Jimenez vs. Francisco

2/17/22, 4:20 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 744
A.C. No. 10548. December 10, 2014.*

CAROLINE CASTAÑEDA JIMENEZ, complainant, vs.
ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO, respondent.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A lawyer’s personal deference to the

law not only speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and
obedience to the law, on the part of the public.—Canon 1 clearly
mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal
processes.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
216
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jimenez vs. Francisco
To the best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and

abide by the law and, thus, avoid any act or omission that is
contrary thereto. A lawyer’s personal deference to the law not
only speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and
obedience to the law, on the part of the public. Rule 1.0, on the
other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all
lawyers.
Same; Same; Membership in the legal profession is bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known
to possess good moral character.—Membership in the legal
profession is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned
in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers
should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in
a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public’s faith
in the legal profession. “To say that lawyers must at all times
uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such
statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, of all
classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to
uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by the law.”
https://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017f06c5f5c0491cb85e000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/26
Same; Same; It needs to be emphasized that the lawyer’s

fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth
and justice, and must be held within the bounds of reason and
common sense.—Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers
that their support for the cause of their clients should never be
attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes
absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his
genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense
of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. It needs
to be emphasized that the lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not
be pursued at the expense of truth and justice, and must be held
within the bounds of reason and common sense. His responsibility
to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant
a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions.
Same; Same; Lawyers are expected to act with honesty in all
their dealings, especially with the court.—Canon 10 of the CPR
provides that, “[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court.” Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the CPR provides that
“a lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
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VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 217

Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by

an artifice.” Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist
in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our
legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law.
They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings,
especially with the court. From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco
clearly violated his duties as a lawyer embodied in the CPR,
namely, to avoid dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01,
Canon 1) and to act with candor, fairness and good faith (Rule
10.01, Canon 10). Also, Atty. Franciso desecrated his solemn oath
not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of the same.
Same; Same; Conflict of Interests; A client can only entrust
confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation
from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for
his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all his dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the
lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting
interests.—Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, “[a]
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.”

“The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should
ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence.
This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to
promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential
information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of
information between them. Needless to state, a client can only
entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the
lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with the client. Part of
the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing
conflicting interests…” Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by
prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline
professional employment if the same would trigger a violation of
the prohibition against conflict of interest.
Same; Suspension; Disbarment; In suspension or disbarment
proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove the
allegations in the complaint by preponderant evidence.—In
suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the
presumption of inno-
218

cence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to

clearly prove the allegations in the complaint by preponderant
evidence. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater
weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in
determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence,
the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which
they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c)
the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial;
and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that
preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
Same; Same; Same; Grounds by which a Lawyer may be
Suspended or Disbarred.—A member of the Bar may be penalized,
even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for

violating of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the CPR, for the practice of law is
a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is
entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character. The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends
on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly
immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful
appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.

Multiple Violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
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VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 219

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Reyes, Francisco and Associates for respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Board of Governors (IBP-BOG), dated
January 3, 20131 and March 22, 2014,2 adopting and
approving the findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) which found Atty. Edgar B. Francisco (Atty.
Francisco) administratively liable for multiple violations of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and
recommended the penalty of suspension of one (1) year
from the practice of law.
On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a complaint,
dated July 14, 2007,3 filed by Caroline Castañeda Jimenez
(complainant) against Atty. Francisco for multiple
violations of the CPR. On October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco
filed his Answer.4 On June 26, 2009, the mandatory

conference was held and terminated. Only the counsel for
Atty. Francisco appeared. The notice of the said conference
addressed to complainant was returned with the notation
“unknown at the given address.” No new address was
provided by the complainant. Both parties were required to
submit their respective position papers. For this purpose,
Atty. Francisco adopted his Answer.

The Antecedents

Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez
(Jimenez), filed a complaint for estafa against complainant,
her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Geraldine
Antonio,
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 278.
2 Id., at p. 309.
3 Id., at pp. 2-7.
4 Id., at pp. 115-140.
220

Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel

Gonzalez.5 The said complaint was docketed as IS No.
074314 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
City. Jimenez alleged that he was the true and beneficial
owner of the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and
Development Corporation (Clarion), which was
incorporated specifically for the purpose of purchasing a
residential house located in Forbes Park, Makati City
(Forbes property). The incorporators and original
stockholders of Clarion were as follows:

Thomas K. Chua – P500,000.00
Teresita C. Alsua – P500,000.00
Myla Villanueva – P249,998.00
Edgar B. Francisco – P1.00
Soledad Gamat – P1.00

Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarion’s Articles of
Incorporation, the above named stockholders, except for
Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed of assignment of
their respective shares in favor of complainant, who was

then Jimenez’s common-law partner. Clarion’s total
capitalization was only P5,000,000.00. Thus, in order to
achieve its purpose of purchasing the Forbes property,
Clarion simulated a loan from the complainant in the
amount of P80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased
the Forbes property in the amount of P117,000,000.00 from
Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a check
in the said amount which was funded entirely by Jimenez.
The sale, however, was undervalued. In the deed of sale, it
was made to appear that the Forbes property was
purchased for P78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money
used as the purchase price was not reflected in the books of
Clarion.
On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua
assigned their shares in Clarion to Jimenez by virtue of a
deed
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5 Id., at pp. 141-149.
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VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 221

of trust. On the other hand, Myla’s 249,997 shares were

transferred to complainant based on a deed of assignment.
The remaining one (1) share was transferred to Ma.
Carolina C. Crespo. These transactions appeared in
Clarion’s General Information Sheet (GIS) filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Resultantly,
the subscribed shares of Clarion were as follows:

Mark Jimenez – P500,000.00
Caroline Jimenez – P749,997.00
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo – P1.00
Edgar B. Francisco – P1.00
Soledad Gamat – P1.00

On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his
shares to complainant by another deed of assignment,
making her the holder of Clarion shares amounting to
P1,249,997.00.
According to Jimenez’s complaint, while he was in
prison in the United States in 2004, he learned from Atty.
Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel), approached
the complainant and threatened her, claiming that the

United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was about to
go after their properties. Marcel succeeded in persuading
complainant to transfer her nominal shares in Clarion to
Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of assignment.
Again, this was reflected in Clarion’s GIS for the year 2004.
Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco
that, through fraudulent means, complainant and her
corespondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property
for sale sometime in August 2004. The said property was
eventually sold to Philmetro Southwest Enterprise, Inc.
(Philmetro) for the amount of P118,000,000.00 without
Jimenez’s knowledge. This sale was again undervalued at
P78,000.000.00 per the deed of sale. Atty. Francisco relayed
to Jimenez that he was the one who received the payment
for the sale of the Forbes property and that he handed all
the proceeds thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the
presence of complainant.
222

Jimenez’s complaint for estafa was based on

complainant’s alleged participation in the fraudulent
means in selling the Forbes property which was acquired
by Clarion with Jimenez’s money. Complainant was duty-
bound to remit all the proceeds of the sale to Jimenez as
the true and beneficial owner. Complainant and her
corespondents, however, misappropriated and converted
the funds for their personal use and benefit.
In support of Jimenez’s complaint for estafa, Atty.
Francisco executed an affidavit reiterating its factual
averments.6 A perusal of this affidavit likewise would show
the following claims and admissions, among other things,
of Atty. Francisco:
1. Sometime in August 2004, complainant called him,
asking for assistance in the documentation of the sale of
the Forbes property owned by Clarion. Atty. Francisco
asked her if she had secured permission from Mark
Jimenez and complainant answered in the affirmative.
2. The Board of Directors of Clarion issued a resolution
authorizing him to negotiate the sale of the property.
3. For purposes of the sale, he opened an account with
Security Bank, San Francisco Del Monte branch. When the
cash payment was deposited, he withdrew the amount and
handed the same to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence

of complainant.
4. All transfers of shares were caused without any
consideration. The transfer taxes, however, were paid.
5. When Mark Jimenez returned to the Philippines, he
was able to confirm that the sale of the Forbes property
was without his knowledge and approval.
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6 Id., at pp. 100-104.
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VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 223

The proceeds of the sale had already been farmed out to

different corporations established by complainant and her
sister.
6. The frequent changes in stockholdings were
premeditated in order to steal the money of Mark Jimenez.

The Complaint

Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations
in the complaint for estafa filed by Jimenez against her.
She felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of
Atty. Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer
and Clarion’s corporate counsel and secretary of Clarion.
This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty.
Francisco for representing conflicting interests. According
to her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco
regarding the legal implications of Clarion’s transactions.
More significantly, the principal documents relative to the
sale and transfer of Clarion’s property were all prepared
and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law
office.7 Atty. Francisco was the one who actively
participated in the transactions involving the sale of the
Forbes property. Without admitting the truth of the
allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that its
execution clearly betrayed the trust and confidence
_______________
7 1) Deed of Assignment dated November 5, 2002 notarized by Atty.

Pastor M. Reyes, Jr.; 2) General Information Sheet dated November 5,
2002 prepared by Atty. Francisco; 3) Deed of Assignment dated August 10,
2004 notarized by Atty. Pastor M. Reyes, Jr.; 4) General Information

Sheet dated September 9, 2004 prepared by Atty. Francisco and notarized
by Atty. Pastor M. Reyes, Jr.; 5) Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 15,
2005 between Clarion and Philmetro covering the Forbes property signed
by Atty. Francisco on behalf of Clarion; and 6) Board Resolution dated
March 28, 2005 signed by Atty. Francisco.
224

she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason,

complainant prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Francisco.

The Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,8 Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez
initially engaged his services in 1998 for the incorporation
of Clarion for the purpose of purchasing a residential house
in Forbes Park, where he intended to live with his long-
time partner, the complainant; that the original
incorporators and stockholders of Clarion held their
respective shares in trust for Jimenez; that the subsequent
changes in the ownership of Clarion shareholdings were
also pursuant to Jimenez’s orders; and that as the
corporate secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, he
prepared all the legal documentation to give effect to the
said transfers and, ultimately, to the purchase of the
Forbes property.
Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004,
Jimenez was imprisoned in the United States for excessive
contributions to the Democratic Party; that during this
time, Jimenez’s son, Marcel, and the complainant, asked
him again to change the ownership of Clarion shares in
order to avoid the attachment of Jimenez’s properties in a
tax evasion case; that he acceded to the request on the
belief that this was in accordance with Jimenez’s wishes;
and that as a result, almost 100% of Clarion’s ownership
was transferred in the name of Geraldine Antonio.
Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter,
complainant tasked him to talk to prospective buyers and
to negotiate the sale of the Forbes property until it was sold
for P118,000,000.00; that Marcel and complainant led him
to believe that Jimenez had knowledge of the sale as they
were in constant communication with him; that all these
representations, however, turned out to be false when
Jimenez re-
_______________
8 Rollo, pp. 115-140.
225
VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 225

turned to the Philippines and discovered that the

proceeds of the sale were coursed through other
corporations set up by complainant and her sister; that
Jimenez likewise learned of the successive sale of his other
properties, including Meridian Telekoms, Inc., by the
members of his family; and that this led to the filing of the
estafa case against the complainant and the others. As a
witness to the fraud committed against Jimenez, Atty.
Francisco executed the affidavit narrating the facts and
circumstances surrounding the said transactions.
Atty. Francisco mainly argued that he violated neither
the rule on disclosures of privileged communication nor the
proscription against representing conflicting interests, on
the ground that complainant was not his client. He was the
lawyer of Jimenez and the legal counsel of Clarion, but
never of the complainant. He might have assisted her in
some matters, but these were all under the notion that
Jimenez had given him authority to do so. Further, though
he acted as legal counsel for Clarion, no attorney-client
relationship between him and complainant was formed, as
a corporation has a separate and distinct personality from
its shareholders. While he admitted that the legal
documentation for the transfer of shares and the sale of the
Forbes property were prepared by him and notarized by the
members of his law firm, he averred that these acts were
performed in his capacity as the corporate secretary and
legal counsel of Clarion, and not as a lawyer of
complainant. Therefore, he served no conflicting interests
because it was not a “former client” and a “subsequent
client” who were the opposing parties in litigation.
He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed
his client, the rule on privileged communication does not
apply to his case. Here, complainant failed to allege, much
less prove, the requisites for the application of the
privilege. When Atty. Francisco denied being her lawyer,
the complainant should have established, by clear and
convincing evidence, that a lawyer-client relationship
indeed existed between them. Complainant failed to do
this.
226

Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa

case was but a truthful narration of facts by a witness,
Atty. Francisco cited Gonzaga v. Cañete,9 where the Court
ruled that “the fact that one of the witnesses for the
defendant had been formerly the lawyer for the defendant
in this suit was no ground for rejecting his testimony.” In
this case, he merely attested to the fraudulent acts of
complainant, in the course of which, he defended and
served Jimenez as a client. This was likewise pursuant to
the rule that unlawful and illegal motives and purposes
were not covered by the privilege. It was just unfortunate
that he fell for the ploy of complainant.

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

In the Commissioner’s Report,10 dated November 7,
2011, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Jose I. Dela
Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner), found Atty.
Francisco guilty of violations of the CPR and recommended
that he be suspended for one (1) year from the practice of
law.
Initially, the Investigating Commissioner noted that the
subsequent affidavit of desistance executed by Jimenez in
the estafa case did not affect the investigation conducted by
the CBD as it was not an ordinary court which accepted
compromises or withdrawals of cases. After weighing on
the claims of the parties, the Investigating Commissioner
concluded that nothing in the records would show that a
lawyer-client relationship existed between Atty. Francisco
and Jimenez.11 The circumstances would show that Atty.
Francisco was an original incorporator and shareholder of
Clarion. He was also the legal counsel and corporate
secretary of the said corporation, the articles of
incorporation of which did not include Jimenez as an
original incorporator. He became a stockholder only in
_______________
9 3 Phil. 394, 397 (1904).

10 Rollo, pp. 279-288.
227
VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 227

2001, when Jimenez acquired shares from Thomas Chua

and Teresita Alsua. Jimenez’s participation in Clarion
affairs again stopped when he assigned the entirety of his
shares in favor of complainant.
Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion as
alluded to by Atty. Francisco, the report stated that it
would appear that the latter permitted misrepresentations
as to Clarion’s ownership to be reported to the SEC
through its GIS. The Investigating Commissioner also
pointed out Atty. Francisco’s clear admission that the
transfer of shares within Clarion were “without any
consideration,” ran counter to the deeds of assignment that
he again admittedly executed as corporate counsel. Worse,
Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan and
undervalued the consideration of the effected sale of the
Forbes property, which displayed his unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1 of
the CPR. Further, when he executed the affidavit
containing allegations against the interest of Clarion and
complainant, the Investigating Commissioner held that
Atty. Francisco violated the rule on privileged
communication and engaged in an act that constituted
representation of conflicting interests in violation of
Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR.
In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,12 the IBP-BOG
adopted and approved, in toto, the findings and
recommendation of the CBD against Atty. Francisco.
The respondent received a copy of the said resolution on
March 26, 2013 and moved for its reconsideration.13
Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the IBP-
BOG, reasoning out that the penalty of suspension of one
(1) year is too severe considering that in his more than
three decades of practice, he had never been involved in
any act that would warrant the imposition of disciplinary
action upon him. It was only in 2007, when his client,
Jimenez, experi-
_______________
11 Jimenez was represented by the Law Office of Chavez Miranda

