Flight Inspection Guidance Material For APAC Region
Flight Inspection Guidance Material For APAC Region
Flight Inspection Guidance Material For APAC Region
ASIA PACIFIC
FLIGHT INSPECTION GUIDANCE
MATERIAL
First Edition
Asia Pacific Flight Inspection
(ii) Guidance Material
(ii)
Preface (iii)
AMENDMENTS
Amendments are announced in the supplements to the Publications
Catalogue; the Catalogue and its supplements are available on the
ICAO website at www.icao.int. The space below is provided to keep a
record of such amendments.
(iii)
Asia Pacific Flight Inspection
(iv) Guidance Material
PREFACE
This publication was prepared in response to a recommendation from the “Seminar on Flight Inspection and
Procedure Validation (FIPV)” held in the ICAO Asia and Pacific (APAC) Regional Office, Bangkok, Thailand from
24 to 27 September 2019 with content contribution from volunteer States / Administrations and industry partners.
It is decided to complement existing Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) to provide guidance on
flight inspection and to serve as a reference upon which States / Administrations can develop their own specific
practices and procedures.
The guidance material is developed with the experiences and knowledge among APAC States / Administrations
and industry partners and includes recommendations of key activities and milestones in planning, execution, and
delivery of a flight inspection. Useful materials, including sample flight inspection reports are also included for
reference. This guidance material can hopefully facilitate and be useful to States / Administrations, especially for
those without a national Flight Inspection Service Provider (FISP) and with difficulties when conducting flight
inspection.
This guidance material is not intended to and shall not replace the relevant flight inspection
requirements stipulated in Annex 10 and Doc 8071. In the event of any inconsistency or conflict between
this document and Annex 10 and Doc 8071, Annex 10 and Doc 8071 shall take precedence.
The support from ICAO APAC Office and contributions from the following volunteer State/Administration and
industry partner (in alphabetical order) in preparing the guidance material are acknowledged and highly
appreciated: -
AeroPearl, Australia
Airways, New Zealand
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
FCS Flight Calibration Services GmbH, Germany
Flight Inspection Center, Civil Aviation Administration of China, China
Hong Kong Civil Aviation Department, China
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Definitions (v)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
(v)
GLOSSARY
ABBREVIATIONS
(vi)
Definitions (vii)
(vii)
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This material was developed in response to the recommendation from the Seminar on Flight
Inspection and Procedure Validation (FIPV) held in the ICAO APAC Regional Office, Bangkok, Thailand from 24
to 27 September 2019, considering the typical need of States / Administrations without a national FIS provider
and some recommended measures necessary for conducting flight inspection at night.
1.1 OBJECTIVE
1.1.1 In accordance with the ICAO Annex 10 Volume I and Document 8071 requirements, flight
inspection has to be conducted periodically to ensure accuracy, reliability and integrity of the signals-in-space
from the air navigation facilities, and that the radio navigation systems meet the SARPs in Annex 10.
1.1.2 While flight inspection could also be conducted for surveillance facilities and/or other purposes
such as flight procedure validation, VHF coverage checking, etc., this guidance material focuses on flight
inspection for air navigation and surveillance facilities and is a sharing and representation of common practices
existing in a number of States with considerable experiences in flight inspection.
1.1.3 This guidance material introduces and describes different stages in flight inspection for air
navigation facilities, including planning, conducting and accepting the report that all tolerances are met. It is not
intended to recommend specific FISP(s) or equipment to be used, but rather to provide general details and
guidelines in the arrangement of flight inspection for States’ own consideration.
1.2 SCOPE
1.2.1 This guidance material describes general reference in conducting flight inspection, including
resources planning, roles and responsibilities of involving parties and identification of stakeholders. It also
provides guideline in communication with stakeholders and criteria on planning and scheduling flight inspection.
1.2.2 This document introduces example flight inspection procedures for Instrument Landing System
(ILS) including visual aids, Doppler Very High Frequency Omni-Directional Range (DVOR), Distance Measuring
Equipment (DME), Primary Surveillance Radar and Secondary Surveillance Radar (PSR / SSR) and discusses
about the arrangement for flight inspection at night and also emergency flight inspections.
1.2.3 Reference is also given on the example flight inspection system performance specifications
and associated Test Accuracy Ratios (TAR) and the workflow on reporting of flight inspection results. Sample
flight inspection records and reports are also shared in this document for States to make reference with.
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Chapter 2
2.1 GENERAL
2.1.1.1 General setup – there are 2 typical scenarios of flight inspection arrangements:
Able to activate within a short period of time during emergency (high flexibility);
Particularly useful when State has large number of facilities / aerodromes to be flight
inspected; and
More cost effective when State has small number of facilities to be flight inspected;
More feasible when the State may not have the necessary expertise;
More flexible to change FISP to meet the required service performance; and
2.1.1.4 General planning before flight inspection typically includes the following:
Determine type of aircraft used for flight inspection, for example using jet aircraft for
high level (i.e. FL350 and above) radar coverage check;
Check with apron operations on where the inspection aircraft can park and identify any
traffic/timing restrictions for its taking off and landing;
Develop draft flight inspection schedule and flight inspection profiles as well as
proposed date for brief and debrief;
Notify parties involved/affected by draft flight inspection schedule and flight inspection
profiles. Parties involved/affected could be ATC, runway maintenance team, military,
ground handlers, Navaids & Surveillance facilities managers, Navaids & Surveillance
maintenance staff, airfield lighting / Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI)
maintenance team;
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2.1.2 Roles and Responsibilities of the Flight Inspection Service Provider (FISP) Including Crew
Resources Management
FISP is the main party to provide safe and reliable flight inspection services. Selection of an appropriate FISP is
a key successful factor for flight inspection.
2.1.2.1 Roles
Assist Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) in planning, scheduling and conducting
the flight inspection;
Be familiar with the airspace / airport to conduct safe and efficient flight inspection with
minimum impact to normal traffic; and
2.1.2.2 Responsibilities
Assist ANSP to ensure no equipment (e.g. navigation aids) would expire the validity
period as recommended by ICAO or State’s regulatory requirement, or any validity
period as confirmed by the ANSP, with proper planning and scheduling of flight
inspection tasks;
Survey or assist to survey the reference point(s) for Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) for precision flight inspection on ILS;
Obtain all the necessary permits to fly over areas for its flight inspection;
Closely coordinate with ATC and ground technical personnel to prepare and conduct
flight inspection including the provision of flight profiles for ATC assessment;
Keep good archived records of flight inspection results of the equipment / system being
inspected and provide advice if there was any anomaly trend or result observed;
Feedback to the ANSP on overall flight inspection arrangement, discuss and assist to
resolve problems encountered; and
Desirable to have Crew Resource Management (CRM) to clearly define the roles and
responsibilities of each crew member and to establish close collaboration among the
crew members.
Crew Resource Management (CRM) and Crew Coordination Concept (CCC) define how crews are to work
together and the roles and responsibilities of each crew member. It clearly describes the communications
involved in executing tasks and should be reinforced by Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and checklists.
The CRM system, however, does not only define the cooperation among cockpit members, but also should
encompass procedures and communication between cockpit and cabin, and it should define the interface
between the flight crew and the rest of the organisation, like tasking / scheduling, management, maintenance, etc.
This holistic approach in CRM is of great importance to create a working environment that takes into account all
requirements to accomplish the organization’s mission profile safely and reliably. It effectively translates into a
Team Resource Management (TRM).
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A flight inspector is the person who performs checking on equipment / system status. He / she must be proficient
and have a good understanding on the characteristics of various equipment / systems to be flight inspected as
well as familiarise himself / herself with relevant procedures to perform flight inspection on that equipment /
system.
2.1.3.1 Roles
Perform equipment checking in flight inspection and alert ANSP in real time of any out-
of-tolerance conditions or anomaly observed during the flight inspection;
Assist ANSP to identify and analyse any anomaly / adverse trends observed; and
2.1.3.2 Responsibilities
Coordinate with the rest of flight inspection team (e.g. pilots) for ad-hoc and flexible
arrangement of flight inspection procedures (e.g. re-check on a specific run);
Observe the measured results of flight inspection and checks against the relevant
tolerance limits;
Keep records of the measurement results and notifies ANSP for any trend/anomaly
observed;
Assist ANSP from the flight inspection perspective for the rectification on any anomaly
observed; and
Coordinate any real time changes to the flight inspection schedule due to unforeseen
circumstances such as inclement weather, aircraft or aircrew problem.
The ANSP is ultimately responsible for management of the flight inspection. It is therefore vital that ANSP takes
an active role throughout the flight inspection.
2.1.4.1 Roles
2.1.4.2 Responsibilities
Ensure that all systems and facilities to be flight inspected are operational and in a
condition suitable for flight inspection on the scheduled dates;
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Ensure all systems and facilities are regularly flight inspected, complying with the
State’s regulatory requirement on the periodicity of flight inspection;
Provide an annual draft schedule of systems and facilities to be flight inspected to the
flight inspection service provider to facilitate early planning;
Assist in obtaining security clearance for flight inspection crew to access aircraft;
Provide authorization for flight inspection aircraft to fly below established minimum
altitudes, together with all other necessary air traffic authorizations to accomplish the
flight inspection;
Review flight inspection profiles with ATC and arrange discussion with FISP for any
clarification, if required;
Ensure FISP obtain necessary permits to fly over areas for the planned flight inspection;
Publish addition or / and amendments to AIP regarding systems / facilities after flight
inspection;
Make arrangement for flight inspection crew to call ATC before the start of each sortie
for co-ordination purposes;
ATC to facilitate flight inspection and accord it some priority, whenever possible; and
The smooth conduct of flight inspection requires concerted efforts from all key stakeholders. Subject to the
organization structure in the States, an example list of stakeholders related to flight inspection is provided below
for reference:
FISP plays a vital role in flight inspection and is expected to be conversant with the
relevant ICAO and local standards and requirements for fight inspection of various CNS
equipment. FISP is also expected to be familiar with the flight profiles to be conducted
and local airport / airspace environment in order to perform flight inspection in an
efficient and effective manner. FISP should also be familiar with details of permits /
approvals required for flying in airspace to ensure a successful and effective flight
inspection.
The flight inspection team deployed by the FISP normally consists of three types of staff,
namely pilots, flight inspectors and aircraft engineers.
(i) Pilots – mainly communicate with air traffic controllers to perform flight
inspection profiles
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(iii) Aircraft Engineer – support staff to deal with daily maintenance and
problems encountered on the flight inspection aircraft, which would
normally have been deployed at a far distance from the FISP’s main base.
States may consider, as far as practicable, to assign dedicated air traffic controller(s) in
handling the flight inspection aircraft, in which the flight path might cross multiple
sectors and affect normal traffic patterns. Experienced air traffic controllers could
efficiently reduce the lead time to conduct flight inspection, while keeping the impact to
normal traffic to a minimum.
Subject to different airport and airspace, temporary holding of ground and / or air traffic
might be required to allow the flight inspection aircraft to conduct dedicated profiles
unaffected.
Air traffic controller handling flight inspection aircraft has to work closely with the flight
inspection pilot and keep a very close eye on the aircraft position to keep it clear from
normal traffic.
The ground maintenance personnel are responsible for equipment maintenance and
adjustment during the flight inspection. They have to work closely with the flight
inspector to ensure the measured reading is within tolerance limit and ensure the
equipment is safe for operational use. Prior to the flight inspection, the ground
maintenance personnel shall also ensure the equipment is operational and in a
condition suitable for flight inspection.
To facilitate daily flight inspection mission, there might be logistics support required for
the flight and ground crews of the flight inspection team to travel between airport and
their accommodation place. Immigration, Customs and Exercise clearance support
might also be required to facilitate smooth operation of flight inspection activities.
The military shall be informed of the civilian flight inspection schedule to ensure military
flights and civilian flight inspection aircraft routes are de-conflicted. The civilian flight
inspection aircraft should take note of the military no fly zones.
2.2.2.1 A thorough understanding of the details of flight inspection arrangements is crucial to the
successful completion of a flight inspection. All stakeholders should know their roles and duties to render the
best support to the flight inspection activities.
2.2.2.2 To facilitate clear communication among stakeholders, ANSP could consider preparing a
comprehensive but concise daily programme for sharing among all stakeholders. The daily programme would
typically include information on equipment / facility to be inspected, estimated start and end time, parties involved
and their roles, useful contacts, etc. (see sample at Attachment A to this chapter).
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2.2.2.3 In addition, the ANSP could also consider preparing a detailed flight inspection check sheet for
each equipment / facility to document the planned flight inspection profiles to be conducted (preferably with
diagrams for easy visualisation) and estimated duration for each run. This check sheet could greatly facilitate air
traffic controllers and airport stakeholders to assess any potential impact to airport / airspace operations and to
aid communication during the flight inspection (see sample at Attachment B to this chapter). Appropriate NOTAM
should also be issued to ensure airlines and pilots are kept informed of the flight inspection schedule and time.
2.2.2.4 Before the commencement of each round of flight inspection, an in-briefing involving all key
stakeholders is recommended to ensure all are familiar with their roles and responsibilities in supporting the daily
flight inspection as well as any issues requiring special attention. This also allows all stakeholders to exchange
comments about the daily arrangement, for instance the flight profiles sequence, and helps to spot early issues
that would potentially hinder normal ATC operations and flight inspection.
2.2.2.5 Contingency plan, including backup flight inspection date(s) due to unexpected ad-hoc event such
as inclement weather or technical fault, could also be discussed with key stakeholders during the in-briefing.
2.2.2.6 During the flight inspection, it is essential that the ground maintenance personnel maintains direct
communication with the on-board flight inspector so that any required adjustment of ground facilities or any
recheck can be done expeditiously.
2.2.2.7 During the flight inspection period, daily de-briefing among flight inspection crews, ANSP, ATC and
ground maintenance personnel would allow quick feedback on any issues encountered during the flight
inspection so as to make timely fine-tuning when necessary for the subsequent flight inspection. This allows
individual stakeholder to make adjustment / enhancement arrangement promptly such as issuance / cancellation
of NOTAM, co-ordination / cancellation of runway closures, etc.
2.2.2.8 After the completion of each round of flight inspection, a de-briefing involving all stakeholders
would help all to strive for continuous improvements on overall flight inspection arrangement, with parties sharing
their views and suggestions as well as to share results and resulting actions of the flight inspection.
Flight inspection, depending on the exact flight profiles to be conducted, often causes some degrees of disruption
to normal airport and airspace operations, especially at busy international airports during peak traffic hours.
When planning and scheduling flight inspections, a number of key factors have to be considered so as to
minimise potential interruptions to normal operations, for example:-
During day time when normal traffic is usually at its peak, the coordination of flight
inspection by air traffic controllers will be complex and with great challenges which
often results in undesirable disruption to normal air traffic. Hence, for busy airports,
there is a trend to advance the flight inspection time to dawn or even earlier so as to
avoid the busy day time traffic.
Some flight inspection profiles may require day-light conditions to perform. When
scheduling the flight inspection, one possible way to take advantage of less busy early
hours would be to perform those flight profiles that do not require day-light condition
first, followed by those requiring day-light conditions. As the time of flight inspection is
dependent on time of peak traffic volume, close co-ordination and early inputs from
ATC and slot planner from the airport operator in the planning would be beneficial.
Long holidays and travel peak seasons would significantly increase the air traffic
volume. In some ANSPs, there may also be a period of time in which equipment
configuration or change is not allowed as this supports the heavy traffic in long holiday
and peak season. Therefore, when planning and scheduling flight inspection programs,
such long holiday and travelling peak seasons should be avoided as far as practicable.
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In some States, there might be seasonal strong winds, typhoons or severe weather
conditions in some parts of the year. Heavy rainfall, lightning and other severe weather
conditions may impact or delay flight inspection activities. As such, the fight inspection
program should be scheduled to avoid bad weather seasons as far as practicable.
Planning of flight inspection should avoid disruption with a period of major military flying
exercises. This is because during the latter, many forbidden flying areas / zones may
be activated and such activations could affect the normal flight inspection.
Flight inspection operations at night are becoming more popular and may inevitably be required at large and high
traffic density airports so as to minimize potential impact to the normal air traffic flow. The possibility of reduced
traffic flow densities at night may allow the necessary inspection profiles to be flown with minimal disruption to
ATC. However, the potential risks for the FISP crews for performing such tasks at night need to be properly
managed.
To reduce the risk in flight inspection at night, FISP crews should be familiar with the airspace and airport
environment including the height of terrain and structures along and close to the flight inspection path. Air traffic
controllers have to pay special attention to the altitude and flight path of the flight inspection aircraft to avoid any
deviation from the planned safe flight path.
Night operations should be considered as any flight inspection being performed 30 minutes after sunset until 30
minutes before sunrise.
2.3.1.1 The aircraft should be a multi-engine type capable of safe flight within the intended operational
envelope with one engine inoperative, fully equipped and instrumented for night and instrument flight operations.
2.3.2.1 Flight inspection operations at night present additional risks that must be identified, assessed with
necessary mitigations and documented. Night flying operations should only be conducted by experienced pilots
that are current and proficient at night flying and who understand well the risks associated with night-time flight
inspection.
2.3.2.2 A dual pilot operation should be considered for a normal night flight inspection operation to mitigate
against the higher risks involved for night operations.
2.3.3.1 FISPs operate under their own Air Operator’s Certificate (AOC) and Flight Time Limitation (FTL)
which would normally include duty periods for their specific night operations. Consideration should be given to the
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preceding duty period prior to any planned night duty to ensure the crew, including the flight inspector, have
enough rest periods before and after the night duties.
2.3.3.2 Limitations should be provided for night duties worked in immediate succession, for example two
consecutive nights, with a maximum duty period of 11 hours each.
2.3.3.3 Upon the conduction of a single night duty, or two consecutive night duties, there should be a
minimum interval of rest time for the FISP crews before the commencement of the next duty time.
2.3.4.1 Where a requirement exists for flight inspection of ILS or other NAVAID installations at night, the
following operational requirements should be met.
2.3.4.2 Aircraft Related - In addition to the normal equipment required for a night operation, the following
equipment should be functioning normally:
Auto-Pilot;
Up-to-date database for flight inspection equipment map display (If applicable);
2.3.4.3 ANSP Related – The following is recommended to be provided by the ANSP prior to any night
flight inspection operation:
ANSP should provide a full radar service within the area of operation;
Runway edge, centreline, approach lighting and PAPI’s shall be serviceable and
operating normally;
Any obstacle lighting shall be operational within the designated area of operation;
The weather conditions for the night inspection must be Visual Meteorological
Conditions (VMC) below the 25/10 NM Minimum Sector Altitude (MSA) or Minimum
Radar Vector Altitude (MVA) / Radar Lower Safe Altitude (LSALT); and
2.3.4.4 Pilot Related - Prior to the commencement of any night inspection operation, a skyline plot of the
obstructions in the approach path must be obtained from the aerodrome operating authority. The pilot should
compare the intended inspection runs and adjustments made to the minimum operating altitude as necessary.
2.3.4.5 Where flight crews have not conducted a daylight operation into an aerodrome, then prior to
conducting a night inspection task, the crew should first fly the approach in daylight conditions to assess the
obstacle clearance within the approach area.
2.3.4.6 Areas surrounding the inspection runs shall be predominantly level, clear of terrain and obstacles.
2.3.4.7 For operations in certain States it may be compulsory for the crew to provide an alternate
Aerodrome for recovery, these requirements must be determined prior to commencement of night operations. In
addition, holding and alternate requirements always need to be borne in mind.
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2.3.4.8 To raise the flight crew situational awareness and to reduce fatigue, the autopilot should be used
whenever possible.
2.3.4.10 Flight Inspection Profiles - Flight inspection at night should be conducted using the following
minimum altitudes:
Level runs, Orbits and Part Orbits should not be conducted below the sector
25NM/10NM MSA or radar LSALT.
Not below SECTOR 25/10 NM MSA or radar LSALT until established on a flight
inspection approach run, when established within full-scale deflection of the localiser
descent may occur.
2.3.4.11 Localiser (LOC) offset approaches that involve flights more than half scale (5 Dots) indications
should be flown during daylight.
2.3.4.12 Where a LOC part orbit altitude needs to be increased for a night operation, a range change may
be required to ensure that the localiser coverage area correlates with the published GlidePath (GP) angle.
2.3.4.13 Cat III ILS approaches that include a fly through at 50ft along the runway to ILS Point ‘E’ should
only be flown at night providing the following are met:
Pilots have conducted the relevant simulator training for such an operation.
An alternate method would be for the aircraft to perform a run along the runway centreline prior or post the
inspection.
2.3.4.14 GP approach profiles that involve flight with more than half scale “FLY UP” indications should be
flown during daylight e.g. GP lower edge (5 dots Fly Up) runs.
2.3.4.15 GP level runs need to encompass coverage and clearance at a minimum angle of 0.45Θ, however,
increasing the height to be at MSA for this measurement will inevitably mean an increase in the start range to
achieve this, with the possibility that the GP coverage tolerance may not be met beyond 10NM. As an alternate
solution, the GP level run profile could be flown with the addition of the night profile run during daylight and the
measurements used as a reference transfer standard between the two profiles.
2.4.1.1 The various types and priorities of flight inspection are published within ICAO DOC 8071, Chapter
1 (Para.1.5). The following paragraphs discuss the requirements surrounding special inspections.
2.4.2.1 If there are multiple flight inspection requests, the use of inspection priorities will determine the
tasks to be supported first and make the most effective use of the resources in FISP. The following is an order of
priorities that should be considered:
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2.4.3.1 A flight inspection may be requested following an accident or incident by the investigating authority
to verify the NAVAID system performance is satisfactory and able to continue to support the published instrument
approach procedures and ANSP operations.
2.4.3.2 For a FISP, this type of inspection should be accorded highest priority and an appropriate
response time should be contractually agreed between the ANSP and the service provider.
2.4.3.3 Pre-Flight Requirements – The flight inspector will be required to obtain the following information:
2.4.3.4 The flight inspector will need to coordinate the system configuration with the maintenance
personnel and perform as a minimum, an inspection of the facility which may include the instrument procedure
used if applicable. It is important to note that no equipment adjustments should be made during this inspection
and if required, should be performed in a separate special inspection to facilitate investigation.
2.4.3.5 In the event of an accident or incident, ANSP should do all that is reasonably practicable to
ascertain that a NAVAID is operating correctly. For this reason, ANSP should have equipment suitable for making
field measurements available.
2.4.4.1 Where a runway excursion by an aircraft has occurred and damage has been sustained to a
NAVAID, the maintenance authority will determine the repairs required to the facility and whether a ground or
flight inspection is required to return the facility back into service. However, the following considerations should
be given when determining the need for a flight inspection:
Replacement or re-positioning of an ILS near field monitor if the system does not
contain integral course monitoring;
Major repair work to the LOC antenna distribution unit or when the center line phasor
has been adjusted;
Damage to ILS critical areas ground in the beam forming areas that need re-grading.
2.4.4.2 In the event of an accident or incident, ANSP should do all that is reasonably practicable to
ascertain that the facility is operating correctly. For this reason, all aerodromes should have equipment suitable
for making field measurements available.
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2.4.5.1 Information regarding FISP may be obtained from the appropriate ICAO Regional Office or online
from the International Committee for Airspace Standards and Calibration (ICASC) at http://www.icasc.co 1
2.4.6.1 The reporting of aviation safety occurrences is vital to the prevention of aircraft accidents and
contributes to the understanding of where safety risks lie within the aviation system. This information provides an
understanding of the safety related issues thus allowing these to be addressed and relevant measures adopted.
Safety occurrence reporting by aviation professionals contributes to the prevention of accidents and
fundamentally promotes the safety of aviation activities within the organisations that employs them or uses their
services.
2.4.6.2 Persons involved in aviation activities should be encouraged to report any safety issue they
encountered. State regulations should differentiate between the cases which would require mandatory reporting
and those that may be reported after judging it relevant.
2.4.6.3 The obligation of these reporting occurrences would be included within the normal operation of an
organisation’s SMS. ANSP or airline operator should, through a mandatory reporting system, inform the relevant
authority of a particular occurrence and with defined categories that represent a significant risk to aviation safety.
2.4.6.4 Safety management systems are reliant on the collection and analysis of safety related information.
Therefore, anything that is perceived by the individuals as having the potential to impact safety should be
reported within reasonable time, for example, 72 hours to raise awareness of the occurrence.
2.4.6.5 Organisations SMS may define the format of the occurrence reports to be used by relevant aviation
professional. It should include areas to report NAVAID performance or RNAV procedure where relevant. In
general, reporting forms need to be user friendly and will not discourage potential reporters to report the
occurrences. The aim should be to facilitate the collection of occurrence information as much as practicable from
the front-line individuals and allow the appropriate authorities to understand and address the issues from the
information provided.
2.4.6.6 The following reporting information requirements should be considered as a minimum, but not
limited to, in the determination of NAVAID’s performance from both an ATC and Pilots perspective.
Date/Time UTC
Airline Operator
Pilot Name
SSR Code
Aircraft Type
Aircraft Flight Phase (Climb, Descent, Level, Approach), IFR/VFR, Radar Vectored,
Navigational Aid in use (ILS/VOR/DME/NDB/RNAV)
Description of Occurrence
2.4.6.7 ANSP’s and Airline Operators are likely to have their own organisations occurrence report forms to
cover the mandated reporting requirements within their SMS. These may not contain the aforementioned
information relevant for a pilot reporting an unreliable NAVAID performance. Therefore, additional information
may be required for investigation purposes depending on the seriousness of the occurrence. Consultation with
the ground technicians will greatly assist an immediate investigation on a system status and possible actions
required.
2.4.6.8 For precision approach landing aid systems such as an ILS/DME or GNSS Landing System (GLS),
once an occurrence report related to the system is received from a pilot, an ANSP would have to follow up by
investigation and discussion with ground technicians and may require the issue of a NOTAM on that facility once
it is identified to be faulty and requires maintenance. The ANSP has to ensure a continued safe operation or
provide alternative services and procedures resulting from the occurrence.
1
ICAO DOC 8071 Fifth Edition, 2018
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2.5.1 There might be occasion that the flight inspection could be affected by external factor with global
impact, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. With such a huge global impact, cross-country deployment of flight
inspection aircraft might become difficult, especially for those States who do not have their own FISP. As such,
States should assess and consider the flight inspection periodicity on radio navigation aids to secure continuous
service or keep minimum impact to service.
2.5.2 ICAO has published a reference note on the considerations of radio navigation aids flight
inspection periodicity during COVID-19 (at Attachment C to this chapter).
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Attachment A
Example Flight Inspection Programme
- Expected period and end time for VOR and ILS flight inspection
- Runway closure and maintenance requirements
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Attachment B
Example Flight Inspection Profiles
Target
Facility
Completio Run Procedure
Flight Procedure Transmitter Items To Be Inspected
n Time No. Description
Number
(LT)
xxNM-xxNM,
Radial xxxº
VOR/DME
QNH xxxxFT
No.1 e.g. VOR Monitor Alarm Check
xxNM-xxNM,
Radial xxxº Only
QNH xxxxFT
xxNM-xxNM, VOR/DME
Radial xxxº e.g. VOR Monitor Alarm Normal
QNH xxxxFT No.1
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Runway ILS
ILS Name ID Routine Inspection
Identification
Target Facility
Run Flight Procedure
Completion Transmitter Items To Be Inspected
No. Procedure Description
Time (LT) Number
xxxx-xxxx e.g. Level Run xxNM-xxNM e.g. Width (including alarm), Symmetry
GP No.1
QNH xxxxFT SBP, etc.
xxxx-xxxx e.g. Level Arc xxNM, +xxº/-xx º, e.g. Width (including alarm), Symmetry,
LOC No.1
QNH xxxxFT Clearance, etc.
xxxx-xxxx e.g. Approach DME No.1; e.g. DME and Runway Lighting, Path
with low pass Initial From xxNM
LOC/GP Angle, Datum, Mod Sum, Structure,
and QNH xxxxFT
No.1 etc.
Runway ILS
ILS Name ID Routine Inspection
Identification
Target Facility
Run Flight Procedure
Completion Transmitter Items To Be Inspected
No. Procedure Description
Time (LT) Number
xxxx-xxxx e.g. Level Run xxNM-xxNM e.g. Width (including alarm), Symmetry
GP No.2
QNH xxxxFT SBP, etc.
xxxx-xxxx e.g. Level Arc xxNM, +xxº/-xx º, e.g. Width (including alarm), Symmetry,
LOC No.2
QNH xxxxFT Clearance, etc.
xxxx-xxxx e.g. Approach DME No.2; e.g. DME and Runway Lighting, Path
with low pass Initial From xxNM
LOC/GP Angle, Datum, Mod Sum, Structure,
and QNH xxxxFT
No.2 etc.
Remarks:
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Attachment C
Flight Inspection Periodicity Considerations for
Radio Navigation Aids during the COVID-19 Pandemic
and Related Recovery Phase
1. Introduction
1.1. The present note discusses issues related to flight inspection that could arise during the COVID-19
pandemic and during the recovery phase, with particular regard to periodicity. The main purpose of the document
is to ensure that flight inspection will be able to maintain safe operation of navigation aids during the pandemic
and will not be on the critical path to aviation recovery after the pandemic.
1.2. To this end the document stresses the need to maintain regular ground and flight checks of navaids
to ensure that they are available during recovery (delaying implementation of new facilities if necessary). It
provides information on flight inspection experiences and best practice currently adopted in several ICAO States,
including recommendations on how to deal with periodicity intervals when delays are experienced.
2.1. The fundamental ICAO provision addressing flight inspection in general is the Standard in Annex 10,
Volume I, Chapter 2, 2.2.1 (reproduced in Appendix).
2.2. Guidance on flight inspection, including periodicity, is given in the ICAO Manual on Testing of Radio
Navigation Aids (Doc 8071). The general aspects of periodicity requirements are addressed in section 1.15 of the
document (reproduced in Appendix), whereas suggested [1] periodicities for specific navigation aids are given in
the chapters corresponding to each aid. States may have determined their periodicity requirements based on
local circumstances and as such the recovery should consider these periodicities.
3.1. This document focuses on flight inspection periodicity. However, Doc 8071 also specifies a number
of ground tests with an associated periodicity. Normal practice is to ensure that a navigation facility passes all of
its ground tests prior to conducting a flight inspection. Local maintenance staff normally accomplish this. This
document assumes that such ground testing can be carried out as required and in accordance with the local
COVID-related health precautions. Some of the measures discussed herein can also be applied to ground
maintenance staff. The document focuses on flight inspection due to its often international dimension (cross-
border operations).
4.1. The ICAO Secretariat and EUROCONTROL have conducted an informal survey of flight inspection
practices during the pandemic in twenty-seven States.
4.2. The survey results show that the majority of States surveyed are maintaining a regular or near-
regular flight inspection schedule during the pandemic. This is consistent with the general recognition of ATC as
an essential public service and the related need for reliable system performance of radio navigation aids.
However, it should also be noted that the majority of the responses came from States that operate their own flight
inspection aircraft. So the survey may not fully reflect the situation in States where issues may exist due to delays
or suspended flight inspection operations, especially if they rely on cross-border flights by flight inspection
providers (see below).
5. Special Measures
5.1. In order to sustain the flight inspection schedule notwithstanding the pandemic-related difficulties,
the majority of the States surveyed have adopted special health safety procedures and operational measures, as
discussed below.
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Chapter 2. Planning for Flight Check 2-17
6.1. Some or all of the following health safety procedures have been put in place:
daily supply of personal protection devices to crew, with detailed instructions on usage;
flight inspection crew segregation from ground support personnel (ground maintenance,
dispatch, refuel etc);
flight inspection crew segregation from engineering personnel responsible for the
navaids under test (telephone coordination only);
segregation between the flight inspection crews themselves (fixed crew staffing); and
implementation of alternate on/off crew rotation rosters taking into account potential
incubation period.
7. Operational Measures
7.1. While flight inspection operations have been to some extent facilitated by the low air traffic levels
currently prevailing, overall significant operational restrictions are being experienced, calling for special measures
to mitigate them.
7.2. A common approach adopted for flight inspection operations during pandemic is to keep individual
missions within a single day, returning to base at the end of the day and thus avoiding overnight stays at the
destination.
7.3. The impact of the associated reduction in efficiency could be mitigated by prioritizing regular flight
inspection missions over new implementation projects (new facilities and procedures).
7.4. Furthermore, among regular missions, those addressing facilities that are approaching the flight
inspection due date, particularly in the case of ILS Category III facilities, should be prioritized.
7.5. In some cases however, reductions in aerodrome operating hours may limit the number of working
hours available in a day. In such cases and in other cases when overnight stays are necessary (e.g. to avoid
exceeding flight duty time limitations), particular care should be given to assessing the chosen accommodation to
ensure compliance with pandemic sanitation provisions and minimize the need for external contacts.
8.1. In some cases, in which flight inspection services are supported by cross border flights
(international flight service operations), a number of specific issues have been encountered:
8.2. These issues were largely unexpected, due to the situation being effectively unprecedented, and
were not taken into account in the original inspection schedules. They have required ad-hoc adjustments,
negotiated bilaterally on a case-by-case basis by the entities involved. This has typically led to scheduling delays.
However, notwithstanding the delays, cross border flights have remained largely feasible, if less efficient, thanks
to the commitment of all the parties to the flight inspection requirements.
8.3. In the process, the need for international recognition in pandemic situations of the special status
and needs of flight inspection as a key element of the safety-critical air navigation infrastructure has been
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highlighted. Future work by ICAO will address the development of guidance to States on facilitating cross-border
flight inspection operations in pandemic situations, including development of an advisory health safety protocol to
minimize interaction between crew and ground personnel.
9. Dealing with Potential Periodicity Issues during and after the Pandemic
9.1. The informal survey results suggest that in principle flight inspection should be feasible even in
COVID-19 times, possibly with some restrictions requiring prioritization/rearranging of schedule as discussed
above.
9.2. As a result, periodicity of flight inspection should not be affected substantially, and it should be
possible to limit any potential deviations from the nominal intervals to within the time window of extension
mentioned in Doc 8071, 1.15.15. While Doc 8071 makes no recommendations on the length of such time
windows, the extension window needs to be a reasonable fraction of the nominal interval. For example, some
States use a maximum delay of 1 month for nominal inspection periodicities of 6 months.
9.3. In cases in which nominal periodicity cannot be maintained and the appropriate extension time
window is exceeded (e.g. because of initial set-up issues with cross-border operations, as discussed above), Doc
8071, 1.15.15 offers a choice of actions that may be considered:
allowing for further extension time, after engineering evaluation and/or ground
maintenance reinforcement;
9.4. In choosing among those actions, the responsible entities should take into account the
exceptionality of the current situation, in which aviation has suffered an unprecedented setback and is facing what
can be expected to be a very difficult recovery phase. In this context, the navigation infrastructure must remain
operational both to support the reduced level of traffic during containment measures (including flights meeting
critical pandemic-related needs, such as delivery of medical supplies) and to facilitate the resumption of regular
flight operations. Therefore, in cases where timely flight inspection cannot be ensured, the preferred method for
maintaining safe signals in space is to either take advantage of the (short) periodicity extension window, or, if a
longer extension is required, to grant an extension of periodicity intervals in line with the principles described in
Doc 8071. Furthermore, in cases where flight inspection operations were suspended and periodicity intervals
extended, careful planning should ensure that navigation aid availability of service can be ensured to support the
recovery.
9.5. At the same time, no compromise on operational safety due to non-standard performance of
navigation aids should be accepted. Instead, potential extensions of nominal inspection intervals should be
considered only in the presence of appropriate mitigations maintaining nominal safety levels. To this end, the
provisions of Doc 8071, 1.15 should be taken into account.
9.6. Doc 8071, 1.15.2 recognizes that the suggested periodicities are given as general guidance and
may be modified based on the manufacturer's recommendation or operational experience. Subsequent sections
(1.15.4 – 1.15.6) discuss the factors influencing the inspection intervals, including reliability and stability of
operation of the equipment, extent of ground monitoring, degree of correlation between ground and flight
measurements, changes in the operating environment, manufacturer recommendations, and quality of
maintenance. In many cases, modern ground facilities using current technology provide highly stable and reliable
signals. A point of particular practical interest in the current context is given in 1.15.6 with the observation that
equipment reliability may be adversely affected by too frequently scheduled major maintenance activities, which
should therefore be limited to essential needs if extended periodicity is desired.
9.7. Further sections of Doc 8071, (1.15.7 – 1.15.8 and 1.15.10- 1.15.14) discuss the type of technical
analysis that would need to be performed to extend nominal ground and flight inspection periodicities in a normal
situation. While performing such detailed analysis may be unpractical in a pandemic situation, it should be noted
that the most important item to ensure safe facility performance is the verification of the proper functioning of
executive monitor shutdown capabilities. Special attention should also be given to site safeguarding, especially if
aircraft or other large equipment is being parked near a navigation aid.
9.8. While the guidance in Doc 8071 does not explicitly address the current situation, it does indicate
that, in situations in which maintaining nominal flight inspection periodicity is effectively impossible, case-by-case
extensions can legitimately be considered on an exceptional basis when the relevant enabling factors are present.
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Chapter 2. Planning for Flight Check 2-19
In other words, in the unprecedented situation now being faced by aviation, a reliable system running in a stable
configuration with a history of nominal performance, undergoing regular ground checks consistent with
manufacturer recommendations which indicate normal functioning, and in the absence of anomaly reports, should
normally qualify for an extension of the periodicity interval.
9.9. Special considerations apply to the specific case of Category III ILS. Because of the particularly
demanding requirements, rigorous testing is essential. For that reason, during the current pandemic several
States are prioritizing flight inspection of Category III ILS. Should it nevertheless occur that flight inspection
intervals for a Category III ILS are significantly exceeded, as mentioned above a potential option would be
downgrading of the facility from Category III to Category II or Category I.
Note:
[1] It should be noted that "suggested" is the term used in Doc 8071, as opposed to "required". See for instance
Doc 8071, 1.5.2: "This document contains suggested schedules for each radio navigation aid, which should be
considered (and modified, if necessary), based on the conditions relevant to each State and each site."
[2] See for example EASA "Safety Directive under Article 76(6)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 2018/1139 - SD No.:
2020-01"
2-19
Chapter 3
3.1.1.1 Each FISP should provide evidence of operating to a Flight Inspection Procedure Manual. This
manual provides assurance to the customer that the necessary compliance checks are being carried out as
intended by Doc 8071 and can help with demonstrating compliance. These may vary State to State depending on
the regulatory oversight. Some investigation into other areas of aviation within your State can aid with what could
be acceptable criteria such as:
3.1.1.2 Doc 8071 provides guidance on typical check methods intended for both Ground and Air for each
facility type. The operator should ensure that each listed item is applicable to the inspection type (Commissioning
or Categorization, Site, Periodic). The operator or owner of the facility should verify the FISP is adequate to
satisfy the required parameter check. For comparison, flight test procedures have been also included in Doc
8071 for guidance.
3.1.1.3 Some flight profiles have been included in this document to assist with comparisons. In some
situations, flight validation of the procedure is considered a separate inspection, and therefore it is important to
check if the intended procedure covers flying the approach procedure. This may be of benefit in satisfying the
procedure revalidation criteria.
3.1.1.4 Clear procedures should be provided to cover any navigational, surveillance or communication
equipment that is subject to flight inspections. Inspections should be undertaken with equipment that has
calibration traceability and where the FISP can provide clear evidence of the suitability for individual parameter
assessment. A Test Accuracy Ratio (TAR) of minimum three or better for each parameter measured can provide
a good picture of uncertainties and if the system is fit for purpose.
3.1.1.5 As a provider of service such as DVOR, ILS or other navigational equipment, it is important that the
ANSP can demonstrate the facilities are operating to the respective ICAO standard. For this reason, the closer
the inspecting receivers represents the level of avionics needed in large aircraft, the less risk of finding
inconsistencies between airline approaches and ground check measurements. Hence it is sometimes
advantageous if the equipment has international accreditation such as TSO conformance and other relevant
aircraft software development standards. This is more important for systems that are directly used for the
purpose of Air Navigation verification. The degree of compliance is less for items used as a surveillance tool.
Antenna should be calibrated for field strength through the frequency range and
different orientations. This should also include frequency response and polar patterns.
This data should be available for verification.
The antenna should have TSO compliance for IFR and comply with the local airworthy
certification. Location and installation of the antenna should be in accordance with the
following:
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Asia Pacific Flight Inspection
3-2 Guidance Material
(iii) Kit should be capable of recording the required parameters against the
reference system, typically at a rate greater than 5 samples per second.
(iv) The antenna should also have the appropriate TSO rating as required by
IFR flight.
(v) The kit should be capable of recording the parameters as outlined in Doc
8071 within the accuracy specified.
6-10NM arc profiles, forty degrees either side of the runway centre-line.
3.1.2.3 Typical parameters to be recorded as applicable for the items being checked:
Modulation levels
3.1.2.4 Careful consideration should be made with regard to the procedures used and the purpose of the
check.
3.1.2.5 Depending on the methods employed to ensure monitor integrity, instead of inspecting both the
transmitting and monitoring systems of the ILS in every check, some locations may choose to flight inspect the
transmitting system once in every two inspections.
3.1.2.6 FISP should be able to provide a table of parameters to assist with comparisons against Doc 8071.
3.1.2.7 An example checklist of commissioning and periodic flight inspection items for ILS is tabulated
below for reference.
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Chapter 3. Conducting Flight Inspection 3-3
- = Not required
(1) = Capture/Clearance Wide Alarm applies only for a dual frequency localizer
(2) = Includes runway visual aids
(3) = Alignment, Modulation Depth and Identification Only
Antenna should be calibrated for field strength, and data should be available for
verification. The antenna should have TSO compliance for IFR and comply with the
local airworthy certification.
Aircraft should be fitted with airworthy DVOR equipment approved for IFR flight.
Kit should be capable of recording the required parameters against the reference
system, typically at a rate greater than 5 samples per second.
The antenna should also have the appropriate TSO rating as required by IFR flight.
The kit should be capable of recording the parameters as outlined in Doc 8071, within
the accuracy specified.
3.1.3.2 Typical parameters to be recorded as applicable for the items being checked:
Modulation levels
Modulation index
3.1.3.3 An example checklist of commissioning and periodic flight inspection items for DVOR is tabulated
below for reference.
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3-4 Guidance Material
- = Not required
(1) = An appearance inspection of the VASI/PAPI is to be included if not
otherwise subject to a routine inspection
(2) = Final approach radial(s) only, profile as published
Antenna should be calibrated for field strength and data should be available for
verification. This should consider cables and connectors.
3.1.4.2 A summary of flight test requirements is listed in ICAO Doc 8071. These form a comparison
against the FISP’s procedure manual. If there are missing parameters, further clarification should be made where
in some cases, with acceptable technical and statistical validation, these parameters could be moved to a ground
inspection. This is more common on DME facilities. However, this may not be acceptable by your State’s
regulatory authority and may need to be endorsed by them.
3.1.4.3 Often the DME equipment would be included as part of the ILS or DVOR flight inspections where it
is considered an associated facility.
3.1.4.4 Typically, published DME arcs with the appropriate altitude restrictions would be flown, and in
accordance with any associated procedures.
3.1.4.5 Doc 8071 provides a list of parameters for reference. It is important to consider both ground check
requirements and flight inspection requirements for DME.
3.1.4.6 An example checklist of commissioning and periodic flight inspection items for DME is tabulated
below for reference.
LEGEND: X = To action
- = Not required
(1) = As specified by Navigation Services
(2) = Identification only for second transponder
3.1.5.1 The requirements are very dependent on the engineering assessment requirements and expected
coverage volume.
Altitude;
Range;
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Chapter 3. Conducting Flight Inspection 3-5
3.2.1.1 This is detailed in ICAO Doc 9906, Quality Assurance Manual for Flight Procedure Design. Volume
5 – Validation of Instrument Flight Procedures. The ANSP, FISP and Procedure Design Company need to work
closely to ensure this aspect is covered off adequately.
3.2.2.1 Flight inspection is typically carried out under request from an appropriately trained
Communications/ADS-B or GBAS engineer. The specifics such as location, type of check and flight profiles are
determined by a collaborative approach between all involved disciplines. In some cases, flight inspection is used
to assist in the validation of models for determining coverage.
3.2.3.1 At a minimum, the aircraft should have the capability to undertake the desired procedure validation.
RNP procedures’ validation requirements would normally be specified within the Procedure Design Company
specifications. The Aeronautical Design and Development organization should analyze the results to determine
containment within the specified criteria. Technical assessment perspective is as follows;
Validation of obstacle survey data is recommended during the flight validation process.
The survey data may be affected by waypoint, track and bearing error.
Verification is often done slightly lower than the published profile to remove altimeter
error as often it is advantageous to verify in the worst-case position.
3.3.1.1 As the results obtained by the flight inspection system could potentially be used to defend a service
provider in the event of an incident or accident, the State should clearly specify the standards adopted in the
maintenance and calibration of the systems used for flight inspection purposes. To effectively perform calibration
of a system, the calibration equipment should be typically five (minimum three) times more accurate than the
system equipment. Some considerations should be as follows:
Electromagnetic interference.
Absolute measurements.
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3-6 Guidance Material
Relative measurements.
3.3.1.2 The calibration equipment should also undergo regular periodic checking as part of verification
against traceable international standards that support the TAR required.
3.3.1.3 A dedicated calibration facility operated by the ANSP or ISO/IEC 17025 approved facility is the
preferred means by which to achieve this to ensure a good consistency of standards.
3.3.2 Duplication
3.3.2.1 System duplication is important throughout the calibration process of both the flight inspection
equipment and calibration laboratory used to calibrate the systems. Duplication of equipment can very quickly
identify system drift and prevent unknowingly using a bad receiver to adjust an air critical system incorrectly.
3-6
Chapter 4
4.1.1 After each daily flight inspection, the flight inspector should prepare the flight inspection report. The
formal flight inspection report signed by the responsible captain and flight inspector should be provided after the
flight inspection. The contents of flight inspection report typically include the following items:
Location
Identification
Facility inspected
Type of inspection
Inspected items
Results
NOTAM
Facility status
Remarks
4.1.2 A sample flight inspection report is provided in Attachment A to this Chapter for reference.
4.2.1 Flight inspection records and flight inspection data sheet should be provided by flight inspector.
The contents of flight inspection record typically comprise of the following items:-
Airport name
Date of inspection
Inspector’s name
Flight hours
Run numbers
Transmitter number
4.2.2 A sample Flight Inspection Report is provided in Attachment B to this Chapter for reference.
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Attachment A
Sample Flight Inspection Reports
8.CATELOGY: 9.FREQUENCY:
12.LOCALIZER
TX1 TX2
IDENTIFICATION
MODULATION
ALIGNMENT
COURSE STRUCTURE—Z1/RNG
COURSE STRUCTURE—Z2/RNG
COURSE STRUCTURE—Z3/RNG
COURSE STRUCTURE—Z4/RNG
COURSE STRUCTURE—Z5/RNG
VERTICAL POLARIZATION/RNG
WIDTH/SYMMETRY
MEAN WIDTH(HALF)/SYMMETRY
CLEARANCE 90/DEG
CLEARANCE 150/DEG
MOD.BALANCE(COS/CLR)
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Chapter 4. Reporting of Flight Inspection Results 4-3
USABLE DISTANCE
MONITOR
WIDTH ALARM(NARROW)/SYM
WIDTH ALARM(WIDE)/SYM
ALIGNMENT ALARM(+)
ALIGNMENT ALARM(-)
13.GLIDE SLOPE
TX1 TX2
MODULATION
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4-4 Guidance Material
Sample Flight Inspection Report for Runway Approach Lights and PAPI
3.DATE/DATES OF INSPECTION:
4-4
Chapter 4. Reporting of Flight Inspection Results 4-5
UNRESTRICTED
RESTRICTED
UNUSABLE
12.REMARKS:
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4-6 Guidance Material
1.LOCATION: 2.IDENTIFICATION:
6.ORBIT RESULTS
NO. TX NO. FLIGHT LEVEL(MSL) ORBIT MEAN BEARING ERROR MEAN RANGE
RADIUS(NM) ERROR
1 1
2 2
7.RADIAL RESULTS
RADIAL USE
AZIMUTH
TX NO.
MSL ALTITUDE
DISTANCE FROM
DISTANCE TO
ALIGNMENT ERROR
MAX BEND/RANGE
ROUGHNESS/RANGE
POLARIZATION
TRANSMITTER DIFF
MOD30HZ AM
MOD30HZ FM
MOD9960HZ
MINIMUM SS
4-6
Chapter 4. Reporting of Flight Inspection Results 4-7
INTERFERENCE
8.MONITORS
TX1 TX2
11.GENERAL
STANDBY POWER
VOICE
VOR IDENTIFICATION
DME IDENTIFICATION
4-7
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4-8 Guidance Material
DME ACCURACY
DME COVERAGE
UNRESTRICTED
RESTRICTED
UNUSABLE
14.REMARKS:
4-8
Chapter 4. Reporting of Flight Inspection Results 4-9
Attachment B
Sample Flight Inspection Records
4-9
Appendix 1
1. USEFUL REFERENCE
ICASC - Document on Standards and Recommended Practises for Flight Inspection & Flight Validation
Organisations
http://www.icasc.co/sites/faa/uploads/documents/Library/ICASC/ICASC_SARPs_FI_FV_v14_11102018
_final101.pdf
Reference note from ICAO on the considerations of radio navigation aids flight inspection periodicity
during COVID-19
https://www.icao.int/safety/COVID-19OPS/Pages/ANS.aspx
App-1
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App-2 Guidance Material
Appendix 2
1.1. Flight navigation systems are essential in the world where global air traffic growths continuously.
These systems enable Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) to ensure that aircraft can reach their
destination in due time safely, despite the continuous increase in air traffic density. Indeed, Air Traffic
Management (ATM) companies strongly rely on advanced, unfailing and efficient navigation aid equipment in
order to accomplish their mission in the best conditions.
1.2. Among the numerous requirements from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), flight
navigation systems must be regularly calibrated, inspected and maintained to ensure that all essential navigation
aids for pilots are always working properly. This means that these systems must be tuned and maintained to
radiate the correct signals in the airspace, at any time. To achieve this, a combination of ground and air
inspections is necessary, like the localizer measurements for CAT III ILS (Instrument Landing System).
1.3. ILS is an essential navigation aid to help pilots land their aircraft in low visibility conditions during
IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) flights. In order to maintain the ICAO ILS certification, dynamic measurements need
to be performed by the airport operators / ANSPs, their subcontracted flight inspection organizations or
government agencies. These companies are always looking to improve and streamline inspection processes to
mitigate impacts on airport operations. The regular ILS signal inspection is made in flight, using a manned aircraft.
It requires prior coordination and preparation with various stakeholders, together with ground measurements in
order to optimize the manned flight inspection.
1.4. Both of the above flight and ground operations have their limitations: the manned aircraft is costly,
noisy and environmental unfriendly with large fuel consumption by flight inspection aircraft, while the ground one
is limited in terms of reachable distance and height for the measurement antenna. The ground ILS inspections
are indeed restrained to the runway threshold, since they are performed using masts that generally don’t go
higher than around 25 meters, from the ground. This is where the initiative for developing drones or Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) inspection solution. With improved lifting power, efficiency and reliability, the drone / UAV
could perform inspections in the ILS far field as well as ILS elevation profiles and mini approaches with inspection
to analyze the ILS signals (course alignment, slope angle, alarms, displacement sensitivity, etc.) and to
supplement the ground and manned flight measurements in a more comprehensive mean.
1.5. With the technology of UAV being widely and rapidly developing, more and more flight inspection
institutes came into the research on how to utilize UAVs for flight inspection and many practices have been made.
The UAVs are normally classified in two groups, the drones, which are smaller, normally with multiple rotors; and
Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS), which are heavier and with fixed wings. Some institutes concentrate
on the development of RPAS flight inspection, which is quite similar to the performance of normal flight inspection
aircrafts, but cheaper on cost.
1.6. It should be noted that the technology of UAV/RPAS is still emerging. Major issues that still need to
be addressed including the integration of UAV/RPAS with other manned civil aviation traffic in unsegregated
airspace, while maintaining a similar high level of integrity and reliability that have been developed and matured
over the past decades. These integrity requirements, especially those apply to the operations beyond line of sight,
would be even more significant when operating in Terminal Airspace, with a mixture of UAV/RPAS operations
and regular traffic in densely used airspace. Major challenges in mastering UAV/RPAS autonomous operations
(traffic sensing and avoidance), improving system integrity and reliability, as well as establishing a suitable
certification framework and process, still need to be addressed. Nowadays, UAV/RPAS are already well
positioned to assist Ground and Flight Inspection under a clearly defined and restrained operational environment.
2.1. Application of drone inspection allows improvements on ILS inspection operations by dramatically
reducing the manned aircraft flight inspection frequency and thus decreasing the overall operational cost for
airport operators. Highlights of advantages that could be brought by applying drone in ILS flight inspections are
listed below:
Excellent repeatability
App-2
Appendix App-3
2.2. This major step in ILS maintenance domain for preventive and corrective maintenance is only a
beginning. Thanks to the technology advancement, research institutes are going further in developing the next
generation ATM systems. In addition to ILS flight inspections, new horizon also arise for drone / UAV inspection
on other systems like VOR, DF, PAPI, radars, etc.
2.3. With user-friendly interface, preparing the drone operation could take less than 1 minute. The
operator just has to select the airport and the runway from database and then choose the type of the required
inspection. Once this is done, all the required data (missions, waypoints, distances, altitudes, etc.) is generated
automatically. There is no need to read the procedures to figure out which measurements that are to be made
and where to be made. The operation could be created in platform with simple access from the tablet to view and
download the details. This database of airports, runways and navigation aids can be expanded and updated with
an easy-to-use web interface.
2.4. Once the corresponding operation has been downloaded to the inspection program / application,
the operator could launch the mission and monitor the automated procedures. The operator is guided throughout
the mission. Each mission takes only a few minutes of flight and could be repeated as many times as needed.
Measurements are available and could be viewed in real-time.
2.5. Reports are viewable on-site through the program / application. There is no need to download the
measured data to compile the reports. Reports contain all the relevant measurements and parameters same as
any report generated from generic flight inspection aircraft, in the form of tables and images. Reports, along with
all the measurements, images or videos, are uploaded into a platform for centralized recording, future reference
or additional processing.
3.1. As in 2019, flight inspection organizations or institutes in Belgium, China, Germany, Italy, Russia,
Spain have used drones to assist and provide supplementary tests in flight inspection works. The drones are
normally be used to assist testing of navigation equipment signals, since they are not competent for all flight
inspection missions with limited performance in speed, service ceiling, endurance, crosswind resistance, payload,
etc.
3.2. Belgium
The development of the UAV / drone solution for ILS inspection was started in 2015
and in operation since January 2018 in Belgium and has extended the usage to
Geneva (GVA – LSGG) and Zurich (ZRH – LSZH) airports.
3.3. Germany
In early November 2018, a drone specially developed for carrying out ILS
measurements was employed at Hannover International Airport in Germany during the
commissioning of a new ILS. This entailed generating DDM (Difference of Depth of
Modulation) measurement curves above and below the 3° approach path of the new
09R ILS at 1 km distance from the threshold. The measurement flights were monitored
not only in the control tower of the Hannover airport, but also at the DFS headquarters
in Langen via a drone tracking system. The flights were very successful and form an
important impulse for the rapid operational introduction of measurement drones for
ground measurements of the numerous Instrument Landing Systems installed at
German airports.
4.1. Balancing the factors of performance, cost, operation, maintenance, management, safety, the
fixed-wing RPAS with 8-11 meters wing span is better for flight inspection due to its stability in flying, with
following example performance for reference.
App-3
Asia Pacific Flight Inspection
App-4 Guidance Material
RPAS aircraft
Airborne inspection system including all the receivers, transceivers, camera, position-
fixing, communication equipment and antennas, etc.
Control car
Fully pre-programmed flight for all inspection profiles including take-off and landing
5.1. ILS
App-4
Appendix App-5
All the inspection items including LOC alignment, GP angles, modulations, structures,
clearance, width, coverage and all the alarms could be checked by RPAS.
Alignment alarm of LOC should be checked closer to the antenna on the runway or
using the approach since it would be difficult to get a stable result on the ground of
runway threshold.
RPAS could implement almost all the profiles required for VOR/DME and NDB flight
inspection. The only insufficiency is the high flight level en-route signal check limited by
RPAS performance.
5.3. PAPI
Many institutes and organizations have attempted to check PAPI with camera-equipped
drones. RPAS could do this work better since it could simulate a real approach and get
more realistic results. However, camera stability and the ability to zoom during high
speed approach would be a challenge to RPAS flight inspection researchers.
5.4. Flyability
The lack of human sensing and judgment in actual cockpit and without assistance from
on-board flight instruments, it is difficult to rate the fly-ability for a specific procedure /
equipment by RPAS flight inspection. . It is suggested that fly-ability should be
assessed by manned aircrafts.
Flight inspection recordings and plotting, together with the inspection reports could be
done on ground and transferred to a central data repository, which could then be
analyzed by customers and facilitate set-up of a Big Data system for future
management and reference.
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