Afp Manual For Courts Martial
Afp Manual For Courts Martial
Afp Manual For Courts Martial
MANUAL
FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL
Malacañang Palace
Manila
Pursuant to the authority vested in my by Article 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, entitled “An
Act for making further and more effectual provision for the national defense by establishing a system
of military justice for persons subject to military law, I, Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philip -
pines, do hereby prescribe the following rules of procedure, including modes of proof in cases before
courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions, and other military tribunals in the Army of the
Philippines, and direct them to be published for the government of all concerned. These rules shall be
known a designated as the Manual for Courts-Martial, Philippine Army, and shall be in force and ef-
fect from this date.
Done at the City of Manila, this seventeenth day of December, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and thirty eight, and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
MANUEL L. QUEZON
President of the Philippines
BY THE PRESIDENT:
JORGE B. VARGAS
Secretary to the President
Door to
Chambers
The Bench
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18
Exit
15 12
14
11
16
17 13
The Bar
The GALLERY – the public & press are not allowed beyond the bar. They may
occupy benches provided before the Bar to witness the trial.
Exit
CHAPTER II
COURTS-MARTIAL
CLASSIFICATION – COMPOSITION
CHAPTER III
COURTS-MARTIAL
(continued)
APPOINTING AUTHORITIES – APPOINTMENT OF TRIAL
JUDGE ADVOCATE, DEFENSE COUNSEL, ASSISTANTS
the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be ap-
pointed by superior competent authority (AW 8).
Under the authority of AW 8, the Commanding Officer of an army, an army
corps, a division, or a separate brigade, the Provost Marshal General, and the Superin-
tendent of the Philippine Military Academy (except for the trial of an officer) are
hereby empowered to appoint general courts-martial. (As amended by Executive Or-
der [EO] Nr. 47, 8 June 1945)6
Whether the commander who convened the court is the accuser or the prosecutor
is mainly to be determined by his personal feeling or interest in the matter. An accuser
either originates the charge or adopts and becomes responsible for it; prosecutor pro-
poses or undertakes to have it tried or proved. See Section 60 (Accuser) in this con-
nection. Action by a commander which is merely official and in the strict line of his
duty cannot be regarded as sufficient to disqualify him. Thus, a division commander
may, without becoming the accuser or prosecutor in the case, direct a subordinate to
investigate an alleged offense with a view to formulating and preferring the charges as
the facts may warrant, and may refer such charges for trial as in other cases.
As AW 8 expressly designates those who have authority to appoint general courts-
martial, it follows that no one else has any such authority, and that anyone having
such authority can not delegate or transfer it to another. The authority of a command-
ing officer to appoint general courts-martial is independent of his rank and is retained
by him as long as he continues to be such commanding officer. The rules as to the de-
volution of command in case of the death, disability or temporary absence of a perma-
nent commander are stated in pertinent regulations.
An officer who has power to appoint a general court-martial may determine the
cases to be referred to it for trial and dissolve it; but he cannot control the exercise by
the court of powers vested in it by law. He may withdraw any specification or charge
at any time unless the court has reached a finding thereon.
b. Special courts martial – The commanding officer of a district may appoint special
courts-martial; when empowered by the President, the commander of a garrison, fort,
camp, brigade, regiment, detached battalion, or other detached command, may ap-
point special courts-martial7, but when any such commanding officer is the accuser or
the military academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint general
courts-martial. Under PD 1850 the Constabulary Regional Commanders, INP may appoint a general court-
martial when empowered by the President.
6
By Executive Order 264 (8 Sept 1949) [amending EO 47 of 8 June 1945] the President empowered the com -
manding officer of a division, of a military area, and the Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy
(except for the trial of an officer) to appoint a general court-martial. EO 414 of 16 Feb 1951 empowered, in ad-
dition to the officers mentioned in EO 264 (supra) the commanding officer of a battalion or a larger unit, or
corresponding units of the Air Force and the Navy assigned for duty in a territory beyond the jurisdiction of
the Philippines, to appoint general courts-martial. Executive Order 493 of 20 Feb 1952 empowered the com-
manding officer of the Philippine Army Training Command, in addition to other officers mentioned in EO 414
(supra), to appoint general courts martial.
7
Commanding Officer of a District is no longer authorized to appoint a special court-martial. Under AW 9 as
amended by RAs 242 & 516, the commanding officer of a major command, task force, military area, or divi -
sion, and, when empowered by the President, the commanding officer of a garrison, fort, camp, brigade, regi-
ment, detached battalion or squadron, or other detached command or place, zone or commissioned vessel
where troops are on duty, may appoint special courts-martial. Under PD 1850 the Constabulary Regional Di -
rector, INP may appoint special and summary courts martial. Other subordinate field commanders of the PC/
INP may appoint summary courts-martial when empowered by the President.
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prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by a supe-
rior authority, and may in any case be appointed by superior authority when by the
latter deemed desirable. (AW 9)
Under the authority of AW 9, the commanding officer of a military district, a
brigade, regiment, detached battalion and other detached commands, as well as the
commanding officer of all garrisons, forts and camps directly under Army Headquar-
ters are hereby empowered to appoint special courts-martial. – As amended by EO 47,
8 June 458.
The principles of the last three paragraphs of Subsection 5a apply to special
courts-martial.
A battalion or other unit is “detached” when isolated or removed from the imme-
diate disciplinary control of a superior of the same branch of the service in such man-
ner as to make its commander primarily the one to be looked to by superior authority
as the officer responsible for the administration of the discipline of the enlisted per-
sonnel composing the same. The term is used in a disciplinary sense, and is not neces-
sarily limited to what constitutes detachment in a physical or tactical sense. For in-
stance, the commanding officers of units that are independent, except insofar as they
constitute parts of a division, who are responsible directly to their respective com-
mands, are competent to appoint special courts-martial for the same, subject to the
power of the division commander to appoint special courts-martial for all subordinate
units under this command, if by him deemed desirable.
The subordinate commander may exercise the power to appoint special courts-
martial for his command unless a competent superior deems it desirable to reserve
that power to himself and so notified the subordinate.
c. Summary courts-martial – The commanding officer of a garrison, fort, camp, or other
place where troops are on duty, and the commanding officer of a regiment, detached
battalion, detached company, or other detachment may appoint summary courts-mar-
tial9, but such summary courts-martial may in any case be appointed by a superior au-
thority when by the latter deemed desirable; Provided, That when but one officer is
present with a command, he shall be the summary court-martial of that command and
shall hear and determine cases brought before him. (AW 10)
When the appointing authority of a summary court or the summary court officer is
the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, it is discretionary
with the appointing authority whether he will forward the charges to superior author-
ity with a recommendation that the summary court be appointed by the latter; but the
fact that the appointing authority or the summary court officer is the accuser or prose-
cutor in a particular case does not invalidate the trial.
When more than one officer is present, a subordinate officer will be appointed
summary court-martial. But when one officer is present, no order appointing the court
will be issued.
8
The authorities mentioned in note 6, supra, are empowered by the President in EO 264 of 8 Sept 1949 to ap -
point special courts-martial. PD 1850 likewise authorizes the Constabulary Regional Commander/Director,
INP to appoint special courts-martial.
9
RA 516 amended AW 10 by including, as one of those who may appoint a special court-martial, the com -
manding officer of a commissioned vessel. Other field subordinate commanders of the PC/INP – see PD 1850.
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The principles of the third and fourth paragraphs of both Subsections 5a and 5b
apply to summary courts-martial.
6. COURTS-MARTIAL – Appointment of trial judge advocate, defense counsel, assis-
tants. – For each general or special court-martial, the authority appointing the court shall
appoint a trial judge advocate and a defense counsel, and for each general court-martial,
one or more assistant trial judge advocates and one or more assistant defense counsel,
when necessary.
In general, it is desirable that as many assistant defense counsel as trial judge advo-
cates be appointed.
The power of appointment under AW 11 cannot be delegated.
CHAPTER IV
COURTS-MARTIAL
(Continued)
JURISDICTION IN GENERAL – JURISDICTION OF GENERAL,
SPECIAL AND SUMMARY COURTS-MARTIAL
court had jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, and whether, through such juris-
diction, it had exceeded its powers in the sentence pronounced. (Grafton vs. US, 206 US
333, 4347-348)
Their jurisdiction does not, in general depend on where the offense was committed.
See, however, AW 94 as to Various Crimes.
The jurisdiction of a court-martial, i.e., its power to try and determine a case, and
hence, the validity of each of its judgments, is conditioned upon these indispensable req-
uisites: That the court was appointed by an official empowered to appoint it; that the
membership of the Court was in accordance with law and with respect to number and
competency to sit on the court; and that the court thus constituted was invested by act of
the National Assembly with power to try the person and the offense charged.
8. COURTS-MARTIAL – Jurisdiction in general – Persons – The following persons are
subject to military law:
a. All Officers, members of the Nurse Corps and solders belonging to the Regular Force
of the Philippine Army; all reservists, from their dates of their call to active duty and
while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other
persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said
service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or ordered to
obey the same10;
b. Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary third lieutenants11;
c. All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Army of
the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared, though not
otherwise subject to these articles;
d. All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial. (AW 2)
9. COURTS-MARTIAL – Jurisdiction in general – Contempts – A military tribunal may
punish as for contempt any person who disturbs its proceedings by any riot or disorder;
Provided, That such punishment shall not exceed ten days confinement or a fine not ex-
ceeding two hundred pesos, or both. (AW 31)12 [See Section 101 (Contempts)]12
10. COURTS-MARTIAL – Jurisdiction in general – Termination – General rules – The
general rule is that courts-martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets, soldiers, and others in
the military service of the Philippines ceases on discharge or other separation from the
service, and that jurisdiction as to an offense committed during a period of service thus
terminated is not revived by a re-entry into the military service.13
10
RAs 242 & 516 have modified this portion of AW 2 to read: “(a) All officers and soldiers of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary, all members of the reserved force from the dates of their call to active
duty and while on such active duty, all trainees undergoing military instructions, and all other persons lawfully called,
drafted, or ordered into, or to duty, or for training in said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call,
draft, or order, to obey the same x x x .” Erring INP personnel, members of the INP who are on active duty are
triable by court-martial.
11
Second Lieutenants. See CA 717.
12
Under PD 39, Series of 1972, a Military Commission may punish through direct contempt with confinement
for not less than one (1) month and indirect contempt with confinement for as long as the person fails to com-
ply with a lawful order of the Commission.
13
Court-martial jurisdiction attaches upon receipt of sworn charges by an officer exercising court-martial juris-
diction over the command. Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 1850.
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Exceptions – To this general rule there are, however, some exceptions, among them
the following:
Jurisdiction as to certain cases of fraud and embezzlement is not terminated by dis-
charge or dismissal. See AW 95.
All persons under sentence adjudged by a court-martial remain subject to military law
while under such sentence. AW 2
Where a soldier obtains his discharge by fraud, the discharge may be cancelled and
the soldier arrested and returned to military control. He may also be required to serve out
his enlistment and may be tried for his fraud.
A discharge other than dishonorable releases only from the particular contract and
term of enlistment to which it relates, and therefore, does not terminate other subsisting
enlistments or relieve the soldier from liability to trial by court-martial for an offense
committed during any such enlistments. On the other hand, a dishonorable discharge ter-
minates all subsisting enlistments and a soldier dishonorably discharged cannot be tried
by court-martial for an offense committed during any such enlistment, except as provided
in AW 95 and as stated in the next paragraph.
In certain cases where the person’s discharge or other separation does not interrupt his
status as a person belonging to the general category of persons subject to military law,
court-martial jurisdiction does not terminate. Thus, when an officer holding a reserve
commission is discharged from said commission by reason of acceptance of a commis-
sion in the Regular Force, there being no interval between services under the respective
commissions, there is no termination of the officer’s military status, but merely the ac-
complishment of a change in his status from that of a reserve to that of a regular officer,
and that court-martial jurisdiction to try him for an offense committed prior to the dis-
charge is not terminated by the discharge. So also, where a dishonorably discharged gen-
eral prisoner is tried for an offense committed while a soldier and prior to his dishonor-
able discharge, such discharge does not terminate his amenability to trial for the offense.
Effect of escape – The fact that after arraignment and during the trial the accused had
escaped does not terminate the jurisdiction of the court, which may proceed with the trial
notwithstanding the accused’s absence. However, the presence of the accused is neces-
sary for the reading of the judgment.14
11. COURTS-MARTIAL – Jurisdiction in general – Exclusive and non-exclusive – Courts-
martial have exclusive jurisdiction over purely military offenses. But a person subject to
military law is, as a rule, subject to the municipal law applicable to persons generally, and
if by one act or omission he violates an Article of War and the local criminal law, such
act or omission may be made the basis of a prosecution before a court-martial or before
the proper civil tribunal, and in some cases before both, the jurisdiction which first at-
tached in any case being entitled to proceed. If in a case where application under AW 75
for delivery to the civil authorities is anticipated, good reason exists for the primary exer-
cise of military jurisdiction, charges should be promptly preferred.
14
Under Section 14, Art III of the New Constitution, it is provided that after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused, provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustifiable. Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides in part that if the
judgment is for conviction and the accused’s failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall
further order the arrest of the accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision to
him or his counsel.
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The provisions of the Articles of War conferring jurisdiction upon courts martial
should not be construed as depriving other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in
respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war are triable by such
military tribunals (AW 15). See AW 81-83 for instances of concurrent jurisdiction ex-
pressly conferred on courts-martial and certain other tribunals.
12. COURTS-MARTIAL – Jurisdiction in general courts-martial – Persons and offenses –
General courts-martial shall have the power to try any person subject to military law for
any crime or offense made punishable by the Articles of War, and any other person who
by the law of war is subject to trial by tribunals; Provided, That no officer shall be
brought to trial before a general court-martial appointed by the Superintendent of the Mil-
itary Academy. (AW 12)
13. COURTS-MARTIAL – Jurisdiction of general courts-martial – Punishment – Punish-
ment upon conviction is discretionary with a general court-martial within certain limita-
tions, the more important of which are as follows: Certain punishments are mandatory un-
der the law (e.g., AW 96); such discretion may be limited by the President under AW 44;
the death penalty can be imposed only when specifically authorized (AW 42); and certain
kinds of punishments are prohibited (AW 40).
The statutory limitations just mentioned and other limitations will be fully taken up in
other sections. See in particular Sections 102-1-4 (Punishments).
14. COURTS-MARTIAL – Jurisdiction of special courts-martial – Persons and offenses –
Special courts-martial shall have the power to try any person subject to military law for
any crime or offense not capital made punishable by the Articles of War; Provided, That
the President may, by regulations, except from the jurisdiction of special courts-martial
any class or classes of persons subject to military law (AW13); Provided further, That the
officer competent to appoint a general court-martial for the trial of any particular case
may when in his judgment the interest of the service shall so require, cause any case to be
trial by a special court-martial notwithstanding the limitations upon the jurisdiction of the
special courts-martial as to offenses set out in AW 13; but the limitations upon jurisdic-
tion as to person and upon punishing power set out in said article shall be observed. (AW
12)
Under the authority of AW 13 persons of actual, relative or assimilated rank of third
lieutenant15 or above in the Army are hereby excepted from the jurisdiction of special
courts-martial.
The crimes and offenses denounced in AW 65, 67, 68, and 93 are capital at all times;
those denounced by AW 59, 60, 76-79, 82, 83, and 87 are capital if committed in time of
war.
Although capital under the articles just cited, a crime or offense is not capital within
the meaning of AW 13 of the applicable maximum limit of punishment prescribed by the
President under AW 44 is less than death; and even though a crime or offense is capital
within the meaning of AW 13, it may be tried by a special court-martial under the condi-
tions stated in the provisions of AW 12, quoted above. But no crime or offense, capital or
otherwise, for which a mandatory punishment is prescribed, can be tried by a special
court-martial if such punishment is beyond the power of the court to impose. Thus, a case
of murder cannot properly be referred to a special court-martial for trial, as the penalty in
the event of conviction must be either death or imprisonment for life.
15
Second Lieutenant (Ibid.)
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CHAPTER V
COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL
16
A special court-martial may adjudge a bad conduct discharge. (See AW 13 as amended by RA 516.)
17
Probationary Second Lieutenant, CA 717.
18
Noncommissioned officers shall not, if they object thereto, be brought to trial before a summary court-mar-
tial without the authority of the officer competent to bring them to trial before a special court. AW 14 as
amended by RAs 242 & 516.
Note by SJA for CSAFP – It seems that this sentence should read: Under the authority of AW 14, persons of actual, rela-
tive, or assimilated rank above that of private first class in the Army are hereby excepted from the jurisdiction of summary
courts-martial, provided that noncommissioned officers of actual, relative, or assimilated rank below that of technical
sergeant in the Army may be tried by summary court-martial unless they object, or such trial is authorized by the officer
competent to bring them to trial before a general court-martial.
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thority, the term “commanding officer” includes the commanding officer of a garrison,
fort, camp, or other place where troops are on duty and the commanding officer of a regi-
ment, detached battalion, detached company, or other detachment, and their superiors.
For reports, etc., required in cases of confinement or arrest and for action required
when a commanding officer places an officer in arrest or confinement without preferring
charges, see pertinent Army Regulations.
21. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL – ARREST AND CONFINEMENT –
Status of person in arrest – Any person placed in arrest under the provisions of AW 70
shall thereby be restricted to his barracks, quarters, or tent, unless such limits are enlarged
by proper authority. [AW 70]
22. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL – ARREST OF DESERTER BY
CIVILIANS – Civil officers – It shall be lawful for any civil officer having authority under
the laws of the Philippines to arrest offenders, summarily to arrest a deserter from the mil-
itary service of the Philippines and deliver him into the custody of the military authorities.
[AW 107]
23. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL – ARREST OF DESERTER BY
CIVILIANS – Civilians generally – A private person has no authority as such, without the
order or direction of a military officer, to arrest or detain a deserter from the Army of the
Philippines.
The fact that the person who arrested and delivered a deserter was not authorized to
do so is not a legal ground for the deserter’s discharge from military custody.
CHAPTER VI
COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL
(continued)
PREPARATION OF CHARGES
supposed offense committed by a person subject to military law. Such information may,
of course, be received from anyone, whether subject to military law or not.
Any person subject to military law may prefer charges, even though he be under
charges, or in arrest, or in confinement.
Instead of preferring charges, it is ordinarily preferable, especially in a minor case, to
inform the accused’s immediate commanding officer of the matter.
A person subject to military law cannot legally be ordered to prefer charges to which
he is unable truthfully to make the required oath on his own responsibility; but he may
legally be ordered to prefer such charges s in his (the subordinate’s) opinion he may prop-
erly substantiate by the required oath.
26. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL – PREPARATION OF CHARGES –
When preferred – When any person subject to military law is placed in arrest or confine-
ment, immediate steps will be taken to try the person accused or to dismiss the charge and
release him. Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or car-
rying the case to a final conclusion shall be punished as court-martial may direct (AW
71). When it is intended to prefer charges, they should be preferred without unnecessary
delay. Anything like an accumulation or saving up of charges through improper motives
is prohibited; but when a good reason exists (e.g., when in the interest of discipline it is
advisable to exhibit a continued course of conduct), a reasonable delay in permissible if
the person concerned is not in arrest or confinement.
Ordinarily, charges for an offense should not be preferred against anyone when the
only basis for the belief that the offense was committed is his statement that he committed
it.
27. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL – PREPARATION OF CHARGES –
General rules and suggestions – One transaction, or what is substantially one transaction,
should not be made the basis for an unreasonable multiplication of charges against one
person. Thus, a soldier should not be charged with disorderly conduct and for an assault
when the disorderly conduct consisted in making the assault, or for a failure to report for
a routine scheduled duty, such as reveille, an for absence without leave. So also, the theft
of several articles should not be alleged in several specifications, one for each article,
when the theft of all of them can properly be alleged in one specification; and where a
soldier willfully disobeys an order to a certain thing, and persists in his disobedience
when the same order is given again by the same or other superior, a multiplication of
charges of disobedience should be avoided. However, there are times when sufficient
doubt as to the facts or law exists to warrant making one transaction the basis for charging
two or more offenses.
Where charges are preferred for serious offenses, there should not be joined with them
charges for minor derelictions unless the latter serve to explain the circumstances of the
former. Thus, as an extreme case, charges for willfully disobeying an order of a commis-
sioned officer and for absence from a routine duty should not be joined.
Any demand for trial made under AW 105 may be noted on a memorandum attached
to the charges.19
19
Under the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 1750 [01 Dec 82] the procedure prescribed by PD 77 as
amended by PD 911 shall be followed in the conduct of pre-trial investigation.
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When two or more accused are jointly charged with one offense, any one of the ac-
cused demanding it must be tried separately.
Two or more persons can not join in the commission of an offense of a kind that can
only be committed by one person. For instance, soldiers A and B cannot join in the com-
mission of the offense committed by B in absenting himself without leave with the intent
not to return to the military service, even if A also leaves without authority with a like in -
tent, and the two deserted together. A has deserted and so has B, but neither committed
the other’s desertion. In a proper case, however, two or more men may be jointly charged
with, and tried for conspiracy, or entering into an agreement to desert.
28. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL – PREPARATION OF CHARGES –
Drafting the charge – The technical charge should be appropriate to all specifications un-
der it, and ordinarily will be written thus: “Violation of the _____ Article of War”, giving
the number of the article. Neither the designation of a wrong article, nor the failure to des-
ignate any article is ordinarily material, provided the specification alleges an offense over
which courts-martial have jurisdiction. For other instances and some specimen charges,
see Appendix 4.
29. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL – PREPARATION OF CHARGES –
Drafting of specifications –
a. The specification should include the following:
The name of the accused person and a showing either by a description of such
person by rank and organization or otherwise, that the accused is within court-mar-
tial jurisdiction as to persons. For rules as to the use of the Christian name; use of an
alias; change in rank; general prisoners; etc., see instructions in Appendix 4.
A statement in simple and concise language of the facts constituting the offense.
The facts so stated and those reasonably implied therefrom should include all the el-
ements of the offense sought to be charged. Any intent expressly made an essential
element of the offense by the Articles of War should be alleged; for example, a false
muster should be alleged as “knowingly” made. To a reasonable extent matters of
aggravation may be recited. If applicable, the wording of the appropriate Article of
War should be used in preference to a supposedly equivalent expression. Thus, in
charging an officer found drunk on duty, the specification should not allege that he
was found intoxicated on duty.
A statement of when and where the offense was committed. For details, see Ap-
pendix 4 (Instructions g).
b. One specification should not allege more than one offense.
c. A specification alleging the violation of a written order, or of any written obligation –
as an oath of allegiance, parole, etc. – should set forth the writing, preferably in ver-
batim, and the act or acts which constitute the alleged violation. Oral statements
should be set out as nearly as possible to the exact words, but should always be qual-
ified by the words “or words to that effect”, or some other similar expression, as, for
example, in cases of insubordinate or disrespectful language.
d. Some specimen charges and forms for specifications covering the more usual offenses
are given in Appendix 4.
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CHAPTER VII
COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL
(continued)
SUBMISSION AND ACTION UPON CHARGES
of charges and specifications as set forth in the affidavit will be made to correspond to
any renumbering made necessary by the elimination of any specification or charge. Any
demand for trial made by an accused (see Section 107) will be noted and initialed if
charges are forwarded.
Charges forwarded or referred for trial and accompanying papers should be free from
defect of form and substance, but delays incident to the return of papers for correction of
defects that are not substantial will be avoided. Obvious errors may be corrected and the
charges may be redrafted over the signatures thereon, provided the redraft does not in-
volve any substantial change or include any person, offense, or matter not fairly included
in the charges as received. Corrections and redrafts should be initialed by the officer mak-
ing them.
He will make or cause to be made any necessary investigation (see Subsection 30c)
but will not investigate charges signed by himself if another officer is available. If the
charge were investigated before reaching him, another investigation need not be made un-
less there is a reason to believe that further investigation would aid in the administration
of justice.
With due regard to the policies of the President and other superiors and subject to ju-
risdictional limitations, charges, if tried at all, should be tried by the lowest court that has
power to adjudge an appropriate and adequate punishment. In this connection, see Section
14 as to the authority to cause a capital case to be tried by special court-martial. The ob-
jections to referring charges for a serious military offense, such as desertion, to an inferior
court should be considered. In this connection, it should be remembered that retention in
the Army of thieves and persons guilty of other offenses involving moral turpitude injuri-
ously reflects upon the good name of the service and its self-respecting personnel. Ordi-
narily, a specification as to which the statute of limitations may apparently be success-
fully pleaded should not be referred for trial.
35. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL – SUBMISSION OF, AND ACTION
UPON CHARGES – Investigation of charges; reference to staff judge advocate; suspected
insanity.
A. Investigation of charges – Statutory requirements; introductory statement – No
charge will be referred for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation
thereof shall have been made. The investigation will include inquiries as to the truth
of the matter set forth in the charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the case
should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation, full op-
portunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they
are available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf either in defense
or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses re-
quested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they
shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both
sides. (AW 71)
No witness shall be compelled to incriminate himself or to answer any question
the answer to which may tend to incriminate him, or to answer any question not mate-
rial to the issue when such answer might tend to degrade him. (AW 24)
What follows in this Subsection (35a) is primarily intended to indicate a proper
procedure in the more usual cases. Variations to save labor, time, or expense, or de-
signed to meet other cases, or exceptional conditions, or for any other good reason,
- - - page 19 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
are not only permissible but should be adopted, provided the spirit and purpose of the
statutory requirements quoted above are carried out. The investigation should be
prompt, dignified, and military. It should also be as brief as is consistent with thor-
oughness and fairness, and should, therefore, not include any examination or cross-ex-
amination into matters not essential to determine the necessity of trial.
Instructions – At the outset of the investigation the accused will be informed of
the following: the offense charged against him; the names of the accuser and of the
witnesses, as far as then known to the investigating officer; the fact that the charges
are about to be investigated; his right to cross examine witnesses against him if they
are available, and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in de-
fense or mitigation; his right to have the investigating officer examine available wit-
nesses requested by him; and his right to make or submit a statement in any form,
subject to the risk of having such statement used against him.21
All available witnesses who appear to be reasonably necessary for a thorough and
impartial investigation will be called and examined in the presence of the accused. Or-
dinarily, application for the attendance of any witness subject to military law will be
made to such witness’ immediate commanding officer. The decision of the officer ex-
ercising summary court-martial jurisdiction over the command to which the witness
belongs as to attendance as to availability is final. There is no provision for com-
pelling the attendance of or for paying civilian witnesses in this investigation. Wit-
nesses need not be sworn or required to sign their statements; but either or both will
be done if the investigating officer deems such action advisable or is so instructed.
Where the investigating officer makes known to the accused the substance of the
testimony expected from a witness as ascertained by written statement of the witness,
interview with the witness, or other similar means, and the accused states that he does
not desire to cross-examine such witnesses, the witness need not be called, even if
available. Where a witness requested by the accused is available, such witness need
not be called if the accused withdraws his request upon being informed that the testi-
mony by the accused from such witness will be regarded as having been actually been
taken.
To the extent required by fairness to the Government and the accused, documen-
tary evidence and statements of non-available witnesses will be shown or the sub-
stance thereof will be made known to the accused.
Unless the investigating officer is required to make a formal report or unless the
probable disposition of a case is such that a formal report should be made (e.g., when
the investigating officer, himself, recommends action involving a forwarding of the
charges), an informal report is sufficient.
21
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the ser -
vices of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel. Sec 12, Art XIII of the 1986 Constitution.
No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited. [Ibid.]
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
[Ibid.]
- - - page 20 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
CHAPTER VIII
22
See footnote 19, page 16, supra.
- - - page 21 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
CHAPTER IX
COURTS-MARTIAL – PERSONNEL
(continued)
TRIAL JUDGE ADVOCATE – ASSISTANT TRIAL JUDGE ADVOCATE –
DEFENSE COUNSEL – ASSISTANT DEFENSE COUNSEL –
REPORTER – INTERPRETER – CLERKS AND ORDERLIES
23
No general court-martial shall receive evidence or vote upon its findings or sentence in the absence of the
law member regularly detailed. (AW 8 as amended by RA 242 and RA 516)
24
No general court-martial shall receive evidence or vote upon its findings or sentence in the absence of a law
member regularly detailed. (AW 8 as amended by RA 242 & 516) The law member of a general court-mar-
tial shall rule in open court upon interlocutory questions, other than challenge, arising during the proceed-
ings. A ruling made by the law member of a general court-martial upon any interlocutory question other than
a motion for an finding of not guilty, or the accused’s sanity, shall be final and shall constitute the ruling of
the court. (AW 30 as amended by RA 516)
- - - page 23 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
make a prompt, full, and systematic presentation of the case at the trial. As to each of-
fense charged, the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt by
relevant evidence that the offense was committed, that the accused committed it, that
he had the requisite criminal intent at the time, and that the accused is within the juris-
diction of the court, except to the extent that such burden may be relieved by a plea of
guilty. Whatever the defense may be, this burden never changes. Proper preparation to
meet this burden includes a consideration of the essential elements of the offense and
of the pertinent rules of evidence, to the end that only relevant evidence will be intro-
duced at the trial, and a determination of the order in which the evidence will be intro-
duced. The general principle as to the order of introducing evidence is that a case
should be presented in sequence of events as nearly as practicable, and that, when sev-
eral offenses are charged, especially if unrelated, the evidence should be directed to
the development of their proof in the order charged so that neither the court nor the
accused may be in doubt at any time as to the offense to which the evidence being in-
troduced refers.
If he finds that the provisions of this manual are not sufficiently specific clearly to
settle a question likely to arise at the trial, he should endeavor to secure for use at the
trial authorities (such as pertinent decisions of the court or authoritative military
precedents) to sustain his contentions. To the end of securing such authorities, he may
communicate with or consult the appointing authority.
If, while preparing a case for trial, he discovers a matter which, in his opinion,
makes it inadvisable to bring the case to trial, he will at once bring such matter to the
attention of the appointing authority, provided it is reasonably apparent that such mat-
ter was not known to the appointing authority when the charges were referred for trial.
Such action would be appropriate where, for example, the trial judge advocate discov-
ers evidence that the accused was or is insane, or finds that the only witness to an es-
sential fact has disappeared or repudiates the substance of the testimony expected of
him.
D. Duties during trial – He executes all orders of the court. Under the direction of the
court he keeps or superintends the keeping of the required record of the proceedings.
He signs the record of each day’s proceedings.
While his primary duty is to prosecute, any act (such as the conscious suppression
of evidence favorable to the defense) inconsistent with a genuine desire to have the
whole truth revealed is prohibited.
While the court is in open session, he should respectfully call its attention to any
apparent illegalities or irregularities in its action or in the proceedings.
He will take care that any papers in his possession which relate to a case referred
to him for trial and which are not in evidence, are not exposed to any risk of inadver-
tent examination by members of the court.
Aside from opinions expressed in the proper discharge of his duty to prosecute
(e.g., in an argument on the admissibility of evidence), he should not give the court
his opinion upon any point of law arising during the trial except when it is asked for
by the court in open court. When he addresses the court, he will rise. The court may
require him to reduce his arguments to writing.
E. Relations to the accused and his counsel – Except to the extent that this Manual may
otherwise require, it is not his duty to assist or advise the defense.
- - - page 25 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
Immediately on receipt of charges referred to him for trial, he will serve a copy of
the charge sheet as received and corrected by him on the accused and will inform the
defense counsel of the court that such copy has been so served. Except as otherwise
directed by the appointing authority, he will permit the defense to examine from time
to time any papers accompanying the charges, including papers sent with charges on a
rehearing. He will also permit the defense to examine from time to time the orders of
the appointing authority and all modifying orders.
Ordinarily, his dealings with the defense will be through any counsel the accused
may have. Thus, if he desires to know how the accused intends to plea, he will ask the
defense counsel or other counsel, if any, of the accused. He should not attempt to in-
duce a plea of guilty.
The defense will be allowed to read the record as it is written up, except unan-
nounced findings and sentences; and the trial judge advocate of a general court-mar-
tial will furnish very person tried by the court who desires a copy of the record of
trial, less unannounced findings and sentence and exhibits not copies. See in this con-
nection Subsection 46b (Preparation of carbon copies); Section 48 (Clerks and order-
lies), and Subsection 85b (Receipt or certificate of delivery.
42. COURTS-MARTIAL – PERSONNEL – ASSISTANT TRIAL JUDGE ADVOCATE –
A. Duties in general – An assistant trial judge advocate of a general court-martial shall
be competent to perform any duty devolved by law, regulation, or the custom of the
service upon the trial judge advocate of the court (AW 116). He will perform such du-
ties in connection with trials as the trial judge advocate may designate. See Appendix
5 for suggestions as to appropriate duties and Section 95 as to oath.
B. Term “trial judge advocate” includes assistant – Wherever in this Manual the trial
judge advocate of a general court-martial is mentioned, the term will be understood to
include assistant trial judge advocate, if any, unless the context clearly shows that a
different sense is intended.
43. COURTS-MARTIAL – PERSONNEL – DEFENSE COUNSEL –
A. Selection; relief; absence – He will be carefully selected.
When it appears to the president of the court or to the defense counsel himself that
the latter is for any reason, including bias, prejudice, or hostility in a particular case,
disqualified or unable properly and promptly to perform his duties, the facts will be
reported at once to the appointing authority through appropriate channels. For a
proper reason (e.g., preparation for another case) the court, if in session, otherwise the
president, may with the consent of the accused excuse from attendance during the trial
such of the personnel of the defense as will not be required.
B. Duties – When the defense is not in charge of a counsel of the accused’s own selec-
tion, the duties, etc., of the defense counsel are those of a military counsel of the ac-
cused’s own selection (see Section 45). When the defense is in charge of a counsel of
the accused’s own selection, civil or military, the duties of the defense counsel as as-
sociate counsel are with such as the selected counsel may designate.
Immediately upon charges being referred for trial to the court, he will inform the
accused of the fact and of his rights as to counsel, and will render the accused any de-
sired assistance in securing and consulting counsel of his own selection. Unless the
- - - page 26 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
accused otherwise desires, the defense counsel will undertake the defense without
waiting for the appointment or the retaining of an individual counsel.
C. Term “counsel for the accused” – Wherever the phrase “counsel for the accused”, or
any other similar phrase is used in this Manual, it is to be understood, unless the con-
text indicates otherwise, as including the defense counsel of the court and any individ-
ual counsel.
44. COURTS-MARTIAL – PERSONNEL – ASSISTANT DEFENSE COUNSEL –
A. Duties – An assistant defense counsel shall be competent to perform any duty de-
volved by law, regulations, or the custom of the service upon counsel for the accused
(AW 116). Unless in charge of the defense, he will perform such duties in connection
with the trial as the counsel in charge of the defense may designate.
B. Term “defense counsel” includes assistant – Whenever in this Manual the defense
counsel of a general court-martial is mentioned, the term will be understood to include
an assistant defense counsel, if any, unless the context shows clearly that a different
sense is intended.
45. COURTS-MARTIAL – PERSONNEL – INDIVIDUAL COUNSEL FOR THE ACCUSED –
A. Statutory rights of accused; detail of individual counsel – The accused shall have the
right to be represented in his defense before the court (general or special court-mar-
tial) by counsel of his own selection, civil counsel if he so provides, or military if such
counsel be reasonably available; otherwise, by the defense counsel duly appointed for
the court pursuant to AW 11. should the accused have counsel of his own selection,
the defense counsel and assistant defense counsel, if any, of the court shall, if the ac-
cused so desires, act as his associate counsel (AW 17). Civilian counsel will not be
provided at the expense of the Government.
Application, through the usual channels, for the detail of a person selected by the
accused as military counsel may be made by the accused or any one on his behalf.
When the application reaches an officer who is authorized to make the detail and or-
der any necessary travel, he will act thereon. His decision is subject to revision by his
immediate superior on appeal or on behalf of the accused.
B. Duties in general; freedom in conducting defense – An officer, or other military per-
son, acting as individual counsel for the accused before a general or special court-
martial, will perform such duties as usually devolve upon the counsel for a defendant
before civil courts in a criminal case. He will guard the interests of the accused by all
honorable and legitimate means known to the law. It is his duty to undertake the de-
fense regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused; to disclose to
the accused any interest he may have in or in connection with the case which might
influence the accused in the selection of counsel; to represent the accused with undi-
vided fidelity, and not to divulge his secrets or confidence. It is improper for him to
assert in argument his personal belief in the accused’s innocence or to tolerate any
manner or fraud or chicane.
With a view to saving time, labor, and expense, he should join in appropriate stip-
ulations as to unimportant or uncontested matters. See Section 126 (Stipulations).
Before the trial he will explain to the accused the meaning and effect of a plea of
guilty and his right to introduce evidence after such plea (Section 70); his right to tes-
tify or to remain silent (see Subsections 120d and 121b); his right to make a statement
- - - page 27 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
(see Section 76); his right to introduce evidence in extenuation (see Section 111); and,
in an appropriate case, his right to avail himself of the statute of limitations (see Sec-
tions 69 & 78). These explanations will be made regardless of the intentions of the ac-
cused as to testifying, making a statement, or as to how he will plead.
His preparation for trial should include a consideration of the essential elements of
each offense charged and of the pertinent rules of evidence, to the end that such evi-
dence as he proposes to introduce in defense may be confined to relevant evidence,
and that he may be ready to make appropriate objections to any irrelevant evidence
that might be offered by the prosecution. In determining the order in which he pro-
poses to introduce evidence for the defense, he should observe the general principle
stated in the third paragraph of Subsection 41c.
The fourth paragraph of Subsection 41c applies equally to him.
He will examine the record of the proceedings of the court before it is authenti-
cated.
The court will avoid any unwarranted interference in his conduct of the defense,
but may require him to reduce his arguments to writing. When he addresses the court,
he will rise.
Ample opportunity will be given [him] and the accused properly to prepare the de-
fense, including opportunities to interview each other and any other person.
Where the trial proceeds after the accused has escaped, the individual counsel
continues to represent him.
46. COURTS-MARTIAL – PERSONNEL – REPORTER –
A. Authority for appointment or detail – Under such regulations as the President may
from time to time prescribe, the president of a court-martial or military commission or
court of inquiry shall have the power to appoint a recorded. (AW 115)
Enlisted men may be detailed to serve as stenographic reporters for general courts-
martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions, and other military tribunals.
Subject to such exceptions as may be made by appointing authorities, and within
the limitations of law and regulations, the appointment of reporters or the detail of en-
listed men to serve as stenographic reporters is hereby authorized for general courts-
martial, and for special courts-martial, except, in the latter case, when the appointing
authority directs that the testimony be not reduced to writing, and the accused offers
no objection thereto. Summary courts-martial are not entitled to the appointment or
detail hereinabove mentioned, except when the appointing authority directs that the
testimony be reduced to writing. For other military tribunals, such appointment or de-
tail is in general authorized.
B. Duties; oath; compensation – He shall record the proceedings of and testimony taken
before such court or commission and may set down the same, in the first instance, in
shorthand (AW 115). If a question is raised as to whether any particular matter is in-
cluded in the term “proceedings of and testimony taken”, the court will determine the
question in accordance with applicable law and regulations.
He will be required to discharge his duties as promptly as practicable under the
circumstances. He will prepare one carbon copy of the typewritten parts of general
- - - page 28 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
courts-martial records, and such additional copies thereof as may be required by the
trial judge advocate, not exceeding the number authorized by the appointing authority.
47. COURTS-MARTIAL – PERSONNEL – INTERPRETER –
A. Authority for appointment – Under such regulations as the President may from time to
time prescribe, the president of a court-martial or military commission or court of in-
quiry may appoint an interpreter. (AW 115) Interpreters may be employed for courts-
martial whenever necessary without application to the appointing authority.
B. Duties; compensation – He shall interpret for the court.
In questioning a witness through an interpreter the question should be put in the
same form as when questioning a witness not through an interpreter. Thus, ask “What
is your name?” instead of telling the interpreter to ask the witness what his name is.
The interpreter should translate questions and answers given to him in the lan-
guage of the witness. Thus, if the question is “What is your name?” that question
should be asked in the language of the witness, and the interpreter should not use such
form as “They want to know what your name is.”
See Section 95 as to oath, and pertinent Army Regulations as to compensation.
48. COURTS-MARTIAL – PERSONNEL – CLERKS AND ORDERLIES – When necessary the
commanding officer will detail suitable soldiers as clerks and as orderlies to assist the
trial judge advocate and counsel for the accused.
CHAPTER X
COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURES
CERTAIN GENERAL MATTERS – CLOSED SESSION –
INTERLOCUTORY QUESTIONS OTHER THAN
CHALLENGES - CONTINUANCES
A. Statutory provisions – The law member of the court, if any, or if there be no law
member of the court, then the president25 may rule in open court upon interlocutory
questions, other than challenges, arising during the proceedings; Provided, That, un-
less such ruling be made by the law member of the court, if any member object
thereto, the court shall be cleared and closed and the question decided by a majority
vote, viva voce, beginning with the junior in rank; And, provided further, That, if any
such ruling be made by the law member of the court upon any interlocutory question
other than an objection to the admissibility of evidence offered during the trial and
any member object to the ruling, the court shall be likewise cleared and closed and the
question decided by a majority vote, viva voce, beginning with the junior in rank.
(AW 30)
B. Applicability of this Section – This Section (51) applies to all interlocutory questions
arising during the proceedings (i.e., all questions other than the findings and sentence)
except the question whether or not a challenge shall be sustained. Any statement or
indication in this manual to the effect that a certain question is to be decided by the
court (see, for example, Subsection 46b) is not to be understood as making an excep-
tion to the foregoing rule.
25
Under AW 30 as amended by RA 516 it is the law member who rules upon interlocutory questions. See foot-
note 16, page 12 supra.
- - - page 30 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Ruling of law member is final. See footnote 16.
29
Ibid.
- - - page 31 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
A failure by the trial judge advocate to cause a copy of the charges to be served as
required may be a ground for a continuance; and in time of peace, no person shall,
against his objection, be brought to trial before a general court-martial within a period
of five days subsequent to the service of charges upon him (see AW 71).
The refusal by a court to grant a continuance where a reasonable cause is shown
will not nullify the proceedings, but may be a good ground for directing a re-hearing.
C. Application and action thereon – Application should be made to the court if in ses-
sion; otherwise, to the appointing authority; but an application to the court for an ex-
tended delay, if based on reasonable cause, may be referred by the court to the ap-
pointing authority.
The proper time for making an application to the court is after the accused is ar-
raigned and before he pleads. The court may defer until after arraignment action on an
application made before arraignment, and should so defer action whenever it appears
that the granting of a continuance before arraignment may involve a risk of the trial of
an offense being barred by the statute of limitations (see Section 69).
Reasonable cause for the application must be alleged. For instance, when a contin-
uance is desired because of the absence of a witness, the application should show that
the witness is material, that due diligence has been used to procure his testimony or
attendance, that the party applying for the continuance has reasonable ground o be-
lieve that he will be able procure such testimony or attendance within the period
stated in the application, the facts which he expects to be able to prove by such wit-
ness, and that he can not safely proceed with the trial without such witness.
In general, the facts as set forth in the application may be accepted as substantially
true; but if long or repeated delay is involved, or the facts are disputed or improbable,
or any other good reason exists, the applicant may be required to furnish further proof.
On any issue of law or fact arising in the proceedings on an application for a continu-
ance, both parties will be given an opportunity to present evidence and make an argu-
ment.
An application based on the absence of a witness may be denied where the oppo-
site party is willing to stipulate that the absent witness would testify as stated in the
application, unless it clearly appears that such denial would be prejudicial.
CHAPTER XI
COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURES
(continued)
ASSEMBLING – SITTING OF PERSONNEL AND ACCUSED – ATTENDANCE AND
SECURITY OF ACCUSED – INTRODUCTION OF THE ACCUSED AND COUNSEL –
SWEARING REPORTER – ASKING ACCUSED AS TO COPY OF GENERAL COURT-
MARTIAL RECORD – ANNOUNCEMENT OF MEMBERS PRESENT
CHAPTER XII
COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURES
(continued)
EXCUSING MEMBERS – CHALLENGES –
WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION –
- - - page 33 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
30
Pursuant to PD 39, peremptous challenge is no longer allowed.
Note by SJA for CSAFP – However, in Comendador, et al. vs. Gen de Villa, et al, G.R. No. 93177- 21 Aug 91, the
Supreme Court ruled that the right to peremptory challenge has been restored as cited below:
- - - page 34 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
sustains the challenge, it shall cease proceedings an make a report of its action to the
appointing authority; otherwise, it shall proceed with the trial.
59. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION OR THE DEFENSE
– If at any stage of the proceedings any member of the court be called as a witness for the
prosecution or the defense, he shall, before qualifying as a witness, be excused from fur-
ther duty as a member in the case.
60. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – ACCUSER – An officer who has signed and sworn
to the charges in a particular case is necessarily an accuser in that case. But while prima
facie the person who sign and swears to the charges is the only accuser in the case, that is
not always true. There may be another or others who are real accusers. (See Section 5.)
61. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – OATHS – After the proceedings as to challenges
are concluded, the members of the court, trial judge advocate, and each assistant trial
judge advocate are sworn (see Section 95 as to oaths). The organization of the court is
then complete and it may proceed with the trial of the charges in the case then before the
court.
62. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – ARRAIGNMENT –The court being organized and
both parties ready to proceed, the trial judge advocate will read the charges and specifica-
tions, including the signature of the accuser, to the accused, and then ask the accused how
he pleads to each charge and specification. This proceeding constitutes the arraignment.
Instead of entering a plea, the accused may demur to any charge and/or specification. See
Subsection 64b (Demurrers). The pleas are not part of the arraignment. The fact that the
service of the charges was within five days of the arraignment (see AW 71) does not pre-
vent the arraignment, even though the accused objects on that ground to the proceedings,
but such fact is available as a ground of valid objection to any further proceedings in the
case at that time. As to deferring action on an application for a continuance until after ar-
raignment, see Subsection 52c.
During the arraignment the accused and the personnel of the prosecution and defense
will stand. With the consent of the court, the accused may waive the reading of the
charges and specifications.
The order pursued in case of several charges and specifications, as a rule, will be to
arraign the first, second, etc., specification to the first charge, then the first charge, then
on the first charge, and so on.
After the members have been sworn to try and determine “the matter now before
them”, additional charges, which the accused has had not notice to defend and regarding
which the right to challenge has not been accorded him, cannot be introduced or the ac-
cused required t plead thereto. But if all the usual proceedings prior to arraignment are
first had with respect to such additional charges, including proceedings as to excusing and
challenging members and administering oaths, such charges may be introduced, the ac-
cused may be arraigned on them, and the trial may proceed on both sets as the trial of one
case. In such a case an application for a reasonable continuance should be granted.
CHAPTER XIII
COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURES
(continued)
- - - page 37 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
3) That more than one offense is charged in any particular specification; except only
in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various al-
lied offenses;
4) That the facts charged do not constitute a punishable act;
5) That it contains averments which, if true, will constitute a legal justification or ex-
cuse;
The demurrer must be oral, and a minute thereof in writing filed with the papers in
the case.
C. Effect of demurrer – Before passing on a contested demurrer the court will give each
side an opportunity to introduce evidence and make an argument. A decision on a de-
murer is a decision on an interlocutory question.
If a demurrer is sustained, the judgment shall be final on the charge or specifica-
tion demurred to, and shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, when
such judgment has been approved by the reviewing authority, unless the court deliver-
ing the judgment was without jurisdiction, or unless the court, being of the opinion
that the objection may be avoided, directs a new charge and/or specification to be
filed. If the court does not direct that the accused be remembered to a court of proper
jurisdiction for trial or that a new charge and/or specification be filed, the accused
must be discharged, unless he is being held for another charge.
Should the demurrer be disallowed, the court must require the defendant to plead.
If he refuses, plea of not guilty shall be entered for him.
Notwithstanding the action of a court on demurrers, the court may proceed in the
usual course as long as one or more specifications remain as to which the accused has
made a plea.
D. Pleas – Kinds – There are four kinds of pleas to any charge or specification: (1)
guilty; (2) not guilty; (3) a former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the offense
charged; and (4) once in jeopardy.31
The plea must be oral and a minute thereof in writing filed with the papers of the
case.
A plea of guilty can be put in only by the accused himself in open court. The
court may at any time before the judgment upon a plea of guilty permit it to be with-
drawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.
The accused has a perfect legal and moral right to enter a plea of not guilty even if
he knows he is guilty. This is so because his plea of not guilty amounts to nothing
more than he stands upon his right to cast upon the prosecution the burden of proving
his alleged guilt.
E. Inadmissible objections – Such objections as that the accused, at the time of the ar-
raignment, is undergoing a sentence of a general court-martial; or that, owing to the
long delay in bringing him to trial, he is unable to disprove the charge or to defend
himself; or that his accuser was actuated by malice or is a person of bad character; or
31
Under Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the New Rules of Court, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and
the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it
is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial
court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.
- - - page 39 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
that he was released from arrest upon the charges, are not proper subjects for demur-
rers, however much they may constitute grounds for a continuance or affect the ques-
tions of the truth or falsity of the charges, or of the measure of punishment. The same
is true in general as to objections that are solely matters of defense under the general
issue. (Winthrop)
65. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – DEMURRERS – That the offense charged or the
person of the accused is not within the jurisdiction of the court – The lack of jurisdiction
of the court, in order to be available as a ground of demurrer, must appear on the face of
the charge or specification. Thus, when the specification states that an offense punishable
under the ninety fourth Article of War was committed outside of any Army reservation,
or that there is no allegation that such offense was committed within an Army reservation,
or that there is no allegation that such offense was committed within an Army reservation,
the charge or specification is demurrable on this ground.
Whenever the person of the accused, by virtue of the provisions of law or of this man-
ual, is not within the jurisdiction of a court-martial before which he is brought, he may
present the appropriate demurrer under this heading. For example, a third lieutenant
brought to trial before a special court-martial may demur on this ground.
66. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – DEMURRERS – That it does not conform substan-
tially to the prescribed form – When the charge and specification are not drawn substan-
tially in accordance with Sections 27, 2 and 29, and the appendices therein indicated, such
charge and specifications are insufficient and demurrable on this ground.
67. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – DEMURRERS – That more than one offense is
charged in a particular specification – In order to prevent confusion and to guarantee to
the accused an intelligent presentation of his defense for each offense charged against
him, each specification must contain only one offense. This principle is founded upon the
constitutional right of an accused person to be properly informed of the nature of the of-
fense of which he is charged so that he may properly meet the issues involved. A soldier,
for example, who is being prosecuted under the eighty-seventh Article of War, may not
be charged with sleeping on post and at the same time leaving it before he is regularly re-
lieved under the same specification. If the two punishable acts are alleged in only one
specification, such specification would be demurrable on this ground.
68. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – DEMURRERS – That the facts charged do not
constitute a punishable act – When an act is not made expressly punishable, it may not be
the basis of any prosecution. Thus, an accused may demur whenever he thinks that the act
he has committed is not penalized by any Article of War. However, even if an act is not
specifically described as punishable by any Article of War, yet such an act, in accordance
with standing regulations and customs of the service, may be deemed an offense under
the ninety-seventh Article of War. If in this case the accused still believes that the act he
has committed is not in violation of any standing regulation or custom of the service, he
may demur on this ground.
69. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – DEMURRERS – That it contains averments which,
if true, would constitute a legal justification or excuse – When the specification, for in-
stance, alleges that the accused committed a crime under the circumstances which exempt
him from criminal liability, as when a person killed another in self-defense or in defense
of a stranger, etc., pursuant to the fundamental principles of criminal law in this jurisdic-
tion, such specification is demurrable on this ground.
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This ground of demurrer may also be availed of when on the face of the charge or
specification it appears that the offense prosecuted is barred by the statute of limitations.
Exemption from liability to be tried or punished by a court-martial for all but a few
crimes or offenses may be claimed after two (or three) years with certain limitations. See
Appendix 12, and notes thereunder.
Although absence without leave (AW 62); desertion (AW 59); and fraudulent enlist-
ment (AW 54) are not continuing offenses and are committed, respectively, the person so
absents himself, or deserts, or first received pay or allowances under the enlistment, the
period of prescription, however, does not begin to run except as provided in the seventh
paragraph of this Section (69).
In applying the statute of limitations the court will be guided by the crime or offense
described in the specifications, and not by the Articles of War stated in the charge under
which the specifications is placed. Thus, where an offense properly chargeable under A
94 is erroneously charged under AW 91, the limitation is three instead of two years.
If it appears from the charges themselves that the statute has run against an offense
charged or (in the case of a continuing offense), a part of an offense charged, the court
may bring the matter to the attention of the accused and advice him (through the president
or the law member, if the president so directs) of his right to plead the statute. This action
should, as a rule, betaken at the time of arraignment.
Whenever it develops during or after trial that the offense charged has prescribed un-
der the statute of limitations, the accused may present a proper motion in bar of punish-
ment before sentence is announced. See Subsection 78a (Statute of Limitations).
The period of prescription of an offense shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the charge, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The burden is not on the defense to show that neither absence nor other impediment
prevents the accused from claiming exemption under AW 38. For example, if it appears
from the charges in a peacetime desertion case that more than three years have elapsed
between the date of the commission of the offense and the date of filing of the charge, the
demurrer, motion, or objection should be sustained, unless the prosecution shows by a
preponderance of evidence that the statute does not apply owing to the existence of peri-
ods which under the second proviso of AW 8 are to be excluded in computing the three
years.
70. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – PLEAS –
A. Pleas to the general issue –The pleas of guilty and not guilty are pleas to the general
issue. Should an accused enter a contradictory plea such as guilty without criminality
or guilty to a charge after pleading guilty to all specifications thereunder, such contra-
dictory pleas will be regarded as a plea of not guilty.
So also whenever the plea of former judgment of conviction or acquittal or of
once in jeopardy is overruled by the court, the trial will proceed on the general issue
under a plea of not guilty, unless the accused enters a plea of guilty.
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The court shall proceed to the trial and judgment as if he has pleaded not guilty
when an accused fails or refuses to plead or answers foreign to the purpose (AW 21).
See Section 63 in this connection.
A plea of guilty does not exclude the taking of evidence, and in the event that
there be aggravating or extenuating circumstances not clearly shown by the specifica-
tion and plea, any available and admissible evidence as to such circumstances should
be introduced.
Whenever it appears to the court that a plea of guilty may have been entered im-
providently or through lack of understanding of its meaning and effect, or whenever
an accused, after a plea of guilty, makes a statement to the court, in his testimony or
otherwise, inconsistent with that plea, the president or the law member, if so directed
by the law member, will make such explanation and statement to the accused as the
occasion requires. If, after such explanation and statement, it appears to the court that
the accused in fact entered the plea improvidently or through lack of understanding of
its meaning and effect, or if after such explanation and statement the accused does not
voluntarily withdraw his inconsistent statement, the court will proceed to trial and
judgment as if he had pleaded not guilty (AW 21). Occasion for making such explana-
tion and statement frequently arises in the ordinary desertion case, where the accused,
after pleading guilty, testifies or states in effect that throughout his unauthorized ab-
sence he had the intention of returning.
B. Plea of former conviction or former acquittal – Former conviction and former acquit-
tal, as defenses, are pleas of discharge or release that give a reason why the defendant
ought not to answer the charge and specification and ought not to be put upon trial for
the crime alleged, if pleaded at the time of the arraignment, and proven at separate
proceedings which may properly be had to try the issues raised without entering the
trial of the case on its merits. In pleading former conviction or former acquittal, it is
not sufficient that the defendant should simply allege that he has been once convicted
or acquitted; he must both allege and prove specifically that the offense, of which he
was formerly convicted or acquitted, is the same offense for which it is proposed to
try him again. (See Albert’s Criminal Procedure)
For the purpose of pleading former conviction, no proceeding in which an accused
has been found guilty by a court-martial upon any charge or specification shall be
held to be a trial until the reviewing and, if there be one, the confirming authority
shall have taken final action upon the case. (AW 39)
C. Plea of former jeopardy – One who in a competent court has been convicted, acquit-
ted, or put in what the law terms jeopardy in respect to a real or supposed crime, can-
not be further or again pursued for it, except, as by some step in the proceedings, he
waives his right to rely on this immunity (Bishop, Criminal Law). This doctrine is
founded on reason and justice, and embodied in the maxim of civil law, non bis in
idem.
The following conditions must exist before an accused is deemed to have been
placed in legal jeopardy:
1) That a valid indictment has been filed against him;
2) Before a competent court;
3) After he has been arraigned; and
4) He pleaded to the indictment. [People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851]
- - - page 42 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
Once a person is tried for an offense, he cannot, without his consent, be tried for
the same offense, or for any offense necessarily included of which he might have been
convicted. Thus, a prosecution for murder based upon the same acts, and a prosecu-
tion for desertion bars trial for the subsequent charge of absence without leave based
upon the same acts.
71. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – MOTIONS –
A. General – Three motions are discussed below, but others may be made for the pur-
pose of making a request or of raising an objection or an interlocutory question. If a
motion amounts in substance to an application for a continuance, or to a challenge,
plea, demurrer, or other matter for which a procedure is provided, such motion will be
regarded as such application, challenge, plea, demurrer, or other matter. A motion to
elect – that is, a motion that the prosecution be required to elect upon which of two or
more charges or specifications it will proceed – will not be granted. A motion should
briefly and clearly set forth the nature the nature of and the grounds for the request,
objection, or question it is intended to make or raise. A motion admits nothing either
as to the jurisdiction of the court or the merits of the case.
Whenever the accused desires to present any objection not covered under the gen-
eral subject of challenges, pleas, or demurrers, he may do so by appropriate motion.
Thus, a pardon, a former punishment under the 105 th Article of War, and immunity
promised under Subsection 120d, may be availed of by filing the proper motion. Pun-
ishment, however, under the 105th Article of War does not bar a trial for another crime
or offense growing out of the same act or omission. For instance, punishment under
AW 105 for reckless driving would not bar trial for homicide where the reckless driv-
ing caused a death.
B. Motion to sever – A motion to sever is a motion by one of two or more joint accused
to be tried separately from the other or others. It will regularly be made before the
commencement of the trial. The motion should be granted except in cases where the
offense was committed in conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of an offense and decide to commit
it. This constitutes the exception to the general rule stated in the fourth paragraph of
Section 27.
Even in cases of conspiracy, however, the court may at its discretion grant a mo-
tion to sever when the grounds of this motion are that the mover desires to avail him-
self in his trial of the testimony of one or more of his co-accused, or of the testimony
of the wife of one; or that a defense of the other accused is antagonistic to his own; or
that the evidence as to them will in some manner prejudice his defense; or on some
other similar grounds.
If the motion is granted, the court will first decide as to which accused the court
will proceed to trial, and will then direct an appropriate amendment of the charges.
For instance, if after severance, the trial of B is directed in a case where A and B are
charged with an offense, the specification should be amended so as to allege in effect
either that B committed the offense or that B committed the offense jointly with A.
The amendment should be made formally as a part of the proceedings, no actual alter-
ation being made in the charge sheet itself. For an example see form of record, Ap-
pendix 6. Where, as a result of action on motion to sever, trial of one or more of the
accused is deferred, the action will be reported at once to the appointing authority by
- - - page 43 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
the trial judge advocate in order that such authority may take appropriate action with a
view to the trial of such accused by another court, or other disposition of the charges
as to such accused.
C. Motion to strike out – Irrelevant and redundant allegations in any specification that
may only tend to confuse the accused and prevent him from making a proper plea or
defense must upon motion be stricken out upon such terms as the court may, in its dis-
cretion, impose.
Ordinarily this motion should be made upon arraignment.
D. Motion for findings of not guilty – At the close of the case for the prosecution and be-
fore the opening of the case for the defense the court may, on motion of the defense
for findings of not guilty, consider whether the evidence before the court is legally
sufficient to support a finding of guilty as to each specification designated in the mo-
tion. The court in its discretion may require that the motion specifically indicate
wherein the evidence is legally insufficient. The court will determine the matter as an
interlocutory question (see Section 51). If there be any substantial evidence which, to-
gether with all reasonable inferences therefrom and all applicable presumptions, fairly
tend t establish every essential element of an offense charged or included in any speci-
fication to which the motion is directed, the motion as to such specification will not be
granted. The court in its discretion may defer action on any such motion as to any
specification and permit or require the trial judge advocate to re-open the case for the
prosecution and produce any available evidence. If the motion is sustained as to any
specification, the court will forthwith enter a finding of not guilty of such specifica-
tion and, where necessary, of the proper change.
72. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – NOLLE PROSEQUI – A nolle prosequi is a decla-
ration of record by the prosecution to the effect that by direction of the appointing author-
ity the prosecution withdraws a certain specification, or a certain specification and charge,
and will not pursue the same further at the present trial. A nolle prosequi will be entered
only when directed by the appointing authority, who may give such direction either on his
own initiative or on application duty made to him. In a joint case he may limit the direc-
tion to one or more of the accused.
Proper grounds for such direction include substantial defect in the specification; insuf-
ficiency of available evidence to prove a specification; and the fact that it is proposed to
use one of the accused as a witness.
A nolle prosequi is not in itself equivalent to an acquittal or to a grant of pardon and is
not a ground of objection or of defense in a subsequent trial. It may be entered either be-
fore or after arraignment and plea.
As to withdrawal of charges, see Section 5 (Appointing Authorities).
73. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – ACTION ON DEFECTIVE SPECIFICATION – If a
specification, while defective, is nevertheless sufficient fairly to apprise the accused of
the offense intended to be charged, the court upon the defect being brought to its atten-
tion, by demurrer or otherwise, will, according to circumstances, direct the specification
to be stricken out and disregarded or continue the case to allow the trial judge advocate to
apply to the convening authority for direction as to further proceedings in the case, or per-
mit the specification to be so amended as to cure such defect, and continue the case for
such time as in the opinion of the court may suffice to enable the accused properly to pre-
pare his defense in view of the amendment. The court may proceed immediately with the
- - - page 44 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
trial upon such amendment being made, if it clearly appears from all the circumstances
before the court that the accused has not in fact been misled in the preparation of his de-
fense and that a continuance is not necessary for the protection of his substantial right.
See in this connection Subsections 64a, b and c (On demurrers).
74. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – ACTION WHERE EVIDENCE INDICATES AN OFFENSE
NOT CHARGED – If at any time during the trial it becomes manifest to the court that the
available evidence as to any specification is not legally sufficient to sustain a finding of
guilty thereof or of any lesser included offense thereunder, but that there is substantial ev-
idence, either before the court or offered, tending to prove the guilt of the accused of
some other offense not alleged in any specification before the court, the court may, in its
discretion, either suspend trial pending action on an application by the trial judge advo-
cate to the appointing authority for direction in the matter or proceed with the trial. In the
latter event a report of the matter may properly be made to the appointing authority.
Instances of occasions for applying this rule would be where in a trial for the theft of a
watch the proof shows that the article was a compass; and in a trial for the wrongful sale
of property (AW 85) the proof shows that the accused negligently lost the property.
CHAPTER XIV
COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURES
(continued)
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE
mental responsibility for an offense charged should be obtained in the interest of jus-
tice, the court will call for such additional evidence. The court may adjourn pending
action on a request made by it to proper authority that the accused be examined by
one or more medical officers and that such officer or officer be made available as a
witness. See Subsection 35c (Suspected Insanity) in this connection. A request, sug-
gestion, or motion that additional evidence be called for by the court as contemplated
herein may be made by any one or the personnel of the court, prosecution, or defense.
The court may, in its discretion, give priority to evidence on such issue and determine
as an interlocutory question whether the accused was mentally responsible at the time
of the alleged offense. See Subsection 78a (Reasonable Doubt). If the court deter-
mines that the accused was not mentally responsible, it will forthwith enter a finding
of not guilty as to the proper specification. Such priority should be given where the
evidence of matters set forth in the specification is voluminous or expensive to obtain
and has little or no bearing on the issue of mental responsibility for such matters.
The court, in its discretion, may direct that a document, although excluded as not
admissible in evidence, be marked for identification and appended to the record for
consideration of the reviewing authority, and will so direct on request of the party of-
fering the document.
Where a document, which must or should be returned to the source from which it
was obtained (e.g., an original record), is received in evidence or marked for identifi-
cation, a suitable copy or extract thereof, certified as such by the trial judge advocate,
will be substituted for such document so as to permit such return.
The court may, in its discretion (through the president, or the law member, if the
president so directs), explain to the accused his right as to each specification, to re-
main silent, or to testify as a witness (see Subsections 120d and 121b), or to make an
unsworn statement (see Section 76). Such explanation should be made if the court has
any doubt that the accused fully understands his rights in the premises. The explana-
tion is usually made after the prosecution has rested.
The court should protect every witness from insulting or improper questions,
harsh or insulting treatment, and unnecessary inquiry into his private affairs. The
court should also forbid any question which appears to be intended merely to annoy a
witness or which, though otherwise proper, is needlessly offensive in form.
B. General duties, etc., of trial judge advocate – As to preparation for trial, attendance if
witnesses, sending out interrogatories for depositions, and swearing of witnesses, see
Sections 41, 97, 98 and 95m respectively.
After the pleas the trial judge advocate will, to the extent required by the court,
read the parts of this manual or of the authoritative military precedents (see Section
128) that are pertinent to the definition, proof, and defense of the offenses charged.
He may make an opening statement – that is, a brief statement of the issues to be
tried and what he expects to prove – but will avoid including or suggesting matters as
to which no admissible evidence is available or intended to be offered. Originally,
such a statement is made only immediately before the introduction of evidence for the
prosecution, but in exceptional cases, the court may, in its discretion, permit like
statements to be made at later stages of the proceedings.
On behalf of the prosecution he conducts the direct and redirect examination of
the witnesses for the prosecution and the cross and re-cross-examination of the wit-
- - - page 46 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
nesses for the defense. He will, unless the court otherwise directs, conduct the direct
and redirect examination of witnesses for the court.
C. General duties, etc., of counsel – He may make an opening statement for the defense
similar to that indicated in Subsection 75b. This statement is ordinarily made just after
the prosecution has rested or immediately following the opening statement of the trial
judge advocate; but in exceptional cases, the court may, in its discretion, permit it or
other like statements to be made at a later stage or other stages of the proceedings.
On behalf of the defense he conducts the direct and redirect examination of the
witnesses for the defense and the cross and re-cross-examination of the witnesses for
the prosecution and of the witnesses for the court.
As to preparation for trial, attendance of witnesses, and submission of interrogato-
ries for depositions, see Sections 45, 97, and 98, respectively.
CHAPTER XV
COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURES
(continued)
STATEMENTS – ARGUMENTS – FINDINGS – DATA AS TO SERVIC, ETC.,
EVIDENCE OF PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS; EVIDENCE OF PREVIOUS DISCHARGE;
EVIDENCE OF PREVIOUS PUNISHMENT – SENTENCE – ANNOUNCING
SENTENCE; MATTERS OF AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO CLEMENCY;
ADJOURNMENT
sel. The trial judge advocate has the right to make the opening argument, and if any argu-
ment is made on behalf of the defense, the closing argument. Arguments throughout the
trial may be oral, in writing, or both, except where the court requires an argument to be
reduced to writing. See Subsections 41d and 45b. Arguments in writing will ordinarily be
read to the court by the party who submits them. The last paragraph of Section 6 applies
equally to arguments.
The failure of an accused to take the stand must not be commented upon; but if he tes-
tifies and if he fails in such testimony to deny or explain specific facts or an incriminating
nature that the evidence of the prosecution tends to establish against him, such failure
may be commented upon. Where, however, an accused is on trial for a number of of-
fenses and taking the stand in his own defense testifies to one or more of them only, no
comment can be made on his failure to testify as to the others.
Refusal of a witness to answer a proper question may be commented upon.
As to permissible comments on the fact that one witness testified after hearing an-
other, see Subsection 121a (Examination of witnesses).
After the arguments and before the court closes for the findings, both sides should be
asked whether they have anything further to offer.
78. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – FINDINGS –
A. General – Basis of finding – Only matters properly before the court as a whole may be
considered. A member should not, for instance, be influenced by any knowledge of
the acts, character, or service of the accused not based on the evidence or other proper
matter before the court; or by any opinions not properly in evidence; or by motives of
“partiality, favor or affection.” See in this connection Section 76 (Statements) and
Section 77 (Arguments). Matters as to which comment in argument is prohibited can
not be considered.
A member is, however, expected to utilize his common sense, and his knowledge
of human nature and of the ways of the world in weighing the evidence. In the light of
all the circumstances of the case, he should consider the inherent probability or im-
probability of the evidence and with this in mind may properly believe one witness
and disbelieve several witnesses whose testimony is in conflict with that of the one.
See in this connection Section 124 (Credibility of witnesses) and Subsection 114a
(Confessions).
Reasonable doubt – In order to convict for an offense the court must be satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty thereof. By reasonable doubt is in-
tended not fanciful or ingenious doubt or conjecture but substantial, honest, conscien-
tious doubt suggested by the material evidence, or lack of it, in the case. It is an hon-
est, substantial misgiving generated by insufficiency of proof. It is not a captious
doubt, nor a doubt suggested by the ingenuity of counsel or court and unwarranted by
the testimony; nor doubt born of a merciful inclination to permit the defendant to es-
cape conviction; nor a doubt prompted by sympathy for him or those connected with
him. The meaning of the rule is that the proof must be such as to exclude not every
hypothesis or possibility of innocence but any fair and rational hypothesis except that
of guilt; what is required being not an absolute or mathematical but a moral certainty.
A court-martial which acquits because, upon the evidence, the accused may possibly
be innocent falls as far short of appreciating the proper amount of proof required in a
- - - page 48 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
criminal trial as does a court which convicts on a mere probability that the accused is
guilty (see Winthrop).
The rule as to reasonable doubt extends to every element of the offense. Thus, if,
in a trial for murder, a reasonable doubt exists as to the presence of any qualifying cir-
cumstance, the accused cannot properly be convicted as charged, although he might
be convicted of the lesser included offense of homicide. Prima facie proof of an ele-
ment of the offense does not preclude the existence of a reasonable doubt with respect
to such element. The court may decide, for instance, that the prima facie evidence
presented does not outweigh the presumption of innocence.
Where a reasonable doubt exists as to the mental responsibility of an accused for
an offense charged, the accused can not legally be convicted of that offense. A person
is not mentally responsible for an offense unless he was at the time so far free from
mental defect, disease, or derangement as to be able concerning the particular acts
charged to both distinguish right from wrong and to adhere to the right.
A reasonable doubt may arise from the insufficiency of circumstantial evidence,
and such insufficiency may be with respect to either the evidence of the circumstances
themselves or to the strength of the inference from them.
Reasons for findings; divulging or disclosing findings, etc. – No finding should in-
clude any indication of the reasons for making it. See, however, Subsection 80a (Mis-
cellaneous). For the information of the reviewing authority, but not as part of a find-
ing, the court may formulate for inclusion in the record a statement of the reasons
which led to a finding, and a statement of the weight given to certain evidence. A
proper occasion for such action would be when the court finds an accused not guilty
because of a doubt as to sanity.
See AW 19 as to divulging findings, and s to disclosing or discovering the vote or
opinion of a number upon the findings.
Acquittal; statute of limitations – Whenever the court has acquitted the accused
upon all specifications and charges, the court shall at once announce such result in
open court. An acquittal automatically results from findings of not guilty of all
charges and specifications.
If by exceptions and substitutions the accused is found guilty of an offense against
which it appears that the statute of limitations (AW 38) has run, the court may advise
the accused in open court of his right to avail himself of the statute in bar of punish-
ment, if he so desires. This will do in the form of a motion to the court.
B. Findings as to the charges – Permissible findings include guilty; not guilty; not guilty,
but guilty of a violation of the ….. Article of War.
An attempt or frustration should not be found as a violation of AW 97 unless the
attempt or frustration is included in the express terms of some other article of war or
the penal law indicated therein. See AW 94.
The findings of the charge s to any specification should be supported by, and not
be inconsistent with, the finding of that specification. Thus, where two specifications
of desertion are under one charge and the accused is found guilty of the first specifica-
tion, but guilty of absence without leave only as to the second specification, the find-
ing should be: Of the Charge; as to Specification 1: Guilty. As to Specification 2: Not
guilty; but guilty of a violation of the 62 nd Article of War. A finding of guilty of one
- - - page 49 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
specification appropriate to its charge requires a finding of guilty of the charge; but a
finding of not guilty of another such specification under that charge does not require
any of the charge as to it. Thus, upon finding an accused guilty of one of the two spec-
ifications under a proper charge, and not guilty of the other, the finding of the charge
should be simply guilty.
C. Findings as to the specifications – General – Permissible findings include guilty; not
guilty, guilty with exceptions, with or without substitutions; and not guilty of the ex-
ceptions and guilty of any substitution as stated below.
A finding should be consistent with itself. For instance, a finding of guilty without
criminality should not be made.
Any different findings as to two or more joint accused should be consistent with
one another. For instance, where one of two joint accused is found not guilty and the
other is found guilty, the name of the former as well as the words indicating a joint of-
fense should be eliminated from the specification by the finding as to the latter.
Where, however, three or more accused are involved, it is sufficient if the finding as
to each accused clearly appears from reading the record of all the findings together.
Exceptions and substitutions – One or more words or figures may be expected
and, where necessary, others substituted, provided the facts as so found constitute an
offense by an accused which is punishable by the court, and provided that such action
does not change the nature or identity of any offense charged in the specification or
increase the amount of punishment that might be imposed for any such offense. The
substitution of a new date or place may, but does not necessarily change the nature or
identity of an offense.
Lesser included offense – If the evidence fails to prove the offense charged but
does not prove the commission of a lesser offense necessarily included in that
charged, the court may by its findings except appropriate words, etc., of the specifica-
tion, and, if necessary, substitute others instead, finding the accused not guilty of ex-
cepted matter but guilty of absence without leave under a charge of desertion. Such a
finding may be thus worded when the specification is in the usual form: Of the speci-
fication: Guilty except the words “desert” and “in desertion”, substituting therefore,
respectively, the words “absent himself without leave from” and “without leave”, of
the excepted words not guilty, of the substituted words guilty.
In the discussion of certain offenses in Sections 127-152 (Punitive Articles), some
of the included offenses are stated.32
D. Procedure – The court sits in closed session during deliberation on the findings. De-
liberation may properly include full and free discussion as to the merits of the case.
The influence of superiority in rank should not be employed in any manner in an at-
tempt to control the independence of the members in the exercise of their judgment.
Any attempt of this nature constitutes a military offense.
Voting is by secret ballot (AW 30) and is obligatory. A finding of not guilty re-
sults as to any specification or charge if no other valid finding is reached thereon; but
a court may reconsider any finding at any time before the same has been announced
32
Under AW 38 as amended by RAs 242 & 516, and also under the rules and regulations implementing PD
1850, the period of limitation upon trial and punishment by courts-martial is two (2) years from the time the
offense was committed, except for violation of AWs 94 & 95, the prescriptive period is three (3) years from
the time the offense was committed.
- - - page 50 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
or the court has opened to receive evidence of previous convictions. The order in
which several charges and specifications are to be voted on will be determined by the
president, subject to the control of the court, except that all the specifications under a
charge shall precede that charge. See AW 42 as to the number of votes required and
AW 30 as to counting and checking votes and announcing the result of the ballot. If in
computing the number of votes required a fraction results, such fraction will be
counted as one; thus, where five members are to vote, a requirement that two-thirds
concur is not met if less than four concur.
79. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – DATA AS TO SERVICE, ETC., EVIDENCE OF
PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS; EVIDENCE OF FORMER DISCHARGES; EVIDENCE OF FORMER
PUNISHMENT –
A. General – In the event of conviction of an accused the court will open for the purpose
of receiving evidence such as data as to his age, pay, and service as may be shown on
the first page of the charge sheet, and of giving the trial judge advocate an opportunity
to introduce evidence of the accused’s previous convictions by court-martial.
This evidence, and any evidence of the accused’s former discharges (Subsection
79e), is for consideration by the court in fixing the kind and amount of punishment.
See in this connection Sections 1-2-1-4 (Punishments).
A written stipulation containing the pertinent data as to service and previous con-
victions may be accepted by the court.
B. Data as to service, etc. – If the defense objects to such data as being inaccurate or in-
complete in a specified material particular, or as containing specified objectionable
matter, the court may either sustain the objection without further inquiry or proceed to
determine the issue. Objections not asserted may be regarded as waived.
C. Evidence of previous convictions – Such evidence is not limited to evidence relating
to offenses similar to the one of which the accused stands convicted or to the evidence
referred with the charges. Such evidence must, however, relate to offenses committed
during a current enlistment, appointment, or other engagement or obligation for ser-
vices of the accused, and in the case of an enlisted man during the one year, and in the
case of others, during the three years next preceding the commission of any offense
charged. In computing the one or three years as the case may be, periods of unautho-
rized absences as shown by the findings in the case or by the evidence of previous
convictions should be excluded.
In the case of a general prisoner, whether the sentence of dishonorable discharge
was suspended or not, the rules as to an enlisted man apply, except that the evidence
of previous convictions should be limited to evidence of offenses committed during
his status as a general prisoner.
Unless the accused has been tried for an offense in the sense of AW 39, evidence
as to such offense is not admissible as evidence of a previous conviction. See Subsec-
tions 70b and c.
Subject to the rules as to documentary evidence, including the rules as to the use
of copies, proof of previous convictions by court-martial and civil court may be estab-
lished, respectively, by the order publishing the case (or by the record of trial, if no
order was published, or the order is not sufficient exhibit), and by the indictment and
record of conviction. The accused’s service record or an admissible copy or extract
- - - page 51 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
copy thereof may also be used. The accused may, of course, object on proper grounds
to the introduction of any offered evidence of previous convictions. If he does, action
as indicated in Subsection 79b will be taken. Any objection not asserted may be re-
garded as waived. In the absence of objection, an offense may be regarded as having
been committed during the required periods, unless the contrary appears.
D. Evidence of former discharges – The accused may introduce evidence of the character
given on any former discharges from the military service, subject to the right of the
prosecution to introduce in rebuttal evidence of the character given the accused on
other former discharges from such service.
E. Evidence of former punishment – The fact that disciplinary punishment under AW
105 has been enforced may be shown by the accused upon his trial for a crime or of-
fense growing out of the same act or omission for which such punishment under AW
105 was imposed and enforced. (AW 105)
80. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – SENTENCE –
A. General – Basis of determining – To the extent that punishment is discretionary, the
sentence should provide for a legal, appropriate, and adequate punishment. See Sec-
tions 102-104 (Punishments). In the exercise of any discretion the court may have in
fixing the punishment, it should consider, among other factors, the character of the ac-
cused as given on former discharges, the number and character of the accused of the
previous convictions, the circumstances extenuating or aggravating the offense itself,
or any collateral feature thereof made material by the limitations on punishment. The
members should bear in mind that the punishment imposed must be justified by the
necessities of justice and discipline. See in this connection Subsection 78a (Basis and
Findings); Subsection 79a (Evidence of former punishment); and Section 111 (Evi-
dence in extenuation). Comments with respect to matters proper for consideration in
fixing the punishment are made in other connections. For example, see Subsections
126a and 139a.
In deliberating upon the sentence the court will consider only such evidence of
previous convictions as to relate to offenses committed in the case of an enlisted man
or general prisoner during the one year, and in the case of others during the three
years next preceding the commission of any offense of which the accused has been
found guilty by the court.
The imposition by courts-martial of inadequate sentences upon officers and others
convicted of crimes which are punishable by the civil courts would tend to bring the
Army, as to its respect for the criminal laws of the land, into disrepute.
If the accused is found guilty of two or more offenses constituting different as-
pects of the same act or omission, the court should impose punishment only with ref-
erence to the act or omission in its most important aspect.
Miscellaneous – Forms of sentences are given in Appendix 9. See AW 19 as to di-
vulging or discovering the vote or opinion of a member upon the sentence.
A general court-martial in cases of conviction must include in the record a ratio-
nale of its decision and sentence. In any other cases, a court-martial may formulate for
inclusion in the record, for the information of the reviewing authority, a brief state-
ment of the reasons for the decision and sentence.
- - - page 52 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
B. Procedure – The court sits in closed session during deliberation on the sentence. De-
liberation may properly include full and free discussion. The influence of superiority
in rank should not be employed in any manner in an attempt to control the indepen-
dence of the members in the exercise of their judgment. Any attempt of this nature
constitutes a military offense.
Voting is by secret written ballot (AW 30) and is obligatory on each member, re-
gardless of his vote as to the findings. It is the duty of each member to vote for a
proper sentence for the offense or offenses of which the accused has been found
guilty, without regard to his opinion or vote as to the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused. See AW 42 as to the number of votes required, and AW 30 as to counting and
checking votes and announcing the result of the ballot. If in computing the number
votes required a fraction results, such fraction will be counted as one; thus, where six
members are to vote, a requirement that three-fourths concur is not met unless five
concur. Any sentence, even in a case where the punishment is mandatory, must be
concurred in by the required number of members.
81. COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURE – ANNOUNCING SENTENCE; MATTERS OF, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO CLEMENCY; ADJOURNMENT – When a court-martial has sentenced
an accused, the court will at once announce the findings and sentence in open court, un-
less, in the court’s opinion, good reasons exist for not making the findings and sentence
public a the time. In this latter event, the president may state in open court that the find-
ings and sentence are not to be announced.
After such announcement or statement, the defense may submit in writing for attach-
ment to the record any matters as to clemency which it desires to have considered by the
members of the court or the reviewing authority. The rules of evidence are not applicable
to such matters.
One or more recommendations to clemency, each signed by the members joining
therein, may be submitted to the trial judge advocate for forwarding with the record. Such
recommendation may include a recommendation for the suspension of all or part of the
sentence, including a sentence of dishonorable discharge. It should be specific as to
amount and character of clemency recommended and as to the reasons for the recommen-
dation.
At the conclusion of the case, the court may proceed to other business, adjourn until a
definite time, or adjourn to meet at the call of the president.
As to the duty of the trial judge advocate to notify the commanding officer of the re-
sult of trial, see Subsection 41b.
CHAPTER XVI
COURTS-MARTIAL – PROCEDURES
(continued)
SPECIAL AND SUMMARY COURTS –
REVISION - REHEARINGS
- - - page 53 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
CHAPTER XVII
COURTS-MARTIAL – RECORDS
proper person will fully inform the appointing authority as to the facts and as to the
action, if any, taken.
C. Disposition – The original record and accompanying papers with proper letter of
transmittal and the General Court-Martial Date Sheet properly filled out will be sent
by the trial judge advocate to the appointing authority or to his successor, or, in the
case of a court appointed by the President, to the Judge Advocate General of the
Army. (See AW 34)
86. COURTS-MARTIAL – RECORDS – SPECIAL AND SUMMARY COURTS-MARTIAL – Ex-
cept as otherwise indicated in the form for record of trial by special court-martial (Appen-
dix 7) or elsewhere, the requirements of Section 85 are in general applicable to records of
special courts-martial. As to records of summary courts-martial, see Appendix 8.
At the conclusion of the trial of each case a summary court will record and sign its
findings and the acquittal or sentence as indicated by the form and will transmit the
record of trial and any papers received with the charges or as evidence without letter of
transmittal to the appointing authority or his successor. Where the summary court is the
only officer present with the command, the record will so state, and such officer thereafter
holds the records as transmitted to himself as reviewing authority.
CHAPTER XVIII
COURTS-MARTIAL – ACTION
the reviewing authority nor any other officer is authorized to add to the punishment
imposed by a court-martial. As to automatic reduction of noncommissioned officers
consequent upon action on certain offenses, see Subsection 103d. Upon a rehearing no
sentence in excess of more severe than the original sentence shall be enforced, unless
the sentence be based upon a finding of guilty of an offense not considered upon the
merits in the original proceedings. (AW50). Where only so much of a finding of
guilty of desertion as involves a finding of guilty of absent without leave is approved,
and it appears from the record that punishment for such offense is barred by AW 38,
the reviewing authority should not consider any such absence as a basis for punish-
ment, although he may disapprove the sentence and order a rehearing. In this connec-
tion it should be remembered that absence without leave is not a continuing offense.
AW 36 vests a sound legal discretion in the reviewing authority to the end that
substantial justice may be done. The effect of a particular error within the purview of
AW 36 should be weighed by him in the light of all the facts as shown by the record,
and unless it appears to him that the substantial rights of the accused were injuriously
affected, he should disregard the error as a basis for holding the proceedings invalid
or for disapproving a finding or the sentence. No findings or sentence need be disap-
proved solely because a specification is defective if the facts alleged therein and rea-
sonably implied therefrom constitute an offense, unless it appears from the record that
the accused was in fact misled by such defect, or that his substantial rights were in
fact otherwise injuriously affected thereby. If through mistake or inadvertence, the
trial judge advocate should be present during all or part of the closed session of a
court, such irregularity is not a ground for a disapproval, unless it appears that such
presence of the trial judge advocate injuriously affected the substantial rights of the
accused. Any malicious action of a trial judge advocate in this regard is a military of-
fense.
The reviewing authority will take appropriate action where it appears from the
record or otherwise that the accused may have been insane at the time of the commis-
sion of the offense, or insane at the time of his trial, regardless of whether any such
question was raised at the trial or of how it was determined.
If the reviewing authority disagrees with the court on any ruling on demurrers, he
may return the record to the court with a statement of his reasons for disagreeing and
with instructions to reconvene and reconsider its action with respect to the matters as
to which he is not in accord with the court. To the extent that the court and reviewing
authority differ as to a question which is merely one of law, such as a question as to
the jurisdiction of the court, the court will accede to the views of the reviewing au-
thority; and the court may properly defer to such views in any case. The order return-
ing the record should include an appropriate direction with respect to proceeding with
the trial. If the reviewing authority does not wish to return the record, he will take
other appropriate action.
The disapproval of a sentence puts an end to it as a basis of punishment, and con-
firmation of a disapproval is not required in any case. A disapproval should be ex-
press. Neither an acquittal nor a finding of “not guilty” requires approval or confirma-
tion; and neither should be disapproved. Such disapproval can not in any event affect
the finality of a legal acquittal or of a legal finding of not guilty. The reviewing au-
thority may, however, properly advice on matters of the court by letter of his noncon-
- - - page 57 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
currence in an acquittal or in a finding of not guilty, and the reasons for such noncon-
currence.
► Reference of General Court-Martial Record to Staff Judge Advocate or to the
Judge Advocate General – See AW 45 for statutory requirements.
The staff judge advocate will submit a written review of the case. The review will
include his opinion, both as the weight of evidence and any error or irregularity, and a
specific recommendation of the action to be taken, together with his reasons for such
opinion and recommendation. The reviewing authority may direct his staff judge ad-
vocate to make supplementary reviews or reports, oral or written, and may require a
more comprehensive written review. If the reviewing authority in doubt as to his ac-
tion, he may, before acting thereon, transmit the record to the Judge Advocate General
with request for advise either as to the whole case or to any particular matter involved
in the case; and will so transmit it for advise on the whole case before acting on it, if
he has no staff judge advocate or officer acting as such.
Revision and correction of record – A record of trial which, by reason of some ap-
parent omission, error, or other defect, appears to be substantially incomplete or in-
correct, or which in the opinion of the reviewing authority shows improper action by
the court as to a finding or sentence, may be returned to the president or the court (or
to the summary court), directing that the court reconvene for such action as may be
appropriate. See AW 39 for matters as to which a return of record of trial for recon-
sideration is prohibited.
If a previous conviction was erroneously considered by the court, and it is be-
lieved that the consideration of such conviction influenced the court in its sentence,
the reviewing authority may return the record to the court to reconsider the sentence
without regard to the previous conviction.
The record of trial must speak the truth. When it appears that any material matter
has, through clerical error or through inadvertence been omitted or erroneously stated
in the record, and it is impracticable or inconvenient to reconvene the court, the record
itself, or a copy, or a synopsis of the pertinent part thereof may be sent to the officers
who authenticated the record for a certificate as to the facts with reference to such ap-
parent omissions or erroneous statements. The certificate will be attached to the
record of trial immediately after the original signatures authenticating it and will be-
come part of the record of trial. The necessary action will be taken by the reviewing
authority to the end that each accused who was furnished a copy of the record is like-
wise furnished a copy of such certificate. Such method of correction is appropriate
where, for instance, the record of a general court-martial fails to show that the mem-
bers were sworn or that the required number of members concurred in a finding. It is,
of course, understood that the certificate must correspond to the facts; for instance, if
in such a case the members were not in fact sworn, the certificate must so state.
Miscellaneous and advisory instructions – Appropriate action should be taken
where the court has imposed an unwarranted though legal punishment. For example,
while evidence of previous convictions may always be considered in determining the
proper measure of punishment, evidence of previous convictions of offenses materi-
ally less grave than the offense or offenses for which the sentence was adjudged is not
to be regarded as in itself justifying a sentence of maximum severity. In every case the
punishment should be graded according to the circumstances of the offense.
- - - page 58 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
exceeding two-thirds of the soldier’s pay per month for a period not exceeding that
prescribed in the sentence.
The action of a reviewing authority in approving a sentence and simultaneously
remitting a part thereof is legally equivalent to approving only the sentence as re-
duced.
The authority competent to order the execution of a sentence of dismissal of an of-
ficer, or a sentence of death, may suspend such sentence until the pleasure of the Pres-
ident be known (AW 51).
The authority competent to order the execution of a sentence of a court-martial
may, at the time of the approval of such sentence, suspend the execution, in whole or
in part, of any such sentence as does not extend to death, and may restore the person
under sentence to duty during such suspension (AW 52). The reviewing authority
should suspend the whole of a sentence when it appears to him that such action will
promote the discipline of the command.
As to penitentiary confinement, see subsection 90a.
Forms of action and related matters – The reviewing authority will state at the
end of the record of trial in each case his decisions and orders. This equally applies in
summary court cases, even where the reviewing authority is the officer that tried the
case as a summary court. Forms of action are in Appendix 10. Any reprimand or ad-
monition provided for by the sentence of a general or special court-martial as ordered
executed will be included in the action. He will sign in his own hand the action taken
by him on the proceedings, his rank, and the fact that he is the commanding officer
appearing after his signature. So also, any supplementary or corrective action pursuant
to a holding of the board of review and the Judge Advocate General under AW 50
must be signed by the reviewing authority personally.
Any action taken may be recalled and modified before it has been published or the
party to be affected has been duly notified of the same.
In a proper case, the action may include an order as to the release of the accused
from arrest or confinement. In such a case, steps should be taken with a view to the
prompt carrying out of the order.
Where in his final action on a case the reviewing authority disapproves a finding
of desertion or a sentence based wholly or in part on such a finding, he should indi-
cate in his action the reasons therefore. Such reasons assist the Quartermaster Service
in making certain decisions relative to forfeiture and stoppages. In any case, the rea-
son for a disapproval may be stated.
If the sentence of a general court-martial as ordered executed provides for con-
finement, the place of confinement will be designated. See Section 90.
C. Disposition of record and related matters – General Court-Martial – The record, with
the decisions and orders of the reviewing authority thereon, will be transmitted ordi-
narily without letter of transmittal direct to the Judge Advocate General of the Army.
With the record will be forwarded the accompanying papers (see Section 85), five au-
thenticated copies of the order, if there be any, promulgating the result of the trial, and
a signed copy of the review of the staff judge advocate. This applies equally to cases
where action by a confirming authority other than the President is necessary; the
record, etc., will be transmitted to such authority. Where the order of execution is
- - - page 60 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
withheld under AW 50, the reviewing authority will, before forwarding the record,
take therefrom the date necessary for drafting general court-martial orders, and when
such order is issued, five authenticated copies thereof will be forwarded.
Special Court-martial – The record and accompanying papers, together with a
copy of the order publishing the result of trial, will be forwarded by indorsement to
the officer exercising immediate general court-martial jurisdiction over the command,
and after having been acted upon, shall be transferred for permanent file in the office
of the Judge Advocate General of the Army. See in this connection pertinent Army
regulations on the subjects of service record, reports of changes, etc.
Summary Court-martial – The several records of trial by summary courts-martial
within a command shall be filed together in the office of the commanding officer and
shall constitute the summary court record of the command. See in this connection per-
tinent Army regulations regarding service record, reports of changes, etc. A report of
each trial – that is, a copy of the record – will be sent to the officer exercising imme-
diate general court-martial jurisdiction over the command. Three years after action
thereon a record of trial by summary court-martial may be destroyed.
D. Orders and related matters – An order promulgating the result of trial by general or
special court-martial, while not necessary to the validity of the trial, will be issued
whether such result was an acquittal or otherwise. For forms of orders and data to be
shown therein, see Appendix 11 and pertinent Army regulations. Matter unfit for pub-
lication will be set forth only in the original folder, in such copies as may be furnished
the Adjutant General, the authorities of the post or other place where the accused is,
and to the commanding officer or other head of the place where the accused is to be
confined, if confinement is involved.
The order will be of the date that the reviewing or conforming authority takes final
action on the case. The order will state the date upon which the sentence was adjusted
by the court.
When a rehearing is directed, neither the action of the court at the former proceed-
ing nor the action of the reviewing or conforming authority thereon will be published
in orders, but the court-martial order promulgating the final action in the case will in a
separate paragraph publish such charges and specifications at the former hearing as
may not have been referred for rehearing, together with the action of the court and re-
viewing authority thereon.
88. COURTS-MARTIAL – ACTION – CONFIRMING AUTHORITY – See AW 47 for cases
where confirmation is required.
When empowered by the President so to do, the commanding general of the Army in
the field or the district commander may approve or confirm and commute (but not ap-
prove or confirm without commuting), mitigate, or remit, any sentence which under the
Articles of War requires the confirmation of the President before the same may be exe-
cuted (AW 49).
As to powers included in the power to confirm, see AW 48.
A confirming authority will be guided by the principles and provisions of Section 87
as far as applicable.
- - - page 61 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
CHAPTER XIX
COURTS-MARTIAL – ACTION
The order directing a rehearing should be made at the time of disapproving or vacat-
ing the sentence and will ordinarily be included in the action on such sentence.
When a rehearing is directed there will be referred with the charges to the trial judge
advocate the record of the former proceedings and the accompanying papers which are
pertinent, together with a copy of the holding of the board of review or the review by the
staff judge advocate or such other holding or opinion as may inform him of the errors
made at the former hearing which necessitated a rehearing.
90. COURTS-MARTIAL – ACTION – PLACE OF CONFINEMENT –
A. Penitentiary – A penitentiary may be designated as the place of confinement for the
whole period of confinement imposed by the sentence as ordered executed, provided
such period exceeds one year, and provided also that such sentence is wholly or partly
based on one or more of the offenses listed below or was imposed by way of commu-
tation of a death sentence:
Desertion in time of war
Repeated desertion in time of peace
Mutiny
An offense involving an act or omission recognized as an offense of a civil nature
and so punishable by penitentiary confinement for more than one year by some
statute of the Philippines.
A penitentiary will not be designated as the place of confinement except as autho-
rized above in this Subsection (90a). For limitation on length of penitentiary confine-
ment, see proviso of AW 44. Instructions as to the particular penitentiary to be desig-
nated will be issued from time to time by the President.
It is the policy of the President to separate, so far as practicable, general prisoners
convicted of offenses punishable by penitentiary confinement from general prisoners
- - - page 62 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
and those convicted of purely military offenses or the light felonies, in addition to
purely military offenses. In furtherance of this policy, reviewing authorities should
designate a penitentiary as the place of confinement in every case where such action is
authorized, unless it appears that the holding of the prisoner in association with mis-
demeanants and military offenders will not be to the detriment of such misdemeanants
and military offenders and that the purposes of punishment do not demand peniten-
tiary confinement.
B. Disciplinary barracks; military post, etc. – Subject to such instructions as may be is-
sued from time to time by the President, a military post, station, or camp will be des-
ignated, or a disciplinary barracks may be established as the place of confinement in
cases where a penitentiary confinement is not designated.
CHAPTER XX
COURTS-MARTIAL – ACTION
(continued)
ACTION AFTER PROMULGATION
The power to suspend a sentence subsequent to its approval is vested only in the Chief
of Staff or the officer holding general court-martial jurisdiction over the offender, regard-
less of the kind of court-martial by which the sentence may have been adjudged. How-
ever, the power of suspension is not to be confused with, nor is it included within the
power of remission or mitigation vested by AW 49 in the military authority competent to
appoint, for the command in which the person under sentence is held, a court of the kind
that imposed the sentence.
A sentence to dishonorable discharge may be suspended under AW 52 for a period
beyond the term of confinement but within the current enlistment, and if the period of
suspension is not specifically indicated, it will be deemed to end with the current enlist-
ment.
Also, the proper authority may vacate at any time during a soldier’s term of enlist-
ment an order suspending a sentence.
Any action taken toward the suspension of the sentence of a general or special court-
martial while the sentence is being served and any action taken toward vacating such sus-
pension will be promulgated in a general or special court-martial order.
Sundry regulations relating to the execution and remission of sentence of forfeiture
and confinement (court-martial forfeitures – enlisted men) (prisoners – general provi-
sions) are contained in pertinent Army regulations.
The authority which has designated the place of confinement, or higher authority, may
change the place of confinement or any prisoner under the jurisdiction of such authority;
but when a military prison or post has not been designated as the place of confinement of
a prisoner, the place of confinement can not thereafter be changed to a penitentiary under
the same sentence.
The distribution of general and special courts-martial orders is announced from time
to time by the Chief of Staff.
When an officer is dismissed from the service for cowardice or fraud, the crime, pun-
ishment, name, and place of abode of the delinquent shall be published in the newspapers
in and about the camp and in the province or city from which the offender came, or where
he usually resides; and after such publication, it shall be scandalous for an officer to asso-
ciate with him (AW 43). The terms “cowardice” and “fraud” as employed in AW 43 refer
mainly to the offenses made punishable by AW 76 and 95. With these, however, may be
regarded as included all offenses in which fraud or cowardice is necessarily involved, al-
though the same be not expressed in terms in the charge or specification. The publication
throughout the Philippines in press dispatches of “the crime, punishment, name, and place
of abode” of the accused is a sufficient compliance with the article.
CHAPTER XXI
COURTS-MARTIAL – ACTION
95. OATHS – Oaths in trials by courts-martial – In this paragraph the word “oath” includes
affirmation. Forms of oaths (except of the oath to test competency and of the oath to
charges) and other matters relating to oaths in trials by courts-martial are in AW 19 and
AW 114. The form of oath to test competency and the form of oath to charges are shown
in the second paragraph of this Section (95) and Appendix 4, respectively. In case of af-
firmation, the phrase “So help you God” will be omitted.
The prescribed oaths must be administered in and for each case to each member, trial
judge advocate, assistant trial judge advocate, reporter, and interpreter before he functions
in the case as such. The point in the proceedings at which each of the various oaths is usu-
ally administered is shown in Appendix 6. In addition to the prescribed oath, there may be
such additional ceremonies or acts as will make the oath binding on the conscience of the
person making it. While the members and the trial judge advocate and his assistants are
being sworn, all persons concerned with the trial and any spectators will stand. When the
reporter, interpreter, and a witness is being sworn, he and the person administering the
oath will stand. If either the trial judge advocate or assistant trial judge advocate is to tes-
tify, the oath will be administered by the other or by the President. The trial judge advo-
cate will administer to a challenged member who is to be examined under oath as to his
competency the following oath.
You swear (or affirm) that you will true answers make to questions touch-
ing on your competency as a member of the Court in this case. So help you
God.
96. OATHS – Authority to administer oaths – Any judge advocate or acting judge advocate,
the president of a general or special court-martial, any summary court-martial, the trial
judge advocate or any assistant trial judge advocate or a general or special court-martial,
the president or the recorder or a court of inquiry or of any military board, any officer
designated to take a deposition, any officer detailed to conduct an investigation, and the
adjutant of any command shall have power to administer oaths for the purpose of the ad-
ministration of military justice and for other purposes of military administration. (AW
114)
Depositions to be read in evidence before military courts, commissions, courts of in-
quiry, or military boards, or for other use in military administration may be taken before
and authenticated by an officer, military or civil, authorized by the laws of the Philippines
or by the laws of the place where the deposition is taken to administer oaths. (AW 26)
In all cases in which under the laws of the Philippines oaths are authorized or required
to be administered, they may be administered by notaries public duly appointed and all
persons authorized by law to administer oaths.
CHAPTER XXII
COURTS-MARTIAL – ACTION
mander or commanding officer will take appropriate action with a view to the prompt
service of the subpoena by the most economical available means. Travel orders will
be applied for when necessary. Service will ordinarily be made by a person subject to
military law, but may legally be made by others. Service is made by personal delivery
of one of the copies to the witness. The other copy, with proof of service made as in-
dicated on the form prescribed, will be promptly returned to the trial judge advocate.
If service can not be made, the trial judge advocate will be promptly so informed.
When use for it is probable, a return addressed post-paid or penalty envelope, ad-
dressed to the trial judge advocate and not to the officer by name, may be sent to the
person who is to serve the subpoena.
Neglect or refusal to appear – See AW 23 and second paragraph below (Warrant
of Arrest).
In order to maintain a prosecution under the part of AW 23 referred to, a person
must not only be duly subpoenaed but be allowed traveling expenses as well, if indi-
gent (AW23). Whenever such action appears to be advisable, appropriate steps will be
taken by the trial judge advocate with a view to such payment or tender at the time of
the service of the subpoena. See pertinent regulations. If an officer, charged with serv-
ing a subpoena, pays the reasonable traveling expenses to an indigent witness, taking
a receipt therefore, he is entitled to reimbursement.
Warrant of arrest – In any case the trial judge advocate may properly consult the
court as to the desirability of issuing a warrant of arrest under AW 22. He should con-
sult the court before issuing a warrant of arrest for a witness desired by the defense if,
in his opinion, the evidence desired can be obtained in another manner, or if he is
willing to admit that the witness would testify as stated by the defense.
Whenever it becomes necessary to issue a warrant of arrest (see prescribed form),
the trial judge advocate will issue, direct, and deliver or send it for execution to an of-
ficer designated for the purpose by the commander of the proper district or other com-
mand.
As the arrest of a person under a warrant of arrest involves deprivation of liberty,
the authority for such action may be inquired into by a writ of habeas corpus. For this
reason, the warrant of arrest should be accompanied by the following papers to enable
the officer to make a full return in case a writ of habeas corpus is served upon him. A
copy of the charges in the case, including the order referring the charges for trial and
copies of the orders appointing the court-martial, each sworn to be a full and true copy
of the original by the trial judge advocate; the original subpoena showing proof of ser-
vice of the same; and an affidavit of the trial judge advocate that the person being ar-
rested is a material witness in the case, that such person has failed and neglected to
appear, although sufficient time has elapsed for that purpose, and that no valid excuse
has been offered for such failure to appear.
In executing such process, it is lawful to use only such force as may be necessary
to bring the witness before the court. Whenever the use of force is likely to be actually
required, and whenever travel or other orders are necessary, appropriate application to
the proper commander will be made by the officer who is to execute the process.
For matters relating to habeas corpus proceedings in connection with arrest, see
Sections 153-157.
- - - page 67 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
c. Military witnesses – The attendance of persons in the military service stationed at the
place of meeting of the court, or so near that no expense of transportation will be in-
volved, will ordinarily be obtained by informal notice served by the trial judge advo-
cate on the person concerned that his attendance as a witness is desired. If for any rea-
son formal notice is required, the trial judge advocate will request the proper com-
manding officer to order the witness to attend; but if travel expenses are involved, the
proper superior will be requested to issue the necessary order. The attendance of per-
sons on the retired list, not assigned to active duty, should be obtained in the same
manner as in cases of civilian witnesses not in Government employ. No travel order
will be issued in such cases. If practicable, request for attendance of military wit-
nesses will be so made that the witness will have at least 24 hours’ notice before start-
ing to attend the meeting of the court.
98. COURTS-MARTIAL – INCIDENTAL MATTERS – PREPARATION OF INTERROGATORIES
AND TAKING OF DEPOSITIONS –
a. Preliminary, general, and miscellaneous – For statutory provisions, see AW 25 and
26. For use of depositions in evidence, see Subsection 119a
Where the name of the person whose deposition is desired is unknown, he may be
identified in the interrogatories and any accompanying papers by his office or posi-
tion, e.g., “Commanding Officer, Company C, 27th Infantry”, “Casher, Philippine Na-
tional Bank, Manila.”
In this Section (98), unless the context otherwise indicates, the term “trial judge
advocate” includes a summary court-martial.
b. Preparation of interrogatories – The party desiring a deposition ordinarily submits to
the opposite party the interrogatories he wishes the witness to answer; but he may
submit them to the court, and the court, when it desires the deposition of a witness,
may direct the trial judge advocate to submit appropriate interrogatories to the court.
In any case all parties in interest will be given full opportunity to submit cross-inter-
rogatories and additional interrogatories, direct and cross, as desired. Where the de-
fense in a capital case submits interrogatories, cross-interrogatories may be submitted
to the same extent as in a case not capital.
If the interrogatories and cross-interrogatories are submitted to the court, objec-
tions on any ground known at the time will ordinarily be made and passed upon at that
time. A wider latitude than usual should be allowed as to leading questions.
c. Sending out interrogatories – All interrogatories are entered upon the form prescribed
as indicated by the notes and instructions thereon. According to circumstances, and
having regard to economy, promptness, and the proper taking of the deposition, the
trial judge advocate may send the interrogatories to the commanding officer of the
military station nearest the witness; to a responsible person, preferably one competent
to administer oaths; a district or other superior commander; to the witness himself; or
the Adjutant General. According to circumstances, the interrogatories will be accom-
panied by such of the following as are advisable or necessary; a proper explanatory
letter, an addressed return postpaid or penalty envelope, and subpoenas in duplicate.
The return postpaid or penalty envelope should be addressed to the trial judge ad-
vocate of the court and not to the officer by name. The subpoenas will be signed and
completed to the extent permitted by the known facts.
d. Action by officer receiving interrogatories – When interrogatories are received by a
military officer, he will take appropriate action with a view to the prompt and eco-
- - - page 68 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
nomical taking of the deposition by a competent person; the sending of the deposition
to the trial judge advocate (addressed by office, not by name); and the payment or rea-
sonable traveling expenses to indigent witnesses. Subject to limitations on his author-
ity, he may, for example, send a suitable person to the residence of the witness or ar-
range by mail or otherwise for the taking of the deposition; or, in the case of a civilian
witness, subpoena him or arrange for his attendance without a subpoena.
e. Suggestions for persons taking deposition – Before a witness gives his answers to the
interrogatories, they should be read and, if necessary, explained to him, or he should
be permitted to read them over in order that his answers may be clear, full, and to the
point. The person taking the deposition should not advise the witness how he should
answer, but he should endeavor to see that the witness understands the questions and
what is desired to be brought out by them, and that his answers are clear, full, and to
the point.
f. Action on receipt of deposition – Upon receipt of the deposition the trial judge advo-
cate will advise the accused or his counsel of that fact and will give them an opportu-
nity to examine the deposition before the trial.
g. Deposition on oral interrogatories – Depositions may be taken on oral interrogatories
by consent of the parties or by direction of the court. The procedure in taking such de-
positions will conform generally to that outlined above. However, instead of writing
out the questions to be asked a witness, each party will indicate in a separate letter or
memorandum the nature of the charges and the points desired to be covered in the ex-
amination of the witness. Whenever practicable the commanding officer to whom the
papers are sent as contemplated by Subsection c above will, in addition to designating
the person authorized by law to administer oaths to take the deposition, detail an offi-
cer to represent each side in propounding the questions.
99. COURTS-MARTIAL – INCIDENTAL MATTERS – Employment of experts – When the em-
ployment of an expert is necessary during a trial by court-martial, the trial judge advocate,
in advance of the employment, will, on order or permission of the court, request the ap-
pointing authority to authorize such employment and to fix the limit of compensation that
is recommended by the prosecution or the defense. Where in advance of trial the prosecu-
tion or the defense knows that the employment of an expert will be necessary, application
should be made to the appointing authority to employ the expert, stating the necessity
therefore and probable cost thereof.
100. COURTS-MARTIAL – INCIDENTAL MATTERS – Expenses of courts-martial, etc. –
See pertinent Army regulations.
101. COURTS-MARTIAL – INCIDENTAL MATTERS – Contempts – See AW 31
The conduct described in AW 31 constitutes a direct contempt. Indirect or construc-
tive contempts (i.e., those not committed in the presence or immediate proximity of the
court while it is in session), and the conduct and acts described or referred to in AW 23
are not included, may be punishable under other provisions of law, such as, for instance,
in the case of persons not subject to military law, and AW 97 in the case of persons so
subject.
The words “any person,” as used in AW 31, include all persons, whether subject to
military law or not. They do not include members of the court itself, although such
members may be punishable as indicated in Subsection 38a.
- - - page 69 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
Where a contempt punishable under AW 31 has been committed, the court may, af-
ter giving the party an opportunity to be heard, impose a punishment within the limits
prescribed by AW 31. A record is made in and as a part of the regular record of the case
before the court showing the facts as to the contempt and the proceedings with reference
to it. Sentences adjudged for contempt require the approval of the reviewing authority in
order to be effective.
The court, instead of proceeding as stated above, may, for example, cause the re-
moval of the offender and in a proper case initiate prosecution against him before a civil
or military court.
CHAPTER XXIII
COURTS-MARTIAL – PUNISHMENTS
GENERAL LIMITATIONS –
MISCELLANEOUS LIMITATIONS AND COMMENTS –
MAXIMUM LIMITS OF PUNISHMENTS
33
See Note 31, supra.
34
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
the death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress here-
after provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Sec 19, Art 3
pf the 1986 Constitution)
The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee,
or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
- - - page 70 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
fense under AW 93, dishonorable discharge may legally be imposed with life impris-
onment.
The death penalty can not be imposed, except for an offense expressly made so
punishable in the Articles of War (AW 42). See Section 14 for a statement on the par-
ticular articles. Although an offense may thus expressly be made punishable by death,
the death penalty can not be imposed for that offense of the applicable limit of punish-
ment prescribed by the President under AW 44 (see Section 104) is less than death.
A court-martial in imposing the sentence of death will prescribe the method,
whether by hanging or shooting. Hanging is considered more ignominious than shoot-
ing and is the usual method, for example, in the case of a person sentenced to death
for spying, for murder in connection with mutiny, or for a violation of AW 93. Shoot-
ing is the usual method in the case of a person sentenced to death for a purely military
offense, as sleeping on post.35
b. Special and summary courts-martial – Special courts-martial shall not have the power
to adjudge confinement in excess of six months, nor to adjudge forfeiture of more
than two thirds pay per month for a period of not exceeding six months (AW 13).
Summary courts-martial shall not have the power to adjudge confinement in excess of
one month, restriction to limits for more than three months, or forfeiture or detention
or more than two-thirds of one month’s pay (AW 14). Neither a special nor a sum-
mary court-martial can impose dismissal or dishonorable discharge (AW 109, AW
117), but these courts are not limited to the kinds of punishments stated in AW 13 and
AW 14. See Section 17 as to apportionment that may be required if a summary court-
martial wishes to impose both confinement and restriction.
c. Officers, members of the Army Nurse Corps, cadets, flying cadets, and probationary
third lieutenants – In general, any limitation as to the punishments that may be im-
posed on an officer by a court-martial is applicable to the case of a nurse, cadet, flying
cadet, or probationary third lieutenant. An officer can not be reduced in grade (e.g.,
from captain to first lieutenant) or to the ranks, or to the grade or status of a noncom-
missioned officer, or sentenced to confinement at hard labor unless the sentence in-
cludes dismissal, or to hard labor without confinement in any case. Similar limitations
apply in the case of a nurse, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary third lieutenant.
d. Enlisted men; general prisoners – For the maximum limits of punishment for certain
offenses by enlisted men, see Section 104. A sentence in the case of a non-commis-
sioned officer which is ordered executed or, as suspended, includes either dishonor-
able discharge, whether suspended until release from confinement or not, or hard la-
bor, whether with or without confinement, immediately reduces such noncommis-
sioned officer to the grade of private. Authorized punishments for enlisted men, sub-
ject to any limitations applicable in a particular case, include reduction to the eighth
grade from the seventh or any high grade. Loss of special rating, loss of all rights and
privileges arising from a certificate of eligibility to promotion, and reduction of a non-
commissioned officer to a lower non-commissioned grade are unauthorized by sen-
tence of a court-martial.
The fact that a general prisoner is at the time of sentence in the status of a general
prisoner under suspended sentence of dishonorable discharge does not prevent the im-
position of dishonorable discharge and other forms of punishment, but if the general
35
Ibid,
- - - page 71 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
prisoner is not in such status, the imposition of any form of punishment other than
confinement at hard labor would in general be futile.
e. Reprimand; admonition – There is no restriction either as to the court which may im-
pose these punishments or as to the persons subject to military law on whom they may
be imposed, but the court will not fix the terms or wording of the reprimand or admo-
nition.
f. Restriction to limits – This form of punishment is rather a deprivation of privileges
than confinement. There is no restriction either as to the court which may impose this
punishment or as to the persons subject to military law on whom it may be imposed,
but it will not be imposed in excess of three months and will not in any event operate
to exempt the person on whom it is imposed from ay military duty.
g. Forfeiture; fines; detention of pay – To be effective, any forfeiture, fine, or detention
intended must be imposed in express terms. Forfeiture of pay, without mention of al-
lowances, does not affect allowances, and vice versa. Fines and forfeitures accrue to
the Philippines and can not be imposed by sentence of a court-martial for the benefit
of any individual. A court-martial has no authority to provide by stoppage, assign-
ment, or otherwise, for the settlement of any pecuniary liability whatever, including
any liability to the Government and any liability to a government agency, such as a
company fund. The forfeiture of deposits or of the interest thereon can not be imposed
by sentence of a court-martial. A sentence requiring a deposit or contribution of pay
or other funds is illegal. See, generally, as to forfeitures, Army regulations relating to
the Quartermaster Service, particularly on the subject of court-martial forfeitures – en-
listed men.
Fine is expressly recognized as a form of punishment in AW 81 and 95.
Detention of pay will not be imposed by sentence of a court-martial except on en-
listed men of the Army.
h. Loss of rank; loss of promotion; suspension from rank, command, or duty – Loss of
rank is accomplished by a sentence directing that the accused be reduced in rank a
certain number of files, or that he be reduced in rank to the foot of the list of officers
of his grade, or that he be reduced in rank so that he shall be and remain at the foot of
the list of his grade for a certain length of time.
Loss of promotion is, if the name of the accused is on the promotion list, accom-
plished by a sentence directing that the accused be reduced on the promotion list a
certain number of files. If the accused is entitled to promotion after a certain period of
service, the sentence should direct that he be suspended from promotion for a certain
length of time after his promotion would otherwise be due.
Suspension from rank includes suspension from command. It does not affect an
officer’s right to rise in files, but renders him ineligible to sit as a member of a court-
martial, court of inquiry, or military board, and deprives him of privileges depending
on rank, such as any priority dependent on rank in the selection of quarters.
Suspension from command merely deprives the officer of authority to exercise
military command and, consequently, of his authority to give orders to his juniors and
to perform ay duty involving the exercise of command. It does not affect an officer’s
right to promotion.
- - - page 72 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
Months
Days
Days
Desertion
Terminated by apprehension -
Not more than 6 months in service at time of desertion............... Yes ......1 ½ .....
.............................................................................................................. ............. ...........
More than 6 months in service at time of desertion ..................... Yes ......2 ½ .....
.............................................................................................................. ............. ...........
In the execution of a conspiracy or in the presence of an un-
lawful assemblage which the troops may be opposing ......... Yes ......5 .........
................................................................................................ ............. ...........
AW 60 – Advising another to desert ................................................ ............. ........... 6
.............................................................................................................. .............6 .........
Assisting knowingly or persuading another to desert ..................Yes .......1 .........
.............................................................................................................. ............. ...........
AW 62 – Absence Without Leave –
From command, quarters, station or camp –
For not more than 60 days, for each day or fraction of a day
of absence ............................................................................. ............ ...........
................................................................................................ 3 .......... ........... 2
For more than 60 days ............................................................... Yes....... .......... 6
.............................................................................................................. .............
From guard
For not more than 1 hour .......................................................... ............. ...........
.............................................................................................................. ............. ...........15
For more than 1 hour ................................................................. ............. ...........
..............................................................................................................3 ........... 3 ........
- - - page 74 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
Months
Years
due
AW 85 – Injuring or losing, through neglect, horse, arms, am- Punishments
munition, accoutrements, equipment, clothing, or
other property issued for use in the military service,
or items belonging to two or more of said classes:
Of a value of P40 or less ................................................................... ........... 3
............................................................................................. .............Confinement
3 ........ at hard
Of a value of P100 or
Offenses less and more than 40 ...................... Yes ...... ...........
labor not to 6 exceed -
............................................................................................. ............. 6 ........
Of a value of more than P100 ............................................. Yes ...... 1 ........
............................................................................................. ............. ...........
Injuring or losing, willfully, horse, arms, ammunition, accou-
Months
Months
Years
Of a value of P100 or less and more than 40 ...................... Yes ...... 1 ........
............................................................................................. ............. ..........
Of a value of more than P100 ............................................. Yes ...... 5 ........
............................................................................................. ............. ...........
Discharging, through carelessness, a firearm ...................................... ............. ........... 3
....................................................................................................... .............3 .........
Disorderly, in command, quarters, station, or camp ........................... ............. ........... 1
..................................................................................................................... ..........
Disorderly under such circumstances as to bring discredit upon
the military service........................................................................ ............. ........... 4
.....................................................................................................................4 .........
Drunk in command, quarters, station, or camp ................................... ............. ...........
....................................................................................................... ............. ........... 15
Drunk under such circumstances as to bring discredit upon the
military service ............................................................................. ............ ........... 3
....................................................................................................... .............3 .........
Drunk, prisoner found ......................................................................... ............. ........... 3
....................................................................................................... .............3 .........
Failing to obey a lawful order:
Of a superior officer ..................................................................... ............. ........... 6
....................................................................................................... .............6 .........
Of a non-commissioned officer .................................................................. ........... 3
....................................................................................................... ............. 3 ........
Failing to pay a just debt under such circumstances as to bring
discredit upon the military service ............................................... Yes ...... ...........6
....................................................................................................... ............. ...........
False official report or statement knowingly made:
- - - page 77 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
Punishments
Confinement at hard
Offenses labor not to exceed -
Months
Months
Years
Days
Days
d. Application of penal laws other than the Articles of War – Whenever a court-martial
applies any penal law other than the Articles of War, it shall be guided by the penal-
ties therein prescribed; provided, that fines authorized by said law, whenever imposed
by the court, shall not exceed the limits prescribed by the Articles of War; and, pro-
vided further, that in no case shall a penalty be imposed in excess of the jurisdiction
of the court. (See AW 12, AW 13, AW 14, and AW 94.)
CHAPTER XXIV
DISCIPLINARY POWER OF COMMANDING OFFICER
105. AUTHORITY –
a. Who may impose Disciplinary Punishment – For statutory basis or authority, see AW
105. The commanding officer of any detachment, company, battalion, squadron, com-
missioned vessel, or higher command, may, for minor offenses, impose disciplinary
punishments upon persons of his command who are subject to military law, including
officers, without the intervention of a court-martial. For purposes of AW 105, the fol-
lowing shall be deemed as “Commanding Officers” with respect to persons on de-
tached service or assigned to their respective offices who are subject to military law:
the Vice Chief of Staff, The Deputy Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chiefs of Joint Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chiefs of the Special, Administrative, Tech-
- - - page 79 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
nical and Personal Staffs, General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
the Chiefs of the General Staff of the Major Services and Unified Commands of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. The terms “detached service” and “assigned” as
used herein have the same meaning as the term “of his command”.
b. Delegation Prohibited – The authority of a commanding officer under AW 105 can
not be delegated, but communications with respect thereto may be signed or transmit-
ted by him personally or as provided for, official communications in general. How-
ever, a commanding officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction or an officer
or general or flag rank in command may specifically delegate his power under AW
105 to an officer who is one of his principal assistants. Unless otherwise prescribed by
these regulations or the terms of delegation, the officer to who these powers are dele-
gated has the same authority under AW 105 as the officer who delegated the powers.
c. Minor Offenses – The term “offenses”, as used in connection with the authority to im-
pose disciplinary punishment under AW 105 for minor offenses includes only those
acts or omissions punishable under the Articles of War. Whether or not an offense
may be considered as “minor” depends upon its nature, the time and place of its com-
mission, the persons committing it, and other circumstances surrounding its commis-
sion. Generally, the term includes derelictions not involving moral turpitude or ay
greater degree of criminality than is involved in the average offense tried by summary
court-martial. An offense for which the Articles of War prescribe a mandatory punish-
ment or authorize the punishment of dishonorable discharge, or bad conduct dis-
charge, or penitentiary confinement (See AW 41) is not a minor offense.
d. Non-punitive Measures – AW 105 and the provisions of this chapter do not apply to,
include, or limit the use of those non-punitive measures that a commanding officer is
authorized and expected to use in order to further strengthen the efficiency of his
command or unit, such as administrative admonitions, reprimands, rebukes, written or
oral, not intended or imposed as a punishment, but purely as a corrective measure,
more analogous to instruction than to punishment, in the strict line of his duties to cre-
ate and maintain efficiency.
106. POLICIES –
a. General – Commanders are responsible for the maintenance of discipline within
their commands. In the great majority of instances, discipline ca be maintained
through effective measures which a commander is expected to use to further the effi-
ciency of his command or unit (see Sec 105d). A commanding officer should resort
to his power under AW 105 in every case where that article applies and where non-
punitive measures are considered insufficient, unless it is clear that punishment un-
der that article would not meet the needs of justice and discipline. Superior comman-
ders should restrain any tendency of subordinate commanders to resort unnecessarily
to court-martial jurisdiction for the punishment of offenders.
b. Referral to Superior Authority – If a commanding officer determines that his author-
ity under AW 105 is insufficient to make a proper disposition of a case, he may refer
the case to a superior commander for appropriate disposition.
c. Evaluation – Before exercising authority under AW 105, a commanding officer must
thoroughly evaluate each case. No policy may be established whereby certain cate-
gories of offenses must be disposed of under AW 105 regardless of the circum-
- - - page 80 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
(4) forfeiture of not more than one-half of one month's base pay per month
for three months;
(5) detention or withholding of not more than one-half of month's base pay
for six months;
(6) deprivation of liberty on shore not exceeding 60 consecutive days, for
those attached to or embarked in a commissioned vessel of the Philippine
Navy.
2) Upon other military personnel of his command –
a) By any military officer –
(1) Withholding of privileges for not more than 30 consecutive days;
(2) Restriction to certain specified limits, with or without suspension from duty,
for not more than 30 consecutive days;
(3) Arrest in quarters for not more than 15 consecutive days;
(4) Forfeiture of not more than one-half of one month's base pay;
(5) Detention or withholding of not more than one-half of one month's base pay
per month for three months;
(6) Hard labor without confinement for not more than 15 consecutive days;
(7) Confinement not under guard for not more than 15 consecutive days;
(8) Correctional custody for not more than 15 consecutive days;
(9) Extra duties, for not more than 15 consecutive days;
(10) Reduction to one or two inferior pay grades, if the grades from which de-
moted is within the promotion authority of the officer imposing the reduc-
tion or any officer subordinate to the one who imposes the reduction.
(11) With respect to those attached to or embarked on a commissioned vessel of
the Philippine Navy, deprivation of liberty on shore not exceeding 30 con-
secutive days, or confinement on bread and water or diminished rations for
not more than 5 consecutive days.
b) By a commanding officer in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel or Commander, or
above –
(1) Withholding of privileges for not more than 60 consecutive days;
(2) Restriction to certain specified limits, with or without suspension from duty,
for not more than 60 consecutive days;
(3) Arrest in quarters for not more than 30 consecutive days;
(4) Forfeiture of not more than one-half of one month's base pay for two
months;
(5) Detention or withholding of not more than one-half of month's base pay for
six months;
(6) Hard labor without confinement for not more than 30 consecutive days;
(7) Confinement no under guard for not more than 30 consecutive days;
(8) Correctional custody for not more than 30 consecutive days;
(9) Extra duties, including fatigue or other duties, for not more than 45 consec-
utive days;
(10) Reduction to the lowest or any intermediate pay grade, if the grade from
which demoted is within the promotion authority of the officer imposing the
reduction or any officer subordinate to the one who imposes the reduction,
but an enlisted member in a pay grade above E-4 may not be reduced more
than two pay grades.
- - - page 82 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
that any monthly contribution from his pay that any military person is required by
law to make to entitle him to benefits under said law must be deducted before the
net amount of pay subject to withholding is computed. The amount to be withheld
will be expressed in pesos amounts (not in pesos and centavos) and not in a man-
ner of days of fractions of monthly pay. If the withholding is to be applied for
more than one moth, the amount to be withheld per month and the number of
months should be stated. If the punishment includes both reduction, whether or
not suspended, and withholding, the withholding must be based on the grade to
which reduced. The amount of pay withheld is returned to the offender at the expi-
ration of the specified period of withholding or of the offender’s term of service,
whichever is earlier; withholding of pay not extend to any pay accrued before the
date of its imposition.
d. Combination and apportionment –
1) Restriction and extra duties may be combined to run concurrently, but the com-
bination may not exceed the maximum duration imposable for extra duties. Re-
striction or extra duties may also be combined with correctional custody, but not
beyond the maximum duration imposable for correctional custody. Restriction
may be combined to run concurrently with arrest in quarters. Correctional cus-
tody inherently includes a form of restriction and may include extra duties. Ar-
rest in quarters and restriction, or two or more of the punishments of correctional
custody, extra duties, and restriction may not be combined to run consecutively
in the maximum amount imposable for each. All of these punishments are in the
nature of deprivation of liberty, and when they are combined to run concurrently,
there must be apportionment as provided herein.
Forfeiture of basic pay and withholding of basic pay may not be combined to
run either concurrently or consecutively without an apportionment. Both punish-
ments amount to a deprivation of entitlement to pay, either permanently or tem-
porarily. A commanding officer may also impose forfeiture or withholding of
pay, or a properly apportioned combination of these punishments, with a reduc-
tion in grade. Confinement on bread and water or diminished rations may not be
imposed in combination with correctional custody, extra duties, or restriction.
Where an apportionment is required when combining certain punishments,
the following Table of Equivalent Disciplinary Punishments will be used in sub-
stituting one form of punishment for another.
* The factors designated by asterisk (*) are 2 instead of 1 ½ when the punishment
is imposed by a commanding officer below the grade of Lieutenant Colonel or
Commander. The punishment of forfeiture and withholding of basic pay may
not be substituted for the other punishments listed in the table, nor may those
other punishments be substituted for forfeiture or withholding of pay.
2) Illustrations –
a) A commanding officer in the grade of lieutenant colonel or commander, or
above, may impose upon an enlisted person punishment consisting of restric-
tion for 20 days, extra duties for 15 days, and correctional custody for 10 days
to run consecutively using the following calculations: the authorized maxi-
mum restriction imposable is 60 days, of which only 20 days have been im-
posed; 15 days extra duties can be substituted for 20 of the unused days of re-
striction (1 ½ for 2); and 10 days of correctional custody can be substituted for
the remaining 20 days of unused restriction to limits (1 for 2).
b) A commanding officer with GCM jurisdiction may impose upon a commis-
sioned officer a forfeiture of 5 day’s pay and a detention of 10 day’s pay for
the first month; the same forfeiture and detention for the second month, the
same forfeiture and detention for the third month; and a detention of 15 day’s
pay for the fourth month. This is calculated as follows: the total amount that
may be forfeited is one-half of one month’s pay for three months, or 45 day’s
pay. However, a total of only 25 day’s pay has been forfeited, leaving a total
permissible detention of 30 day’s pay (20 x ½). The monthly allocation of for-
feitures and detentions, shown in this illustration, has been made because: [a]
the combination punishments may not operate as to deprive the offender of
more than one-half of his monthly pay in any one month, and [b] the forfeiture
may not be imposed beyond the third month. Other allocations, equally within
the above principles, could be made.
3) Use of the Table – The Table of Equivalent Punishments may be used only when
punishment is initially imposed. It may not be used in mitigating punishment or
at the time of vacation of suspension of punishments, e.g., a punishment of 30
days correctional custody may not, at the end of 20 days, be mitigated to restric-
tion for more than 10 days as only 10 days of the original punishment remains
unserved. A punishment of 30 days correctional custody which has been sus-
pended may not, at the time of the vacation of the punishment, be mitigated to
restriction for more than 30 days.
e. Effectivity of punishments – Disciplinary punishments imposed under authority of AW
105, if unsuspended, shall take effect and will be carried into execution on the date
the offender is informed of the imposition of punishment upon him. If the punish-
ment is suspended, but thereafter vacated, they shall take effect on the date the com-
manding officer orders the vacation of the suspension.
109. PROCEDURE, RECORDS OF PUNISHMENT.
a. Notification of imposition of punishment – The commanding officer, upon ascer-
taining to his satisfaction from the investigation conducted that an offense cogniz-
able by him under AW 105 has been committed by a member of his command, will
proceed to impose the punishment. The member will be notified in writing of the
misconduct or offense committed by him. The member shall also be directed to ac-
- - - page 86 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
d. The power to set aside punishments and restore rights, privileges, ad property af-
fected by the executed portion of a punishment should ordinarily be exercised
only when the authority considering the case believes that, under all the circum-
stances of the case, the punishment has resulted in a clear injustice. Also, the
power to set aside an executed punishment and mitigate a reduction in grade to a
forfeiture or withholding of pay should ordinarily be exercised only within a rea-
sonable time after the punishment has been executed. In the absence of unusual
circumstances, three months is a reasonable time.
e. An application for suspension, mitigation, remission, or setting aside of the pun-
ishment, in whole or in part, not made within a reasonable time may be rejected
by the authority to whom the application is made. An application made more than
fifteen days after the punishment was imposed, in the absence of unusual or spe-
cial circumstances, may be considered as not having been made within a reason-
able time.
109-B. APPEALS – A person punished under authority of AW 105 who deems his punish-
ment unjust or disproportionate to the offense may, through proper channels, appeal to
the next superior authority, but may in the meantime be required to undergo the pun-
ishment adjudged. A appeal not made within a reasonable time may be rejected by the
next superior authority. In the absence of unusual circumstances, an appeal made
more than 30 days after the punishment was imposed may be considered as not having
been made within a reasonable time. Authority “superior” to a particular commanding
officer is the authority normally superior in the chain of command. However, when
the punishment has been imposed under a delegation of a commander’s power to im-
pose disciplinary punishment (see Section 105b), the appeal will not be directed to
that commander.
Appeals will be in writing through proper channels and will include a brief state-
ment of the reasons for regarding the punishment as unjust or disproportionate. The
immediate commanding officer of the accused will, when necessary, include with the
appeal a copy of the record of the case. Before acting on an appeal from any punish-
ment of arrest in quarters for more than 10 days; correctional custody for more than
10 days; forfeiture of more than seven day’s pay; reduction of one or more pay grades
from the fourth or higher pay grade; extra duties for more than 15 consecutive days;
restriction for more than 15 days; or detention or withholding of pay for more than 15
days, the superior authority shall refer the case to his judge advocate or legal officer
for consideration and advice, and may so refer the case upon appeal from ay punish-
ment imposed under AW 105. If the superior authority has no judge advocate or legal
officer serving on his staff, he may refer the case for action to a superior authority
who has a judge advocate or legal officer on his staff. In considering the case, the
judge advocate or legal officer is not limited to a examination of any written matter
comprising the record of the proceedings and may make inquiries he determines desir-
able.
The superior authority will, in passing upon an appeal, ordinarily hear no wit-
nesses. He may exercise the same powers with respect to the punishment imposed as
may be exercised under AW 105 by the officer who imposed the punishment or his
successor in command. Thus, under the conditions set forth in Sections 108 and 109-
A, he may suspend, remit, mitigate, or set aside in whole or in part the punishment
imposed.
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After having considered the appeal, the superior authority will transmit the papers,
through channels, to the appellant’s immediate commanding officer with a direction
to inform the appellant of the disposition of his appeal.
Under AW 105 any superior authority may exercise the same powers as may be
exercised by the officer who imposed the punishment or his successor in command
under Sections 108 and 109-A, whether or not a appeal was made from the punish-
ment. A superior authority who is a commanding officer exercising general court mar-
tial jurisdiction or is an officer of general or flag rank in command may delegate the
powers he has as superior authority under this chapter to a principal assistant.
109-C. MISCELLANEOUS –
a. Not bar to trial, etc. – The imposition and enforcement of a disciplinary action un-
der AW 105 for an act or omission is not a bar to trial by court-martial for a seri-
ous crime or offense growing out of the same act or omission and not properly
punishable under AW 105 (see Section 71a). However, the accused may show at
the trial that he has been punished under AW 105 and, when so shown, this fact
shall be considered in determining the measure of punishment to be adjudged if a
finding of guilty results.
CHAPTER XXIV
DISCIPLINARY POWER OF COMMANDING OFFICER
SECTION
PAGE
111. General Rules ............................................................................................................ 92
112. Presumptions; direct and circumstantial evidence ..................................................... 92
a. Presumptions .......................................................................................................... 93
b. Direct and circumstantial evidence ......................................................................... 93
General ............................................................................................................ 94
Testimonial knowledge .................................................................................... 94
Opinion evidence ............................................................................................. 94
Expert witness ................................................................................................. 94
Accused’s bad character .................................................................................. 94
113. Hearsay Rule .............................................................................................................. 95
a. General rule ............................................................................................................ 95
b. Illustrations ............................................................................................................. 95
c. Exceptions .............................................................................................................. 96
114. Confessions; accused’s admissions; acts and statements of conspirators
and accomplices ......................................................................................................... 96
a. Confessions ............................................................................................................ 96
General observations ....................................................................................... 96
Rules ................................................................................................................ 96
b. Accused’s admissions ............................................................................................ 98
- - - page 90 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
When criminal intent, motive, or guilty knowledge in respect of the act is an el-
ement in the offense charged, evidence of other acts of the accused, not too re-
mote in point of time, manifesting that intent, motive, or knowledge, is not
made inadmissible by reason of the fact that it may tend to establish the com-
mission of another offense not charged. The court should not consider evidence
so offered as bearing in ay way upon the question of the accused’s character.
The following are illustrations of the rule and the exceptions.
On a charge of knowingly passing a counterfeit coin, evidence that the accused
had on another recent occasion passed a counterfeit coin is admissible as tend-
ing to establish that on the instant occasion he knew the coin to be a counterfeit.
On a charge of assaulting a fellow soldier with intent to wound, a former assault
on another soldier six months before and under entirely different circumstances
would not be admissible, having no bearing on the intent in the case charged.
On a charge of attempt to desert, the fact that the accused had recently assaulted
and beaten another soldier and was under arrest under trial for the offense
would be admissible as evidence of a probable motive to attempt to desert.
On a charge of falsification of accounts of stores, the fact that the accused em-
bezzled some of the same stores, if offered as evidence of a motive for conceal-
ing the embezzlement by falsifying accounts, would be admissible; but evi-
dence of a conviction of falsification before enlistment in a totally distinct
transaction would be admissible, since such evidence bears solely upon his gen-
eral moral character and not upon his present intent or motive.
113. COURTS-MARTIAL – Rules of Evidence – HEARSAY RULE –
a. General rule – Hearsay is not evidence. By this rule is meant simply that a fact can
not be proved by showing that somebody stated it was a fact. The fundamental rea-
sons for the rule are that the author of a statement was not under oath, and was not
subject to cross-examination, and that the court had no opportunity to cross-examine,
and that the court had no opportunity to observe his demeanor.
Of course the fact that a given statement was or was not made may itself be mate-
rial. In such a case a witness may testify that such a statement was made, but not for
the purpose of proving the truth of such statement.
b. Illustrations – Captain A conducted the investigation of charges against the accused.
Captain A’s testimony at the trial that a witness other than the accused, at the investi-
gation, testified to certain facts, is inadmissible to prove such facts because Captain
A’s testimony, not being based on his personal knowledge of such facts, would be
hearsay. However, the testimony of a person present at the investigation, that he heard
the investigating officer inform the accused that he was not required to make any
statement and that any statement he might make might be used against him, is admis-
sible for the purpose of showing that a confession made by the accused at the investi-
gation was voluntary. This is true because in the latter case the testimony is offered
not for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements made by the investigator, but
merely to prove the fact that such statements were made to the accused. Here the testi-
mony is not hearsay because the witness has personal knowledge of the fact sought to
be proved by his testimony.
- - - page 95 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
A soldier is being tried for theft of clothes from the locker. Private A is able to tes-
tify that Private B told Private A that he, Private B, about the time the clothes were
stole, saw the accused leave the quarters with a bundle resembling clothes. Such testi-
mony from Private A would be hearsay and would be inadmissible. Private B, him-
self, should be called.
The fact that the statement was made to an officer in the course of an official in-
vestigation does not make hearsay admissible. For instance, if Private B had made his
statement to Captain C in the course of an official investigation by Captain C, the tes-
timony of Captain C as to what Private B told him is hearsay and inadmissible.
A soldier is being tried for selling clothing. Policeman A is able to testify that,
while on duty as policeman, he saw the accused with a bundle under his arm go into a
shop, that he (the policeman) entered the shop and the accused ran away and the po-
liceman was unable to catch him, and that he (the policeman) the next day asked the
proprietor of the shop what accused was doing there, and the proprietor replied that
the accused sold him some clothes issued by the Government and that he paid the ac-
cused P2.50 for them. The testimony of the policeman as to the reply of the proprietor
would be hearsay and would be inadmissible. The fact that the policeman was acting
in the line of his duty at the time the proprietor made the statement would not render
the evidence admissible.
A soldier is being tried for disobedience of a certain order given him orally by
Captain C. A person is able to testify that he heard Captain C give the order to the ac-
cused. Such testimony, including the terms of the order, is not hearsay and is not sub-
ject to exclusion for that reason.
Unless covered by one of the exceptions noted below, official statements made by
an officer – as, for instance, by a company, regimental, or district commander, or by a
staff officer, in an indorsement or other communication – are not excepted from the
general rule by reason of the official character of the communication or the rank or
position of the officer making it. Nor is such a statement so excepted because it is
among papers referred to the trial judge advocate with the charges.
c. Exceptions – Some of the exceptions to the hearsay rule which are usually presented
for application in courts-martial are stated or referred to in Sections 114-119.
114. COURTS-MARTIAL – RULES OF EVIDENCE – Confessions; accused’s admissions;
acts and statements of conspirators ad accomplices –
a. Confessions – General observations – A confession is an acknowledgment of guilt. I
view of the peculiar conditions in which accused persons are often placed when
making confessions, evidence of confessions is, in general, to be received with cau-
tion. Where, however, a confession is explicit and deliberate, as well as voluntary,
and if oral, is proved by a witness or witnesses by whom it has not been misunder-
stood and is not misrepresented, it is, indeed, one of the strongest forms of proof
known to the law.
Courts should bear in mind that mere silence on the part of an accused when
questioned as to his supposed offense is not to be treated as a confession.
Although a confession may be inadmissible as a whole because it was not volun-
tarily made, nevertheless, the fact that it furnished information which led to the dis-
covery of other evidence of pertinent facts will not be a reason for excluding such
- - - page 96 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
other evidence; and when such pertinent facts have thus been proved, so much of the
accused’s statements as related strictly to those facts become admissible. For exam-
ple, where an accused held for theft said, “I stole the articles and tore up a board in
the floor of my room and I hid them there”, the fact that the confession was improp-
erly induced by promises or threats would not exclude evidence that the articles were
discovered in the place indicated by him, and after the introduction of such evidence,
it would be proper to prove that the accused made the statement, “I stole the articles
and tore up a board in the floor of my room and I hid them there”. The fact that a
confession, otherwise admissible, was made to an investigating officer during an in-
vestigation of a charge does not make the confession inadmissible.
Rules – The following rules limit the use of an accused’s confessions, oral or written,
made out of court.
Evidence of a confession or supposed confession can not be restricted to evi-
dence of only a part thereof. Where a part only is shown, the defense by
cross- examination or otherwise may show the remainder so that the full and
actual meaning of the confession or supposed confession may appear. For ex-
ample, if in a trial for the crime of robbery of a horse the prosecution proves
that the accused admitted that he broke into the stable and “stole” the horse,
the defense may show that the accused added the statement that the horse
was taken solely for a temporary purpose with the intent to return it.
An accused can not be convicted legally upon his unsupported confession. A
court may not consider the confession of an accused as evidence against him
unless there be in the record other evidence, either direct or circumstantial,
that the offense charged has probably been committed; in other words, there
must be evidence of the corpus delicti other than the confession itself. Usu-
ally such evidence is introduced before evidence of the confession; but the
court may, in its discretion, admit the confession in evidence upon the condi-
tion that it will be stricken out and disregarded in the event that the above re-
quirement as to evidence of the corpus delicti is not met later. This evidence
of the corpus delicti need not be sufficient of itself to convince beyond rea-
sonable doubt that the offense charged has been committed, or to cover any
element of the charge, or to connect the accused with the offense. Examples:
If unlawful homicide charged, evidence of the death of the person alleged to
have been killed coupled with evidence of circumstances indicating the prob-
ability that he was unlawfully killed will satisfy the rule and authorize con-
sideration of the confession, if otherwise admissible. In a case of theft or in a
case of alleged unlawful sale, evidence that the property in question was
missing under circumstances indicating in the first case that it was probably
stolen, and in the second case that it was probably unlawfully sold, would be
a compliance with the rule.
It must appear that the confession was voluntary on the part of the accused.
In the discretion of the court, a prima facie showing to this effect may be re-
quired before evidence of the confession itself is received. No hard and fast
rules for determining whether or not a confession was voluntary are here pre-
scribed. The matter depends largely on the special circumstances of each
case. The following general principles are, however, applicable.
- - - page 97 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
A confession not voluntarily made must be rejected; but where the evidence
neither indicates the contrary or suggests further inquiry as to the circum-
stances, a confession may be regarded as having been voluntarily made.
Thus, where all the available evidence as to the circumstances merely shows
that the accused, a private, confessed to a friend, another private, the confes-
sion may be regarded as voluntary.
The fact that the confession was made to a military superior or to the repre-
sentative or agent of such superior will ordinarily be regarded as requiring
further inquiry into the circumstances, particularly where the case is one of
an enlisted man confessing to a military superior or to the representative or
agent of a military superior.
Facts indicating that a confession was induced by hope of benefit or fear of
punishment or injury inspired by a person competent (or believed by the
party confessing to be competent) to effectuate the hope or fear is, subject to
the following observations, evidence that the confession was involuntary.
Much depends on the nature of the benefit or of the punishment or injury, on
the words used, and on the personality of the accused, and on the relations of
the parties involved. Thus, a benefit, punishment, or injury of trivial impor-
tance to the accused need not be accepted as having induced a confession, es-
pecially where the confession involves a serious offense; casual remarks or
indefinite expressions need not be regarded as having inspired hope or fear;
and an intelligent, experienced, strong-minded soldier might not be influ-
enced by words and circumstances which might influence an ignorant, dull-
minded recruit.
Evidence that the accused stated that he made the confession freely without
hope of reward or fear of punishment, etc., or evidence that the accused was
warned just before he made the confession might be used against him or that
he need not answer any questions that might tend to incriminate him is evi-
dence, but not conclusive evidence, that the confession was voluntary.
b. Accused’s admissions – In many instances an accused has made statements which
fall short of being acknowledgments of guilt, but which, nevertheless, constitute im-
portant admissions as to his connection or possible connection with the offense
charged. Such statements are called “admissions against interest” and are admissi-
ble in evidence without any showing that they were voluntarily made. Shout it, how-
ever, be shown that an admission against interest was procured by means which the
court believes to have been of such character that they may have caused the accused
to make a false statement, the court may either exclude or strike out and disregard all
evidence of the statement.
The following are examples of admissions against interest: A statement made af-
ter arrest by an accused charged with homicide in a dance hall, that he was in the hall
when the homicide occurred; a statement made to a police authority by an accused
charged with desertion, that he was “tired of working for the Government and did
not want to work for it any longer”.
The mere fact that the admission was made during an investigation of the charge
does not make it inadmissible.
- - - page 98 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
c. Acts and statements of conspirators and accomplices – In cases where several per-
sons join with a common design in committing an offense, all acts and statements of
each made in furtherance of the common design are admissible against all of them. It
is immaterial whether such acts or statements were done or made in the presence or
hearing of the other parties. The acts and statements of a conspirator, however, done
or made after the common design is accomplished or abandoned, are not admissible
against the others, except as acts and statements in furtherance of an escape. Of
course, this rule is not to be construed as affecting the competency of one accom-
plice to testify against the others. See Section 120 (Interest or bias).
Foundation must be laid by either direct or circumstantial evidence sufficient to
establish prima facie the fact of conspiracy between the parties. But as it sometimes
interfere with the proper development of the case to require the trial to begin with
proof of the conspiracy, in such case the prosecution may, at the trial, prove the dec-
larations and acts of one made and done in the absence of the others, before proving
the conspiracy between the defendants, though such proof will be treated as nugatory
unless the conspiracy be afterwards independently established.
The fact that a confession or admission of one conspirator is inadmissible against
the others does not prevent the use of such confession or admission against one who
has made it, but any such confession or admission can not be considered as evidence
against the others. The effect of an unsworn statement made by one of several of-
fenders at the trial is likewise to be confined to the one who made it.
115. COURTS-MARTIAL – RULES OF EVIDENCE – DYING DECLARATIONS; RES GESTAE –
a. Dying declarations – See Section 148 (Murder).
b. Res gestae – Circumstances including exclamations, declarations, and statements of
participants and bystanders, substantially contemporaneous with the main fact under
consideration and so closely connected with the main fact as to throw light upon its
character, are termed res gestae. Evidence of anything constituting the res gestae is
always admissible.
Thus, where an accused, A, is charged with the murder of B, evidence by any per-
son who was present is admissible to show that, immediately before the killing, the
accused’s wife exclaimed to him, “B has just assaulted me.” This evidence is admissi-
ble because the making of the remark was substantially contemporaneous with the
main fact under consideration – i.e., the alleged killing – and so closely connected
therewith as to throw light upon its character in that the remark tends to indicate what
the motive was in the accused’s mind, regardless of whether his wife had in fact been
assaulted or not. In such a case, the evidence is being introduced, not for the purpose
of proving the truth of the remark, but merely to show that the remark was made; its
admissibility does not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule.
It sometimes happens, however, that an utterance constituting a part of the res ges-
tae was made under such circumstances of shock or surprise as to show that it was not
the result of reflection or design, but made spontaneously. In such a case evidence that
the utterance was made may be introduced for the purpose of proving the truth of the
utterance itself. This does constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. For example, an
accused, A, is charged with having shot and killed B. A witness testifies that he, as
well as A, B, and a fourth man, C, were present at the time of the shooting; that he did
not actually see the shot fired; that he was looking at B and not at A and C when he
- - - page 99 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
heard the shot; and saw B, who was looking toward A and C, fall; and that as B fell, B
exclaimed “A has shot me!” The testimony as to B’s exclamation is admissible as part
of the res gestae; but, because of the circumstances under which the exclamation was
made, the evidence may also be considered as tending to prove that it was A who shot
B.
116. COURTS-MARTIAL – RULES OF EVIDENCE – DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE; Proving
contents of writing; Authentication of writings –
a. Proving contents of writings – General Rule – A writing is the best evidence of its
own contents and must be introduced to prove its contents. Under this rule, if it is de-
sired to prove the contents of a private letter or other unofficial paper, or of a official
paper, such as a voucher, a written claim against the Government, a pay roll or muster
roll, a company morning report an enlistment paper, etc., the strict and formal method
of doing so is to call a witness who can authenticate it, and then to introduce in evi-
dence the original.
Exceptions – If a writing has been lost or destroyed or if it is otherwise satisfacto-
rily shown that the writing can not be produced, then the contents may be proved by a
copy or by oral testimony of witnesses who have seen the writing.
When the original consists of numerous writings which can not conveniently be
examined by the court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole col-
lection, and that result is capable of being ascertained by calculation, the calculation
may be made by some competent person and the result of the calculation testified to
by him, as, for instance, if the fact to be proved is the balance shown by account
books. In such cases it must be shown to the court that the writings are so numerous
or bulky that they can not conveniently be examined by the court; that the act to be
proved is the general result of the whole collection, that the result is capable of being
ascertained by calculation; that the witness is a person skilled in such matters, and ca-
pable of making the calculation; and that the opposite party has had access to the
books and papers from which the calculation is made. Opportunity will be afforded to
the opposite party to cross-examine the witness upon the books and papers in ques-
tion, and to have them, or such of them as the cross-examiner may desire and the
court may permit produced in court for the purpose of the cross-examination.
In case of a public record required by law, regulation, or custom to be preserved
on file in a public office, a duly authenticated copy is admissible to the extent that the
original would be, without either first proving that the original has been lost or de-
stroyed, or without otherwise accounting for the original.
Copies of any books, records, papers, and documents in any of the executive de-
partments of the Government are duly authenticated by the seal of such departments.
A copy of any book, record, paper, or document in Army Headquarters, including
its different arms and services, or in any command or unit in the Army may be duly
authenticated by the seal, inked stamp, or other identification mark of such branch,
command, or unit, or by a signed certificate or statement indicating that the paper in
question is a true copy of the original and that the signer is the custodian of the origi-
nal. Thus, “A true (extract) copy: (Sgd.) Pedro Cruz, Capt., 1st Inf. Comd’g. Cd. A, 1st
Inf.” would be sufficient, prima facie, to authenticate a paper as a copy of an original
company record of Company A, First Infantry.
- - - page 100 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
fore, is not evidence of such facts. See, however, in this connection, Subsection 79c
(Previous convictions) and Section 129 (Final indorsement on service on service
record). A failure to object to a document on the ground that the information therein
is compiled from other original sources may be regarded as a waiver of the objec-
tion.
b. Former testimony – As to use of the record of the proceedings of a court of inquiry,
see AW 27.
Where, at any trial by a court-martial, including a rehearing, it is made to appear
to the satisfaction of the court that a witness who has testified in either a civil court
or a court-martial at a former trial of the same person where the issues were the same
as in the case on trial and where the accused was confronted with the witness and af-
forded the right of cross-examination, is dead, insane, or too old or infirm to attend
the trial, or is beyond the reach of process, or more than 150 kilometers from the
place where the trial is had, or can not be found, his testimony at the former trial, if
properly proved, may be received by the court if otherwise admissible, except that
such testimony of an absent witness may not be introduced in evidence in a capital
case without the consent of the accused, unless the witness is dead or beyond the
reach of process.
The testimony of a witness who has testified at a former trial by court-martial
may be proved by the record of the former trial or by a duly certified copy of so
much of such record as contains the desired testimony, and in any case the testimony
may be proved by the stenographic report of such testimony verified by the person
by whom it was reported. If in any case other competent proof is not available, the
former testimony of such a witness may be proved by any person who heard the
same being given and who remembers all or substantially all of it.
If otherwise admissible, a deposition taken for use or used at a former trial by a
court-martial is admissible in a subsequent trial of the same person on the same is-
sues.
118. C0URTS MARTIAL – RULES OF EVIDENCE – DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE: Books of
account, maps, photographs, etc. –
a. Books of account – Entries in books of account where such books are prove to have
been kept in the regular course of business, and the entrant is dead, insane, out of the
jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise unavailable to testify, are admissible as evi-
dence. Also, the lack of a entry in a series of written entries is admissible as an im-
plied statement that no events occurred of the kind that would have been recorded.
Where the entrant is available to testify in court, books of account will be used,
just as memoranda are used, for the purpose of refreshing or supplying the recollec-
tion of the witness.
Where the entrant only records an oral report or written memorandum made in the
regular course of business by another person or persons, such other person or persons,
if available, must also be called to testify.
The original document of entry must be produced or accounted for. Where a com-
posite entry is used, the extent to which intermediate memoranda must be produced
depends o the circumstances of each case. As between ledger and daybook or other
- - - page 102 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
kinds of books, the book required is that which contains the first regular and collected
record of the transactions.
b. Maps, photographs, etc. – Maps, photographs, sketches, etc., as to localities, wounds,
etc., are admissible as evidence when properly verified by the party who made them,
or by anyone personally acquainted with the locality, object, person, etc., thereby rep-
resented or pictured, and able to state their correctness, from his own personal knowl-
edge or observation; or when coming from official sources that are authentic. This
character of evidence is capable of gross misrepresentation of facts and should be
carefully scrutinized. Fingerprints, upon proper verification, are admissible, but cau-
tion should be taken to use only witnesses skilled in interpreting fingerprints.
119. COURTS-MARTIAL – RULES OF EVIDENCE – DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE: Deposi-
tions; memoranda; affidavits –
a. Depositions; general – See AWs 25 & 26 and Section 98 (Interrogatories and Deposi-
tions). Any case referred to a special court-martial for trial under the second proviso
of AW 12 is a case “not capital” within the meaning of AW 25. The case is not capital
within the meaning of AW 25 if none of the crimes or offenses charged is legally pun-
ishable by death; and although a crime or offense charged in the case is punishable by
death under the Articles of War denouncing it, such crime or offense is not legally so
punishable if the applicable limit of punishment prescribed by the President under
AW 44 is less than death.
Deposition testimony may be introduced for the defense in capital cases if other-
wise admissible. Where the defense calls for such testimony in capital cases, the wit-
nesses may be cross-examined by interrogatories as fully as a witness in a case not
capital. Under express consent of the defense made or presented in court, but not oth-
erwise, a court may admit deposition testimony not for the defense in a capital case.
Except when express consent is required as just noted, failure to object to the intro-
duction of a deposition on the ground that it was not authorized by AW 25 or was not
taken before a proper officer or on reasonable notice may be regarded as a waiver of
the objection.
The same rules as to competency of a witness and admissibility of evidence apply
in the taking of evidence by deposition that apply in the examination of a witness be-
fore the court, except that a wider latitude than usual should be allowed as to leading
questions.
If the interrogatories and cross-interrogatories for depositions are submitted for
acceptance by the court in open session, objection to the competency of the deponent,
if grounds of objection are known at the time, as well as objections to questions,
should be raised at such session and ordinarily be passed upon by the court at that
time. The court should, however, in the interests of justice, entertain such objections
when the depositions are offered in evidence.
If the interrogatories and cross-interrogatories were not so submitted, objections to
the depositions as a whole or to a part thereof may be made when it is offered in evi-
dence.
Offering depositions – The party at whose instance a deposition has been taken
should not be permitted to offer only such parts of the deposition as are favorable to
him or as he may elect to use; he must offer the deposition in evidence as a whole or
- - - page 103 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
not offer it at all. If the party at whose instance a deposition has been taken decides
not to offer it, it may be offered by the other party.
Reading, etc., of depositions – Ordinarily, a question will be read to the court by
the side o whose behalf it was taken, but if the accused is not represented by counsel,
the trial judge advocate will read to the court the deposition taken on his behalf, un-
less the accused requests to read it or does not desire to offer it. After being read to
the court a deposition will be properly marked as an exhibit with a view to incorpora-
tion in the record.
b. Memoranda – Memoranda may be used to supply facts once known but now forgotten
or to refresh the memory. Memoranda are, therefore, of two sorts: First, if the witness
does not actually remember the facts but relies on the memorandum exclusively (as in
the case of a bookkeeper using an old account book), then the witness must be able to
state that the record accurately represented his knowledge at the time of its making.
But it is not necessary that he should himself have made the record if he can state
from his present recollection that it was correct when made, and the entries must have
been made at or near the time, and the recollection at such time must have been fresh
as to the facts recorded. Where the witness’s certainty rests o his usual habit or course
of business in making memoranda or records, it is sufficient. Second, if the witness
can actually remember the facts and merely needs the memorandum to refresh his
memory, or a part of it, then the above limitations do not apply. But the court should
see to it that no attempt is made to use such a paper to impose a false memory on the
court under the guise of refreshing it.
A memorandum of the first sort is admissible. Where the memorandum is of the
second sort, the witness will testify without the memorandum itself being admitted in
evidence.
The memorandum to be used must always, on demand, be shown to the opponent
for purposes of inspection ad cross-examination.
c. Affidavits – The general rule is that affidavits are not admissible; but there may be ex-
ceptions. See for examples of such exceptions the second paragraph of Section 111
(Interlocutory questions) and Subsection 126c (Waiver of objection).
120. COURTS-MARTIAL – RULES OF EVIDENCE – COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES –
a. General – The general capacity, mental and moral, of a adult witness is always pre-
sumed. The party alleging the contrary must always prove to the court the specific
ground of incapacity, or else the witness should be allowed to testify; that is, the bur-
den of proof rests upon the party who alleges incompentency.
Any known objection to the witness’ competency should be made before he is
sworn. If his incompetency should later appear, however, a valid objection should be
sustained, or the court, of its own motion, should refuse to hear him further, and order
that any testimony he may have already given be disregarded.
b. Children – The competency of children as witnesses is not dependent upon their age,
but upon their apparent sense and their understanding of the moral importance of
telling the truth. Such sense and understanding may appear upon such preliminary
questioning of the child as the court deems necessary or from the child’s appearance
and testimony in the case.
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c. Conviction of crime – Conviction of an offense does not disqualify a witness, but may
be shown to diminish his credibility. See Subsection 124b (Impeachment).
d. Interest or bias – Interest or bias does not disqualify. For instance, the fact that a per-
son owes a party money or has a property interest with or against a party does not dis-
qualify him from testifying for or against that party; and a person who is an avowed
friend or enemy of the accused is not thereby disqualified from testifying for or
against the accused.
Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crimes committed by one
against the other, neither wife nor husband is a competent witness for or against the
other in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both shall be parties. A wife
may, therefore, testify against her husband without his consent whenever she is the in-
dividual or one of the individuals injured by an offense charged against her husband.
Thus, in such cases as bodily injuries inflicted by him upon her, bigamy, polygamy, or
adultery, abandonment of wife and children, or failure to support them, or using or
transporting her for “white slavery” or immoral purposes, the wife may testify against
her husband; but she can not be compelled to do so. See in this connection Subsection
123b (Privileged communication).
The accused is, at his own request, but not otherwise, a competent witness. His
failure to make such request shall not create any presumption against him. Upon tak-
ing the stand as a witness, he occupies no exceptional status. The same rules as the ad-
missibility of evidence, privilege of the witness, impeaching of his credit, etc., will
apply to him as to any other witness. As to cross-examination of accused, see Subsec-
tion 121b.
One or two or more persons concerned in a offense is always competent to testify,
whether he be charged jointly or separately, and whether he be tried jointly or sepa-
rately, and whether he be called for the prosecution or for the defense; except that he
can not, if on trial himself, be called except upon his own request; and if not on trial
himself, he may assert his privilege not to incriminate himself. See in this connection
Subsection 114c (Acts, etc., of conspirators, etc.) and Subsection 122b (Compulsory
self-incrimination).
The fact that an accomplice testifies for the prosecution does not make him after-
wards immune from trial except to the extent that immunity may have been promised
by an authority competent to order his trial by general court-martial.
121. COURTS-MARTIAL – RULES OF EVIDENCE – EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES –
a. General - As to oaths of witnesses, see Section 95. Where a witness is recalled to the
witness stand, he will not be sworn again, but should be reminded that he has been
sworn in the case and is still under oath. A failure so to remind him, however, does
not affect the validity of the trial and will not be ground for rejecting the testimony.
Subject to the discretion of the court, a witness before completing his testimony is
not ordinarily permitted to be present in court during the introduction of other evi-
dence or during the opening statements. The fact that a witness was so present may be
commented upon in argument by either party, in relation to the weight to be given the
evidence of the witness.
Witnesses are usually examined in the following order: Witnesses for the prosecu-
tion, witnesses for the defense, witnesses for the prosecution in rebuttal, witnesses for
- - - page 105 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
the defense in rebuttal, witnesses for the court. The order of examining each witness is
usually direct examination, cross-examination, and examination by the court. How-
ever, the court may permit the recall of witnesses, including an accused, at any stage
of the proceedings; it may permit material testimony to be introduced by either party
quite out of its regular order and place, and may permit a case once closed by either or
both sides to be reopened for the introduction of testimony previously omitted.
The court shall not excuse a witness until satisfied that neither party has any fur-
ther questions to ask him.
Refusal by a witness to answer a proper question is a military offense or an of-
fense under AW 23, according to whether the witness is subject to military law or not.
It is never necessary for a party to ask questions through the court or ask that the
court adopt a question.
A witness should be required to limit his answer to the question asked. He can not,
however, be required to answer categorically (e.g., by a simple “yes” or “no”) unless
it is clear that such an answer will be a complete response to the question. A witness
may always be permitted at some time before completing his testimony to explain any
of his testimony
The reason for any objection will ordinarily be stated.
With reference to questioning witnesses through an interpreter, see Section 47
(Duties of an Interpreter).
b. Cross; re-direct and re-cross examination; examination by the court or a member –
Cross examination should be limited to matters having a bearing upon the testimony
or the witness on direct examination. As one purpose of cross-examination is to test
the credibility of the witness, he may always be cross-examined as to matters bearing
upon his credibility, for instance, he may be interrogated as to his relationship to the
parties and to the subject-matter of the case, his interest, his motives, inclinations, and
prejudices, his means of obtaining a correct and certain knowledge of the facts about
which he testifies, the manner in which he has used those means, his powers of dis-
cernment, memory, and description. Leading questions may be freely used on cross-
examination.
A witness, whatever his rank or office, may be cross-examined. For instance, he
may be asked in a proper case whether he has not expressed animosity toward the ac-
cused, or whether on a previous occasion he made a statement materially different
from that embraced in his testimony. Such questions imply no disrespect to the wit-
ness, and he can not properly declined to answer them on that ground.
An accused person taking the witness stand as a witness becomes subject to cross-
examination like any other witness. So far as the latitude of the cross-examination is
discretionary with the court, a greater latitude may properly be allowed in his cross-
examination than in that of other witnesses. When the accused testifies in denial or
explanation of any offense, the cross-examination may cover the whole subject of his
guilt or innocence of that offense. Any fact relevant to the issue of his guilt of such of-
fense or relevant to his credibility as a witness is properly the subject of cross-exami-
nation. The accused can not avail himself of his privilege against self-incrimination to
escape proper cross-examination. Where an accused on trial for a number of offenses
and on direct examination has testified about only a part of them, his cross-examina-
- - - page 106 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
tion must be confined to questions of credibility and matters having a bearing upon
the offense about which he testified.
Redirect and re-cross examination – Ordinarily, the re-direct examination will be
confined to matters brought out on the cross-examination, and the re-cross examina-
tion will be confined to matters brought out on the re-direct examination. But in these
matters, the court, in the interest of truth and justice, should be liberal in relaxing the
rule.
Examination by the court or a member – The court and its members may ask a
witness other than the accused any questions that either side might properly ask such
witness. If new matter, not properly the subject of cross-examination of such witness
on his previous testimony, be elicited by questions of the court or its members, both
parties will be permitted to cross-examine the witness upon such new matter.
An accused who has testified in his behalf may be examined by the court and its
members for the purpose of eliciting all important facts bearing upon the issue, but on
matters not connected with the facts stated in his direct examination, the examination
by the court is to be subject to the same rules applied in direct examination.
c. Leading questions; ambiguous and misleading questions; other objectionable ques-
tions. Leading questions – General Rule – Leading questions are questions which ei-
ther suggest the answer it is desired the witness shall make, or which, embodying a
material fact, are susceptible of being answered by a simple yes or no. A leading
question, except on cross-examination, should be excluded upon proper objection. For
example, where a knife is introduced in evidence, a witness should not be asked on di-
rect examination whether it is the know with which he saw the accused stab Private A.
He should be asked first whether he recognizes the knife, and if he answers that he
does, then he may be asked where he saw it, and what was done with it, etc. A ques-
tion may be nonetheless leading, although it includes the prefatory phrase “Did you or
did you not.”
Exceptions – To abridge the proceedings, the witness may be let at once to points
on which he is to testify. The rule is, therefore, not applicable to that part of the exam-
ination of a witness which is purely introductory. For example, in a desertion case, the
policeman who supposedly apprehended the accused may be asked whether at a cer-
tain time and place he saw the accused.
When the witness appears to be hostile to the party calling him or is manifestly
unwilling to give evidence, the court may, in its discretion, permit the party calling
him to put leading questions. In this connection, see Subsection 124b (Impeachment).
When it appears that the witness had made an erroneous statement through a mere
slip of the tongue, his attention may be directed to the matter by a leading question I
order to afford him a opportunity to correct the statement, if he so desires.
Where, from the nature of the case, the mind of the witness can not be directed to
the subject matter of the inquiry without a particular specification of it, a leading
question may be asked for that purpose. Thus, where a witness testified that he heard
the accused make a certain statement on a certain occasion in the hearing of certain
other persons, ad such persons are called to contradict the witness, each of then may
be asked whether he heard the accused make the statement.
- - - page 107 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
In other cases the court, in its discretion, may allow liberal departures from the
rule, but it must always be careful tin so doing not to allow an untruthful witness an
opportunity to shape his testimony as he thinks the questioner desires, or reverse, or to
try to match it up with the testimony of other witnesses, from suggestions he may
gather during his examination, and not to allow either the trial judge advocate or
counsel for the accused, on direct examination, to intimate to a witness that his testi-
mony on a material point is wrong, or ought to be changed except within the limits in-
dicated above.
Ambiguous and misleading questions – A question which is ambiguous or mis-
leading should never be permitted either on direct or cross-examination. Such a ques-
tion is unfair to a witness, who may thereby be led into making an unintentional mis-
statement. Moreover, his answer may give a wrong impression to the court. Included
in ambiguous or misleading questions are those embodying two or more separate ele-
ments or questions. Thus, the question “Did you see the accused leave the quarters
with a bundle under his arm?” really contains four questions. Under certain circum-
stances the witness’s affirmative or negative answer might be intended to apply only
to one or the other questions involved and might be understood by the court to apply
to all of them. Also included are questions which assume a fact not previously testi-
fied to by the witness. Thus, the question “When you saw the accused, was anyone
with him?” would be improper unless the witness had previously testified that he had
seen the accused.
Other objectionable questions – Questions should not be asked for the purpose of
suggesting matters known not to exist or that the rules of evidence clearly make inad-
missible. See also Subsection 75a (Duties of court) and Section 122 (Degrading and
incriminating questions).
122. COURTS-MARTIAL – RULES OF EVIDENCE – DEGRADING AND INCRIMINATING
QUESTIONS –
warrant. There may be cases in which the court would be justified in attaching no
weight at all to the testimony of a witness. In general, a witness gains no corrobora-
tion merely be repeating his statements a umber of times to the same effect. Hence,
similar statements made by a witness prior to the trial consistent with his present testi-
mony are in general not admissible to corroborate him. But this is only a general rule,
and there are some situations in which such statements, having a real evidential value,
are admissible. For example, if a witness is impeached on the ground of bias due to a
quarrel with the accused, the fact that before the date of the quarrel he made an asser-
tion similar to his present testimony tends to show that his present testimony is not
due to bias. So, also, where he is sought to be impeached on the ground of collusion
or corruption, the circumstances of the case may show that such prior statements have
such evidential value as to make them admissible.
A conviction may be based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, but
such testimony is of doubtful integrity and is to be considered with great caution.
b. Impeachment of witness – General – Impeachment signifies the process of attempting
to diminish credibility. The credibility of any witness, including an accused, may be
attacked.
The general rule is that a party is not permitted to impeach his own witness; that
is, to attempt deliberately to discredit him. Such inconsistencies, however, as inciden-
tally develop between witnesses for the same side are not impeachments. The general
rule is subject to a few exceptions. Thus, where a party is compelled to call witness
whom the law, or circumstances of the case, make indispensable, or where a witness
proves unexpectedly hostile to the party calling him, such party is permitted to im-
peach the witness. In the latter case it must first appear that the witness is hostile and
that the party calling him has been surprised by the evidence given by the witness.
The witness may then be asked if he has made inconsistent statements out of the
court, the time, place, and circumstances of the statement being described to him in
detail, and upon his denial, witnesses may be called in proof that he did make them.
While a party surprised by the hostile evidence of his own witness may impeach such
witness as indicated above, the party is not permitted to attack the reputation of such
witness by showing that his general character is bad.
Various grounds – General lack of veracity – Where impeachment of a witness on
this ground is undertake, the impeaching evidence must be limited to evidence of his
general reputation for truth and veracity in the community in which he lives or pur-
sues his ordinary profession or business. In the military service “community” may in-
clude the witness’s organization, post, or station. Personal opinion as to character is
not admissible, except that a witness may, after testifying that he knows the reputation
of the person in question as to truth and veracity in the community in which he resides
or pursues his ordinary profession or business, and that such reputation is bad, be fur-
ther asked whether or not from his knowledge of such reputation he would believe the
person in question on oath. After such impeaching evidence, evidence that the wit-
ness’ general reputation for truth and veracity in such community is good may be used
in rebuttal.
Conviction of crime – Evidence of conviction of any crime is admissible for the
purpose of impeachment where such crime either involves moral turpitude or is such
as to affect the credibility of the witness. Proof of such conviction may be made by
the original or admissible copy of the record thereof or by a admissible copy of the or-
- - - page 111 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
der promulgating the sentence. Before introducing such proof, the witness must first
be questioned with reference to the conviction sought to be shown, in order that he
may have an opportunity of denying or admitting and explaining it. If the witness ad-
mits the conviction, other proof is unnecessary. Evidence relating to a offense not in-
volving moral turpitude or affecting the credibility of the witness should be excluded.
Inconsistent statements – A witness may be impeached by showing by any compe-
tent evidence that he has previously made a statement inconsistent with his testimony
on the stand. The foundation for the introduction of evidence of the making of an in-
consistent oral statement must first be laid by asking the witness on cross-examination
if he did not make the inconsistent statement, at the same time directing his attention
to the time and place of such statement and the person to whom it was made. If the
witness admits making the statement no other proof that he made it is admissible. If
he denies making the statement or testifies that he does not remember whether he
made it or not, evidence that he made it may be introduced.
If the inconsistent statement is contained in a writing signed by the witness, the
writing should be shown to the witness, and he should be asked to identify his signa-
ture thereon. If he admits his signature, the writing then becomes admissible in evi-
dence. If he does not admit his signature, it may be otherwise proved, and the writing
will then become admissible in evidence.
The fact that the inconsistent statement was made in the course of an investigation
or at another trial does not make proof of the making of such statement inadmissible
for purpose of impeachment.
Proof of the making of an inconsistent statement relating only to a collateral fact
and or to any issue in the case is not admissible.
A witness has a right to explain any apparently inconsistent statement previously
made by him and may, if excused from the stand, be recalled for the purpose.
Prejudice, bias, etc. – Prejudice, bias, friendship, former quarrels, relationship,
etc., may be shown to diminish the credibility of the witness, either by the testimony
of other witnesses or by cross-examination of the witness, himself. Such matters are
never regarded as collateral.
125. COURTS-MARTIAL – RULES OF EVIDENCE – Judicial notice – Certain kinds of facts
need not be proved because the court is authorized to recognize their existence without
proof. Such recognition is termed JUDICIAL NOTICE.
The principal matters of which a court-martial may take judicial notice are as fol-
lows:
The existence and territorial extent of states, and of the several islands forming the
Philippine Archipelago, their forms of government, and symbols of nationality, the
law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the United States and of the Philippines, the seals
of the several departments of the Government of the United States, and of the States
of the Union, and of the Philippines, public and private, and official acts of the leg-
islative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of the Philip-
pines, the laws of nature, and the measure of time, the geographical divisions and
political history of the world, and all similar matters of public knowledge shall be ju-
dicially recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the court may
- - - page 112 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section stated when it shall find it
necessary for its own information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books,
documents, or evidence. (Section 275, Act 190.)
The organization of the Army, including the regulations relating thereto, the Army
Regulations, the Official Army Register, the Army List and Directory, the provisions
of this and other official Army manuals, the existence and location of military dis-
tricts, reservations, posts, and stations of troops, as published to the Army; the fact
an officer belongs to a certain organization, branch, etc.
General orders, bulletins, circulars, and general court-martial orders of the Army of
the Philippines; general orders, bulletins, circulars and general court-martial orders
of the authority appointing the court and higher authority; and
Price of articles issued or used in the Military Establishment when published to the
Army in orders, bulletins, or price lists.
The principle of judicial notice does not prohibit the court from receiving evidence
of such a fact of which it is authorized to take judicial notice, and, if not satisfied of the
fact of which it is asked to take judicial notice, it may resort to any authentic source of
information. For example, where the terms of a general order of the Army Headquarters
are material, the court ay send for copy of that order.
It is customary for the side desiring the court to take judicial notice of a given fact
to ask the court to do so, at the same time presenting any available authentic source of
information on the subject.
126. COURTS-MARTIAL – Rules of Evidence – MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS: Intent; Stip-
ulations; Waiver of Objections –
a. Intent – General – In certain offenses, as murder, theft, robbery, and desertion, a spe-
cific intent is a necessary element. In such a case the specific intent must be estab-
lished either by independent evidence, as, for example, words proved to have been
used by the offender, or by inference from the act itself.
In other offenses, as sleeping on post, drunkenness on duty, neglect of duty, and
absence without leave, specific intent is not an element, and roof of the act alone is
sufficient to establish guilt. Other illustrations and details as to evidence of intent in
the more usual cases are included in Chapter XXXVI (Punitive Articles).
Drunkenness – It is a general rule of law that voluntary drunkenness, whether
caused by liquors or drugs, is not an excuse for crime committed while in that condi-
tion; but it may be considered as a mitigating circumstance when it is not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit said crime; but when the drunkenness is habitual or
intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Such evidence should be carefully scrutinized, as drunkenness is easily simulated
or may have been resorted to for the purpose of stimulating the nerves to the point of
committing the act.
In courts-martial, however, evidence of drunkenness of the accused, as indicated
in his state of mind at the time of the alleged offense, whether it may be considered as
properly affecting the issued to be tried, or only the measure of punishment to be
awarded in the event of conviction, is generally admitted in evidence.
As to proof of drunkenness, see Section 145 (Drunkenness on duty).
- - - page 113 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
Ignorance of fact – Ignorance or mistake of fact will exempt a person from crimi-
nal responsibility, provided always it is an honest ignorance or mistake and not the re-
sult of carelessness or fault on his part. (US vs Ah Chong, 15 Phil 488).
Ignorance of law – Ignorance of the law is not an excuse for a criminal act. This
rule may be partially relaxed by courts-martial in the trial for purely military offenses
of soldiers recently enlisted.
For example, a recruit might be permitted to show that the Articles of War had
never been read to him as required by AW 111. While such evidence would not
amount to a defense, it could be regarded by the court as an extenuating circumstance.
b. STIPULATIONS –
As to facts – The parties may make a written or oral stipulation of the existence or
nonexistence of any fact. A stipulation need not be accepted by the court, ad should
not be accepted where any doubt exists as to the accused’s understanding of what is
involved. A stipulation which practically amounts to a confession where the accused
has pleaded not guilty and such plea still stands; and a stipulation of a fact which, if
true, would operate as a complete defense to an offense charged should not ordinarily
be accepted by the court. In a capital case and in other important cases, a stipulation
should be closely scrutinized before acceptance. The court is not bound by a stipula-
tion even if received. For instance, its own inquiry may convince the court that the
stipulated fact was not true. The court may permit a stipulation to be withdrawn. If so
withdrawn, it is not effective for any purpose.
As to testimony and documentary evidence – The parties may stipulate that if a
certain person were present in court as a witness, he would give certain testimony un-
der oath. See Subsection 52c in this connection (Stipulation which warrants denial of
continuance). Such a stipulation does not admit the truth of such testimony, nor does
it add anything to the weight of the testimony. Such stipulated testimony may be at-
tached or contradicted or explained in the same way as though the witness had actu-
ally so testified in person. The principles as to acceptance and withdrawal of stipula-
tions as to facts apply here; but the court may be more liberal in accepting stipulations
as to testimony.
c. Waiver of objections – The prosecution or the defense may in open court either orally
or in writing waive an objection to the admissibility of offered evidence. Such a
waiver adds nothing to the weight of the evidence nor to the credibility of its source.
The court in its discretion may refuse to accept, and may permit the withdrawal of,
any such waiver. There is no prescribed form for making a waiver. Thus, if it clearly
appears that the defense or prosecution understood its right to object, any clear indica-
tion on its part that it did not desire to assert that right may be regarded as a waiver of
such objection. However, a waiver of an objection does not operate as a consent
where consent is required, and a mere failure to object does not amount to a waiver
except as otherwise stated or indicated in this manual.
CHAPTER XXVI
PUNITIVE ARTICLES
- - - page 114 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
127. PUNITIVE ARTICLES – Synopsis of chapter – In this synopsis the left-hand refer-
ences are to sections; the right-hand, to pages.
SECTION
PAGE
128 Preliminary statement ......................................................................................................... 116
129 AW 54 – Fraudulent enlistment ........................................................................................... 116
130 AW 59 –
a. Desertion ......................................................................................................................... 117
b. Attempting to desert ........................................................................................................ 119
131 AW 60 – Advising, persuading, or assisting desertion ........................................................ 119
132 AW 62 – Absence without leave ......................................................................................... 120
133 AW 64 – Disrespect toward a superior officer ..................................................................... 120
134 AW 65 –
a. Assaulting a superior officer ............................................................................................ 121
b. Disobeying a superior officer .......................................................................................... 122
135 AW 66 –
a. Assaulting a non-commissioned officer .......................................................................... 122
b. Disobeying a non-commissioned officer ......................................................................... 123
c. Using threatening or insulting language or behaving in an insubordi-
nate or disrespectful manner toward a non-commissioned officer ................................. 123
136 AW 67 –
a. Attempting to create a mutiny or sedition ........................................................................ 123
b. Beginning or joining a mutiny or sedition ........................................................................ 124
c. Causing or exciting a mutiny or sedition ......................................................................... 124
137 AW 68 –
a. Failure to suppress a mutiny or sedition ......................................................................... 124
b. Failure to give information of mutiny or sedition ............................................................. 124
138 AW 69 –
a. Disobedience of orders into arrest or confinement ......................................................... 125
b. Threatening, drawing a weapon upon, or offering violence to a officer,
member of the Army Nurse Corps, or non-commissioned officer .................................. 125
139 AW 70 –
a. Breach of arrest .............................................................................................................. 125
b. Escape from confinement ............................................................................................... 126
140 AW 74 –
a. Releasing prisoner without prior authority ....................................................................... 126
b. Suffering prisoner to escape through neglect ................................................................. 126
c. Suffering prisoner to escape through design .................................................................. 127
141 AW 76 –
a. Misbehavior before the enemy ........................................................................................ 127
b. Running away before the enemy .................................................................................... 128
c. Shamefully abandoning or delivering up any command ................................................. 128
d. Endangering the safety of any command by: [a] misconduct, [b] dis-
obedience, or [c] neglect ............................................................................................... 129
e. Speaking words inducing others to misbehave, run away, or abandon
or deliver up or endanger the safety of any command .................................................. 129
f. Casting away arms or ammunition .................................................................................. 129
- - - page 115 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
128. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT – In case of any doubt with respect to any offense
that is not resolved by a reference to the pertinent Articles of War and ay interpretations
thereof that may be included in (Appendix 1), and to the form of specification (Annex
4), reference should be had to authoritative military precedents.
129. FIFTY-FOURTH ARTICLE OF WAR – FRAUDULENT ENLISTMENT – Discussion –
A fraudulent enlistment is procured by means of either a willful – i.e., intentional – mis-
representation in regard to any of the qualifications or disqualifications prescribed by
law, regulation, or orders for enlistment, or a willful concealment in regard to any such
qualification.
Misrepresentation and concealment include any act, statement, or omission which
has the effect of conveying what is known by the applicant to be an untruth or of con-
- - - page 116 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
from his place of service (which is for him “the service of the Philippines”) with in-
tent not to return thereto. A prompt repentance and return, while material in extenua-
tion, is no defense. The fact that such intent is coupled with a purpose to return pro-
vided a particular but uncertain event happens in the future, or to report for duty
elsewhere, or again to enlist, does not constitute a defense. Unless, however, an in-
tent not to return to his place of duty exists at the inception of, or at some time dur-
ing his absence, the soldier cannot be a deserter, whether his purpose is to stay away
a definite or indefinite length of time. If a soldier while in desertion again enlists and
deserts while serving under the second enlistment, he is amenable for trial for both
desertions.
Under AW 58 any soldier who “without having first received a regular dis-
charge, again enlists in the Army of the Philippines or in the Army or Navy of the
United States, or in any foreign army, shall be deemed to have deserted the service
of the Philippines. Such enlistment is not only no defense to a charge of desertion
but is prima facie proof of it. His presence in the military service under such enlist-
ment is not in itself a return to military control with respect to his former enlistment,
although such return may effected through his voluntary disclosure of the facts or
through the discovery of the facts without his aid. For example, where such a de-
serter is confined by his commanding officer as a result of information received from
the authorities, his desertion should be regarded as terminated by apprehension. In a
case of a soldier enlisting without a discharge, the specification charging desertion
should follow the usual form, the desertion being alleged as having occurred on the
date the accused absented himself without leave. If not absent without leave before
he again enlisted, he becomes so absent at that time.
ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE WITH INTENT TO AVOID HAZARDOUS DUTY OR WITH
INTENT TO SHIRK IMPORTANT SERVICE – Under AW 58 any person subject to military
law who “quits his organization or place of duty with the intent to avoid hazardous
duty or to shirk important service shall be deemed a deserter.” The “hazardous duty”
or “important service” may include such service of troops as strike or riot duty; em-
ployment in aid of the civil power in, for example, protecting property; or quelling or
preventing disorder in times of great public disaster; embarking for foreign duty or
duty beyond that of territorial limits of the Philippines; and, under some exceptional
circumstances, such as threatened invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, entrainment
for duty. Such services as drill, target practice, maneuvers, and practice marches will
not ordinarily be regarded as included.
Proof – (a) That the accused absented himself without leave, or remained absent
without leave from his place of service, organization, or place of duty, as alleged; (b)
that he intended, at the time of absenting himself or at some time during his absence,
to remain away permanently from such place, or to avoid hazardous duty, or to shirk
from important service as alleged; (c) that his absence was of a duration and was ter-
minated as alleged; and (d) that the desertion was committed under the circum-
stances alleged, e.g., in the execution of a certain conspiracy or in time of war. As to
time of war, see Section 125 (Judicial notice).
ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE – Absence without leave is usually proved, prima facie,
by entries on the morning report. See Sections 1176 ad 117. But the morning report,
even though it refers to the accused as a “deserter”, is not complete evidence of de-
sertion; it is evidence only of absence without leave, and it is still necessary for the
- - - page 118 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
trial judge advocate to prove an intent to remain permanently absent, or else to avoid
hazardous duty or to shirk important service. The condition of absence without leave
with respect to an enlistment having once been shown to exist may be presumed to
have continued, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, until the accused’s return
to military control under such enlistment. Where a soldier during one enlistment
again enlists or attempts to enlist while on a duty status or while on pass or furlough,
he by that act abandons such status of duty, pass, or furlough, and from that moment
becomes absent without leave with respect to the former enlistment. Similarly, a sol-
dier absent on a short pass from his station who, for instance, is found on board a
steamer bound for China, may be regarded as having abandoned any authority he
might have for such absence and to be absent without leave, although he may not
have gone beyond the area fixed in the pass and the pass may not have expired.
Intent – If the condition of absence without leave is much prolonged, ad there is
not satisfactory explanation of it, the court will be justified in inferring from that
alone an intent to remain permanently absent. However, a plea of guilty of absence
without leave to a charge of desertion is not in itself a sufficient basis for a convic-
tion of desertion. In such a case no inference of the intent not to return arises from
any admission involved in the plea, and therefore, to warrant conviction of desertion,
evidence, such as evidence of a prolonged absence or other circumstances, must be
introduced from which the intent in desertion can be inferred. Such inference may be
drawn from such circumstances as that the accused attempted to dispose of his uni-
form or other property; that his civilian clothes were missing; that he purchased a
ticket for a distant point or was arrested or surrendered at a considerable distance
from his station; that he attempted to secure passage or to stow away on a ship; that
while absent he was in the neighborhood of military posts ad did not surrender to the
military authorities; that he was dissatisfied in his company or with the military ser-
vice; that he had made remarks indicating an intention to desert the service; that he
was under charges or had escaped from confinement at the time he absented himself;
that just previous to absenting himself he stole or took without authority money,
civilian clothes, or other property that would assist him in getting away. On the other
hand, previous excellent and long service, the fact that none of the property of the
accused was missing from his locker, and the fact that he was under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or drugs when he absented himself, and that he continued for
some time under their influence, etc., are circumstances which the court may regard
as basis for a contrary inference. Although the accused may testify that he intended
to return, such testimony is not compelling as the court may believe or reject the tes-
timony of ay witness in whole or in part. The fact that a soldier intends to report or
actually reports at another station does not, on the one hand, prevent a conviction for
desertion, as such fact in connection with other circumstances may tend to establish
his intention not to return to his proper place of duty. On the other hand, a soldier ab-
sent without leave from his place of service and without funds may report to another
station for transportation back to his original place of duty, and such a circumstance
would of course, tend to negative the existence of such intent. No general rule ca be
laid down as to the effect to be given to an intention to report or an actual reporting
to another station.
Where the accused soldier enlisted without a discharge (see AW 58), the proof
should include proof that the accused was a soldier in a certain organization of the
Army; and that, without being discharged from such organization, he again enlisted
- - - page 119 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
in the Army of the Philippines, or in the Army or navy of the United States, or in ay
foreign Army or Navy. For the method of proving the fact that the accused was not
discharged from his prior enlistment, see Subsection 152a (Disorders and neglects,
etc.)
B. ATTEMPTING TO DESERT – Discussion – An attempt to desert is an overt act other
than mere participation toward accomplishing a purpose to desert. The attempt to
desert may be with the intent not to return, to avoid hazardous duty, or to shirk im-
portant service. Once the attempt is made, the fact that the soldier desists, either of
his own accord or otherwise, does not obliterate the offense. An instance of the of-
fense is: A soldier intending to desert hides himself in an empty freight car on the
post, intending to effect his escape from the post be being taken out in the car. Enter-
ing the car with intent to desert is the over act. See discussion of desertion.
Proof – (a) That the accused made the attempt by doing the overt act or acts al-
leged; (b) that he intended to desert at the time of doing such act or acts; that is, he
then entertained the intent not to return or the intent to avoid hazardous duty, or to
shirk important service as alleged; (c) that the attempt was made under the circum-
stances alleged; e.g., in the execution of a certain conspiracy or in time of war. As to
time of war, see Section 125 (Judicial notice). See Comments under Proof of deser-
tion.
131. SIXTIETH ARTICLE OF WAR – ADVISING, PERSUADING, OR ASSISTING DESERTION -
Discussion – See Section 130. The offense of persuading and assisting desertion are not
complete unless the desertion occurs; but the offense of advising is complete when the
advise is given, whether the person advised deserts or not.
It is not necessary that the accused acted alone in giving the advise or assistance or
in the persuasion; and he may act through other persons in committing the offense.
Proof – (a) That the accused in the manner and form alleged, advised, used persua-
sion to induce, or knowingly assisted a certain person subject to military law to desert as
alleged; (b) if charged with persuading or assisting desertion, that such certain person
deserted as alleged [see Proof of desertion], and where persuasion is alleged, that he was
induced to do so by such persuasion; and (c) that the act of advising, persuading, or as-
sisting was done, if so alleged, in time of war. See, however, Section 125 (Judicial no-
tice).
132. SIXTY-SECOND ARTICLE OF WAR – ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE – Discussion –
The article is designed to cover every case not elsewhere provided for where any person
subject to military law is through his own fault not at the place where he is required to
be at a time when he should be there. The first part of the article – that relating to the
properly appointed place of duty – applies whether such place is appointed as a ren-
dezvous for several or for one only. Thus it would apply in the case of a soldier failing
to report as the kitchen police or leaving such duty after reporting.
A soldier turned over, upon application of AW 75, to the civil authorities, is not ab-
sent without leave while held by them under such delivery. So also, where a soldier, be-
ing absent without leave, is held, tried, and acquitted by the civil authorities, his status as
absent with leave, or absent without leave, is not thereby changed however long he may
be held. Where a soldier is convicted by the civil authorities, the fact that he was ar-
rested, held, and tried does not excuse any unauthorized absence, and the status of ab-
sence without leave is not changed by an inability to return through sickness, or lack of
- - - page 120 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
transportation facilities, or other disabilities. But the fact that all or a part of the period
of unauthorized absence was in a sense enforced involuntarily should be given due
weight when considering punishment to be imposed.
Proof – Where the accused fails to appear at or goes from a place of duty – (a) that a
certain authority appointed a certain time and place for a certain duty by the accused, as
alleged; and – (b) that the accused failed to report to such place at the proper time, or
having so reported, went from the same without authority from anyone competent to
give him leave to do so.
Where the accused is charged with absenting himself without proper leave – (a) that
the accused absented himself from his command, guard, quarters, station, or camp for a
certain period, as alleged; and – (b) that such absence was without authority from any-
one competent to give him leave.
Where the accused is charged with absenting himself without proper leave from his
guard with intent to abandon the same – (a) that the accused absented himself from his
guard as alleged; and – (b) the facts and circumstances of the case indicating that the ac-
cused intended to abandon his guard.
133. SIXTY-FOURTH ARTICLE OF WAR – DISRESPECT TOWARD A SUPERIOR OFFICER –
Discussion – The disrespectful behavior contemplated by this article is such as detracts
from the respect due to the authority and person of a superior officer. It may consist in
acts or language, however expressed.
It is not essential that the disrespectful behavior be in the presence of the superior,
but in general it is considered objectionable to hold one accountable under this article for
what was said or done by him in a purely private conversation.
The officer toward whom the disrespectful behavior was directed must have been the
superior of the accused at the time of the acts charged; but by superior is not necessarily
meant a superior rank, as a line officer, though inferior in rank, may be the commanding
officer, and thus the superior of a staff officer, such as a medical officer.
Disrespect by words may be conveyed by opprobrious epithets or other contume-
lious or denunciatory language. Disrespect by acts may be exhibited in a variety of
modes – as neglecting the customary salute, by a marked disdain, indifference, inso-
lence, impertinence, undue familiarity, or other rudeness in the presence of a superior of-
ficer. [Winthrop.]
Where the accused did not know that the person against whom he acts, etc., were di-
rected to his superior officer, such lack of knowledge is a defense.
Proof – (a) That the accused did or omitted to do certain acts or used certain lan-
guage to or concerning a certain officer, as alleged; (b) that the behavior involved in
such acts or omissions, or words, was, under certain circumstances, or in a certain con-
nection, or with a certain meaning, as alleged; and (c) that the officer toward whom the
acts, omissions, or words were directed was the accused’s superior officer.
134. SIXTY-FIFTH ARTICLE OF WAR –
a. ASSAULTING SUPERIOR OFFICER – Discussion – The phrase “on any pretense whatso-
ever” is not to be understood as excluding as a defense the fact that the striking was
done in legitimate self-defense or in the discharge of some duty, such as is enjoined
by AW 69.
- - - page 121 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
By “superior officer” is meant not only the commanding officer of the accused,
whatever may be the relative rank of the two, but any other commissioned officer of
rank superior to that of the accused. That the accused did not know the officer to be
his superior is available as a defense.
The word “strikes” means an intentional blow with anything by which a blow ca
be given.
The phrase “draws or lifts up any weapon against” covers any simple assault
committed in the manner stated. The weapon chiefly had in view by the word
“draw” is no doubt the sword; the term might, however, apply to a bayonet in a
sheath or to a pistol, and the drawing of either in an aggressive manner or the raising
or brandishing of the same menaciously in the presence of the superior and at him is
the sort of act contemplated. The raising in a threatening manner of a firearm
(whether or not loaded) or of a club, or of any implement or thing by which a serious
blow could be given, would be within the description “lift up”. [Winthrop]
The phrase “offers any violence against him” comprises ay form of battery or of
mere assault not embraced in the preceding more specific “strikes” and “draws or
lifts up”. But the violence where not executed must be physically attempted or man-
aced. A mere threatening in words would not be an offering of violence in the sense
of the article. [Winthrop]
An officer is in the execution of his office “when engaged in any act or service
required or authorized to be done by him by statute, regulation, the order of a supe-
rior, or military usage. [Winthrop] It may be take in general that striking or using vi-
olence against any superior officer by a person subject to military law, over whom it
is at the time the duty of that superior officer to maintain discipline, would be strik-
ing or using violence against him in the execution of his office.
Proof – (a) That the accused struck a certain officer, or drew or lifted up a
weapon against him, or offered violence against him, as alleged; (b) that such officer
was the accused’s superior officer at the time; and (c) that such superior was in the
execution of his office at the time.
b. DISOBEYING SUPERIOR OFFICER – Discussion – The willful disobedience contem-
plated is such as shows a intentional defiance of authority, as where a soldier is
given an order by an officer to do or cease from doing a particular thing at once and
refuses or deliberately omits to do what is ordered. A neglect to comply with an or-
der through heedlessness, remissness, or forgetfulness is an offense chargeable under
AW 97. Where the order to a person is to be executed in the future, a statement by
him to the effect that he intends to disobey it is not a offense under AW 65, although
carrying out such intention may be.
The order must relate to military duty and be one which the superior officer is
authorized under the circumstances to give the accused. Disobedience of an order
which has for its sole object the attainment of some private end, or which is given
for the sole purpose of increasing the penalty for an offense which it is expected the
accused to commit, is not punishable under this article.
A person can not be convicted under this article if the order was illegal; but a or-
der requiring the performance of a military duty or act is disobeyed at the peril of the
subordinate. Disobedience of an illegal order might under some circumstances in-
volve an act of insubordination properly chargeable under AW 97.
- - - page 122 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
It should appear that the power conferred by the article was being exercised for
the purpose stated, and therefore, the charges and proof should refer to the order
given during the disorder. It should be made to appear that the accused heard or un-
derstood the order and knew that the person giving it was an officer or non-com-
missioned officer, or other person thereunto authorized by the article.
Proof – (a) That the accused was a participant in a certain quarrel, fray, or dis-
order occurring among persons subject to military law; (b) that during the disorder
a certain officer, or other authorized person ordered the accused into arrest or con-
finement as alleged, with a view to quell or part the disorder; and (c) that the ac-
cused refused to obey.
b. THREATENING, DRAWING A WEAPON UPON, OR OFFERING VIOLENCE TO, AN
OFFICER, MEMBER OF THE NURSE CORPS, OR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER – Dis-
cussion – See discussion I Sections 234, 235, and Subsection 138a. The word
“threat” as here used includes any menacing action, either by gesture or by words.
Proof – The proof of the second, third, and fourth crimes defined by the article
should follow in form and essentials the proof in Subsection 138a, except that, in-
stead of proving a refusal to obey, drawing a weapon, making a threat, or doing vi-
olence must be proved as the consummation of the particular offense.
139. SEVENTIETH ARTICLE OF WAR –
a. BREACH OF ARREST – Discussion – The distinction between arrest and confinement
lies in the difference between the kinds of restraint imposed. In arrest the restraint
is moral restraint imposed by the orders fixing the limits of arrest or by the terms of
the article. Confinement imports some physical restraint.
The offense of breach of arrest is committed when the person in arrest infringes
the limits set by orders, or by AW 70, and the intention or motive that actuated him
is immaterial to the issue of guilt, though, of course, proof of inadvertence or BONA
FIDE mistake is admissible in extenuation. Innocence of the offense with respect to
which an arrest or confinement may have been imposed is not a defense. A person
can not be convicted of a violation of this article if the arrest or confinement was in
fact illegal. However, the circumstances of a breach of an illegal restraint may sub-
ject the person breaking such restraint to a prosecution under some other article.
For example, where a prisoner in making an escape assaults a sentinel, the fact that
the confinement was illegal wound not be a defense to a prosecution for the assault.
It is immaterial whether the breach of arrest or escape from confinement took place
before or after trial, acquittal, or sentence. A violation of a restraint on liberty other
than arrest or confinement – for example, the restraint imposed on a prisoner
paroled to work within certain limits – should be charged under AW 97.
Proof – (a) That the accused was duly placed in confinement; and (b) that he
freed himself from the restraint of his confinement before he had been set at liberty
by proper authority. A confinement is presumed to be legal.
b. ARREST FROM CONFINEMENT – Discussion – See Subsection 139a (Breach of ar-
rest). An escape may be either with or without force or article, and either with or
without the consent of the custodian. Any completed casting off of the restraint of
confinement before being set at liberty by proper authority is an escape from con-
finement, and a lack of effectiveness of the physical restraint imposed is immaterial
to the issue of guilt. An escape is not complete until the prisoner has, momentarily
- - - page 126 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
at least, freed himself from the restraint of his confinement; so, if the movement to-
wards escape is opposed, or before it is completed an immediate pursuit ensues,
there will be no escape until opposition is overcome or pursuit is shaken off. In
cases where the escape is not completed the offense should be charged as an at-
tempt under AW 97.
Proof – (a) That the accused was duly placed in confinement; and (b) that he
freed himself from the restraint of his confinement before he had been set at liberty
by proper authority. A confinement is presumed to be legal.
140. SEVENTY-FOURTH ARTICLE OF WAR –
a. RELEASING A PRISONER WITHOUT PROPER AUTHORITY – Discussion – The phrase
“any prisoner” includes a civilian or military prisoner.
While a commander of the guard must receive a prisoner committed by an offi-
cer, the power of the committing officer ceases as soon as he has committed the
prisoner, and he is not, as such committing officer, a “proper authority” to order a
release.
An officer may receive in his charge a prisoner not committed in strict compli-
ance with the terms of AW 72 or other law, and such prisoner having been so re-
ceived has been “duly committed”.
Proof – (a) That a certain prisoner was duly committed to the charge of the ac-
cused; and (b) that the accused released him without proper authority.
b. SUFFERING A PRISONER TO ESCAPE THROUGH NEGLECT – Discussion – See Subsec-
tion 140a. The word “neglect” is here used in the sense of the word “negligence”.
Negligence is a relative term. It is defined by law as the absence of due care.
The legal standard is that which would have been taken by a reasonably prudent
man in the same or similar circumstances. This test looks to the standard required
of persons acting in the capacity in which the accused was acting. Thus, if the ac-
cused is an officer, the test will be, “How would a reasonably prudent officer have
acted?” If the circumstances were such as would have indicated to a reasonably
prudent officer that a very high order of care was required to prevent escape, then
the accused must be held to a very high order of care. The test is thus elastic, logi-
cal, and just.
A prisoner can not be said to have escaped until he has overcome the opposition
that restrained him and shaken off immediate pursuit. If he escapes, the fact that he
returns, is taken in a fresh pursuit, is killed or dies, is not a defense to a charge of
having suffered him to escape through neglect.
Proof – (a) That a certain prisoner was duly committed to the charge of the ac-
cused; (b) that the prisoner escaped; (c) that the accused did not take such care to
prevent escape as a reasonably prudent person, acting in the capacity in which the
accused was acting, would have taken in the same or similar circumstances; and (d)
that the escape was the proximate result of the neglect of the accused.
c. SUFFERING A PRISONER TO ESCAPE THROUGH DESIGN – Discussion – See Subsec-
tion 140a and b. In law a wrongful act is designed when it results from conduct so
shockingly and grossly devoid of care as to leave room for no inference but that the
act was contemplated as an extremely probable result of the course of conduct fol-
- - - page 127 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
haustion of provisions of water, the absence of hope of relief, and the certainty or
extreme probability that no further effort could prevent the place, with its garrison,
their arms, and magazines, from presently falling into the hands of the enemy. Un-
less such absolute necessity is shown, the conclusion must be that the surrender or
abandonment was shameful within the meaning of this article.
An officer’s duty to defend may be imposed by orders or by the circumstances
in which he finds himself at a particular stage of operations; but an officer will find
less justification in abandoning a post that he has been ordered to defend than in
abandoning one that he has decided to defend. He will have less justification in de-
livering up a post than in abandoning it, and in delivering up a post that he has been
ordered to defend he will have no justification at all except as can be found in proof
that no further resistance was possible
Proof – (a) That the accused was charged by orders or by circumstances with a
duty to defend a certain fort, post, camp, guard, or other command; and (b) that
without justification he abandoned it or surrendered it.
d. ENDANGERING THE SAFETY OF ANY COMMAND BY: [A] MISCONDUCT, [B]
DISOBEDIENCE, OR [C] NEGLECT – Discussion – “Misconduct,” like behavior, im-
plies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment. It means in general “a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion is
left, except what necessity may demand:; whereas, on the other hand, carelessness
and negligence and unskillfulness are transgressions of some established but indefi-
nite rule of action where some discretion is necessarily left to the actor. “Miscon-
duct” is a violation of definite law; “carelessness is a forbidden quality of an act
and is necessarily indefinite” (Vol 5, Words and Phrases, p. 4531).
As to “disobedience”, see Subsection 134b.
Proof – Facts and circumstances showing that the accused endangered the
safety of a certain command, as alleged, by certain [1] misconduct, [2] disobedi-
ence, or [3] neglect, as alleged (as the case may be).
e. SPEAKING WORDS INDUCING OTHERS TO MISBEHAVE, RUN AWAY, OR ABANDON OR
DELIVER UP OR ENDANGER THE SAFETY OF ANY COMMAND – Discussion – The
words “to do the like” refer to the offenses of misbehavior and running away, as
well as to abandoning or delivering up or endangering the safety of a command.
The inducement contemplated is verbal only, but it may include any argument,
persuasion, threat, language or discouragement or alarm, or false or incorrect state-
ment which may avail to bring abut an unnecessary surrender, retreat, or ay misbe-
havior, or endanger the safety of the command, before the enemy. The offense will
not be complete, however, unless the words spoken do not induce some person
other than the accused to misbehave, run away, or abandon or surrender, or by
some misconduct, disobedience, or neglect, endangering the safety of a command.
It is to be noted, however, that speaking words whose natural tendency is to induce
others to do any of these things may in itself constitute misbehavior of the speaker
within the meaning of this article, although the words spoken induce no misconduct
on the part of others.
Proof – (a) That some person other than the accused misbehaved in the pres-
ence of the enemy or ran away or abandoned or delivered up, or by some miscon-
- - - page 129 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
duct, disobedience, or neglect, endangered the safety of any command which it was
his duty to defend; and (b) words spoke by the accused which induced such action.
f. CASTING AWAY ARMS OR AMMUNITION – Proof – (a) That the accused cast away
certain arms or ammunition as specified.
g. QUITTING POST OR COLORS TO PLUNDER OR PILLAGE – The word “post” includes
any place of duty, whether permanently or temporarily fixed. The term “colors”
was used to include cases where the offender’s organization is moving, but the
words “quits his post”, as here used, import any unauthorized leaving of that place
where the accused should be.
In proving this crime an intent to pillage or plunder must be shown. The words
“to pillage or plunder” may be properly paraphrased “to seize and appropriate pub-
lic or private property.” The offense is no less committed, though the quitting is by
quasi authority, as where soldiers quit the place where they should be to go forth
and maraud in company with an officer or non-commissioned officer.
The act is complete when the accused has left his post with the prescribed in-
tent, although he may never have consummated his design.
Proof – (a) That the accused left his post of duty; and (b) that the intention of
the accused in leaving was to seize and appropriate private or public or private
property.
h. OCCASIONING FALSE ALARMS – The article is intended as well to guard the repose
and tranquility of troops as to avoid the ill effect on morale which must inevitably
follow needless excursions and alarms. The article contemplates the spreading of
false and disturbing rumors and reports as well as the needless giving of such alarm
signal as the beating of drums and the blowing of trumpets.
The intent is immaterial. If the alarm was given and it appears that there was no
material cause or occasion which should reasonably justify a general alarm, the of-
fense is complete.
Proof – (a) That an alarm was occasioned in a certain camp, garrison, or quar-
ters; and (b) that there was no reasonable or sufficient justification in fact for occa-
sioning the alarm.
NOTE – “Officer or Soldier” – No one except a commissioned officer or an en-
listed man can be tried under the seventy-sixth Article of War. Any other person
subject to military law, such as a member of the Nurse Corps, can not be charged
under this article, but for the offense denounced in this article may be tried under
the ninety-seventh Article of War.
142. EIGHTY THIRD ARTICLE OF WAR – BEING A SPY – Discussion – The phrase
“any person” brings within the jurisdiction of courts-martial and military commissions
all persons of whatever nationality or status who may be accused of the offense de-
nounced by the article.
The principal characteristic of this offense is a clandestine dissimulation of the true
object sought, which object is an endeavor to obtain information with the intention of
communicating it to the hostile party. Thus, soldiers not wearing disguise, dispatch rid-
ers, whether soldiers or civilians, and persons in aircraft who carry out their missions
openly and who have penetrated hostile lines are not to be considered spies, for the rea-
- - - page 130 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
son that, while they may have resorted to concealment, they have practiced no dissimu-
lation.
It is necessary to prove an intent to communication information to the hostile party.
This intent will very readily be inferred on proof of a deceptive insinuation of the ac-
cused among our forces, but this inference may be overcome by very clear evidence that
the person had come within the lines for a comparatively innocent purpose, as to visit his
family or that he had assumed a disguise in order to reach his own lines.
It is not essential that the accused obtained the information sought or that he commu-
nicate it. The offense is complete with the lurking or dissimulation with intent to accom-
plish these objects.
“A spy who, after rejoining the army to which he belongs, is subsequently captured
by the enemy *** incurs no responsibility for he previous acts of espionage.” [Rules of
Land Warfare]
A person living in occupied territory who, without dissimulation, merely reports
what he sees or what he hears through agents to the enemy, may be charged under AW
82 with communicating or giving intelligence to the enemy, but he may not be charged
under this article with being a spy.
Proof – (a) That the accused was found at a certain place within our zone of opera-
tions, acting clandestinely, or under false pretenses; and (b) that he was obtaining, or en-
deavoring to obtain, information with intent to communicate the same to the enemy.
143. EIGHTY-FOURTH ARTICLE OF WAR – SUFFERING MILITARY PROPERTY TO BE
LOST, ETC. – Discussion – The loss, etc., may be said to be willfully suffered by one
who, knowing the loss, etc., to be imminent or actually going on, takes no steps to pre-
vent it, as where a sentinel seeing a small and readily extinguishable fire in a stack of
hay on his post allows it to burn up. A suffering through neglect implies an omission to
take such measures as were appropriate under the circumstances to prevent a probable
loss, damage, etc.
The willful or neglectful sufferance specified by the article may consist in a delib-
erate violation or positive disregard of some specific injunction of law, regulations, or
order; or it may be evidenced by such circumstances as reckless or unwarranted personal
use of the property; causing or allowing it to remain exposed to weather, insecurely
housed, or not guarded; permitting it to be consumed, wasted, or injured by other per-
sons; loaning it to an irresponsible person by whom it is damaged, etc. [Winthrop]
Proof – (a) that certain military property belonging to the Philippines was lost,
spoiled, damaged, or wrongfully disposed of in the manner alleged; (b) that such loss,
etc., was suffered by the accused through a certain omission of duty on his part; (c) that
such omission was willful, or negligent, as alleged; and (d) the value of the property, as
alleged.
Although there may be no direct evidence that the property was military property
belonging to the Philippines, still circumstantial evidence such as evidence that the prop-
erty shown to have been lost, spoiled, damaged, or wrongfully disposed of by the ac-
cused was of a type and kind used in, or furnished and intended for the military service,
might warrant the court in inferring that it was such military property.
144. EIGHTY-FIFTH ARTICLE OF WAR –
- - - page 131 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
In time of war and in a region of active hostilities, the circumstances are often such
that all members of a command may properly be considered as being continuously on
duty within the meaning of this article.
So, also, an officer of the day and members of the guard are on duty during their en-
tire tour within the meaning of this article; but a sentinel found drunk on post should or-
dinarily be charged under AW 97.
The offense of a person who absents himself from his duty and is found drunk while
so absent, or who is relieved from duty at a post and ordered to remain there to await or-
ders, and is found drunk during such status, is not chargeable under this article.
When the drunkenness was caused by liquor or drugs is immaterial; and any intoxi-
cation which is sufficient sensibly to impair the rational and full exercise of the mental
and physical faculties is drunkenness within the meaning of the article.
Proof – (a) That the accused was on a certain duty, as alleged; and (b) that he was
found drunk while on such duty.
On an issue of drunkenness, admissible testimony is not confined to a description of
the conduct and demeanor of the accused; and the testimony of a witness that the ac-
cused was drunk or sober is not admissible on the ground that it is an expression of opin-
ion.
146. EIGHTY-SEVENTH ARTICLE OF WAR –
a. BEING FOUND DRUNK ON POST – Discussion – See Section 145.
The term “sentinel” does not include a watchman or an officer or a non-commis-
sioned officer of the guard unless posted as such.
A sentinel is on post within the meaning of this article not only when he is walk-
ing a duly designated sentinel’s post, as is ordinarily the case in garrison, but also,
for example, when he may be stationed in observation against the approach of an en-
emy, or on post to maintain internal discipline, or to guard stores, or to guard prison-
ers while in confinement or at work.
A sentinel’s post is not limited to an imaginary line, but includes, according to
orders or circumstances, such contiguous area within which he may walk as may be
necessary for the protection of property committed to his charge or for the discharge
of such other duties as may be required by general or special orders. The sentinel
who goes anywhere within such area for the discharge of his duties does not leave
his post, but if found drunk or sleeping within such area may be convicted of a viola-
tion of this article.
The fact that the sentinel was not posted in the regular way is not a defense.
Proof – (a) That the accused was posted as sentinel, as alleged; and (b) that he
was found drunk while on such post.
b. BEING FOUND SLEEPING ON POST – Discussion – See Subsection 146a. The fact that
the accused had been previously overtaxed by excessive guard duty is not a defense,
although evidence to that effect may be received in extenuation of the offense.
Proof – (a) That the accused was posted as sentinel, as alleged; and (b) that he
was found sleeping while on such post.
- - - page 133 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
c. LEAVING POST BEFORE BEING RELEIVED – Discussion – See Subsection 146a. The
offense of leaving post is not committed when a sentinel goes an immaterial distance
from the point, path, area, or object which was prescribed as his post.
Proof – (a) That the accused was posted as sentinel, as alleged; and (b) that he
left such post without being relieved.
147. NINETIETH ARTICLE OF WAR –
a. COMMITTING AY WASTE OR SPOIL – Discussion – The terms “waste” or “spoil”
as used in this article refer to such acts of voluntary destruction or permanent
damage to real property as burning down buildings, tearing down fences, cut-
ting down shade or fruit trees, and the like.
Proof – (a) That the accused, being with a certain command in quarters,
camp, garrison, or on the march, committed waste or spoil on certain property
in the manner alleged; and (b) that such acts were not ordered by his command-
ing officer.
b. WILLFULLY DESTROYING PROPERTY – Discussion – To be destroyed it is not
necessary that the property be completely demolished or annihilated. It is suffi-
cient if it is so far injured as to be useless for the purpose for which it was in-
tended.
Proof – (a) that the accused, being with a certain command in quarters,
camp, garrison, or on the march, destroyed certain property, as alleged; and (b)
that such destruction was willful and w sot ordered by his commanding officer.
c. COMMITTING DEPRADATION OR RIOT – Discussion – The term “any kind of
depredation” includes plundering, pillaging, robbing, and any willful damage to
property not included in the preceding specific terms of the article.
A riot is a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three or more persons as-
sembled together of their authority, with the intent mutually to assist one an-
other against any one who shall oppose them in the execution of some enter-
prise or a private nature, and who afterwards actually execute the same in a vio-
lent and turbulent manner, to the terror of the people, whether the act intended
was of itself lawful or unlawful. [McClain, Crim. Law]
Proof – (a) That the accused being with a certain command in quarters,
camp, garrison, or on the march, committed certain acts of depredation on cer-
tain property, or certain acts of rioting, as alleged.
d. REFUSING OR OMITTING TO SEE REPARATION MADE – Discussion – Refusing to
entertain a proper complaint at all; refusing or omitting to convene a board for
the assessment of damage or to act on such proceedings, or to direct the proper
stoppages, are instances of this offense.
Proof – (a) That the accused was the commanding officer of a certain com-
mand in quarters, garrison, camp, or on the march, as alleged; (b) that a com-
plaint was made to him by a certain person of damage or loss of certain prop-
erty occasioned by troops of the accused’s command, as alleged; and (c) that
the accused either refused to see reparation made, or omitted in the manner al-
leged to see reparation made, to the party injured in so far as the offender’s pay
would go toward such reparation.
- - - page 134 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
Proof – (a) That the accused killed a certain person named or described by certain
means, as alleged [this involves proof that the person alleged to have been killed is dead;
that he died in consequence of an injury received by him; that such injury was the result
of the act of the accused]; (b) that such killing was attended with ay qualifying circum-
stances; and (c) that such killing occurred in time of war.
In trials for murder – The law recognizes an exception to the rule rejecting hearsay
by allowing the dying declarations of the victim of the crime, in regard to the circum-
stances which have induced his present condition, and especially as to the person by
whom the violence was committed, to be detailed in evidence by one who has heard
them. It is necessary, however, to the competency of testimony of this character – and it
must be proved as preliminary to the proof of the declaration – that the person whose
words are repeated by the witness should have been in extremis and under a sense of im-
pending death, i.e., in the belief that he was to die soon, though it is not necessary that
he himself state that he speaks under this impression, provided the fact is otherwise
shown. And, if this belief on his part sufficiently appears, it is not essential to the admis-
sibility of his words that death should have immediately followed upon them. On the
other hand, if, in uttering the words, he was under the impression that he should recover,
the same would be inadmissible, even if in fact he presently died. But it is no objection
to their admissibility that they were brought out in answer to leading questions, or upon
urgent solicitations addressed to him by any person or persons; and if, instead of speak-
ing, he answered the questions by intelligible signs, these signs may equally be testified
to. But it is held that only such declarations are admissible as would be admitted if the
party were himself a witness; so that where the language employed is irrelevant or con-
sists in a statement of opinion, instead of fact, it can not be received. If it was put in
writing at the time, the writing should be produced. Dying declarations are admissible as
well as in favor of the deceased as against him.
It is to be remarked that evidence of dying declarations are usually to be received
with great caution, since such declarations are usually made under circumstances of
mental and physical depreciation, and without being subject to the ordinary legal tests.
[Winthrop]
149. NINETY-FOURTH ARTICLE OF WAR –
a. VARIOUS CRIMES – Discussion – This article puts persons subject to military law un-
der the jurisdiction of courts-martial when they commit on a Philippine Army reserva-
tion ay crime, breach of law, or violation of municipal ordinance, which is recognized
as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable under the penal laws of the Philip-
pines or under municipal ordinances.
Whenever persons subject to military law commit ay of the offenses above stated
outside Philippine Army reservations, they fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of
civil courts.
By army reservation is meant an area of land set apart by proper authority for mil-
itary purposes. [Gerber] The delimitations of such an area are usually described in Ex-
ecutive Proclamations.
C. EXCEPTION – This article exempts officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Con-
stabulary from the jurisdiction of courts-martial when they commit the offenses signi-
fied by this article (AW 94) although the same are committed within a Philippine
Army reservation.
- - - page 136 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
the property or money need not be for the benefit of the accused; the words “to his
own use or benefit” qualify the word “applies” only.
Theft, embezzlement, etc. must be of the particular kind of property mentioned
in the article. Post-exchange funds and money appropriated for other than the mili-
tary service do not come within the description “money of the Philippines furnished
or intended for the military service thereof”.
Although there may be no direct evidence that the property was at the time of
the alleged offense property of the Philippines furnished or intended for the military
service thereof, still, circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the property
was of a type and kind furnished or intended for, or issued for use in the military
service, might, together with other proved circumstances, warrant the court in infer-
ring that it was the property of the Philippines, so furnished or intended.
Proof – THEFT – (a) That the property alleged to have been stolen belongs to the
Philippines and that it was furnished or intended for the military service thereof; (b)
the taking by the accused of the property, as alleged; (c) the facts and circum-
stances of the case indicating that the taking was with a fraudulent intent to deprive
the Philippines permanently of such property or interest in the goods or of their
value or a part of their value; ad (d) that such property was of the value as alleged
or of some value.
Proof – EMBEZZLEMENT – (a) That the accused was entrusted with certain prop-
erty or money belonging to the Philippines and which was furnished or intended for
the military service thereof; (b) that he fraudulently converted or appropriated such
money or property; (c) the facts and circumstances showing that such conversion or
appropriation was with fraudulent intent; and (d) the value, as alleged.
Proof – MISAPPROPRIATION AND MISAPPLICATION – (a) That That the accused
misappropriated or applied to his own use certain property in the manner alleged;
(b) that such property belonged to the Philippines and that it was furnished or in-
tended for the military service thereof; (c) the facts and circumstances of the case
indicating that the act of the accused was willfully and knowingly done; and (d) the
value of the property, as specified.
Proof – SALE OR WRONGFUL DISPOSITION – (a) That the accused sold or disposed
of certain property in the manner alleged; (b) that such property belonged to the
Philippines and that it was furnished or intended for the military service thereof; (c)
the facts and circumstances of the case indicating that the act was wrongfully or
knowingly done; and (d) the value of the property, as alleged.
E. PURCHASING OR RECEIVING IN PLEDGE OF MIILTARY PROPERTY – Discussion –
To constitute this offense the accused must know not only the person selling or
pledging the property was in one of the specified classes and that the property was
the property of the Philippines, but also that the person so selling or pledging it had
o lawful right so to do.
Proof – (a) That the accused purchased, or received in pledge, for a certain obli-
gation or indebtedness certain property of the Philippines, as alleged, knowing it to
be such property; (b) that such property was purchased or so received in pledge
from a certain soldier, officer, or other person who was a part of or employed in the
military service of the Philippines, as alleged, and that the accused knew the person
selling or pledging the property to be such soldier, officer, or other person; (c) that
- - - page 138 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
such soldier, officer, or other person had not the lawful right to sell or pledge such
property; (d) that the accused knew, at the time, of such lack of lawful right in such
soldier, officer, or other person, so to sell or pledge such property; and (d) the value
of the property, as alleged.
151. NINETY-SIXTH ARTICLE OF WAR – CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER AND A
GENTLEMAN. – Discussion – The conduct contemplated is action or behavior in an offi-
cial capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing the individual as a officer, seriously
compromises his character and standing as a gentleman, or action or behavior in an offi-
cial or private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing the individual personally as a
gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a officer and exhibits him as morally
unworthy to remain a member of the honorable profession of arms. (Winthrop)
There are certain moral attributes common to the ideal officer and the perfect gentle-
man, a lack of which is indicated by acts of dishonesty or unfair dealing, of indecency or
indecorum, or of lawlessness, injustice, or cruelty. Not every one is or can be expected
to meet ideal standards or to possess the attributes in the exact same degree demanded
by the standards of his own time; but there is a limit of tolerance below which the indi-
vidual standards in these respects of an officer or cadet can not fall without his being
morally unfit to be an officer or cadet or to be considered a gentleman. The article con-
templates such conduct by a officer or cadet which, taking all the circumstances into
consideration, satisfactorily shows such moral unfitness.
This article includes acts made punishable by any other Article of War, provided
such acts amount to conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman; thus, an officer
who embezzles military property violates both this and the preceding article.
Instances of violation of this article are:
Knowingly making false official statements; dishonorable neglect to pay debts;
opening and reading another’s letters without authority; giving a check on a bank where
he knows or reasonably should know that there are no sufficient funds to meet it, and
without intending that there should be; using insulting or defamatory language to an-
other officer in his presence, or about him to other military persons; being grossly drunk
and conspicuously disorderly in a public place; public association with notorious prosti-
tutes; cruel treatment of soldiers; committing or attempting to commit a crime involving
moral turpitude; failing without good cause to support his family.
Proof – (a) That the accused did or omitted to do the acts, as alleged; and (b) the cir-
cumstances, intent, motive, etc., as specified.
152. NINETY-SEVENTH ARTICLE OF WAR –
a. DISORDERS AND NEGLECTS TO THE PREJUDICE OF GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY
DISCIPLINE – Discussion – The disorders and neglects include all acts or omissions to
the prejudice of good order and military discipline not made punishable by ay of the
preceding articles.
By the term “to the prejudice,” etc., is to be understood directly prejudicial, not in-
directly or remotely, merely. A irregular or improper act on the part of an officer or
soldier can scarcely be conceived which may not be regarded in some indirect or re-
mote sense prejudicing military discipline; but it is hardly supposed that this article
contemplated such distant effects, and the same is, therefore, confined to cases in
which the prejudice is reasonably direct and palpable. [Winthrop]
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Instances of such disorders and neglects in the case of officers are: Disobedience
of standing orders or of the orders of an officer when the offense is not chargeable un-
der a specific article; allowing a soldier to go on duty knowing him to be drunk; ren-
dering himself unfit for duty by excessive use of intoxicants or drugs; drunkenness.
Instances of such disorders and neglects in the case of enlisted men are: Failing to
appear on duty with a proper uniform; appearing with dirty clothing; malingering;
abusing public animals; careless discharge of firearms; personating an officer; making
false statements to an officer in regard to matters of duty.
Among the disorders herein made punishable is the fraudulent enlistment contem-
plated by AW 58, which differs from the fraudulent enlistment under AW 54 in that
the element of the receipt of pay or allowances is not present. The fact that, at the time
of the alleged fraudulent enlistment, the accused was serving in a prior enlistment
from which he had not been discharged may be proved, prima facie, by introducing
authenticated records of a former unexpired enlistment. If the period of the prior en-
listment has elapsed, the fact that there was no discharge from his prior enlistment
may be proved, prima facie, by the certificate of The Adjutant General or one of his
assistants that the files and records of the office of The Adjutant General contain no
record of the discharge of the accused from such enlistment.
For proof of fraudulent enlistment under AW 54, see Section 129 (Proof).
Proof – (a) That the accused did or failed to do the act specified; and (b) the cir-
cumstances, etc., as specified.
b. CONDUCT OF A NATURE TO BRING DISCREDIT UPON THE MILITARY SERVICE – Discus-
sion – “Discredit” as used here means “to injure the reputation of.” Instances of such
conduct on the part of persons subject to military law may include acts in violation of
local law committed under such circumstances as to bring discredit upon the military
service. So also is punishable under this clause any discreditable conduct not else-
where made punishable by any specific Article of War or by the first clause of AW
97.
If an officer or soldier in incurring private indebtedness or by his attitude toward it
or his creditor thereafter reflects discredit upon the service to which he belongs, he
should be brought to trial for his misconduct. He should not be brought to trial unless,
in the opinion of the military authorities, the facts and law are undisputed and there
appears to be no legal or equitable counterclaim or set-off that may be urged by the
officer or soldier. The military authorities will not attempt to discipline officers and
soldiers for failure to pay disputed indebtedness or claims, that is, where there appears
to be a genuine dispute as to the facts or the law. An officer may be tried for this of-
fense under either AW 96 or AW 97, as the circumstances may warrant.
One object of including this phrase in the general article was to make military of-
fenses those acts or omissions of retired soldiers which were not elsewhere made pun-
ishable by the Articles of War but which are of a nature to bring discredit on the ser-
vice, such as failure to pay debts.
Proof – (a) That the accused did or failed to do the acts alleged; and (b) the cir-
cumstances, etc., as specified.
CHAPTER XXVII
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HABEAS CORPUS
153. HABEAS CORPUS – GENERAL - The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to bring
the person seeking the benefit of it before the court or judge to determine whether or not
he is illegally restrained of his liberty. It is a summary remedy for unlawful restraint of
liberty and it can not be made use of to perform the function of a writ or error or an ap-
peal. Where it is decided that the restraint is unlawful, he is ordered released; but if the
restraint is lawful, the writ is dismissed. If the restraint be by virtue of legal process, the
validity ad present force of such process are the only subjects of investigation.
Persons taken into military custody by authority of the Articles of War and other
laws may test the legality of their restraint by the writ of habeas corpus. Officers of the
Army must, therefore, familiarize themselves with the law on habeas corpus so that they
may make proper returns on the writ. Attention is called to Chapter 26 of Act No. 190,
Act 654, and Sections 77 to 94, inclusive, of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the
Philippines. Section 529 of Act No. 190 is not applicable.36
154. HABEAS CORPUS – NATURE AND SCOPE – Legal provisions quoted – To what the
writ extends - Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberty under
any pretence whatever may prosecute a wit of habeas corpus, in order to inquire into the
cause of such imprisonment or restraint. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 77)
The writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto, except in cases expressly excepted.
(Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 77.)
By whom granted – The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a court superior to
that of justice of the peace, or a judge thereof, within the limits of the court’s jurisdic-
tion. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 79.)
The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any judge
thereof, in term time or in vacation, and if so granted, it shall be enforceable anywhere
in the Philippine Islands, and it shall be made returnable before the court or any judge
thereof. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, in term or
in vacation, and returnable before himself, enforceable within his judicial district only
(Code of Civil Procedure, Section 526)
Respondent must admit person charged with the service of the writ – If the person to
whom the writ is directed conceals himself or refuses admittance to the officer or person
charged with the service of the writ, or if he attempts to convey wrongfully the plaintiff
or petitioner out of the province after the writ has been served, the officer or other per-
son serving the same may arrest him or any other person or persons resisting his author-
ity, and bring him or them, together with the petitioner, forthwith before the court or
judge before whom the writ is returnable. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 85)
Persons discharged upon habeas corpus may not again be imprisoned – Exceptions -
No person who has been discharged by order of a court or judge upon habeas corpus can
be again imprisoned, restrained, or remanded to custody for the same cause, except in
the following cases:
36
Habeas corpus is governed by Rule 102, Rules of Court (Jan., 64)
- - - page 141 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
1. If he has been discharged from custody based on a criminal complaint, and is after-
wards committed for the same offense by legal order or process;
2. If, after discharge for defect of proof or for any defect of process, warrant, or com-
mitment in a criminal case, the prisoner is again arrested on sufficient proof and
committed by legal process for the same offense. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Section
92.
A person who is set at liberty upon a writ of habeas corpus shall not be again impris-
oned for the same offense, unless by the legal order or process of the court wherein he is
bound by recognizance to appear, or other court having jurisdiction of the cause or of-
fense; and a person who knowingly, contrary to the provisions of this chapter, recom-
mits or imprisons, or causes to be committed or imprisoned, for the same offense, or pre-
tended offenses, any person so set at liberty, or knowingly aids or assists therein, shall
forfeit to the party aggrieved five hundred dollars notwithstanding any colorable pre-
tense or variation in the warrant of commitment, and may also be dealt with as for a con-
tempt by the judge or court granting the writ. (Code of Civil Procedure, Section 547)
155. HABEAS CORPUS – RETURN TO WRIT – Legal provisions quoted – What shall be
stated in writ – The person upon whom the writ is served must make return thereto in
writing stating therein plainly and unequivocally whether he then has, or at any time has
had, the plaintiff under his control and constraint, and if so, the cause thereof. If he has
transferred him, he must state to whom and the time of transfer, also the reason or au-
thority therefore. The return must be verified. If the plaintiff is detained by virtue of any
written authority, a copy thereof must be annexed to the return and the original produced
at the hearing. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 86)
When the person to be produced is imprisoned or restrained by an officer, the person
who makes the return shall sate therein, and in other cases the person in whose custody
the prisoner is found shall state in writing to the court or judge before whom the writ is
returnable, plainly and unequivocally:
1. Whether he has or has not the party in his custody or power, or under restraint;
2. If he has the party in his custody, or power, or under restraint, he shall set forth,
at large, the authority and the true and whole cause of such imprisonment and re-
straint, with a copy of the writ, warrant, execution, or other process, if any, upon
which the party is detained;
3. If he has had the party in his custody or power, or under restraint, and has trans-
ferred such custody or restraint to another, he shall state particularly whom, at
what time, for what cause, and by what authority such transfer was made. (Code
of Civil Procedure, Section 538)
The writ must be signed and sworn to – The return or statement shall be signed by
the person who makes it and shall also9 be sworn to by him, unless he is a sworn public
officer, and makes the return in his official capacity. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Section
87)
Respondent must produce the body of persons detained – Exceptions – To whom
body conveyed – The person to whom the writ is directed must produce of the body of
the person in his custody or under his restraint, according to the command of the writ,
except when it appears by affidavit that, on account of sickness or infirmity, he cannot
- - - page 142 of one hundred forty two pages - - -
safely be brought, or where the party in restraint or custody waives the right to be
present in writing or by attorney. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 87)
The officer or person to whom the writ is directed shall convey the person so impris-
oned or detained, and named in the writ, before the judge allowing the writ, or, in case
of his absence or disability, before some other judge of the same court, on the day speci-
fied in the writ; and he shall make due return of the writ, together with the day and cause
of the caption and detention of such person according to the command thereof. (Code of
Civil Procedure, Section 536)
Two whom writ is returned – When the writ is issued by a member of the Supreme
Court, it may be made returnable before himself, or the Supreme Court, or before any
court immediately inferior, or any judge thereof. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 81)
When the writ is issued by a court in session, if the court had adjourned when the
same is returned, it shall be returned before any judge of the same court; and when the
writ is returned before one Judge at a time when the court is in session, he may adjourn
the case into the court, there to be heard and determined. (Code of Civil Procedure, Section
537)
Writ not to be disobeyed for defect of form – No writ of habeas corpus can be dis-
obeyed for defect of form if it sufficiently appears therefrom in whose custody or under
whose restraint the party imprisoned or restrained is held and the court or judge before
whom he is to be brought. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 91)
Penalty for disobeying writ – A person to whom a writ is directed who neglects or
refuses to obey or make return of the same according to the command thereof, or makes
false return thereof, or who, upon demand made by the prisoner or any person in his be-
half, refuses to deliver to the person demanding, within six hours after demand therefore,
a true copy of the warrant of commitment and detainer of the prisoner, shall, for the first
offense, forfeit to the party aggrieved two hundred dollars, and may also be dealt with
by the judge of the court as for a contempt. (Code of Civil Procedure, Section 546)
[For Forms, See Appendix 17]
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