Risk Assessment Data Directory

Report No. 434 – 18

March 2010

Construction
risk for
offshore units
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers
P ublications

Global experience
The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers has access to a wealth of technical
knowledge and experience with its members operating around the world in many different
terrains. We collate and distil this valuable knowledge for the industry to use as guidelines
for good practice by individual members.

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Our overall aim is to ensure a consistent approach to training, management and best prac-
tice throughout the world.
The oil and gas exploration and production industry recognises the need to develop consist-
ent databases and records in certain fields. The OGP’s members are encouraged to use the
guidelines as a starting point for their operations or to supplement their own policies and
regulations which may apply locally.

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Many of our guidelines have been recognised and used by international authorities and
safety and environmental bodies. Requests come from governments and non-government
organisations around the world as well as from non-member companies.

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Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this publication,
neither the OGP nor any of its members past present or future warrants its accuracy or will, regardless
of its or their negligence, assume liability for any foreseeable or unforeseeable use made thereof, which
liability is hereby excluded. Consequently, such use is at the recipient’s own risk on the basis that any use
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herein, however, is intended to replace, amend, supersede or otherwise depart from such requirements. In
the event of any conflict or contradiction between the provisions of this document and local legislation,
applicable laws shall prevail.

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 RADD – Construction risk for offshore units

Contents
1.0 Scope and Application ........................................................... 1
1.1 Scope ............................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Definitions ....................................................................................................... 1
2.0 Summary of Recommended Data ............................................ 3
2.1 Worldwide Construction Failure Risks ......................................................... 3
2.2 North Sea Construction Failure Frequencies............................................... 3
2.3 Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) data ..................................................................... 3
3.0 Guidance on use of data ........................................................ 4
3.1 General validity ............................................................................................... 4
3.2 Contributors to Severe/Significant or Total Loss Incidents ....................... 4
3.3 Uncertainties ................................................................................................... 4
4.0 Review of data sources ......................................................... 5
4.1 Construction Incident frequency................................................................... 5
4.1.1 Historical Frequencies of Incidents.......................................................................... 5
4.1.2 WOAD Accident Reports ........................................................................................... 6
4.2 FAR data ........................................................................................................ 12
4.2.1 OGP FAR Data .......................................................................................................... 12
4.2.2 Comparison with other industries .......................................................................... 13
4.2.3 Construction FAR breakdown by Region .............................................................. 13
4.2.4 Norwegian Construction Data................................................................................. 13
5.0 Recommended data sources for further information ............ 13
6.0 References .......................................................................... 14

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Abbreviations:
DPS Dynamic Positioning System
E&P Exploration and Production
FAR Fatal Accident Rate
FPSO Floating Production, Storage and Offloading
FSU Floating Storage Unit
GoM Gulf of Mexico
HSE (UK) Health & Safety Executive
MODU Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
MOPU Mobile Offshore Production Unit
NPD Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
NS North Sea
OGP International Association of Oil and Gas Producers
OSHA Occupational Safety & Health Administration
PSA Petroleum Services Authority (Norway)
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
TLP Tension Leg Platform
UK United Kingdom
US United States
UKCS United Kingdom Continental Shelf
WOAD Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank
WW Worldwide

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1.0 Scope and Application

1.1 Scope
This datasheet presents estimates of fabrication, construction and installation risks in
respect of asset damage/loss and personnel safety. The data are mainly applicable to
offshore installations although reference is made to onshore construction fatal accident
rates.
The datasheet has not been designed to assist with the quantification of general project
management uncertainties for the purpose of estimating the likelihood of project
schedule and cost overruns. This is considered to be a separate subject.
Measured in terms of the life-cycle of a project, the fabrication, construction and
installation phases have a short duration and can be characterised as:
• labour intensive,
• involving a large number of one-off tasks,
• requiring temporary work arrangements and working environments,
• exposing components/structures to non-design loading condition.
In terms of the last of these, structures can be designed to withstand extreme loadings
when fixed in-situ, such as an offshore installation being designed for a one-hundred
year return wave (a storm having an annual probability of occurrence of 10-2). However,
their tolerance can be considerably lower during the temporary phases. In addition,
ancillary systems such as semi-submersible crane vessels can be in a condition which
makes them vulnerable to adverse weather for the period of an operation.
In regard to the QRA of an onshore facility there may be no need to treat the three
phases as distinct. All hazardous operations could take place at the one site and the
phases could overlap in the project schedule.
The risks arising from the use of Temporary Living quarters and in particular the
potentially high risk associated with vehicle activity are not included in the construction
risks outlined. The Land Transport Accident Statistics datasheet provides an indication of
potential vehicle risk which may need to be evaluated when considering the total risks
associated with a construction project.

1.2 Definitions
• Construction (as defined by OGP [4])
Construction comprises all construction and fabrication activities, and also
disassembly, removal and disposal (decommissioning) at the end of the facility life.
Factory construction of process plant, yard construction of structures, offshore
installation, hook-up and commissioning, and removal of redundant process
facilities are all examples which are included under construction activities.
With this definition, construction may involve the assembly of relatively large
sections of an installation. Examples would include:
- lifting of modules onto a module support frame (MSF),
- mechanical outfitting of a concrete gravity based structure (GBS).

