Malaloan v.

Court of Appeals
GR 104879, 6 Ma 1994

DOCTRINE:
A search warrant is but a judicial process, not a criminal action. No legal provision,
statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial
limit on its area of enforceability.

FACTS:
March 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central
Sector) filed with the RTC of Kalookan an application for search warrant which sought
for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Ammunitions).

Respondent RTC Judge issued Search Warrant wherein members of the CAPCOM
proceeded where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and
Research (EILER) was then taking place. According to CAPCOM's 'Inventory of
Property Seized,' firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents, were seized
and taken during the search. And all the 61 persons were brought to Camp Karingal,
Quezon City but were later released, except herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who
were indicted for violation of P.D. 1866 before RTC of Quezon City with respondent
Judge Velasco.

On July 1990, petitioners presented a 'Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search

Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence' before the Quezon
City court; and a 'Supplemental Motion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of
Search Warrant and Exclusion of evidence Illegally Obtained'.

On September 1990, the respondent QCJudge Velasco issued the challenged order,
consolidating subject cases but denying the prayer for the quashal of the search warrant
under attack, the validity of which warrant was upheld; opining that the same falls under
the category of Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraphs 3(b) of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be serve not only within the territorial jurisdiction
of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court (National
Capital Judicial Region).

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, a petition was filed before
the CA as to whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search
warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and,
thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's
supposed territorial jurisdiction.

CA rendered judgment affirming trial court’s decision by denying the petition and lifting
the temporary restraining order it had issued.
Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: (syllabus-related)
W/N search warrant against the petitioners is invalid for being issued by the RTC
Kalookan even if such seizure of firearms and ammunition was allegedly cached
illegally in Quezon City.

RULING:
NO.

Petitioners relied on the theory that "only the branch of a Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant an application for and issue a
warrant to search that place." Support for such position is sought to be drawn from
issuances of this Court, Circular No. 13, as amended by Circular No. 19.

Firstly, these circulars were issued by the Court to meet a particular exigency as
emergency guidelines on applications for search warrants filed only in the courts of
Metropolitan Manila and other courts with multiple salas and only with respect to
violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against public order under the Revised
Penal Code, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions, and violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the aforesaid theory on the court's jurisdiction to
issue search warrants would not apply to single-sala courts and other crimes.
Accordingly, the rule sought by petitioners to be adopted by the Court would actually
result in a bifurcated procedure which would be vulnerable to legal and constitutional
objections.

Neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention that Administrative Order No. 3 of

this Court, "defining the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts,"
was the source of the subject matter jurisdiction of, as distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction by, the courts. This administrative order was issued pursuant to the
provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129:

"SEC. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. — The Supreme
Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall
exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be territorial area of
the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all writs, proceedings or
actions, whether civil or criminal..

Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, not
by a procedural law and, much less, by an administrative order or circular. The
jurisdiction conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and their judges is basically
regional in scope.

In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer
jurisdiction on the covered regional trial court or its branches, such that non-observance
thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits
of the administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority
pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The circulars only
allocated to the three executive judges the administrative areas for which they may
respectively issue search warrants under the special circumstance contemplated
therein, but likewise pursuant to the jurisdiction vested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg.
129.

Secondly, we cannot accept the conclusion that the grant of power to the courts to
entertain and issue search warrants where the place to be searched is within their
territorial jurisdiction, was intended to exclude other courts from exercising the same
power. Circular No. 19 was basically intended to provide prompt action on applications
for search warrants and ordered that such applications should immediately be "taken
cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the place to
be search is located," or by their substitutes enumerated therein.

Circular No. 19 was never intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on said executive
judges. They were themselves directed to personally act on the applications, instead of
farming out the same among the other judges as was the previous practice, it was but
necessary and practical to require them to so act only on applications involving search
of places located within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The phrase was
therefore, in the nature of an allocation in the assignment of applications among them,
in recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and not a mandate for the exclusion
of all other courts.

It is incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can
issue the search warrant. It may be conceded, that where a criminal case is pending,
the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to
issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the
executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the offenses
contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction.

This should not mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the
place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of
that search warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of
urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely, neither should a search warrant duly
issued by a court which has jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by
an executive judge or his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by Circular
No. 19 be denied enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the
court's territorial jurisdiction.

Additionally, no law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same
manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest. In our jurisdiction, no
period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten
days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be
made to the issuing judge, said warrant does not become functus officio but is
enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. On the other hand, the
lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly set in our Rules at ten days but there is
no provision as to the extent of the territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is
implemented on and within the premises specifically described therein which may or
may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court.

The jurisdictional rule heretofore was that writs and process of the so-called inferior
courts could be enforced outside the province only with the approval of the former court
of first instance. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the enforcement of such writs
and processes no longer needs the approval of the regional trial court. On the other
hand, while, formerly, writs and processes of the then courts of first instance were
enforceable throughout the Philippines, under the Interim or Transitional Rules and
Guidelines, certain specified writs issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable
only within its judicial region. In the interest of clarity and contrast, it is necessary that
said provision be set out in full:

"3. Writs and processes. —

(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.

(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the
Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the
regional trial court."

The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a regional trial
court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides
that all other writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a search warrant is
but a judicial process, not a criminal action. No legal provision, statutory or
reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area
of enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the interim Rules
expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the
processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made
regarding the processes contemplated in par (b).

ADDITIONAL ISSUE: the petitioners invoked the constitutional proscription against

illegal searches and seizures.

SC does not believe that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a court outside
the territorial jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched is located would create a
constitutional question. Nor swayed by the professed apprehension that the law
enforcement authorities may resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping,
by filing an application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely be recalled
that a search warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermore, the constitutional
mandate is translated into specifically enumerated safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a search warrant, and all these have to
be observed regardless of whatever court in whichever region is importuned for or
actually issues a search warrant.

NOTE: The following are possible conflicts of jurisdiction where the criminal case is
pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of
personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case. This
arrangement is without precedent in our jurisdiction but were anticipated in Circular No.
13 under the limited scenario contemplated therein.

1. The Court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to
issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An
application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under
extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the
satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the
application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the
same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.

2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same
may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any
proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the
resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent
or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the
quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the
issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case
is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under
the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate
courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash
a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not
cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall
consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that
objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the
quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress.
The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to
any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.

4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the
same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all
personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to
the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards
and documentation therefor.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is
charged in different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts
with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. When the issue of
which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be
considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search
warrants incident to the criminal case.