Earth dam failures can be grouped into three general categories: overtopping

failures, seepage failures, and structural failures. A brief discussion of each

type follows.

Overtopping Failures

Overtopping failures result from the erosive action of water on the

embankment. Erosion is due to uncontrolled flow of water over, around, and
adjacent to the dam. Earth embankments are not designed to be overtopped
and therefore are particularly susceptible to erosion. Once erosion has begun
during overtopping, it is almost impossible to stop. A well vegetated earth
embankment may withstand limited overtopping if its crest is level and
water flows over the crest and down the face as an evenly distributed sheet
without becoming concentrated.

Seepage Failures

All earth dams have seepage resulting from water permeating slowly
through the dam and its foundation. Seepage must be controlled in both
velocity and quantity. If uncontrolled, it can progressively erode soil from
the embankment or its foundation, resulting in rapid failure of the dam.
Erosion of the soil begins at the downstream side of the embankment, either
in the dam proper or the foundation, progressively works toward the
reservoir, and eventually develops a direct connection to the reservoir. This
phenomenon is known as "piping." Piping action can be recognized by an
increased seepage flow rate, the discharge of muddy or discolored water,
sinkholes on or near the embankment, or a whirlpool in the reservoir. Once a
whirlpool (eddy) is observed on the reservoir surface, complete failure of the
dam will probably follow in a matter of minutes. As with overtopping, fully
developed piping is virtually impossible to control and will likely cause
failure.
 Seepage can cause slope failure by creating high pressures in the soil
pores or by saturating the slope. The pressure of seepage within an
embankment is difficult to determine without proper instrumentation. A
slope which becomes saturated and develops slides may be showing signs of
excessive seepage pressure.

Structural Failures

Structural failures can occur in either the embankment or the appurtenances.

Structural failure of a spillway, lake drain, or other appurtenance may lead to
failure of the embankment. Cracking, settlement, and slides are the more
common signs of structural failure of embankments. Large cracks in an
appurtenance or the embankment, major settlement, and major slides will
require emergency measures to ensure safety, especially if these problems
occur suddenly.

The three types of failure previously described are often interrelated in

a complex manner. Uncontrolled seepage may weaken the soil and lead to a
structural failure. A structural failure may shorten the seepage path and lead
to a piping failure. Surface erosion may result in structural failure.

History of Dam Failures

A few case histories of dam failures in India and in USA are described
briefly below:

Kaddam Project Dam, Andhra Pradesh, India

Built in Adilabad, Andhra in 1957 - 58, the dam was a composite structure,
earth fill and/or rock fill and gravity dam. It was 30.78 m high and 3.28 m
wide at its crest. The storage at full was 1.366 * 108 m3. The observed floods
were 1.47 * 104 m3/s. The dam was overtopped by 46 cm of water above the
crest, inspite of a free board allowance of 2.4 m that was provided, causing a
major breach of 137.2 m wide that occurred on the left bank. Two more
breaches developed on the right section of the dam. The dam failed in
August 1958.

Kaila Dam, Gujarat, India

The Kaila Dam in Kachch, Gujarat, India was constructed during 1952 - 55
as an earth fill dam with a height of 23.08 m above the river bed and a crest
length of 213.36 m. The storage of full reservoir level was 13.98 million m3.
The foundation was made of shale. The spillway was of ogee shaped and
ungated. The depth of cutoff was 3.21 m below the river bed. Inspite of a
freeboard allowance of 1.83 m at the normal reservoir level and 3.96 m at
the maximum reservoir level the energy dissipation devices first failed and
later the embankment collapsed due to the weak foundation bed in 1959.

Kodaganar Dam, Tamil Nadu, India

This dam in the India, was constructed in 1977 on a tributary of Cauvery
River as an earthen dam with regulators, with five vertical lift shutters each
3.05 m wide. The dam was 15.75 m high above the deepest foundation,
having a 11.45 m of height above the river bed. The storage at full reservoir
level was 12.3 million m3, while the flood capacity was 1275 m3/s. A 2.5 m
free board above the maximum water level was provided. The dam failed
due to overtopping by flood waters which flowed over the downstream
slopes of the embankment and breached the dam along various reaches.
There was an earthquake registered during the period of failure although the
foundation was strong. The shutters were promptly operated during flood,
but the staff could only partially lift the shutters, because of failure of power.
Although a stand-by generator set was commissioned soon, this could not
help and they resorted to manual operation of shutters. Inspite of all efforts,
water eventually overtopped the embankment. Water gushed over the rear
slopes, as a cascade of water was eroding the slopes. Breaches of length 20
m to 200 m were observed. It appeared as if the entire dam was overtopped
and breached.
Machhu II (Irrigation Scheme) Dam, Gujarat, India
This dam was built near Rajkot in Gujarat, India, on River Machhu in
August, 1972, as a composite structure. It consisted of a masonry spillway in
river section and earthen embankments on both sides. The embankment had
a 6.1 m top width, with slopes 1 V : 3 H and 1 V : 2 H respectively for the
upstream and downstream slopes and a clay core extending through
alluvium to the rocks below. The upstream face had 61 cm small gravel and
a 61 cm hand packed riprap. The dam was meant to serve an irrigation
scheme. Its, storage capacity was of 1.1 * 108 m3. The dam had a height of
22.56 m above the river bed, a 164.5 m of crest length of overflow section,
and a total of 3742 m of crest length for the earth dam. The dam failed on
August 1, 1979, because of abnormal floods and inadequate spillway
capacity. Consequent overtopping of the embankment caused a loss of 1800
lives. A maximum depth of 6.1 m of water was over the crest and within two
hours, the dam failed. While the dam failed at a peak discharge of 7693
m3/s, the figure was revised to 26,650 m3/s after failure, with a free board of
2.45 m given, providing also an auxiliary spillway with a full capacity of
21,471 m3/s. The observed actual flood depth over spillway crest was 4.6 m
with an observed 14,168 to 19,835 m3/s, while the design depth over
spillway crest was 2.4 m.

DAM FAILURES ON FIRST FILLING

The Teton Dam was situated on the Teton River, three miles northeast
of Newdale, Idaho. It was designed to provide recreation, flood control,
power generation, and irrigation for over 40,000 hectares (100,000 acres) of
farmland. The Office of Design and Construction, U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation (USBR), at the Denver Federal Center, designed the dam and
the construction contract was awarded to the team of Morrison-Knudsen-
Kiewit in December of 1971.
 The preparations for this dam project had been underway for many
years. The first active site investigation in the area occurred in 1932 (Teton
Dam Failure @ 2002). Between 1946 and 1961, eight alternate sites within
about 16 km (10 miles) of the selected site were investigated. Between 1961
and 1970, approximately 100 borings were taken at the site (Independent
Panel, 1976).

The design of the foundation consisted of four basic elements: 1) 21

meter (70 foot) deep, steep-sided key trenches on the abutments above the
elevation of 1,550 meters (5,100 feet); 2) a cutoff trench to rock below the
elevation of 1,550 meters (5,100 feet); 3) a continuous grout curtain along
the entire foundation; and 4) the excavation of rock under the abutments
(Independent Panel, 1976). These elements for the foundation were
important because the types of rock located in this area, basalt and rhyolite,
are not generally considered acceptable for structural foundations.

The embankment itself consisted of five main zones. Zone 1 was the
impervious center core, which formed the water barrier of the dam. Zone 2
overlaid Zone 1 and extended downstream to provide a layer to control
seepage through the foundation. Zone 3 was downstream and its main
function was to provide structural stability. Zone 4 consisted of the storage
areas downstream from the control structure and the temporary enclosures
built to permit the work to be done. Finally, Zone 5 was the rockfill in the
outer parts of the embankment (Independent Panel, 1976).

Construction of the dam began in February 1972. When complete, the

embankment would have a maximum height of 93 meters (305 feet) above
the riverbed and would form a reservoir of 356 million cubic meters
(288,000 acre-feet) when filled to the top. The dam was closed and began
storing water on October 3, 1975, but the river outlet works tunnel and the
auxiliary outlet works tunnel were not opened (Arthur, 1977).

Due to these sections being incomplete, the water was rising at a rate
of about 1 meter (3 feet) per day, which was higher than the predetermined
goal rate of 0.3 to 0.6 meters (1 to 2 feet) per day for the first year, as set by
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. However, the increased rate was expected,
due to the tunnels being incomplete, and considered acceptable by the
Bureau of Reclamation as long as seepage and the water table downstream
of the dam were measured more frequently (Independent Panel, 1976).

On June 3, 1976 several small seepages were noticed in the north

abutment wall. Pictures were taken and these leaks were reported to
the Bureau of Reclamation. This led to more frequent inspections of
the dam. It was now to be inspected daily, and readings were to be
taken twice weekly instead of once a week. On June 4, 1976 wetness
was noticed in the right abutment and small springs were beginning to
appear (Independent Panel, 1976).

On June 5, 1976 the first major leak was noticed between 7:30
and 8:00 a.m. The leak was flowing at about 500 to 800 liters per
second (20 to 30 cfs) from rock in the right abutment. By 9:00 a.m. the
flow had increased to 1,100 to 1,400 liters per second (40 to 50 cfs)
and seepage had been observed about 40 meters (130 feet) below the
crest of the dam (Arthur, 1977).

At 11:00 a.m. a whirlpool was observed in the reservoir directly

upstream from the dam and four bulldozers were sent to try to push
riprap into the sinkhole near the dam crest (Independent Panel, 1976).
Two of the bulldozers were swallowed up by the rapidly expanding
hole, and the operators were pulled to safety by ropes tied around
their waists (Teton Dam Flood @ 2002). Figure 2 shows a cross
section of the dam with the approximate locations of the seepage, the
sinkhole, and a whirlpool in the reservoir noted.

One of the first possible mechanisms considered was increased

settling of the structure under the weight of the structure and the
water, which would have led to cracking. It was determined that this
did not contribute to the failure, because the tunnel below the spillway
would also have been cracked. Furthermore, earthen dams are
relatively flexible and tolerant of differential settlements. The failure
hypotheses eliminated included seismic activity, reservoir leakage, and
seepage around the end of the grout curtain, as well as differential
settlement.

Another cause of failure investigated was hydraulic fracturing

near the leaks in the dam. Hydraulic fracturing causes cracking when
the sum of the normal and tensile stresses exceeds the porewater
pressure. It was determined that due to the cracks that had already
existed, the pressure beneath the key trench was less than full
reservoir pressure. In other words, due to the fact that the grout
curtain was not fully effective, the failure was probably not due to
hydraulic fracturing. However, hydraulic fracturing may have been a
factor in the initial breaching of the key trench fill (Independent Panel,
1976).

The panel summarized its conclusions (pp. vii-ix, Independent

Panel, 1976):

1. The pre-design site and geological studies were “appropriate and

extensive.”
2. The design followed well-established USBR practices, but without
sufficient attention to the varied and unusual geological
conditions of the site.
3. The volcanic rocks of the site are “highly permeable and
moderately to intensely jointed.”
4. The fill soils used, “wind-deposited nonplastic to slightly plastic
clayey silts,” are highly erodible. The soil classification was ML.
5. The construction was carried out properly and conformed to the
design except for scheduling.
6. The rapid rate of filling of the dam did not contribute to the
failure. If the dam had been filled more slowly, “a similar failure
would have occurred at some later date.”
7. Considerable effort was used to construct a grout curtain of high
quality, but the rock under the grout cap was not adequately
sealed. The curtain was nevertheless subject to piping – “too
much was expected of the grout curtain, and … the design
should have provided measures to render the inevitable leakage
harmless.”
8. The dam’s geometry caused arching that reduces stresses in
some areas and increased them in others and “favored the
 development of cracks that would open channels through the
erodible fill.”
9. Finite element calculations suggested that hydraulic fracturing
was possible.
10. There was no evidence of differential foundation
settlement contributing to the failure.
11. Seismicity was not a factor.
12. There were not enough instruments in the dam to provide
adequate information about changing conditions of the
embankment and abutments.
13. The Panel had quickly identified piping as the most
probable cause of the failure, then focused its efforts on
determining how the piping started. Two mechanisms were
possible. The first was the flow of water under highly erodible
and unprotected fill, through joints in unsealed rock beneath the
grout cap, and development of an erosion tunnel. The second
was “cracking caused by differential strains or hydraulic
fracturing of the core material.” The Panel was unable to
determine whether one or the other mechanism occurred, or a
combination.
14. “The fundamental cause of failure may be regarded as a
combination of geological factors and design decisions that,
taken together, permitted the failure to develop.”

The Panel further described the geological factors as numerous

open joints in the abutment joints and scarcity of better fill material
than the highly erodible soil. the design decisions were “complete
dependence for seepage control on a combination of deep key
trenches filled with windblown soils and a grout curtain,” a geometry of
the key trench that “encouraged arching, cracking, and hydraulic
fracturing” in the backfill, using compaction of the fill as the only
protection against piping and erosion, and failure to provide for the
inevitable seepage (pp. ix-x, Independent Panel, 1976).

Another factor was the poor compaction of the aeolian silt fill
material. It was compacted at less than the optimum moisture
content. The “material, as compacted in the dam, permitted
continuous erosion channels (pipes) to be formed in the core without
any evidence of their existence becoming visible.” (p. 7-14,
Independent Panel, 1976).

Lessons Learned

The lessons learned from this case may be divided into two
categories. In addition to the technical aspects of the failure,
professional and procedural factors also influenced the course of
events. The lessons learned also have implications for engineering
education.

Technical Aspects. The failure of the Teton Dam could have

been avoided. Early investigations into the geology of the site showed
that the rocks in the area were almost completely of volcanic origin.
These volcanic rocks consisted of basalt and rhyolite. In the footnotes
to the geological survey of January 1971, the rhyolite is defined as
“lightly to locally highly fractured and jointed, relatively light weight”
(pp. 4-7, Independent Panel, 1976). This was also the condition for
other possible sites located upstream of the site where the dam was
constructed. These materials are usually avoided due to a history of
erosion and deposition. The reason for the extensive foundation was
the poor quality of the underlying material, including the grout curtain.
The grout curtain failed to do its job of preventing these materials from
being easily washed away.

The panel noted that the design did not provide for
downstream defense against cracking or leakage, and did not ensure
sealing of the upper part of the rock under the grout cap. The grout
curtain was not constructed in three rows, and the reliance on a single
curtain was judged to be “unduly optimistic.” The dam and foundation
were not instrumented sufficiently to warn of changing conditions.

Professional/Procedural Aspects. At the first sign of a

problem the people at the dam site informed the Bureau of
Reclamation. The Bureau did not immediately inform the public due to
fear of panic and because there were initially no signs of imminent
danger, but the public was warned about 45 minutes before the
collapse (Arthur, 1977). It was determined that the people involved
acted responsibly and were not punished for their involvement.
However, the failure of the Teton Dam brought about changes in dam
construction and operation by the Federal Bureau of Reclamation to
ensure safety.

On the 25th anniversary of the disaster, Ken Pedde, the Acting

Regional Director of the Pacific Northwest Region of the USBR,
reviewed the lessons that had been learned. Some of the changes in
the process of dam design and construction include peer review of
dams, special treatment for fractured rock foundations, and frequent
site visits during construction by the design engineer. Also, redundant
measures began to be used to control seepage and prevent piping
(The Failure of Teton Dam @ 2001). Pedde's address can be found at
http://www.pn.usbr.gov/news/01new/dcoped.html

This failure also made each federal agency review their dam safety
activities and Congress passed several acts that authorized a national
Dam Safety Program. These reviews and programs brought about
annual dam inspections and the installation of instruments to monitor
dams. Also, the Reclamation Safety of Dams Act of 1978 provided
funds to analyze and modify existing structures that were determined
to be potentially unsafe (The Failure of Teton Dam @ 2001).

Educational Aspects. This case demonstrates the importance

of engineering geology and geotechnical engineering for civil
engineering students. Engineering geology is important for evaluation
of the suitability of foundation and borrow or fill materials. In this
instance, both the rhyolite under the dam and the fine aeolian silt used
as a fill material were deficient. Ironically, better borrow material was
available in the valley downstream from the dam site, but the USBR
decided that using it would be environmentally disruptive
(Independent Panel, 1976).

It is also important to compact fill materials to maximum

density at or near the optimum moisture content. In this case, the
material was too dry and was not sufficiently compacted (Independent
Panel, 1976)..

The static hydraulic pressure may also be determined using the

height of the dam of 93 meters (305 ft.) and the height of the water of
86.1 meters (282.4 ft.). The pressure increased continually as the dam
was filled. Also, this case can be used to review aspects of
professional practice such as the responsibility of reviewing designs,
and using redundant measures to ensure the safety of the public.

From the failure of Teton Dam, many lessons were learned.

One of these lessons is that a dam site must have solid foundation
material. An effective grout curtain may be an effective way of dealing
with this unsuitable material, but only if there is a way to check if the
grout curtain is an effective barrier once it is in place. Also, this failure
showed that dams must be designed so that pressure can be
decreased if necessary. This was especially important in this case since
the dam was allowed to begin filling while other parts were still under
construction.

SUDDEN DRAWDOWN FAILURE OF EARTHEN DAM

Stability analysis during rapid drawdown is an important consideration in

the design of embankment dams. During rapid drawdown, the stabilizing
effect of the water on the upstream face is lost, but the pore-water pressures
within the embankment may remain high. As a result, the stability of the
upstream face of the dam can be much reduced. The dissipation of pore-
water pressure in the embankment is largely influenced by the permeability
and the storage characteristic of the embankment materials. Highly
permeable materials drain quickly during rapid drawdown, but low
permeability materials take a long time to drain.