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Fabrication activities need not take place in the same location as the construction
activities. Therefore, construction could involve the transport of substantial
sections of the installation between sites. The hazards and risks associated with
these activities may need to be considered and analysed within the framework of a
“total” risk analysis.
• Fabrication (taken as a subset of Construction above)
Activities performed in producing significant sub-components, packages, or
modules which will be combined during the construction phase.
• Installation (taken as a subset of Construction above)
Activities performed to transfer the structure to, and position it at, the designated
site.
This definition is tailored to offshore developments, where one or more structures
are transported and assembled at the site. An onshore facility may have no
equivalent activities.
For an offshore jacket platform this phase can include the lifting or load-out of the
jacket and deck, onto transport barges. Some structures, such as concrete gravity
based structures, can be towed without the assistance of a transport barge.
This data sheet can be used in risk assessments oriented to either quantifying risks to
personnel or to quantifying risks to asset integrity.
The following damage categorisation as extracted from the Worldwide Offshore
Accident Databank (WOAD, [1]) is used, as applied to all accident types:
• Total Loss: Total loss of the unit including constructive total loss from an
insurance point of view, however the unit may be repaired and put into operation
again.
• Severe Dam age: Severe damage to one of more modules of the unit: large
/medium damage to load bearing structures: major damage to essential equipment.
• Significant Dam age : Significant/serious damage to module and local area of the
unit: minor damage to the load bearing structures: significant damage to single
essential equipment: damage to more essential essential equipment.
• Minor Dam age: Minor damage to single essential equipment: damage to more non
essential equipment: damage to non load bearing structures.
• Insignificant Dam age: Insignificant or no damage: damage to part of essential
equipment, damage to towline, thrusters, generators and drives.

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2.0 Summary of Recommended Data

2.1 Worldwide Construction Failure Risks

Table 2.1 outlines the Construction damage risks worldwide, where ‘Construction’ is
defined as set out in Section 1.2.

Table 2.1 Construction Dam age Risks: W orldwide

-3
Risk of all types of damage 6.5 × 10 per unit constructed
-3
Risk of Severe/Significant damage 3.1 × 10 per unit constructed
-4
Risk of Total Loss 3.6 × 10 per unit constructed

2.2 North Sea Construction Failure Frequencies

Table 2.2 outlines the Construction damage risks in the North Sea, where ‘Construction’
is defined as set out in Section 1.2.

Table 2.2 Construction Dam age Risks: North Sea

-2
Risk of all types of damage 6.9 × 10 per unit constructed
-2
Risk of Severe/Significant damage 3.6 × 10 per unit constructed
-3
Risk of Total Loss 2.0 × 10 per unit constructed

The North Sea damage risks are around 10 times higher than the Worldwide data
(Section 3.1 explains this).

2.3 Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) data

The best available FAR data for fabrication, construction and installation activities are
those extracted from OGP’s Safety Performance Indicator reports for 2006 and 2007
([4],[6]). Based on specific construction activity safety data collected in these years, the
following FARs have been calculated:
• 2006: 2.63
• 2007: 2.33
The data have not been split to yield any onshore/offshore specific FAR or
Company/contractor FAR as applied to many other breakdowns within [4]. The limited 2
year data collection/ analysis period does not allow for 3 or 5 year rolling bases which
offer a stronger (less uncertain) measure of the FAR. Note the reader should be aware of
the variation in OGP member company reporting from year to year as this can give rise
to some uncertainty on the overall values.

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3.0 Guidance on use of data

3.1 General validity

The risk values given in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 are applicable to the offshore oil and gas
industry worldwide and specifically in the North Sea.
However, it is recommended that failure risk data to be used on particular studies are
localised to the country where the unit will be deployed as there are variations and
trends on the risks calculated, as can be seen comparing the worldwide and NS data
(Table 2.1 and Table 2.2). The worldwide data are dominated by the fixed installations in
US GoM. These are historically smaller and simpler than North Sea installations and this
is likely to be reflected in the risks. Therefore the Worldwide data is considered
appropriate to represent the construction risk for simple installations in shallow water.
For large integrated installations in deeper water (including those in deeper water in the
GoM) the North Sea data are representative of the risks as there is much more material
and overall construction activity involved.
The risks reflect incidents that have arisen mainly in the ‘under construction’ phase
within WOAD, and do not address the reverse construction / decommissioning risks.
Note there is a small category of events listed under “scrapping” category within
WOAD, most of which relate to idle units having problems, rather than true
decommissioning/ deconstruction activity. Conservatively, as there has been no serious
deconstruction events noted to date despite such activities occurring, construction
phase risks could be applied to deconstruction activities which are becoming more
common.

3.2 Contributors to Severe/Significant or Total Loss Incidents

The failure risk data presented in section 2.1 and 2.2 relate to the frequency of overall
system failures rather than component failures. Failure data at system level are most
useful for a “first pass” QRA, with the function of gauging the overall risk level and
estimating the relative contribution of specific activities. By review of the actual incident
reports detailed in Table 4.3 to Table 4.6 inclusive, the following hazard types are
prevalent:
• Dropped objects
• Mooring failures
• Dynamic positioning failures
• Floating unit collisions with installations
• Ballasting failures
• Weather window forecasting failures.
A detailed causal analysis of failures when under construction has not been attempted
although the raw incident reports will allow users to interpret causes if desired.

3.3 Uncertainties
In some cases the exposure data available makes no distinction between unit categories
e.g. for Monohull units there is no distinction between FPSO and FSU. The same
situation occurs for WOAD exposure data for fixed units. [2] provides a summary of
exposure data used to calculate worldwide structural failure accident frequencies.

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Hence, by making no distinction in the exposure data the calculated frequency may be
overestimated or underestimated for FSPO, FSU and Fixed units within WOAD.

4.0 Review of data sources

4.1 Construction Incident frequency

The principal source of the data presented in Section 2.1 is the data from WOAD for the
period 1980-2005 [1] and the HSE [7],[8] for 1980-2005. Databases available worldwide
were thoroughly reviewed and interrogated appropriately in producing these sources. It
is therefore believed that they are reasonably complete in recording accidents and
incidents worldwide and on the NS for offshore units.
These statistics are based on the numbers of incidents evident within WOAD software
v5.1 and the exposure data (number of unit years) [2],[7],[8]. Accident data used cover
the time period from 1980 to 2005 as this is the basis of the exposure data.

4.1.1 Historical Frequencies of Incidents

This section gives a historical picture of all incidents, including their severity during the
fabrication, construction and installation phases of offshore projects. The review is
limited to offshore incidents due to the accessibility of relevant accident/incident
records.
Incidents from WOAD, satisfying following criteria were used for the analysis:
• installation type - concrete, jacket, FPSO/FSU, and TLP
• operation mode - under construction
Examinations of the records found the majority did not occur in the phases as defined
by this data sheet. In WOAD, “construction” can cover temporary work on the platform
at any point in its lifecycle. Therefore it was necessary to review each entry to find
relevant incidents. It was also found not to be possible to differentiate with confidence
between the fabrication or construction phases of a project.
Overall estimates of incident/accident frequencies for all phases are given in Table 4.1
along with the assumptions underlying the estimates. The relevant entries from WOAD
are listed in Table 4.2 to Table 4.5 in Section 4.1.2.
Table 4.2 details a breakdown on the severity of each of the events on a worldwide and
North Sea Basis, used to determine the frequency of severe/significant and total failure
frequencies outlined in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2.

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Table 4.1 Sum m ary of W OAD search [4]

Estimated Estimated risk of

Fixed Number of reported
population (units incident/unit
units incidents (in WOAD)
constructed) (1,2) constructed
WW NS WW NS WW NS
Concrete 13 13 n/a 41 n/a 0.32
Jacket 36 17 8201 425 0.004 0.04
FPSO/ FSU 2 2 77 21 0.026 0.095
TLP 3 2 13 3 0.23 0.67
TOTAL 54 34 8291 490 0.0065 0.069
Note 1
Assumption of total fixed installation World wide:
For the period 1970 – 1995, total number of fixed installations 6515 (100% Jacket)
For the period 1996 – 2005, total number of fixed installations 1686 (100% Jacket)
There are few concrete installations outside the North Sea (Hibernia, Sakhalin (Lun-A, PA-B,
Molipak), at least 3 off Australia), none of which feature in the WOAD search, and as they are less
than 1% of the overall population they are excluded as negligible.
Note 2
Assumption of total fixed installation in North Sea:
For the period 1970 – 1995, total number of fixed installations 360 (10% concrete and 90% Jacket)
For the period 1996 – 2005, total number of fixed installations 106 (5% concrete and 95% Jacket)

Table 4.2 Incident Severity

Fixed Incident Severity

installations No. of Insignifica
Significa Total
Event nt/ no Minor Severe
nt Loss
s damage
Concrete WW 13 6 1 1 4 1
Concrete NS 13 6 1 1 4 1
Jacket WW 36 9 6 10 9 2
Jacket NS 17 3 2 5 7 0
FPSO/ FSU WW 2 2 0 0 0 0
FPSO/FSU NS 2 2 0 0 0 0
TLP WW 3 0 1 1 1 0
TLP NS 2 0 1 0 1 0

4.1.2 WOAD Accident Reports

Table 4.3 to Table 4.6 detail the construction incident descriptions for the 4 fixed
installation categories within WOAD [1] for the period up to February 2009.

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Table 4.3 Concrete Facility Under Construction Incidents [1]

Accident Unit Name Description

Date
15-May-96 BRENT,211/29,C The new derrick of the platform drilling rig for the Brent C platform was being transported from Bergen in Norway to the UK on
Heerema's derrick barge "DB 102" when the derrick struck a bridge causing damage to the upper section of the derrick. The
platform rig was returned to Consafe's Burntisland yard for repairs. An investigation into the accident was initiated. The incident
was not expected to delay the re-development of the Brent field. A similar accident occurred in August (see accident in Table 4.4
dated 04-Aug-96 to unit in CAPTAIN field).
12-Aug-95 TROLL,31/6 Smoke developed in a firewater pump located in the seawater shaft. No persons were in the shaft at that moment. No further
information available.
15-Apr-95 TROLL,31/6,A During installation of scaffolding below the deck, a worker fell overboard and 20 m down into the sea and was quickly recovered.
The worker was in shock and taken to hospital.
09-Aug-92 SLEIPNER,15/9,A2 A fire occurred in a 440 V emergency switchboard. The fire will not hamper the completion of the platform. The replacements and
repair work should be completed mid September.
14-May-92 SLEIPNER,15/9,A2 The Aker Verdal yard experienced a construction accident during assembly of the platform jacket. The accident occurred during
roll-up and lifting of the upper part of the "row 2" jacket frame (weight 700 tons). One of the two lift slings parted and the frame
leaned slowly over and stopped at a 45 deg. Angle without hitting "row 1". No injuries or damage.
23-Aug-91 SLEIPNER,15/9,A1 Water intrusion into one of the drillshafts caused the sinking of the 600,000 tons concrete base of Sleipner 'a' platform. 22 workers
onboard were evacuated when the water flooding started. 15 mins later the base sank in water 200 m deep. The base was crushed
against the sea bottom and destroyed. Investigations have revealed that the concrete base in some places were underdesigned
and hence not able to support the exposed loads.
Three separate mistakes led to the sinking:
1: design forces in cracked areas were underestimated; 2: reinforcing steel in those areas was incorrectly designed; 3: some joints
were not separately designed. The accident may delay startup of the Sleipner field and it would take approx. 12-15 months to build
a new gravity base structure.
Insurance claims worth 2.3 billion NOK arising from the loss of the platform were settled in October 1993. This sum covers a new
base structure, outfitting lost with the original, the cost of temporarily storing the topsides and additional hook-up work. The
amount will be covered by insurance companies Vesta (Norway) and Lloyd's of London.
08-Nov-85 GULLFAKS,34/10,A Steel shock absorbers between the 41.000 ton deck and the legs failed and the deck started tilting. The deck was evacuated. The
deck was raised 0.02 m during a 10 hour successful jackup operation Nov.11 and the shock absorbers were replaced by steel
plates so that weight was evenly distributed on the four legs. Work was then resumed.
04-Nov-85 GULLFAKS,34/10,B The barge 'concem' was offloading cement into the platform Gullfaks C during slipforming when barge capsized and sank (ref
accident id. No 8601100). The barge's 10m high construction tower struck platform and containers on barge's deck clipped side of
platform base and caused damage to riser supports. Additional damage resulted from power failure which affected slipforming
equipment on platform.
27-Aug-84 FRIGG,25/1,TCP2 A gas leak occurred due to a failure of the bolts of the upper isolating valve of the standpipe for LSH on glycol contactor CV2C.
Standpipe and isolating valves were removed and nozzles blinded. Cause seems to be that bolts were overstressed due to
misaligned supporting and inaccurate tightening of bolts.
25-Feb-78 STATFJORD,33/9A,A During installation of platform four workers were doing welding and grinding at the 49.5 m level of the utility shaft. A liquid surface
was 2 m below the workers. Protective coating was added to the water from time to time. Diesel was trapped on top of the surface.
Probably due to breakage of acetylene hose a sudden fire ignited the diesel and heavy smoke and fire developed. Air hose to
grinding tool was probably melted and escaping air fed the fire. Escape stair tube behaved as a chimney with high flame intensity.
2 men tried to escape by elevator, but this stopped probably due to optical endstop switches activated by heavy smoke. One man
was found in the control room, an other at the 49.5 m deck. The only man wearing a breathing apparatus was found at 55.5 m deck
with only the last 5 min emergency air left. The smoke divers were forced back at the 61.5 m level due to the strong heat. Water
from hoses and deluge system cooled down heat and the fire was under control after about 2 hours.
06-Oct-76 NINIAN The concrete batching plants barges "no. 3" and "no. 4" and generator barge "h.d. barge no. 3" ranged against fendering of the
NORTH,3/3,CENTRAL partly constructed platform. The platform suffered damage to temporary installed anti-scouring fenderings and water ingress. No
further info available.

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22-Mar-76 FRIGG,10/1,CPD1 The fire blaze broke out at the base of the towers of the structures about 40 ft from the water level. The fire was extinguished after
one hour. About 10 square metres of concrete was damaged into a thickness of one inch.
15-Mar-99 TROLL,31/2,C The incident occurred during pressure testing of the of the Troll C platform structure before connection of deck and hull. Main
parts of the hull (including pipe shafts in columns) is filled with water and in order to ensure watertight penetrations for electric-,
instrument-, power- and hydraulic cables and pipes "Brattberger connections" are used. The day after the test immersion started,
leaks occurred between pipe shaft and pump room in column g 20 and between pipe shaft and stairwell in column g 10. The
ballasting operation was stopped immediately and the pump room and the stairwell was de-ballasted, flushed with fresh water and
dried out with hot air. Both leaks were caused by leaking "Brattberger connections". The Brattberger connection in the pump room
(mct rgsr) was designed for a hydrostatic pressure of 4 bar and started leaking at a water depth of 31.4 m. The supplier (Nortelco)
found the cause to be wrong packing of the connection. The Brattberger connection in the stairwell (mct rgpm 100) was design for
a hydrostatic pressure of 1.8 bar and started leaking at a waterdepth between 13.2 and 18.2 m. The cause of the leak was that the
maximum hydrostatic pressure the connection was designed for had been reached. - it was concluded that an unsuitable
connection was installed since this connection will not be capable of handling an unforeseen immersing. Corrective actions taken:
all Brattberger connections installed below el. 15.0 m were checked by supplier. All Brattberger connections between pipe shaft
and pump room (rgsr) were opened and re-packed. 8 Brattberger connections of type RGPO 100 towards pipe shaft in columns
g10 and g20 were replaced with Brattberger connections of type RGPM 100 which are designed for a hydrostatic pressure of
15 bar. All other Brattberger connections of type RGPO was reinforced by use of flat bar welded to both sides of the bulkhead. All
work was controlled, checked out and approved by Nortelco AS. When the test immersion was restarted, small leaks from 3
Brattberger connections were discovered. The pipe shafts was de-ballasted and the connections re-packed under control and
approval of Nortelco. More information available in archive.

Table 4.4 Steel Jacket Under Construction Incidents [1]

Accident Unit Name Description

Date
15-Mar-00 VERMILION,267 While derrick barge 'Southern Hercules' was attempting to load the 390-ton vermilion 267 platform deck onto a materials barge in
the bayou black channel at the ocean marine facility in Gibson la., the load dropped. The derrick barge's jib broke away from the
boom during the lifting operation. The derrick barge suffered minor damage to hull and boom. It was not revealed any damage to
deck and no delays to first production was expected. The cause of failure was to be investigated. The accident is also recorded on
the derrick barge, see accident id. No. 0004060.
03-Dec-98 PETRONIUS The platform was under construction when a 72 million usd worth 3800-ton south deck module dropped to the seabottom at 2230
hrs as it was being installed onto the deepwater compliant tower platform. The module was being lifted by derrick barge "db 50"
when a lifting line parted. The module struck a transport barge being alongside as well as the "db50" before falling to the seafloor
in 1754 ft waters. The deck, the second of two modules that were to be pieced together into one unit, held the crew quarters,
waterflood facilities and production equipment. It was decided that the module would not be retrieved since it did not pose any
threat to the environment or to navigation. In may 1999, the go-ahead for building a new module was given.
17-Jul-98 MAIN PASS,65/B The Nabors offshore drilling platform rig "t-269" was being installed on the 100-ft platform when the rig partially collapsed over the
platform (with approx. 70 people onboard) and several sections of the rig fell overboard. However, the largest part of the rig
remained intact. The platform was in the final stage of construction when the accident occurred. The rig and heavy drilling set-up
were being constructed on top of the platform. When the work was finished there would have been a towering derrick typical of
those that drill older fields. Crews were unloading components to the "sub-structure" (supporting the derrick) from a barge to
large rails on the platform. Pumping equipment, tanks, electrical components and generator were in place when the accident
occurred. The rig split in two sections of which one fell overboard and onto a neighbouring barge. Three workers were killed and
12 persons were injured. Fishing vessels in the area pulled floating workers from the waters and the injured persons were taken to
hospital by helicopters and by boats. Two of the dead workers were crushed by the collapse of steel rigging and walkways as the
drilling portion of the rig fell.
17-Nov-77 HEATHER,2/5,A In wind NNE 45 knots and 40 feet waves, a 24" pipe, 50ft long, 8 tons, sealed in both ends and floating, broke loose.

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28-Dec-92 BRUCE,9/8A,PUQ Two persons were working on the scaffolding underneath the platform, some 70 ft above the sea, when the scaffolding suddenly
collapsed. The incident occurred when they pulled equipment on to the scaffolding. One person fell straight into the icy sea, while
the other was trapped by his legs and struggled to free them before he let himself into the sea. Fortunately, none of them suffered
injuries apart from shock. Despite not wearing life jackets, both managed to swim to the platform legs within two mins and climb
up the ladders before "zodiac" rescue boats were launched and reached the spot.
04-Aug-96 CAPTAIN,13/22A,WPP A During towout of the platform (transport on barge) from the Clydebank yard of UIE Scotland, it collided with the Erskine road
bridge (aadt=18000) in the river Clyde, causing damage to the platform's drilling rig and closing of all traffic on the bridge such that
engineers assessed the extent of damage. It will probably remain closed to end-august and for heavy vehicles to the end of '96.
Reports indicate that the accident may have been caused by a miscalculation of clearances, which failed to take account of the
height of the barge being used. Platform repairs were carried out offshore. There may be raised claims by road transport firms to
compensate for extra costs due to the closing of the bridge. This was the second such accident within short time, see accident in
Table 4.3 dated 15-May-96 to BRENT C.
10-Sep-94 FRÏY,25/5 During cutting of riser pipe, a sheen of oil in the pipe ignited causing a fire. A fire blanket was used to put out the fire. The oil was
left in the pipe after flushing during construction.
21-Jan-94 GUNESHLI FIELD PLATFORM The platform capsized and sank during bad weather. The recently installed drilling platform was designed to withstand winds up to
42 m/s. No injuries and no oil was spilled. No decision has been made yet on whether the platform will be salvaged. The platform
took over 7 years to build and will cost tens of millions of dollars to replace. No further information available.
27-Oct-93 GRAND ISLE,102 During installation the platform jacket toppled. Certain problems with the jacket's mud mats and inclement weather were
encountered during the installation. The jacket is being surveyed for damage. It is expected that the jacket will be salvaged and
reinstalled after being repaired at the fabrication yard of "gulf island fabrication" in Houma.
15-Nov-92 BRUCE,9/8A,D During offshore commissioning it was discovered that someone seriously had tampered with electrical cables and pipework in
platform's drilling modules. The defects were corrected and the platform's hookup schedule was not affected. The platform is
under construction at the Eiffel yard in Marseilles. The Bruce field is scheduled to commence commercial production in spring
1993.
15-Oct-92 GOODWYN A During installation of the platform, the pile foundations (20 off, 130 m long), which should secure the platform to the sea floor, were
damaged. After sinking through a soft layer of sand, the piles were supposed to pierce into a thin layer of rock before sinking
further into bedrock. However, the piles did not pierce neatly through and were bent and buckled approximately 86 m below the
sea bed. A programme aimed at repairing the piles was started immediately so that the topsides installation, hook-up and
commissioning could proceed. Initial production is set to October 1994, one year later than expected.
25-Aug-92 BRUCE,9/8A,PUQ A fire occurred on the south-east leg of the platform at 0856 hrs. The fire is believed to have caused by a gas burner pre-heater.
Helicopters were scrambled and the platform was downmanned from 34 to 16. M tug/supply vessel "Maersk Rover" (standby
vessel for the "beryl a" platform), was put on readiness to assist in fire-fighting if required. Rescue operations terminated at 0930
hrs. The fire was reported put out at 0920 hrs.
13-Jan-92 BRUCE,9/8A,D An explosion occurred to the drilling platform under construction at the Eiffel yard at St Louis du Rhone near Fos (Marseille). The
explosion occurred in one of the mud tanks. It is speculated that inflammable gas built up in the tank during the weekend and was
ignited when normal construction activities restarted Monday morning. The walls of the module and the scaffolding were hit by the
blast. Bp states that the accident will not affect the schedule for the project.
15-Aug-90 OSEBERG 2,30/6,C During piling of the platform, brace no. 7015 was dented. The damage does not affect platform integrity in the period until
installation of modules in spring 1991. Corrective actions have been taken.
06-Mar-88 OSEBERG,30/9,B West German submarine U27 collided with the Oseberg B platform. Personnel were evacuated to the hotel platform
"Polyconfidence" which is linked to the platform with a gangway. A later survey found that a crossmember with diameter of 1.2 m
had been dented to a depth of about 20 cm. The repair costs will probably reach several million dollars. The submarine was
navigating approx. 20 m below the surface. The platform was marked on the map, but no signals from the sonar were received. The
submarine sustained damage to bow, bridge and navigation equipment. No injuries.
17-May-87 LOGGS GGS,ACCOMODATION One of the newest offshore platforms may have to be cut from the seabed by explosive charges. During piling work severe
vibrations caused damage to the jacket. The pile-driving equipment broke down. A substitute pile-driver proved to be too powerful
for the piles needed.
14-Jul-86 CHEVRON JACKET The platform installed by Brown&Root tipped over while the structure was being set. The incident was believed to be caused by a
UNKNOWN hole left in the seafloor where the drilling rig had been. The jacket was uprighted and there was no damage.

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 RADD – Construction risk for offshore units

26-Jun-86 HARRIET,B The deck structure of Harriet B tilted approx. 20 deg. On barge Intermac 256. Towed to shallow water for safety. The barge's deck
received some holes. Salvage required a giant derrick barge and salve cost estimated to 1mill usd. Value of monopod cargo of 350
tonnes is 4mill usd.
07-Jun-86 ZELDA/E Diving/work barge "Satyra Tirta" had accidental contact with the platform. No damage to the platform is reported, but the vessel
got its port side shell plating torn open in way of fuel tank and store room associated distortion to internal crop etc. Later
inspection showed flooding of winchroom and wetting of electrical cables.
04-Dec-85 PNT ARGUELLO Jacket contacted lock in panama canal during voyage from Morgan City to Port Hueneme loaded on barge "450-10". One gantry
316,HERMOSA crane needs to be renewed, two turbo generator casings reconditioned and partly renewed, 2 sets of electric conduits and one air
winch clutch renewed. Repairs deferred.
09-Jun-82 NORTH RANKIN,A Damage to valve removal track during launching.
01-Apr-82 MAGNUS,211/12,PRODUCTION Installation of the 40000 tonne structure halted because several steel piles fell off the structure altering the balance of the
structure. The piles were needed to secure it to the seabed. The piles were discovered 100 yards clear of the platform target
location. The oil platform was finally sited on the Magnus field Apr 4.
25-Feb-82 TYRA,5504/6.2,TE-E Damage to jacket due to storm during tow out.
15-Jul-81 VALHALL,2/8A,PCP During installation of the jacket in July 1981, a pile hammer was accidently dropped on the east side of the jacket. An investigation
survey by use of ROV showed no damage to jacket structure. During an annual underwater insp. In June 85,a puncture in the
subject diagonal was revealed during close visual inspection. The repair offshore is scheduled to start mid September 85.
16-Aug-80 PLATFORM SA Accident occurred when deck was lifted from barge to place it onto the jacket. There were two unsuccessful attempts, and in each
attempt the ropes gave way resulting in damage to the barge in the first and to the deck in the second. Repairs will be handled
locally.
17-Apr-80 PLATFORM SA Jacket fell into sea while being fitted onto leg of rig. See also accident 11-Jan-1980.
11-Jan-80 PLATFORM SA The jacket of the "platform SA" sank while it was launched at Bombay high oilfield. Mishap probably due to a leakage in the
compressor system at the time of the mechanical launching. Jacket was salvaged with the help of cranes and divers and was then
installed at the site.
01-Jun-77 HEATHER,2/5,A Suffered damage during piling operation when a steel pile was accidentally dropped, striking one of the "bottle" legs and
fracturing pile sleeves. Production delayed probably six months (to February 1978).
18-Nov-76 NINIAN SOUTH,3/8A External corrosion was discovered on an import riser pipe. One of three flow- lines has to be replaced.
29-Aug-75 AUK,30/16,A Visibility below 50 yards. Collision with supply vessel. Production delayed for 3 weeks.
12-Mar-75 UNKNOWN,TRINIDAD JACKET Jacket on barge '299'. Delivery to Amoco Trinidad Oil Co.. During launching, the jacket slipped off the barge and subsequently
floated in an angular position. Platform was to be launched in sheltered water due to prolonging storm. It was under way to be
installed when interrupted by storm.
25-Oct-74 FRIGG,10/1,DP1 Location: the elf/total group at the 'Frigg' gas field. The buoyancy tanks failed as the platform was tilted from a horizontal to a
vertical position about 3 km from the installation site. A new 20 mill usd platform is under construction. Field production delayed
about one year. Platform was refloated July 7 1975. Will be used for other purposes.
06-Jun-74 SAMAAN Barge 'MM 151' transporting platform overturned and sank. No attempts to recover jacket.
05-Feb-73 EKOFISK,2/4,A Half the deck section dropped into the water. The wire broke while lifting the deck section from the building site to the pontoon for
transport to Ekofisk. Repaired March 22, expected cost: several million NOK.
09-Oct-70 AGOSTINO Ready for use when found inclined. Submerged part of support columns reinforced by further internal piles.
04-May-04 South Pars platform, SPP1 A man was killed while working on the installation of the jacket for one of the gas platforms for the South Pars field off Iran. The
accident happened when the piles were being loaded from a barge to the Stanislav Yudin crane ship. Both Statoil and seaway
heavy lifting have appointed internal commissions of inquiry to find the cause of the accident. Statoil is operator for the
development of the offshore part of phases six, seven and eight. The deceased was contracted for construction and installation of
the jackets for the gas platforms. No more information available.

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 RADD – Construction risk for offshore units

Table 4.5 FPSO/FSU Under Construction Incidents [1]

Accident Unit Name Description

Date
27-Dec-98 JOTUN,25/7,FPSO Jotun B was undergoing hook up/commissioning activities when the incident occurred. No production or drilling activities was
performed. A hydraulic oil leak in the east fire pump was detected and thought to be a maintenance issue initially but pulling of
the pump was found to be required. 300 - 400 l of oil was lost within the pump caisson. All hot work in connection with the hook-
up was suspended. The repair period was estimated to 2-3 days. No more information available
30-Jan-99 JOTUN,25/7,FPSO The incident occurred in platform hook-up and commissioning phase. Two smoke detectors in room 108, 1st floor, living
quarters detected gas. All personnel were mustered. Site inspection showed that smoke was still present in the room and the
initial investigation showed that the feeder within a switchboard had short circuited resulting in damage to the bars and
surrounding insulation supports. No injuries to personnel. No more information available.

Table 4.6 TLP Under Construction Incidents [1]

Accident Unit Name Description

Date
04-May-95 HEIDRUN,6507/7,TLP During towout of tension leg no. 2 to the Heidrun field, the clamps for the pontoons broke and the leg sank in 240 m waters at
position N 64.37.5 and E 08.03.7. The leg has been located and is lying flat on the seabed. The operator plans to salvage the leg.
No further information available.
23-Jun-89 GREEN CANYON,184 Four of the structure's tendons sank while enroute to installation site. Cause is being investigated, but rests of the tropical storm
allison may have accelerated the sinking. Installation was carried out without the four tendons. Production would not begin until
the four missing ones were installed. Estimated startup of production was second week in November.
01-Nov-82 HUTTON,211/28,TLP Cracks in steelwork for the Hutton field prod. Platf. Built at Nigg bay on the Cromarty Firth. The cracks are so widespread that
large sections may have to be scrapped. However, Conoco might be able to repair cracked sections.

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 RADD – Construction risk for offshore units

4.2 FAR data

4.2.1 OGP FAR Data

As at the date of preparation of this datasheet, [6] is the source for the recommended
FAR data, replacing all other FAR data provided in the original E&P Forum datasheet.
However, users of these data are advised to consult the most up-to-date annual OGP
Safety performance indicators reports as they become available. Though limited in
recording period, this is considered to offer a modern, stronger insight into
construction FAR than many other sources.
Other data sources have been reviewed to identify alternative or more extensive FAR
analysis. The UK HSE publishes annual statistic reports (Offshore Injury, Ill Health, and
Incident Statistics) and it is noted that the Maintenance/Construction category in these
offers the closest match to the Construction category as defined in this datasheet.
For 2007/2008, the Maintenance/Construction category contributed 72 incidents, or
37.5% of all the incidents and also had the most major injuries (13 incidents, or 29.5%).
In 2006/2007 [10] the equivalent values were 2 fatal incidents (2 fatalities) (100% of total),
15 major (39% of total) and 60 severe (38% of total).
The HSE data does not present a FAR breakdown for the Maintenance/Construction
category. In overall terms a single FAR value per annum, or on a rolling basis is not
provided. The HSE data combines fatal and major injury data in presenting 3-year rolling
results.
The OGP data [4],[6] have been analysed in more detail to determine if further
breakdown of the reported Construction FAR is feasible. The OGP report presents a
breakdown of the overall annual FAR, with further breakdown for onshore/offshore and
contractor/ company personnel. Though not accurate, some estimate of onshore and
offshore Construction FAR could be determined from the reported data.
• From 2006 data ([4]) the overall FAR was 3.92, with 4.64 applicable onshore and 1.58
offshore.
• From 2007 data ([6]) the overall FAR was 3, with 3.0 applicable onshore and 2.9
offshore.
Offshore FAR contributions increased in 2007, with the capsize of the Bourbon Dolphin
which claimed 8 lives.
The 2-year average onshore overall FAR allocation is 3.82 ((4.64+3.0)/2) and the offshore
overall FAR is 2.24 ((1.54+2.9)/2). Continued collection of OGP data will enable better 3-
and 5-year rolling average estimates to be made in the future.
The overall average Construction FAR for 2006 was 2.63 ([4], p63) and that for 2007 was
2.33 ([6], p62)
If the overall average FAR ratios are applied to the Construction FAR, the following
approximate average Onshore and Offshore Construction FAR are determined.
• Average construction FAR (2 year average) = (2.63+2.33)/2) = 2.48
• Average overall FAR (2 year average) (= (3.92+3.0)/2) = 3.46
• Onshore average construction FAR = 3.82/3.46 × 2.48 = 2.74
• Offshore average construction FAR = 2.24/3.46 × 2.48 = 1.60
The onshore and offshore average construction FAR values are considered
approximate; analysis of the actual detail of the OGP electronic database will yield more
accurate values.

12 ©OGP
 RADD – Construction risk for offshore units

The finding that the onshore construction FAR is higher than the offshore construction
FAR overturns the previous E&P Forum datasheet which postulated that the offshore
FAR was higher.

4.2.2 Comparison with other industries

Comparing overall FARs with other industries as detailed in the original E&P Forum
datasheet is no longer seen as offering significant value and has not been included. The
OGP now has a wealth of data where it is possible to analyse data by geography,
operation/activity type and incident severity along with trending. This is of much greater
value than comparison with other industries.

4.2.3 Construction FAR breakdown by Region

It is conceivable that the OGP database enables this, although no attempts have been
made to postulate this using mathematical manipulation of the reported data.

4.2.4 Norwegian Construction Data

The average frequency of fatalities for the period 2001 up to and including the first half
of 2008 on the UK Continental Shelf is 2.9 per 100 million manhours against 1.2 on the
Norwegian Continental Shelf [11] (Page 30). However the report does not lend itself to
any interpretation of the contributions stemming from construction activity and
reference to the old data presented in the E&P Forum Construction datasheet is now
considered to be significantly out of date (very high values) and should be avoided.

5.0 Recommended data sources for further information

Country-specific accidents and incidents data bases may be interrogated depending on
the area that the installation will be deployed. As a starting point WOAD is a reliable
source of information that can be interrogated in a variety of ways. There are more
sources of data including, but not limited to, the HSE in the United Kingdom, the
Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) in the United States of America,
and the Petroleum Services Authority (Norway) and the increasingly valuable annual
OGP reports which do illustrate a breakdown along regional lines on some of their
construction statistics, e.g. Lost Time Injury Frequency but not on their FAR values.

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 RADD – Construction risk for offshore units

6.0 References
[1] DNV, 2009. Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD), v5.2. Search: February
2009.
[2] DNV, 2004. Exposure Data for Offshore Installations 1980-2002, Technical Note 22,
DNV internal documentation.
[3] UK Health & Safety Executive, 1996. The Offshore Installations and Wells (Design &
Construction, etc) Regulations, 1996.
[4] OGP, 2007. Safety performance indicators - 2006 data, OGP report no. 391.
[5] Trbojevic V.M., Bellamy L.J., Brabazon P.G., Gudmestad T., Rettedal W.K., 1994.
Methodology for the analysis of risks during the construction and installation
phases of an offshore platform, J Loss Prev. Process Ind., 1994 Vol 7(No 4).
[6] OGP, 2008. Safety performance indicators - 2007 data, OGP report no. 409. noting
erratum for FAR corrected in OGP Report 419
[7] DNV, 2007a. Accident statistics for fixed offshore units on the UK Continental Shelf
1980-2005, HSE Research Report RR566, Sudbury, Suffolk: HSE Books.
(http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrhtm/rr566.htm)
[8] DNV, 2007b. Accident statistics for floating offshore units on the UK Continental Shelf
1980-2005, HSE Research Report RR567, Sudbury, Suffolk: HSE Books.
(http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrhtm/rr567.htm)
[9] HSE, 2008. Offshore Injury, Ill Health, and Incident Statistics 2007/2008, HID Statistics
Report HSR 2008 - 1, Sudbury, Suffolk: HSE Books.
(http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/statistics/hsr0708.pdf)
[10] HSE, 2007. Offshore Injury, Ill Health, and Incident Statistics, 2006/2007, HID Statistics
Report HSR 2007 - 1, Sudbury, Suffolk: HSE Books.
(http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/statistics/hsr0607.pdf)
[11] Petroleum Safety Authority Norway, 2009. Trends in Risk Level in the Petroleum
Industry – Summary Report Norwegian Continental Shelf 2008.
http://www.ptil.no/getfile.php/PDF/RNNP%20sam%20eng%2008.%20til%20nettet.pd
f

14 ©OGP
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