NATO UNCLASSIFIED

AJP-2.7

ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR

RECONNAISSANCE AND
SURVEILLANCE

AJP-2.7

ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

Intentionally blank

ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR

RECONNAISSANCE AND
SURVEILLANCE

JULY 2009

i
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

Intentionally blank

ii
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

AJP-2.7

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

7 July200Q

1. AJP-2.7 ALLIED DOCTRINE FOR RECONNAISSANCE AND

SURVEILLANCE is a NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED publication. The agreement of
NATO nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 7107.

2. AJ-2.7 is effective on receipt. It supercedes ATP-61, which shall be

destroyed in accordance with the local procedure for the destruction of
documents.

Juan . MORENO
Vice dmiral ESP(N)
Dir tor, NATO Standardization
Agency

iii
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

Intentionally blank

iv
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

RECORD OF CHANGES

Change Date Effective By Whom

No. Entered Date Entered

v
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

Intentionally blank

vi
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS

Chapter Reservation by nations

vii
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATION

Nation Specific Reservation

viii
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

TABLE OF CONTENT

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 2 - RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE MISSION AREAS

CHAPTER 3 - RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES,

CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS
Section I - Required Capabilities General
Section II - Characteristics and Limitations

CHAPTER 4 - RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE SUPPORT AND THE

INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

CHAPTER 5 - RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE, COLLECTORS,

PRODUCTS and TARGETS

ANNEX A - GLOSSARY ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

ANNEX B - TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

ix
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

Intentionally blank

x
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

0101. Purpose. The purpose of this publication is to provide a reference document

covering doctrine for reconnaissance and surveillance support to Allied joint
operations.

0102. Scope. Reconnaissance and surveillance doctrine is intended to assist

commanders in accomplishing assigned missions by supporting their ability to
obtain information necessary for developing plans and conducting operations.
This publication’s focus will be on operational level doctrine but may be used as a
reference at any level. This doctrine should serve as the foundation for other
subordinate reconnaissance and surveillance publications to include tactics,
techniques, and procedures. Tactics, techniques and procedures will not be
described in this document except where necessary for understanding or
continuity. The publication will:

a. Provide guidance for NATO and national commanders, their staffs, and their
components in order to effectively employ assigned, attached, or supporting
reconnaissance and surveillance forces;

b. Lead to a better understanding of reconnaissance and surveillance operations

within NATO’s nations and armed forces.

0103. Applicability. The principles, guidelines, and conceptual framework described in

this document are provided for NATO Nations, higher NATO commands, joint
task forces, subordinate units of these organisations, tactical commanders and
their staffs. They are written for those who:

a. Provide strategic direction for reconnaissance and surveillance operations;

b. Employ and prepare Allied joint forces for reconnaissance and surveillance
operations;
c. Support or are supported by reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

0104. Authority. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of
commanders. Commanders will exercise judgement in applying the doctrine
herein to accomplish their missions.

0105. Abbreviations, Terms, and Definitions. Abbreviations, terms, and definitions

are located in chapter 2 and annex A.

1-1
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

Intentionally blank

2
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

CHAPTER 2 - RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

MISSION AREAS

“What enables the wise sovereign and the general to...achieve things beyond the reach of
ordinary man is foreknowledge. ”
Sun Tzu

0201. Definitions.

Reconnaissance, a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other

detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or
potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic,
or geographic characteristics of a particular area. 1

Surveillance, the systematic observation of aerospace, surface and subsurface

areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or
other means. 2

Air Reconnaissance, the collection of information of intelligence interest either

by visual observation from the air or through the use of airborne sensors. 3

Air Surveillance, the systematic observation of air space by electronic, visual, or

other means, primarily for the purpose of identifying and determining the
movements of aircraft and missiles, friendly and enemy, in the air space under
observation. 4 (AAP-6)

Battlefield Surveillance, systematic observation of the battle area for the purpose
of providing timely information and combat intelligence. 5

Sea Surveillance, the systematic observation of surface and subsurface areas by

all available and practical means primarily for the purpose of locating, identifying
and determining the movement of ships, submarines, and other vehicles, friendly
and enemy, proceeding on or under the surface of the world’s seas and oceans. 6

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR),

is the process that links surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition
systems and sensors to cue manoeuvre and offensive strike assets. It encompasses
collection and management of information and intelligence to provide situational

1
AAP-6
2
AAP-6
3
AAP-6
4
AAP-6
5
AAP-6
6
AAP-6
2-1
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
awareness for commanders and staff to direct operations and support the targeting
process. 7

0202. General. The primary objective of reconnaissance and surveillance operations is

to provide timely collection support and satisfy information/intelligence
requirements, including Alliance, national, and theatre requirements.
Reconnaissance and surveillance operations:

• Provide assessment support to all levels of command before, during and after
the conduct of operations;

• Assist in determining where and when to employ limited resources and

concentrate the efforts of these resources;

• Provide important means for assessing efforts of deception and concealment;

• Affect the formulation of policy and strategy as well as the development of a
joint campaign;

• Are performed by forces with a primary reconnaissance and surveillance

mission and other forces with either a collateral mission or the capability to
perform such a mission; and

• Can be categorised as either strategic, operational, or tactical though the

missions accomplished are essentially the same for each level of operations or
interests. The variables are depth of operations, operational tempo, level of
detail, timelines, reporting, and level of acceptable risk.

0203. Strategic Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Operations conducted to collect

information that when processed, analysed, and integrated with other information,
supports political leaders and senior military commanders in the formulation of
policy and military plans at the national or Alliance level.

0204. Operational Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Operations conducted to collect

information that supports commanders in the development and execution of
campaigns and major operations.

0205. Tactical Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Operations conducted to collect

information that supports commanders in the planning and execution of battles
and engagements.

7
ISTAR is not defined in AAP-6. A definition is found in AJP-2: “An operations-intelligence activity that
integrates and synchronises the planning and operation of sensors and assets, and the processing,
exploitation, targeting and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations”.
However, this definition is made by the Joint ISTAR custodial group. This definition of ISTAR is also
found in AJP-2.1(A).
2-2
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
0206. Tasks. In order to satisfy information/intelligence requirements, reconnaissance
and surveillance resources conduct operations in support of the following
intelligence functional areas:

a. Provide Indications and Warning (I&W). Reconnaissance and surveillance

operations provide time-sensitive information necessary to assess forces and
installations that threaten NATO. This mission area may require continuous
surveillance or as-required reconnaissance to provide timely I&W of a threat
or impending attack. I&W information is necessary to assess an enemy’s
offensive and defensive force capabilities and other factors that may affect
Allied plans and operations.

b. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB). Intelligence Preparation

of the Battlespace (IPB) is a command and staff function to allow the
systematic, continuous analysis of the enemy and the battlespace environment.
Reconnaissance and surveillance support the systematic IPB process that
begins in peacetime and continues throughout an operation. They provide
information needed to identify and analyse enemy centres of gravity,
strengths, weaknesses, capabilities, intentions, and critical vulnerabilities.

