods in history when many who are part of them feel their times are
especially turbulent or in some way remarkable (just as when an individual, for
example, falls seriously ill, undergoes a severe loss, wins the lottery, or retires). At
such times, interest in ‘making sense of the past’ has a practical point – namely, the
felt need to come to terms with the present through gaining a perspective on how
one has got there. Such reflections serve the function of restoring, or confirming,
a meaning to the present otherwise lost or at least jeopardized by an unprecedented
flow of events. Only too aware of the particular narrative of events leading to our
present situation, we attempt to regain our bearings by seeking more reflective
generalised explanations for the state we are in. This urge to ‘take stock’ of affairs
in turbulent times is ‘natural’, I suggest, for either of two reasons – first, the need
not only for individuals but also for communities (local, regional, national, and
even international) to preserve their sense of identity; and second, the need to
find excuses or deflect blame, where the unsteadiness of the present is unpleasant
and perceived as resulting from failure. This latter is probably no more than a
particular case of the general need to preserve a sense of identity, for in finding
‘excuses’ for the parlous state one might be in, one is meaning ‘it wasn’t me, sir’!
As we will see, if by a ‘theodicy’ is meant ‘a justification of the ways of God to man’,
many speculative philosophies of history contain elements of ‘a justification of the
ways of man to man’, (for which we might coin the term ‘histodicy’).3 For example,
‘America is still the land of the free despite some of the things it has “had” to do
. . .’, just as ‘I am still “me” despite some of the things I have done . . .’.

To complete our analogy, a third reason why speculative philosophy of history is

understandable is that there are periods in history when many intuit the coming
to an end of an epoch, and the possibility, even necessity, of fashioning a new
future. Thus the range of their vision extends beyond the short or medium term,
and they look at themselves (either as individuals or, by analogy, as ‘cultures’, or
even as ‘mankind’) in terms of their ‘historic’ possibilities. This involves an attempt

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to supersede the ‘details’ of the past in order to abstract overall ‘trends’ and general
‘laws’ from which to predict the future. A variety of positions can follow, most of
which have been proposed at one time or another by different philosophers
of history. The prediction may be one of gloom, which we can do nothing about;
or of gloom, but one we can at least mitigate; or of a gloom which can be entirely
averted. Alternatively the prediction may be one of endless ‘progress’ which only
has to be nurtured, or of limited progress in limited areas. There is even the
‘prediction’ that ‘history’ has stopped – that, at least politically and economically,
mankind has reached a culmination from which we can expect no further
fundamental changes or developments either in terms of regress or progress.

Is speculative philosophy of history worthwhile?

From the above, then, I suggest speculative philosophy of history is an under-
standable intellectual exercise and, to that extent, defensible. Broadly, its project
is interesting in its own right since it purports to ‘make sense’ of history, and to that
extent suggest answers to ‘the meaning of life’. The latter issue has naturally
occupied human beings (and always will) insofar as they are ‘self-conscious’ – i.e.,
‘meaning-constructing’ beings. And in an increasingly secular age where religion
is less appealed to for answers to that question, speculative philosophy of history is
all we have left. Also, as suggested, for those who dismiss the question of ‘the
meaning of life’ on the a priori grounds that there simply isn’t one, perhaps
the burden of proof is on them to show, from history, its meaninglessness (i.e.,
demonstrate it a posteriori). But in doing so, they would be engaging precisely in
that which their a priori stance would appear to denigrate, namely, speculative
philosophy of history!
We also saw two broadly practical reasons for engaging in speculative philosophy
of history – namely, the urge in rapidly changing times to restore a sense of
continuity, or at least intelligibility, in defence of a society’s identity; and secondly,
the impulse to predict the future, and hopefully influence it, on the basis of
identifying general forces governing history.
From all this it is not surprising that certain themes recur in the writings of many
speculative philosophers of history – the search for meaning or design in the flow
of history, various theories of progress, the notion of recurring cycles, the issue of
individual agency, the discovery of ‘laws’ of development which ‘determine’ history,
and the question of the changeability of ‘human nature’; in their turn, these themes
generate subsidiary notions regarding the role of chance, Fate, or Providence,
different periodisations of history, theories of different ‘national’ or ‘cultural’
characteristics of peoples, variously coloured predictions for the future, and
attempts to make sense of human suffering.
As suggested, this is all intrinsically interesting. But one further theme which
cannot but press itself on historians in particular, is whether, not only this or that
example of a ‘theory’ of history, but the general rationale underlying all speculative
philosophy of history (understandable as the impulse is) is worthwhile in the first

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place. According to the philosopher Hegel, writing in the early nineteenth century,
historians only ‘skim the surface’, (i.e., record and analyse ‘the facts’ without
comprehending their part in the larger scheme of things) – and in the Introduction
I mentioned similar concerns voiced today about the teaching and writing of
history. What is the point of studying history, it might be asked, if not to emerge
with something to say about its overall meaning, direction, and significance? In
short, one could turn the issue on its head and ask whether the study of history is
worthwhile if it is not pointed deliberately towards wider horizons of understanding.
Fascinating as the minutiae of the Crimean War might be, or the task of inferring
a satisfactory account of the social origins of Victorian prostitution, are such
piecemeal historical studies worthwhile in themselves? The practice of many
historians today suggests they think it is. Others will argue that they study and
teach, for example, the history of the Crimean War in order to enhance under-
standing of, and gain perspective on, aspects of European history both before and
after that war. To that extent, then, they are moving towards finding a grander
‘design’ or ‘significance’ to history. Alternatively, some may value studying history
not because of any such leanings towards ‘theorising’ or ‘speculating’ about its
course but because of that ‘civilising’ effect the discipline is supposed to have in
virtue of being one of the ‘humanities’ subjects revitalised in the Renaissance.
There may be other justifications for studying history4 – but the point is made. If
some historians question the value of speculative philosophy of history, the shoe
can be put on the other foot – but in a more charitable spirit, for no speculative
philosopher of history would question the value of the study of history, only the
value of how it is undertaken in any particular instance.

Although the following chapters of Part 1 are far from being a history of speculative
philosophy of history, they are at least suggestive of the framework such a history
might employ. This is because they are chronological in order, thereby offering
the possibility of conveying the sense in which the same thing (in this case,
speculative philosophy of history) has changed over time, and of suggesting
explanations for how and why. However, as elaborated upon at the beginning of
the next chapter, rather than adopting the stricter definition of ‘speculative
philosophy of history’ which a proper history would probably require, for the
more general purposes of a ‘guide’ I have adopted a looser notion in order to
accommodate what may be proposed as ‘dominant general attitudes’ towards the
meaning of history in addition to specific speculative philosophies of history crafted
by individual thinkers. As for the latter, this guide draws attention mainly to the
most celebrated examples. But sufficient guidelines emerge from their study, I hope,
to enable those interested in the genre to pursue lesser known examples from an
informed perspective.

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