Batch 5 Case Digest in Remedial Law Review
Batch 5 Case Digest in Remedial Law Review
Batch 5 Case Digest in Remedial Law Review
2. FIRST SARMIENTO FACTS First Sarmiento obtained from PBCOM a loan, which was secured
PROPERTY HOLDINGS by a real estate mortgage over parcels of land. Later on, PBCOM resort to
vs PB COM extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties for the failure of First
Temporary restraining Sarmiento to pay its loan. Meanwhile, the mortgaged properties were
order auctioned and sold to PBCOM as the highest bidder. First Sarmiento filed a
Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage and its amendments, with
prayer for the issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction. First Sarmiento
claimed in its Complaint that it never received the loan proceeds from
PBCOM, yet the latter still sought the extrajudicial foreclosure of real
estate mortgage.
In its Opposition, PBCOM asserted that the RTC failed to acquire
jurisdiction over First Sarmiento's Complaint because the action for
annulment of mortgage was a real action that is capable of pecuniary
estimation; thus, the filing fees filed should have been based on the fair
market value of the mortgaged properties.
RTC issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order for 72 hours, enjoining
the registration of the certificate of sale with the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan. Thereafter, RTC directed the parties to observe the status quo
ante.
Later on, RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction because
plaintiff failed to pay the appropriate filing fees.
First Sarmiento sought direct recourse to SC with its Petition for Review
under Rule 45. B.
ISSUE/S: WON the order of the RTC, which directed the parties to observe
the status quo ante, effectively extending indefinitely its 72-hour ex-parte
temporary restraining order is proper.
RULING: NO. Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides the
instances when a temporary restraining order may be issued:
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. —
No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice
to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable
injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on
notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was
made, may issue a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a
period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be
enjoined, except as herein provided.
Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or
person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction
should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the
preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the
corresponding order.
It is clear that a temporary restraining order may be issued by a trial court
in only two (2) instances: first, when great or irreparable injury would
result to the applicant even before the application for writ of preliminary
injunction can be heard; and second, if the matter is of extreme urgency
and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury. The
executive judge of a multi-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala
court may issue a 72-hour temporary restraining order. In both instances,
the temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte. However, in the
first instance, the temporary restraining order has an effectivity of only 20
days to be counted from service to the party sought to be enjoined.
Likewise, within those 20 days, the court shall order the enjoined party to
show why the injunction should not be granted and shall then determine
whether or not the injunction should be granted. In the second instance,
when there is extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice
and irreparable injury, the court shall issue a temporary restraining order
effective for only 72 hours upon issuance. Within those 72 hours, the court
shall conduct a summary hearing to determine if the temporary restraining
order shall be extended until the application for writ of preliminary
injunction can be heard.
However, in no case shall the extension exceed 20 days. If the application
for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the given
periods, the temporary restraining order is automatically vacated and the
court has no authority to extend or renew it on the same ground of its
original issuance. G.R. No. 202836 June 19, 2018 C.
RULING: Despite the clear wording of the rules, the Regional Trial Court
issued a status quo ante order indefinitely extending the temporary
restraining order on the registration of the certificate of sale with the
Registry of Deeds. Petitioner applied for a writ of preliminary injunction,
yet the Regional Trial Court did not conduct any hearing for that purpose
and merely directed the parties to observe the status quo ante.
Miriam College Foundation, Inc v. Court of Appeals explained the
difference between preliminary injunction and a restraining order as
follows:
Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court,
agency or a person to perform to refrain from performing a particular act or
acts. As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or
maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent
actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. A
preliminary injunction persists until it is dissolved or until the termination
of the action without the court issuing a final injunction. The basic purpose
of restraining order, on the other hand, is to preserve the status quo until
the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction. Under the former
A§5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A§5, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 224, a judge (or justice) may issue a temporary restraining order with
a limited life of twenty days from date of issue. If before the expiration of
the 20-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the
temporary order would thereby be deemed automatically vacated. If no
action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction
within the said 20 days, the temporary restraining order would
automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial
declaration to that effect being necessary.
