Philosophical Review

St. Thomas' Doctrine of Necessary Being

Author(s): Patterson Brown
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan., 1964), pp. 76-90
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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 ST. THOMAS' DOCTRINE
OF NECESSARY BEING

THE PURPOSE of this paper is to clear up several long-

standing misinterpretations of St. Thomas Aquinas' views
on necessary being.' I shall begin by quoting from the works of
several reputable philosophers who claim to be expounding
and/or criticizing St. Thomas' theory of necessary and contingent
existence, but who appear to have misunderstood his writings
on this topic. For example, J.J.C. Smart offers the following
summary and demolition of what he takes to be Aquinas' so-
called cosmological argument:

Everything in the world around us is contingent.That is, with regard

to any particular thing, it is quite conceivable that it might not have
existed. ... For a really satisfying explanation of why anything
contingent (such as you or me or this table) exists you must eventually
begin with something which is not itself contingent, that is, with some-
thing of which we cannot say that it might not have existed, that is
we must begin with a necessary being. So the first part of the argument
boils down to this. If anythingexistsan absolutelynecessarybeingmustexist.
Somethingexists. Thereforean absolutelynecessary
beingmustexist.
The second part of the argument is to prove that a necessarily
existing being must be an infinitely perfect being, that is, God. ...
The cosmological argument is radically unsound. ... For the
first stage of the argument purports to argue to the existence of a
necessary being. And by "a necessary being" the cosmological
argument means "a logically necessary being," i.e. "a being whose
non-existence is inconceivable in the sort of way that a triangle's
having four sides is inconceivable." The trouble is, however, that the
concept of a logically necessary being is a self-contradictory concept.
... The demand that the existence of God should be logicallynecessary

1 I am indebtedto Mr. P. T. Geachfor suggestingto me the generalinter-

pretationof St. Thomas'thoughtwhich I have attemptedto followout in this
essay. My thanksare also due to ProfessorWilliamE. Kennickfor a number
of helpfulsuggestionsconcerningan earlierversionof this paper.

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 ST. THOMAS O;NNECESSARY BEING

is thus a self-contradictory one.... We reject the cosmological argu-

ment, then, because it rests on a thorough absurdity.2

As I hope to show, the following assumptions which Smart has

here made are groundless, albeit widely shared: that St. Thomas
thought that everything in the world around us is or must be
contingent; that Aquinas held that a necessary being must be an
infinitely perfect being; and that by "necessary being" Aquinas
meant "logically necessary being." Similar misconceptions are
evident in P. Edwards' exposition:
This is the third of the five ways of Aquinas.... All around us we
perceive contingent beings. This includes all physical objects and also
all human minds. In calling them "contingent" we mean that they
might not have existed.... To say that there is a necessary being is
to say that it would be a self-contradiction to deny its existence.3

Again, we may quote R. W. Hepburn's account:

St. Thomas's Third Way-the argument about "might-not-have-
beens"-uses ... the concepts of "contingency" and "necessity."
The contingent is what happens to exist, but need not have existed:
necessary being is being that has to exist, that cannot not exist....
We could rephrase the Argument in this way: "The proposition
'God exists' is necessary." That is, it would be contradictory to deny
God's existence.4

And C. B. Martin is in the same muddle:

St. Thomas claims that ... since something does now exist, there must
exist a Being for whom it is not possible for it not to exist. ... The
difficulty with [this claim] is . . . that it suggests that God's existence
is logically necessary. That is, it suggests that it does not make sense

2 "The Existence of God," ChurchQuarterlyReview (I955); reprinted by

A. Flew and A. MacIntyre (eds.), New Essays in PhilosophicalTheology(New
York, 1955), pp. 35-39.
3 Editor's Introduction to section entitled "The Existence of God" by
A. Pap and P. Edwards (eds.), A ModernIntroductionto Philosophy(Glencoe,
1957), p. 455. I have omitted Edwards' actual statement of what he takes to
be Aquinas' argument, as it follows the same lines as Smart's delineation.
4 Christianity
andParadox(London, I 958), p. I 7 . Hepburn goes on to consider
another interpretation of "necessary" which bears greater resemblance to
St. Thomas' doctrine.

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 PA TTERSON BROWN

to say that it is possible that God should not exist. But, surely, we can
understand what it would be like for God not to exist. What we can
understand is a possibility.5
As a final example, we may note that Father Copleston has
ascribed to the Angelic Doctor the view that "there can be but
one necessary being."6
A large number of commentators have, like Smart, interpreted
the first part of Aquinas' Third Way according to the following
schema:
(i) If anything exists, then there must exist a logically
necessary being.
(2) Something exists.
(3) Therefore: there must exist a logically necessary being.
St. Thomas would have to have been rather artless to defend such
an argument. For the most obvious point about it is that the two
premises are entirely superfluous. That is to say, if God's existence
is supposed to be logically necessary, then surely the conclusion
will stand on its own. Step (3), in short, itself constitutes the
rationalistic version of the ontological argument. So, if this
interpretation of Aquinas' demonstration were correct, the Third
Way would really be an a prior proof merely masquerading as
a posterior (cf. n. 42, infra).
The foregoing shows a complete misunderstanding of St.
Thomas' thought, however. For, to begin with, he writes about
necessary beings other than God so often in his works that it is
hard to imagine how anyone who bothered to check could over-
look the point. The most obvious passage on this matter is in the
last part of the Third Way itself:
Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist
something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary
thing either has its necessity caused by another or not. Now it is
impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their
necessity caused by another. ... Therefore we cannot but admit the
existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not
receiving it from another. This all men speak of as God.7
5 ReligiousBelief (Ithaca, N. Y., 1959), pp. 151-152.
6 A Historyof Philosophy(London, I959), ii, 363.
7 SummaTheologica(hereafter S. T.), I, Q. 2, Art. 3.

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 ST. THOMAS ON NECESSARY BEING

This, the very passage which Smart and the others are claiming
to expound and discuss, both admits the possibility of a plurality
of necessary beings, and also explicitly states that a being's
necessity can be causedby another being. This latter point, one
would have thought, conclusively rules out the possibility that by
"necessary being" Aquinas meant "being whose existence is
logically necessary." For it would be naive to think that there
could be an efficient cause for what is logically necessary. And
St. Thomas' admission that there might in principle be many
necessary beings should lead one to doubt whether he thought
that "x exists necessarily" entails "x is an infinitely perfect being;
that is, God"-Kant to the contrary notwithstanding.
Now we find the following, rather unambiguous, assertion
in the Summa Theologica:"there are many necessary things in
existence."8 Again, Aquinas speaks of "those necessary things
that are created."9 Further, he mentions "all that is in things
created by God, whether it be contingent or necessary. "10 Nor
does St. Thomas fail to particularize: "heavenly bodies, with
their movements and dispositions, are necessary beings";" ; "in
the heavenly bodies, the substantial being ... is unchangeable" ;12
"the heavenly bodies ... are incorruptible."113 Further: "the
intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incor-
ruptible" ;14 "of all creatures, the rational creature chiefly is
ordained for the good of the universe, being per se incorruptible."'5
Further: "matter ... is incorruptible, since it is the subject of
generation and corruption."16 And lastly: "it must necessarily
be maintained that the angels are incorruptible of their own

8 S. T., I,
Q.44, Art. i, Obj. 2 (although the passage quoted actually occurs
in an Objection, St. Thomas' Reply implicitly accepts its truth); see also
Q. ig, Art. 8 and Q. 22, Art. 4.
9 S. i., I-II, Q. 93, Art. 4, Reply Obj. 3.
10 S. T., I-II, Q. 93, Art. 4.
1 S. T., I, Q. I15, Art. 6, Obj. i (again, the Reply does not dispute the
quoted statement).
12 S.T., I, Q. io, Art. 5; cf. also Q. 66, Art. 2.
13 S. T., I,
QI 75, Art. 6.
14 Ibid.
15 S.T., I, Q. 23, Art. 7.
16 S.T., I, Q. 104, Art. 4.

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 PA TTERSON BROWN

nature" ;17 "the angels ... have, as regards their nature, an

unchangeable being" ;18 "in the form itself [of an angel] there is
no potency to non-being; and so such creatures are immutable
and invariable as regards their being."19 It is quite certain,
therefore, that St. Thomas held that celestial bodies, human
souls, prime matter, and angels are one and all necessary beings.
And so he clearly did not think that God alone exists necessarily.
The foregoing implies, as I previously hinted, that Kant was
entirely wrong in his contention that the cosmological argument
subsumes the ontological argument-at least if he intended this
polemic to weigh against St. Thomas. The following well-known
passage from the Critiqueof Pure Reason is simply not germane to
Aquinas' natural theology:
The cosmological proof uses ... experience only for a single step in
the argument, namely, to conclude the existence of a necessary being.
What properties this being must have, the empirical premise cannot
is a concept,and
tell us. . . . If I say, the conceptof the ens realissimum
indeed the only concept, which is appropriate and adequate to neces-
sary existence, I must also admit that necessary existence can be
inferred from this concept. Thus the so-called cosmological proof
really owes any cogency which it may have to the ontological proof
from mere concepts.20
It cannot have been St. Thomas' opinion, at any rate, that the
concept of the ens realissimumor perfectissimumis the only concept
which is proper to necessary existence. For he obviously did not
hold that those necessary beings which are God's creatures are
themselves most real or perfect beings. Kant's celebrated refuta-
tion is completely off the mark.
In the light of what has been said, it cannot reasonably be
thought that Aquinas considered that a necessary being is one
which cannot not-exist. For he of course opined that everything
but God is a creature of God; "everything, that in any way
is, is from God."'21And this implies that some necessary things-

17 S.T., I, Q. 5o, Art. 5.

18 S.T., I, Q. iO, Art. 5.
19 S.T., I, Q. 9, Art. 2.
20 A6o6-607, B634-635.
21 S.T., I, Q.44, Art. i.

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 ST. THOMAS ON NECESSART BEING

namely, all of them save God-are created. Some people have

held, writes Aquinas, that
what is necessary has no cause. But [St. Thomas replies] this is mani-
festly false. ... There are some necessary things which have a cause
of their necessity. But the reason why an efficient cause is required
is not merely because the effect can not-be, but because the effect
would not be if the cause were not.22
So St. Thomas quite openly asserts that necessary things can
not-exist, and moreover can have a cause of their (necessary)
being. This is just faithful Aristotelianism, since the Philosopher
had written that "some things owe their necessity to something
other than themselves; others do not, but are themselves the
source of necessity in other things."23 Accordingly, Aquinas states
that "to create belongs to God alone; and hence whatever can
be caused only by creation [ex nihilo] is caused by God alone-viz.,
all those things which are not subject to generation and cor-
ruption."24 But all creatures, necessary and contingent, began to
exist a finite time ago; "God is the Creator of the world in such
a way that the world began to be."25 So the necessary creatures
not only can not-be, but in addition they have not everlastingly
been. Therefore, it cannot possibly have been St. Thomas' view
that "x exists necessarily" is equivalent to "it is logically impossible
that x should not exist." This is stated with clarity by Aquinas
in his reply to Aristotle's argument26 that the presence of necessary
beings in the world proves that the world never began to exist:
Whatever has the power always to be, from the fact of that power
cannot sometimes be and sometimes not-be. However, before it received
that power [from its creator], it did not exist. Hence this argument
[of Aristotle's] . . . does not prove absolutely that incorruptible beings
never began to be; it proves that they did not begin according to the
natural process by which generable and corruptible beings begin
to be.27
22 S.T., I, Q. 44, Art. i, Reply Obj. 2.
23 Metaphysica,bk. V, ch. 5.
24 S. T., I, Q.47, Art. i.
25 S. T., I, QA46, Art. 2.
26 De Caelo, bk. I, ch. I 2.
27S.T., I, Q. 46, Art, i, Reply Obj. 2.

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 PATTERSON BROWN

We must conclude, then, that Aquinas did not hold either that
everything in the natural world is contingent, or that a necessary
being is one which cannot possibly not-exist, or that any being
which is necessary must be the ens realissimumor perfectissimum.
If it be demonstrated that St. Thomas did not understand
by "necessary existence" what he is commonly thought to have
understood, then it is incumbent upon me to explain what he did
mean by that phrase. And our previous quotations suggest that
Aquinas meant by the term "necessary," as applied to beings,
that they be neither generable nor corruptible.28 That is to say,
a necessary being is defined as one which cannot come into
existence via conglomeration, construction, or reformationo, and
which cannot pass out of existence via deterioration, destruction,
or deformation. This notion is obviously derived from Aristotle
(see De Caelo, Bk. I, Chs. 9-I2; De Generationeet Corruptione,Bk. II,
Ch. i i; Metaphysica,Bk. II, Ch. 2, Bk. V, Ch. 5, Bk. VI, Chs. I-4,
and Bk. XII, Chs. i-io). In short, for both Aristotle and Aquinas,
a necessarybeing is one which cannotundergoany essentialchangein any
of the ways permitted by the Aristotelian theories of matter and
form, potentiality and actuality, and simplicity and complexity.
So, as we have already seen (notes 23 and 26), Aristotle thought
that a necessary being can have a cause but nonetheless cannot
possibly come into or pass out of existence, since to do either
would involve a change in the above-mentioned sense. And St.
Thomas followed Aristotle in holding that a necessary being
could not begin or cease existing by any "natural" process allowed
by the Aristotelian physics; but Aquinas added that such beings
can come into existence via creation ex nihilo, as well as pass out
of existence via total annihilation.29 A necessary being, then,
is one which cannot undergo any essential alteration-though
all of them but God can undergo accidental change (cf. n. 33).
With regard to the angels, for instance, St. Thomas says the
following:

28 It must be borne in mind that "necessary" was for St. Thomas an alethic

modality de re, not de dicto; by "x necessarily exists" he did not mean "N(x
exists)." Cf. G. H. von Wright, An Essay in Modal Logic (Amsterdam, I951).
29 See nn. 24 and 27, and S. T., I, Qs. 44-46, 65-66, and 104, as well as
Q.s o, Art. 5, Q. 6i, Art. i, and Q. go, Art. 2.

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 ST. THOMAS ON NECESSARY BEING

It must necessarily be maintained that the angels are incorruptible

of their own nature. The reason for this is that nothing is corrupted
except by the separation of its form from matter. Hence, since an
angel is a subsisting form [without any matter], ... it is impossible
for its substance to be corruptible. . . . Therefore, the angel's imma-
teriality is the reason why it is incorruptible by its own nature....
There is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity.
Hence it is not repugnant to a necessary being[my italics]
or incorruptible
to depend for its being on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is
said that all things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless
preserved by God, this does not mean that there is any principle of
corruption in the angels, but that the being of the angels is dependent
upon God as its cause. For a thing is not said to be corruptible because
God can reduce it to non-being, by withdrawing His act of preser-
vation; but because it has some principle of corruption within itself,
or some contrariety, or at least the potentiality of matter.30
For St. Thomas, then, "x exists necessarily" entails each of the
following propositions: "x can undergo no substantial change,"
"x is a subsisting being," x is neither generable nor corruptible,"
and "x can come into existence only via creation ex nihilo, and
can pass from existence only via total annihilation"-none of
which, it should be noted, entails "there is an x." Aristotle's
doctrine was the same, except that he had not allowed for creation
or annihilation:
In its most proper use the predicate "indestructible" is given because
it is impossible that the thing should be destroyed, i.e. exist at one
time and not at another [subsequent time]. And "ungenerated" also
involves impossibility when used for that which cannot be generated,
in such fashion that, while formerly it was not, later it is.
What is "of necessity" coincides with what is "always," since that
which "must be" cannot possibly "not-be." Hence a thing is eternal
if its "being" is necessary: and if it is eternal, its "being" is necessary.31
These two quotations show that the Philosopher held that
necessary beings are those whose existence is neither generable
30 S. T., I, Q. 50, Art. 5 and Reply Obj. 3; cf. also Q. 66, Art. 2 and Q. 75,
Art. 6, where Aquinas gives parallel arguments for the necessity of celestial
bodies and human souls.
31 De Caelo,bk. I, ch. i I; De Generatione
et Corruptione,bk. II, ch. i I.

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 PA TTERSON BR O WN

nor corruptible by any natural process. All that Aquinas added

to this was the notion of a supernatural beginning or ceasing to be,
namely by the creation or annihilation of a necessary thing's
entire being, effected by another being.
The distinction between the necessity of God and the necessity
of angels, prime matter, souls, or celestial bodies is simply that
the latter are all created by God-who is defined for the purposes
of St. Thomas' natural theology as the untreated creator (Aquinas
says that his purpose is to demonstrate concerning God "whether
He exists, and ... what must necessarily belong to Him, as the
first cause of all things").32 Thus, St. Thomas writes:
God alone is altogether immutable, whereas every creature is in some
way mutable. We must observe ... that a mutable thing can be so
called in two ways: by a power in itself, and by a power possessed by
another. For all creatures, before they existed, were possible, not by
any created power, since no creature is eternal, but by the divine
power alone, inasmuch as God could bring them into being....
Therefore, as it was in the Creator's power to produce them before
they existed in themselves, so likewise it is in the Creator's power,
when they exist in themselves, to bring them to nothing. In this way,
therefore, by the power of another-namely, of God-they are mutable,
inasmuch as they were producible from nothing by Him, and are by
Him reducible from being to non-being.
If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power existing in it-
[self], in this way also every creature is in some regard mutable. ...
In every creature there is a potentiality to change: either as regards
substantial being, as in the case of corruptible things; or as regards
being in place only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as regards
the order to their end, and the application of their powers to divers
objects, as is the case with the angels; and universally all creatures
generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose power
is their being and non-being. Hence, since God is mutable in none of
these ways [i.e. neither in Himself (whether essentially or accidentally),
nor by the power of another], it belongs to Him alone to be altogether
immutable. 33
The corresponding passage from Aristotle reads as follows:

32 S.T., I, Q. I2, Art. I2 (my italics).

33 S. T., I, Q. 9, Art. 2; see also Q. 104, passim.

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 ST. THOMAS ON NECESSARY BEING

If something is moved it is capable of being otherwise than as it is.

Therefore if [as in the case of the heavenly bodies] its actuality is the
primary form of spatial motion [i.e. circular motion], then in so far
as it is subject to change, in thisrespect it is capable of being otherwise
-in place, even if not in substance. But since there is something
which moves [others] while itself unmoved, existing actually, this can
in no way be otherwise than as it is. ... The first mover, then, exists
of necessity. .. . [It] cannot be otherwise, but can only exist in a single
way.34
According to St. Thomas, therefore, there are three sorts of
beings. (i) Contingent beings: these are nonsubsisting; that is,
generable and corruptible, as well as mutable in various inessential
ways. (2) Necessary creatures:these are subsisting beings; that is,
ungenerable and incorruptible, but yet are mutable in various
ways which do not pertain to their essential being, and in addition
they are created ex nihilo by another, who could therefore anni-
hilate them. And (3) the untreatednecessarybeing: he is ungenerable
and incorruptible, and thus subsists, but is not mutable in any
inessential way either; moreover, he is uncreated and therefore
cannot be annihilated. Thus God is, as it were, underivatively
necessary, whereas the other necessary beings were created as such
by God. And, of course, God also created the contingent creatures
-although, "just as accidents and forms and other non-subsisting
things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought
to be called concreatedrather than created things. . . Properly
speaking, it is subsisting beings [alone] which are created."35
So all things can come into and pass from existence except God,
who is defined as the first being-from which it follows, Aquinas
claims, that he is ungenerable, incorruptible, nonannihilable,
and entirely immutable.
Let us now return to the first half of the Third Way, in which
St. Thomas tries to demonstrate that if anything exists, then
at least one necessary being exists:
We find in nature [some] things that are possible to be and not to be,
since they are found to be generated and to be corrupted; and con-

34Metaphysica, bk. XII, ch. 7.

5 S.T., I, Q. 45,
Art 4.

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 PATTERSON BROWN

sequently, it is possible for them to be and not to be. But it is impos-

sible for these always to exist, for that which can not-be at some time
is not. Therefore, if everything can not-be, then at one time there
was nothing [left] in existence. Now, if this were true, even now there
would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist
begins to exist only through [the agency of] something already existing.
Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been
impossible for anything [subsequently] to have begun to exist; and
thus even now nothing would be in existence-which is absurd.
Therefore, not all beings are merely possible [or contingent], but there
must exist something [i.e., at least one thing] the existence of which
is necessary [and so forth].36
I think that St. Thomas' reasoning here can be paraphrased as
follows. Some (but not all) of the things that we find around us
in the world are seen to be either generating or perishing, and are
thus shown to be inherently corruptible. Thus, mountains are thrust
up only to erode away, animals are born only to grow old and die
whereupon their bodies decompose, clouds gather and disperse,
metal is hammered into one or another shape but subsequently
rusts and disintegrates, and so on. This is really the crux of the
Third Way, but unfortunately it is very often misunderstood. The
point is not that contingent beings in principle can not-be; rather
it is that they have a built-in process of corruption, an actual
progress toward non-being. A typical misconstruction of this
point, for example, has been made by C. B. Martin, who writes
that "it is hard to see how St. Thomas came to assert" that "if a
thing is possible to be and not to be, then at some time that thing
is not."37 What Aquinas was in fact contending was that when
we see certain things in the world actually being generated,
surviving awhile, and finally succumbing to deterioration,
we thereby know that such things are naturally corruptible
or contingent. And anything which is inherently corruptible
must in fact corrupt, and thus eventually cease to exist. Again,
part of the source is Aristotle:
It is impossible that the destructible should not at some time be
destroyed. For otherwise it will always be at once destructible and in
36 S.T., I, Q. 2, Art. 3.
37 Op. Cit., p. I5I.

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 ST. THOMAS ON NECESSARY BEING

actuality indestructible, so that it will be at the same time capable

of always existing and of not always existing. Thus the destructible
is at some time actually destroyed.38
But now, the Third Way continues, if there existed only such
inherently deteriorating things, then obviously the day would
come in which each contingent thing had completed its own
built-in process of corruption; and so on that day nothing would
remain in existence. Thus, to take a simple analogy, if clocks
ceased existing as soon as they ran down, then the time would
come when there were no clocks left-unless we also hypothesize
some being continually to wind them and/or make new clocks.
Similarly, a modern-day St. Thomas might argue, if the Second
Law of Thermodynamics is true, then the time must arrive in
which entropy is maximal and all energy dispersed. Moreover,
if past time be infinite (which, Aquinas says, it would have to be
if there were no Creator, since the world cannot have come into
existence without a cause),39 then this day of universal decay
and death would already have arrived; for in an infinite amount
of time all the individual processes of corruption would have been
completed. Now, if indeed this had ever come to pass in the history
of the world-namely, that nothing at all existed-then there
would still be nothing in being at the present time. Things cannot
just have begun to exist again without some cause; so that there
can have been no fresh beginning, as it were. But there are
obviously many things currently in existence which have thus
not utterly corrupted. We must therefore conclude that our earlier
premise was wrong; there do not exist onlyinherently deteriorating,
contingent things. There must in fact exist some being or beings
which by their nature do not progress toward nonexistence.
And so, as a preliminary conclusion, Aquinas feels forced to
postulate at least one necessary being, that is, at least one being
which has no inherent propensity to corrupt. Such a necessary
being could then continually cause new corruptible things to
come into being as the older ones died off. And indeed, we do
find some necessary things in the world around us-for example,

38 De Caelo,bk. I, ch. I 2.
39 Cf. S.T., I, Q. 46, passim.

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 PATTERSON BROWN

human souls, the heavenly bodies, and prime matter (a contem-

porary St. Thomas might suggest, in place of the latter pair, the
subatomic particles and/or energy quanta, which are necessary
in the Aristotelian sense).
Now, the Third Way continues, not all of the incorruptible
beings need be creators; but at least one of them must be, as
otherwise the continually renewed supply of deteriorating and
expiring things cannot be accounted for. Some of the necessary
beings, then, may themselves be created (cf. n. 22); and we know
that at least one of them must be a creator. The question now
arises: can there be an infinite regress of these subsisting beings,
each having been created by another? Aquinas' answer to this
is no. I pick up the quotation of the Third Way at the point
where we left it earlier:
Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist
something [i.e. at least one thing] the existence of which is necessary.
But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another,
or not. Now it is impossible to go on [regressing] to infinity in necessary
things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been
proved already [in the Second Way] in regard to efficient causes.
Therefore we cannot but admit the existence of some being having
of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather
causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.40
At first sight, the suggestion of uniqueness in the next-to-last
sentence here seems to be a non sequitur, since it has not been
demonstrated that there is only one uncreated necessary being.
St. Thomas goes on to try to prove this point, however (I, Q. 3,
Arts. 3 and 4, Q. ii, Art. 3, Q. 44, Art. i, and Q. 45, Art. 5).
So perhaps the disputed sentence could be restated in the following
way: "Therefore we cannot but admit the existence of at least
one being having of itself its own necessity, not receiving it from
another, and which may cause in others their necessity." This
seems especially likely in light of the fact that, in the first sentence
of the above quotation, Aquinas uses "something" to mean "at
least one thing," as we previously noted. It is thus plausible to
believe that, in the next-to-last sentence, he employs "some

40 S.T., I, Q. 2, Art 3.

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 ST. THOMAS ON NECESSART BEING

being" to mean "at least one being." Admittedly, this inter-

pretation is prima facie difficult to square with the concluding
sentence of the demonstration: "This all men speak of as God."
I can only suggest that St. Thomas was, in the last two sentences
of his Third Way, tacitly presupposing his own subsequent proof
regarding uniqueness. Otherwise, I cannot understand why he
should have felt obliged to offer that proof at all.
The gist of Aquinas' uniqueness argument, in short, is that
the concept "uncreated creator" involves the notion of an identity
of suppositum,essence, and being; and this triple identity, in turn,
involves the notion of uniqueness. A first being's suppositumand
essence must be identical because a creator must as such be
a form without matter, and forms are individuated of themselves.
And to add that a first being's existence is the same as its suppositum-
cum-essence is just to say that it exists of itself, that is, is untreated.
The mistake is often made of thinking that St. Thomas' doctrine
of identical essence and being is the same as his doctrine of neces-
sary existence; but this is emphatically not so. Only a being which
is both necessary and also uncreated is supposed by Aquinas to
have an identity of essence and being. This crucial aspect of the
Angelic Doctor's thought comes out in statements like "God
alone is Being by virtue of His own essence (since His essence is
His being), whereas every creature has being by participation,
so that its essence is not its being."'41 In other words, to be a
creature (to exist "by participation") is to owe one's existence
to another being; whereas to be uncreated (to exist "of oneself")
is to own one's own existence, to have it as part of one's own
essence. So the identity of God's essence and being by no means
implies that he actually exists, but only that his existence would
be underived. After all, Aquinas explicitly rejected the idea of
basing an ontological argument on the unity of God's essence
and being.42 Since "x is both necessary and uncreated" entails
"the suppositumof x is identical with the essence of x," it follows
that all beings which are both necessary and uncreated must
share one and the same suppositum-which is to say, must be the
41 S.T., I, Q. I04, Art. i.
42 See the third argument which he entertains in the SummaContraGentiles,
I, ch. i O, together with his reply in ch. I I.

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 PA TTERSON BROWN

same individual. And so, St. Thomas concludes, there can in

principle be only one first being, that is, only one God.
My purpose in this essay has been merely to delineate St.
Thomas' doctrine of necessary being, and not to criticize it.
There are, I think, some very severe difficulties in the Aristotelian
notion of necessary existence, as well as in Aquinas' employment
of this concept in his natural theology. But we cannot intelligently
discuss these issues until we are clear on what the doctrine really
was. I hope that this essay has made a step toward that under-
standing.
PATTERSON BROWN
HarperCollege,State Universityof New rork

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