c. Identify Enemy Orders of Battle/Force Disposition. Reconnaissance and

surveillance operations provide information to intelligence staffs, who will
integrate it with other information/intelligence to develop enemy orders of
battle and other intelligence related databases. These will be used to prepare
an Intelligence Estimate, detailing the enemy’s capabilities, limitations,
vulnerabilities and intentions, as well as assessments of terrain and weather
effects in the operational area. This allows commanders to plan and conduct
campaigns and major operations. At the unit level, such information allows
commanders to plan and execute their assigned missions.

d. Situation Development. Reconnaissance and surveillance support the

dynamic process of situation development by collecting critical information
needed to assess the current situation and confirm or deny enemy courses of
action predicted by IPB. Situation development helps the commander refine
his understanding of the battlespace, identify enemy orders of battle, force
dispositions and monitor enemy activity, thereby reducing uncertainty and
risk.

e. Monitor Enemy Activity. During peacetime, reconnaissance and surveillance

assets monitor potential enemies to identify emerging threats to Allied
interests in order that an appropriate response can be prepared. They can also
assist in monitoring, or verifying compliance with international agreements,
e.g., arms control accords. During times of crisis, reconnaissance and
surveillance assets monitor potential conflict areas, providing information to
assist commanders in planning their deployments. During war, reconnaissance
and surveillance assets continuously monitor the enemy in order to determine
2-3
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
his situation, force posture and dispositions relative to friendly forces and to
measure reactions to friendly combat operations.

f. Support to Force Protection. Force protection is the set of comprehensive

security measures, collection activities, and defensive operations taken to
guard the force against the effects of enemy action. Reconnaissance and
surveillance operations support the broader intelligence force protection
mission by aiding in identifying, locating, and countering enemy intelligence,
collection, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism capabilities; by enhancing
detailed and accurate assessment of threat force capabilities and intentions;
and by helping facilitate friendly command and control warfare (C2W) efforts
to deny the enemy the opportunity to take offensive action against friendly
forces.

g. Support Targeting Objectives. Targeting plays a prominent role in the

commander’s decision to employ forces. Reconnaissance and surveillance
operations contribute to the targeting process by detecting, locating,
identifying, and analysing targets and later providing input for after-action
assessments.

1. Detection involves the use of reconnaissance and surveillance assets to

identify new potential targets or significant changes to existing targets.
Detection is an ongoing process; it is conducted before, during, and after
military operations. During peacetime, requirements must be established
for target reconnaissance and surveillance, crisis monitoring, and combat
support. During military operations other than war and war, priorities may
need to be adjusted as the situation or objective changes.

2. Once detected, a potential target’s location must be accurately defined

within a designated reference system. Mobile targets pose significant
problems because their positional data is so perishable; current data is
essential for target analysis and later for target acquisition.

3. Identification is the discrimination between objects within a particular

type or class. In order to identify a target, multiple reconnaissance and
surveillance operations using differing information collectors, such as
human observation and technical sensors may be necessary. Frequently,
the information from one collector can be used to cue other collectors to the
target. The amount of information required and the collector used will vary
depending on the target characteristics, location, and circumstances of its
detection.

4. Once the target is identified, detailed information may be required to

analyse the target, evaluate its vulnerabilities, and indicate the appropriate
method and/or weapon system(s) to attack the target.

2-4
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
5. After-action assessments monitor the impact of operations on enemy
targets and provide information for follow-on actions.

h. Assessment. Reconnaissance and surveillance operations provide assessment

support to all levels of command before, during, and after the conduct of military
operations. Assessments such as Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) can provide
information on the success of military operations and the need for follow up or
new operations. Reconnaissance and surveillance operations can assist in
determining where and when to employ limited resources and concentrate their
efforts. They also provide an important means for assessing deception efforts.
Such assessments will affect the formulation of policy and-strategy, as well as the
development of campaigns, operations, battles, and engagements.

2-5
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

Intentionally blank

2-6
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

CHAPTER 3 - RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

CAPABILITIES, CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS

Section I - Required Capabilities General

0301. General. This chapter will address those capabilities which reconnaissance and
surveillance systems should possess in order to provide users required
information. No single system can cover all the information requirements of the
requesters; therefore, requesters must articulate their needs in a manner that is
clear to the collection managers. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets are force
multipliers. Effective use of these forces enables commanders to increase
preparedness, and maximise the effects of combat forces by optimising strengths,
exploiting enemy weaknesses, and countering enemy strengths. Whether planning
for aerial reconnaissance, sea surveillance, ground reconnaissance or space
surveillance, the availability of these forces and their capabilities are critical to
mission success. All reconnaissance and surveillance forces have unique
characteristics for their own special mission. Commanders must be aware of these
capabilities and limitations and thoroughly weigh each against the mission
objectives. They must consider the survivability of the forces and determine the
risk at which they are willing to place them to obtain the intelligence information.
A comprehensive ISTAR capability enables commanders to ‘stay ahead’ of the
enemy to conduct operations successfully and protect forces.

0302. Required Capabilities. Lessons learned from recent military conflicts

demonstrate that the speed of modem warfare dictates that commanders receive
timely, accurate and relevant information to support them in their decision making
process. That same information is necessary at the unit level in order to properly
plan and execute their missions. In addition to being able to provide timely and
accurate information, reconnaissance and surveillance assets must be available in
a timely manner, survivable, reliable, suitable, standardized, capable of
continuous coverage (if required), and protected from enemy exploitation. To
achieve these capabilities, they must be exercised during peacetime to maintain
their operational efficiency.

a. Timeliness. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets must be responsive to the

needs of the requester. These assets should be made available to collect
information when and where it is required; Timeliness should be looked at in
the aggregate and is driven by the purpose of the mission, level of need, and
customer requirements. Commander Allied Joint Forces (COMAJF) should
ensure available collection assets are ready to meet anticipated requests. As
required, he will exploit information from collection assets not allocated to the
joint force. The period of time between the arrival of a request and the
requested time over target may limit the time available for planning,
preparation, choice of asset or sensor, and execution of the mission.
3-1
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

b. Accuracy. Accuracy is a crucial requirement for all aspects of the

reconnaissance and surveillance cycle (see Chapter 4). Reconnaissance and
surveillance assets should provide unambiguous, undistorted and complete
information, and be resistant to deception. Accuracy requirements may be
driven by the purpose of the mission, level of need and customer
requirements. These requirements may in turn, determine the selection of the
collection system(s).

c. Survivability. Survivability must be examined in the context of the entire

reconnaissance and surveillance system - collection platforms, sensors,
communications and data links, ground stations, processing facilities, and
personnel. Not all systems, or components of the system, requite the same
degree of survivability. For those systems that can not transmit information
during a mission, the safe return of these assets is especially important.
Survivability must be matched to the threat these systems will be exposed to
during the operation and their importance to the entire reconnaissance and
surveillance system. Reconnaissance and surveillance systems are vulnerable
and also scarce resources; therefore, commanders should consider how they
would compensate for the loss of reconnaissance and surveillance capability
should it be destroyed or otherwise become unavailable. Careful mission
planning, effective employment tactics, and redundancy or overlap of
reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities are the best ways of ensuring that
information is collected and it delivered.

d. Reliability. Reconnaissance and surveillance systems must be able to provide

reliable information despite enemy deception measures such as camouflage
and decoys. This may require the employment of other reconnaissance and
surveillance systems to verify the information acquired by previous systems.
The development and evaluation of these systems should be initiated as soon
as potential enemy concealment and deception capabilities are known.

e. Suitability. Suitability is an important consideration in planning for the

employment of collective reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities.
Tasking must be based on an asset’s capability and its suitability within the
context of the overall collection plan. Suitability also applies to the
transmission, exploitation and-dissemination of the collected information or
processed intelligence. Both the information and the format must be useful to
the user and easy to interpret.

f. Standardization. Standardization is a critical aspect of any reconnaissance

and surveillance system. Interoperability, commonality, and compatibility of
sensors, data link, and supporting Communication and Information Systems
(CIS) are crucial to the responsiveness, survivability, and overall effectiveness
of a reconnaissance and surveillance system. Commanders will be deprived of
information if the components of the system are dissimilar, or if connectivity
3-2
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
among sensors, supporting systems, and supported systems is too fragile to
withstand the stress of combat. The collection and dissemination systems must
be able to transmit accurate information to those who need it in a timely
manner. Interoperable systems unify collection efforts resulting in enhanced
application of armed force. Connectivity also improves the overall
reconnaissance and surveillance capability to accurately portray the
battlespace through cross-cueing, information enhancement, and analytical
exchange. This multi-source approach reduces the possibilities of being
deceived by the enemy.

g. Continuous Coverage. If required, reconnaissance and surveillance assets

must be able to provide comprehensive 24/7 coverage in poor visibility
conditions, over varying terrain and in all electromagnetic environments. The
capability to loiter and observe targets over a prolonged timescale ensures
support is available when needed. Extensive knowledge of enemy strategy,
tactics, capabilities, and culture requires extensive data collection over a
prolonged period in order to provide the most complete and accurate picture
of the enemy possible. Having a complete and exact picture enables personnel
to anticipate enemy actions and to choose appropriate responses. However,
keeping sensors, equipment, and systems in place for extended periods adds
an extra burden to support systems.

Section II - Characteristics and Limitations

0303. General. Commanders must be aware of the capabilities, limitations, and
numbers of their assigned and supporting reconnaissance and surveillance
systems. This is required to ensure systems are not placed at unnecessary risk or
the wrong asset tasked to satisfy a collection need. COMAJF should ensure
assets; sensors and support systems are ready to meet anticipated requests. If the
required capability does not exist within the commander’s assigned force, other
external collection capabilities can be requested to support the commander’s
collection requirements. External collection capabilities of a classified nature may
be made available to COMAJF. Reconnaissance and surveillance systems posses
a wide variety of characteristics, specifications, and limitations. They can operate
below the surface, on the surface, in the air and throughout space. They can be
manned as well as unmanned. They can image visible or non-visible objects,
penetrate surfaces, and detect and collect different wavelengths of the
electromagnetic and acoustic spectra. All systems include one or more sensors to
collect information. Some systems can change their sensors for specific
operations. Reconnaissance and surveillance systems have two common
limitations; they are scarce resources and are generally high-value assets. These
two factors require commanders to employ assets judiciously. Different
reconnaissance and surveillance assets and systems can complement each other
and eliminate specific limitations when used in mixed or combined applications.

3-3
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
0304. Aerial Systems. Among the primary sources of reconnaissance and surveillance
capability available to support the joint force’s information requirements are
aerial systems. These systems can be equipped with imaging and signal collecting
sensors.

a. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) offer significant advantages and

limitations. The greatest advantage of these systems is that they normally do
not put friendly personnel at risk. Moreover, they possess relatively low radar
cross-sections and minimized visual and acoustic signatures which reduce the
chance of detection. UAVs can be configured with a broad range of collection
capabilities. In the past, UAVs were only considered tactical in nature,
characterized by specific mission capabilities and relatively small area
coverage. New systems, mainly under development will provide broad area
coverage, greater sensor payload, higher operating altitudes, longer endurance
and better retasking capabilities. The range and endurance of UAVs vary
considerably depending on the situations for which they are designed to be
employed. Weather can impede or preclude UAV operations in many cases
where large, manned aircraft would not be affected. Payload constraints often
permit less than the full complement of sensors desired for a given tasking.
Increased payload and loiter time are available for increased size, complexity,
and cost. Also, UAV flight paths must either be pre-programmed, or remotely
controlled with line of sight limitations (a control station may be airborne to
increase UAV range). Employment of UAVs often requires the
implementation of special airspace control means and joint coordination
between in-theatre forces to enable safe passage.

b. Manned aerial platforms generally are among the most flexible, mobile and
responsive assets available and capable of carrying out critical missions. Some
platforms are able to collect vital information in near real time (NRT).
Manned platforms can respond to changing conditions and may be able to
modify missions while they are in progress. They can cover a relatively large
area and carry a wide range and mix of sensors. Many of these assets have
common data links between aircraft or with ground stations allowing them to
send large volumes of information often in NRT. Manned air surveillance and
reconnaissance capabilities can be divided into two groups, penetrating and
standoff. During peace time, virtually all air reconnaissance and surveillance
is accomplished using standoff techniques. The standoff mode may be used
during military operations other than war and war when the enemy threat is
too great to allow high value assets to penetrate enemy territory. The primary
advantage of using a standoff mode is reduced vulnerability to enemy surface-
to-air and air-to-air attacks. The primary disadvantage is standoff
requirements limit the amount of enemy territory that can be observed.
Reconnaissance and surveillance platforms will penetrate when information is
required beyond standoff range, where other systems may not be available to
provide the coverage required, or when weather conditions are such that
standoff systems are degraded. The main disadvantage of manned systems is
3-4
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
the exposure or potential exposure of personnel and scarce reconnaissance
assets to enemy military operations. Manned assets are considerably more
expensive than unmanned systems. All assets are susceptible to adverse
environmental conditions (e.g., weather, smoke, chemicals, etc.); however, in
some cases, unmanned assets may fly in adverse environmental conditions
when risk to humans is considered too great.

0305. Surface Systems. Surface platforms also vary greatly in size and complexity, with
great differences between land-based and sea-based assets.

a. Land-based reconnaissance assets provide a diverse mix of capabilities that

can range from a small force conducting a reconnaissance patrol, to dedicated
SIGINT units, to highly sophisticated surveillance radars. Such assets can be
employed to support operations across the full range of military activities and
can obtain extremely diverse types of information. For example, a
reconnaissance patrol can determine the extent and location of obstacles and
defensive positions while also performing counter reconnaissance operations
to deceive the enemy and deny friendly force dispositions. They can also cue,
and-be cued by other high resolution assets. As with aerial platforms, there are
advantages and disadvantages to land-based reconnaissance systems. The
primary advantage is that as they are generally organic to the land component,
they are usually forward deployed and responsive to its needs; they are not
easily prone to deception, can be interrogated, and they have the ability to
interpret information. Manned reconnaissance assets, e.g., patrols, have
additional advantages: they can carry out other actions whilst on a primarily
reconnaissance mission; and can use their initiative to investigate sightings
further, e.g., suspected deception measures. They can also be debriefed on
other matters not included in their original mission. However, their range is
usually limited by physical constraints, personnel safety, the military situation
and the ability of combat support systems to sustain assets over extended
ranges and timescales.

b. Sea-based surface platforms have varying degrees of reconnaissance and

surveillance capability, including organic manned and unmanned aerial
systems. Part of this capability for example, radar, sonar and underwater
acoustic surveillance, is required for defence of maritime forces. These
facilities monitor enemy submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and surface
targets. Other capabilities, such as SIGINT-gathering assets, can support a
broad range of military activities ranging from monitoring arms control treaty
compliance to establishing enemy orders of battle and preparation of combat
strike plans. Deployment aboard ships also provides sea-based reconnaissance
and surveillance assets with several advantages. Ships have greater power and
load-carrying capabilities than do some other .reconnaissance and surveillance
platforms, enabling them to carry heavier and bulkier equipment that may
have greater information gathering and processing capabilities. Ships also
possess the advantages of mobility and sustainability, enabling them to
3-5
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
position and reposition reconnaissance and surveillance assets. Access is
relatively unrestricted because maritime areas of interest to reconnaissance
and surveillance are often close to international waters. Many classes of ships
have organic air assets that can extend shipboard sensor horizons and provide
valuable on-site reconnaissance. These qualities at times provide advantages
over other reconnaissance and surveillance assets.

c. Air, land, and maritime forces employ surface-based surveillance systems to

control the movement of aircraft through a given sector of airspace. The
purpose of surface-based surveillance systems used to control the movement
of aircraft is to provide a degree of warning and control over air resources
within a designated airspace control area. Examples of these systems are early
warning (EW), ground controlled intercept (GCI), and air traffic control
radars. The advantage of these systems is that they provide an additional layer
of control and observation that may not be available with other surveillance
systems. Their primary disadvantage is that they are susceptible to enemy
attack and jamming. Also, some of the ground-based warning sensors have
sensor limitations and are susceptible to adverse weather conditions. In
addition, air defence sensors are limited to line-of-sight surveillance, and
many systems are affected by ground clutter.

d. Special operations forces (SOF) are valuable assets and should be considered
for employment in joint reconnaissance and surveillance operations. Although
most SOF activities are surface-based, SOF aircraft may also support
reconnaissance and surveillance operations. Special reconnaissance (SR)
operations can be conducted when there is a need to obtain or verify
information about enemy capabilities, intentions, and activities or to gather
data about meteorological, hydrographical, or geographic characteristics of an
area inaccessible by technical means. SOF patrols have the capability to
sustain long-range 24 hour operations for extended periods of time. They also
have secure communications for near-instantaneous transmission of their
reports. SR operations complement national and theatre reconnaissance and
surveillance assets across the range of military operations to obtain specific,
time-sensitive information of strategic and operational significance. SOF
offers the availability of technically knowledgeable observers to verify critical
information about targets or target complexes. These observers will use their
judgement to defeat enemy deception attempts and may transmit a more
complete picture of what is happening on the target. As with other manned
reconnaissance, SOF can be tasked or retasked with secondary missions, and
can designate targets, e.g., with laser designators, for attack missions. These
highly specialized personnel are often able to achieve results out of proportion
to their numbers; but they need to be inserted, require time to prepare
positions or redeploy, and am vulnerable to compromise if used in an overt
role.

3-6
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

0306. Subsurface Systems. Subsurface systems vary greatly in size, complexity, and
capability. These include sensors generally best suited for long-term surveillance
of a specific and limited geographic region. Seismic detectors, for example, can
indicate that enemy forces might be moving in an area, making further
reconnaissance of the area useful. Submarines, on the other hand, are invaluable
platforms for clandestine reconnaissance operations within waters peripheral to
enemy territory. Submarines are dispatched on independent patrols to collect a
range of data from hydrographic features to enemy activities. These patrols also
assist in filling in gaps from other collection systems, such as long-range aircraft.

0307. Space Systems. While not all NATO nations possess space assets capable of
reconnaissance and surveillance, those nations that do can be expected to provide
some degree of reconnaissance and surveillance support using these systems.
Space systems provide information allowing commanders to assess the situation,
develop concepts of operations, and distribute changes to their forces quickly.
Commanders should be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of space
systems available for use. The primary advantage of these systems is the ability to
provide worldwide coverage of areas of interest, especially those remote or hostile
areas where little or no information can be obtained by conventional resources.
Other advantages include their longevity and relative immunity to enemy actions
and the ability to place satellites into orbits that maximise their effectiveness.
Limitations include atmospheric and weather disturbances that affect most
imagery systems. Also, space systems schedules can be predicted and are
therefore vulnerable to deception practices and signature control activities. While
able to provide worldwide coverage, tasking demands on space systems and orbit
requirements may limit their responsiveness. The support provided by space
systems are divided into military and non-military systems, as outlined below.

a. Military space reconnaissance and surveillance systems employ a variety of

specialised sensors providing a broad and increased range of capabilities.
During peacetime, space systems routinely support activities such as
indications and warning, peacekeeping operations, disaster and humanitarian
relief and training exercises. Space reconnaissance and surveillance
information helps commanders to determine the enemy’s strength, location,
and intentions. Detection and warning sensors provide early detection of
ballistic missile attack and down-link this information to the appropriate
ground stations, allowing commanders to take the appropriate actions.
Environmental monitoring systems are crucial in understanding and reacting
to weather that may affect friendly and enemy military operations. Ignorance
of environmental conditions can jeopardise the success of an operation or
mission. Space reconnaissance and surveillance systems provide military
forces with terrain information that enhances mission planning capabilities.
Additionally, these systems can often cue or be cued by other reconnaissance
and surveillance systems to watch a specific area of interest, enhancing
accuracy and reaction times to the users of that information.
3-7
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

b. Non-military space systems include civil, commercial, and Allied capabilities,

and normally complement military space systems. These systems possess a
variety of capabilities; however, in some cases, their availability may be
limited due to the priority of their civil or commercial tasks, Examples of
these systems are weather, navigation and multispectral imagery satellites.
COMAJFs may have some of their requirements satisfied by these systems,
depending on how share-use agreements are negotiated with the owners.

0308. Other Collection Capabilities. Most NATO nations operate reconnaissance and
surveillance systems controlled at the national level and provide direct support to
the national authorities. The information provided by these systems is used by
senior government leaders to make strategic political and military decisions; it is
also very useful to theatre commanders. Depending on the specific collection
capability, timeliness can be good - within seconds of collection. Other
capabilities are inherently slow - hours to days from the time of the request.
Accuracy is system dependent. Additionally, the security of these systems and
their sources may require sanitation of the information before it can be made
available to the requester. National reconnaissance and surveillance systems
provide invaluable information, especially when local access by conventional
reconnaissance and surveillance systems is denied by range limitations, lack of air
superiority, or political reasons. COMAJF must develop specific requirements
well in advance so that use of these systems will be reliable and timely. These
systems should be considered when the theatre commander’s organic
reconnaissance and surveillance assets cannot satisfy the intelligence
requirements or to verify information from another collection source. COMAJF
can request specific information from these systems and should exercise the
process during peacetime exercises. Nevertheless, the employment of national
reconnaissance assets remains under the responsibility of the designated national
authority/commander.

3-8
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

CHAPTER 4 - RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

SUPPORT AND THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

0401. General. This chapter explains how reconnaissance and surveillance fits into the
overall intelligence process. To provide a basis for understanding how the two
work together, the chapter discusses the various intelligence collection
disciplines, the intelligence cycle, the reconnaissance and surveillance cycle, and
how the two cycles are interrelated.

0402. Intelligence Disciplines. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets collect

information that becomes intelligence when processed, analysed, evaluated, and
interpreted. The following is a list of intelligence collection disciplines relevant to
reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

a. Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is derived from imagery acquired by

photographic, radar, electro-optical and thermal sensors which can be ground
based, sea-borne or carried by air and space platforms. IMINT uses imagery to
locate and identify enemy activity, facilities, infrastructure, and equipment. It
can also provide commanders environmental information which may have an
impact on their military operations.

b. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is the generic term used to describe

communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT)
when there is no requirement to differentiate between the types of intelligence,
or to represent fusion of the two. SIGINT uses intercepted electromagnetic
emissions to provide information on the capabilities, intentions, formations,
and locations of enemy forces.

(1) COMINT consists of information derived from intercepting, monitoring,

and locating the enemy’s communications systems. COMINT exploits the
enemy’s communications transmissions.

(2) ELINT consists of information derived from intercepting, monitoring, and

locating the enemy’s non-communication emitters. ELINT exploits the
enemy’s radar, beacons, and other non-communication emitters.

c. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is a category intelligence derived from

information collected and provided by human sources. HUMINT sources can
also provide technical intelligence and imagery, and may be vital in the
preparation for operations. Examples of HUMINT activities are surface
reconnaissance units and long range patrols, observation and listening posts,
or aircrew or submarine crew debriefings. Trained linguists are often an
essential requirement for these activities.

4-1
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
d. Acoustic Intelligence (ACOUSTINT) is derived from the collection and
processing of acoustic phenomena.

e. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) is scientific and

technical intelligence obtained from quantitative and qualitative analysis of
data derived from sensing instruments for the purpose of identifying any
distinctive feature associated with the source, emitter or sender, and to
facilitate further identification and/or measurement of the same.

0403. Intelligence Cycle. The intelligence cycle is the process by which information is
collected, converted into intelligence, and made available to the user. The four
steps in the cycle include direction and planning, collection, processing/
exploitation, dissemination and evaluation. These steps define a recurring,
sequential, and interdependent process for the development of intelligence.
Intelligence operations are conducted within the framework of the intelligence
cycle, the entire cycle, or a specific step within the cycle. Moreover, all
intelligence, regardless of the scope of the requirement or level of command, is
developed by following these steps. No one step of the cycle is more important
than the others; consequently, proper direction is required to ensure the process
flows smoothly and remains focused on the correct objectives.

a. Direction and Planning. In addition to supporting the policy/strategy

development processes at all levels, the intelligence cycle is geared to support
COMAJF in the formulation of the concept of operations, development of the
campaign plan, and execution of the campaign. Therefore, COMAJF must
clearly articulate the mission and objectives, outline the plan of action, and
state the intelligence requirements necessary to support the mission, objectives
and plan. The process of planning reconnaissance and surveillance operations
should include identifying and validating the need for the operations, and if a
need is determined, prioritising the operations.

(1) Intelligence Requirements. COMAJF may be given intelligence

requirements (IRS) by higher headquarters. COMAJF, in his mission
analysis, may also identify IRS which can be general or highly specific,
and with time constraints. Based on these IRS, COMAJFs intelligence
staff will also develop IRS to be included in the J2 Collection Plan. This
plan forms the basis of the reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. The
designation of IRS helps to ensure reconnaissance and surveillance efforts
are focused on the most critical information needs to support the
operational effort. Once hostilities begin and as they continue, new
direction and guidance evolves, creating new requirements or modifying
existing requirements.

(2) Validation. The information requirement must then be validated. Does the
requirement meet the commander’s concept of operation? Has the
information been acquired but not distributed to the requester? Are there
4-2
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
other ongoing operations that might satisfy the requirement? If any of
these conditions are met, the requested reconnaissance and surveillance
mission may not be necessary.

(3) Priorities. Once a requirement has been established and validated, it must
be prioritized among the other requests for information. As the
intelligence requirements are aligned with the collection capabilities
available, factors such as the enemy threat to reconnaissance and
surveillance assets, timeliness of the reconnaissance and surveillance
response, availability of reconnaissance and surveillance assets, and the
impacts of platform and sensor capabilities will affect how reconnaissance
and surveillance are tasked and employed.

(4) Collection Plan. Based upon the commander’s direction, a collection plan
is formulated which co-ordinates organic sensors, and if necessary,
requests national tasking to support collection efforts. The Collection Plan
contains specific tasking of the selected sources and agencies.

b. Collection. This step includes not only the actual physical collection of
information but in some cases, the transfer or transmission of that information
to processing facilities. This requires close co-ordination between the
operations planners, collection managers, and intelligence analysts. The
collection managers establish collection requirements to satisfy their
intelligence requirements, while the operations planners determine how to
employ assigned reconnaissance and surveillance assets to satisfy the
collection requirements. If the assigned assets cannot meet the commander’s
objectives, then external reconnaissance and surveillance support, such as
specific national capabilities, will be required. This external collection support
may be on going but may require specific tasking or parameters to satisfy the
intelligence requirement. Also, different types of collection capabilities may
be required to validate information acquired from another source.
Furthermore, collection capabilities need redundancy so the loss or failure of
one system can be compensated by another one. Ideally, they should be
interoperable so that the information collected can be integrated and correlated
into an all-source analysis. The collection architecture must be aware of and
responsive to the intelligence requirements of the theatre forces. The system
must be in place and exercised during peacetime in order to implement a
collection plan at the beginning of hostilities.

c. Processing/Exploitation. Processing involves five stages: collation, where

the incoming information is recorded and grouped together; it is then evaluated
to determine its reliability and credibility. Evaluation is followed by analysis;
the identification of significant items of information and comparing them with
existing knowledge or intelligence and drawing relevant conclusions.
Integration involves assembling analysed information and intelligence to
facilitate the recognition of significant patterns of knowledge; finally,
4-3
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
interpretation involves judging the significance of analysed information and
other intelligence in relation to the current body of knowledge. Processing
allows commanders to take full advantage of or exploit information that has
come to hand. The need to task additional reconnaissance and surveillance
assets may become apparent at any stage of processing, for instance to
confirm information received from one particular source, or to investigate
enemy developments revealed by analysis or interpretation. Advances in
technology have changed the way information is processed into intelligence.
Some reconnaissance and surveillance assets possess an onboard data
processing capability. This allows the data to be converted into usable
information, though further processing may be necessary to produce a finished
intelligence product. For example, Joint STARS can process the data it
obtains onboard and send it to specific ground processing stations or by data
link directly to the requester.

d. Dissemination and Evaluation. This final step in the intelligence cycle is

also being affected by advances in technology. Some reconnaissance and
surveillance systems are capable of disseminating collected data/information
to requesters on a real or NRT basis, vastly increasing their responsiveness.
This is especially important for those reconnaissance and surveillance
operations supporting ongoing military operations in which the situation may
be evolving rapidly and perishable information may lose its usefulness within
a matter of minutes or even seconds. Both the collection and dissemination
processes require continuous management. Without effective management,
communications paths can become saturated by single source information
retranslated by many intermediate collection agencies. This well-intentioned
information flow can quickly exceed the reconnaissance and surveillance
information processing capability. On the other hand, intelligence agencies
should evaluate the potential value of unconfirmed information. These
agencies should be aware of operational requirements and provide all
pertinent intelligence information (i.e., i threat information).

0404. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Cycle. The reconnaissance and surveillance

cycle is the process by which reconnaissance and surveillance assets are
requested, integrated into the overall operations plan, and tasked to satisfy
information or intelligence requirements. The steps in the Reconnaissance and
Surveillance Cycle are: tasking, planning, execution, processing/exploitation and
dissemination; these are described in more detail below and depicted at Figure 4-l.
The request to conduct a reconnaissance and surveillance operation is the
principal link between the Intelligence and the reconnaissance and Surveillance
cycles. The request defines the basic intelligence needs, requirements and
prevailing conditions for the support by reconnaissance and surveillance assets.
The request should provide sufficient information on the area or object of interest.
Additionally, requests should include: information detailing the reason for or
intended use of the data, priority, timelines, product types and means of
transmission.
4-4
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

a. Tasking. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets are tasked in essentially the

same manner during peacetime, crisis, and war, except for tailoring the
approval and execution process for the scope of operations. Reconnaissance
and surveillance assets are tasked once information or intelligence
requirements have been established. This may be accomplished through
request messages. In cases where real or NRT information is required, it may
be necessary to establish ad hoc procedures in theatre to satisfy the immediate
requirements. Most important to the requesters of information is to clearly
articulate their requirements and allow the collection managers and operations
planners to decide the best way to meet their requirements. Within the
commander’s staff, the intelligence collection managers will coordinate with
the operations planners to determine what available reconnaissance and
surveillance asset(s) should be tasked to satisfy the given intelligence
requirements. If organic assets are available, then the appropriate unit will be
tasked. If organic assets are not available to satisfy the request and the request
is still considered valid, then the request is forwarded to the next higher level
for consideration. Assets may also be tasked or retasked while the mission is
ongoing. Changing situations may dictate that reconnaissance and surveillance
assets be reassigned from their planned mission to support a new requirement.
Reassigning assets that are executing their planned mission must be
considered carefully.

b. Planning. This step of the reconnaissance and surveillance cycle involves

both the broad planning done at the headquarters level, which is incorporated
into the campaign plan, and the detailed planning accomplished at the unit
level.

(1) Reconnaissance and surveillance planning begins at the Major NATO

Command (MNC) level by providing direction and guidance and
establishing strategic and operational level intelligence requirements. This
direction and guidance is passed to lower echelons and refined. At this
level, collection managers establish theatre level collection requirements
and co-ordinate their efforts with the operations planners. The components
of these commands are normally tasked to accomplish the reconnaissance
or surveillance operation. Therefore, they normally determine the best way
to employ their reconnaissance and surveillance assets in such a way so as
to allow maximum effectiveness while minimising risk. At this level,
reconnaissance and surveillance planners must consider the trade-offs of
survivability and information acquisition. Commanders should establish
priorities for reconnaissance and surveillance operations knowing that
these priorities may change as the situation develops. These priorities
should be established to generally conform to command objectives,
concept of operation, and unanticipated requirements. Combining
objectives, guidance, threats, force capabilities, and system availability
requires thorough analysis and effective co-ordination among all elements
4-5
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
which plan reconnaissance and surveillance operations. The end results of
the planners’ efforts are included in the tasking order.

(2) The detailed mission planning at the unit level is accomplished based on
information contained in the tasking order and other sources such as the
airspace control order. Planning should take into account the existing and
forecasted threat, weather, geographical features, tactics necessary to
accomplish the mission and defeat the threat, and specific information the
requester may require (i.e., scale, run-in heading, oblique versus vertical
photography).

c. Execution. This step involves the actual execution of the assigned mission.
To complete the mission successfully, commanders must consider the risks
(e.g., threat, tactics, weather, safety, and logistics) involved.

d. Processing/Exploitation. The collected or transmitted information may not

always be in a form suitable for direct use by the requester. Information may
need to be processed and exploited by specialist agencies before dissemination
to the requester. Reconnaissance and surveillance mission taskers should
always ensure that the appropriate agency is tasked in parallel with the
collection mission. Processing is the transfer of collected/transmitted and
recorded raw data of the sensor (primary imagery or data) into useable/visible
information (secondary imagery or data). This includes the chemical process
of exposed wet film in the negative or positive state, the processing of radar
data into radar imagery, the decompression of compressed data and also the
enhancement of the data or imagery. Imagery is interpreted, and generally, the
results are included in a report.

e. Dissemination. This step involves the transmission of the collected processed

and exploited information to the requester. It may take on various forms: real
time or NRT data links directly from collection platform to requesters,
broadcast transmissions from collection platform to multiple agencies, or
standard reporting procedures.

0405. Intelligence and Reconnaissance/Surveillance Interrelationship. Traditionally,

a reconnaissance and surveillance mission entailed completion of the
reconnaissance/ surveillance cycle and dissemination of the collected information
back into the intelligence cycle where the information was further processed,
analysed and became intelligence. However, technology has changed that
traditional process. Due to the highly perishable nature of some I’
information/intelligence or criticality of a situation, the requester may not be able
to wait for the normal intelligence process to satisfy intelligence requirements. In
some cases, data that has been minimally evaluated may be transferred directly
from the collection platform to the requester; however, it is important that this data
is also transferred to the All Source Cell (ASC) where it will be processed and
used in the production of intelligence. Since this data has not been processed and
4-6
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
analysed or integrated with other data, the product is not finished intelligence;
rather it is considered as comb2 information or raw data. Figure 4-1 depicts the
relationship between the reconnaissance/surveillance cycle and the intelligence
cycle.

Figure 4-1 Intelligence-Reconnaissance/Surveillance Relationship

0406. Collection Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirements Management

(CCIRM) Concept. The need for unified and coherent collection of information
and intelligence so as to ensure that the IRS of the operational commanders are
better met by the intelligence community has led to the development of the
CCIRM Concept. The concept develops logically from the constituent elements of
the Intelligence Cycle; CCIRM is a management function to enable the timely
flow of intelligence. Its principal objective is the efficient exploitation of the full
spectrum of collection assets, sources and databases in order to satisfy IRS from
all operational levels. CCIRM consists of two major components: the co-
ordination of the collection effort and the management of the IRS arising from
particular operations, missions or deployments.

4-7
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
a. Collection co-ordination. The development and control of a collection plan,
which sets out how information and intelligence needed to meet IRS is to be
collected. This results in either the direct tasking of assets over which a
collection manager has authority, or the generation of tasking requests to
tasking authorities at higher, lower or lateral level:. The collection plan is
constantly revised and updated.

b. Intelligence requirements management. The overall management of

processing, exploiting, and disseminating intelligence to satisfy tactical,
operational and strategic IRS in support of military operations.

c. CCIRM Organisation. Allied Joint Force Headquarters (AJFHQ) J2 staffs

will be responsible for CCIRM policy and implementation. The J2 staff will
receive COMAJF’s priority intelligence requirements as well as requests for
information from subordinate formations. It will satisfy those it can from
within the force’s joint resources or seek national assistance for those it can
not. At lower command levels, CCIRM organisations may form the focal
points for tactical intelligence requirements management. They will satisfy
IRS from within its formation resources where practicable, and co-ordinate
access to other resources as necessary.

4-8
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

CHAPTER 5 - RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

COLLECTORS, PRODUCTS and TARGETS
0501. Sensors. There are two general means of collecting information: human
observation and technical sensors. They are described in detail below.

a. Human Observation. Reconnaissance and surveillance by human

observation is the oldest method of gathering military information and
remains a valued source of information. Human observation is done by visual
and acoustic detection, recognition and even identification. The human eye
has a far greater “field of view” than most sensors and can be adjusted to
changing points of interest instantly. Human sources can rapidly evaluate and
assess observed information, draw conclusions and direct actions. Gathered
information can be transferred expeditiously to the requester or other users.
Technical devices can assist the human eye or ear in extending their range,
minimizing disturbances and increasing their sensitivity or resolution. Human
sources can complement the results of other sensors by providing additional
data not covered by the sensors and also replace them if they malfunction. The
value and the reliability of human sources are highly dependent upon the
degree of training and experience they have, as information gleaned from
human sources may possess a certain degree of subjectivity. The performance
of human sources generally decreases with the growing duration of the
operation and can be adversely affected by stress factors. These factors also
increase the tendency of human beings to ‘see what they expect or wish to
see’ and the susceptibility to measures of camouflage, concealment, deception
and masking.

b. Technical Sensors. Technical sensors can generally be divided into two

categories: imaging and non imaging. Both operate in the electromagnetic and
acoustic spectrum and cover frequencies not perceptible by the human eye or
ear. Technical sensors not only collect, but they also record data for repeatable
recalling, transmission, copying and even enhancement for specific purposes.
Additionally they are able to provide auxiliary data which may include
information such as the parameters of the carrying platform (speed, height,
bank, and time) or the specifications of the sensor itself. Different sensors can
be used at the same time in various configurations and suites. Sensors can be
pre-programmed or operator directed. Generally, technical sensors are highly
reliable and may be less susceptible to efforts of concealment or deception
than human sources. Technical sensors may be degraded by malfunction and
operator error, and their products may be impacted by atmospheric and other
natural factors.

(1) Imaging Sensors. Operating within a certain frequency spectrum, imaging

sensors are able to produce an image of targets or objects of interest.
Optical and non-optical images are permanently recorded on a medium
such as film or tape and may be transmitted from a platform to the
5-1
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
requester, thus significantly improving the timeliness of the information.
Imaging sensors for reconnaissance and surveillance operate traditionally
in the frequency of visible light, infrared or radar, providing pictures or
photos and videos highly similar to which is seen with the human eye.

(a) Optical sensors are passive and receive light from artificial and
natural sources reflected by the target or object of interest. They use
electronic scanning devices or conventional lenses with a broad range
of focal length, in single or multiple configurations. They can take
imagery from the vertical or oblique view including side, forward or
even rear oblique perspectives. Some sensors have the capability to
collect imagery across the horizon or along a specific track.

(b) Infrared (IR) imaging sensors are also passive and scan IR radiation,
emission or reflection which basically accompanies heat or thermal
radiation. IR sensors are able to detect and recognize information
which is hidden from visual sensors, e.g., energy flows. If thermal
traces still exist, IR sensors may be able to indicate activities already
past. Although they can penetrate darkness and even artificial smoke,
their performance may be degraded by moisture in the atmosphere and
some natural substances as chlorophyll. IR sensors are an ideal
supplement to and therefore often used with optical sensors. IR sensors
can “look” vertical and side or forward oblique.

(c) Imaging radar sensors for reconnaissance and surveillance are

mainly air- or space-based, and are capable of covering considerably
more targets or area than other sensors. They illuminate the target, area
or object with HP-wavelengths, receive reflected returns and convert
phase and amplitudes into a “visible” image. Some microwave systems
only look sideways, e.g., Sideways Looking Aperture Radar (SLAR).
State-of-the-art systems use a synthetic aperture radar vice the older
ones utilising a real aperture radar. SLAR or Synthetic Aperture Radar
(SAR) systems have long range all-weather capability. They are able
to detect and differentiate moving targets (Moving Target Indicator -
MTI) to determine heading and speed. Inverse SAR, interferometric
SAR and forward looking systems are highly specialized variants. The
latter is also used as a terrain-following radar and has target tracking
capabilities.

(d) Passive microwave (radiometric) systems are mainly used for civil
applications of remote sensing. They also produce an image by
scanning and recording the natural microwave radiation of the earth’s
surface.

(2) Non Imaging Sensors. Non imaging sensors search for, intercept, record,
identify and often analyse natural and artificially radiated electromagnetic
5-2
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
energy. They can be sensitive to radio waves, microwaves, IR-radiation,
X-rays and gamma rays. Sensors for specific military use operate in the
frequency range of radio waves and microwaves. Passive sensors intercept
communications or other transmitters such as radars or navigation aids.
Communications Intelligence (COMINT) systems can identify adversaries
by analysing voice patterns or the particular use of a communications
code. Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) systems provide electronic
fingerprints such as signal strength or bandwidth of the intercepted type of
radar, and may also identify a specific piece of such equipment. Active
sensors, such as radar facilitate the continuous, systematic collection of
information on position, movement, origin and to some extent, the identity
of objects (e.g. aircraft, ships) within a given area.

0502. Products. The results of reconnaissance and surveillance operations can be

provided in the form of reports, imagery, data-linked or networked real or NRT
data, tables, drawings, overlays, diagrams, data bases, and maps. The choice of
the final product and the source of origin (man or machine) depends on the
specific objective of the operation as well as the specific sensor or system applied.
All results can be transmitted on- or off-line.

a. Reports. Reports can be submitted verbally or as written text or electronic

data (soft COPY).

(1) Verbal reports are given by personnel such as aircrews or analysts

explaining what they have seen through visual observation or by screening
imagery. The in-flight report (INFLIGHTREP) is a formatted report given
by the crew of an airborne asset and can be based on or supported by the
data of a sensor. The narrative overlay is a verbal report given by the
observer or screener of running video imagery. It can be transmitted in
NRT to the user separately or together with the recorded video.

(2) Writ& reports are normally structured or formatted in a standardized

NATO form, e.g., the Reconnaissance Exploitation Report or Radar
Exploitation Report. The content of these reports depends on the mission
objective, the target category and the purpose code. Such reports enable
the user to extract only the information requested or required.

b. Imagery. Imagery is collectively the representation of objects of interest,

areas or targets reproduced electronically or by optical means and processed.
Imagery is a product used to extract particular information by image
interpretation and reporting. Generally, imagery provides considerably more
detail than actually needed and may possess peculiarities, ambiguities and
distinctive features which would have to be considered during interpretation.
Radar imagery in particular requires experienced and well trained interpreters
and analysts. The collected (raw) image is called primary imagery and has to
be processed and exploited to gain the interpretable form of secondary
5-3
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7
imagery. Modem image interpretation is enhanced with the support of
computer-based systems possessing enlargement and enhancement devices,
and software tools for interpretation, reporting, annotation, change detection
and merging with auxiliary data, other imagery and (digital) maps.

c. Data Linked or Networked Real or NRT Data. Surveillance sensors can

continuously distribute data via data-links or networks that may be merged
with information from other sources. An example of such a product is the
Recognized Air Picture.

d. Tables/Drawings/Overlays/Diagrams/Data Bases/Maps. These results may

be produced by the sensor itself automatically (e.g. fingerprints data), by
supporting computer systems or by human analysts. They include extractions
of specific details of imagery, vectors, headings, and digital figures. They also
can be transmitted together with textual reports,

0503. Targets. The target or object of interest will influence the way in which a
reconnaissance and surveillance operation is planned and conducted.

a. Target Categories. III STANAG 3596, Air Reconnaissance Requesting and

Target Reporting Guide, NATO has defined 17 target categories ranging from
airfields to power supply facilities, and included the specific structure of
textual reports for each category. National categories or those for other
specific purposes may differ,

b. Target Designations. With regard to the execution of a reconnaissance

operation, NATO distinguishes between the following target designations: Pin
Point or single target, Lines Searches, Strip Searches and Area Searches.
These are described below.

(1) Pin Point. A Pin Point is a target or object whose location is already
known precisely and can be expressed with an accurate geographical
reference. Examples are permanent targets such as airfields, barracks,
bridges or railway stations.

(2) Line Searches. Line searches are defined by a start and end point and are
part of lines of communication, roads, railroads or waterways. Such lines
should not exceed 25 NM in length. Start and endpoints must be
confirmed by image. Detected targets can be confirmed by visual
observation and/or imagery. Imagery confirmation can be obtained by pre-
planned sensor coverage of the suspected location or by an aircrew.

(3) Strip Searches. Strip searches are straight lines between a defined start
and end point and should not exceed 10 NM. Target confirmation is
obtained in same manner for line searches.
5-4
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

(4) Area Searches. Area searches are conducted in areas defined by exact
border point locations or at a given radius from a centre point. Target
confirmation procedures are the same as those for line and strip searches.

5-5
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

Intentionally blank

5-6
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

ANNEX A
GLOSSARY ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

ACOUSTINT Acoustic Intelligence

AJFHQ Joint Force Headquarters
ASC All Source Cell
BDA Battle Damage Assessment
C2W Command and Control warfare
CCIRM Collection, Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirements
Management
CIS. Communication and Information Systems
COMAJF Commander, Allied Joint Force
COMINT Communications Intelligence
ELINT Electronic Intelligence
EW Electronic Warfare
GCI Ground Controlled Intercept
HUMINT Human Intelligence
I&W Indications and Warnings
INFLIGHTREP Inflight Report
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
IR Infrared
IRS Intelligence Requirements
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance. Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
LOS Line Of Sight
MAS Military Agency for Standardization
MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MNC Major NATO Command
MTI Moving Target Indicator
NAEW NATO Airborne Early Warning
NRT Near Real Time
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SLAR Sideways Looking Aperture Radar
SOF Special operations Forces
SR Special Reconnaissance
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

A-1
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-2.7

ANNEX B
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Air Reconnaissance: The collection of information of intelligence interest either by
visual observation from the air or through the use of airborne sensors. (AAP-6)

Air Surveillance: The systematic observation of air space by electronic, visual, or other
means, primarily for the purpose of identifying and determining the movements of
aircraft and missiles, friendly and enemy, in the air space under observation. (AAP-6)

Battlefield Surveillance: Systematic observation of the battle area for the purpose of
providing timely information and combat intelligence. (AAP-6)

Collection Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirements Management Concept:

Encompasses those activities that result in the effective and efficient employment of
intelligence collection, processing, exploitation and reporting to satisfy intelligence
requirements in support of military operations. Consists of two major components: the
co-ordination of the collection effort and the management of intelligence requirements
arising from particular operations, missions or deployments.

Intelligence: The product resulting from the processing of information concerning

foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or
potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product
and to the organisations engaged in such activity. (AAP-6)

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance ( ISTAR): is the

process that links surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition systems and sensors
to cue manoeuvre and offensive strike assets. It encompasses collection and management
of information and intelligence to provide situational awareness for commanders and
staff to direct operations and support the targeting process.

Reconnaissance: A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other

detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or
potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or
geographic characteristics or a particular area. (AAP-6)

Sea Surveillance: The systematic observation of surface and sub-surface areas by all
available and practical means primarily for the purpose of locating, identifying and
determining the movement of ships, submarines, and other vehicles, friendly and enemy,
proceeding on or under the surface of the world’s seas and oceans. (AAP-6)

Surveillance: The systematic observation of aerospace, surface and subsurface areas,

places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.
(AAP-6)

B-1
ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSFIED