d457 Note
d457 Note
d457 Note
on Banking Supervision
January 2019
This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org).
© Bank for International Settlements 2019. All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced or
translated provided the source is stated.
Explanatory note on the minimum capital requirements for market risk ................................................................... 1
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................................... 1
2. Background and rationale for revising the market risk framework ............................................................ 2
2.1 Deficiencies identified in the pre-crisis framework ........................................................................................... 2
2.2 Basel 2.5 reforms ............................................................................................................................................................. 2
2.3 Remaining issues with the Basel 2.5 market risk framework ......................................................................... 3
Worked example 1 – Sensitivities-based method for delta risk and the default risk capital requirement . 16
1. Delta risk capital requirement .................................................................................................................................. 16
2. Default risk capital requirement.............................................................................................................................. 18
Worked example 2 – Sensitivities-based method for vega risk and curvature risk .............................................. 19
1. Vega risk capital requirement .................................................................................................................................. 19
2. Curvature risk capital requirement......................................................................................................................... 19
Explanatory note on the minimum capital requirements for market risk iii
Explanatory note on the minimum capital requirements for
market risk
1. Introduction
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision introduced the first framework for minimum capital
requirements for market risk in January 1996. 1 The aim of the framework was to ensure that banks
maintained a minimum level of regulatory capital to absorb losses arising from movements in market
prices of instruments held in the trading book. Losses suffered by banks in the financial crisis of 2007-09
revealed that the design of the framework was not sufficient to ensure that banks could withstand such
significant market distress. In response, the Committee introduced a set of revisions to the market risk
framework in July 2009, often referred to as the Basel 2.5 reforms. 2 While these reforms addressed the
most pressing deficiencies of the framework, the Committee acknowledged that a number of structural
shortcomings that came to light during the crisis remained unaddressed. It therefore conducted a
“fundamental review of the trading book” (FRTB). The objective of the project was to develop a new,
more robust framework to establish minimum capital requirements for market risk, drawing on the
experience of “what went wrong” in the build-up to the crisis. 3
In January 2016, the Committee published the revised framework Minimum capital requirements
for market risk (hereafter the “revised market risk framework”). 4 The revised market risk framework:
• specified stricter criteria for the assignment of instruments to the trading book;
• overhauled the internal models approach to better address risks that were observed during the
crisis;
• reinforced the supervisory approval processes for the use of internal models; and
• introduced a new, more risk-sensitive standardised approach.
In the course of monitoring the implementation and expected impact of the framework, the
Committee identified a number of issues that needed to be addressed prior to its implementation.
Consequently, in December 2017, the Committee’s governing body, the Group of Central Bank
Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS), announced an extension of the framework’s
implementation from the original 1 January 2019 date to 1 January 2022. In March 2018, the Committee
published a consultative document to propose improvements to the framework to address the issues it
had identified and to propose a simplified alternative to the new standardised approach for banks with
1
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate market risks, January 1996,
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs24.pdf.
2
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework (updated as of 31 December 2010),
February 2011, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs193.pdf.
3
The Committee subsequently published three consultative documents on the trading book review prior to the January 2016
publication of the revised framework: Fundamental review of the trading book, May 2012, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs219.pdf;
Fundamental review of the trading book: A revised market risk framework, October 2013, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs265.pdf; and
Fundamental review of the trading book: Outstanding issues, December 2014, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d305.pdf.
4
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Minimum capital requirements for market risk, January 2016,
www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d352.pdf.
The financial crisis exposed a number of shortcomings in the pre-crisis market risk framework that had
been in place since 1996. The definition of the regulatory boundary between the banking book
(ie exposures generally subject to credit risk capital requirements) and the trading book (ie exposures
generally subject to market risk capital requirements) relied solely on the bank’s intent to trade an
instrument, and proved to be a key design weakness. It left open the possibility for a bank to move
instruments between its trading book and its banking book in pursuit of lower capital requirements,
often resulting in insufficient capital requirements relative to an instrument’s risks. In addition, risk
measurement methodologies to determine market risk capital requirements were insufficient. The
internal models approach – which allowed banks to determine capital requirements via use of their own
internal models – was not sufficiently comprehensive to incorporate all relevant risk drivers that could
lead to material losses. The standardised approach (ie the framework’s non-models-based approach to
determining capital requirements) lacked risk sensitivity and therefore was not a credible alternative and
complement to the internal models approach. When banks’ internal models performed poorly,
supervisors faced challenges in requiring banks to switch to use of the standardised approach in a short
time frame, as the risk-insensitive design of the standardised approach could lead to a large increase in
capital requirements for banks with significant trading activities.
In response to these weaknesses, the Basel 2.5 reforms, published in July 2009 (and updated in 2010),
addressed the immediate need to ensure adequate capital requirements for trading activities. The
reforms improved the internal model risk measure – value-at-risk (VaR) – that served as the basis for
market risk capital requirements in the pre-crisis framework by introducing an additional VaR-based
capital requirement calibrated to stressed market conditions. The “stressed VaR” metric takes better
account of tail risk – losses that banks can suffer in a stressed period. An additional capital requirement
for the credit risk associated with trading book instruments was introduced to the internal models
approach via the incremental risk capital (IRC) framework. The IRC framework determined capital
5
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Revisions to the minimum capital requirements for market risk, March 2018,
www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d436.pdf.
6
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Minimum capital requirements for market risk, January 2019,
www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d457.pdf.
2.3 Remaining issues with the Basel 2.5 market risk framework
Although a material improvement, the Basel 2.5 reforms did not address key structural shortcomings in
the market risk framework:
• Issues with the scope of application were not fully addressed. The July 2009 revisions made only
minor amendments to the specification of instruments that should be excluded from, or
included in, the trading book. The revisions did not change the key determinant upon which
application of the credit risk framework or the market risk framework to a given instrument was
based – the bank’s intent to trade the instrument. This inherently subjective criterion made the
boundary between the application of the credit risk and market risk frameworks difficult to
enforce in a consistent manner, and allowed for the possibility of banks to engage in regulatory
arbitrage between the capital requirements of the banking book and the trading book where it
was determined that lower capital requirements would apply in one or the other.
• Several weaknesses in the internal models approach remained. The Committee identified a
number of weaknesses stemming from the use of the VaR metric as the basis of capital
requirements, including:
(a) Incentives for banks to take on tail risk. Even though the Basel 2.5 framework better
accounted for tail risk by introducing the stressed VaR requirement, the design of the VaR
and stressed VaR metrics fundamentally ignored losses that had less than a 1% probability
of occurring. This created perverse incentives to hold positions that featured significant tail
risks but were subject to limited risk in “normal” conditions.
(b) Inability to capture the risk of market illiquidity. The Basel 2.5 framework assumed that
individual banks would be able to exit or hedge their trading book exposures over a 10-day
period without affecting market prices. However, in times of stress, the market is likely to
become illiquid rapidly when the banking system as a whole holds similar exposures. This
happened at the height of the crisis as banks were unable to exit or hedge positions in a
short time frame, resulting in substantial mark-to-market losses.
(c) Inability to capture adequately the credit risk inherent in trading positions. The VaR and
stressed VaR metrics did not adequately incorporate the credit risk to which trading book
positions may be subject. The 10-day time horizon over which VaR and stressed VaR
estimated potential losses was too short to account for losses incurred in the event of
default or in the event of the credit rating downgrade of the issuer of an instrument. This
weakness meant that, with the rapid growth in the market for traded credit in the early
2000s, banks held large, undercapitalised exposures to credit-related instruments in their
trading books. The introduction of the IRC model via the Basel 2.5 reforms addressed this
7
Basel 2.5 reforms limited the use of internal modelling for securitisations positions to correlation trading book portfolios.
This section sets out the key elements introduced in the January 2016 standard Minimum capital
requirements for market risk. The revisions introduced in the amended framework are also summarised
below.
3.1 Scope of application under the January 2016 market risk framework
The January 2016 market risk framework’s specification of the scope of application for market risk capital
requirements (commonly referred to as the “boundary” between the trading book and the banking
book) is designed to improve consistency of implementation and to reduce arbitrage opportunities
between the capital requirements for market risk and credit risk. Under the revised market risk
framework, the basis for the boundary is still trading intent, but the framework has been bolstered by
additional specifications and enhancements, including:
• Additional specification on the appropriate contents of the trading book. Recognising that the
market risk and credit risk capital requirements address different types of risk, the revised
boundary sets out a list of instruments that must be allocated to the trading book and a list of
instruments that must be allocated to the banking book – banks are not permitted to deviate
from these lists. Additionally, the definition of the trading book is supplemented with a list of
instruments “presumed” to be in the trading book. A bank must receive supervisory approval
for any deviations from these presumptions.
• Enhanced supervisory oversight. Banks must make available to supervisors reports that describe
the rationale for including instruments in the trading book and compliance with the
framework’s scope of application.
• Restrictions on the ability to arbitrage the boundary. The framework establishes a strict limit on
the movement of instruments between the banking book and the trading book. If the capital
requirement for an instrument is reduced as a result of moving the instrument from one book
to the other, the difference in the capital requirement as measured at the time of the move is
imposed as a fixed, additional Pillar 1 minimum capital requirement.
Further amendments made in the January 2019 revision to the scope of application
In the course of monitoring banks’ implementation of the framework’s revised scope of application, the
Committee identified areas where the clarity of the requirements warranted improvement. It also
recognised that the treatment of specific instruments necessitated amendment in order to reduce
implementation burden. The January 2019 revision includes refinements and clarifications in three main
areas:
• Clarifications regarding to which regulatory book instruments are to be assigned. The Committee
identified that, in some cases, a financial instrument could be included both in the list of
instruments that must be in a particular book, and in the list of instruments that are expected to
be in the other book. In these cases, it was not clear which requirement would take precedence.
The amended framework clarifies the approach in these situations.
• Treatment of investments in funds (eg investment funds or similar types of managed funds). The
January 2016 framework lacked clarity with regard to necessary criteria for investment funds to
be allocated to the trading book, when a bank cannot look through the fund to its underlying
assets. The amended framework permits equity investments in funds to be allocated to the
trading book if the bank is able to “look through” to the fund’s underlying assets (ie determine
capital requirements based on the underlying positions held by the fund), or where the bank
has access both to daily price quotes and to the information contained in the mandate of the
fund.
• Treatment of structural foreign currency positions. As was the case under the Basel 2.5
framework, the January 2016 framework permitted banks to exclude certain foreign currency
risk positions from foreign exchange (FX) capital requirements, if those positions were entered
into or maintained with the intent to completely or partially hedge adverse effects of exchange
rate movements on the bank’s risk-based capital ratio. The amount of the exclusion was limited
to the amount of the bank’s investments in subsidiaries. To better align with banks’ risk
management practices, the amended framework revises the limit to the amount that serves to
neutralise fluctuation of the bank’s risk-based capital ratio due to FX movements.
3.2 Internal models approach under the January 2016 market risk framework
The internal models approach under the January 2016 market risk framework features an enhanced,
more granular model approval process to ensure that internal models are used only where they estimate
risk appropriately. The approach is also designed to better capture credit and tail risks and to
incorporate the risk of market illiquidity. It replaced the Basel 2.5 internal models approach’s heavy
reliance on VaR, and includes three components for measuring capital requirements which are described
in more detail below: (i) an expected shortfall (ES) metric, which determines capital requirements for
those market risk factors (ie market variables such as interest rates or equity prices that affect the value
of financial instruments) for which a sufficient amount of observable market data is available and
therefore are deemed suitable for modelling (“modellable” risk factors); (ii) a non-modellable risk factor
(NMRF) requirement for market risk factors with limited observable market data which are deemed not
suitable for modelling; and (iii) a default risk capital (DRC) requirement, to determine the capital
(ii) New type of internal model to capture tail risk and market illiquidity: expected shortfall
The revised internal models approach replaces VaR and stressed VaR with a single ES metric that is
calibrated to a period of significant market stress. Two features of this new metric address deficiencies in
the Basel 2.5 framework:
• ES captures the tail risks that are not accounted for in the existing VaR measures. While VaR
calculates the maximum potential loss at a certain confidence level (eg a 97.5% VaR measures a
loss that is expected to be exceeded only 2.5% of the time), ES calculates the average loss
above a certain confidence level (eg a 97.5% ES measures the average of the worst 2.5% of
losses). 8
8
In other words, whereas VaR calculates the losses at a single cut-off point in the distribution (eg 97.5%), ES looks at the
average of any loss that exceeds the cut-off point in the distribution. Therefore, if the same cut-off point is used for VaR and
for ES, the value of ES will be higher than the value of VaR. The difference between ES and VaR outcomes increases in cases
of fat-tailed distributions. In the revised market risk framework, the 97.5th percentile ES is roughly equivalent to the 99th
percentile VaR used in Basel 2.5.
VaR ES
• To recognise the risk of market illiquidity, the ES measure prescribes different liquidity horizons
for different risk factors. In this context, “liquidity horizon” is defined as the time required to exit
a position or to hedge a risk factor without materially affecting market prices under stressed
market conditions. The ES measure calculates the loss that a bank might suffer over the
specified liquidity horizon in a period of market stress – the measure will thus tend to calculate
higher capital requirements for less liquid risk factors.
Finally, the revised internal models approach limits the amount of diversification benefit
assumed in determining capital requirements. The total ES capital requirement is calculated as the
average of: (i) an “unconstrained” ES calculation, with diversification benefits recognised across all risk
classes (eg across interest rate, equity, FX, commodity and credit spread risks); and (ii) a simple sum of
separate ES calculations for each risk class, in which no diversification benefit across risk classes can be
recognised.
Further amendments made in the January 2019 revision for the internal models approach
The Committee’s monitoring following the January 2016 publication identified aspects of the internal
models approach that posed significant implementation challenges – in particular, the design of the
profit and loss attribution test. In addition, as banks began to investigate the range of risk factors
deemed non-modellable under the framework, some risk factors that appeared amenable to modelling
failed the conditions, and the impact of the NMRF framework was significantly greater than had
originally been estimated. The January 2019 revisions do not change the overall structure of the internal
models framework, but introduce targeted changes to address these issues.
• Revised P&L attribution (PLA) test metric and failure consequence. The revisions introduce new
PLA test metrics to better differentiate well performing models from poorly performing models.
To reduce potential cliff effects in capital requirements, the consequence of failing the test has
also been revised from the previous binary pass or fail outcome to a “traffic light” approach
with an intermediate “amber zone”. Trading desks in the “amber zone” may continue to use the
internal models approach but will be subject to a capital surcharge. Trading desks that
materially fail the test are determined to be in the “red zone” and must use the standardised
approach.
• Revised NMRF conditions and capitalisation approach. A number of revisions have been made to
reduce the conservatism and operational burden of this element of the framework.
(a) The quantitative conditions for a risk factor to be eligible for modelling have been
amended to include risk factors that have sufficient liquidity but may experience extended
periods during which there is limited trading (eg agricultural commodities). For example
the requirement of no more than a 30-day gap between real price observations has been
replaced by a requirement of a minimum of four real price observations in a 90-day period.
Where a risk factor fails this risk factor eligibility test, it may still be considered eligible for
modelling if there are a minimum of 100 real price observations in the previous 12 months.
In both cases banks are permitted to count only one real price observation per day.
(b) The calculation of the stressed loss for each NMRF has been simplified to reduce
operational burden. The January 2016 framework required banks to identify a separate
stress period for each NMRF for the calculation of stressed loss. The amended framework
allows banks to use a common stress period for all risk factors relevant to a particular risk
class (eg all interest rate risk factors). The period over which the loss should be calculated
has been amended to be the same as the liquidity horizon specified for the ES measure,
with a floor of 20 days.
(c) The aggregation approach to calculating the overall NMRF capital requirement
incorporates additional, but limited, diversification benefits. No diversification benefit was
recognised among NMRFs under the January 2016 framework other than for particular
types of credit risk factors – this led to an overly conservative level of NMRF capital
requirements.
9
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Regulatory consistency assessment programme (RCAP) – Analysis of risk-weighted
assets for market risk, January 2013, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs240.pdf.
10
Under IRC, banks had the option (subject to supervisory approval) to include equity positions.
3.3 Standardised approach under the January 2016 market risk framework
The revised standardised approach is designed to be more risk-sensitive than the Basel 2.5 framework (in
which the standardised approach was largely unchanged from the version introduced in 1996). It has
three components (shown in Graph 2), the sum of which determines the overall capital requirement:
(i) sensitivities-based method; (ii) standardised default risk capital requirement; and (iii) residual risk add-
on.
Graph 2: Structure of the revised market risk framework standardised approach
The Annex sets out a number of worked examples to illustrate the mechanics of key elements of the
revised standardised approach.
Further amendments made in the January 2019 revision to the standardised approach
The Committee’s monitoring of the implementation and impact of the revised standardised approach
highlighted areas where the approach to measuring risk factor losses, and their aggregation, was too
high in relation to the actual risk. In addition, the Committee identified a number of areas where the
approach could be simplified to reduce its operational burden. The January 2019 revisions include the
following changes to the sensitivities-based method:
• Under the FX risk class, the scope of currency pairs that are considered liquid, and are therefore
subject to lower risk weights, has been broadened. The overall approach to FX risk has also
been amended so that banks, subject to supervisory approval, may calculate FX risk with
respect to the currency in which they manage their trading business (their “base currency”)
11
Risk classes are interest rate risk, equity risk, FX risk, commodity risk, credit spread risk (non-securitisations), credit spread risk
(securitisations – non correlation trading portfolio) and credit spread risk (securitisations – correlation trading portfolio).
The standardised approach included in the January 2016 framework was developed to provide a risk-
sensitive approach for banks that do not require a modelled treatment for market risk, to serve as a
credible fallback to the internal models approach (IMA) and to facilitate transparent, consistent and
comparable reporting of market risk across banks and jurisdictions.
However, the Committee recognises that the sophistication of the revised standardised
approach’s sensitivities-based method may pose implementation challenges for some banks that have
relatively small or non-complex trading portfolios.
For those banks, the current Basel 2.5 standardised approach will be retained as a simplified
alternative to the revised standardised approach, subject to the application of specified scalars to ensure
a sufficiently conservative calibration of capital requirements for these banks. The scalars per risk class
are set at: 1.3 for interest rate risk; 3.5 for equity risk; 1.9 for commodity risk; and 1.2 for FX risk. As the
scalars are multiplied by the capital requirement calculated under the Basel 2.5 framework, the scalar of
1.3 for the interest rate risk means a 30% increase in capital requirements relative to Basel 2.5.
4. Impact assessment
The overall calibration of the framework is based on a limited set of data provided by banks, due to the
challenges banks face in establishing systems to assess all aspects of the revised framework prior to its
implementation.
12
As noted in the Committee’s report on the end-December 2017 Basel III monitoring exercise, QIS data for market risk
represent best efforts and are less robust than in other areas of the Committee’s Basel III monitoring exercise owing to the
large number of trading positions at individual banks that require, and will require, numerous manual adjustments until
systems reflecting the revised minimum capital requirements for market risk are available. See Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, Basel III Monitoring Report, October 2018, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d449.pdf.
1
The median value is represented by a horizontal line, with 50% of the values falling in the 25th to 75th percentile range shown by the box.
The upper and lower end points of the vertical lines generally show the range of the entire sample. The dots represent weighted averages.
Sample for distribution includes 93 Group 1 banks, 30 G-SIBs, 85 Group 2 banks, and the consistent sample of banks for the development
over time includes 36 Group 1 banks, 14 G-SIBs, 20 Group 2 banks.
For the sample of banks included in the impact analyses below, Table 1 shows the share of
market RWAs as a proportion of total RWAs based upon the Basel 2.5 framework, the January 2016
framework excluding the January 2019 amendments (2016 FRTB), and the amended framework (2019
FRTB). Overall, as of end-December 2017, based on the 2019 amended framework, market RWAs would
account for 5.3% of total RWAs on average, 13 compared with 4.4% under the Basel 2.5 framework and
7.2% under the original January 2016 framework.
The distribution of impact on the share of market risk capital requirements across the sample of
banks is illustrated in Graph 4.
13
The difference in the share of market risk capital requirement under the January 2016 framework between the Basel III
Monitoring Report (October 2018) and this note stems from the smaller size of the sample used for this analysis – banks that
did not contribute granular data to assess the impact of amended framework are not included.
Compared with the Basel 2.5 framework, the amended framework is estimated to result in a
median increase of 16%, and a weighted average increase of 22% in market risk capital requirements
(Table 2). The expected impact on banks that exclusively use the standardised approach is a 40%
increase for the median bank and a 30% increase on a weighted average basis, while the expected
impact on banks that use the internal models approach is a 5% increase for the median bank and a 20%
increase on a weighted average basis.
Estimated changes in market risk capital requirement under the amended framework
compared with the Basel 2.5 framework
All banks, in percent Table 2
Table 3 sets out the ratio of market risk capital requirements under the revised standardised
approach relative to capital requirements under the revised internal models approach. In practice, the
ratio for the FX risk class is expected to be lower given that these estimates, as noted above, do not
account for all amendments to the standard.
Table 4 shows the distribution of capital impacts for banks that could use the simplified
alternative to the standardised approach. Based on a sample of 13 banks that currently use only the
standardised approach to determine market risk capital requirements, the market risk capital
requirement would be expected to increase 43% for the median bank (57% on a weighted average
basis). The Committee notes, however, that the banks included in this sample may not be representative
of those banks that ultimately would be permitted by their supervisors to use the simplified alternative.
As noted above, the simplified alternative is intended to be used only by banks with smaller and less
complex trading book positions. Banks of this nature may not be well represented in the sample of
banks from which QIS data are collected.
This Annex provides worked examples of the key elements of the standardised approach. Worked
examples 1 and 2 illustrate the core calculation mechanics of the sensitivities-based method and of the
default risk capital requirement. Worked example 3 illustrates the application of a newly introduced
feature of the standardised approach – the base currency approach.
This example demonstrates the calculation of capital requirements for a portfolio of equities. A bank
uses USD as its reporting currency and has a portfolio containing the three equities described in
Table A1.1. The portfolio does not contain any options, so the elements of the standardised approach
that must be calculated are the sensitivities-based method delta risk capital requirement and the
standardised default risk capital (DRC) requirement.
Weighted
Market Sensitivity Risk weight
Issuer Sector sensitivity
value (a) (b)
(a) x (b)
Telecommunications
Telco A USD 200m USD 200m 35% USD 70m
(equity risk class bucket 6)
Telecommunications
Telco B USD –100m USD –100m 35% USD –35m
(equity risk class bucket 6)
Financials
Finco C USD 100m USD 100m 70% USD 70m
(equity risk class bucket 9)
The Graph A1 below provides an overview of the calculation steps for the delta risk capital requirement.
Graph A1: Steps for delta risk capital requirement
The bucket-level capital requirement for the bucket of Telco A and Telco B (bucket 6) is based
on a prescribed correlation parameter of 25%:
The bucket-level capital requirements are then aggregated using a prescribed cross-bucket
correlation parameter to produce the overall capital requirement for the equity risk class. For this
example, the prescribed correlation is 15%. The resultant equity risk class-level capital requirement is:
The capital requirement is the largest value of the low, medium and high correlations scenarios.
In this example, the low correlation scenario produces the largest outcome, resulting in an overall delta
risk capital requirement of USD 103.2 million for the portfolio.
In addition to the delta risk capital requirement, banks must calculate default risk capital requirements
for equities. The approach specifies (i) how banks should measure exposure at default (ie the jump-to-
default, or JTD, position) for instruments subject to default risk (ie the loss that would be incurred in the
event of a default on the part of the issuer) and (ii) risk weights. These two components are simply
multiplied together, with some offsetting benefit permitted between long and short positions.
For equities, the market price is the basis of the gross JTD positions. Thus the JTD positions for
the three equities are: 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴 = USD 200𝑚𝑚, 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐵𝐵 = USD − 100𝑚𝑚, 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶 = USD 100𝑚𝑚.
To recognise the hedging relationship between long and short positions, a fraction of the short
positions can be offset against the long positions. This fraction (the “hedge benefit ratio”) is calculated as
the ratio of long JTD positions to the summed absolute values of long and short JTD positions:
200𝑚𝑚 + 100𝑚𝑚 300𝑚𝑚
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = = = 0.75
200𝑚𝑚 + |−100𝑚𝑚| + 100𝑚𝑚 400𝑚𝑚
Each position is risk-weighted, with risk weights determined by the credit rating of the equity
issuer. In this example, Telco A is rated BBB, so receives a risk weight of 6%. Telco B and Finco C are both
rated B, so receive a risk weight of 30%.
The default risk capital requirement is: (i) the sum of risk-weighted long positions minus (ii) the
sum of risk-weighted short positions multiplied by hedge benefit ratio.
This worked example illustrates the implementation of the standardised approach vega and curvature
risk capital requirements for options (the approach for delta risk is described in worked example 1, so is
not addressed here). The example is from the perspective of a CAD reporting bank that holds a put
option on Telco D as described in Table A2.
Table A2.1
Exercise Market value
Instrument Currency Maturity Industry (CAD)
type
Telco D put option EUR Two years Telecoms European –0.38
The vega risk calculation process is the same as that used for the delta risk capital requirement, but
based on a different type of sensitivity – the sensitivity of the value of the options to a 1 basis point
change of the implied volatility of the underlying equity.
Step 1 is to calculate the sensitivity of the value of the option to movements in implied
volatility at specified tenor points. For the Telco D option, the relevant tenor points are: 0.5 years, 1 year
and 3 years.
Table A2.2
Vega sensitivity in CAD Equity risk bucket Tenor point (years)
0.5 1 3
Telco D put option 6 0.00 –0.63 –0.60
Step 2 is to multiply the sensitivities by a specified risk weight. In this case, the risk weight is
77.8%.
The risk-weighted net sensitivities (CAD) are:
Table A2.3
Vega sensitivity in CAD Equity risk bucket Tenor point (years)
0.5 1 3
Telco D put option 6 0.00 –0.49 –0.47
Step 3 is to aggregate risk-weighted sensitivities using a specified formula (the same formula
as for delta risk) and correlation assumption. The resulting vega capital requirement is CAD 0.95.
For curvature risk, the sensitivity is the difference between the actual change in value of the option and
the change in value estimated based on the option’s delta when equity prices move significantly. As
such, the curvature risk measurement captures the additional risk not captured by delta risk. Curvature
risk is based on two scenarios: one upward shock and one downward shock to the equity price. Applying
the prescribed shock (in this case 35%), the curvature risk sensitivity is:
Table A2.4
Curvature risk in CAD Bucket Upward shock Downward shock
The January 2019 revisions introduce the ”base currency” approach as an additional method to
determine FX risk. This worked example illustrates the mechanics of applying the approach.
The example is based on a CAD reporting bank with the net open FX positions set out in
Table A3.1. If the bank did not use the ”base currency” approach, it would calculate one sensitivity for
each exposure; but under the ”base currency” approach, the exposures would have two sensitivities
(illustrated in Steps 2 and 3 below).
Table A3.1
Under the ”base currency” approach, assuming that USD is the bank’s chosen ”base currency”,
the bank can transform the value of its FX positions into USD, measure the FX risk relative to USD, and
then translate the capital requirement back to CAD for reporting purposes.
Step 1 is to convert the value of all FX exposures to USD by applying the current CAD/USD spot
FX rate as shown in Table A3.2 below (the rate applied in the example is 1.2534).
Table A3.2