Aseoche in the estafa case he filed against the complainant.
12 Rollo, p. 278.
13 Id., at pp. 289-304.
228

enced a difficult crisis involving his children and

common-law partner that he experienced a major upheaval
in his professional life. He apologized for his not being too
circumspect in dealing with the relatives of Jimenez.
As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco reiterated
that his participation in the execution of the documents
pertaining to the sale of the Forbes property were all
connected to his capacity as Clarion’s corporate secretary
and legal counsel, not to mention his ties with his client
and friend, Jimenez. He admitted that he owed fidelity to
Clarion and Jimenez, but denied that this duty extended to
the incorporators and shareholders of Clarion. Thus, when
complainant sought advice in her capacity as a shareholder
in Clarion, no fiduciary duty arose on his part. In his own
words, Atty. Francisco insisted that “Carol is not Clarion
and vice versa.”14
Attached to Atty. Francisco’s motion for reconsideration
was an affidavit executed by Jimenez, stating that he had
retained the legal services of Atty. Francisco since 1999.
Espousing Atty. Francisco’s defenses, Jimenez asserted
that Atty. Francisco’s law firm was in-charge of all the
companies he owned in the Philippines. He directed Atty.
Francisco to execute all the documentation to show his
ownership of these companies, including Clarion. These
documents were in the possession of complainant for
safekeeping. When Jimenez ran for Congress in 2001, Atty.
Francisco personally assisted him in the filing of his
certificate of candidacy and the proceedings before the
electoral tribunals. While he was in prison in the United
States, it was Atty. Francisco who visited and told him that
his children, Myla and Marcel, were then facilitating the
sale of one of his companies, Meridian Telekoms, Inc.,
without his knowledge. He asked Atty. Francisco to keep
quiet about his children’s betrayal and to wait until he
could go home. When he filed the criminal cases against his
children and complainant, the latter even filed a frivolous
kidnapping case
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14 Id., at p. 294.
229
VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 229

against Atty. Francisco. According to Jimenez, the

people who committed crimes against him were now
exhausting all possible means to keep Atty. Francisco
silent and to prevent the latter from performing his duties
as a lawyer.
In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,15 the IBP-BOG denied
the respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The Court’s Ruling

Violations of Canons 1 and 10 of the CPR and the
Lawyer’s Oath

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE

CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer
to laws and legal processes. To the best of his ability, a
lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and,
thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A
lawyer’s personal deference to the law not only speaks of
his character but it also inspires respect and obedience to
the law, on the part of the public. Rule 1.0, on the other
hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all
lawyers.
Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or
unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or
disregards the law is “unlawful.” “Unlawful” conduct does
not necessarily imply the element of criminality although
the concept is broad
_______________
15 Id., at p. 309.
230

enough to include such element.16 To be “dishonest”

means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or
betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity,
integrity in principle, fairness and straightforwardness17
while conduct that is “deceitful” means the proclivity for
fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or
device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true
facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed
upon.18
Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in law, but also
known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act
and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public’s
faith in the legal profession.19 “To say that lawyers must at
all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious,
but such statement can never be overemphasized.
Considering that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers
are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative
that they live by the law.”20
When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also
took an oath to “obey the laws,” “do no falsehood,” and
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion.21
_______________
16 Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.), p. 1538.

19 Rivera v. Corral, 433 Phil. 331, 342; 384 SCRA 1, 10 (2002).
20 Resurreccion v. Sayson, 360 Phil. 313, 315; 300 SCRA 129, 130
(1998), citing Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265; cited in Malcolm, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, p. 214.
21 The Lawyer’s Oath states in full:
I, _______ do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support the Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to
231
VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 231


In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco
clearly violated the canons and his sworn duty. He is guilty
of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he
admitted to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to
actively misrepresent to the SEC, the significant matters
regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently, its
corporate shareholdings. In the documents submitted to
the SEC, such as the deeds of assignment and the GIS,
Atty. Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the
validity of these transfers of shares, making it appear that
these were done for consideration when, in fact, the said
transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the alleged orders
of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was correct in
pointing out that this ran counter to the deeds of
assignment which he executed as corporate counsel. In his
long practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to
assume that Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on
contracts, corporation law and the rules enforced by the
SEC. As corporate secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and
obligation to register valid transfers of stocks. Nonetheless,
he chose to advance the interests of his clientele with
patent disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Worse, Atty.
Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan entered into
by Clarion and to have undervalued the consideration of
the effected sale of the Forbes property. He permitted this
fraudulent ruse to cheat the government of taxes.
Unquestionably, therefore, Atty. Francisco participated in
a series of grave legal infractions and was content to have
granted the requests of the persons involved.
Despite assertions that these were in accordance to
Jimenez’s wishes, or pursuant to complainant’s
misrepresen-
_______________
the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients;
and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
232

tations, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty.

Francisco’s act of drafting, or at the very least, permitting
untruthful statements to be embodied in public documents.
If the Court allows this highly irregular practice for the
specious reason that lawyers are constrained to obey their
clients’ flawed scheming and machinations, the Court
would, in effect, sanction wrongdoing and falsity. This
would undermine the role of lawyers as officers of the
court.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that
their support for the cause of their clients should never be
attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer
owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full
devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so
only within the bounds of the law. It needs to be
emphasized that the lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not
be pursued at the expense of truth and justice, and must be
held within the bounds of reason and common sense. His
responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his
client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill
motives and malicious intentions.22
In the same vein, Atty. Francisco’s admissions show that
he lacks candor regarding his dealings. Canon 10 of the
CPR provides that, “[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and
good faith to the court.” Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the
CPR provides that “a lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead
or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice.” Lawyers are
officers of the court, called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our
legal system, protecting and upholding truth
_______________
22 Plus Builders, Inc. v. Revilla, Jr., 533 Phil. 250, 261; 501 SCRA 615,
626 (2006), citing Choa v. Chiongson, 329 Phil. 270; 260 SCRA 477 (1996).
233
VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 233

and the rule of law. They are expected to act with

honesty in all their dealings, especially with the court.23
From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated his
duties as a lawyer embodied in the CPR, namely, to avoid
dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and

to act with candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01,
Canon 10). Also, Atty. Franciso desecrated his solemn oath
not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of the
same.

Rule on Conflicting Interests and Disclosure of
Privileged Communication

With respect to Atty. Francisco’s alleged representation
of conflicting interests and disclosure of privileged
communication, the Court deviates from the findings of the
IBP-BOG.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, “[a]
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts.”24 “The relationship between a lawyer and
his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest
level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of
confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full
disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to
his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information
between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust
confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and
discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound
_______________
23 Id., citing Ting-Dumali v. Torres, 471 Phil. 1, 9; 427 SCRA 108, 115
(2004); Radjaie v. Alovera, 392 Phil. 1, 17; 337 SCRA 244, 255-256 (2000);
Ziga v. Arejola, 486 Phil. 37, 49; 443 SCRA 435, 445 (2004); Berbano v.
Barcelona, 457 Phil. 331, 345; 410 SCRA 258, 264 (2003); Busiños v.
Ricafort, 347 Phil. 687, 692; 283 SCRA 407, 414 (1997).
24 Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr., A.C. No. 5098, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA
76, 81.
234

to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings

and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty
in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting
interests…”25 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by
prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline
professional employment if the same would trigger a

violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest.
In Quiambao v. Bamba,26 the Court discussed the
application of the rule on conflict of interest in this wise:
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting

interests when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend
for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose.
Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests
to determine whether a lawyer’s conduct lies within this
proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight
for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time,
to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s
argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in
arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of
the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer
would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former
client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interest
applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present
clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no
moment that the lawyer
_______________
25 Id., at pp. 80-81.

26 505 Phil. 126, 134-135; 468 SCRA 1, 10-11 (2005).
235
VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 235

would not be called upon to contend for one client that which
the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would
be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from
one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one
of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or
conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them
would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to
both clients.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on conflict
of interests presupposes a lawyer-client relationship. The
purpose of the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary
nature of the ties between an attorney and his client.
Conversely, a lawyer may not be precluded from accepting
and representing other clients on the ground of conflict of
interests, if the lawyer-client relationship does not exist in
favor of a party in the first place.
In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated
the rule on conflict of interests, a scrutiny of the parties’
submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant
failed to establish that she was a client of Atty. Francisco.
First, complainant’s claim of being Atty. Francisco’s
client remains unsubstantiated, considering its detailed
refutation. All that the complaint alleged was that Atty.
Francisco was Clarion’s legal counsel and that complainant
sought advice and requested documentation of several
transfers of shares and the sale of the Forbes property.
This was only successful in showing that Atty. Francisco,
indeed, drafted the documents pertaining to the
transaction and that he was retained as legal counsel of
Clarion. There was no detailed explanation as to how she
supposedly engaged the services of Atty. Francisco as her
personal counsel and as to what and how she
communicated with the latter anent the dealings she had
entered into. With the complaint lacking in this regard, the
unrebutted answer made by Atty. Francisco, accompanied
236

with a detailed narrative of his engagement as counsel

of Jimenez and Clarion, would have to prevail.
Second, there is a stark disparity in the amount of
narrative details presented by the parties. Atty. Francisco’s
claim that he was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and
not of the complainant, was clearly established in a sworn
statement executed by Jimenez himself. Complainant’s
evidence pales in comparison with her claims of being the
client of Atty. Francisco couched in general terms that
lacked particularity of circumstances.
Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not
to file a reply to Atty. Francisco’s answer. This could have
given her opportunity to present evidence showing their
professional relationship. She also failed to appear during
the mandatory conference with the IBP-CBD without even

updating her residential address on record. Her
participation in the investigation of the case apparently
ended at its filing.
In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy
the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to clearly prove the allegations in the
complaint by preponderant evidence. Preponderance of
evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is,
as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of
the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to
the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in
determining whether or not there is preponderance of
evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the
facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the
witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately
appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses,
although it does not
237
VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 237

mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater

number.27
Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his
entanglement with this fiasco among the members of
Jimenez’s family by taking an upfront and candid stance in
dealing with Jimenez’s children and complainant. He could
have been staunch in reminding the latter that his tasks
were performed in his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion
and Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty. Francisco’s
indiscretion does not detract the Court from finding that
the totality of evidence presented by the complainant
miserably failed to discharge the burden of proving that
Atty. Francisco was her lawyer. At most, he served as the
legal counsel of Clarion and, based on the affirmation
presented, of Jimenez. Suffice it to say, complainant failed
to establish that Atty. Francisco committed a violation of
the rule on conflict of interests.
Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does

not apply. In Mercado v. Vitriolo,28 the Court elucidated on
the factors essential to establish the existence of the said
privilege, viz.:
In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a
prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by
reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are
protected by the rule on privileged communication even if the
prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the
latter declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the
prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the
lawyer without
_______________
27 Rodica v. Lazaro, A.C. No. 9259, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 1, 9-
10, citing Aba Siao v. De Guzman, Jr., A.C. No. 7649, December 14, 2011,
662 SCRA 361, 372.
28 498 Phil. 49, 58-60; 459 SCRA 1, 9 (2005).
238

fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used

against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain
information from the prospective client.
x x x
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information
transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and
client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is
aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or
the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground.
Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to
the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party,
an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by a
client to his counsel not in his professional capacity, are not
privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not

being present.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney
in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not
be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking
legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The
communication must have been transmitted by a client to his
attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or
personal assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege does not
attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
[Emphases supplied]
239
VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 239

Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court

holds that the evidence on record fails to demonstrate the
claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant failed
to establish the professional relationship between her and
Atty. Francisco. The records are further bereft of any
indication that the “advice” regarding the sale of the Forbes
property was given to Atty. Francisco in confidence.
Neither was there a demonstration of what she had
communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of
circumstances under which the confidential communication
was relayed. All that complaint alleged in her complainant
was that “she sought legal advice from respondent in
various occasions.”29 Considering that complainant failed to
attend the hearings at the IBP, there was no testimony as
to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged
by Atty. Francisco without her consent. It is, therefore,
difficult, if not impossible, to determine if there was any
violation of the rule on privileged communication. As held
in Mercado, such confidential information is a crucial link
in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. It is not
enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.30 It
cannot be gainsaid then that complainant, who has the
burden of proving that the privilege applies, failed in this
regard.

The Penalty

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred

or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violating of
the lawyer’s oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the CPR,31 for the practice
of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those who are
qualified and who possess good
_______________
29 Rollo, p. 3.
30 Supra note 28 at p. 61; p. 12.
31 Catu v. Rellosa, 569 Phil. 539, 550; 546 SCRA 209, 221 (2008).
240

moral character.32 The appropriate penalty on an errant

lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts.33
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended
on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice
or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral
conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful
appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court.
While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict
of interests and disclosure of privileged communication, the
acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing
Clarion to make untruthful representations to the SEC and
in other public documents, still constitute malpractice and
gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a
suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months is
warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B.
Francisco GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a
STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or

similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of
a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of
Atty. Edgar B. Francisco and furnished to the Office of the
Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated
_______________
32 Director of Religious Affairs v. Bayot, 74 Phil. 579, 581 (1944).

33 Lim-Santiago v. Saguico, 520 Phil. 538, 552; 486 SCRA 10, 25
(2006).
241
VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 241

Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines,

for their information and guidance.
Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of
the date of his receipt of this Decision so that the Court can
determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall
take effect.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta,** Del Castillo (Acting Chairperson),

*
Villarama, Jr. ** and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Atty. Edgar B. Francisco suspended from practice of law

for six (6) months for violation of Canons 1 and 10 of Code
of Professional Responsibility, with stern warning against
commission of similar offense.
Notes.—The proscription against representation of

conflicting interest applies even if the lawyer would not be
called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer
has to oppose for the other, or that there would be no
occasion to use the confidential information acquired from
one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are
wholly unrelated, except if there is a written consent from
all the parties after full disclosure. (Ylaya vs. Gacott, 689
SCRA 452 [2013])
Three Tests in Determining Whether a Lawyer is Guilty
of Representing Conflicting Interest. (Lee vs. Simando, 698
SCRA 20 [2013])
——o0o——
_______________
* * Designated acting member, in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T.

Carpio, who inhibited himself, as a member of his staff is closely related to
a party, per Raffle dated December 9, 2014.
* ** Designated acting member, in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D.
Brion, per Special Order No. 1888 dated November 28, 2014.
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2/17/22, 4:20 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 744

A.C. No. 10548. December 10, 2014.*

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A lawyer’s personal deference to the

216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

To the best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and

Same; Same; It needs to be emphasized that the lawyer’s

VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 217

Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by

consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.”

218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

cence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to

even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.

VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 219

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

filed his Answer.4 On June 26, 2009, the mandatory

220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel

their respective shares in favor of complainant, who was

5 Id., at pp. 141-149.

VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 221

of trust. On the other hand, Myla’s 249,997 shares were

the complainant and threatened her, claiming that the

222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jimenez’s complaint for estafa was based on

handed the same to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence

6 Id., at pp. 100-104.

VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 223

The proceeds of the sale had already been farmed out to

7 1) Deed of Assignment dated November 5, 2002 notarized by Atty.

2004 notarized by Atty. Pastor M. Reyes, Jr.; 4) General Information

224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason,

8 Rollo, pp. 115-140.

VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 225

turned to the Philippines and discovered that the

226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa

9 3 Phil. 394, 397 (1904).

VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 227

2001, when Jimenez acquired shares from Thomas Chua

11 Jimenez was represented by the Law Office of Chavez Miranda

228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

enced a difficult crisis involving his children and

VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 229

Jimenez vs. Francisco

against Atty. Francisco. According to Jimenez, the

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE

230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

enough to include such element.16 To be “dishonest”

16 Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.), p. 1538.

VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 231

232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tations, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty.

VOL. 744, DECEMBER 10, 2014 233

and the rule of law. They are expected to act with

dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and

234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED