G.R. No.

L-24365             June 30, 1966

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, deceased.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, executor and appellee,
vs.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, oppositor and appellant.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, oppositor and appellee.

J. Salonga and L. M. Abellera for oppositor and appellee.

Carlos Dominguez, Jr. for executor-appellee.
M. R. Sotelo for appellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died leaving a will
executed on March 5, 1951. The will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of
Davao in its decision of February 28, 1954. In that same decision the court declared that Maria
Helen Christensen Garcia (hereinafter referred to as Helen Garcia) was a natural child of the
deceased. The declaration was appealed to this Court, and was affirmed in its decision of
February 14, 1958 (G.R. No. L-11484).

In another incident relative to the partition of the deceased's estate, the trial court approved the
project submitted by the executor in accordance with the provisions of the will, which said court
found to be valid under the law of California. Helen Garcia appealed from the order of approval,
and this Court, on January 31, 1963, reversed the same on the ground that the validity of the
provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine law, and returned the case to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as provided by said law (G.R. No. L-16749).

On October 29, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Davao issued an order approving the project
of partition submitted by the executor, dated June 30, 1964, wherein the properties of the estate
were divided equally between Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan (named in the will as Maria Lucy
Christensen Daney, and hereinafter referred to as merely Lucy Duncan), whom the testator had
expressly recognized in his will as his daughter (natural) and Helen Garcia, who had been
judicially declared as such after his death. The said order was based on the proposition that
since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was
annulled, and hence the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died
intestate, saving only the legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies have
been duly approved by the lower court and distributed to the legatees.

The case is once more before us on appeal, this time by Lucy Duncan, on the sole question of
whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should pertain to her and to Helen Garcia in
equal shares, or whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir should be merely
reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to 1/4 of the
entire estate.

The will of Edward E. Christensen contains, among others, the following clauses which are
pertinent to the issue in this case:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (Now
Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago,
who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my
above-named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

xxx     xxx     xxx

7. I give, devise, and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she
was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time
adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00),
Philippine Currency, the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at
the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the
principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted.

xxx     xxx     xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney) now residing, as aforesaid, at No.
665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed
at my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her
lifetime; Provided, however, that should the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY
at anytime prior to her decease having living issue, then and in that event, the life
interest herein given shall terminate, and if so terminated, then I give, devise, and
bequeath to my daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY the rest,
remainder and residue of my property with the same force and effect as if I had originally
so given, devised and bequeathed it to her; and provided, further, that should the said
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY die without living issue, then, and in that event, I
give, devise and bequeath all the rest, remainder and residue of my property one-half
(1/2) to my well-beloved sister, Mrs. CARRIE LOUISE C. BORTON, now residing at No.
2124, Twentieth Street, Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., and one-half (1/2) to the children
of my deceased brother, JOSEPH C. CHRISTENSEN, namely: Mrs. Carol F. Ruggaver,
of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., and Joseph Raymond Christensen, of Manhattan
Beach, California, U.S.A., share and share alike, the share of any of the three above
named who may predecease me, to go in equal parts to the descendants of the
deceased; and, provided further, that should my sister Mrs. Carol Louise C. Borton die
before my own decease, then, and in that event, the share of my estate devised to her
herein I give, devise and bequeath to her children, Elizabeth Borton de Treviño, of
Mexico City Mexico; Barbara Borton Philips, of Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., and
Richard Borton, of Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., or to the heirs of any of them who may
die before my own decease, share and share alike.
The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains, that there has been preterition of Helen
Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in the annulment of the institution of heir
pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious.

On the other hand, appellant contends that this is not a case of preterition, but is governed by
Article 906 of the Civil Code, which says: "Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by
any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied."
Appellant also suggests that considering the provisions of the will whereby the testator
expressly denied his relationship with Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy nevertheless
although less than the amount of her legitime, she was in effect defectively disinherited within
the meaning of Article 918, which reads:

ART. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of
which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code,
shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but
the devices and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such
extent as will not impair the legitimate.

Thus, according to appellant, under both Article 906 and 918, Helen Garcia is entitled only to
her legitime, and not to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the succession
were intestate.

Article 854 is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Spanish Civil Code; and Article 906 of Article
815. Commenting on Article 815, Manresa explains:

Como dice Goyena, en el caso de pretericion puede presumirse ignorancia o falta de

memoria en el testador; en el de dejar algo al heredero forzoso no. Este no se
encuentra plivado totalmente de su legitima: ha recibido por cualquir titulo una porcion
de los bienes hereditarios, porcion que no alcanza a completar la legitima, pero que
influeye poderosamente en el animo del legislador para decidirle a adoptar una solucion
bien diferente de la señalada para el caso de pretericion.

El testador no ha olvidado por completo al heredero forzoso; le ha dejado bienes; pero

haciendo un calculo equivocado, ha repartido en favor de extraños o en favor de otros
legitimarios por via de legado donacion o mejora mayor cantidad de la que la ley de
consentia disponer. El heredero forzoso no puede perder su legitima, pero tampoco
puede pedir mas que la misma. De aqui su derecho a reclamar solamente lo que le
falta; al complemento de la porcion que forzosamente la corresponde.

... Dejar el testador por cualquier titulo, equivale a disponer en testamento por titulo de
herencia legado o mejora, y en favor de legitimarios, de alguna cantidad o porcion de
bienes menos que la legitima o igual a la misma. Tal sentido, que es el mas proprio en
al articulo 815, no pugna tampoco con la doctrina de la ley. Cuando en el testamento se
deja algo al heredero forzoso, la pretericion es incompleta: es mas formularia que real.
 Cuando en el testamento nada se deja el legitimario, hay verdadera pretericion. (6
Manresa, 7th Ed., 1951, p. 437.)

On the difference between preterition of a compulsory heir and the right to ask for completion of
his legitime, Sanchez Roman says:

La desheredacion, como expresa, es siempre voluntaria; la pretericion puede serlo pero

se presume involuntaria la omision en que consiste en cuanto olvida o no atiende el
testador en su testamento a la satisfaccion del derecho a la legitima del heredero
forzoso preterido, prescindiendo absoluta y totalmente de el y no mencionandole en
ninguna de sus disposiciones testamentarias, o no instituyendole en parte alguna de la
herencia, ni por titulo de heredero ni por el de legatar o aunque le mencionara o
nombrara sin dejarle mas o menos bienes. Si le dejara algunos, por pocos que sean e
insuficientes para cubrir su legitima, ya no seria caso de pretericion, sino de
complemento de aquella. El primer supuesto o de pretericion se regula por el articulo
814, y produce accion de nulidad de la institucion de heredero; y el segundo, o de
complemento de legitima por el 815 y solo original la accion ad suplementum, para
completar la legitima. (Sanchez Roman, Tomo VI, Vol. 2, p. 1131.)

Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all
or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting
him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. Manresa continues:

Se necesita pues (a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso; (b) Que la
omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el
testamento.1äwphï1.ñët

xxx     xxx     xxx

B. Que la omision sea completa — Esta condicion se deduce del mismo Articulo 814 y
resulta con evidencia al relacionar este articulo con el 815. El heredero forzoso a quien
el testador deja algo por cualquier titulo en su testamento, no se halla propiamente
omitido pues se le nombra y se le reconoce participacion en los bienes hereditarios.
Podria discutirse en el Articulo 814 si era o no necesario que se reconociese el derecho
del heredero como tal heredero, pero el articulo 815 desvanece esta duda. Aquel se
ocupa de privacion completa o total, tacita este, de la privacion parcial. Los efectos
deben ser y son, como veremos completamente distintos (6 Manresa, p. 428.)

La privacion de la legitima puede ser total o parcial.

Privar totalmente de la legitima es negarla en absoluto al legitimario, despojarle de ella

por completo. A este caso se refiere el articulo 814. Privar parcialmente de la legitima,
es menguarla o reducirla dejar al legitimario una porcion, menor que la que le
corresponde. A este caso se refiere el articulo 815. El 813 sienta, pues, una regla
general, y las consecuencias del que brantamiento de esta regla se determina en los
articulos 814 y 815. (6 Manresa p. 418.)

Again Sanchez Roman:

 QUE LA OMISSION SEA TOTAL. — Aunque el articulo 814 no consigna de modo
expreso esta circunstancia de que la pretericion o falta de mencion e institucion o
disposicion testamentaria a su favor, sea total, completa y absoluta, asi se deduce de no
hacer distincion o salvedad alguna empleandola en terminos generales; pero sirve a
confirmarlo de un modo indudable el siguiente articulo 815, al decir que el heredero
forzoso a quien el testador haya dejado por cualquier titulo, menos de la legitima que la
corresponda, podria pedir el complemento de la misma, lo cual ya no son el caso ni los
efectos de la pretericion, que anula la institucion, sino simplemente los del suplemento
necesario para cubrir su legitima. (Sanchez Roman — Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 p. 1133.)

The question may be posed: In order that the right of a forced heir may be limited only to the
completion of his legitime (instead of the annulment of the institution of heirs) is it necessary that
what has been left to him in the will "by any title," as by legacy, be granted to him in his capacity
as heir, that is, a titulo de heredero? In other words, should he be recognized or referred to in
the will as heir? This question is pertinent because in the will of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen Helen Garcia is not mentioned as an heir — indeed her status as such is denied —
but is given a legacy of P3,600.00.

While the classical view, pursuant to the Roman law, gave an affirmative answer to the
question, according to both Manresa (6 Manresa 7th 3rd. 436) and Sanchez Roman (Tomo VI,
Vol. 2.0 — p. 937), that view was changed by Article 645 of the "Proyecto de Codigo de 1851,"
later on copied in Article 906 of our own Code. Sanchez Roman, in the citation given above,
comments as follows:

RESPECTO DEL COMPLEMENTO DE LA LEGITIMA. — Se inspira el Codigo en esta

materia en la doctrina clasica del Derecho romano y patrio (2); pero con alguna racional
modificacion. Concedian aquellos precedentes legales al heredero forzoso, a quien no
se le dejaba por titulo de tal el completo de su legitima, la accion para invalidar la
institucion hecha en el testamento y reclamar y obtener aquella mediante el ejercicio de
la querella de inoficioso, y aun cuando resultara favorecido como donotario, por otro
titulo que no fuera el de heredero, sino al honor de que se le privaba no dandole este
caracter, y solo cuando era instituido heredero en parte o cantidad inferior a lo que le
correspondiera por legitima, era cuando bastaba el ejercicio de la accion ad
suplementum para completarla, sin necesidad de anular las otras instituciones de
heredero o demas disposiciones contenidas en el testamento.

El Articulo 851 se aparta de este criterio estricto y se ajusta a la unica necesidad que le
inspira cual es la de que se complete la legitima del heredero forzoso, a quien por
cualquier titulo se haya dejado menos de lo que le corresponda, y se le otorga tan solo
el derecho de pedir el complemento de la misma sin necesidad de que se anulen las
disposiciones testamentarias, que se reduciran en lo que sean inoficiosas conforme al
articulo 817, cuya interpretacion y sentido tienen ya en su apoyo la sancion de la
jurisprudencia (3); siendo condicion precisa que lo que se hubiere dejado de menos de
la legitima al heredero forzoso, lo haya sido en el testamento, o sea por disposicion del
testador, segun lo revela el texto del articulo, "el heredero forzoso a quien el testador
haya dejado, etc., esto es por titulo de legado o donacion mortis causa en el testamento
y, no fuera de al. (Sanchez Roman, Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 — p. 937.)

Manresa cites particularly three decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain dated January 16,
1895, May 25, 1917, and April 23, 1932, respectively. In each one of those cases the testator
left to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to
the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons. It
was held that Article 815 applied, and the heir could not ask that the institution of heirs be
annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed. (6 Manresa, pp. 438, 441.)

The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with the expressed wishes of the testator
in the present case as may be gathered very clearly from the provisions of his will. He refused to
acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her share to a legacy of
P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is no
reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective
attitude towards her would have undergone any change and that he would have willed his
estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by him.

The decision of this Court in Neri, et al. v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185, is cited by appellees in support of
their theory of preterition. That decision is not here applicable, because it referred to a will
where "the testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage,
and (that) without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left nothing to
them or, at least, some of them." In the case at bar the testator did not entirely omit oppositor-
appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a legacy of P3, 600.00.

The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death consisted of 399 shares of stocks in the
Christensen Plantation Company and a certain amount in cash. One-fourth (1/4) of said estate
descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime. Since she became the owner of her share as of the
moment of the death of the decedent (Arts. 774, 777, Civil Code), she is entitled to a
corresponding portion of all the fruits or increments thereof subsequently accruing. These
include the stock dividends on the corporate holdings. The contention of Lucy Duncan that all
such dividends pertain to her according to the terms of the will cannot be sustained, for it would
in effect impair the right of ownership of Helen Garcia with respect to her legitime.

One point deserves to be here mentioned, although no reference to it has been made in the
brief for oppositor-appellant. It is the institution of substitute heirs to the estate bequeathed to
Lucy Duncan in the event she should die without living issue. This substitution results in effect
from the fact that under paragraph 12 of the will she is entitled only to the income from said
estate, unless prior to her decease she should have living issue, in which event she would
inherit in full ownership; otherwise the property will go to the other relatives of the testator
named in the will. Without deciding this, point, since it is not one of the issues raised before us,
we might call attention to the limitations imposed by law upon this kind of substitution,
particularly that which says that it can never burden the legitime (Art. 864 Civil Code), which
means that the legitime must descend to the heir concerned in fee simple.

Wherefore, the order of the trial court dated October 29, 1964, approving the project of partition
as submitted by the executor-appellee, is hereby set aside; and the case is remanded with
instructions to partition the hereditary estate anew as indicated in this decision, that is, by giving
to oppositor-appellee Maria Helen Christensen Garcia no more than the portion corresponding
to her as legitime, equivalent to one-fourth (1/4) of the hereditary estate, after deducting all
debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will of the decedent, in
accordance with Article 908 of the Civil Code. Costs against appellees in this instance.