CASE STUDY 1: THE LONDON 2012 OLYMPIC STADIUM

1. The Project
The Olympic stadium is a project that is part of an intricate Olympic programme which is
embodied by a compulsory timetable and programme of works that affects the
development of each of the facilities that makes up the Olympic programme.
The delivery of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympics games facilities is regarded
as the biggest and most intricate project embarked on in the UK for a very long time
(MPA, 2006). The site for the Olympics will be Europe's largest regeneration project
(LSC, 2007). The hub essence of the project is the development of facilities for the
games as well as the regeneration of the section of eastern part of the capital city,
London (BBC, 2008a). According to WLB (2006), the development of the Olympic
facilities and their legacy transformation includes (1) five permanent venues
construction namely- Olympic Stadium, Aquatic Centre, Velopark, Handball Arena and
Eton Arena; (2) three temporary sporting venues (Basketball Arena, Hockey and
Fencing Venues); (3) International Broadcast Centre/Main Press Centre construction;
(4) permanent and temporary structures, roads and bridges; (5) site-wide utilities
infrastructure; earthwork and extensive landscaping; and (6) extensive post games
legacy regeneration works.
The Olympic stadium brief was drafted to produce an amazing 80,000-seater stadium
for the hosting of the track and field events as well as the opening and closing
ceremonies for both the Olympic and Paralympics games (WLB, 2006). After the games
it would be ​unmounted or perhaps reduced to 25,000 seats, but still retains the
maintainable and rational capacity of hosting ranges of sporting, educational, cultural
and community events with athletics being its ​core ​use (WLB, 2006a). The knack of
conversion of the stadium from an 80,000-seater venue to a 25,000-seater venue with
55,000 demounted immediately the Olympics ends is regarded as highly innovative and
espouses great forward thinking (BBC, 2008a).
The £496 million Olympic stadium design is motivated by a commitment made during
London's bid to bequeath a world class athletics legacy rather than a succession of
flamboyant edifice as exemplified in previous Olympics (Guardian, 2008). While
considering how to reduce and come up with a reasonable cost and make the
demounting of the stadium (as outlined in the project brief and shown in Fig 5.2a) less
complicated, the majority of the services usually found within the stadium such as
catering, bars, toilets and merchandise ​stalls was designed to be located in ​"pods" ​on
the ​forecourt​ outside the stadium (Guardian, 2008).
According to BBC (2008a) the main features of the design are ​(1) a sunken bowl built
into the ground for the field of play and lower permanent seating, designed to bring
spectators close to the action;(2) 25,000 permanent seats + 55,000 demountable; (3) a
cable-supported roof that will stretch 28 metres the whole way around the stadium,
providing cover for two-thirds of spectators; (3) a fabric curtain will wrap around the
stadium structure, acting as additional protection and shelter for spectators; and (4)
facilities such as catering and merchandising will be grouped into self-contained 'pod'
structures.
The Olympics Minister, Tessa Jowell MP in her words extols the virtues of the concept
and stated that "​Once the Games are over this will then be translated into a stadium that
will not only host grand prix athletics events and other national sport events but will also
serve the communities of the boroughs​" (BBC, 2008a). After completion the stadium will
supplement and complement other grand stadia around London such as Wembley, the
Emirates and the Twickenham stadia (BBC, 2008a).

2. The Client
The Olympic programme involves a complex ​array ​of 5 key stakeholders (MPA, 2006)
as shown in Fig. 5.2c and ​bidding for the Olympic has to be in conformation with the
International Olympic Committees' (IOC) guidelines (Guardian, 2008b). The Olympic
board comprises the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, the Mayor of
London, Lord Moynihan, Lord Coe and Jack Lemley (MPA, 2006). The first two people
mentioned chair the board alternatively while the rest of the board acts in advisory
capacity (MPA, 2006).
The Olympic Board Steering Group (OBSG) comprises of senior officials of the 5 key
stakeholders namely: (1) ODA; (2) the London Organising Committee of the Olympics
Games (LOCOG); (3) the Greater London Authority (GLA); (4) British Olympic
Association (BOA); and (5) the Government (MPA, 2006). Their main functions are to
collectively advise and provide assurance to the board (MPA, 2006). These
stakeholders have differing perceptions as to what constitutes success. While they all
have different responsibilities towards the success of the game, their individual
objectives have to be met. It is worth noting that their varying objectives were well
reconciled ​as per the game. Shared understanding was created among them and
reconciliation of objectives was easy because one of the predominant ​overarching
aims of both the UK government and IOC for the games is sustainability.

IOC parameters stipulate that the construction costs had to be given in prices in the
year of the bidding (2004) rather than the likely overall costs in the hosting year of 2012
(Guardian, 2008b). This led to the £280 million bid book price to the IOC (Guardian,
2008b). It ​augurs that prices had to be going up constantly due the inflation in the UK
construction industry which ran at 6.5% as at late 2007 (Guardian, 2008b). The issue of
the under budgeting which created widespread criticism was partly as a result of the
IOC's strict guidelines of presenting costing within a certain parameters. The inflation in
the construction industry is currently running on close to 7% as against a lower one in
2004 when the estimate was made. The IOC ought to have considered economic terms
and allowed for future prices to be made as in most accounting future predictions. It is
rather surprising and somewhat ​disheartening ​to note that IOC had to wait this long to
change the negative presentation of using bidding year costing as the actual cost of the
stadium to be built in 8 years time!. With prevailing interest rates which tends to force
cost escalation gave the public negative opinion and views with cost rising up to 100%
increase!
The demounting cost of the stadium as well as value added tax (VAT) were not included
in the initial £280 million cost submitted to IOC which meant the venue was always
going to cost more than originally figured (Guardian, 2008b). The brief was hurriedly
made which never tallied with the tactical issues of the whole concept. The author
reckons that there was no comprehensive one at the time! The strategic issues and the
tactical issues were not in unison because of the prevalent atmosphere of uncertainty
surrounding winning the bid. Irrespective of the chosen procurement routes, changes in
brief will definitely lead to changes in cost. Moreover, while offering plausible reasons
for the demounting and being optimistic of a possible buyer of the demountable parts, it
is still seen that finding a possible buyer could be onerous or perhaps impossible.
Designs and technology change rapidly and likewise innovations which tend to lead to
changes in materials. Today's innovation can be tomorrow's error!
The vision and strategic objectives are well spelt out. According to MPA (2006) the
vision is "​To host an inspirational, safe and inclusive Olympic and Paralympics games
and leave a sustainable legacy for London and the UK​".
As shown in the Fig. 5.2c above, the ODA is the public body responsible for the
development and construction of all the new ​venues ​and infrastructure for the Games
and thus represents the clients on the project (MPA, 2006). The ODA was considered to
be a comparatively small organization structure and an industry representative called
the private delivery partner was chosen to take up the balance of the ​mishmash ​of
resources provision and management (MPA, 2006). CLM was however chosen as the
private delivery partner. Though they are knowledgeable and experienced clients, they
still engage external expertise ​to augment their in-house assemblage. This was a
smart approach in the right direction considering the magnitude of the project at hand.
The CLM is a consortium of Laing O'Rourke Plc, Mace Ltd and CH2M Hill and was
appointed to work with the ODA to project manage the venues and infrastructure
programme for the games. Their functions include the integration of design,
construction, commissioning, procurement, scheduling and cost management (MPA,
2006). The consortium signed a performance based contract where profit will be earned
if targets are met thus making it a reward structure linked with delivery.
3. The Analysis of the Procurement Process
ODA launched a procurement policy that highlights both high quality and value for
money as core values for procuring contracts for all the 2012 Games venues and
infrastructural developments (WLB, 2006b). ODA chose a competitive process to
procure an Integrated Design and Construct Team for the design and construction of
the Olympic stadium so as to ensure top quality design, construction and completion,
commissioning, testing and licensing of the stadium for the Games (Creative Match,
2006).
The procurement policy has themes such as security measures, sustainability and
legacy and thus allows all businesses bidding for contracts to be rated according to a
balanced scorecard (WLB, 2006b). The policy is expected to result in an excellent
working relationship with shared values and objectives of sustainability and lasting
legacy with ​the best of businesses and companies found in the UK construction industry
(WLB, 2006b). It is envisaged that the successful bidder must have an innovative
design flair, capacity, experience, technical expertise, financial and economic strength
(Creative Match, 2006). This was successfully achieved through the appointment of the
preferred bidder.
The ODA preferred tendering option was the Electronic tendering (E-tendering), a two
stage competitive process which allows companies to take part in tenders in a secured
and efficient way (WLB, 2006a). ​In consonance with ​the EU guidelines (WLB, 2006a),
7 national and international applications/bids were received to pre-qualify for the
contract (NAO, 2008). Consequently, ​in compliance with ​the public contracts
regulations, ODA sets prequalification criteria which were only met by Sir Robert
McAlpine Ltd submission (WLB, 2006a) and was considered both viable and compliant
with requirements (NAO, 2008). It is however worth noting that competition was not
keen because of the progress of only one successful ​tenderer to the next stage. The
use of two stage tendering is to give chance for competition which never materialised.
To the authors' consternation it is a shame to the industry. The Australian company,
Multiplex, would have provided stiff ​competition to Sir McAlpine had they successfully
executed ​the Wembley national stadium project.
Moreover, negotiations started between ODA and Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd and a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which is legally binding was signed to both
design and build the Olympic stadium (WLB, 2006a). To the dismay of ODA, a particular
bidder ​team was without a construction contractor despite the core requirement for an
integrated design and build bid (NAO, 2008). Again, this is a shame to the UK
construction industry which produces 6% of the nation GDP. The action does not
exemplify professionalism. The integrated design and construction approach will reduce
risk and potential cost ​overruns (Creative Match, 2006). However, as it turned out an
additional £29 million pounds which translates to £525 million is expected to be the
potential final cost! ODA reckons that the lackadaisical interest was as a result of the
risk perception of high profile stadium projects in the UK public sector and also the
advance knowledge that Team Stadium was also a bidder (NAO, 2008). However, due
to the failure of other bidders, ODA entered into a single tender basis with Team
Stadium (NAO, 2008). The failure of Multiplex to produce a successful Wembley
stadium resulted in its non consideration.
The MoU entails the key commercial terms which created the basis of the full integrated
design and build contract and records the terms on which the contractor agreed for
further design development before the signing of full contract (WLB, 2006a).
Considerable design and value engineering was carried out on the project and the
signing of the MoU allowed the development of design which necessitated the early
procurement of commodities such as steel needed to build the Stadium (London 2012,
2007). It is worth ​giving kudos here that one of the averred recommendations of the
government and industry reports is the early supply chain ​assemblage​. The Sir Robert
McAlpine Ltd and their designers are known as the Team Stadium (WLB, 2006a).
According to WLB (2006a) the Team Stadium comprises of: (1) Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd
(Construction contractor); (2) HOK Sport Ltd (Architect and Sport venue designer); and
(3) Buro Happold Ltd (Structural and services engineers) (WLB, 2006a). The three
companies have at different times worked together on different projects namely: (1)
Arsenal stadium (Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd, Buro Happold Ltd and HOK Sport Ltd; (2)
ExCeL Exhibition Centre (Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd and Buro Happold Ltd); and (3) The
Eden project (Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd and Buro Happold Ltd). This demonstrates
integration of supply chain, long term relationship and collaborative workings.
Consequently, a design and build contract was signed with the Team Stadium on 17
March 2008 (NAO, 2008). This demonstrates single point responsibility and adherence
to government directives of 3 effective procurement routes that exemplifies value for
money. A forecast of potential cost of £525 million was envisaged in March 2008 which
reflects the uncompetitiveness of the procurement process and the changes in the
design and scope requirements as a result of roof amendment (NAO, 2008). Therefore,
£525 million stands as the potential final cost and £496 million as the budget (NAO,
2008). Design changes and variations are costly.

4. Lessons Learnt
It is still premature to ascribe failure to the Olympic stadium because of the besmirched
and unpleasant information available to the public. With cost also escalating every
second of the day, this has eroded the mind of the public and cast a bad impression on
the stadium's success. Most messy projects always have time and cost overrun
attached to them which always leads to adversarialism. When a project involves
multiple stakeholders with little time to bid for the Olympics, there are bound to be
hurried assembly of bids which might not be absolutely impeccable. This indicates that
lessons should always be learnt from the limitations of previously held Olympics. The
IOC has taken a wonderful timely reversion of presenting bid costs in the year of hosting
rather than in the year of bidding which is a welcome action.
Smart approaches have been taken to erase the bad impression and re-create public
confidence. The ​timetable has been reset with the project starting three months ahead
of schedule which is hoped to make the stadium available before the scheduled time.
Also, the early assembling of the teams is really helping the progress of the project.
The procurement policy which is in consonance with the ​stakeholders ​objectives of
sustainability and legacy derivation is seen to be a right move in the right direction. It
has resulted in excellent working arrangement of the assembled team. Moreover, it is
worth ​acknowledging that any ​endeavour that is worth doing should be done well. The
Sir McAlpines' past achievement record was the overarching consideration of their
success, while Multiplex shame delivery of the Wembley ​hindered ​them from even
tendering​ for the project.
The design and build can be seen to be the right route for the stadium delivery. While its
limitation of not being so good in quality can be enhanced by close monitoring of project
managers, its time and cost certainty for the stadium delivery is a forte attached to it
which is most important for the stadium delivery.
CASE STUDY 2: THE WEMBLEY NATIONAL STADIUM

1. The Project
There is the worldwide belief that the Wembley national stadium has always had an
exceptional place in the annals of the UK as an event and entertainment centre
(Quintain, 2004). During the late 20th century, the Wembley national stadium hosted
series of major park, theatre and ​funfair ​events such as the 1924 British Empire
Exhibition, the 1934 Empire Games, the 1948 Summer Olympics, the 1996 World Cup
Finals, the 1978 Eurovision Song Contest, the 1996 European Championships and
several other events staged in between (Quintain, 2004).
The stadium was demolished in 2002 and rebuilt in 2006 to a 90,000-seater stadium
(WNSL, 2008). The new £757 million Wembley national stadium (NAO, 2003) is now
almost thrice as large as its former size with its arch positioning 140 metres beyond its
concourse, which is considered enormous enough to roll the London eye
beneath!(Quintain, 2004). Though the arch replaced the twin towers which were the
stadium's symbol, the Wembley national stadium is still considered as an icon just as
the old Wembley stadium (SPG, 2008a). Though controversy trailed the demolition of
the ​iconic ​twin towers, it is worth giving kudos for the eventual settlement of the ​uproar
with the ​impeccable​ choice of the ​arch.
The project was triggered in 1996, by the clamour for a new English national stadium
and consequently after national competition, Sport England overwhelmly selected
Wembley as the preferred site (House of Commons, 2004). Sport England overarching
objective was support the development of an iconic stadium for three major sports
namely football, rugby league and athletics (NAO, 2003).
The principal uses of the Wembley national stadium are football and rugby league
(NAO, 2003). It is mandated that after five years of the stadium's operation, 1% of its
annual ​turnover ​will be donated by WNSL for the delivery to sports education and other
projects (NAO, 2003).

2. The Client
The Football Association (FA) was at the forefront of the stadium project and the
stadium was eventually brought to life by its subsidiary​, WNSL (House of Commons,
2004). WNSL was responsible for its construction and consequently charged with
operating and owning the new stadium (NAO, 2003). The Wembley National Stadium
project was wholly undertaken by private sector organisations and was mostly financed
by private capital (NAO, 2003).
The public sector contribution towards the construction of the stadium was £161 million
with the breakdown of: (1) £120 million from Sport England; (2) £20 million from the
Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS); and (3) £21 million from the London
Development Agency (NAO, 2003). The full contributions of the key ​stakeholders (both
the public and private sectors) and the various uses of the funds are as shown in Fig.
5.3b and 5.3c respectively.
Profits generated from the operation of the Wembley National Stadium are used by the
FA for the benefit of football (NAO, 2003). The issue of track inclusion in the design
created a bit of ​acrimony ​between Sport England (SE) and WNSL (House of
Commons, 2004). However, it was later decided that athletics consideration (track)
should be withdrawn which SE was persuaded to accept ​unwillingly (NAO, 2003). This
act is seen to be unfair. As one of the key stakeholders a meeting ought to be called
and sought the view of SE before taking any decision. Perhaps value management
exercise ought to have been carried out as discussed in one of the industry report and
all the stakeholders especially SE would have a shared understanding as to why the
track is to be removed.

3. The Analysis of the Procurement Process

On 14th July 1999, ​WNSL threw open ​bids submission for contractors for the Wembley
national stadium (Building, 2008). Mowlem, HBG, Sir Robert McAlpine and
Bovis/Multiplex were the companies that responded to the invitation (Building, 2008). In
early 2002, Cyril Sweett was hired by WNSL as the independent consultants and the
firm consequently gave Multiplex contract a clean sheet as providing value for money
(SPG, 2008a). Initially, Multiplex was agreed as the preferred contractor on a
guaranteed maximum price (GMP) design and build contract of £326.5m (which does
not include design fees) with a 31/4-year programme to construct the Wembley stadium
(Building, 2008). The Wembley National Stadium project was completed in 2007 at an
amazingly high cost of £757 million (House of Commons, 2004) with the stadium
eventually gulping £445 million (NAO, 2003). The project ​overran​ on time and cost.
The design of the stadium was carried out by architects Foster and Partners and HOK
Sport while ​Sir Norman Foster designed the arch and the roof structure (SPG, 2008a).
According to Building (2008) the ​tendering process started with the appointment of
Bovis/Multiplex consortium in 2000 as the preferred contractor which was later
dissolved and Multiplex was appointed. Bovis opted out when it ​envisaged that the
agreed price was not tenable or visible (Building, 2008). This was the genesis of the
stadium's problem. As a deeply rooted company in the UK, Bovis understood very
clearly that construction was not visible at that cost. However, owing to the ​plausible
smart play of WNSL and the ubiquities of mischief associated with the design and
construct route where contractors bid low in order to wait for claims and variations to
improve their profit. WNSL fell for the trap and an agreement was signed. But this
turned out to be adversarial leading to numerous accusations and court cases.
Moreover, Tropus was first appointed as Wembley project manager whose contract ran
out and was consequently replaced by Symonds (Building, 2008).
Due to the clamour in 1996 for a national stadium, Wembley was consequently chosen
as the preferred site (House of Commons, 2004). Two years later, SE awarded £120
million towards the development of the project (House of Commons, 2004). It was
however envisaged in 1998 that the construction cost would be in the region of £320
million and to be completed within 4 years (House of Commons, 2004).
However, in 2000 the project suffered financial ​setbacks and a request for additional
public fund was initiated by the FA in 2001, but the Secretary of State for Department
for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) declined and asked Mr Patrick Carter to review
the project (House of Commons, 2004). A ​staggering sum of £1.6 million was
squandered in reviewing the project (House of Commons, 2004). From the author's
viewpoint, spending such an amount of money in reviewing does not exemplify value for
money. A report from Tropus should have been taken seriously and re-tendering
ordered instead of spending the money on reviewing and coming out with little effective
report.
It was noted during the course of the review, that there was lapses on the project by
WNSL and DCMS was also ​cognisant of concerns about features of the management
such as the procurement process which resulted in the appointment of Multiplex as the
main contractor to build the stadium (House of Commons, 2004).
This concern led to its investigation by Mr David James CBE ​stemming from the
request of the then Chairman of Wembley National Stadium Limited (House of
Commons, 2004). While no speck of evidence of impropriety was found, serious
concerns were raised as to whether equal opportunity was granted to all the bidders
(House of Commons, 2004). A conclusion was however reached that the procurement
process did not meet the highest standards expected in the industry (House of
Commons, 2004). It was noted that a comprehensive formal procurement process was
not enacted by WNSL and it was also seen that for the award of the same contract, they
ran two separate corresponding tendering processes on dissimilar terms (House of
Commons, 2004). To ​buttress the non enforcement of level playing ground, it was also
noted that they had dialogue with Multiplex before the commencement of the formal
procurement process (House of Commons, 2004). As a client of the construction
industry, the action is seen to be against best practice. As an industry seen to be
besmirched with image problems, a favourable and fair level playing ground is
expected to be provided by the construction client for active involvement of all and
sundry.
It was therefore concluded by the then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport
that the availability of further public funding would be ​hinged on meeting series of tests
by both the FA and WNSL (House of Commons, 2004). However, these tests were later
met and the project was considered commendable of further support (House of
Commons, 2004).O
DCMS thought of re-tendering the construction contract as a condition of further support
was discarded on the ground that no likelihood of savings to the ​public purse would be
achieved (House of Commons, 2004). This was a wise decision considering that £1.6
million has been expended on review and more time might be wasted in re-tendering.
Two reports were published by Tropus and James and they both concluded that WNSL
never followed best practice thereby being bereft of best value (Building, 2008). It was
however argued that players in the UK industry were not given ample chance to
compete for the project (Building, 2008).
The arch ​construction started in 2003 and its fabrication was done on-site using steel
modules manufactured by steel subcontractor Cleveland Bridge. However,
irreconcilable differences erupted between Cleveland Bridge and Multiplex and the
former had to leave the project and was replaced by another steel subcontractor called
Hollandia (SPG, 2008a). Cleveland Bridge was unsure if they would be paid for the
materials to be employed (SPG, 2008a). This later resulted into a court case (SPG,
2008a). This reinforced the issue of long term relationships and effective supply chain
integration. The author ​reckons that the Bovis/Multiplex consortium would have
provided strong supply chain ties needed for success. Bovis is a deeply rooted
company that understands the UK industry and has a strong supply chain leaning unlike
the Australian company. While accepting the EU directives, it is also more important to
look at the antecedence of magnitude of projects executed by the company in the
country under consideration. If there had been strong supply chain ties between
Multiplex and its steel sub-contractor, the issue of distrust of payment would never have
arisen.

4. Lessons Learnt
The design and build and its various variants are expected to produce cost and time
certainty which were never on the Wembley stadium. The novated design and build
which was employed on the case study was expected to allow the client the opportunity
to have great input into the design before novating the designer to the contractor after
output specification would have been fully specified. From the case study, the GMP
novated Design and Build contract was hurriedly assembled by WNSL without fully
establishing its requirement. This is considered inappropriate and can lead to
adversarialism​. Consequently, the project was characterised with numerous court
cases.
It was also noted that the project was full of adversarial relationships both on the sides
of the client and contractor and the contractor and subcontractor. All the ​benchmark
reports ​advocated for long term relationships and effective supply chain management.
Knowledge of UK construction industry terrain is very essential which as noted in the
case study was not quite and fully understood by Multiplex. WNSL too never made
matters easy by allowing Bovis to walk out of the process and rushing into agreement
with only the Australian company. As noted in the case study, Multiplex is partially or
perhaps bereft of the ​modus operandi of the UK construction industry and the author
reckons that was why multiplex entered into a consortium with Bovis. However, WNSL
action and consideration of multiplex could be seen to be based on price alone and
perhaps very low cost consideration which is not in consonance with best practise.
Strong and effective supply chain was ​devoid in the project leading to massive ​rift
between the supply chain due to lack of long term relationship.
As noted in case study one of the Olympic stadiums, Multiplex image has been
besmirched by its unsuccessful execution of the Wembley national stadium. It can be
concluded that for a construction company's continued existence and progress in the
volatile UK construction industry, successful and unsuccessful past project execution
will surely play a significant role in its successful bidding for the project.
Lastly, the project was seen to lack effective stakeholders management. Due
consideration needs to be given to all stakeholders before changing any aspect of the
project. Effective and timely consideration needs to be the watchword.

CASE STUDY 3: THE ARSENAL EMIRATES STADIUM

1. The Project
The Emirates stadium is a 60,000-seater stadium constructed in Ashburton Grove as a
replacement for the Highbury stadium which was the former ground (SPG, 2008b). The
Emirates stadium is the home of premier league Football Club called Arsenal.
Announcement was made in late 2004 that the new stadium would be known as the
Emirates stadium after a sponsorship deal of £100 million was struck with Emirates
Airline (SPG, 2008b). The stadium will be known as Emirates stadium for at least for the
first 15 years of the stadium's operations (SPG, 2008b). Commencing from 2006/07
football season, payments for an 8 year shirt sponsorship was also agreed on which
was included in the £100 million deal (SPG, 2008b).
Ashburton Grove is very close to Highbury (SPG, 2008b). Several options were looked
at including Wembley stadium before settling for Ashburton Grove which it has long
been known with for an ​upward of 90 years (SPG, 2008b; Arsenal, 2008). This is in line
with the client's objective of maintaining close ties with the area (SPG, 2008b).
Moreover, sustainability was a special consideration in its design and in its housing
development, BREEAM Eco Homes standards were its ​overarching yardstick (SPG,
2008b). This is seen to be in line with the industry benchmark report which recommends
sustainability. The project also includes housing development and a waste recycling
centre (SPG, 2008b).

2. The Client
The construction of a £390 million modern stadium together with a new waste recycling
centre and the ​impeccable business relocation was the overarching aim of Arsenal
football club (Arsenal, 2008).
For the successful delivery of the project, a subsidiary of Arsenal Holdings plc called
Ashburton Properties was formed and a £260 million senior loan facility was secured
from a banking group that financed stadium facilities (SPG, 2008b).
The banking group is made up of: (1) the Royal Bank of Scotland PLC; (2) Espirito
Santo Investment; (3) The Bank of Ireland; (4) Allied Irish Banks PLC; (5) CIT Group
Structured Finance (UK) Limited; and (6) HSH Nordbank AG (SPG, 2008b). The
remaining funds for the execution of the project came from Arsenal Football Club
through funds from Granada, Nike and the cash released from the sale of ​surplus land
assets in connection with the stadium site for new housing development (SPG, 2008b).
Delaware North ​catering firm financed the stadium's catering facilities through £15
million with the exclusive right to be in charge of the stadium's catering operation (SPG,
2008b). While there were a bit of ​hitches in planning and funding arrangement, the
funding was still well secured ahead of time with well defined and established clients
objectives. This make up exemplifies a perfect privately run project with well defined
objectives as shall be seen in the subsequent section.

3. The Analysis of the Procurement Process

In 2001, the stadium scheme design was unveiled ​and Sir ​Robert McAlpines' bid was
successful and accepted as the main contractor for the stadium the following year
(Liddell, 2006). Two stage tendering was employed for the tendering process and
initially both ​lump sum and fixed percentage for the contractor's preliminaries and the
latter for profit and ​overheads was used (Liddell, 2006). However, when an agreement
was reached on works packages ​allowances​, a conversion was consequently made to
a GMP (Liddell, 2006). This was a smart decision on the part of the contractor to have
certainty on cost before getting involved with the GMP because lots of work package
contracts are involved for the stadium as well as the waste recycling centre (Liddell,
2006). As a result, all the work package contractors were involved in the design to
improve ​buildability (Liddell, 2006). The stadium was delivered within budget and two
weeks before deadline (Liddell, 2006). Unlike in the Wembley case of Multiplex, Sir
McAlpines' experience of the UK construction industry is vast. The contractor fully
understands what it takes to deliver a successful project. The contractor knows where
adversarial relationships can erupt and took smart approaches in dealing with them
before agreeing on the GMP contract. The effective use of two stage tendering will
always lead to value for me for the client and allows the contractor to fully share its
understanding of what is value to the client.
In the words of the Sir ​Robert McAlpines' director Vince Corrigan and project manager
Andrew Veness, the project faced several challenges such as: (1) Occupation of the site
by local businesses; (2) Railway lines are sideways of the site; (3) delivery must be
before the commencement of the 2006/07 season; and (4) interruption of works for 9
month for sorting out of planning and funding issues (Exceptional Performers, 2007).
However, against all these ​odds the project was successfully delivered by the
contractor. As noted in the case study below, early engagement of contractors and an
effective and selective supply chain are key to success.
Moreover, several reasons were adduced for the successful delivery of the stadium but
the most overarching and notable of the reasons was the effective and selective supply
chain created by the main contractor (Exceptional Performer, 2007). It was noted that
the early engagement of sub-contractors that Sir ​Robert McAlpine have established a
long term relationship with was the magic (Exceptional Performer, 2007). This was an
epitome of trust, communication and empowerment (Exceptional Performer, 2007). The
project was seen to be ​devoid of formal dispute as a result of established trust from the
inception of the project (Exceptional Performer, 2007). The effective process of contract,
programming and planning systems and processes, prompt meetings and the excellent
client attitude were the magic behind the successful delivery of the project (Exceptional
Performer, 2007). The stadium was delivered in conjunction with HOK sport and Buro
Happold (Arsenal, 2008). Trust plays a massive role in the successful delivery of a
project. In the case study of Wembley national stadium, Multiplex and its steel
subcontractor never established trust. There was no long term relationship between the
two to provide the trust needed. And as noted this led to various court cases. This case
study epitomizes best practice in action. The built stadium came out with top quality and
devoid of time and cost overruns. It was noted that effectively delivering a project will
certainly increase the chance of being ranked and consequently securing more projects.
This was well visible in the ODA consideration of Sir McAlpines' declaration as the best
contractor to deliver the Olympics stadium. While there was ​uproar against the
successful delivery of the Olympic stadium, the choice of Sir McAlpines has ​doused the
apprehension.

4. Lessons Learnt
This case study has shown that "​good wine needs no bush​". It is what is sown that
would surely be reaped. The client took a smart approach in setting its objectives and
output specification before involving the main contractor. And equally, the main
contractor took smart approaches in its dealing with the client and the sub-contractor.
Employing a contractor that understands the UK construction industry ​terrain plays a
long way in the successful delivery of projects. The possession of an effective supply
chain and established long term relationship also played a significant role in the
successful delivery of the stadium. Trust which is seen to be a ​scarce ​commodity in
the UK construction industry was also a magic in the Emirates stadium successful
delivery. This case study has therefore demonstrated that trust should not be a scarce
commodity if a client can specify its output specification and objectives at the outset of
the project before engaging the main contractor. Equally, engaging a contractor with UK
strong ties is very essential. Effective and selective supply chains advocated by all the
government and industry's benchmark reports can be seen to be justifiable from this
case study.

5. CONCLUSIONS
Best and bad practices have been ​showcased by the case studies analysed. The case
studies were diligently chosen to highlight the extent to which construction projects
outcomes can be influenced by the construction clients irrespective of the chosen
procurement route. As ​highlighted ​in the case studies, each of the case studies have
different stakeholders make up. The Olympic stadium stakeholders were seen to be
public sector construction clients that even ​transcends beyond a particular country to a
body standing for the whole world. The Wembley stadium stakeholders on the other
hand, were seen to be a mishmash of both the private and public sector clients.
However, the Emirates stadium stakeholders were predominantly private sector clients.
While all the case studies employed the same procurement route with different variants
to allow for more clients' involvement and input into design, they still all came out with
different outcomes. The case studies have shown to some extent that it is not the
chosen routes that are unfavourable to the projects but the leader and the parties
involved that to a large extent determine the successful delivery of the projects. Though
the Olympic stadium is still ongoing, it can be seen that the clients involved have really
responded to the call of the industry despite the shaky start of the project. Sustainability,
value for money procurement route, use of project managers to shore up knowledge
base and early involvement of integrated supply chain were noticeable in the Olympic
stadium project. However, the Wembley stadium was seen to ​epitomise bad practice.
The project was fraught with adversarialism, acceptance of low cost tendering, partiality
in tendering and non effective supply chain integration. On the other hand, the Emirates
stadium was an impeccable example of best practice. Sustainability, collaborative
working, effective and selective integrated supply chain management and early
contractor involvement were the project ingredients. The project was efficiently
executed, devoid of adversarialism and came out within budget and even before the
agreed time.
Consequently, it can be concluded that the success of a construction project lies to a
greater extent in the hands of the construction clients. For effective adoption of a
procurement route to provide integrated working and successful outcome, the
construction client attitude towards contractor selection and contractor's freedom of
presenting what is good practice are ​paramount. Design and build procurement route is
an impeccable and wonderful option that offers value for money as ​espoused by the
benchmark report but depends largely on how it is implemented..