In the instant case, no such preliminary injunction was issued; hence, the
TRO earlier issued automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of
the Rules of Court. A temporary restraining order cannot be extended
indefinitely to take the place of a writ of preliminary injunction, since a
temporary restraining order is intended only to have a limited lifespan and
is deemed automatically vacated upon the expiration of 72 hours or 20
days, as the case may be.
ANTECEDENT FACTS:
Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that
the complaint averred no cause of action, violated the rule that government
infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs, contravened the
mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the corporate
president had no authority to sign and file the complaint.
The CA granted the petition and annulled and set aside the ruling of the
RTC. Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the
motion. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep.
Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme Court, on
government projects?
RULING:
The CA’s decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely abused its
discretion, firstly, when it entertained the complaint of Nerwin against
respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby contravening the
express provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for
its seeking to enjoin the bidding out by respondents of the O-ILAW
Project; and, secondly, when it issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction.
The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing
was left for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon
Nerwin obedience to them. The RTC could not have been unaware of the
prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975 considering that the Court had
itself instructed all judges and justices of the lower courts, through
Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with and respect the
prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary
prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving contracts and projects of the
Government.
The Court notes that the RTC did not properly appreciate the real nature
and true purpose of the injunctive remedy. This failing of the RTC presses
the Court to use this decision to reiterate the norms and parameters long
standing jurisprudence has set to control the issuance of TROs and writs of
injunction, and to now insist on conformity to them by all litigants and
lower courts. Only thereby may the grave misconduct committed in Civil
Case No. 03106921 be avoided
An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is
merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not
give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act
prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a
right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of
law.
4. ZUNECA FACTS:
PHARMACEUTICAL,
AKRAM ARAIN AND/OR Respondent is an all-Filipino pharmaceutical company which manufactures
VENUS ARAIN, M.D. and sells a medicine bearing the generic name "CITICOLINE," which is
DBAZUNECA indicated for heart and stroke patients. The said medicine is marketed by
PHARMACEUTICAL, respondent under its registered trademark "ZYNAPSE," which respondent
PETITIONERS, VS. obtained from the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) on September 24,
NATRAPHARM, INC., 2007 under Certificate of Trademark Registration No. 4-2007-005596.With
its registration; the trademark "ZYNAPSE" enjoys protection for a term of
Preliminary Injunction 10 years from September 24, 2007.
vis-à-vis permanent
injunction Allegedly unknown to respondent, since 2003 or even as early as 2001,
petitioners have been selling a medicine imported from Lahore, Pakistan
bearing the generic name "CARBAMAZEPINE," an anti-convulsant
indicated for epilepsy, under the brand name "ZYNAPS," which trademark
is however not registered with the IPO."ZYNAPS" is pronounced exactly
like "ZYNAPSE."
Via a petition for certiorari with an application for a TRO and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction, respondent questioned before the CA the RTC's
denial of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. CA issued a
Resolution denying respondent's application for TRO and/or preliminary
injunction for lack of merit. However, contrary to its earlier resolutions
denying the application for a TRO/preliminary injunction, the CA, in its
April 18, 2011 Decision, upheld the allegations of respondent that it is
entitled to injunctive relief on the basis of its IPO registration and
permanently enjoined petitioners from the commercial use of "ZYNAPS."
ISSUE:
HELD:
5. Mila Caboverde Tantano The controversy arises when Eve and Fe (siblings of petitioner) filed a
Vs Dominalda Espina- complaint praying for the annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly
Caboverde et al transferring Lots from their parents in petitioner’s favor. During the
pendency of the case, the parties executed a Partial Settlement Agreement
Receivership (PSA) where they fixed the sharing of the uncontroverted properties among
themselves. The PSA also provide that Dominalda shall be entitled to
receive a share of the net income derived from the uncontroverted
properties and that appointed receiver to provide former’s medicine.The
RTC approved the PSA.
However, Dominalda filed with the RTC a Verified Urgent
Application to place the controverted lots under receivership. She claimed
that while she had a legal interest in the controverted properties, she could
not enjoy them, since the income derived was solely appropriated by
petitioner Mila. She alleged that she immediately needs her legal share in
the income of these properties for her daily sustenance and medical
expenses.
The RTC granted the application. As the purpose of the movant,
who is old and sickly, is to procure money from the proceeds of these
properties to spend for medicines and other needs. This circumstance falls
within the purview of Sec. 1(d), that is, "Whenever in other cases it appears
that the appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and feasible
means of preserving, administering, or disposing of the property in
litigation."
The CA ruled that RTC has the discretion to decide whether or not
the appointment of a receiver is necessary. The trial court took into
consideration that the applicant is already an octogenarian who may not
live up to the day when this conflict will be finally settled.
Ruling: NO
Receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted with utmost
circumspection and only in extreme situations. The doctrinal
pronouncement in Velasco & Co. v. Gochico & Co is instructive:
The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be
exercised with extreme caution and only under circumstances requiring
summary relief or where the court is satisfied that there is imminent danger
of loss, lest the injury thereby caused be far greater than the injury sought
to be averted. The court should consider the consequences to all of the
parties and the power should not be exercised when it is likely to produce
irreparable injustice or injury to private rights or the facts demonstrate that
the appointment will injure the interests of others whose rights are entitled
to as much consideration from the court as those of the complainant
Indeed, Sec. 1(d) rule 59 is couched in general terms and broad in
scope, encompassing instances not covered by the other grounds
enumerated under the said section. However, in granting applications for
receivership on the basis of this section, courts must remain mindful of the
basic principle that receivership may be granted only when the
circumstances so demand, and that being a drastic and harsh remedy,
receivership must be granted only when there is a clear showing of
necessity for it in order to save the plaintiff from grave and immediate loss
or damage.
In this case, Dominalda’s alleged need for income to defray her
medical expenses and support is not a valid justification for the
appointment of a receiver. Moreover, placing the disputed properties under
receivership is not necessary to save Dominalda from grave and immediate
loss or irremediable damage. Contrary to her assertions, Dominalda is
assured of receiving income under the PSA approved by the RTC. There is
no clear showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being lost or
materially impaired and that placing them under receivership is most
convenient and feasible means to preserve, administer or dispose of them.
6. Milagros P. Enriquez V Petitioner Enriquez filed a replevin case against Asuten for the recovery of
The Mercantile Insurance the Toyota Hi-Ace van valued at ₱300,000.00. She applied for a bond in
Co., Inc the amount of ₱600,000.00 with respondent Mercantile Insurance in
Replevin Asuten's favor. The Regional Trial Court approved the bond and ordered
the sheriff to recover the van from Asuten and to deliver it to petitioner.
While the van was in petitioner's custody, the Regional Trial Court
dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to prosecute. Thus, it
ordered the sheriff to restore the van to Asuten. When petitioner failed to
produce the van, the Regional Trial Court directed Mercantile Insurance to
pay Asuten the amount of the bond.
Since, petitioner failed to remit the amount paid to Asuten,
Mercantile Insurance filed a collection suit against Enriquez.
Issue: WON petitioner should be made liable for the full amount of the
bond paid by respondent as surety, in relation to a previous case for
replevin filed by petitioner.
Ruling: YES
Replevin is an action for the recovery of personal property. It is
both a principal remedy and a provisional relief. When utilized as a
principal remedy, the objective is to recover possession of personal
property that may have been wrongfully detained by another. When sought
as a provisional relief, it allows a plaintiff to retain the contested property
during the pendency of the action.
As a provisional remedy, a party may apply for an order for the
delivery of the property before the commencement of the action or at any
time before an answer is filed. Rule 60, Section 2 requires that the party
seeking the issuance of the writ must first file the required affidavit and a
bond in an amount that is double the value of the property.
Of all the provisional remedies provided in the Rules of Court, only
Rule 60, Section 2 requires that the amount of the bond be double the value
of the property. The other provisional remedies provide that the amount be
fixed by court or be merely equal to the value of the property. The rationale
to the requirement that the bond for a writ of seizure in a replevin be
double the value of the property. The bond functions not only to indemnify
the defendant in case the property is lost, but also to answer for any
damages that may be awarded by the court if the judgment is rendered in
defendant's favor.
Forfeiture of the replevin bond requires first, a judgment on the
merits in the defendant's favor, and second, an application by the defendant
for damages
In this case, there was no trial on the merits. The Regional Trial
Court's dismissal for failure to prosecute was a dismissal without prejudice
to re-filing. Thus, upon the dismissal of the case, it was imperative for
petitioner to return the van to Asuten. When petitioner failed to produce the
van, equity demanded that Asuten be awarded only an amount equal to the
value of the van. The RTC would have erred in ordering the forfeiture of
the entire bond in Asuten's favor, considering that there was no trial on the
merits or an application by Asuten for damages. This judgment could have
been reversed had petitioner appealed the Regional Trial Court's Order in
the Civil Case. Unfortunately, she did not. Respondent was, thus,
constrained to follow the Regional Trial Court's directive to pay Asuten the
full amount of the bond.
It is clear from the antecedents that any losses which petitioner has
suffered were due to the consequences of her actions, or more accurately,
her inactions.1âwThe Regional Trial Court forfeited the replevin bond
which she had filed because she refused to return the property. She is now
made liable for the replevin bond because she failed to appeal its forfeiture.
Susan filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution and she asserted
that none of the expenses deducted by Danilo may be chargeable as part of
the monthly support contemplated by the CA Decision. The RTC granted
Susan’s motion. Danilo filed a MR and a motion for inhibition of Judge
Yrastorza, Sr which the latter both denied.
Danilo still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears pendente lite;
hence, Susan filed in the CA a Petition for Contempt of Court with
Damages. Danilo filed a Petition for Certioari under Rule 65. The two
cases were consolidated.
Ruling:
The CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by Danilo to be
credited against the accrued support pendente lite. Any amount Danilo
seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those incurred
fir sustenance and household expenses. Accordingly, only the following
expenses of respondent may be allowed as deductions from the support
pendente lite: Medical expenses for Susan, Dental Expenses, credit card
purchases of the children.
Respondents counterargued that their titles are valid and effective by virtue
of the decision of the CFI Lanao del Norte in 1968. They insisted that
FEMCO is illegally occupying a portion of their lot.
The CA granted the appeal of respondents for the following reasons: 1) the
complaint of FEMCo is actually an indirect action for annulment of title
and must be dismissed in accordance with the doctrine that a cert of title
cannot be subject to a collateral attack; and 2) an action for quieting of title
is not the appropriate remedy where the action would require the
modification or interference with the judgment or order of another coequal
court. Hence, this petition.
Ruling: No.
An action to quiet title or to remove the clouds over a title is a special civil
action governed by the Rule 63, Sec. 1, Par. 2. Specifically, an action for
quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity.
Ruling: Yes.
The prescriptive period for actions based upon a written contract and for
reformation of an instrument is ten (10) years under Article 1144 of the
Civil Code. In the case at bar, respondent had ten years from 1968, the time
when the contract of lease was executed, to file an action for reformation.
However, it did so only on May 15, 1992 or 24 years after the cause of
action accrued. Hence, its cause of action has become stale and time-
barred.
In addition, respondent’s action will still not prosper. Under Rule 64, Sec.
1 of ROC, an action for the reformation of an instrument is instituted as a
special civil action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties for their guidance in
the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues
arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before
the breach or violation of the law or contract to which it refers. In the case
at bar, respondent brought the present action for reformation after an
alleged breach or violation of the contract was already committed by
Bentir. Consequently, the remedy of reformation no longer lies.
10. LATOJA vs LIM FACTS:
On May 21, 1997, respondent Teresita Cabe, together with Donato A.
Cardona II (Cardona II), executed a Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro over
a parcel of land registered under the “Heirs of Donato Cardona represented
Consolidation of by Jovita T. Cardona.”
ownership For failure of Cardona II to repurchase the property from her within one
year as agreed upon in the deed, Cabe filed a Petition for Consolidation of
Ownership pursuant to Article 1607 of the Civil Code to the RTC. The
petition was granted. Cardona II questioned the trial court’s decision by
filing with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari which was
dismissed by the CA.
Cardona II also appealed to the Supreme Court which was also denied.
Thereafter, respondent Cabe filed a motion for execution of the RTC
decision in the consolidation case which was granted. Cabe prayed for the
issuance of a Writ of Possession which was granted by Judge Lim of RTC
Branch 2.
Petitioners allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Lim,
contending that Judge Lim wrongly granted the motion for the issuance of
a Writ ofPossession to Cabe. They allege that in 2006, this same Judge Lim
rendered a Judgment by Compromise in an Action for Partition of Real
Properties.
This action was filed by Spouses Latoja against Spouses Cardona, who are
the parents of Cardona II, respondent in the consolidation case Among the
properties included in the partition case was OCT No. 41, the same
property subject of the consolidation case. The Judgment by Compromise
awarded OCT No. 41 on a 50/50 pro indiviso ownership to Spouses Latoja
and Spouses Cardona pursuant to their Compromise Agreement. Spouses
Latoja contend that Judge Lim, wrongly granted the motion for the
issuance of a Writ of Possession to Cabe despite the Judgment by
Compromise he had previously rendered in the partition case. Judge Lim
was then the presiding judge of RTC-Br. 1, Borongan, Eastern Samar when
he awarded half of the same property to petitioners.
Alleging that they are in possession of a portion of the subject property,
petitioners also prayed for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin the
implementation of the assailed Order in view of the issuance of the Notice
to Vacate issued by the court sheriff. SC granted the TRO prayed for.
Cabe contends that the Decision in the consolidation case had become final
after the SC dismissed the appeal of Cardona II and before the Judgment by
Compromise was rendered in 2006. Therefore, Judge Lim was simply
guided by the rule on the finality of judgment when he issued the assailed
Order. Cabe asserts that she is therefore entitled to the writ of possession
prayed for
ISSUE: Whether Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by Granting
the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession - YES
HELD: Jurisprudence provides only these four instances when a writ of
possession may issue: (1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of
property, provided that the mortgagor has possession, and no third party
has intervened; and (4) execution sales.
The consolidation of title prescribed in Article 1607 of the Civil Code is
merely for the purpose of registering and consolidating title to the property
in case of a vendor a retro’s failure to redeem. Judge Lim overlooked the
nature of the Pacto de Retro sale entered into by Cabe and Cardona II.
It is basic that in a pacto de retro sale, the title and ownership of the
property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro. As a result, the
vendee a retro has a right to the immediate possession of the property sold,
unless otherwise agreed upon. Therefore, the right of respondent Cabe to
possess the subject property must be founded on the terms of the Pacto de
Retro Sale itself, and not on the decision in the consolidation case.
On April 10, 2002, the spouses Guerrero filed a petition for prohibition
with the RTC Las Pinas praying that the Complaint in civil case no. 6293
be quashed, and raising the following lone issue:
“An Act with two joined controversies, one beyond pecuniary
estimation such as extinguishment of Contract (Cognizable by the
RTC) and the other, for ejectment (Unlawful detainer) is beyond the
adjudicatory powers of an inferior court.
RTC denied the petition for prohibition for lack of merit. In denying the
petition for prohibition of the spouses Guerrero, the RTC held that
Prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli. In
this case, the contract to sell has already been cancelled before the filing of
the complaint for unlawful detainer, hence, the prohibition will no longer
lie. Hence this petition.
SC RULING
On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC
Resolution, the Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC)
proclaimed Reyes as the winner of the May 13, 2013 elections for the
position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
Subsequently, the May 18, 2013 proclamation of respondent REGINA
ONGSIAKO REYES is declared NULL and VOID and without any legal
force and effect. Petitioner LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO is hereby
proclaimed the winning candidate for the position of representative in the
House of Representatives for the province of Marinduque.
Velasco alleged that despite all the letters and requests to Speaker
Belmonte Jr. and Sec. General Baua-Yap, they refused to recognize him as
the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
Likewise, in the face of numerous written demands for Reyes to vacate the
position and office of the representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque, she continues to discharge the duties of said position.
Hence, the instant petition for Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/ or injunction.
ISSUE: WON a writ of mandamus can be issued to compel Speaker
Belmonte to recognize Velasco as the duly elected Representative of the
Lone District of Marinduque.
Ruling:
Yes the petition has merit. A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is
shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the
petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant
thereof. Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that
any person may file a verified petition for mandamus ‘when any tribunal,
corporation, board officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.
The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been
established. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done. If the law imposes a duty upon public officer and gives him the right
to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment.