G.R. No.

197728, September 16, 2015

SPOUSES ARMANDO AND LORNA TRINIDAD, Petitioners, v. DONA* MARIE GLENN IMSON

Nature of the case: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal
and setting aside of the Decision1 and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated December 22, 2010 and
June 23, 2011,2 respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 110357. The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the
Decision3 dated June 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155, while the
questioned CA Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

Facts: On August 17, 2007, herein petitioners filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City a
Complaint4 for ejectment against herein respondent. In their Position Paper,5 petitioners alleged that: they are the
owners of a condominium unit, denominated as Unit 2203, which is located at AIC Gold Tower, Emerald Avenue,
Ortigas Center, Pasig City; they purchased the condominum unit from three (3) Indian nationals who originally
contracted to buy the said property from the developer, AIC Realty Corporation (AIC), but had not fully paid for it
yet; petitioners' purchase was evidenced by a Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights6 dated June 13, 2002 and,
later on, a Deed of Absolute Sale7 dated July 13, 2007 in the name of petitioner Armando; at the time of petitioners'
purchase of the subject condominium unit, the same was being leased by respondent from the original owners; the
period of lease was from April 1, 2002 to March 1, 2003; petitioners respected the contract of lease between
respondent and the original owners; however, since June 2002 up to the time of the filing of the complaint for
ejectment, respondent neither remitted nor consigned the monthly rentals due to petitioners for her continued use of
the condominium unit; the rental arrears amounted to a total of P2,130,000.00; petitioners sent a letter of demand to
respondent requiring that she, together with any and all persons using the said unit with her approval, vacate the
premises and pay her arrears; respondent ignored petitioners' demand letter; petitioners tried to settle the case
amicably but no agreement was reached.

In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims,8 respondent countered that: she, indeed, entered into a contract of
lease with the original owners of the disputed condominium unit which was to commence on April 1, 2002 and
would end on March 1, 2003; sometime in June 2002, she decided to purchase the unit; however, since she was then
undergoing proceedings to annul her previous marriage and thinking that her purchase of the subject property would
disrupt the property arrangements already agreed upon, she thought it best not to have the condominium unit
registered yet in her name; instead, she requested Armando Trinidad, who was her confidante, to purchase the unit
and register it under his name with the understanding that the said property would actually be owned by respondent;
Armando agreed without objection, which led to the execution of the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights in
his name; payments for the purchase price were made by respondent through cash and checks paid to the original
owners who acknowledged said payments; aside from paying the purchase price, respondent also paid the real
property taxes due on the condominium unit as well as the association dues, water bills, common area real estate tax,
building insurance and other charges billed by the developer; having full trust in Armando, coupled with her hectic
schedule, respondent did not bother to transfer ownership of the subject unit in her name; since April 2002 up to the
time of filing her Answer, respondent has been in open and public possession of the subject property; in 2007, while
respondent was out of the country, Armando, without respondent's knowledge, annotated his claim on the
condominium certificate of title; he also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in his favor on July 13, 2007; as a result,
respondent was surprised to receive a copy of petitioners' demand letter and complaint.

The MeTC of Pasig City, Branch 70, rendered its Decision9 dismissing petitioners' complaint and ordering them to
pay respondent the amount of P250,000.00 as attorney's fees and cost of suit.
The MeTC found that respondent is the true owner of the subject property and that the true intention of the parties is
for Armando to hold the condominium unit in behalf of respondent until the property could be placed in the latter's
name.

RTC of Pasig City, Branch 155, rendered its Decision which reversed the MeTC Decision. ordering the defendant-
appellee and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate because RTC held that, by preponderance of evidence,
the question of ownership is resolved in favor of petitioners. The RTC held that the subject Deed of Assignment and
Transfer of Rights and the Deed of Absolute Sale in the name of Armando is superior to the evidence presented by
respondent, which merely consisted of bills of payments of association dues, utility bills, real estate tax on the
common areas and building insurance.

CA promulgated its assailed Decision setting aside the RTC judgment and ordering petitioners to return possession
of the subject condominium unit to respondent. CA ratiocinated that, based on the evidence adduced by the parties,
respondent's claim of ownership deserves more credence. The CA ruled that records of payment of the purchase
price of the subject property, through respondent's personal checks, acknowledgment of these payments by the
former owners by way of receipt and affidavit, and respondent's exercise of acts of ownership prove that she is the
owner of the disputed condominium unit and, thus, is entitled to the possession thereof.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it in its Resolution

Issue: whether or not an implied trust was created in respondent's favour?

Held : The first sentence of Article 1448 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]here is an implied trust when property is
sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the
beneficial interest of the property." This is sometimes referred to as a purchase money resulting trust, the elements
of which are: (a) an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable
consideration; and (b) such consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust. The
principle of a resulting trust is based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration, and not legal title,
determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties.  They
arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby
becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. although
only presumed, implied or supposed by law from the nature of the transaction or from the facts and circumstances
accompanying the transaction, particularly the source of the consideration - is always an element of a resulting trust
and may be inferred from the acts or conduct of the parties rather than from direct expression of
conduct.38 Certainly, intent as an indispensable element, is a matter that necessarily lies in the evidence, that is, by
evidence, even circumstantial, of statements made by the parties at or before the time title passes.39 Because an
implied trust is neither dependent upon an express agreement nor required to be evidenced by writing, Article 1457
of our Civil Code authorizes the admission of parole evidence to prove their existence.40 Parole evidence that is
required to establish the existence of an implied trust necessarily has to be trustworthy and it cannot rest on loose,
equivocal or Indefinite declarations.41 In the instant petition, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the
findings of the MeTC and the CA that, under the circumstances of the case, the parole evidence presented by
respondent sufficiently proves that an implied trust was created in her favor.
Finally, a trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another, does not lose that character
simply because of what appears in a legal document.42 Applying this principle to the present case, petitioner
Armando, as trustee, cannot repudiate the trust by simply relying on the questioned Deed of Assignment and
Transfer of Rights and the Deed of Absolute Sale.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.