Carol Ebdon

City of Omaha
Aimee L. Franklin
University of Oklahoma

Technology, Citizen Participation in Budgeting Teory

Communication,
Collaboration

Carol Ebdon is the Finance Director for

Citizen participation in government budgeting processes Later, the Great Society programs brought the
the City of Omaha, Nebraska. is a topic that has received attention for many decades. language of “maximum feasible participation” through
E-mail: cebdon@ci.omaha.ne.us. Despite prescriptive exhortations to cities, research in this citizen participation mandates included in social ser-
Aimee L. Franklin is an associate
area has significant limitations. We identify four elements vice block grants (Moynihan 1970). Dubbed an
professor in the Political Science that are believed to influence the participation process. “experiment in the governmental process” (Barber
Department at the University of Oklahoma. Te variables within each element have received atten- 1966), this and other efforts culminated in Arnstein’s
Her research and teaching focus on the use
of strategic management to enhance the
tion in the empirical literature, but no systematic effort typology, which described a “ladder of citizen partici-
governance process. has been made to uncover interaction effects and extend pation,” in 1969. In this ladder, each of the eight
E-mail: alfranklin@ou.edu. theory to make it more robust. We consider the weaknesses rungs corresponded to the extent of citizen empower-
of our knowledge, suggest an impact model of citizen ment, ranging from manipulation (nonparticipation)
participation in budgeting, and identify hypotheses that at the lowest rung to meaningful, substantive engage-
may be tested in future research. ment at the top rung.

Te 1970s introduced the survey as a means for deter-

M
any state and local governments are cur- mining citizens’ policy preferences (McIver and
rently struggling with fiscal stress—in some Ostrom 1976; Webb and Hatry 1973). Despite this
cases, the worst they have experienced in methodological advancement, cities struggled to inter-
decades. Painful decisions are required regarding spend- pret and apply the preference data (Hatry and Blair
ing and service reductions or tax and fee increases. Tis 1976; Rosener 1978).
appears to be an important time for citizens to play a
role in helping elected officials determine the best During the 1980s, the new buzzword was “stakehold-
solutions for government and the community. ers,” and the concern in the literature and among
practitioners was the need to deliberately include citi-
Calls for citizen participation in resource-allocation zens and other actors in governmental policy making
decisions have been heard in the past. During the (Mark and Shotland 1985; Mason and Mitroff 1983;
early 1900s, Frederick Cleveland, one of the founders Wilson 1983). During the 1990s and into the new
of the New York Municipal Research Bureau, millennium, the concern with cynical, distrustful citi-
noted that government should zens has led governments to
be both responsive and efficient focus again on gathering citizen
and that ensuring effective gov- During the 1990s and into the input during budgeting. Tese
ernment was the duty of both new millennium, the concern actions have been comple-
elected officials and citizens. Te with cynical, distrustful citizens mented by an abundance
introduction of rational adminis- has led governments to focus of articles in the public
tration separated from value- again on gathering citizen input administration literature dealing
driven political decisions might with the desirability and prom-
during budgeting.
have signaled an ideal opportu- ise of citizen participation in
nity to solicit input from the governance.
citizenry regarding budgetary preferences. However,
the emphasis on technical expertise brought Fast forward to today’s fiscal stress, and again, we see
about by the call for rational analysis silenced that many governments are struggling with how to
the average citizen and shifted control over the include citizens in budgetary decision making. Why
debate to government officials (Kelly and is this issue continuously being addressed? Are we
Rivenbark 2003). trapped in a vicious cycle of normative prescriptions
Citizen Participation in Budgeting Theory 437
 about what should be done, followed by positivist the- the extant literature. Tis section also forms the basis
orizing, both of which are arguably disconnected from for an inventory of our knowledge base in the disci-
the empirical evidence? In practice, as study after pline. Te second section systematically examines the
study has suggested, citizen participation in budgetary strengths and weaknesses of existing theory in a more
decision making is typically minimalist and yields few, positivist perspective. Using this, we present an im-
if any, directly observable results. Are city government pact model of the citizen-participation process to ad-
officials wasting a valuable opportunity to understand dress the voids in our knowledge of the process. Te
and refine the priorities of the community, to educate final section uses this information to consider future
the public about fiscal priorities and trade-offs, to en- directions to move theories of citizen participation
hance trust and transparency in government, and to forward into more productive areas.
pull together as a community? Or are they acting in a
pragmatic fashion, gathering and considering policy The Literature on Budget Participation:
preference information using other input mechanisms? Evolution or Stagnation?
When attempting to aggregate the citizen-participation
Alternatives to gathering input when the budget is literature, a number of common elements deemed
being formulated exist, of course. Instead of taking critical to structuring budget participation emerge
the time and effort to involve citizens during resource- (see table 1). Tree commonly reported elements
allocation decisions, governments can wait until they (independent variables) represent (1) the governmental
experience voter distrust and anger, as in the stringent environment, (2) the design of the process, (3) the
tax-and-spending constraints on state and local gov- mechanisms used to elicit participation. Te fourth
ernments during the past couple of decades and the element (a common dependent variable) represents the
recent California gubernatorial recall. To win elec- goals and outcomes desired from participation in
tions, candidates promise that huge budget gaps can budgetary decision making.
be dealt with through greater efficiencies, with no im-
pact on essential services or tax increases; such prom- Environment
ises are difficult to keep and inevitably prompt greater Tere is some evidence that the governmental
citizen disillusionment. Wouldn’t it be better to start environment is related to the involvement of citizens
the discussions earlier—to help citizens understand in the budgeting process. Four components of
the realities of the fiscal situation—rather than pre- the environment are identified in the literature:
tend that miracles can happen in government? Alter- (1) structure and form of government, (2) political
natively, do we lack sufficient knowledge about the dynamics and culture, (3) legal requirements, and
key elements of citizen participation that lead to “suc- (4) population size and heterogeneity.
cessful” outcomes and, in the absence of good theo-
ries, are forced to believe in miracles? Scholars have considered the influence of variation in
the structure and form of local government on the
Te research questions underlying this paper build
on each other. First, what do we know about citizen
Table 1 Key Elements of Citizen Participation in Budgeting
participation in the budget process? Second, what
do we suspect? Tird, what are the gaps or the Elements Variables
missing links in our knowledge? And finally, how can Environment • Structure and form of government
we move theory forward? We argue that there is a • Political culture
need for more rigorous theorizing using empirical • Legal requirements
evidence to model causal relationships. Te incessant • Population size and diversity
theorizing about the worth of participation continues Process design • Timing
• Type of budget allocation (by program
without acknowledging the gap between theory and
or earmarked funds, operating, capital)
practice and without taking any proactive steps to • Participants (selection method, numbers,
make participation more beneficial to practitioners representativeness)
or to make theory more robust. Tis effort can • Sincere preferences/willingness to pay
benefit practitioners who are searching for ways to Mechanisms • Public meetings
reach out to the public, or to do so more successfully • Focus groups
than they have done in the past. It can also benefit • Simulations
• Advisory committees
the scholarly community by systematically assessing
• Surveys
existing theory, identifying weaknesses and gaps, Goals and outcomes • Reduce cynicism
and proposing possible directions for future • Educate participants about the budget
research that would expand our knowledge in • Gain support for budget proposals
this area. • Gather input for decision making
• Change resource allocation
Tis article is divided into three sections. First, to de- • Enhance trust
• Create a sense of community
termine what we know about the problem, we review
438 Public Administration Review • May | June 2006
likelihood that participation will be utilized. Kweit Population size and heterogeneity may also affect the
and Kweit (1981) found that communities with the participation environment. Participation has been
council-manager form of government, because they found to be more prominent in larger cities (Wang
employ a full-time professional, are more likely to 2001; O’Toole, Marshall, and Grewe 1996; Ebdon
seek citizen input. Ebdon (2000a) found differences 2000a). Larger cities are more heterogeneous, which
between at-large mayoral elections and district-based might lead to increased political conflict because of
city council elections in terms of the city’s likelihood varying group demands (Protasel 1988). Citizens in
of seeking citizen budget input, but the results were these cities might desire increased access to decision
not statistically significant. Nalbandian (1991) sug- makers (Nalbandian 1991). However, heterogeneity as
gested that cities with a council-manager form of defined by racial diversity was not found to be related
government may be more likely to encourage citizen to the use of budget participation in council-manager
participation, and he later found (1999) that city cities (Ebdon 2000a).
managers have become much more focused on facili-
tating participation in public policies during the past Tese findings suggest some convergence in what we
10 years. Tis was supported by Ebdon (2002), who know about the relationship between environmental
found that council-manager cities are more likely to factors and citizen participation in cities: (1) Te
use formal budget-participation methods as well as council-manager form of government appears to be
methods that are not specifically related to the budget, more likely to solicit input; (2) the city’s political
such as citizen surveys and strategic planning. culture might condition perceptions (among politi-
cians and citizens) about the need for participation;
(3) state laws often dictate what cities will do; and
Political culture may also be an important variable in
(4) larger cities are more likely to formalize the par-
the environment’s influence on budget participation
ticipation process because heterogeneity creates
because the history of participation is a fairly good
demand for increased access. But, as noted earlier,
predictor of the forms that participation will take
there are some areas of divergence in the findings,
(Kweit and Kweit 1981). Miller and Evers (2002)
suggesting many gaps in our knowledge.
suggest that the government must want to seek par-
ticipation as much as the participants want to give
Process Design
it, and citizens are less likely to participate if the
Te literature cites a variety of considerations, such as
political environment is not positive and accepting
timing, type of budget allocation, participants, and
of input. Using Elazar’s political culture typology,
gathering sincere preferences, when designing the
Ebdon (2002a) found differences in the use of budget-
participation process. Timing is important because
participation methods in cities with varying political
input that is received late in the process is less likely to
cultures. Northern moralistic cities generally have
have an effect on outcomes (Callahan 2002; Franklin
greater use of participation, followed by southern
and Ebdon 2004; Johnson 1998; Kathlene and Martin
cities with traditional cultures, with the least participa-
1991; King, Feltey, and Susel 1998; Preisser 1997;
tion in individualistic cities in the middle portion
Tomas 1995). Tis would suggest that budget input
of the country.
is more beneficial during the preparation stage rather
than the budget-adoption phase. Tere are examples
Most states impose certain legal budget requirements of budget input occurring early in the process
on local governments (such as public hearings) that (Johnson 1998; Roberts 1997; Simonsen and Robbins
may either enhance or constrain participation. In 2000), but other studies have found participation used
Kansas, for example, public hearings must be held after more frequently at the end of the process (Ebdon
publication of the maximum amount of the budget 2000a, 2002; Ebdon and Franklin 2004).
and tax levy, reducing the potential influence of citi-
zens (Ebdon and Franklin 2004). In other cases, voter Much of the research has focused on the operating
referenda are required for governments to increase taxes budget. However, input is also used—and may be
or to issue general-obligation debt. Te City of more common in—other types of resource allocation.
Dayton, Ohio, did not lose a tax election over a For example, one-third of 28 sampled midwestern
20-year period, a feat that was at least partially attrib- cities had participatory processes for the allocation of
uted to its use of community neighborhood boards nonoperating funds or for particular portions of the
(Gurwitt 1992). Referenda are even used for budget operating budget. Tese included capital improvement,
approval in a few places, such as New York State school Community Development Block Grants, and ear-
districts, where districts with referenda were found to marked funds for community agencies (Ebdon 2002).
spend less than districts without this requirement
(Ebdon 2000b). Legal requirements can also have un- Te selection of participants is another important de-
intended effects. Orosz (2002) suggests that a focus on sign component. Researchers suggest that participation
minimum legal requirements can lead to a gap between should be open to large numbers of people (Kathlene
advocated and actual participation opportunities. and Martin 1991; Tomas 1995). Participants should
Citizen Participation in Budgeting Theory 439
 also be representative of the community, to give wide input, were adopted unanimously by the board of
access and not close anyone out of the process (Crosby, education (Roberts 1997).
Kelly, and Schaefer 1986; Johnson 1998; Kathlene
and Martin 1991; Tomas 1995; Watson, Juster, and Focus groups tend to be more selective than other
Johnson 1991). Te participant-selection method methods because they are generally small groups
might also be critical; for example, city officials could (Tomas 1995). Tey have three fundamental
invite individuals based on neighborhood involve- strengths: exploration and discovery, context and depth,
ment, or individuals could self-select (Franklin and and interpretation (Morgan 1997), each of which can
Ebdon 2004). Selection methods that purposively seek be useful to city officials wishing to determine citizens’
to include a wide range of perspectives are better re- preferences. However, they also can fall victim to
ceived than those in which selection is perceived as groupthink (Janis 1982) and the contagion effect (Sigel
cronyism that supports a particular political agenda. 1996) and may be nonrepresentative (Rosenthal et al.,
1999). Despite these limitations, focus groups can be
Te ability to gain information about sincere prefer- used to gain in-depth opinions regarding budget prefer-
ences or the willingness to pay for public services is ences and to come to consensus on specific issues.
also cited as important in the literature. Studies have
found a discontinuity between citizen demands and Budget simulations reveal sincere preferences because
their willingness to pay taxes (Glaser and Denhardt they require participants to make trade-offs to balance
1999; Glaser and Hildreth 1996). In some cases, indi- the budget. Eugene, Oregon, used a budget-balancing
viduals might state a higher preference for a service if exercise along with citizen surveys to determine re-
they believe they will not have to pay their fair share sponses to fiscal stress (Simonsen and Robbins 2000).
(Wilson 1983). Terefore, it might be desirable to take Wichita, Kansas, has also used simulations as part of
this into consideration to understand true preferences. their annual budget process to educate citizens about
the difficulties of balancing the budget (Ebdon and
We have a good understanding of variables that have Franklin 2004).
been found to be important to participatory design. Te
timing is critical: It should occur early, but often does Citizen budget advisory committees have been used
not. And input may vary by the type of budget alloca- in some places. Tese are better than other methods
tion being made. Care must be taken in soliciting input at informing participants about budget issues. How-
that is both representative and collective rather than ever, participation is limited and may not be represen-
individually interested; input should be sincere or a true tative, and they can be costly in terms of time and
expression of willingness to pay (or make trade-offs). effort (Irvin and Stansbury 2004; Tomas 1995).
One study found that advisory committees are effec-
Mechanisms tive when appointments are made in a democratic
Many methods, each with strengths and weaknesses, manner and when the committees have clear goals
have been used to elicit participation in the budget (Callahan 2002).
process including: public meetings, focus groups,
simulations, committees, and surveys (Ebdon 2003). Finally, citizen surveys can be useful for understanding
Public meetings are not very good at giving citizens citizen satisfaction and needs (Miller and Miller 1991;
direct influence, but they can be used as forums Webb and Hatry 1973) and can be designed to deter-
for preliminary information sharing (Adams 2004; mine sincere preferences (Ferris 1982). Tey can be
Kweit and Kweit 1981). Public budget meetings are representative of the public at large, but they may not
common; at least one open public hearing is required show the intensity of an individual’s opinions regard-
in most governments before budget adoption. As ing services (Tomas 1995). In addition, question
noted earlier, the timing of these wording is critical—citizens do
hearings is often a constraint. not always have sufficient infor-
Attendance is generally low Public meetings are not very mation to render educated opin-
unless a “hot issue” is involved, good at giving citizens direct ions—and surveys can be
such as proposed tax increases or influence, but they can be used expensive (Hatry and Blair
service reductions (Ebdon 2002). as forums for preliminary infor- 1976).
In addition, attendees may not mation sharing.
be representative, and they may Te National Civic League fos-
have little knowledge of the ters enhanced efforts toward citi-
budget as a whole (Tomas 1995). However, public zen engagement. A number of new mechanisms are
meetings can be useful. One school superintendent being used to promote this goal. For example, recent
used a four-month, community-wide process issues of the National Civic Review have highlighted
involving more than 2,000 citizens to successfully the use of study circles (Leighninger 2002; McCoy
determine how to make substantial budget reductions; and Scully 2002) and town meetings (Lukensmeyer
the superintendent’s recommendations, based on this and Brigham 2002) to address community issues.
440 Public Administration Review • May | June 2006
Tese types of activities could be used to foster par- Some also view participation as useful in marketing
ticipation in budget decision making. their proposals to the public. For example, the city of
Auburn, Alabama, uses citizen surveys to assess citizen
Some governments use multiple-input methods, per- satisfaction and solicit perspectives. In one case, the
mitting the weaknesses of one method to be offset by city found that the public did not agree with its
the strengths of others. For example, the Eugene priorities, so the city council enhanced publicity and
experience included public meetings, a budget balanc- communication to “sell” the public on the importance
ing exercise, and citizen surveys (Simonsen and of those issues (Watson, Juster, Johnson 1991).
Robbins 2000). Hillsborough County, Florida, holds
public hearings during budget consideration as well as Finally, a goal of participation (especially for citizens)
advisory committees, surveys, and community meet- may be to actually influence decision making. Input
ings throughout the year (Johnson 1998). has been found to affect budget decisions in some
cases. Multiple authors have reported on citizen-
Many mechanisms and combinations of mechanisms participation processes in which public officials said
have been tried, with mixed results and little, if any, this input was influential in their final resource alloca-
institutionalization that would allow for longitudinal tion decisions (Ebdon 2002; Franklin and Carberry-
studies. Research has shown the strengths and weak- George 1999; Roberts 1997; Simonsen and Robbins
nesses of various input methods. Determination of the 2000; Watson, Juster, and Johnson 1991). However,
appropriate mechanism should be related to the par- Franklin and Ebdon (2004) could not point to any
ticipation goals. Te mechanism chosen also must changes in resource allocation from their case studies.
have a direct relationship to the design elements. Instead, citizen input was used to confirm proposals
However, we still know very little about how these made in other venues or to set the stage for discussion
decisions are made in governments across the country. of modification in later years.

Wang (2001) found that managers often associate par-

Goals and Outcomes
ticipation with increased public trust, but they do not
Te next element that is important to citizen
limit this goal to the budgeting process. In fact, one of
participation considers both the goals and outcomes
the weaknesses of the literature is that trust has not
of participation. Goals should be set at the beginning
been investigated as it pertains specifically to the bud-
of the citizen-participation process, and outcomes
get process. Participation as a means to create a sense
should be assessed and compared to what was
of community may also be considered important.
expected when the goals were established. Five
Some scholars argue that enhanced participation is a
potential goals for budget input have been identified
crucial way for citizens to recognize and assert their
in the literature: (1) informing decision making,
duties as citizens and vital members of the community
(2) educating participants on the budget, (3) gaining
(Box 1998; King, Stivers, et al. 1998).
support for budget proposals, (4) influencing decision
making, and (5) enhancing trust and creating a sense In sum, participation goals may relate to “high-road”
of community. purposes (Rohr 1989) such as enhancing trust or cre-
ating a sense of community, but this is difficult to do
Te first goal, informing decision making, is often ac- and little information on the direct results of these
complished through passive participation in which citi- efforts exists. Other purposes take the “low road,”
zens communicate their level of satisfaction with the such as education, gaining support, and influencing
proposed budget to decision makers through testimony decisions (Bruce 1995). Tere is consensus that goals
at public hearings. Tis activity represents a one-way should be clearly articulated by the decision makers
flow of information because citizens are commenting on before the process begins (Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer
a reality that has already been constructed by officials 1986; Kathlene and Martin 1991; Rosener 1978;
(Arnstein 1969). Tere is little opportunity to influence Simonsen and Robbins 2000; Tomas 1995). Unfor-
decisions; instead, any impact takes the form of ratifying tunately, goals may vary among actors and over time.
what is intended. Although it is true that decision mak-
ers receive a more accurate expression of preferences, no Few studies have systematically measured the out-
channel is provided for feedback or negotiation. comes of budget participation. Citizens in cities with
more participation are more likely to believe that agen-
Education can be an important goal of budget partici- cies are responsive to their concerns (Halvorsen 2003)
pation, as much of the research has stressed. Govern- and less cynical about local government (Berman
ment budgets can be complex, with multiple funds 1997), but results for budget participation are not as
and inherent trade-offs in decision making (Bland and clear. One study of managers associated participation
Rubin 1997; Kahn 1997). Budget participation has with increased public trust in general, but not specifi-
been found to be beneficial in educating citizens cally for budgeting (Wang 2001). We suggest that
about these complexities (Ebdon 2002; Franklin and participation is valuable because it provides an oppor-
Ebdon 2004). tunity to gather input and encourages two-way
Citizen Participation in Budgeting Theory 441
 communication, but seldom are resource-allocation rect signal that communicates city officials’
decisions modified as a direct result of input (Ebdon expectations regarding participation.
and Franklin 2004; Franklin and Ebdon 2004).
Instead, city officials claim that input is considered Almost universally, the input process is portrayed as
along with preferences simultaneously received from occurring linearly and in reference to a single budget
other sources, and decisions reflect aggregated priorities. cycle rather than as an ongoing two-way dialogue
(Beckett and King 2002). Although scholars have
Inventorying Our Knowledge and concluded that participation is more beneficial when
Identifying Gaps it involves two-way communication (Crosby, Kelly,
As the previous section demonstrated, there is great and Schaefer 1986; Frisby and Bowman 1996;
variation in the participatory opportunities that cities Kathlene and Martin 1991; King, Feltey and Susel
have devised for getting input during the budget 1998; Tomas 1995), evidence of this in the budget
process. Why is participation apparently not uniform process is mixed. Individual cases of two-way dialogue
in the budget process (aside from the public hearing are found in the literature (such as Roberts 1997), but
at the end of the exercise)? Obstacles have been results of surveys and multicity interviews show rela-
identified in each of the approaches discussed earlier. tively little use of two-way input mechanisms in the
First, conditions in the political environment may budget process (Ebdon 2000a, 2002).
limit the commitment of city officials to seeking or
using input. Professional administrators may have Cost and frequency of input may be factors in the lack
concerns about sharing decision making on complex of two-way communication. Two-way methods may
issues with the public (O’Toole and Marshall 1988; take more time and effort. Some studies of budget
Tomas 1995), and administrators and elected participation have focused on fairly time-consuming,
officials may feel that citizens already have sufficient one-time deliberative methods for a specific purpose,
access or that increased input makes their jobs even such as dealing with serious fiscal constraints or long-
harder (Bland and Rubin 1997; Tompson and Jones term planning (e.g., Roberts 1997; Simonsen and
1986). To further complicate the issue, finance officers Robbins 2000). It may be more difficult to use inten-
have been found to desire participation, but they sive methods on a regular basis, such as the annual
would like elected officials to initiate it (Miller and budget process.
Evers 2002). Environmental factors may also have
inconsistent effects on participation (Ebdon 2002), Significant gaps exist in our knowledge of participa-
which raises interesting but unanswered questions tion in the budget process. Tis is partly the result of
about the relationship between the environmental the methodologies used to date. Te empirical work
factors and participatory outcomes. has largely been case studies, small limited samples,
key informant interviews, or a very few questions on
Process-design variables present another set of obstacles budget participation included in broader surveys. Te
that are not easily overcome. It is difficult to find a empirical literature reflects this diversity in reporting
group of representative citizens willing to commit the what works in practice and relating this experience to
necessary time and effort to learn about complex theory. Missing are large-scale research projects and
public budgets (Ebdon 2002; Frisby and Bowman longitudinal analyses. Te reporting of case studies is
1996; King, Feltey, and Susel 1998; Miller and Evers important from a descriptive perspective, but without
2002), particularly in a way that will get beyond the taking the next step to generalize this information and
propensity to focus on issues of narrow self-interest. In deductively test our conclusions, we cannot advance
addition, too much participation may actually dilute the development of theory.
effectiveness—for instance, attendance at public meet-
ings by “regulars” who always have something to say One significant gap in our knowledge relates to the
(Ebdon 2002). interaction effects between the different factors. For
example, we have some evidence that environmental
No participatory mechanism is without weaknesses. factors are important, but know little about how those
A big difference among the mechanisms is the type of variables relate to the goals and effects of participation
communication they foster between citizens and pub- or to the design and mechanisms used to elicit partici-
lic officials. For example, surveys and public hearings pation. We know the most about the relationship be-
tend to provide one-way information regarding citizen tween process design and mechanisms, such as the
opinions. One-way communication can occur in the strengths and weaknesses of various mechanisms. Much
other direction as well. When city officials release more is unknown, however, such as the goals or mecha-
budget information, the nature of the data reported nisms used for input into allocation of earmarked
and the timing of its release can shape citizens’ percep- funds or capital plans as opposed to operating budgets.
tions of the budget process and the likelihood that Te goals of participation might be different in large
their participation is valued. Even the professionaliza- cities or those with different forms of government,
tion of the public information office can be an indi- which could affect the design and mechanisms used.
442 Public Administration Review • May | June 2006
Frequency of use of input methods is also an important Finally, the study of citizen participation may suffer
variable; the literature includes examples of annual in- from a lack of conceptual precision—do we have ad-
put activities as well as one-time activities, but we do equate face validity in the elements we study? Tere are
not know which is more common and the extent to a number of cases in which participation is designed
which input has become institutionalized within exclusively around the budget, but broader input
governments. Because of the nature of the empirical throughout the year may also be useful in the budget
data though (case studies and small samples), we do not process. For example, the city of Auburn has done citi-
know much about how these variables work together. zen surveys that are not specifically related to the bud-
get, with the results used later in budget prioritization
A glaring weakness in our theory building is that we (Watson, Juster, and Johnson 1991). A national survey
have very little empirical knowledge about the goals of city managers found that input gathered throughout
and outcomes of participation. Te literature shows the year is commonly used to determine community
that it can be pursued for both high- as well as low- needs during budget preparation, and respondents
road reasons. Unfortunately, it appears that the pur- generally consider this to be effective (Ebdon 2000a).
pose of participation is seldom explicitly articulated, Perhaps conclusions about participation and outcomes
leading to varying expectations and little means for are understated in the literature because our definitions
determining whether the results are acceptable or even are ambiguous, lacking clarity and uniformity.
exceed the costs of the activity (Ebdon and Franklin
2004). Tese differing goals can color perceptions of Table 2 summarizes the normative conclusions in the
the effectiveness of participatory efforts and affect the literature and recaps the practical problems that cities
determination of whether the outcomes are sufficient encounter in fostering citizen participation. Te final
to justify them. column articulates the gaps in our knowledge con-
cerning budget participation.
In addition, most of the literature on budget input has
examined cities. A next step would be to study the use Fostering Discipline in Theory Building
of budgetary participation in other governmental When considering citizen participation, perhaps the
units, such as school districts, counties, special only conclusion that scholars and practitioners can
districts, and states. Needs and designs might be very agree on is that it is an extremely complex issue. Tere
different in single-purpose versus general-purpose are multiple variables within each element, but also
governments, for example. within each variable, there are choices in the range of

Table 2 Current Knowledge on Citizen Participation in Budgetary Theory

Elements of Budgetary
Participation Conclusions from Literature Practical Participation Problems Gaps in Knowledge

Environment • Difference by form of • City officials may question • Mostly case studies
government the need for input or lack of or results drawn
• Culture affects perception of access, or they may find it from surveys
need for citizen participation difficult to use input to shape intended for
• Laws often dictate citizen budget decisions broader purposes
participation • Have not studied
• Larger cities use citizen participation the interaction
to foster access between variables
Process design • Important to consider timing • Hard to make sure participants
• Need to study
and representativeness are representative
participation at
• Need to structure process • Takes time and effort to
multiple levels of
to reveal sincere preferences educate before providing input
government,
and willingness to pay
not just cities
Mechanisms • Communities try many, • Often foster one-way
alone, or in combination communication • Weak documentation
• Each has weaknesses and • Not institutionalized of the outcomes
few are institutionalized • May occur too late in the process of participation
Goals and outcomes • Can undertake processes to • Goals are seldom articulated • Concepts are
enhance trust or sense of in advance consistently
community, but often for • May differ among participants, ambiguous
education, gaining support, or leading to varying expectations across studies,
influencing decisions. Outcomes • Costs may exceed benefits in lacking conceptual
can seldom be demonstrated as terms of changing allocations precision
a direct result of CP.

Citizen Participation in Budgeting Theory 443

 coverage. In the evaluation literature, Mohr (1988) sort out whether goals represent an input or an out-
wrestles with the complexity caused by varying levels come. We suspect that repetition in citizen participa-
of inputs, activities, and outcomes through the impact tion exercises creates a feedback loop, making a linear
model. Te impact model uses program theory to representation of the model overly simplistic. But un-
reflect the increasing desirability and difficulty of til this relationship is established, more sophisticated
attaining higher-level outcomes that lead to the models are not necessary.
ultimate program impact. We use this tool to model
citizen participation. As the impact model presented Of course, the operational and predictive validity of
in figure 1 shows, there are different levels of the model must be established. Conceptual validity is
inputs that can lead to different types of outcomes in partially validated by using the extant literature to de-
citizen participation. Looking at this model, the three fine terms. However, to test the face validity of the
key elements that represent inputs (environmental, concepts in the model, it is recommended that practi-
process design and mechanism variables) and process tioners be consulted to give their overall impression
activities are presented on the top half of the model. of the impact model and suggest modifications based
Tey are arranged from left to right to represent a on their experience. Using the proposed research
continuum of conditions ranging from least design—external validity assuring predictive
supportive to most supportive of citizen participation. validity—generalizabilty and reliability of the model
Tese different combinations of inputs lead to can be proved.
different outcomes ranging from one of the easiest
and quickest outputs that can be achieved—informing Conclusion
the public—to the ultimate impact desired: enhancing Currently, governments at all levels are dealing with
trust and building a sense of community, or in Mohr’s serious fiscal issues that require painful decisions on
(1988) terms, happiness! taxation and service provision. Tere is a disconnect
between what citizens expect from government and
Using the impact model of citizen participation in what they are willing to pay—or, perhaps, we have
budgeting, we see there are a number of theoretical not utilized participation techniques to adequately
linkages that could be explored in further studies. Te capture this information. As Arnstein concludes,
bivariate relationships between each of the inputs and “Tere is a critical difference between going through
the outcomes must first be confirmed. Do changes in the empty ritual of participation and having the real
the independent variables lead to enhanced outcomes? power needed to affect the outcome of the process”
Ten, the next step would be to investigate the inter- (1969, 216). Participation can be very useful in
relationships between the independent variables and educating the public about key trade-offs and gaining
the dependent variables. At this time, it is necessary to valuable input from citizens about their priorities and

Least Supportive of Citizen Participation Most Supportive of Citizen Participation

I. Environmental Variables:
Form of Government Commission Mayor /Council Council/Manager
Political Culture Individualistic Traditionalistic Moralistic
Legal Requirements One public hearing Publication of Budget Summary Multiple Opportunities
Population Size Small Medium Large
Population Diversity Homogeneous Heterogeneous

II. Process Design Variables:

Budget Timing: Draft introduced Limits set Deliberations Development Strg Plng first
Budget Type: Program/line item Operating level Operating + capital Comprehensive Linked to Plng
Participants: Self-selected Selective invited Open, non-represent Representative Multiple events
Preferences: Not gathered Not ranked Ranked Measures sincere Citywide survey

III: Mechanisms:
Open records + Public meetings Focus group Simulations Advisory Cmte Multiple types

IV: Goals and Outcomes:

Inform the public about the Educate citizens Gain support for Change resource Enhance trust
proposed budget and reduce about the budget, proposed budget allocation based on and build sense
cynicism through transparency gather input for citizen participation of community
decision-making

Short-term Outputs Long term -Impacts

Lowest Likelihood citizen input gets used Highest
Easiest Ability to Measure Hardest

Strg Plng, = strategic planning; Represent = representative.

Figure 1 Impact Model of Citizen Participation in Budgeting

444 Public Administration Review • May | June 2006
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connections encourages citizens to participate in a Public Administrators. Public Administration Review
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or library remain open without Utilization and Effectiveness
tax increases or other service
Tere is a disconnect between of Citizen Advisory Commit-
cuts. We do have a number of what citizens expect from tees in the Budget Process of
examples of cases in which government and what they are Local Governments. Journal
participation has been willing to pay—or, perhaps, we of Public Budgeting, Account-
successfully used, but there have not utilized participation ing and Financial Manage-
is much that we do not know ment 14(2): 295–319.
techniques to adequately Crosby, Ned, Janet M. Kelly,
and have not systematically
considered.
capture this information. and Paul Schaefer. 1986.
Citizens Panels: A New Ap-
Tis paper has developed a typology of elements and proach to Citizen Participation. Public Administra-
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menting citizen participation in the budget process. Ebdon, Carol. 2000a. Te Relationship between Citi-
We have also discussed what is actually known about zen Involvement in the Budget Process and City
these factors and their components and where gaps Structure and Culture. Public Productivity and
exist in our knowledge about participation. Using this Management Review 23(3): 383–93.
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