Detective and Protective Bureau v. Cloribel

9/18/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 026
VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 255

Detective & Protective Bureau, Inc. vs. Cloribel
No. L-23428. November 29, 1968.
DETECTIVE & PROTECTIVE BUREAU, INC., petitioner,

vs. THE HONORABLE GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch VI, Court of First
Instance of Manila, and FAUSTO S. ALBERTO,
respondents.
Special civil action; Preliminary injunction; Dissolution;
256
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
When verification of motion for dissolution of writ of preliminary

injunction is required.—From the rulings in Sy Yam Bio, et al. v.
Barrios, et al., 63 Phil. 203; Caluya, et al. v. Ramos, et al., 79 Phil.
640, and Canlas, et al. v. Aquino, et al., L-16815, July 24, 1961, as
well as from the terminology of Section 6 of Rule 58 of the new
Rules of Court, it is evident that whether the application for
dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction must be verified or
not depends upon the ground upon which such application is
based. If the application or motion for dissolution is based on the
insufficiency of the complaint, the motion need not be verified. If
the motion is based on the ground that the injunction would cause
great damage to defendant while the plaintiff can be fully
compensated for such damages as he may suffer, the motion
should be verified.
Same; A preliminary injunction issued after hearing and in
accordance with Rule 58 may still be set aside; Reason: A writ of
preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order; Sec. 6 of Rule 58
construed; Writ may be dissolved without giving the other party an
opportunity to be heard.—The provision of Section 6 of Rule 58
that "the injunction may be refused, or, if granted ex parte, may
be dissolved" cannot be construed as putting beyond the reach of
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000165ea6cfcb5c8cf7574003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/14
the court the dissolution of an injunction which was granted after

hearing. The reason is because a writ of preliminary injunction is
an interlocutory order, and as such it is always under the control
of the court before final judgment (Manila Electric Co. v. Artiaga,
et al., 50 Phil. 144; Caluya, et al. v. Ramos, et al., 79 Phil 640;
Clarke v. Philippine Ready Mix Concrete Co., Inc., 88 Phil. 460).
Corporation law; Director; Stock; To qualify as a director of a
corporation, one must own at least one share of stock therein.—
Every director must own in his own right at least one share of the
capital stock of the stock corporation of which he is a director,
which stock shall stand in his name on the books of the
corporation (Sec. 30, Corporation Law). So that, if the By-Laws of
the Corporation provides that "The manager shall be elected by
the Board of Directors from among its members," one could not be
a managing director of said corporation unless he owns at least
one share of stock thereof.
Same; Dispute as to who owns the controlling interest in the
corporation; Party in control or in possession of the controlling
interest is presumed to have the better right to the position of
managing corporate director.—Where ownership of the controlling
interest in the corporation is in dispute, the party in control or in
possession of the disputed interest is presumed to have the better
right (to the position of managing' corporate director) until the
contrary is adjudged, and hence, that party should not be
deprived of the control or possession until the court is prepared to
adjudicate the controverted right in favor
257
VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 257
of the other party (Gordillo, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., 39 Phil.

829). Relevant here is: "The rule that a court should not, by
means of a preliminary injunction, transfer property in litigation
from the possession of one party to another is more particularly
applicable where the legal title is in dispute and the party having
possession asserts ownership in himself" (Gordillo, et al. v. Del
Rosario, supra; Rodulfa v. Alfonso, et al., 79 Phil. 225).
Special civil action; Writ of preliminary injunction; Issuance
discretionary upon trial court; Limitation of court's discretion;
Wide latitude of trial court's discretion in the modifica-tion or
dissolution of the writ.—It is a settled rule that the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preventive
remedy to secure the rights of a party in a pending case is
'entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of

the case—the only limitation being that this discretion should be
exercised based upon the grounds and in the manner provided by
law (Agno River Gold Dredging Co., Inc. v. De Leon, et al., 61
Phil. 190), and it is equally well-settled that a wide latitude is
given under Section 7 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court to the trial
court to modify or dissolve the injunction as justice' may require.
The court which is to exercise that discretion is the trial court, not
the appellate court (North Negros Co., Inc. v. Hidalgo, 63 Phil.
664). The exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court
in injunctive matters should not be interfered with except in cases
of manifest abuse (Rodulfa v. Alfonso, supra; North Negros Sugar
Co. v. Hidalgo, supra).
Same; Petition for certiorari against a trial court's order
dissolving writ of preliminary injunction; Prior motion for
reconsideration filed with trial court required; Exception.—Before
a petition for certiorari should be filed with the Supreme Court,
against an order dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction the
petitioner -should first give the respondent Judge (or trial court) a
chance or opportunity to correct his error, if any, in an
appropriate motion for reconsideration. An omission to comply
with this procedural requirement justifies a denial of the writ of
certiorari applied for (Herrera v. Barreto, et al., 25 Phil. 245; Uy
Chu v. Imperial, et al, 44 Phil. 27; Alvarez, et al. v. Ibañez, et al.,
83 Phil. 104; Ricafort v. Duran, 54 O.G. 2539; Cueto v. Ortiz, L-
11555, May 31, 1960; Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa ng San
Miguel Brewery v. Enriquez, L-12999, July 26, 1960; Maritime
Company of the Philippines, et al. v. Paredes, et al., L-24811,
March 3, 1967). The exceptions to the application of this
procedural rule are: (1) where the question of jurisdiction has
been squarely raised, argued before, submitted to, and met and
decided by the respondent court; (2) where the questioned order is
a patent nullity; and (3) where there is a dep-
258
rivation of the petitioner's fundamental right to due process

(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., Vol. III, p.
154).
ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari

with preliminary injunction.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Crispin D. Baizas & Associates and Jose S. Sarte for
petitioner.
Gaudencio T. Bocobo for respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
The complaint, in Civil Case No. 56949 of the Court of First

Instance of Manila, dated May 4, 1964, filed by Detective
and Protective Bureau, Inc., therein plaintiff (petitioner
herein) against Fausto S. Alberto, therein defendant
(respondent herein), for accounting with preliminary
injunction and receivership, alleged that plaintiff was a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines; that defendant was managing director of
plaintiff corporation from 1952 until January 14, 1964; that
in June, 1963, defendant illegally seized and took control of
all the assets as well as the books, records, vouchers and
receipts of the corporation from the accountantcashier,
concealed them illegally and refused to allow any member
of the corporation to see and examine the same; that on
January 14, 1964, the stockholders, in a meeting, removed
defendant as managing director and elected Jose de la Rosa
in his stead; that defendant not only had refused to vacate
his office and to deliver the assets and books to Jose de la
Rosa, but also continued to perform unauthorized acts for
and in behalf of plaintiff corporation; that defendant had
been required to submit a financial statement and to
render an accounting of his administration from 1952 but
defendant has failed to do so; that defendant, contrary to a
resolution adopted by the Board of Directors on November
24, 1963, had been illegally disposing of corporate funds;
that defendant, unless immediately restrained ex-parte,
would continue discharging the functions of managing
director; and that it was necessary to appoint a receiver to
take charge of the assets and
259
VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 259

receive the income of the corporation. Plaintiff prayed that

a preliminary in junction ex-parte be issued restraining
defendant from exercising the functions of managing
director and from disbursing and disposing of its funds;
that Jose M. Barredo be appointed receiver; that, after
judgment, the injunction be made permanent and

defendant be ordered to render an accounting.
Herein respondent Judge, the Honorable Gaudencio
Cloribel, set for hearing plaintiff's prayer for ancillary relief
and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. On June 18, 1964, respondent Judge granted
the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, conditioned
upon plaintiff's filing a bond of P5,000.00. Plaintiff filed the
bond, but while the same was pending approval defendant
Fausto S. Alberto filed, on July 1, 1964, a motion to admit a
counter-bond for the purpose of lifting the order granting
the writ of preliminary injunction. In spite of the opposition
filed by plaintiff, respondent Judge issued, on August 5,
1964, an order admitting the counterbond and setting aside
the writ of preliminary injunction.
On the belief that the order approving the counter-bond
and lifting the writ of preliminary injunction was contrary
to law and the act of respondent Judge constituted a grave
abuse of discretion, and that there was no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy available to it, plaintiff filed with
this Court the instant petition for certiorari, praying that a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining defendant Fausto
S. Alberto from exercising the functions of managing
director be issued, and that the order dated August 5, 1964
of respondent Judge approving the counter-bond and lifting
the writ of preliminary injunction he had previously issued
be set aside and declared null and void. This Court gave
due course to the petition but did not issue a preliminary
injunction.
In his answer, now respondent Fausto S. Alberto
traversed the material allegations of the petition, justified
the order complained of, and prayed for the dismissal of the
petition.
260

From the pleadings, it appears that the only issue to be

resolved is whether the order of respondent Judge dated
August 5, 1964, admitting and approving the counter-bond
of P5,000 and setting aside the writ of preliminary
injunction granted in his order dated June 18, 1964, was
issued contrary to law and with grave abuse of discretion.
Now petitioner contends that the setting aside of the
order granting the writ was contrary to law and was done
with a grave abuse of discretion, because: (1) the motion to
admit defendant's counter-bond was not supported by

affidavits showing why the counter-bond should be
admitted, as required by Section 6 of Rule 58; (2) the
preliminary injunction was not issued ex-parte but after
hearing, and the admission of the counter-bond rendered
said writ ineffective; (3) the writ was granted in accordance
with Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and established
precedents; (4) public interest required that the writ be not
set aside because respondent had arrogated unto himself
all the powers of petitioning corporation, to the irreparable
damage of the corporation; and that (5) the counter-bond
could not compensate petitioner's damage.
1. The first reason given by petitioner in support of its
contention that the dissolution of the writ of preliminary
injunction was contrary to law is that the motion to admit
respondent's counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ
was not supported by affidavits as required by section 6 of
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. The controverted motion,
however, does not appear in the record. However, the
record shows that respondent Alberto had filed a verified
answer to the complaint and a verified opposition to the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Regarding the necessity of verification of the motion for
dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction, this Court
has ruled that the requirement of verification is not
absolute but is dependent on the circumstances obtaining
in a particular case. In the1 case of Sy Sam Bio, et al. vs.
Barrios and Buyson Lampa, the only question raised was
________________
1 63 Phil. 206.
261
VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 261

whether the respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction

and abused his discretion in setting aside an order
directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
In maintaining the affirmative, petitioners in that case
alleged that the questioned order was issued in violation of
the provisions of Section 169 of Act 190 (which is one of the
sources of Sec. 6 of Rule 58 of the revised Rules of Court)
inasmuch as the Judge set aside said order and directed
the dissolution of the preliminary injunction without any
formal petition of the parties and without having followed
the procedure prescribed by the statute. There was,

however, a verbal application for the dissolution of the
writ, based upon the ground of the insufficiency of the
complaint which was the basis of the application for the
issuance of said writ of preliminary injunction. This Court
said:
"Section 169 of Act 1909 does not prescribe the manner of filing
the application to annul or modify a writ of preliminary
injunction. It simply states that if a temporary injunction be
granted without notice, the defendant, at any time before trial,
may apply, upon reasonable notice to the adverse party, to the
judge who granted the injunction, or to the judge of the court of
which the action was brought, to dissolve or modify the same."
On the strength of the decision in the above-cited

2
case, this
Court in Caluya, et al. vs. Ramos, et al., said;
"Petitioners' criticism that the motion to dissolve filed by the

defendants in Civil Case No. 4634 was not verified, is also
groundless inasmuch as even an indirect verbal application for
the dissolution of an ex parte order of preliminary injunction has
been held to be a sufficient compliance with the provisions of
section 6 of Rule 60 (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Second Edition, Vol. II, p. 65, citing the case of Sy Yam Bio v.
Barrios, etc., 63 Phil. 206), the obvious reason being that said rule
does not prescribe the form by which an application for the
dissolution or modification of an order of preliminary injunction
should be presented."
If according to the above rulings, Section 6 of Rule 60 (now

sec. 6, Rule 58) of the Rules of Court did not require any
form for the application for the dissolution of the writ of
preliminary injunction, then respondent
________________
2 79 Phil. 640, 643.
262

Fausto Alberto's motion to ift the preliminary injunction in

the court below need not be verified, ied, and much less
must the motion be supported by affidavits, as urged by
petitioner.
3
3
However, in Canlas, et al. vs. Aquino, et al., this Court
ruled that a motion for the dissolution of a writ of
preliminary injunction should be verified. In that case,
respondent Tayag filed an unverified motion for the
dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction, alleging that
the same "would work great damage to the defendant who
had already spent a considerable sum of money" and that
petitioners "can be fully compensated for any damages that
they may suffer." The court granted the motion and
dissolved the preliminary injunction. In an original action f
or a writ of certiorari filed with this Court to annul said
order, this Court remarked in part:
"Petitioners herein are entitled to the writ prayed for. The motion
of respondent Tayag for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued on October 22, 1959, was unverified x x x."
From the precedents quoted above, as well as from the

terminology of Section 6 of Rule 58 of the new Rules of
Court, it is evident that whether the application f or the
dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction must be
verified or not depends upon the ground upon which such
application is based. If the application is based on the
insufficiency of the complaint, the motion need not be
verified. If the motion is based on the ground that the
injunction would cause great damage to defendant while
the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such damages as
he may suffer, the motion should be verified.
In the instant case, it is alleged by petitioner that the
motion for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary
injunction was not verified. This allegation was not denied
in the answer. But because said motion does not appear in
the record of the case now before this Court, We cannot
determine what are the grounds for the dissolution that are
alleged therein, and so We cannot rule on whether
________________
3 L-16815, July 24, 1961.
263
VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 263

the motion should have been verified or not, This Court.

therefore, has to rely on the order of respondent Judge,
dated August 5, 1964, which states that "the filing of the
counter-bond is in accordance with law." Consequently, the

f irst ground alleged by petitioner must be brushed aside.
2. The second and third reasons alleged by petitioner in
its petition for certiorari assume that a preliminary
injunction issued after hearing and in accordance with
Rule 58 cannot be set aside. This contention is untenable.
The provision of Section 6 of Rule 58 that "the injunction
may be refused, or, if granted ex parte, may be dissolved"
cannot be construed as putting beyond the reach of the
court the dissolution of an injunction which was granted
after hearing. The reason is because a writ of preliminary
injunction is an interlocutory order, and as such it is
always under the control of the court before
4
final judgment.
Thus, in Caluya, et al. vs. Ramos, et al., this Court said:
"The first contention of the petitioners is that, as said injunction

was issued after a hearing, the same cannot be dissolved,
specially on the strength of an unverified motion for dissolution
and in the absence of proper evidence to support it. Reliance is
placed on Section 6 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court which
provides that 'the injunction may be reduced, or, if granted ex
parte, may be dissolved,' thereby arguing that if an injunction is
not issued ex parte the same cannot be dissolved. The contention
is clearly erroneous. Although said section prescribes the grounds
for objecting to, or for moving the dissolution of, a preliminary
injunction prior to its issuance or after its granting ex parte, it
does not thereby outlaw a dissolution if the injunction has been
issued after a hearing. This is to be so, because a writ of
preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order which is always
under the control of the court before final judgment. (Manila
Electric Company vs. Artiaga and Green, 50 Phil. 144, 147)."
This Court has also ruled that the dissolution of a writ of

preliminary injunction issued after hearing, even if the
dissolution is ordered without giving the other party an
opportunity to be heard, does not constitute an abuse of
discretion and may be cured not by certiorari but by ap-
________________
4 79 Phil. 640, 642-643.
264

peal. In
5
Clarke vs. Philippine Ready Mix Concrete Co., Inc.,
et al., one of the issues presented was whether a writ of
preliminary injunction granted the plaintiff by a trial court
after hearing, might be dissolved upon an ex parte
application by the defendant, and this Court ruled that:
"The action of a trial court in dissolving a writ of preliminary

injunction already issued after hearing, without giving petitioner
an opportunity to be heard, does not constitute lack or excess of
jurisdiction or an abuse of discretion, and any irregularity
committed by the trial court on this score may be cured not by
certiorari but by appeal."
3. The fourth reason alleged by petitioner in support of its

stand is that public interest demanded that the writ
enjoining respondent Fausto Alberto from exercising the
functions of managing director be maintained. Petitioner
contended that respondent Alberto had arrogated to
himself the powers of the Board of Directors of the
corporation because he refused to vacate the office and
surrender the same to Jose de la Rosa who had been
elected managing director by the Board to succeed him.
This assertion, however, was disputed by respondent
Alberto who stated that Jose de la Rosa could not be elected
managing director because he did not own any stock in the
corporation.
There is in the record no showing that Jose de la Rosa
owned a share of stock in the corporation. If he did not own
any share of stock, certainly he could not be a director
pursuant to the mandatory provision of Section 30 of the
Corporation Law, which in part provides:
"SEC. 30. Every director must own in his own right at least one
share of the capital stock of the stock corporation of which he is a
director, which stock shall stand in his name on the books of the
corporation. x x x"
If he could not be a director, be could also not be a

managing director of the corporation, pursuant to Article V.
Section 3 of the By-Laws of the Corporation which provides
that:
"The manager shall be elected by the Board of Directors from

among its members. x x x" (Record, p. 48)
_________________
5 88 Phil. 460.
265
VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 265

If the managing director-elect was not qualified to become

managing director, respondent Fausto Alberto could not be
compelled to vacate his office and cede the same to the managing
director-elect because the by-laws of the corporation provides in
Article IV, Section 1 that "Directors shall serve until the election
and qualification of their duly qualified successor."
4. The fifth reason alleged by herein petitioner in support

of its contention that respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion when he lifted the preliminary injunction upon
the filing of the counter-bond was that said counter-bond
could not compensate for the irreparable damage that the
corporation would suffer by reason of the continuance of
respondent Fausto Alberto as managing director of the
corporation. Respondent Alberto, on the contrary,
contended that he really was the owner of the controlling
interest in the business carried on in the name of the
petitioner, having invested therein a total of P57,-727.29 as
against the sum of P4,000 only invested by one other
director, Jose M. Barredo. We find that there was a
question as to who own the controlling interest in the
corporation. Where ownership is in dispute, the party in
control or possession of the disputed interest is presumed
to have the better right until the contrary is adjudged, and
hence that party should not be deprived of the control or
possession until the court is prepared to adjudicate
6
the
controverted right in favor of the other party.'
Should it be the truth that respondent Alberto is the
controlling stockholder, then the damages said respondent
would suffer would be the same, if not more, as the
damages that the corporation would suffer if the injunction
were maintained. If the bond of P5,000 filed by petitioner
for the injunction would be sufficient to answer for the
damages that would be suffered by respondent Alberto by
reason of the injunction, there seems to be 110 rea-
________________
6 Gordillo, et al. vs. Del Rosario, et al., 39 Phil. 829, 836.
266

son why the same amount would not be suf f icient to

answer for the damages that might be suffered by the
petitioning corporation by reason of the lifting of the
injunction. The following ruling of this Court has a
persuasive application in this case:
"The rule that a court should not, by means of a preliminary

injunction, transfer property in litigation from the possession 01
one party to another is more particularly applicable where the
legal title is in dispute
7
and the party having possession asserts
ownership in himself."
Let it be stated, in relation to all the reasons given by

petitioner, that it is a settled rule that the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preventive
remedy to secure the rights of a party in a pending case is
entirely within the discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case—the only limitation being that this
discretion should be exercised based 8
upon the grounds and
in the manner provided by law, and it is equally well
settled that a wide latitude is given under Section 7 of Rule
58 of the Rules of Court to the trial court to modify or
dissolve the injunction as justice may require. The court
which is to exercise that
9
discretion is the trial court, not
the appellate court. The exercise of sound judicial
discretion by the lower court in injunctive matters should 10
not be interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse.
In the instant case, We find that petitioner failed to show
manifest abuse of discretion by respondent Judge in setting
aside the writ of preliminary injunction.
There is, however, one vital reason why the instant
petition for certiorari should be denied. And it is, that from
the order dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction.
_________________
7 Gordillo, et al vs, Del Rosario, et al., March 28, 1919, 39 Phil, 829;
Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, et al., 76 Phil. 225, 231.
8 Agno River Gold Dredging Co., Inc. vs, De Leon, et al., 61 Phil. 190.
9 North Negros Sugar Co. vs, Hidalgo, 63 Phil, 664,
10 Rodulfa v. Alfonso, supra; North Negros Sugar Co, vs. Hidalgo,
supra.
267
VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 267

the petitioner has gone directly to this Court without giving

the respondent Judge (or trial court) a chance or
opportunity to correct his error, if any, in an appropriate
motion for reconsideration. An omission to comply with this
procedural 11requirement justifies a denial of the writ
applied for.
The instant case is not one of the exceptions in the
application of this rule, which are: where the question of
jurisdiction has been squarely raised, argued before,
submitted to, and met and decided by the respondent court;
where the questioned order is a patent nullity; and where
there is a deprivation
12
of the petitioner's f undamental right
to due process.
It being our considered view that respondent Judge had
not committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
order dated August 5, 1964 lifting the writ of preliminary
injunction which had previously been granted in the order
dated June 18, 1964, and the herein petition for certiorari
having been filed without previously complying with a well
settled procedural requirement, there is no alternative for
this Court but to order its dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction is dismissed, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
Concepcion, CJ., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,

Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
________________
11 Herrera v. Barreto, et al., 25 Phil. 245; Uy Chu v. Imperial, et al., 44

Phil. 27; Alvarez, et al. v. Ibañez, et al., 83 Phil. 104; Ricafort v. Hon.
Duran, 54 O.G. 2539; Cueto v. Ortiz, L-11555, May 31, 1960; Pagkakaisa
Samahang Manggagawa ng San Miguel Brewery v. Enriquez, L-12999,
July 26, 1960; Maritime Company of the Philippines (MCP), et al. v.
Paredes, et al., L-24811, March 3, 1967.
12 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., Vol. III, p. 154.
268
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9/18/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 026

VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 255

No. L-23428. November 29, 1968.

DETECTIVE & PROTECTIVE BUREAU, INC., petitioner,

Special civil action; Preliminary injunction; Dissolution;

256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Detective & Protective Bureau, Inc. vs. Cloribel

When verification of motion for dissolution of writ of preliminary

the court the dissolution of an injunction which was granted after

VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 257

Detective & Protective Bureau, Inc. vs. Cloribel

of the other party (Gordillo, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., 39 Phil.

'entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of

258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Detective & Protective Bureau, Inc. vs. Cloribel

rivation of the petitioner's fundamental right to due process

ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The complaint, in Civil Case No. 56949 of the Court of First

VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 259

receive the income of the corporation. Plaintiff prayed that

judgment, the injunction be made permanent and

260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

From the pleadings, it appears that the only issue to be

admit defendant's counter-bond was not supported by

VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 261

whether the respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction

the procedure prescribed by the statute. There was,

On the strength of the decision in the above-cited

"Petitioners' criticism that the motion to dissolve filed by the

If according to the above rulings, Section 6 of Rule 60 (now

2 79 Phil. 640, 643.

262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Fausto Alberto's motion to ift the preliminary injunction in

From the precedents quoted above, as well as from the

3 L-16815, July 24, 1961.

VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 263

the motion should have been verified or not, This Court.

counter-bond is in accordance with law." Consequently, the

"The first contention of the petitioners is that, as said injunction

This Court has also ruled that the dissolution of a writ of

4 79 Phil. 640, 642-643.

264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

"The action of a trial court in dissolving a writ of preliminary

3. The fourth reason alleged by petitioner in support of its

If he could not be a director, be could also not be a

"The manager shall be elected by the Board of Directors from

VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 265

If the managing director-elect was not qualified to become

4. The fifth reason alleged by herein petitioner in support

6 Gordillo, et al. vs. Del Rosario, et al., 39 Phil. 829, 836.

266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

son why the same amount would not be suf f icient to

"The rule that a court should not, by means of a preliminary

Let it be stated, in relation to all the reasons given by

VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 267

the petitioner has gone directly to this Court without giving

Concepcion, CJ., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,

11 Herrera v. Barreto, et al., 25 Phil. 245; Uy Chu v. Imperial, et al., 44