Criminal Procedure Case Digest

Venue in Criminal Cases is Jurisdictional

Isip v. People
GR No. 170298 June 26, 2007

Facts:Complainant Leonardo Jose came to know petitioner spouses when they

were introduced by his father Nemesio. Nemesio and the Isips were engaged in the
buy and sell of pledged and unredeemed jewelry pawned by gambling habitués.
Since there business is expanding, they needed a capitalist, wherein they offered
to complainant their plan. Complainant agreed, so he gave pieces of jewelries for
the Isips to sell at a commission basis. The said jewelries were given by
complainant in Cavite.

After sometimes, the Isips issued checks which are not sufficiently funded.
Complainant then filed a case of estafa against the Isips.

The RTC of Cavite ruled against the Isips. The Isips contest the decision. The
alleged that the transaction was done in Manila and not in Cavite since respondent
is a resident of Manila. The case should then be filed in Manila. The CA affirmed
the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC Cavite has jurisdiction over case.

HELD:
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is
jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental
rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have
taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or
to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case
is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the
evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that
the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had
sufficiently shown that the transaction took place in his ancestral home in Cavite
City when he was on approved leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs.
Since it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioner’s task to
prove otherwise, for it is his claim that the transaction involved was entered into in
Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his
allegations applies.
 Landbank of the Philippines v. Belista
GR No.164631 June 26, 2009

Facts: Spouses Pablo Ralla and Carmen Munoz Ralla had donated their eight (8)
parcels of lot located in Ligao, Albay to their daughter, Rene RallaBelista, the
herein private respondent.

The eight (8) parcels of lot were placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR, for brevity) under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228). Consequently,
private respondent claimed payment of just compensation over said agricultural
lands.

It further appears that the DAR's evaluation of the subject farms was only
₱227,582.58, while petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP, for brevity)
assessed the same at ₱317,259.31.

Believing that her lots were grossly underestimated, private respondent, on 11

November 2002, filed a Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation
against petitioning bank before the DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for Region V.
Land Bank Legaspi City is hereby ordered to pay herein petitioner.

Aggrieved, Landbank filed an original Petition for Determination of Just

Compensation at the same sala of the RTC. The court a quo motupropio dismissed
the case.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has the jurisdiction over the case.
Held: Yes, RTC has jurisdiction. In a number of cases, the Court has upheld the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as SAC, over all petitions for
determination of just compensation to landowners in accordance with Section 57 of
RA No. 6657.

Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under
this Act.

In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is

vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for
the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is
subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases
for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial
function.

Thus, the trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the
determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.
 People v. Taroy
GR No. 192466 September 7, 2011

Facts: AlejoTaroy y Tarnate (Taroy) was charged with two counts of rape before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet. DES was the eldest
daughter of MILA by her first marriage. MILA married Taroy in 1997 upon the death
of her first husband. The couple lived with MILA’s children in Pucsusan Barangay,
Itogon, Benguet, at the boundary of Baguio City. It took place at their house when
Des was 10 years old.

The RTC found Taroy guilty. He challenged the Benguet RTC’s jurisdiction over the
crimes charged, he having testified that their residence when the alleged offenses
took place was in Pucsusan Barangay, Baguio City. The RTC held, however, that
Taroy’s testimony that their residence was in Baguio City did not strip the court of
its jurisdiction since he waived the jurisdictional requirement.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, has jurisdiction to hear
and decide the cases of rape against Taroy.

Held: Yes, the Supreme Court held that Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It
can neither be waived nor subjected to stipulation. The right venue must exist as a
matter of law. Thus, for territorial jurisdiction to attach, the criminal action must be
instituted and tried in the proper court of the municipality, city, or province where
the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place.

The Informations filed with the RTC of La Trinidad state that the crimes were
committed in the victim and the offender’s house in City Limit, Tuding, Municipality
of Itogon, Province of Benguet. This allegation conferred territorial jurisdiction over
the subject offenses on the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. The testimonies of MILA
and DES as well as the affidavit of arrest point to this fact. Clearly, Taroy’s
uncorroborated assertion that the subject offenses took place in Baguio City is not
entitled to belief. Besides, he admitted during the pre-trial in the case that it was the
RTC of La Trinidad that had jurisdiction to hear the case. Taken altogether, that
RTC’s jurisdiction to hear the case is beyond dispute.
 Bonifacio et al., vs RTC Makati and Jessie John Gimenez
GR No 184800 May 5, 2010

Facts: Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez[3] (Gimenez) filed on behalf of

the Yuchengco Family and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan),[4] a
criminal complaint, for thirteen (13) counts of libelunder Article 355 against officers,
trustees, and members of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI).
PEPCI was aplanholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) owned by the theYuchengco
family. PPI refused to honor its obligations to PEPCI which the latter created and
maintained different websites which tend to be the forum for redress by the
planholders. These websites are easily accessible to the public or by anyone
logged on to the internet. Gimenez alleged that upon accessing such websites by
the PEPCI in Makati, he was appalled to read numerous articles, maliciously and
recklessly caused to be published by [the accused] containing highly derogatory
statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family.
The Makati City Prosecutor’s Office find probable cause and charge them with libel.
Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information[25] which, they alleged, still
failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to allege that
the libelous articles were “printed and first published” by the accused in Makati;
and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the
offended party accessedthe internet-published article.

Issue: Whether or not venue ofinternet-published article libel is where the offended
party accessed the libellous article.

Held: No, in this situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with
precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published.

It is clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual
is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged
defamatory article was printed and first published. The Information in the present
case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the
offending article “was first published and accessed by the private complainant in
Makati City.” In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the
requisite allegation of printing and first publication.

Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted to prevent the accused from harrasment. It
lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the
offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by
means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal
courts.

Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the
indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or
far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an
accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory
material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of
determining the situsof its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez’s
premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners’ website
in Makati with “printing and first publication” would spawn the very ills that the
amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly
requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where
the website’s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein
could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant
may have allegedly accessed the offending website.
 Union Bank vs. People
G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012

Facts: Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum
Shopping. The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2)
complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin. The first complaint
filed before the RTC of Pasay. The second complaint was filed to the MeTC, Pasay
City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification
against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating
Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against
Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other
action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency. Tomas
filed a Motion to Quash, she argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is
the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted
and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case.

Issue:Whether or not the criminal case against the Petitioner was instituted in the
proper venue.

Held:Yes, Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried
in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential ingredients occurred. The above provision should be read in
light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which states: Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is
sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed
or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of
the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.Both
provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not
only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its
essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of
jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Jurisdiction to issue Hold Departure Orders

Mondejar vs. Buban

A.M No. MTJ-01-1349 July 12, 2001

Facts:Complainant Bernadette Mondejar charged Judge Marino S. Buban, MTCC,

Tacloban City, with grossignorance of the law, partiality, serious irregularity and
grave misconduct relative to Criminal Case No. 98-07-CR-133 entitled "People of
the Philippines v. Bernadette Mondejar and Arlette Mondejar" for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.She alleged that respondent judge issued a "hold departure
order" against her on October 23, 1998 inviolation of Supreme Court Circular No.
39-97 which provides that "hold departure orders" shall beissued ONLY in
CRIMINAL CASES within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.

She further alleged that respondent judge did not give her an opportunity to be
heard before issuing the questioned order. When required to comment on the
matter, respondent judge admitted having issued said order because he was not
aware of the Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97. He alleged that he was not
furnished a copy of the circular and managed to secure a copy only after he
instructed his legal researcher to get one from the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Tacloban City. Accordingly, on April 14, 1997, he issued an order
lifting and setting aside the hold departure order dated October 23, 1998. As
regards the issue of denial of due process, respondent judge averred that
complainant and her counsel were duly notified of the scheduled hearing but
neither appeared on said date.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge erred in issuing the assailed “hold
departure order”.

Held: YES, the respondent judge erred. It was not within his jurisdiction to issue a
hold departure order as an MtCC judge because the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction
of issuing hold departure orders for criminal cases.

Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said
circular specifically provides that "hold-departure orders shall be issued only in
criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts." Clearly
then, criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall
within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on the part of respondent judge
to have issued one in the instant case.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be "faithful to
the law and maintain professional competence." The Court, in exercising
administrative supervision of all lower courts, has not been remised in reminding
the members of the bench to exert due diligence in keeping abreast with the
development in law and jurisprudence. Besides, Circular No. 39-97 is not a new
circular. It was circularized in 1997 and violation of which has been accordingly
dealt with in numerous cases before the Court. Herein judge, therefore, cannot be
excused for his infraction. Judges should always be vigilant in their quest for new
developments in the law so they could discharge their duties and functions with
zeal and fervor.
 Mupas vs. Espanol
A.M No. RTJ-04-1850 July 14, 2004

Facts:In a letter-complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator, Judge
Lorinda T. Mupas of the Municipal Trial Court of Dasmariñas, Cavite, charges
Judge Dolores L. Español, Regional Trial Court (Branch 90) of Dasmariñas, Cavite,
in her capacity as Executive Judge, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Usurpation of Authority.

Leonora Bituon, et. al., filed three separate criminal complaints for syndicated
estafa against Eva Malihan, et. al., before the MTC, acting upon a motion of private
complainants,JudgeMupas conducted a preliminary investigation.On the same day,
she issued a warrant of arrest against the accused and recommended no bail for
their provisional liberty. Private complainants filed a motion to transfer accused Eva
Malihan from the municipal jail to the provincial jail. On August 29, 2001,
complainant Judge required the Chief of Police of Dasmariñas, Cavite to comment
on the motion to transfer within five days from receipt of the order. Meanwhile, on
August 31, 2001, accused Eva Malihan filed an urgent petition for bail. On
September 3, 2001, the private complainants filed a supplemental pleading to
support their previous motion to transfer accused Eva Malihan. Invoking that the
Executive Judge has authority to supervise all detainees in the municipal jail of
Dasmariñas, Cavite under Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the private complainants sent copies of the motion to transfer and
supplemental pleading to respondent. On September 4, 2001, complainant Judge
required the private complainants in the criminal case to file their comment or
opposition to the petition for bail. However, on that same day, respondent issued
two orders in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-1485 to 01-1487. The first
Order directed the transfer of the accused Eva Malihan from the Municipal Jail to
the Provincial Jail,while the second Order directed the Commissioner on
Immigration and Deportation to hold and prevent the departure from the Philippines
of the accused Eva Malihan while the cases are pending.

Complainant Judge alleges that respondent's act of issuing said assailed orders,
despite the fact that the cases are pending with the MTC, constitutes gross
ignorance of the law and usurpation of authority.

Issue: Whether or not Respondent Judge Espanol’s action constitutes gross

ignorance of the law and usurpation of power.
Held: Yes, the executive judge has not been given any authority to interfere with
the transfer of detainees in cases handled by other judges, be it of the first or
second level; nor to grant hold-departure orders in cases not assigned to her sala.

The powers of an executive judge relate only to those necessary or incidental to

the performance of his/her functions in relation to court administration.

At the time of the issuance of the hold-departure order, the criminal cases were
only in the preliminary investigation stage in the MTC to determine whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that accused Eva Malihan is guilty of the offense
charged and should be held for trial. Complainant Judge's findings had not yet
been elevated to and reviewed by the provincial prosecutor. Respondent'sissuance
of the hold-departure order was therefore premature and clearly contravenes the
mandate of Circular No. 39-97 proscribing the precipitate and indiscriminate
issuance of hold-departure orders. All told, respondent's claim of good intention
finds no convincing justification.
Jurisdiction determined by the allegations of the Complaint

Foz vs. People

GR No. 167764 October 9, 2009

Facts: Petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr and Danny Fajardo were charged with the crime
of libel. Upon arraignment, they were assisted by counsel de parte and pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. Trial thereafter ensued, finding both of them guilty.
Petitioners moved for recon but was denied. Dissatisfied, they appealed to CA who
affirmed in toto the RTC decision. They then filed a motion for recon which CA
denied. In their petition to the SC, petitioners raise for the first time the issue that
the information charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest
jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City had jurisdiction over the offense of libel
as charged.

Held: SC ruled on the negative. The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first
time the issue of the RTC’s jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their Reply
filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Article 360 of the

Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific
rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation: The criminal action and civil
action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter
shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any
of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense:

The allegations in the Information that “Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region” only showed
that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did
not establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by
the allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue
requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo
City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of
the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its
filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

People vs. Sandiganbayan

GR No. 167304 August 25, 2009

Facts: Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo

City, Province of Cebu at thetime pertinent to this case. She was able to get hold of
a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00under a disbursement voucher in
order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and
Environmental Protection, which she headed. After almost two years since she
obtained thesaid cash advance, no liquidation was made. As such, Toledo City
Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued ademand letter to respondent Amante asking the
latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance withinseventy‐two hours from receipt
of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, submitted aninvestigation
report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB‐Visayas), with
therecommendation that respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain
whether appropriatecharges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as TheAuditing Code of the Philippines.
Thereafter, the OMB‐Visayas, issued a Resolution recommending thefiling of an
Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The
Office of theSpecial Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB‐Visayas'
Resolution, prepared a memorandum findingprobable cause to indict respondent
Amante. The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan
accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445. The case was
raffled to the ThirdDivision of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the
said court a MOTION TO DEFERARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR
REINVESTIGATION and was opposed by The OSP. The Sandiganbayan,in its
Resolution dismissed the case against Amante. Hence, the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary

Grade 26 who was chargedwith violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines
falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Held:Yes. The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A.No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which
was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.8249. The alleged
commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December
19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of
a court to try acriminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
[15] action, not at the time of thecommission of the offense. The exception
contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where itexpressly provides that to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations
of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised PenalCode is not applicable in the present case as the offense
involved herein is a violation of The AuditingCode of the Philippines.
 Serrana vs. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 162059 January 22, 2008

Facts: Petitioner was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu

was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada as a student regent of UP.
petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in
UP Diliman. petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc.
(OSRFI). One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
Annex. President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the
OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the
funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President. The renovation
of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with
the Office of the Ombudsman who after due investigation, found probable cause to
indict petitioner and her brother for estafa in the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan
does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her
capacity as UP student regent, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa that It
only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes
Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa
falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is
not within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Petitioner likewise posited that as a
student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her
peers, she further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies
or funds. The Ombudsman opposed the motion. The Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner’s motion for lack of merit. The Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was also denied with finality, hence this case.

Issue:Whether the Sandiganbayan has Jurisdiction over the Petitioner who is not
Salary Grade 27, not compensated and merely represented her peers in the Board
of Regent, and the crime committed was not within the its Jurisdiction.

Held: Yes, the rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should
receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.
Interpretatiotalis in ambiguis semper fiendaest, uteviteturinconveniens et
absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office.
We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses
included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other
felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the
offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to
their office.

It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The court held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only
officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but
who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there
by express provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested
the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board
of trustees of a non-stock corporation by express mandate of law, petitioner is,
indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Esquivel vs. Ombudsman

GR No. 137237 September 17, 2002

Facts: Police officers Eduardo and Catacutan charged herein petitioners Antonio
Prospero Esquivel, municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony "Eboy"
Esquivel, barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal arrest,
arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats. According
to Eduardo, he was about to eat lunch at his parents’ house at Nueva Ecija, when
petitioners arrived who disarmed him of his Cal. 45 service pistol. They then forced
him to board petitioners’ vehicle and brought him to the Jaen Municipal Hall. On the
way to the town hall, Mayor Esquivel mauled him with the use of a firearm and
threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel pointed a gun at PO2 Eduardo and said,
"Putang-inamo, papatayinkita, aaksidentihinkitadito, bakitmoakokinakalaban!"
Mayor Esquivel then ordered SPO1 Espiritu to kill him, saying "Patayinmonaiyan at
gawan ng senaryo at report." He was struck with a handgun and released. Prior to
his release, however, he was forced to sign a statement in the police blotter that he
was in good physical condition.

PO2 Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated
and threatened because of jueteng and tupada. He said the mayor believed he was
among the law enforcers who raided a jueteng den in Jaen that same day. He
surmised that the mayor disliked the fact that he arrested members of crime
syndicates with connections to the mayor.

Thereafter, separate information docketed as Criminal Case No. 24777 for less
serious physical injuries against Mayor Esquivel and Mark Anthony "Eboy"
Esquivel, and Criminal Case No. 24778 for grave threats against petitioner mayor,
were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners submit that Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over the offenses filed against petitioners, and thus committed GAD
when it assumed jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has Jurisdiction.

Held: Yes. Petitioners theorize that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
their persons as they hold positions excluded in Republic Act No. 7975. As the
positions of municipal mayors and barangay captains are not mentioned therein,
they claim they are not covered by said law under the principle of
expressiouniusestexclusioalterius.

Petitioners’ claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, Binay vs.
Sandiganbayan, and Layus vs. Sandiganbayan, we already held that municipal
mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor
can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a
municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as
amended by R.A. No. 8249, provides that it is only in cases where "none of the
accused (underscoring supplied) are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade ‘27’ or higher"36 that "exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended."37 Note that
under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade of 27.
Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of
Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan
committed no grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal
case, as well as over Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, the
writ of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners’ favor.

Dismissal of the complaint because of inordinate delay

Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. L-72335-39. March 21, 1988
159 SCRA 70

Facts: Antonio de los Reyes, filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential
Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner, who was then Secretary and Head
of the Department of Public Information, with alleged violations of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no
action was taken on said report. Five years later, it became publicly known that
petitioner had submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information, which
was subsequently accepted by President Marcos. Antonio de los Reyes again filed
a complaint with the same charges.

An investigation took place, and a report was submitted, recommending the filing of
charges for graft and corrupt practices against the petitioner. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity, but was denied.
Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner
Tatad. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution
deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of
the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the
Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of his constitutional right to due process
and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.

Held: YES. Long delay in termination of the preliminary investigation by the

Tanodbayan in the instant case found to be violative of the constitutional right of
the accused to due process; Undue delay in the conduct of preliminary
investigation can not be corrected

Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a
falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures
prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security
Command for finding investigation and report. The long delay in resolving the case
under preliminary investigation cannot be justified on the basis of the facts on
record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to
resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. Though
the period fixed by law is merely "directory," it cannot be disregarded or ignored
completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the
case at bar.

Cervantes vs. Sandignbayan

307 SCRA 149

Facts: On March 6, 1986, private respondent Pedro Almendras filed a sworn

complaint with the Office of the Tanodbayan (predecessor of the Ombudsman)
against a certain Alejandro Tapang for falsification of Almendra's “salaysay”
alleging that Tapang made him sign a piece of paper in blank on which paper a
“salaysay” was later inscribed stating that Almendras had been paid his claim in the
amount of P17,594.00, which was not true. Almendras mentioned in the complaint
that he sought the help of petitioner Elpidio C. Cervantes who worked as analyst in
the office of labor arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz. Tapang in a counter-affidavit denied
the accusation of Almendras. Cervantes also denied the accusation against him.

On May 18, 1992, more than 6 years after the filing of the initiatory complaint, the
Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan an information charging Cervantes,
together with Ruiz and Tapang, with violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019.

On October 2, 1992, petitioner filed a motion to quash and motion to recall warrant
of arrest on the ground that the case against him had already prescribed due to
unreasonable delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation.
The Sandiganbayan in a minute resolution dated December 24, 1992 denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.

Held: It took the Special Prosecutor (succeeding the Tanodbayan) six (6) years
from the filing of the initiatory complaint before he decided to file an information for
the offense with the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan and the Special Prosecutor try to justify the inordinate delay in
the resolution of the complaint by stating that “no political motivation appears to
have tainted the prosecution of the case” in apparent reference to the case of
Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan where the Court ruled that the “long delay (3 years) in
the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan” was violative of
the Constitutional right of “speedy disposition” of cases because “political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process
in this case.”

The Special Prosecutor also cited Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan alleging that, as in
Alvizo, the petitioner herein was “insensitive to the implications and contingencies
thereof by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the
matter.” It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as
mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to
the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due
to causes directly attributable to him. The SC granted the petition and annulled the
minute resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner’s motion to quash.

People vs. Sandiganbayan

GR No. 189063, December 11, 2013

Facts: The guarantee of the speedy disposition of cases under Section 16 of

Article III of the Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative bodies. Thus, the fact-finding investigation should not be
deemed separate from the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman if the aggregate time spent for both constitutes inordinate and
oppressive delay in the disposition of any case.

On Nov 2002, Congressman Villarama of Bulacan alleged Sec. Jimenez of acts of

bribery whom he called the “2 M Dollar Man”. In reaction, the Office of the
President directed PAGC to conduct an inquiry. Of which Ombudsman Marcelo
requested PAGC to submit documents relevant to the exposé.
Issue: Whether or not the delay on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman was
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive.

Held: Yes.
The acts of the respondents that the Office of the Ombudsman investigated had
supposedly occurred in the period from February 13, 2001 to February 23, 2001.
Yet, the criminal complaint came to be initiated only on November 25, 2002 when
Ombudsman Marcelo requested PAGC to provide his office with the documents
relevant to the exposé of Cong. Villarama. Subsequently, on December 23, 2002,
Cong. Jimenez submitted his complaint-affidavit to the Office of the Ombudsman. It
was only on November 6, 2006, however, when the Special Panel created to
investigate Cong. Jimenez’s criminal complaint issued the Joint Resolution
recommending that the criminal informations be filed against the respondents.
Ombudsman Gutierrez approved the Joint Resolution only on January 5, 2007.93
The Special Panel issued the second Joint Resolution denying the respondents’
motion for reconsideration on January 25, 2008, and Ombudsman Gutierrez
approved this resolution only on April 15, 2008. Ultimately, the informations
charging the respondents with four different crimes based on the complaint of
Cong. Jimenez were all filed on April 15, 2008, thereby leading to the
commencement of Criminal Case No. SB-08- CRM-0265 and Criminal Case No.
SB-08-CRM-0266. In sum, the fact-finding investigation and preliminary
investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman lasted nearly five years and five
months.

It is clear from the foregoing that the Office of the Ombudsman had taken an
unusually long period of time just to investigate the criminal complaint and to
determine whether to criminally charge the respondents in the Sandiganbayan.
Such long delay was inordinate and oppressive, and constituted under the peculiar
circumstances of the case an outright violation of the respondents’ right under the
Constitution to the speedy disposition of their cases. If, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,
the Court ruled that a delay of almost three years in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation constituted a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused to
due process and to the speedy disposition of his case, taking into account the
following, namely: (a) the complaint had been resurrected only after the accused
had a falling out with former President Marcos, indicating that political motivations
had played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process; (b) the
Tanodbayan had blatantly departed from the established procedure prescribed by
law for the conduct of preliminary investigation; and (c) the simple factual and legal
issues involved did not justify the delay, there is a greater reason for us to hold so
in the respondents’ case.
To emphasize, it is incumbent for the State to prove that the delay was reasonable,
or that the delay was not attributable to it. In both regards, the State miserably
failed.

Anti-Graft Cases in the Sandiganbayan

Venus vs. Desierto

298 SCRA 219

Facts: On and prior to 2 September 1988, petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of
New Washington, Aklan, while private respondents Mars C. Regalado and Harry P.
Abayon were members of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality.
At its sixteenth regular session on 2 September 1988, the SB of New Washington
passed Resolution No. 19, S. 1988 authorizing petitioner to:

Negotiate And/or Inter (sic) Into A Contract With the Board of Liquidators, pursuant
to the resolution, petitioner proceeded to Manila and submitted to one Wenceslao
Buenaventura, a Director and the General Manager of the Board of Liquidators, a
copy of Resolution, together with petitioners letter-proposal wherein, on behalf of
the Municipality of New Washington and pursuant to his authority under the
Resolution, he offered to buy the lot on a government-to-government basis at a
price mutually acceptable to the parties. His offer was rejected, and he informed
the Sangguniang Bayan.

Private respondents filed a sworn letter-complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Kalibo, Aklan, charging petitioner with violation of paragraph (h) of
Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended.
The case was docketed as I.S. No. 92-2449. The case was forwarded to the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas in Cebu City, they alleged that in
contravention of the resolution and authority, in evident bad faith and for the sole
purpose of self-interest, petitioner bought the lot in his name and for personal gain,
and that they never suspected otherwise because from 1988 up to May 1990, the
lot was utilized as a garage for fire trucks and for the municipal mushroom culture
laboratory. It was only when petitioner lost in the 1992 elections and ejected the
Municipal Firetruck that they came to know that petitioner bought the land in his
name and not for the municipality.

In a resolution10 dated 20 October 1993, issued after due proceedings, the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas recommended the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that there existed no case for violation of paragraph (h) of
Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019. Then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, however,
disapproved the resolution it was re-raffled and it in a resolution it was found that
there is a reasonable ground to charge respondent Mayor Eriberto L. Venus of
New Washington, Aklan, for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, and
forthwith prepared the corresponding Information for filing with the Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may validly invoke any of the foregoing exceptions
to restrain criminal prosecution.

Held: Yes. As shown by the procedural antecedents, the Office of the Ombudsman
has not been at all certain in its position. Initially, no less than the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, Hon. Arturo C. Mojica, found no ground to believe
that petitioner had violated Sec. 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. However, then
Ombudsman Vasquez disagreed, in view of the possibility of a violation of Section
3(e) thereof, because of the pervading showing of bad faith on the part of the
[petitioner] in maneuvering to acquire for himself a piece of property which he
himself knew to be badly needed by the Municipality. Subsequently, and
conformably with this observation of Ombudsman Vasquez, the case was
remanded to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas and re-assigned
to Graft Investigation Officer Tanco who thereafter found a prima facie case for
violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. This time, the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas concurred with such finding. Upon review thereof,
Special Prosecution Officer III Orlando Ines agreed with this finding and
recommended the filing of the corresponding information. The Special Prosecutor
and the Ombudsman, in turn, agreed with Ines and the information was forthwith
filed.

Upon a subsequent re-assessment of the evidence as a consequence of

petitioners motion for reconsideration, another Special Prosecution Officer, Victor
Pascual, found that petitioner had not violated Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended. He thus recommended dismissal of the case for want of probable cause
and the filing of the corresponding manifestation to inform the Sandiganbayan of
the result of the motion for reconsideration. In this instance, the Special Prosecutor
himself concurred with the finding. However, the Ombudsman disapproved the
recommendation as he found that probable cause existed, but opted to allow the
court to find absence of bad faith.

Fonacier vs. Sandiganbayan

238 SCRA 687

Facts: These consolidated cases were spawned by the reported "ghost project" in
1978 by the Benguet Highway Engineering District under the then Ministry of Public
Highways. Herein petitioners were among those originally charged before the then
Court of First Instance of Baguio for violation of Section 3, paragraph (e), of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, and for estafa thru falsification of public documents in,
respectively, Criminal Case No. 707 and Criminal Case No. 708. Before petitioners'
arraignment, the Sandiganbayan and the Tanodbayan were created. Pursuant to
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1486, the two cases were transferred to the
Sandiganbayan.

Fonacier, Ramos, Gonzales and Villanueva filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with this Court. Docketed G.R. No. 50691, the petition sprung from the
denial on 21 May 1979 of their motion to quash the information filed against them
by the Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan where they contended that
Presidential Decree No. 1487 (creating the Office of the Ombudsman or
Tanodbayan) and Presidential Decree No. 1606 (amending P. D. 1486, creating
the Sandiganbayan) were unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: Yes. The particular provision of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Republic Act No. 3019) with which violation petitioners have been charged states:

Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of

public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxxxxx
e. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.

The elements of the offense defined in this provision are that: (1) The accused is a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence;
and (3) his action has caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or has given any party unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his functions.

In this, it is undisputed that herein remaining petitioners are public officers with
whom private contractor Del Moral, now deceased, has been charged also as a co-
principal.

Magsuci vs. Sandiganbayan

240 SCRA 13

Facts: Some time in January 1980, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
("BFAR") and Dexter Construction ("DEXTER"), represented by its Manager Jaime
B. Ancla, entered into a "Contract of Service" for the construction by the latter of a
40-ton ice making plant, including a 150-ton ice storage and 350-ton cold storage
facility, in Surigao City. In October 1982, while the construction was still on-going,
BFAR and Ancla executed a supplemental "Memorandum of Agreement," under
which Ancla additionally undertook "the purchase and installation of three
distribution transformers and construction of circular steel elevated tank". On 10
March 1983, BFAR Central Office Engineer David T. Enriquez, charged with the
duty to render accomplishment reports on the progress of the construction and to
certify on the work accomplishments of DEXTER, prepared and signed an
"Accomplishment Report," as well as a "Certification," attesting to the progress and
extent of completion of the additional work. The report also bore the signature of
Ancla. On the following day, or on 11 March 1983, Hermenegildo M. Magsuci, the
newly designated BFAR Regional Director for Region X, Cagayan de Oro City,
read the Accomplishment Report and Certification, affixed his signature thereon,
and directed the Chief of the Fisheries Extension Division in Cagayan de Oro City,
David F. Ernacio, to cause the issuance of the corresponding voucher.
Disbursement Voucher No. 3-0061, to which the Accomplishment Report and
Certification were attached, was thereupon prepared for the payment of 45.32%
(P412,729.24) of the contract price of P910,700.00, or P357,217.16 after deducting
the contractor's tax, withholding tax, and the required retention. Magcusi signed the
disbursement voucher, carrying the standard printed certification that the expenses
were necessary, lawful, and incurred under his supervision. Forthwith, Magcusi
likewise signed four checks, payable to the order of DEXTER, in the total amount
of P357,217.16. The disbursement Voucher, along with its attachments, and the
corresponding checks were then transmitted from the regional office to the BFAR
Central Office in Manila. Director Felix R. Gonzales approved the voucher and co-
signed the checks. Later, the checks were released to DEXTER.

As it turned out, however, the additional work so represented to have been

accomplished in the field report and certifications had yet to be undertaken.
Although somewhat hazy, it would appear that the work was ultimately completed
in December 1983.

After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment, finding Magsuci guilty of the
offense charged.

Issue: Whether or notMagsuci in the discharge of his official duties, has relied on
an act of his subordinate may be criminally liable.

Held: No, In concluding petitioner's involvement in the conspiracy, the

Sandiganbayan could only point to Magsuci's having noted the Accomplishment
Report and Certification submitted by Enriquez, signed the disbursement voucher
with the usual certification on the lawful incurrence of the expenses to be paid, and
co-signed four checks for the payment of P352,217.16 to Ancla. the
Sandiganbayan concluded that petitioner would not have thusly acted had he not
been a party to the conspiracy.

Fairly evident, however, is the fact that the actions taken by Magsuci involved the
very functions he had to discharge in the performance of his official duties. There
has been no intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity
committed by either or both Engr. Enriquez and Ancla. Petitioner might have
indeed been lax and administratively remiss in placing too much reliance on the
official reports submitted by his subordinate (engineer Enriquez), but for conspiracy
to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense.
Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of intentionally on the part of
cohorts.

In Arias vs. Sandiganbayan,this court, aware of the dire consequences that a

different rule could bring, has aptly concluded:

We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common
problems — dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments
or positions, or plain incompetence — is suddenly swept into a conspiracy
conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single detail,
painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every
person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving
authority.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates
and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations. . . . There has to be some added reason why he should examine
each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government
agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed.
There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting
papers that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or
departments is even more appalling.

We are not unaware of an observation made by this Court in People vs. Rodis8 to
the effect that a person may be so held liable as a co-principal if he, be an act of
reckless imprudence, has brought about the commission of estafa through
falsification, or malversation through falsification, without which (reckless
negligence) the crime could not have been accomplished. When, however, that
infraction consists in the reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of office
on a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear case
of conspiracy, the Arias doctrine must be held to prevail.

Sistoza vs. Desierto

GR No. 144784 September 3, 2002

Facts: On 10 August 1999, there was a bidding initiated by the Pre-Qualification,

Bid and Awards Committee (PBAC) of the Bureau of Corrections to secure an
order of tomato paste for the food supply of the inmates of New Bilibid Prison. Elias
General Merchandising offered a bid of P1,350.00 for 100/170 tins-grams to one
(1) case while RBJJ and PMS Trading Enterprises tendered their respective bids
for the same quantity at the higher prices of P1,380.10 and P1,380.05 per case.
Filcrafts Industries, Inc., proffered P539.00 for the quantity of 48/198 tins-grams to
one (1) case. Filcraft Industries’ offer was disqualified for not meeting certain
qualifications such as offering a non-registered brand of tomato paste. The second-
lowest bid, from Elias General Merchandising, won the bidding. However, Elias
General Merchandising increased the quantity of its tomato paste while increasing
the bid. This was approved by the PBAC. Petitioner Pedro Sistoza was the Director
of the Bureau of Corrections, and had the duty to sign the purchase order for the
tomato paste after they have been cleared by his subordinates. He cursorily read
the order, along with the supporting documents, then signed. He endorsed the
purchase order to the DOJ, but it was initially rejected for being the second-lowest
bidder. Upon learning of the DOJ’s rejection, Elias General Merchandising offered
to decrease its bid at P1,120.00 for 100 cans/170 grams. The Bureau of
Corrections, however, offered the lowest bid by Filcraft Industries which Elias
General Merchandising refused. Nevertheless, Sistoza endorsed Elias General
Mechandising’s latest offer to the DOJ. This was rejected twice until it was finally
approved.

On 22 September 1999 respondent Eliseo Co, a perennial bidder for supply of food
items of the New Bilibid Prison, filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman alleging criminal and administrative charges for violation of Sec. 3,
par. (e), RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
against petitioner Pedro G. Sistoza as Director of the Bureau of Corrections and
officers and members of its Supply Division and PBAC. He claimed that Sistoza
and his staff conspired with each other to cause undue injury to the government
and the inmates of the New Bilibid Prison by giving undue advantage to Elias
General Merchandise although its bid was higher in price and lower in quantity than
that offered by Filcrafts Industries, Inc.

The complaint was initially dismissed by the Ombudsman. However, on 29 March

2000 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman found
that the irregularities in the change of price and quantity of the tomato paste were
indicia of an anomaly. The Ombudsman’s Office filed the information before the
Sandiganbayan on 14 June 2000. On 22 June 2000 Sistoza filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion for reinvestigation and suspension of proceedings. The
Sandiganbayan granted the reinvestigation, but not the suspension. On 18 October
2000 the SC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from conducting further proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not Sistoza is guilty of violating the Anti- Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act based on his mere signatures in the purchase orders.

Held: No, Sistoza is not guilty of the crime charged based merely on his
signatures. To begin with, before manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence may even be considered, the Office of the Ombudsman
should determine with certainty the facts indicative of the modalities of committing
a transgression of the statute.

Simply alleging each or all of these methods is not enough to establish probable
cause, for it is well settled that allegation does not amount to proof. Good faith on
the part of petitioner as with any other person is presumed. The facts themselves
must demonstrate evident bad faith which connotes not only bad judgment but also
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. On the other hand, gross
inexcusable negligence does not signify mere omission of duties nor plainly the
exercise of less than the standard degree of prudence. Rather, it refers to
negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons
may be affected.

The facts do not show that Sistoza actually committed the crime charged through
any of the modes established by law. Sistoza simply made an erroneous
assessment, while relying, in good faith, on his subordinates. His act of cursorily
reading the purchase order was simple negligence, and not as gross as that of the
crime charged.

Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman

 Department of Justice vs. Liwag
GR No. 149311 February 11, 2005

Facts: Mary Ong alleges that she was a former undercover agent of the
Presidential AntiOrganized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP)Narcotics Group. She filed before the OMB a complaint
against PNP General PanfiloM. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other
high-ranking officials of thePNP, and several private individuals.

Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses

imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino including:
1. Kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang
Pang, James Wong and Wong Kam Chong;
2. Murder of Wong Kam Chong; and
3. Kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming
May 7, 2001 - a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson et
al,
May 18, 2001 - Lacson and Aquino sent a letter saying the DOJ should dismiss
thecomplaint because the OMB has a similar complaint with the same facts
May 28, 2001 - DOJ denied dismissalLacson and Aquino filed in the RTC a motion
for prohibition, insisting the DOJ doesnot have jurisdiction. Judge Liwag issued a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the DOJ fromconducting a preliminary
investigation. DOJ et al appealed to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the DOJ can concurrently investigate a case wherein the
OMB has anexisting complaint before it.

Held: No - the pendency of the case before the OMB is one of primary jurisdiction
to investigate1987 Admin Code governing the DOJ states:

Section 1. Declaration of policy. It is the declared policy of theState to provide the

government with a principal law agencywhich shall be both its legal counsel and
prosecution arm;administer the criminal justice system in accordance with
theaccepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of thecrimes,
prosecution of offenders and administration of thecorrectional system;

Section 3. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate,the Department shall

have the following powers and functions:Investigate the commission of crimes,
prosecuteoffenders and administer the probation and correctionsystem;

PD 1275 states:
Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service;Supervision and Control of
the Secretary of Justice. There ishereby created and established a National
Prosecution Serviceunder the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice,
tobe composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of theSecretary of Justice and
such number of Regional StateProsecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscals
Offices asare hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible for
the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws.
OMB act (RA 6640) states:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of theOmbudsman shall have
the following powers, functions andduties:Investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint byany person, any act or omission of any public officer oremployee,
office or agency, when such act or omissionappears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. It hasprimary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primaryjurisdiction, it may take over, at
anystage, from anyinvestigatory agency of Government, the investigation ofsuch
cases;

Art. 11, Sec. 13 of the Constitution vests the OMB with plenaryinvestigative powers
and fiscal autonomy. They are granted great leeway in investigating and
prosecutingoffensesProsecution under the OMB has preference over other
bodiesRA 6770 gives them primary jurisdiction in cases cognizable bythe
Sandiganbayan and authorizes them to take over, at anystage, from any
investigatory agency, the investigation of suchcases. The DOJ has general
jurisdiction, it cannot diminish the primaryjurisdiction of the OMB.

This is the first case wherein the first complaint was filed with the OMBbefore the
DOJ. The subsequent assumption of the DOJ would not promote an
orderlyadministration of JusticeDefendants would not know where their recourse
would be (DOJ orOMB). There is a risk of conflicting resolutions regarding guilt.
Two investigations would lead to unnecessary expenditure ofgovernment funds.
Petition dismissed, OMB to have jurisdiction for the preliminary investigation.

Lazatin vs. Desierto

GR No. 147097 June 5, 2009

Facts: On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of
the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-0-98-1500, charging
herein petitioners with Illegal Use of Public Funds as defined and penalized under
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a)
and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.

The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then
Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for
the calendar year 1996, i.e., he was both proponent and implementer of the
projects funded from his CDF; he signed vouchers and supporting papers pertinent
to the disbursement as Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen
(18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner Lazatin, with the help of
petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was
allegedly able to convert his CDF into cash.

A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Evaluation and

Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a Resolution dated May 29, 2000
recommending the filing against herein petitioners of fourteen (14) counts each of
Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said
Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman; hence, twenty-eight (28)
Informations were filed against herein petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were granted by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution
to re-evaluate the cases against petitioners.

Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its resolution. It

recommended the dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or
insufficiency of evidence.

The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review
the OSP Resolution. TheOLA recommended that the OSP Resolution be
disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial of the cases against
petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the Ombudsman adopted the OLA
Memorandum, thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution dated September 18,
2000 and ordering the aggressive prosecution of the subject cases. The cases
were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion or acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction.

Held: No. It has long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the
Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said
office have no constitutional infirmity. The issue of whether said provisions of R.A.
No. 6770 violated the Constitution had been fully dissected as far back as 1995 in
Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.

Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in
accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides
that the Ombudsman shall "exercise such other functions or duties as may be
provided by law." Elucidating on this matter, the Court stated:

x xx While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from the Ombudsman

was indeed present, the Commission [referring to the Constitutional Commission of
1986] did not hesitate to recommend that the Legislature could, through statute,
prescribe such other powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman. x xx As
finally approved by the Commission after several amendments, this is now
embodied in paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers)
of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec.13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:

x xxx
Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other functions or duties as
may be provided by law.

Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee vs. Desierto

July 24, 2007

Facts:On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative

Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the
parties involved and recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued
thereby.

On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61

expanding the functions of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all
non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.

The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest
loan," to wit: "a) it is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is
undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials
like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders, officers or agents of the
borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of loan
proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-
feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and, h) the
extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made."

Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG)
were the loan transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.

After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan
transactions, the Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB
as behest because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals.
Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII
obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII
was able to get 155% loan value from the offered collateral or an excess of 85%
from the required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the
collaterals was a public land contrary to the General Banking Act; that by virtue of
the marginal note of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was
allowed to use the public land as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage
requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paid-up capital at the time of the approval of
the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its obligation.

Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner

filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents.
Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e)
and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the Ombudsman,
prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the
case based on the available evidence. In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in
OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the
respondents and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved
the recommendation on May 21, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9, 1999, which was
approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.

Issue:Whether respondents violated the following provisions of Sec 3 (e) and (g),
specifically corrupt practices of public official, of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Held:On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of

discretion in finding that no probable cause exists against respondents, it must be
stressed that the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court
will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.
Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts
will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of
the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions
seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will
grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way
that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.

While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution
of cases, such as, (1) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when
there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when the acts of the officer
are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid
law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7)
where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of
persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie
case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied,
none apply here.

After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner, the
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman.
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of
discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there is no

basis for the Court to exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of the
Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsman's ruling,
that decision will not be overturned.

Castro vs. Deloria

GR No. 163586 January 27, 2009

Facts: Sharon Castro, a Revenue Officer of BIR Buenavista, Guimaras,

wascharged before the Ombudsman with Malversation of Public Funds. Shewas
accused of misappropriating public funds worth P556,681.53despite notice and
demand upon her account for the funds.

Castro filed a Motion to Quash, stating that the Ombudsman lackedjurisdiction. She
said that the Information failed to allege her salarygrade—a material fact in the
crime charged. Citing Uy vs.Sandiganbayan, since she had a salary grade of 27,
her case should bewithin the jurisdiction of the RTC. She also added that the
prosecutorialpowers of the Ombudsman are limited to the cases cognizable by
theSandiganbayan.

RTC denied the Motion to Quash, recognizing the authority of theOmbudsman in

the case. RTC cited the Resolution of Uy vs.Sandiganbayan in 2001 which
reversed the original decision in Uy vs.Sandiganbayan 1999, and expressly
recognizing the prosecutorial andinvestigatory authority of the Ombudsman in
cases cognizable by theRTC.

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman had the authority to file a case
againstpetitioner, as of May 31, 2001, in the light of the FIRSTDECISION in the Uy
vs. Sandiganbayan case (1999), whichlimited the powers of the Ombudsman.

Held: Ombudsman’s power was upheld. The decision on Uy vs. Sandiganbayan in

1991 was that theOmbudsman’s prosecutorial powers were limited to
Sandiganbayancases, while the Resolution on the same case in 2001 expressly
heldthat the Ombudsman shall have power on all criminal cases involvingpublic
officials.

Petitioner contends that the decision in 1991 should apply to her case,instead of
the 2001 Resolution, because the Ombudsman instituted theaction against her in
April 26, 2000. Hence, the Information filed againsther was void because at that
time, the Ombudsman had no authorityover her case.

The Court finds no merit in her petition.The Ombudsman’s prosecutorial powers

are PLENARY andUNQUALIFIED.Time and time again, the Court has held that the
Ombudsman haspower to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of
theSandiganbayan but also cases within the jurisdiction of the regional trialcourts.
The powers of the Ombudsman are plenary and unqualified.(Office of the
Ombudsman vs. Enoc)The clause “any illegal act or omission of any public official”
is broadenough to embrace the any crime committed by a public officer
oremployee is within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction to prosecute.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction to“take over, at

any stage from any investigatory agency of thegovernment, the investigation of
such cases” cognizable by theSandiganbayan.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should notbe equated
with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor underSection 11 of RA 6770.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely acomponent of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act underthe supervision and control and upon
authority of the Ombudsman.

Angeles vs. Merceditas-Gutierrez

GR Nos. 189161 & 189173, March 21, 2012

Facts: This Petition dated 01 September 2009 seeks to set aside the Joint Order
dated 21 March 2007 of the Ombudsman (the questioned Joint Order) exonerating
respondent Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (respondent Velasco or
respondent) from the charges filed by petitioner Judge Adoracion G. Angeles
(petitioner Judge Angeles or petitioner).
Petitioner Judge Angeles was, at the time this Petition was filed, the Presiding
Judge of Branch 121 of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC); while private
respondent Velasco was a senior state prosecutor at the Department of Justice
(DOJ).
On 20 February 2007, petitioner Judge Angeles filed a criminal Complaint against
respondent Velasco with the Ombudsman and sought his indictment before the
Sandiganbayan for the following acts allegedly committed in his capacity as a
prosecutor:
1. Giving an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to the accused in a
criminal case for smuggling by failing to present a material witness;
According to the Complaint, respondent Velasco, who was the trial prosecutor in a
criminal case involving he smuggling of jewelry, failed to present a material witness
in the aforesaid case.The witness, a gemmologist of the Bureau of Customs, was
to testify on the type of substance making up the pieces of smuggled jewelry.
According to petitioner, considering the materiality of the gemmologists testimony,
which respondent must have known of, since he was the handling trial prosecutor
of the case, his failure to offer the said testimony in court shows that he tried to
suppress the evidence in favor of the accused in the said case.
2. Engaging in private practice by insisting on the reopening of child abuse cases
against petitioner;

The second act complained of refers to respondent Velascos filing of two Petitions
to reopen the child abuse cases filed against petitioner Judge Angeles. Petitioner
was previously charged with inflicting physical and psychological abuse on Maria
Mercedes Vistan, her 13-year-old grandniece. Respondent was the one who
conducted the preliminary investigation of the Complaint for child abuse and later
indicted petitioner for 21 counts thereof. However, the DOJ later on reversed
respondent Velascos recommendation upon a Petition for Review filed by
respondent. Consequently, the Informations, which had been filed in the meantime,
were ordered withdrawn by the trial court. Petitioner later filed an administrative
Complaint against respondent for gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law,
incompetence, and manifest bad faith arising from the alleged malicious indictment.

According to petitioner, the move of respondent to reopen the child abuse cases
was allegedly meant to exact vengeance for petitioners filing of the above-
mentioned administrative Complaint. Petitioner alleges in her Complaint that since
respondent Velasco was not the trial prosecutor in the said case, his unauthorized
act of filing two Petitions to reopen the child abuse cases constituted a violation of
Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees.
3. Falsifying a public document to make it appear that a clarificatory hearing on the
child abuse Complaint was conducted.
The alleged falsification of public document arose from the same preliminary
investigation conducted by respondent in the child abuse cases mentioned above.
According to petitioner Judge Angeles, respondent Velasco made it appear that he
had conducted a clarificatory hearing on the Complaint for child abuse on 22 June
1999 as shown in the Minutes of the said hearing. Petitioner alleges that Leonila
Vistan, the witness who supposedly attended the hearing, was seriously sick and
could not have appeared at the alleged clarificatory hearing. Moreover, respondent
had, in fact, resolved the cases two days earlier, on 20 June 1999, as shown by the
date on the Resolution indicting petitioner. Thus, the latter alleges, the Minutes of
the hearing on 22 June 1999 must have been falsified by respondent by making it
appear that Leonila Vistan had participated in an inexistent proceeding. This act is
in violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, which criminalizes it as a
falsification of a public document.
In the questioned Joint Order, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges against
respondent Velasco. It found that after evaluation of the facts and evidence
presented by complainant, there was no cause to conduct a preliminary
investigation or an administrative adjudication with regard to the charges.
1. On the first charge of suppression of testimonial evidence in connection with the
smuggling case, the Ombudsman dismissed the charge on the ground that
petitioner had no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance.
The Ombudsman explained that petitioner was neither one of the parties nor the
presiding judge in the said criminal case and, therefore, had no personal interest in
it.
2. The Ombudsman likewise dismissed the second charge of private practice of
profession on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, It pointed
out that petitioner should have first elevated her concern to the DOJ, which had
primary jurisdiction over respondents actions and conduct as public prosecutor.
Moreover, the Ombudsman found that respondent Velasco was not engaged in
private practice when he filed the two Petitions for the reopening of the child abuse
cases against petitioner, since he was the investigating prosecutor of the said
cases.
3. Finally, on the falsification of a public document, which was also dismissed, the
Ombudsman said that the issue should have been raised earlier, when petitioner
Judge Angeles filed her Petition for Review of the Resolution of respondent
Velasco. Moreover, petitioner should have substantiated the allegation of
falsification, because the mere presentation of the alleged falsified document did
not in itself establish falsification. The Ombudsman also ruled that with the belated
filing of the charge and the reversal by the DOJ of respondent Velascos Resolution
indicting petitioner, the materiality of the alleged falsified document is no longer in
issue.

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the Complaint against
respondent Velasco.

Held: General Rule of Non-Interference with the Plenary Powers of the

Ombudsman. The general rule has always been non-interference by the courts in
the exercise by the office of the prosecutor or the Ombudsman of its plenary
investigative and prosecutorial powers. In Esquivel v. Ombudsman:

The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable

ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily
interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise
of powers is based upon the constitutional mandate and the court will not interfere
in its exercise.

The Discretionary Nature of Preliminary Investigation

The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or of whether there exists

a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed, and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof, is usually done after the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. However, a preliminary investigation is by no means mandatory.
The Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should
be filed, including whether a preliminary investigation is warranted. The Court
therefore gives due deference to the Ombudsmans decision to no longer conduct a
preliminary investigation in this case on the criminal charges levelled against
respondent Velasco.

Exception is if there is Grave Abuse of Discretion

This Court acknowledges exceptional cases calling for a review of the
Ombudsmans action when there is a charge and sufficient proof to show grave
abuse of discretion.

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility.
The abuse must be in a manner so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.

(1) No, the burden of proof to show grave abuse of discretion is on petitioner,
and she has failed to discharge this burden. She merely states why she
does not agree with the findings of the Ombudsman, instead of
demonstrating and proving grave abuse of discretion. In her arguments,
petitioner would also have us pass upon the factual findings of the
Ombudsman. That we cannot do, for this Court is not a trier of facts.

Review of Decisions of the Ombudsman

Antonino vs. Desierto

GR No. 144492 December 18, 2008

Facts: Petitioner filed a verified complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against

the respondents for violation of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3 of RA No.
3019 and for malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public
documents. This concerns the alleged conspiracy involving respondents to cheat
and defraud the city government of General Santos through the illegal disposition
of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park in violation of law and its charter.

The Ombudsman issued a resolution dismissing the charges against the

respondents. Petitioner filed MR which was denied by the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman held that since the criminal Informations were already filed and the
cases were already pending before the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts of
General Santos City, the Ombudsman had lost jurisdiction over the said case.
Petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion,

amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in the exercise of his prosecutor
functions, by dismissing the charges against the respondents.
Held: NO

1. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides:

SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — (1) All provisionary orders of
the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office

of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice
and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:

(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order,
directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the
interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within
three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall
be entertained.

Petitioner failed to establish that her MR was indeed filed on time, and thus,
failed to refute the assertion of the respondents based on the aforementioned
Certification that petitioner was personally served a copy of the assailed
Resolution. There are a number of instances when rules of procedure are relaxed
in the interest of justice. However, in this case, petitioner did not proffer any
explanation at all for the late filing of the MR. We find no justification why the
Ombudsman entertained the motion for reconsideration, when, at the time of the
filing of the motion for reconsideration the assailed Resolution was already final.

Enemecio vs. Ombudsman

GR No. 146731 January 13, 2004

Facts: Petitioner Agustina M. Enemecio (“Enemecio”) is a utility worker at the Cebu

State College of Science and Technology, College of Fisheries Technology
(“CSCST-CFT”), Carmen, Cebu. Private respondent Servando Bernante
(“Bernante”) is an Assistant Professor IV of CSCST-CFT.
Enemecio filed an administrative complaint for gross misconduct, falsification of
public documents, malversation, dishonesty and defamation against Bernante
before the Office of the Executive Dean of CSCST-CFT. Dr. Severino R. Romano,
CSCST-CFT Executive Dean, indorsed the complaint to the Office of the
Ombudsman for the Visayas (“Ombudsman”).
Enemecio also filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against Bernante for
falsification of public document.
Enemecio further asserted that Bernante made it appear in his leave application
that he was on forced leave from 15 May 1996 to 21 May 1996 and on vacation
leave from 22 May 1996 to 31 May 1996. In truth, Bernante was serving a 20-day
prison term, from 14 May 1996 to 2 June 1996, because of his conviction of the
crime of slight physical injuries. Bernante was able to receive his salary during his
incarceration since then CSCST-CFT Superintendent approved Bernante’s
application for leave. Enemecio contended that Bernante was not entitled to
receive salary for that period because of his “falsified leave applications.”

The Ombudsman rendered a decision dismissing the administrative complaint

against Bernante. On the same date, the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal
complaint against Bernante finding no probable cause.
The Ombudsman denied Enemecio’s motion to reconsider the dismissal of the
criminal complaint. Enemecio filed a special civil action for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals stating that the proper remedy available to Enemecio was a
petition for review under Rule 43 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

In her motion for reconsideration, Enemecio argued that the appellate court should
not have relied on Fabian. Enemecio contended that Fabian declared void only
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (“RA 6770”) and Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 (“AO No. 07”) insofar as they provide for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court.
Enemecio asserted that the other provisions of Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section
7 of AO No. 07, including the “final and unappealable character” of orders,
resolutions or decisions exonerating a respondent from any criminal liability, still
stand. Enemecio stated that she filed the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with
the Court of Appeals because she considered Bernante’s absolution from the
administrative complaint as already final and unappealable. As there was no
adequate remedy of appeal, Enemecio claimed that her only recourse was a
petition for certiorari before the appellate court under Rule 65.

In denying Enemecio’s motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals clarified

that Fabian does not apply to Enemecio’s petition assailing the dismissal of the
criminal complaint against Bernante. The appellate court stated that what Fabian
declared void was Section 27 of RA 6770, which authorized appeals to the
Supreme Court from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases. Under the Fabian ruling, the appellant should take such appeal in
administrative disciplinary cases to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. The Court
of Appeals added that it follows that the power to review decisions of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases is retained by the Supreme Court under Section 14
of RA 6770. Thus, the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner availed the wrong remedy.

HELD: YES. It is clear from the records that Atty. Fernandez filed with the Court of
Appeals a certiorari petition assailing the Ombudsman’s Resolution and Order
dismissing the criminal case, not the administrative case against Bernante. For this
reason, the appellate court in its 7 December 2000 Resolution rectified itself and
stated that Fabian does not apply to Enemecio’s petition as the Fabian ruling
applies only to administrative disciplinary actions. Atty. Fernandez’s attempt to
mislead this Court in a last ditch effort to secure a decision favorable to his client’s
cause does not escape our attention.
Even if we consider Enemecio’s petition before the Court of Appeals as questioning
the dismissal of the administrative case against Bernante, the action must also fail.
Appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions
should be brought to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. 21 The only provision
affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the
proper forum and of Rule 43 as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters in
Section 27 of RA 6770, including the finality or non-finality of decisions of the
Ombudsman, remain valid.

In any event, jurisprudence now holds that where the findings of the Ombudsman
on the existence of probable cause in criminal cases is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65. Since Enemecio filed
a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals, instead of the Supreme Court, she
availed of a wrong remedy in the wrong forum. Hence, the instant petition should
be dismissed outright.

Baviera vs. Zoleta

GR No. 169098 October 12, 2006

Facts: Manuel V. Baviera filed several complaints against officers or directors of

the Standard Chartered Bank (SCB), Philippine Branch, including Sridhar Raman,
an Indian national who was the Chief Finance Officer of the bank, as respondents
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), BangkoSentral ng
Pilipinas(BSP), Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Baviera claimed that
he was a former employee of the bank, and at the same time, an investor who was
victimized by the officers or directors of SCB, all of whom conspired with one
another in defrauding him as well as the investing public by soliciting funds in
unregistered and unauthorized foreign stocks and securities.

On September 18, 2003, Baviera requested the Secretary of Justice for the
issuance of a Hold Departure Order (HDO) against some of the officers and
directors of SCB, including Raman. Said HDO was granted by the DOJ.
Meanwhile, Secretary Datumanong went to Vienna, Austria, to attend a
conference. Undersecretary Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez was designated as
Acting Secretary of the DOJ. When Raman arrived at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) for his trip to Singapore, he was apprehended by BI
agents and NAIA officials based on the HDO of the Secretary of Justice. However,
the next day, September 29, 2003, Raman was able to leave the country. It turned
out that Acting Secretary of Justice Merceditas N. Gutierrez had verbally allowed
the departure of Raman. On the same day, Raman wrote Secretary Datumanong
for the lifting of the HDO. Acting Secretary Gutierrez issued an Order allowing
Raman to leave the country. In said Order, she stated that the Chief State
Prosecutor had indicated that he interposed no objection to the travel of Raman to
Singapore. Baviera then filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the
Ombudsman charging Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez for violation of
Section 3(a), (e), and (j) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, as amended. This was
dismissed by the Ombudsman for insufficiency of evidence. Baviera filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit. Baviera then filed a petition
for certiorari under rule 65 in the CA. However, the CA issued a Resolution
dismissing the petition on the ground that the proper remedy was to file a petition
for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
conformably with the ruling of this Court in Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, insisting that his petition for certiorari in
the CA under Rule 65 was in accordance with the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto. He
insisted that the Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial agency of the
government, and under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the CA has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. He asserted that the filing of his petition for certiorari with the
CA conformed to the established judicial policy of hierarchy of courts as explained
by this Court in People v. Cuaresma.
CA issued a Resolution denying the motion, holding that the ruling in Fabian v.
Desierto is not applicable, as it applies only in appeals from resolutions of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. The remedy of the aggrieved
party from resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases is to file a petition for
certiorari in this Court, and not in the CA.
Baviera then filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
assailing, among others, that the CA seriously erred in not taking cognizant of the
petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner in the CA was the proper
remedy to assail the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Held: No. In 1999, the SC ruled in Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario that the remedy of the
aggrieved party from a resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman finding the
presence or absence of probable cause in criminal cases was to file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 in the SC. The Court reiterated its ruling in Kuizon v.
Desierto and Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario. And on February 22, 2006, in Pontejos v.
Office of the Ombudsman, the Court ruled that the remedy to challenge the
Resolution of the Ombudsman at the conclusion of a preliminary investigation was
to file a petition for certiorari in this Court under Rule 65.

In Estrada v. Desierto, the Court rejected the contention of petitioner therein that
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order/Resolution of the OMB in
criminal cases should be filed in the CA, conformably with the principle of hierarchy
of courts. The Court explained that the appellate court’s jurisdiction extends only to
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In the Fabian
case, SC ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Kuizon and the subsequent case of
Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) drove home the point that
the remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman
finding probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with SC and
not with the Court of Appeals. In cases when the aggrieved party is questioning the
Office of the Ombudsman’s finding of lack of probable cause, as in this case, there
is likewise the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to be filed with this Court and not
with the Court of Appeals following SC ruling in Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman.

Procedure before the Ombudsman

Sesbreno vs. Aglugub

A.M. No. MTJ 05-1581 February 28, 2055

Facts: This case involves a complaint filed by Sesbreño (Complainant) against

MTC Judge Aglugub (Respondent) for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Neglect of Duty
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service relative to a criminal
case (entitled People v. Enrique Marcelino, et al.). In the said criminal case,
Complainant filed three (3) separate complaints against Marcelino, Nuñez,
Tabazon, and Carunungan who are all from the Traffic Management Unit of San
Pedro, Laguna. The criminal complaint was for Falsification, Grave Threats and
Usurpation of Authority. The three (3) cases were assigned to respondent judge’s
branch and subsequently consolidated for disposition. In a Consolidated
Resolution, only the charge of Usurpation was set for arraignment, the rest of the
charges having been dismissed. Thereafter, Complainant made a manifestation
that the complaint also charged the defendants with violation of RA No. 10
accompanied by a prayer for the issuance of warrants of arrests against the
defendants. Respondent judge found no probable cause and dismissed the charge
for violation of R.A. 10. She also denied complainant’s prayer for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against the accused and ordered the records forwarded to the
Provincial Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) for review. The PPO affirmed respondent’s
order and remanded the case to the court for further proceedings on the sole
charge of Usurpation of Authority. During the hearing of the case on February 14,
2004, Tabazon, Carunungan and Nuñez did not appear. Atty. Sesbreño, however,
did not move for the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Neither did he
object to the cancellation of the scheduled hearing.

Issue: Whether or not the Respondent err in transmitting the records of the case to
the PPO instead of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Held: No. This issue is answered by Administrative Order No. 8 entitled Clarifying
and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, which provides "that
all prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors." Moreover,
"[R]esolutions in Ombudsman cases against public officers and employees
prepared by a deputized assistant prosecutor shall be submitted to the Provincial
or City Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn, forward the same to the Deputy
Ombudsman of the area with his recommendation for the approval or disapproval
thereof.”

Thus, Respondent did not err and was, in fact, merely acting in accordance with
law when she forwarded the case for violation of R.A. 10 to the PPO. The fact that
the PPO remanded the case to the court for further proceedings instead of
forwarding the same to the Deputy Ombudsman as required by Administrative
Order No. 8 is quite another matter. In any event, respondent judge should have
taken the necessary steps to remedy the lapse in order to preclude delay in the
disposition of the case.

Complaint dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent was nonetheless admonished to

be more circumspect in the performance of her duties in the future.

Enriquez vs. Caminade

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1966, March 21, 2006

Facts: Imelda S. Enriquez (mother of the murder victim) filed a verified complaint
with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge
AnacletoCaminade with Gross Misconduct, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust
Judgment and Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure relative the Criminal
Case entitled ‘People of the Philippines versus Sherwin Que @ Bungol, Anthony
John Apura,’ for Murder.

There was no preliminary investigation completed on accused Alvin Taggart

Pimentel Alvez and Alvin John Apura [as] they were denied the opportunity to file a
motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before the information was filed
in court. Because of this, Judge Caminade issued an order on March 31, 2004
which:
1.) denies the motion for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the
accused-movants;
2.) sets aside the assailed Resolution of the City Prosecutor on the basis of
which the latest amended information was filed;
3.) quashes the latest amended information; and
4.) remands this case to the City Prosecutor for completion of the preliminary
investigation.’

Due to respondent’s ruling the investigating prosecutor cannot file a criminal

information before the expiration of the 15-day period within which the accused are
allowed by the Revised Rules of Court to move for reconsideration or petition for
review of an adverse ‘Resolution.’

Respondent cited Sales vs Sandiganbayan where it was held that:

1.) ‘the filing of motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary
investigation proper’
2.) information ‘filed without first affording x xx accused his right to file motion for
reconsideration’ is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary
investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sales vs Sandiganbayan ruling is applicable to the case
at bar.

HELD:NO, the Sales vs Sandiganbayan is not applicable to the criminal case

because of significant factual and procedural distinctions between the two cases:
(1) the Sales case proceeded under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman,
while subject criminal case was conducted under the Rules of Court;
(2) there was no completed preliminary investigation in the Sales case but there
was a completed full-blown panel preliminary investigation on the accused in the
subject criminal case; and
(3) it is only under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman that the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed and terminated upon the lapse of the period to
file a motion for reconsideration from the resolution of the Ombudsman while there
is nothing in the Rules of Court which states that a person investigated has the
right to file a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation before the information
can be filed in court.

WHEREFORE, Judge Anacleto L. Caminade is found guilty of gross ignorance of

the law, for which he is FINED in the amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000).
He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely in the future.

Power of the Secretary of Justice over Prosecutors

Punzalan vs. Dela Pena

Gr. No. 158543 July 21, 2004

Facts: Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors. On Aug. 13, 1997, Dela
Peña, a house boarder of the Platas, was in front of a store near their house when
the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio,
Alex “Toto” Ofrin, and others arrived. Eugenio shouted at Dela Peña, “Hoy, kalbo,
saanmobinili ang sumbreromo?” Dela Peña replied, “Kalbongaako, ay
pinagtatawanan pa ninyoako.” Irked by the response, Gregorio slapped Dela Peña
while Rainier punched him in the mouth. The group then ganged up on him.
Somebody shouted, “Yariinna ‘yan!” Thereafter, Ofrin kicked Dela Peña and tried to
stab him with a balisong but missed.
While Dela Peña was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas’ family
driver, who was carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun and pointed it to the group
chasing him to scare them. Michael Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to
wrestle the gun away from Dela Peña. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier
Punzalan on the thigh. The group ran after them and when they got to the Platas’
house, shouted, “Lumabas kayo d’yan, putanginaninyo! Papatayinnamin kayo!”
Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael Plata for
Attempted Homicide and against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm.
In turn, Plata, Cagara and Dela Peña filed several counter-charges for grave oral
defamation, grave threats, robbery, malicious mischief and slight physical injuries
against the Punzalans, including one for Attempted Murder filed by Dela Peña
against Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen others and one for Grave
Threats filed by Dela Peña against Ofrin.
Dela Peña and Cagara separately appealed to the DOJ. On March 23, 2000, then
Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying the July 28, 1998
Joint Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor.

Respondents’ MR was denied. Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA, which reversed June 6, 2000 Resolution where Secretary of Justice directed
the withdrawal of informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda
Punzalan and attempted homicide against the respondents.

Petitioners’ MR was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in setting aside the resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice.

HELD:
YES. The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion to
justify interference by the Courts.

A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at
law.

We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of

discretion in his Resolutions dated June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000. Under the
Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct
control andsupervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors.
“Supervision and control” includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to direct the
performance of duty; and to approve, revise or modify acts and decision of
subordinate officials or units.

In the case of People v. Peralta, we reiterated the rule that the right to prosecute
vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether,
what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a variety of factors
which are best appreciated by prosecutors.

In the case of Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, we declared that: A public prosecutor,

by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal information
where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of
guilt nor prima facie case has been presented by the petitioner.

We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause during a

preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function
exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to
file a criminal action where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of
evidence at hand to support the averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the
duty not to prosecute when after investigation or reinvestigation they are convinced
that the evidence adduced was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Thus,
the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the
prosecutor who is vested with discretion in the discharge of this function.

Dino, et al., vs. Olivarez

GR No. 170447 December 4, 2009

Facts: Petitioners instituted a complaint for vote buying against respondent Pablo
Olivarez. Based on the finding of probable cause in the Joint Resolution issued by
Assistant City Prosecutor Antonietta Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city
prosecutor of Parañaque, two Informations were filed before the RTC charging
respondent Pablo Olivarez with Violation of Section 261, paragraphs a, b and k of
Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code. Respondent filed before the Law
Department of COMELEC an appeal of the Joint Resolution. Respondent argued
that the pendency of the appeal of the Joint Resolution before the COMELEC
should prevent the filing of the Informations before the RTC as there could be no
final finding of probable cause until the COMELEC had resolved the appeal. Law
Department of the COMELEC directed the city prosecutor to transmit or elevate the
entire records of the case and to suspend further implementation of the Joint
Resolution dated 20 September 2004 until final resolution of the said appeal before
the COMELEC en banc.

Assistant Prosecutor Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city prosecutor,

"Opposition to the Motion to Quash and Motion to Admit Amended Informations."
The Amended Informations sought to be admitted charged respondent with
violation of only paragraph a, in relation to paragraph b, of Section 261, Article XXII
of the Omnibus Election Code. Respondent filed an "Opposition to the Admission
of the Amended Informations," arguing among others that the city prosecutor was
no longer empowered to amend the informations, since the COMELEC had already
directed it to transmit the entire records of the case and suspend the hearing of the
cases. Judge Madrona issued an order denying respondent’s Motion to Quash
dated 11 October 2004, and admitted the Amended Informations. Judge Madrona
reset the arraignment however, respondent failed to appear before the RTC.
Thereupon, Judge Madrona, in open court, denied the Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order denying the Motion to Quash and admitting the Amended
Informations, and ordered the arrest of respondent and the confiscation of the cash
bond.

Law Department of the COMELEC filed before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion
wherein it alleged that pursuant to the COMELEC’s powers to investigate and
prosecute election offense cases, it had the power to revoke the delegation of its
authority to the city prosecutor. Pursuant to these powers, the COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 7457. The appellate court granted the appeal declared
that the COMELEC had the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of
election offenses and to prosecute the same. As such, the COMELEC may
delegate such authority to the Chief State Prosecutor, provincial prosecutors, and
city prosecutors. The COMELEC, however, has the corresponding power, too, to
revoke such authority to delegate. Thus, the categorical order of the COMELEC to
suspend the prosecution of the case before the RTC effectively deprived the city
prosecutor of the authority to amend the two informations

Issue: whether the city prosecutor defied the order or directive of the
COMELEC when it filed the amended information?

Held: Yes. Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their
respective assistants have been given continuing authority, as deputies of the
Commission, to conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints involving election
offenses under the election laws and to prosecute the same. Such authority may
be revoked or withdrawn anytime by the COMELEC, either expressly or impliedly,
when in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the
integrity of the process to promote the common good, or where it believes that
successful prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC. Moreover,
being mere deputies or agents of the COMELEC, provincial or city prosecutors
deputized by it are expected to act in accord with and not contrary to or in
derogation of its resolutions, directives or orders in relation to election cases that
such prosecutors are deputized to investigate and prosecute. Being mere deputies,
provincial and city prosecutors, acting on behalf of the COMELEC, must proceed
within the lawful scope of their delegated authority.

It was COMELEC Resolution No. 7457 that revoked the deputation of the City
Prosecutor of Parañaque. However, when the COMELEC Law Department
directed the City Prosecutor of Parañaque to transmit the entire records of the case
to the Law Department, Commission on Elections, Intramuros, Manila, by the
fastest means available and to suspend further implementation of the questioned
resolution until final resolution of said appeal by the Comelec En Banc,. The order
issued by the COMELEC Law Department was with the authority of the COMELEC
En Banc. In other words, it was as if the COMELEC En Banc was the one that
ordered the public prosecutor to transmit the entire records and to suspend further
implementation of the questioned resolution until it finally resolves the appeal.

In the case at bench, public respondent city prosecutor clearly exceeded his
authority as a COMELEC-designated prosecutor when he amended the two
informations. Instead of filing a motion to suspend proceedings and hold abeyance
the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioner and to defer the latter’s
arraignment until after the appeal shall have been resolved, public respondent city
prosecutor took it upon himself to substitute his own judgment or discretion for that
of the COMELEC, by proceeding with the prosecution of the criminal cases. Such
act was a clear defiance of a direct and explicit order of the COMELEC, which was
to suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until the final
resolution of said appeal by the COMELEC En Banc. Indubitably, there was, on the
part of the public respondent city prosecutor, inordinate, if not indecent, haste in
the filing of the amended informations, thereby depriving petitioner of due process.
In fact, it was only on December 11, 2004 that he forwarded the records, – and
these were not even the original copies, but mere photocopies.

In filing the Amended Informations despite the order to hold the proceedings in
abeyance until final resolution of said appeal, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque
clearly exceeded the legal limit of its delegated authority. As a deputy of the
COMELEC, the public prosecutor acted on its own and wantonly defied the
COMELEC’s directives/orders. Thus, the filing of the amended informations and
the amended informations themselves, is declared VOID and of NO EFFECT.

Role of the Office of the Solicitor General in Criminal Cases

People vs. Duca

GR. No. 171175 October 9, 2009

Facts: It was in 1999 that Pedro Calanayan filed an action for ejectment and
damages against Cecilia F. Duca and several of her relatives. The case was
decided in favor of Calanayan. Decision became final and executory.
Ultimately properties belonging to Cecilia hit the auction block to satisfy judgment
and a certificate of sale was issued in favor of Jocelyn Barque, the highest bidder
in the auction sale.

Cecilia Duca went on fighting. She filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of
Execution and Damages with prayer for Writ of Injunction and Temporary
Restraining order. When the said case was heard, Cecilia Duca testified to the
effect that the house erected on the lot subject of the ejectment case is owned by
her son Aldrin Duca. This is the core of the controversy: Cecilia (Mother) and
Arturo (Son) Duca feloniously prepared a Declaration of Real Property over a
bungalow type residential house by making it appear that the signature appearing
on the sworn statement of owner is that of her other son Aldrin F. Duca. This was
false of course, as the latter was abroad at that time having arrived in the
Philippines only long after the dastardly deed.

Accused Arturo F. Duca who affixed his own signature thereon and by doing so
caused damage to private complainant Pedro Calanayan. Because of the
misrepresentation, Cecilia and Arturo were able to mislead the RTC such that they
were able to get a TRO against Sheriff Hortaleza and the policemen ordering them
to stop from evicting the plaintiffs from the property in question.
Both accused denied that they falsified the signature of Aldrin Duca. Cecilia
testified that she had no participation in the execution as she was in Manila at that
time. Arturo insisted there was no falsification. The MTC found him guilty. RTC
affirmed. Duca filed petition for review at the CA.
The CA ruled that Arturo was empowered by Aldrin to issue that tax declaration,
hence no crime had been committed. Aggrieved, the SolGen declared that the CA
should have given the Republic a chance to be heard before ruling such.

ISSUE: Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion and acted without discretion
by resolving the appeal without giving the SOLGEN a chance to be heard.

HELD: CA abused its discretion.

The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and
the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code
explicitly provides, viz.:

SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. – The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and
its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of lawyers. x xx It shall have the following specific powers and
functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in
his official capacity is a party. (emphasis supplied)
The CA also failed to follow Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Court:

Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. – A party desiring to appeal from a
decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying
at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other
lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the
Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition
shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought
to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration
filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full
amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the
expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional
period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to
extend fifteen (15) days.

Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the

petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment
of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the
petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent Duca appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC via a petition
for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The respondent was
mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to serve copies of his
petition for review upon the adverse party, in this case, the People of the
Philippines through the OSG.

Respondent Duca failed to serve a copy of his petition on the OSG and instead
served a copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City. The service of
a copy of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through the Prosecutor
would be inefficacious for the reason that the Solicitor General is the sole
representative of the People of the Philippines in appeals before the CA and the
Supreme Court.

Certiorari was thereby granted and the SC remanded the case to the CA.

Part II: Requisites for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction

A. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

Valdepenas vs. People

16 SCRA 871

Facts: Jurisdiction overthe person of an accused isacquired upon either

hisapprehension,withorwithoutwarrant,orhissubmission tothe jurisdiction
ofthecourt.

Appeal by Valdepeñas from a decision of CA, affirming that of the CFI

Cagayan,convicting him of the crime of abduction with consent, and sentencing
him to anindeterminatepenaltyandtoindemnifyEsterUlsano.

Ester Ulsano, 17yrs old, assisted by her mother filed forcible abduction with rape
against Valdepenas. CFI found him guilty as charged. CA modified to abduction
withconsent.

Valdepenas filedanMR &MNTonthe

findingofminorityattimeofoccurrencewhichwasgranted but on retrial the prior CA
ruling was affirmed. 2nd MR based on lack ofjurisdictionofCFIwasdeniedso
hefiledpetitionfor certiorari.

Petitioner's theory is that no complaint forabductionwith consenthas been

filedandthelowercourtacquirednojurisdiction overhispersonor over
thecrimeofabductionwithconsentandhad,therefore, noauthority toconvicthim.

Issue:Whether or not CAerredinnotreversingCFIforlackof

jurisdictionoverthepersonoftheaccusedand thesubject
matteroftheactionfortheoffenseofabductionwithconsent.
Held: NO. Jurisdiction over the personof an accused is acquired upon either
hisapprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction
ofthecourt. Inthe caseatbar,

itisnotclaimedthatpetitionerhadnotbeenapprehendedorhadnotsubmittedhimselfto
thejurisdictionof thecourt. Indeed,althoughbroughtbeforethe barof
justiceasearlyas January25, 1956, first,beforethethenjustice ofthepeace
court ofPiat,then beforetheCFI
ofCagayan,laterbeforetheCA,thereafterbacktoCFI,andthen,again,before
theCA,never,within theperiodofsix(6)yearshadhequestionedthejudicial
authorityofanyofthese three (3)courts overhis person.

Heis deemedwaivedwhateverobjectionhemighthave had tothe

jurisdictionoverhisperson,and,hence,to have submittedhimself tothe
Court'sjurisdiction. His behavior andevery single one of the steps taken by
him beforesaid courts— particularly themotions therein filed by him — implied, not
merely a submission to the jurisdictionthereof,
but,also,thatheurgedthecourtstoexercisethe authoritythereofoverhisperson.

Abduction with consent – jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law
uponaparticularcourt,maynotbeconferredtheretobytheparties
involveintheoffense.

Inthe caseatbar, theoffendedwomanand

hermotherhavenegatedsuchpreferencebyfilingthecomplaintandgoing
throughthe trialsandtribulationsconcomitant
withtheproceedingsinthiscase,beforeseveralcourts,
forthelastten(10)years.Petitioner saysthat the complaint was forforcible
abduction, notabduction with consent; but, asalreadyadverted to,the latter
isincludedintheformer.This allegationimplies that
Esterisaminorlivingunder patriaprotestas,and,

hence,single,thusleadingtothepresumptionthatsheisavirgin.Shewastakenbyforcefro
mtheir dwellingwhenher motherwas away andbrought toasecludedareaand
raped.

Jimenez vs. Sorongon

687 SCRA 151

Facts: Jimenez(Petitioner) is the president of Unlad Shipping and Management

Corporation a local manning agency, while Antzoulatos, Alamil, Gaza and
Avgoustis are the respondents herein and are some of the listed incorporators of
Tsakos Maritime Services Inc, a local manning agency. In Aug. 19, 2003, Petitioner
filed a complaint-affidavit with the office of the prosecutor of Mandaluyong city
against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment.
Respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit and denying
the complaint. Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counter affidavit. An
Information for the said crime was filed before the RTC-Mandaluyong.

On Dec. 4, 2004, the prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the information and
respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their comment to the opposition; however,
the judge denied the motion as it found existence of probable cause and issued
warrants against the respondents. Respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause to defer the enforcement of the warrants or arrest.
Petitioner filed his opposition with the motion to expunge, contending that Alamil
being a fugitive from justice had no standing to seek any relief and that the RTC
found probable cause. Respondent filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Umali
for being biased or partial. The said judge voluntarily inhibit herself and the case
was re-raffled to Judge Sorongon.

On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence
of probable cause to prosecute the respondents. On April 26, 2006, Alamil moved
to expunge the motion for being prohibited pleading since the motion did not have
any conformity from the city prosecutor. In its May 10, 2006 order, the RTC denied
the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, finding that the petitioner merely
reiterated arguments in issues that had been finally decided.

On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioner’s notice of
appeal since the public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner
had no civil interest in the case. On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment
to the motion to expunge, claiming that, as the offended party, he has the right to
appeal the RTC order dismissing the case; the respondents’ fraudulent acts in
forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him.

Issue: WON Alamil is a fugitive justice and therefore has no right to seek any relief
from the RTC.

HELD:NO. Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction.

As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes
voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the
jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal
case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an
application for bail.

Gimenez vs. Nazareno

160 SCRA 4
Facts: On 3 August 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando
Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and Teodoro de la Vega, Jr., were charged with the
crime of murder. The accused were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. Following the arraignment, the judge, Hon. Ramon E.
Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for 18 September 1973 at 1:00 p.m. All the
accused were duly informed of this. Before the scheduled date of the first hearing
the de la Vega escaped from his detention center and on the said date, failed to
appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case (Fiscal Celso M.
Gimenez and Federico B. Mercado) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed
with the hearing of the case against all the accused praying that de la Vega, Jr. be
tried in absentia invoking the application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution. Pursuant to the above-written provision, the lower court proceeded
with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave de ala Vega the opportunity to take
the witness stand the moment he shows up in court. After due trial, or on 6
November 1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against
the other five accused (Suan, et. al.) while holding in abeyance the proceedings
against de la Vega. On 16 November 1973, Gimenez and Mercado filed a Motion
for Reconsideration questioning the dispositive portion of the court's decision on
the ground that it will render
nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However,
this was denied by the lower court in an Order dated 22 November 1973. Gimenez
and Mercado filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether judgment upon an accused tried should be in abeyance pending

the appearance of the accused before the court.

Held: The second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides
that a "trial in absentia" may be had when the following requisites are present:
(1) that there has been an arraignment
(2) that the accused has been notified;
(3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.

Herein, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. De la
Vega was arraigned on 22 August 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not
guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and
19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by the lower
court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police Blotter that de la Vega
escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure to appear in court
in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court considered his
absence unjustified.

The lower court correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the
prosecution and the other accused in the absence of de la Vega, but it erred when
it suspended the proceedings as to de la Vega and rendered a decision as to the
other accused only. Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the
duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the
time until the accused who escape from custody finally decides to appear in court
to present his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow the
delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional
provision on trial in absentia. Still, the accused remain to be presumed innocent, a
judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court,
and such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. There can be
no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be
heard. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually
waived the rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. Thus, an
escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence
on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified
against him.

Miranda vs. Tuliao

486 SCRA 377

Facts: On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela
which were later identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and ElizerTuliao, son of
the private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection
program.
Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers including
SPO2 Maderal in the RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to the
RTC of Manila. The RTC convicted the accused and sentenced them two counts of
reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time
being at large. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the accused on the ground
of reasonable doubt.
In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and
identified the petitioners as the ones responsible for the death of the victims, so,
Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding
Judge Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2
Maderal.
Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the
hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the
petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the urgent motion on the ground that
since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be
properly heard by the court.

Issue: Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court.

Held: No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
Jurisdiction of the Court. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest
requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over
the body of the accused.

Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of

the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the
Court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of
other relief sought by the defendant whereby mere application, thereof, constitutes
a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person accused.

Garcia vs. Sandignbayan

603 SCRA 348

Facts: To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that the Garcias’ had
allegedly amassed and acquired, the Republic, through the OMB filed with the SB
2 petitions for the forfeiture of those properties. The Garcias’ filed motion to dismiss
on the ground of SB’s lack of jurisdiction for lack of proper and valid service of
summons: (1) Forfeiture I – the corresponding summons on the case were all
issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention; (2) Forfeiture II –
the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the
PNP Detention Center who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia. The general
signed his receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the other
respondents, Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following
qualifying note: “I’m receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy
– but these copies will not guarantee it being served to the above-named (sic).”

Issue: WON the Sandiganbayan has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner and her 3 sons.

Held: Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner
and her children. It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the
latter to be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever
mode authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court
acquires jurisdiction over a person.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were
served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP
DetentionCenter, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is
also undisputed that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II
were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP
Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for
being irregular and defective.

Requirements as laid down in Manotoc vs CA:

1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted

service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there
is impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being
“so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent
and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should
be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other
party.” Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show several attempts
for personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates.
2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of
Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal
service.

3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing

at defendant’s house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of
defendant’s office or regular place of business.

From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of

summons was made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through
Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned
above for a valid substituted service of summons. Moreover, the third requirement
was also not strictly complied with as the substituted service was made not at
petitioner’s house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen.
Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no
valid substituted service of summons was made.

Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan

388 SCRA 367

Facts: January 12, 1990, a complaint was filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
petitioner, former Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and the
former members of the PCA Governing Board, petitioner among them, for violation
of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for having
conspired and confederated together and taking undue advantage of their public
positions and/or using their powers; authority, influence, connections or relationship
with the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos without authority, granted a donation in the amount of Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation
(COCOFED), a private entity, using PCA special fund, thereby giving COCOFED
unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence to the grave (sic) and prejudice
of the Filipino people and to the Republic of the Philippines.
Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that all proceedings in the preliminary
investigation conducted by the PCGG were null and void and the PCGG was
directed to transmit the complaints and records of the case to the Office of the
Ombudsman for appropriate action.

In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators recommended the

filling of an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

Resolution dated June 2, 1992 was referred by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L.

Aportadera, Jr. to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for review and if warranted,
for the preparation of the criminal information.
In a memorandum dated July l5, 1992 the Office of the Special Prosecutor affirmed
the recommendation as contained in the Resolution dated June 2, 1992.

August 19, 1992 then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez ordered the panel of
investigators to discuss the merits of the prejudicial question posed by respondent
Lobregat.

In a Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigators

recommended that the motion to suspend proceedings be granted.

On December 3, 1993 then Ombudsman Vasquez referred for comment to the

Office of the Special Prosecutors the Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 of the
panel of investigators on the issue of the existence of prejudicial question.

On February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by the
respondent Sandiganbayan.

On February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail. On the same day he likewise filed,
through counsel, a Manifestation stating that he was posting bail without prejudice
to the Opposition To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion For Leave To File a
Motion For Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution which he filed.

In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan barred

petitioner from leaving the country except upon approval of the court.

On May 25, 1995, petitioner was conditionally arraigned pleading not guilty to the
Information.
In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated October 22, 1995, Special Prosecution
Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil found no probable cause to warrant the filing against
petitioner and recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation for
dismissal was approved by the Honorable Ombudsman on November 15, 1996.

On December 13, 1996 petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Dismiss alleging that
with the reversal of the earlier findings of the Ombudsman of probable cause, there
was therefore nothing on record before the respondent Sandiganbayan which
would warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the assumption of jurisdiction
over the instant case.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner.

Held: Yes, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. By posting
bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption effect of being subject to the
jurisdiction of respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue
disputing the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting
bail, his claim has been negated when he himself invoked the jurisdiction of
respondent court through the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative
reliefs.

In La Naval Drug vs. CA, Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may
be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he
is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes
not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have
submitted himself to that jurisdiction. Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it
must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the
appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court
jurisdiction over the person.

B. Custody of the law v. jurisdiction over person.

David vs. Agbay

GR No. 199113 March 18, 2015

Facts: Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by

naturalization. Upon retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines
and purchased a lot along the beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a
residential house. However, the portion where they built their house is public land
and part of the salvage zone.

Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with
the DENR. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that
petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the RPC against
the petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of

Republic Act No. 9225.

The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that petitioner’s subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was
void ab initio.

An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a
warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner.
Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have
been committed before he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC
concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen.

Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was denied.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing

himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225.

Held:Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the

effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos
under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was
able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of
allegiance.

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his
MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the
retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his
category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force.
In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became
foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read
together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy
governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.

Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is
a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was
then still a Canadian citizen.

Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian
citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a
natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a
consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual
citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable
cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.

C. Jurisdiction over territory

Trenas vs. People

664 SCRA 355

Facts: Elizabeth Luciaja gave P150,000.00 to Atty. Hector Treñas to assist in the
titling of a house and lot located in Iloilo City. Treñas prepared and issued a Deed
of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. He also gave Elizabeth three Revenue
Official Receipts amounting to P120,000. However, when Elizabeth consulted with
the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector
admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the money for his
other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money. Thus, the instant
case of Estafa was filed against Hector.

An Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the RTC Makati
City which rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa.
Petitioner appealed with the CA which also rendered a Decision affirming that of
the RTC.

Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does
it show that ₱ 150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Also,
the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner was without any indication
of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City. Petitioner
claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to
him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as
well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the
disputable presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course of
nature.

Issue:Whether RTC Makati has jurisdiction over the controversy.

Held:The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of
the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be acquired
by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of
its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by
the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.

Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. In this case, the prosecution failed to
show that the offense of estafa was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Makati City. Also, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain
any allegation as to where the offense was committed.

Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented
by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed
in Makati City. There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the
prosecution that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was
committed.

There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, The RTC of
that city has no jurisdiction over the case.
The case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and
recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

DISPOSITION: There being no showing that the offense was committed within
Makati, The RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.

Union Bank of the Philippines vs. People

667 SCRA 113

Facts: Desi Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against
Forum Shopping. The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank's two (2)
complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses
Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint was filed before
the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint was
filed and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that
Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping.
Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by
falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the
second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding
involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency. Tomas filed a Motion to
Quash. She argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City
court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and
not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. The MeTC-Makati City
denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-
Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged
Tomas with perjury. The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas' motion for
reconsideration. The petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari
before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. RTC-Makati City dismissed the petition.
Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari
.
Issue:What is the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC? Is it
Makati City- where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay
City- where the Certification was presented to the trial court?

Held:MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take
cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners. Petition denied. Venue is an
essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place
where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the
jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the
jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court
can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial
jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in thelocus criminisis grounded on the
necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province
where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available. Unlike in civil
cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be
instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15 (a), Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Remedial Law Union Bank of the Philippines vs. People 2

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of
its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense.
—
The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its
allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular
place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense
charged or is necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases
not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its
essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of
jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. In this case, Tomas is charged with the
crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for making a false Certificate against
Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:

(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter. (b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent
officer, authorized to receive and administer oath. (c) That in the statement or
affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. (d)
That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or
made for a legal purpose.

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the
ground of improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be
examined together with Section 15 (a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the allegations in the Information
sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas
within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.

D. Jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Magno vs. People

 647 SCRA 362

Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for multiple frustrated
murder and double attempted murder against several accused, including MAGNO,
who were public officers working under the NBI

Magno, in open court, objected to the formal appearance and authority of Atty.
Sitoy, who was there as private prosecutor to prosecute the case for and on behalf
of the Office of the Ombudsman

The RTC issued an Order, ruling that “the Ombudsman is proper, legal and
authorized entity to prosecute this case to the exclusion of any other entity/person
other than those authorized under R.A. 6770. This prompted the respondents to file
a petition for certiorari before the CA.
CA original decision: Declared that the private prosecutor may appear for the
petitioner in the case, but only insofar as the prosecution of the civil aspect of the
case is concerned.

CA AMENDED decision: Ruling that the private prosecutor may appear for the
petitioner in Criminal Case to intervene in the prosecution of the offense charged in
collaboration with any lawyer deputized by the Ombudsman to prosecute the case.
This amended CA decision in turn made Magno file for a review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure before the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has the appellate jurisdiction over the
RTC’s decision in not allowing Atty. Sitoy to prosecute the case on behalf of the
Ombudsman.

Held: No. PD No. 1606 created the Sandiganbayan. Section 4 thereof establishes
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction:

“B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complex with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection of this
section in relation to their office.”

In the present case, the CA erred when it took cognizance of the petition for
certiorari. The OMBUDSMAN SHOULD HAVE FILED THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI WITH THE SANDIGANBAYAN, which has EXCLUSIVE
APPELLATE JURISDICTION over the RTC since the accused are public officials
charged of committing crimes in their capacity as Investigators of the NBI

JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY LAW, and the CA’s judgment, issued without

jurisdiction, is VOID. There is no rule in procedural law as basic as the precept that
jurisdiction is conferred by law and any judgment, order or resolution issued without
it is void and cannot be given any effect. This rule applies even if the issue on
jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal or even after final judgment.
 Fukusume vs. People
474 SCRA 570

Facts: Sometime in July 1991, Yu, a businessman engaged in buying and selling
aluminum scrap wires, accompanied by Jovate, went to the house of Fukuzume in
Parañaque. Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is
from Furukawa Electric Corporation and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap
wires. Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong
to Furukawa but they are under the care of NAPOCOR. Believing Fukuzume’s
representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from
Fukuzume. This transaction later turned uneventful as Fukuzume failed to comply
his undertaking to return Yu’s money when Yu was refused by NAPOCOR, thus,
prompting Yu to file an estafa case.

Upon arraignment, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued, finding the accused
guilty as charged. Aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, he appealed to CA but CA
affirmed the trial courts’ decision modifying only the penalty, hence, the petition
before the SC.

Issue: WON the trial court of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Held: SC answered on the negative. We agree with Fukuzume’s contention that

the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense
charged.

The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI and the
affidavit subscribed by Fukuzume. With respect to the sworn statement of Yu,
which was presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged that
he gave Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in
Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzume’s contention that Yu testified during his
direct examination that he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the
latter’s house. It is not disputed that Fukuzume’s house is located in Parañaque.

Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and
the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight
considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the
former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.

More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to

establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him
with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of
the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in
criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Citing Uy vs. Court of
Appeals: However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense
was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati.
However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu, the prosecution
presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu’s
sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the
offense charged was committed in Makati. From the foregoing, it is evident that the
prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati
or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city.
Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa
should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing
of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.

Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Republic

686 SCRA 472

Facts: R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to
administer the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF), which, under Section 8 thereof,
was to be sourced from a P0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra.
Charged with the duty of collecting and administering the Fund was Philippine
Coconut Administration (PCA). Like COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage,
the PCA, by statutory provisions scattered in different coco levy decrees, had its
share of the coco levy. Per Cojuangco’s own admission, PCA paid, out of the
Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF), the entire acquisition price for the
72.2% option shares. The list of First United Bank (FUB) stockholders included
Cojuangco with 14,440 shares and PCA with 129,955 shares. It would appear later
that, pursuant to the stipulation on maintaining Cojuangco’s equity position in the
bank, PCA would cede to him 10% of its subscriptions to (a) the authorized but
unissued shares of FUB and (b) the increase in FUB’s capital stock. In all, from the
"mother" PCA shares, Cojuangco would receive a total of 95,304 FUB (UCPB)
shares broken down as follows: 14,440 shares + 10% (158,840 shares) + 10%
(649,800 shares) = 95,304.

Issue: Whether or not the agreement between PCA and Cojuangco can be
accorded the status of a law without publication.

Held: NO. It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement
referred to above in Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not reproduced or attached as an
annex to the same law. It is well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In
fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of a law. Tañada v.
Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915, 1986) said as much: Publication of the law is
indispensable in every case x xx. Laws must come out in the open in the clear light
of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to
make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
The publication must be of the full text of the law since the purpose of publication is
to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere referencing the number of the
presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of effectivity
would not satisfy the publication requirement.
In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference,
Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract
in the decree. Neither was a copy thereof attached to the decree when published.
The SC cannot, therefore, extend to the said Agreement the status of a law.
Consequently, the Court joined the Sandiganbayan in its holding that the PCA-
Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary transaction between
agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under the Civil Code.

Atienza vs People
G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014

FACTS:This case involves crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document

against Atienza and Castro. Atienza and Castro (petitioners) are employees of the
CA, particularly assigned to its Budget Division and holding the positions of Budget
Officer I and Utility Worker I.

Abitula, Custodian of CA decisions was invited by Castro to attend Atienza’s party

where the latter introduced Atibula to a certain Dario and asked him to assist in
searching for the CA decision. Thereafter, Atibula and Dario returned to the office
and searched for the decision. Dario requested Atibula to insert a decision in one of
the volumes of CA Original Decisions where the latter refused and immediately left.
Atienza offered Atibula 50,000 in exchange for records. Atibula reported the
incident. He further discovered that some of the volumes were missing which he
also reported.

Nelson de Casto, Clerk IV detailed at the CA Reporter’s Division handed to Atibula

a bag containing a gift-wrapped package which turned out to be the missing
records. He claimed that it was Castro who asked him to deliver the said package
to Atibula.

The contents of the returned records were reviewed by Atibula and it was found
that there were new documents inserted therein. Upon Atibula’s comparison, it was
found that the duplicate original decisions did not bear such promulgations. On
investigation, it was found that the signatures of the justices were forged.
Atienza denied the allegations.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: No, the RTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of Criminal Case
No. 01-197426 (i.e., the falsification case) since Falsification of Public Document
under Article 172(1)[90] of the RPC, which is punishable by prisioncorreccional in
its medium and maximum periods (or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1
day to 6 years and a fine of not more than P5,000.00, falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts pursuant to Section 32(2)[92] of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,
otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," as amended by RA
7691.While petitioners raised this jurisdictional defectfor the first time in the present
petition, they are not precluded from questioning the same. Indeed, jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law and cannot
be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or
conferred by the acquiescence of the court. The rule is well-settled that lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
Hence, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time
on appeal.

Tolentino vs. Social Security Commission

138 SCRA 428

Facts: Amado Tolentino was employed as an Editorial Assistant in the SSS before
with a salary of P2,400.00 per annum. His appointment as such was duly approved
by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). He was given a promotion in salary from
P2,400.00 per annum to P2,580.00 per annum. This promotion in salary was
likewise duly approved by the CSC.

Later on, his designation was changed from Editorial Assistant to Credit Analyst.
This appointment was also duly approved by the CSC.

However, he was given an appointment reinstating him to his former position as

Credit Analyst. This reappointment was extended to him following his resignation
from the SSS to run for a municipal position in his municipality in the 1961
elections. After which, he took his Oath of Office.

Later, his designation was changed from Credit Analyst to Technical Assistant, with
an increase in salary from P2,580.00 per annum to P4,200 per annum.

It was the position of Technical Assistant (Executive Assistant) that Tolentino was
holding when the SSC passed Resolution 1003 affirming the decision of
Administrator Gilberto Teodoro finding Tolentino guilty of dishonesty, as charged,
and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service, effective on the
first day of his preventive suspension with prejudice to reinstatement. The
Administrator filed charges against Tolentino for dishonesty and electioneering.

Tolentino answered in two separate letters. The administrator was unsatisfied with
his denial, and an investigation ensued, with Tolentino in preventive suspension.
Tolentino received a letter from the Administrator informing him, among others, of
his dismissal from the service by virtue of Resolution 1003 of the SSC.

Tolentino filed with the CFI Rizal (Quezon City, Branch IX) a petition for mandamus
with preliminary mandatory injunction questioning the validity of Resolution 1003.
After the parties had submitted memoranda to support their respective contentions
on the question raised by the pleadings, the lower court rendered an order
dismissing Tolentino's petition for lack of jurisdiction over the SSC because the
latter ranks with the CFI in the exercise of the quasi-judicial powers granted to it by
the Social Security Act of 1954, as amended, following the decision of this
Honorable Tribunal in Poblete Construction Co., et al. vs. Social Security
Commission, et al.

Tolentino filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present
petitions for review by certiorari involve two different decisions of two different
tribunals.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Social Security Commission has jurisdiction over

administrative actions filed before it against its own erring employees.

HELD:Yes. The decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, and its subsequent en
banc resolutions are null and void, the same having been issued without
jurisdiction. At the time Amado Tolentino was charged with and convicted of
dishonesty in 1966 up to the time the Prosecution Division of the Court of Industrial
Relations filed with said court the unfair labor suit docketed as Case 5042-ULP, the
power to impose disciplinary sanctions on erring employees of the Social Security
Commission was vested exclusively in the Commissioner of Civil Service, without
prejudice to appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals (Sections 18 and 36, R.A.
2260).

Consequently, the Court of Industrial Relations, created under Commonwealth Act

103, a statute of earlier vintage, had no jurisdiction over Case 5042-ULP. Again,
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested by law. It is not acquired by the
consent or acquiescence of the parties, nor the unilateral assumption thereof by
any tribunal. Jurisdiction of a court or tribunal is determined by the statute in force
at the time of the commencement of the action. And once acquired, jurisdiction
continues, regardless of "subsequent happenings", until the case is finally
terminated.

We recall that the petition before us originated from administrative charges of

dishonesty and electioneering filed by the Administrator of the Social Security
Commission before the same office on May 23 and 24, 1966. The Commission's
Resolution No. 1003, the validity of which is questioned here in G.R. No. 28870 for
jurisdictional reasons, was promulgated on September 15, 1966.

The Court found no further need to scrutinize the findings of the Court of Industrial
Relations. To do so would benefit no one.

Cudia vs. Court of Appeals

 284 SCRA 173

Facts: Cudia was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga allegedly for possessing an

unlicensed revolver. He was brought to Angeles City, where he was detained. The
City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. The Information states that he committed
the crime in Angeles City. The case was raffled to RTC Branch 60, Angeles City.
Cudia pleaded not guilty to the charges. During the ensuing pre-trial, the court
called the attention of the parties to the fact that, contrary to the information,
petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City.
Inasmuch as there was an existing arrangement among the judges of the Angeles
City RTCs as to who would handle cases involving crimes committed outside of
Angeles City, the judge ordered the re-raffling of the case to a branch assigned to
criminal cases involving crimes committed outside of the city. Thereafter, the case
was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.

However, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information charging

petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
The case was likewise raffled to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. This
prompted the prosecutor in the first criminal case to file a Motion to
Dismiss/Withdraw the Information, it appearing that the apprehension of the
accused was made in Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the jurisdiction of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. The trial court granted the motion.

Cudia then filed a Motion to Quash the second criminal case on the ground that his
continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition for which he had been arraigned in the first criminal case, and which
had been dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right not to be put
twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court denied the
motion to quash. CA affirmed that there was no double jeopardy on the ground that
the petitioner could not have been convicted under the first information as the
same was defective.

Issue:Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable when she was acquitted in
the criminal charges against her.

Held:It is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority
to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of
Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction.

It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who
should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside
of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting
officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or presented by the
prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not
acquire jurisdiction.
Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City
Prosecutor in filing the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof. As
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioners plea to an information
before he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as
formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by
express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions,
questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among
other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused
(herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this
view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing
it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the
former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient
because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could
not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot
be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of
the first information would not be a bar to petitioners subsequent prosecution.
Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment
that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.

Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan

268 SCRA 554

Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business,

hauling dirt and ore. His services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he
engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at
the former’s premises.

On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR
commanding one of its Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects
and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon
and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and
subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender,
transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by Ancla.
Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.

After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he
had made representations to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby
relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla
surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said
that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of the warrant did not relieve
him from his responsibility.
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with
the crime of malversation of public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum
period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for
new trial which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual

designated by BIR as a custodian of distrained property.

Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.

Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was

specified therein that the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have
jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges the private
individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or
employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.

The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal,

accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public officer,
Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.

Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner,
in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced
to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be
deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was he appointed by direct
provision of law nor by competent authority. While BIR had authority to require
Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the National Internal Revenue
Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power
authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include
the power to appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.

De Jesus vs. Garcia

19 SCRA 554

Facts: The pivotal disputed allegations of the verified complaint below are these:
Ten persons,among whom are petitioners and respondent, Maxima de Jesus, are
co-owners of six (6) parcels of land running along España P. Campa and Adelina
Streets in Sampaloc, Manila. Administratrix thereof and co-owners attorney-in-fact
is Maxima de Jesus.Her stipulated compensation is 10% of the rentals.

Lessee of the property is Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. The original lease
contract was dated August 23 and 29, 1953. This lease was renewed by instrument
executed on January 10, 1966, where under, through the efforts of Maxima de
Jesus, the monthly rentals were increased from P850.00 to P3,500.00 during the
first ten (10) years and to P4,000.00 for the subsequent five (5) years. Shell pays
the rentals by issuing a check for P3,500.00 in the name of Maxima de Jesus who,
in turn, distributes the shares of her co-owners.

Petitioners (defendants below), in October, 1966 — so the complaint further avers

— sought to unjustly deprive Maxima de Jesus of her 10% compensation. And, to
fraudulently escape such obligation, they surreptitiously instructed Shell not to pay
their share in the rentals through said Maxima de Jesus but directly to them.

The problem cropped up because petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint and
to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction upon the above grounds, in that case
filed by principal individual respondents against them in the city court, was denied,
and their motion to reconsider rejected.

Issue: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held:As starting point, we have the rule-long in standing and frequent in

application — that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or law. It cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be
acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the
parties. Neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court. Constitutionally
viewed, apportionment of jurisdiction is vested in Congress. Congress may not
delegate that power. We may not even look to the Rules of Court in search of
jurisdiction jurisdictional boundaries. For indeed, the constitutional authority of the
Supreme Court on this point is circumscribed in the zone properly denominated as
the promulgation of "rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts and the admission to the practice of law"; and, consequently to determine
the "means, ways or manner in which said jurisdiction, as fixed by the Constitution
and acts of Congress, shall be exercised". Rules of Court must yield to substantive
laws of which jurisdiction is a segment. A mistake in statutory jurisdiction may not
be corrected by executive fiat, "but by legislation".

Well may we profit from the wise pronouncement in Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Attorney-General, supra, at pages 529-530, thus: "Certain statutes confer
jurisdiction, power, or authority. Others provide for the procedure by which that
power or authority is projected into judgment. The one class deals with the powers
of the court in the real and substantive sense; the other with the procedure by
which such powers are put into action. The one is the thing itself ; the other is the
vehicle by which the thing is transferred from the court to the parties. The whole
purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice. ... The purpose of such a procedure is not to
restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective
facility in righteous action. ..."

And now we come to the jurisdictional area allocated to inferior courts. A rule, the
validity of which is recognized, is that jurisdiction of an inferior court will not be
presumed; "it must appear clearly from statute or it will not be held to exist." Such
jurisdiction cannot be broadened upon "doubtful inferences" drawn from statutes.
Absent a statutory grant, neither convenience nor assumed justice or propriety of
the exercise thereof in a particular class of cases "can justify the assumption of
jurisdiction" by said courts.

The Law Firm of Chavez vs. Fria

703 SCRA 258

Facts: On July 31, 2006, an Information[4] was filed against respondent Atty.
Josejina C. Fria (Atty. Fria), Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 (Branch 203), charging her for the crime of Open
Disobedience under Article 231[5] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Law Firm was engaged as counsel by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 03-110
instituted before Branch 203.On July 29, 2005, judgment was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff (July 29, 2005 judgment), prompting the defendant in the same case to
appeal. However, Branch 203 disallowed the appeal and consequently ordered that
a writ of execution be issued to enforce the foregoing judgment. Due to the denial
of the defendant's motion for reconsideration, the July 29, 2005 judgment became
final and executory.

In its Complaint-Affidavitdated February 12, 2006, The Law Firm alleged that as
early as April 4, 2006, it had been following up on the issuance of a writ of
execution to implement the July 29, 2005 judgment. However, Atty. Fria
vehemently refused to perform her ministerial duty of issuing said writ.

In her Counter-Affidavitdated June 13, 2006, Atty. Fria posited that the draft writ of
execution (draft writ) was not addressed to her but to Branch Sheriff Jaime Felicen
(Felicen), who was then on leave. Neither did she know who the presiding judge
would appoint as special sheriff on Felicen's behalf. Nevertheless, she maintained
that she need not sign the draft writ since on April 18, 2006, the presiding judge
issued an Order stating that he himself shall sign and issue the same.

On July 31, 2006, the prosecutor issued a Memorandum recommending, inter alia,
that Atty. Fria be indicted for the crime of Open Disobedience.

The MTC ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.The Law
Firm moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied. Accordingly, it
elevated the matter on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in sustaining the MTC's dismissal of the case
for Open Disobedience against Atty. Fria.

Held: No.Under Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial
court judge may immediately dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause, viz:
Sec. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within
ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.
He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to
a warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of
doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be
resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of
information.

In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor's authority, it must be

stressed that the judge's dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases
when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause that is when
the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which
unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the
contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime
charged has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same,
the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to
trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order
the presentation of additional evidence.

In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds
with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a)
issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the
case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c)
order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence
of probable cause.

Applying these principles to the case at bar would lead to the conclusion that the
MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the case.

How Jurisdiction over the subject matter determined

Mobilia Products vs. Umezawa

452 SCRA 736

Facts: Umezawa, then President and General Manager of MPI, organized another
company withhis wifeKimiko, and his sister, Mitsuyo Yaguchi, to be known as
Astem Philippines Corporation,withoutknowledge of the Board of Directors of MPI.
The said company would be engaged in the samebusinessas Mobilia. Umezawa
stole products from MPI amounting to P3,219,875.00.MPI and public
prosecutorfiled criminal complaints against Umezawa. The trial court asserted that
thecontroversy involving the criminalcases was between Umezawa and the other
stockholders of MPI. It also held that the SEC, not the trialcourt, had jurisdiction
over intra-corporate controversies.CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that thedispute
between Umezawa and the other stockholders and officers over the
implementation of theMPI’s standard procedure is intra-corporate in nature;
hence,within the exclusive jurisdiction of theSEC. The petitioner MPI filed the
instant petition for review oncertiorari

ISSUE:Whether or not CA is correct in affirming the RTC’s decision.

HELD:Patently, then, based on the material allegations of the Informations, the

courta quo hadexclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged. CA erred in holding
that the dispute between itand the respondentis intra-corporate in nature; hence,
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. As gleanedfrom thematerial allegations
of the Informations, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction overthe crimescharged.
According to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction
of any court, tribunalor body,except those now falling under the exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan whichshall hereafter be exclusively
taken cognizance of by the latter.Case law has it that inorder to determine the
jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint orInformation must be
examinedfor the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out thereinand
the prescribed period provided for bylaw are within the jurisdiction of the court, and
where thesaid Information or complaint is filed. It is settled thatthe jurisdiction of the
court in criminal cases isdetermined by the allegations of the complaint
orInformation and not by the findings based on theevidence of the court after trial.
Jurisdictionis conferred only by the Constitution or by the law in forceat the time of
the filing of the Information orcomplaint. Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it
isretained up to the end of the litigation.

Rapsing vs. Ables

684 SCRA 195

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the orders
of the RTC of Masbate.

Respondents are members of the Alpha Company, 22nd infantry Battalion of the
Philippine Army in Masbate. Petitioners are widows of Rapsing, Villanueva and
Aparejado, who were allegedly killed by the respondents.

Respondents alleged that on May 3, 2004, they received information about the
presence of NPA partisans in Masbate. Acting on the information, they coordinated
with the PNP and proceeded to the place. There, they encountered armed
elements which resulted to an intense fire fight. After which, seven persons were
named dead including the husbands of the petitioners.

Petitioners claimed that there was no encounter ensued. Hence, they requested
the NBI to conduct investigation. NBI, relying on the statements of the witnesses
who claim that the military massacred helpless and unarmed civilians
recommended to the prosecutor of Masbate to conduct a preliminary investigation
against the respondents for the crime of multiple murder.

Then, before the warrant of arrest of respondents was issued by the RTC Masbate,
Judge advocate general's office of the AFP filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the
case against respondents be transferred to the jurisdiction of the military tribunal, it
was granted.

Petitioners then sought reconsideration of the order, but was denied by the RTC.
Hence, this present petition.

Issue:Whether Judge Ables abused his discretion amounting to excess of

jurisdiction in granting the transfer.

Held:Petition is meritorious. RTC abused its discretion in not taking cognizance of

the case, which actually falls within its jurisdiction.

It is rule of the procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint. what
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing in the complaint.

In this case, murder is a crime within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The military
tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over this case because the offense charged is
not included in the enumeration of the "service-connected offenses or crimes".

Requisites for the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction

E: USE OF IMPOSABLE PENALTY

People v. Buissan, 105 SCRA 547

Facts:

June 26, 1979, Paterno Santiago, private respondent herein, on previous

complaint of the offended party, Araceli C. Medel was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Norte with the crime of simple seduction in an
information. Upon arraignment, respondent Santiago pleaded not guilty, and on the
day set for the trial of the case, said respondent moved to quash the information for
"failure to allege lewd design." He filed a formal Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss
the Information on the same. An opposition was filed by the People of the
Philippines and Judge DimalanesBuissan, one of the public respondents herein,
denied the motion, but remanded the case to the City Court of Dapitan on the
"ground of lack of jurisdiction since the penalty for Simple Seduction is only Arresto
Mayor.

Petitioner People of the Philippines filed its Motion for

Reconsideration  alleging that the City Court has no jurisdiction over the case, but
respondent Judge Buissan denied the motion. City Judge Wilfredo C. Martinez, the
other public respondent, assuming jurisdiction of the case, set the hearing thereof
on the merits. Alleging that CFI Judge Buissan acted with grave abuse of discretion
and that their respective orders likewise referred to above are illegal and void,
petitioner People of the Philippines came to this Court on the present petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction.

Issue:

Whether or not jurisdiction of a criminal case is determined upon the

imposable penalty? YES.

Ruling:

As respondents themselves admit, in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the

court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or
even by the result of the evidence that would be presented during the trial, but by
the extent of the penalty which the law imposes, together with other legal
obligations, on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or
information constitutive of the offense charged, for once jurisdiction is acquired by
the court in which the information is filed, it is there retained regardless of whether
the evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the information.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby
granted. Let the case be returned from the City Court of Dapitan to the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte for trial on the merits.
SO ORDERED.

People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA 341

Facts:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the
Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are
consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law. The
counsel of the defense filed motions to quash the said informations after which the
respondent-courts passed their own orders quashing the said informations on
common ground that the informations did not allege facts constituting an offense
penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an essential element of the crime.

Judge Purisima, in particular, reasoned that the information must allege

that the purpose of possession of the weapon was intended for the purposes of
abetting the conditions of criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder. The
petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is not necessary in this regard
because the prohibited act is basically a malum prohibitum or is an action or
conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The City Fiscal also added in cases
of statutory offenses, the intent is immaterial and that the commission of the act is
voluntary is enough.

Issue:
 Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to
constitute the offense of “Illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under
Presidential Decree No. 9? YES.

Held:

It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal

prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be
sufficient, it must state the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid
surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly.

Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order
dismissing the Information filed before him, thus: ... We believe that… Proclamation
No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law throughout the country was issued
because of wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness and
anarchy. And in order to restore the tranquility and stability of the country and to
secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the quickest possible manner
and time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly weapons without a permit
unless the same would fall under the exception is prohibited. This conclusion
becomes more compelling when we consider the penalty imposable, which is
from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law
would mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the accused. The
petition is DISMISSED.
F. STATUTE APPLICABLE
People vs. Lagon, 185 SCRA 442

Facts:

A criminal information was filed charging private respondent Libertad Lagon

with the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code. The information charged that the accused had allegedly issued a check in
the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or merchandise purchased,
knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check, which check
therefore subsequently bounced.

The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, and not by
the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime. At the time of the
alleged commission of the crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was
vested by law in the City Court. However, by the time the criminal information was
filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had already been
amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder increased,
which penalty was beyond the City Court's authority to impose. Accordingly, the
court dismissed the information without prejudice to its being refiled in the proper
court.Hence this Petition for Review brought by the People, arguing that the City
Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 7362 and that it had
erred in issuing its Order dismissing the case

Issue:
 Would application of the above-settled doctrine to the instant case not result
in also applying Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in disregard of
the rule against retroactivity of penal laws? NO.

Ruling:

In the first place, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined

by the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable
statute given the allegations of a criminal information. Thus, it may be that after
trial, a penalty lesser than the maximum imposable under the statute is proper
under the specific facts and circumstances proven at the trial. In such a case, that
lesser penalty may be imposed by the trial court (provided it had subject-matter
jurisdiction under the rule above referred to) even if the reduced penalty otherwise
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack
of merit. The Order dated 2 December 1976 of the public respondent Presiding
Judge of the City Court of Roxas City is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

Palana v. People, 534 SCRA 296

Facts:

Petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information that on

or about September 1987, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines,
a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly make or draw and issue to
Alex B. The case was archived due to petitioner's non-apprehension despite the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest. The warrant of arrest was recalled and set
aside after petitioner posted the required bail. He was arraigned when he pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged. Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that
petitioner and his wife borrowed money from him in the amount of P590,000.00. To
secure the payment of the loan, petitioner issued a postdated check for the same
amount in favor of the complainant. However, when the check was presented for
payment, it was dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds. Subsequent
demand notwithstanding, petitioner failed to make good the said dishonored check.
Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was an
investment by the latter who was his business patutner.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the check was issued
as a guaranty for the loan, thereby rejecting petitioner's "investment theory". In
ruling against the existence of a partnership between them, the trial court noted
that the so-called partnership... venture, Palana's General Merchandising, was
registered on December 1, 1987 only in the name of petitioner.[13] The Court of
Appeals also held that the act of lending money does not necessarily amount to an
investment of capital.
Issues:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case? YES.

Ruling:

The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, "An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts and the Metropolitan Trial Court"[19] on June 15, 1994 cannot divest the
Regional Trial Court of... jurisdiction over petitioner's case. Where a court has
already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to
proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another... tribunal unless the statute
expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate on
actions pending before its enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive
provisions. However, these only apply to civil cases that have not yet reached the...
pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be
construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases pending
or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.[20] The jurisdiction of
the. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. SO ORDERED.

People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267

Facts:

Former Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan,

Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo were convicted of murder. Hence, this
appeal arguing that the trial court erred when it assumed jurisdiction over the
criminal case. They insisted that the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, had
jurisdiction to try and hear the case against the appellants, as they were public
officers at the time of the killing which was allegedly committed by reason of or in
relation to their office.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case? YES.

Ruling:

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in

force at the time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction,
it may not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new
legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal. The
only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case at bar,
arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is
clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment.

The statutes pertinent to the issue are PD 1606, as amended; and PD 1850,
as amended by PD 1952 and BP 129.
 PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY, IN THE INTEREST
OF JUSTICE, ORDER OR DIRECT, AT ANY TIME BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT,
THAT A PARTICULAR CASE BE TRIED BY THE APPROPRIATE CIVIL COURT.

In the absence of any allegation that the offense was committed in relation to
the office of appellants or was necessarily connected with the discharge of their
functions, the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case.

Asistio v. People, GR No. 200465, April 20, 2015

Facts:

Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of Section 46

of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines (RA 6938) that the said accused, being
then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously acquires personal interest or equity adverse to A. Mabini Elementary
School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative by then and there entering into a
contract with Coca Cola Products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-
Purpose Cooperative in her own personal capacity when in truth and in fact as the
said accused fully well knew, the sale of Coca-Cola products should have accrued
to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative.

CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the RTC Orders dated
October 14, 2008 and February 12, 2009 and remanded the case records to the
RTC for further proceedings. On January 31, 2012, the CA denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of its decision.Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition
for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether in reversing the RTC’s decision of dismissal, has the Court of
appeals gravely erred in disregarding the clean, unambiguous and categorical
provision RA 6938 and adopting for its decision one derived from its interpretation
of a supposed statutory construction?

Ruling:

The Court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature, may
correct clerical errors, mistakes or misprints which, if uncorrected, would render the
statute meaningless, empty or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended
operation, so long as the meaning intended is apparent on the face of the whole
enactment and no specific provision is abrogated. To correct the error or mistake is
to prevent the nullification of the statute and give it a meaning and purpose. For it
is the duty of the court to give a statute a sensible construction, one that will
effectuate legislative intent and avoid injustice or absurdity. It is its duty to
arrive at the legislative intent and in doing so, it should not adopt an arbitrary rule
under which it must be held without variance or shadow of turning the legislature
intended to make a typographical error, the result of which would be to make
nonsense of the act, and not to carry out the legislative scheme, but to destroy it.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the Court

of Appeals Decision dated August 31, 2011 and its Resolution dated Jan. 31, 2012
in CA-G.R. CR No. 32363, are AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

G. Principle of Adherence of Jurisdiction

People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267

Facts:

An administrative case was filed by Nelson Ilisan before the National Police
Commission in which Policemen Tumbagahan, De Los Santos, and Cajilo were
charged with the killing of RonieIlisan. A decision was made which found the police
officers guilty of grave misconduct and ordered their dismissal from the service with
prejudice.

Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Odiongan, Romblon an information for murder against the police officers
and Mayor Cawaling. After due trial, the court rendered its decision finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The killing was
qualified to murder because of the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and treachery. The trial court ruled that there was a notorious inequality of
forces between the victim and his assailant, as the latter were greater in number
and armed with guns.

Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try and hear the case
against the the accused, as they were public officers at the time of the killing which
was allegedly committed by reason of or in relation to their office? NO.

Held:

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in

force at the time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction,
it may not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new
legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal. The
only recognised exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case at bar,
arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is
clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment.

The use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element, and
even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations
but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the
manner of the commission of the crime. Furthermore, the information filed against
the accused contains no allegation that they were public officers who committed
the crime in relation to the office.

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint of information.

In the absence of any allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the
office of the accused or was necessarily connected with the discharge of their
functions, the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case.

H. Objections on Jurisdictional Grounds

Fukuzume v. People, supra

Facts:

Sometime in July 1991, Yu, a businessman engaged in buying and selling

aluminum scrap wires, accompanied by Jovate, went to the house of Fukuzume in
Parañaque. Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is
from Furukawa Electric Corporation and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap
wires. Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong
to Furukawa but they are under the care of NAPOCOR. Believing Fukuzume’s
representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from
Fukuzume. This transaction later turned uneventful as Fukuzume failed to comply
his undertaking to return Yu’s money when Yu was refused by NAPOCOR, thus,
prompting Yu to file an estafa case.Upon arraignment, Fukuzume pleaded not
guilty. Trial ensued, finding the accused guilty as charged. Aggrieved by the trial
court’s decision, he appealed to CA but CA affirmed the trial courts’ decision
modifying only the penalty, hence, the petition before the SC.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense
charged? NO.

Held:

SC answered on the negative. We agree with Fukuzume’s contention that

the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense
charged.

The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI
and the affidavit subscribed by Fukuzume. With respect to the sworn statement of
Yu, which was presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged
that he gave Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in
Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzume’s contention that Yu testified during his
direct examination that he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the
latter’s house. It is not disputed that Fukuzume’s house is located in Parañaque.

The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in

Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu, the prosecution
presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu’s
sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the
offense charged was committed in Makati. From the foregoing, it is evident that the
prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati
or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city.
Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa
should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing
of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.

Ricardo Atienza and Alfredo Castro v. People, supra

Facts:
Petitioners are Court of Appeals (CA) employees; budget officer and utility
worker, respectively. On March 20, 1995, Juanito Atibula (Atibula), a custodian of
the CA Original Decisions, was invited by Castro to Atienza’s birthday party where
he was introduced to a certain Dario who asked for his help in locating a CA
decision in a particular case. (FERNANDO CASE) They found said case in Vol 260
of the CA Original Decisions. Dario perused said document and also scanned Vol.
265. In the following days, Dario approached Atibula and requested the latter to
insert a decision dated Sep 26 1968 in one of the Volumes but Atibula refused.
Atienza thereafter offered him P50,000 in exchange for Vol 260 but he also
refused. Atibula subsequently discovered that Vol. 266 was missing which he
reported to his superiors immediately. Several days later, a certain Nelson de
Castro, also a CA employee, handed Atibula a gift-wrapped package which turned
out to be the missing Vol. 266. De Castro claimed that it was Castro who asked
him to do so. Atienza denied having anything to do with the crimes and he averred
that he was away from the office during the months in question due to work-related
duties as budget and liason officer. Castro on the other hand, did not make any
efforts to refute the charges against him.

RTC held them guilty beyond reasonable doubt and there is conspiracy. The
previous events that conspired between the petitioners and Atibula prove their guilt.
CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the said case and/or whether or
not the Petitioners are precluded from questioning such? NO.

Held:

It bears mentioning that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance
of Criminal Case No. 01–197426 (i.e., the falsification case) since Falsification of
Public Document under Article 172(1) of the RPC, which is punishable
by prisioncorreccional in its medium and maximum periods (or imprisonment for 2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine of not more than P5,000.00, falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts pursuant to Section 32(2) of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise known as the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980,” as amended by RA 7691. While petitioners raised this jurisdictional
defect for the first time in the present petition, they are not precluded from
questioning the same.
 Indeed, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law and cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the
omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. The rule is
well–settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings. Hence, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable
even if raised for the first time on appeal.

People v. Munar, 53 SCRA 278

Facts:

The court herein affirms the judgment of conviction for slight slander as
rendered by the La Union court of first instance. The Court reaffirms the principle
that while the jurisdiction of a court may be challenged at any time, sound public
police bars a party such as appellant from doing so belatedly and challenging the
jurisdiction of the court of first instances after having expressly procured that
jurisdiction herself and speculating on the fortunes of litigation. Accused-appellant
was originally charged with grave slander in the municipal court of San Fernando,
La Union for having uttered defamatory words by calling the offended party the
paramour of somebody.

Accused-appellant filed an appeal directly to the La Union court of first instance

and filed the 100-appeal bond fixed by the municipal court. She was duly re-
arraigned and entered a not-guilty plea. Trial court rendered a decision rejecting
the alibi of the accused, finding her guilty of slight slander and imposing P50 fine
and P500 indemnity to the offended party. Accused filed a Motion for
Reconsideration praying for acquittal and reduction of civil liability to P100 but the
trial court denied the MR and rejected the belated objection.

The accused thereafter filed her notice of appeal directly to the Supreme Court
“Solely on the a question of law, that there was no legal basis for the judgment of
conviction because the proceedings were null and void as the private prosecutor
had no legal personality to represent, or present evidence for, the prosecution in
view of the reservation of the civil action, as borne out by the records.”

Issue:

Whether or not the La Union court of first instance had jurisdiction to try the
case of Slander?

Ruling:

The crime of grave slander comes within are of the concurrent jurisdiction of
municipal courts of provincial capitals or city courts of first instance, and that the
judgment of the La Union courts of first instance to which she had expressly
appealed the municipal court’s conviction should be deemed null and void for want
of jurisdiction as her appeal should have been directly to the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court, but the question is foreclosed by the doctrine of estoppel
enunciated by the Court that “after voluntary submitting a cause and encountering
an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court.” While the jurisdiction of a tribunal may be
challenged at any time, sound public policy bars the petitioners from so
doing after their having procured that jurisdiction themselves, speculation on
the fortunes of litigation.

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29

Facts:

Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy.

Defendants filed a counter bond with ManilaSurety and Fidelity Co (Surety).
Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the
defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was
granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to Court of
Appeals (CA) without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.CA affirmed the
appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a
month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000
exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to SC
since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any
inferior court is in issue.

Issue:

Whether or not Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of

the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal? YES.

Ruling:

Supreme COurt believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to
dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be
estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and
of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held that after
voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits,
it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court
-"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverse. The orders appealed from are affirmed.

Foz, Jr. v. People, 603 SCRA 124

Facts:
 Petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr and Danny Fajardo were charged with the crime
of libel. Upon arraignment, they were assisted by counsel de parte and pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. Trial thereafter ensued, finding both of them guilty.
Petitioners moved for recon but was denied. Dissatisfied, they appealed to CA who
affirmed in toto the RTC decision. They then filed a motion for recon which CA
denied. In their petition to the SC, petitioners raise for the first time the issue that
the information charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest
jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.

Issue:

WON the RTC of Iloilo City had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as
charged.

Ruling:

Supreme Court ruled on the negative. The Court notes that petitioners raised
for the first time the issue of the RTC’s jurisdiction over the offense charged only in
their Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from
doing so.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Article 360 of

the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the
specific rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation: The criminal action
and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this
chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: 

The allegations in the Information that “Panay News, a daily publication with
a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region” only
showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation
but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first published
in Iloilo City.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is

determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Considering that the Information failed to allege
the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the
RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting
petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without
prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.

I. Jurisdiction Conferred by Law

Bacalso vs. Ramolete, 21 SCRA 519

Facts:
 Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for Preliminary
Injunction to restrain respondent Judge from proceeding with the petitioners’ civil
case against herein private respondent. Herein respondent was dissatisfied with a
prior case he has on which decision favored herein petitioner, thereby making the
private respondent file a complaint in the Court of First Instance in
Cebu.Respondents (herein petitioners) of the prior case filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the decision was final and executory, but was denied.
The respondents then filed an “ex-parte motion to order the clerk of court to transfer
this case from Branch V to Branch VII, Barili, Cebu” further invoking the recent
Administrative Order No 302 as amended by Administrative Order 332, which added
2 more branches of the CFI of Cebu.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent Judge presiding over branch V of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu has lost jurisdiction to try and decide the said case by virtue
of the Administrative Orders Nos. 302 and 337 of the Secretary of Justice? NO.

Ruling:

We start with the statement that it is a settled rule that jurisdiction is

conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be fixed by the will of the
parties; it cannot be acquired through, enlarged or diminished by any act of
omission of the parties. Constitutionally viewed, apportionment of jurisdiction is
vested in Congress.

In the case at bar, the respondent Judge grievously erred in not complying
with the directive of the secretary of Justice. Be all that as it may, however, the
legal question under consideration has become moot and academic, because on
June 22, 1963, or more than a, year before the present petition was filed, Republic
Act No. 3729 amending Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Act of 1948, went into effect, increasing the number of branches of the Court of
First Instance in the 14th Judicial District, comprising Cebu, Toledo and Bohol from
11 to 14 branches, and as ordained in Section 6 of the law which means that
branch V of the Court of First Instance of Cebu shall retain jurisdiction to try and
decide the case No. 7278.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, and the writ of preliminary

injunction heretofore issued is hereby dissolved. On equitable considerations, no
costs.

People vs. Estrebella, 164 SCRA 114

Facts:

Accused Romeo Estrebella pleaded not guilty to the crime of rape allegedly
committed by means of force and intimation upon the person of the undersigned,
did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned against her will and consent.
 Accused assails said decision alleging that the trial court gravely erred in
trying the case on ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Trial Court has jurisdiction over the said case? YES.

Ruling:

In the case at bar, while the complaint may have been technically in the
sense that complainant was incompetent, this defect has been cured when
complainant's brother Fernando Alcala took the witness stand for the prosecution.
The brother's testimony shows the consent and willingness of the family of
complainant, who cannot give her consent obviously, to have the private offense
committed against the latter publicly tried. Substantially, this is what is required by
the rules. Evidently, by undergoing trial, the family of complainant chose to
denounce the injustice committed against the latter in public and thus agreed to
bear the personal effects of said exposure. Undoubtedly, therefore, the trial court
had jurisdiction to try the case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the guilt of the accused has been

proved beyond reasonable doubt. The assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.SO
ORDERED.

Heirs of Santiago Nisperos vs. Nisperos-Ducusin, 702 SCRA 721

Facts:

When Santiago and his wife Estefania died, they were survived by their nine
children. The heirs of Santiago, petitioners herein, claim that the subject property
was occupied, controlled and tilled by all nine children of Santiago. They paid taxes
for it and even hired farm workers under Maria and Ciprianas supervision for the
cultivation of the same. For taxation purposes, however, it was initially declared
only under the name of Maria.Starting 1988, it was declared under the names of
Maria and Cipriana. During the time when Maria and Cipriana were overseeing the
property, Maria took respondent Marissa Nisperos-Ducusin, a daughter of their
cousin Purita, as her ward and raised her like her own child.

Alleging fraud on the part of respondent which petitioners claim to have

discovered only in August 2001, petitioners filed a complaint on September 6, 2001
with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of San Fernando City, La
Union. Unfortunately, no settlement between petitioners and respondent was
reached prompting the MARO to issue a Certificate to File Action. On January 23,
2002, petitioners filed with the DARAB a complaint for annulment of documents
and damages against respondent.

Issue:
 Which has jurisdiction over the complaint, the DAR Secretary or the
DARAB?

Ruling:

The complaint should have been lodged with the Office of the DAR Secretary
and not with the DARAB. Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of
Procedure, the rule in force at the time of the filing of the complaint by petitioners in
2001, provides.

SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The

Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657,
Executive Order Nos. 228, 229 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by
Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and
their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include
but not be limited to cases involving the following.

Dolot vs. Paje, 703 SCRA 650

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Order dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution3 dated October 18,
2011 issued by RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 on Continuing Mandamus, Damages
and Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environment
Protection Order (TEPO). Petitioner Maricris Dolot, et al, filed the aforesaid petition
with the RTC of Sorsogon alleging that mining operations conducted by Antones
Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore puts the
municipality of Matnog in environmental dangers and despite this fact, Sorsogon
Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-
scale mining permit. Similarly, it was alleged that representatives of PMS and
DENR did nothing to protect the interest of the people in same community, thus,
respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the
Local Government Code. Dolot, et al primarily prayed for the shutdown of said
mining operations through issuance of TEPO as well as the rehabilitation of the
mining sites and the return of the iron ore mined in the area. The case was referred
by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated
environmental court. However, the case was summarily dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC averred that SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 and
Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 limit the power of such court to try and hear the case
as its territorial jurisdiction was limited to violations of environmental laws within the
boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar,
Castilla, Casiguran and Juban.

Issue:
 Whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-
8338?

Ruling:

The SC held that such reasoning is plainly erroneous and that RTC cannot
solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself
within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed
by the petitioners. As reiterated by the SC, jurisdiction is the power and authority of
the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law. It may either be over
the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants
or over the issues framed in the pleadings. BP Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 also states that jurisdiction over special civil actions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC, hence, original
jurisdiction shall be exercised by the RTCs. Both the SC AO and AC merely
provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court does not have the
power to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction
is lodged solely in Congress and the same cannot be delegated to another office or
agency of the Government.

J. Jurisdiction Vested in Courts not Judges

People vs. Fule, 105 Phil. 1171

Facts:

On June 18, 1957, the Provincial Fiscal of Laguna filed an information for
serious oral defamation against Jose Fule with the office of the deputy clerk of
court of the second branch of the Court of First Instance of Laguna comprising the
City of San Pablo. 

On June 20, 1957, said information was received in the office of the deputy clerk of
court of the third branch of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Said information
was transmitted to the third branch because pursuant to Administrative Order No.
149, series of 1955, of the Secretary of Justice which distributed the cases arising
from the different municipalities in the Province of Laguna among the three
branches of the court, the offense committed was cognizable by the third branch of
the court stationed in San Pablo City. 

Issue:

Whether or not Jurisdiction is vested in the Court or Judges?

Ruling:

Jurisdiction is vested in the Court. There is only one court of first instance of
Leyte; each of its six branches is not a court separate and distinct from the five
other branches. Jurisdiction, furthermore, is vested in the court, not in the judges.
So, when a complaint or information is filed before one branch or judge, jurisdiction
does not attach to said branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the others. The
apportionment does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction; this continues
to be vested in the court of first instance of the province as a whole, and trial
may be had by any branch or judge of the court.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings. No costs. 

K. Determination of Jurisdiction
Treas vs. People, supra

Facts:

Margarita Alocilja (Margarita), through her employee and niece, Elizabeth

Luciaja, wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266
and availed the services of herein petitioner, Atty. Hector Treas (Hector) regarding
the transfer of the title in the Former’s name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the
titling of the property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses
would be incurred: 1)P20,000.00- Attorneys fees; 2) P90,000.00-Capital Gains Tax;
3) P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp, and 4) P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.

During arraignment, petitioner, entered a plea of Not Guilty and due to old
age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to
attend the pre-trial and trial of the case. Petitioner claims that the only logical
conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially
since his residence and office were situated there as well. Thus, the trial court
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:
Can the Regional Trial Court of Makati acquire jurisdiction over the crime of
estafa which the prosecution failed to allege any of the acts material to such
crime had occurred in Makati City?

Ruling:

No. The accused is correct in his argument that he is not required to present
evidence to prove lack of jurisdiction when such lack is already indicated in the
prosecution evidence. As a settled principle in criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense committed outside its limited territory. As explained in the case of Isip v.
People, The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue
of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else,
the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

Moreover, Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal

Procedure of 2000 provides that subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall
be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense
was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. Hence,
jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is
given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law

Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was
dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense
of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. There being no showing that the
offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over
the case.

Buaya vs. Polo, 169 SCRA 471

Facts:

Buaya was an insurance agent of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation

(CBIC) and was authorized to collect premiums for and in behalf of CBIC then
make a report and accounting of the transactions and remit the same to the
principal office of CBIC in Manila. However, an audit of Buaya‟s account showed
that there was a shortage in the amount of P358,850. As a result, she was charged
with estafa before the RTC of Manila.

Buaya filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the RTC of Manila has no
jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds she
allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu City. She also contends that the
subject matter of this case is purely civil in nature. Judge Polo, however denied the
motion to dismiss.

Issue:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Manila have jurisdiction to try the
criminal case against Buaya?

Held:

Yes. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the

allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may
make after the trial. Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: "In all criminal — prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any
of the essential elements thereof took place."

The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the
period 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines . . . ."
Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of
Manila has jurisdiction.

Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may

be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential elements of the crime took
place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the
offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of business and
office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she
collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.
Petitioners other contention that the subject matter is purely civil in nature, suffice it
to state that evidentiary facts on this point have still to be proved.

L. When Jurisdiction Attaches

Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191

Facts:

That on or about June 29, 1994 in the afternoon Rey Sunga, RamilLansang,
Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and LitoOctac as principals, and Locil Cui alias
GinalynCuyos as accomplice by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit:
by pinning down one JOCELYN TAN, a minor, fifteen (15) years of age, succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent; that on
the occasion of said rape and to enable them to conceal the commission of the
crime, the herein accused in furtherance of the conspiracy together with LOCIL
CUI, a minor, acting with discernment and who cooperated in the execution of the
offense as ACCOMPLICE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
taking advantage of their superior number and strength, with intent to kill,
treacherously attack, assault, and use personal violence upon JOCELYN TAN by
repeatedly stabbing and smashing a stone on her head, thereby inflicting upon her
mortal wounds and multiple fractures on her skull which were the direct cause of
her death shortly thereafter.  

On October 18, 1994 a motion to discharge accused Locil Cui (Locil) to be a

state witness, averring therein that the legal requisites for her discharge had been
complied with, and submitting her sworn statement which detailed how her co-
accused carried out the crime.  

Issue:

Whether or not jurisdiction can be acquired through testimonies? NO.

Ruling:

The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a self-confessed

accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused
cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral
certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime.
The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points by
unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and must be to such an extent
that its trustworthiness becomes manifest.  

M. Withdrawal of Information
Palana vs. People, 534 SCRA 296

Facts:
 On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of BP 22. Private
complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September 1987, petitioner
and his wife borrowed money from him in the amount of P590,000.00. To secure
the payment of the loan, petitioner issued a postdated check for the same amount
in favor of the complainant. However, when the check was presented for payment,
it was dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds. Subsequent demand
notwithstanding, petitioner failed to make good the said dishonored check.

Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was
an investment by the latter who was his business partner. He argued that the
subject check was not issued in September 1987 to guarantee the payment of a
loan since his checking account was opened only on December 1, 1987. He
claimed that private complainant cajoled him to issue a check in his favor allegedly
to be shown to a textile supplier who would provide the partnership with the
necessary raw materials. Petitioner alleged that when the check was issued
sometime in February 1988, complainant knew that the same was not funded.

Issues:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case? YES.

Ruling:

Petitioner’s argument that it is the MTC and not the RTC which has
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is without merit. It is hornbook
doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in
force at the time of the institution of the action and not during the
arraignment of the accused. The Information charging petitioner with violation of
BP 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that time, the governing law determinative
of jurisdiction is BP 129 which provides “Exclusive original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two
months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, that in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos.”

N. Affidavit of Desistance
People vs. Ballabare, G.R. No. 108871, November 19, 1996

Facts:

The case arose from the killing of two brothers, Juan Tacadao and Leonardo
Tacadao, Jr., in the afternoon of September 16, 1990, at Sitio Isumbo, Barangay
Pulot II, Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan. Accused-appellant
Gerry Ballabare and his brother, Eder Ballabare, were charged with double murder
with the use of illegally possessed firearms.

Evelyn Alcantara, a resident of another sitio, corroborated accused-

appellant's claim. In addition, the defense submitted to the court an Affidavit for the
withdrawal of the testimony of eyewitness Tessie Asenita and the Affidavit of
Desistance of Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., father of the victims, identified the
signatures on the affidavits and testified that accused-appellant had nothing to do
with the crime because he was not allegedly present at the shooting. He claimed
that it was Eder Ballabare who shot the brothers, and that Gerry Ballabare was
implicated only because the family of the deceased wanted to secure the
conviction of two members of the Ballabare family to answer for the loss of two of
its members.

Issue:

Whether or not the Affidavit of Desistance will affect the

Information/Complaint filed? NO.

Ruling:

The affidavit of desistance of the complainant, like the alleged affidavit of

retraction by Tessie Asenita, is not a repudiation of the material points alleged
in the information and proven at the trial, but a mere expression of the lack of
interest of private complainant to pursue the case. Moreover, the trial court
already had the opportunity of taking a hard look at the records of the case, as
accused-appellant urges, when it resolved the motion for reconsideration filed by
the appellant prior to the elevation of the case on appeal before this Court, but the
trial court found no basis for altering its decision.

RULE 110: Prosecution of Offenses

SECTION 1:

Effects of Institution of the Criminal Action on the Prescriptive Period Pertaining to

Violations of Ordinances –
Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. vs. Hon. Judge Nelson F. Lidua Sr., G.R. No.
169588, October 7, 2013

Facts: 

Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru its General Manager

Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay
alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents Edwin
Ang, BenedictoBalajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the
clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No.
WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and
unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to
Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is P26,250.00.
The fines of P500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of P500.00 were
also not paid by the respondents herein.

Jadewell filed two cases against respondents for Robbery. Respondent

BenedictoBalajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan,
and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion.

Issue: 

Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on
May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense
charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."?

Ruling: 

The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive

law and the procedural rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard
to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that
provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and municipal
ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the
law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No.
3326 as amended does not apply.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on
October 5, 2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge
Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against
respondents. The information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor
signing the same.

Zaldivia vs. Judge Reyes, G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992

Facts:

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a

mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of
Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal. The offense was allegedly committed on May
11, 1990. The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. The corresponding information
was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. The
petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had
prescribed, but the motion was denied. The petitioner first argues that the charge
against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary
Procedure.

Issues:
What is the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of
municipal ordinances?

Ruling:

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the

offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that
the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of
Rodriguez, is governed by... that rule... the Court feels that if there be a conflict
between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be
a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules... on Criminal
Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"...
the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty
cannot exceed six months, and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.

Under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint
is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the
institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late.

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the
petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended
two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No.
3326.

It was not interrupted by the filing... of the complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The
judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the
information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done... only on
October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.

Rules of Prescription for Violation of Special Law (BP 22)

People vs. Pangilinan (G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012)

Facts:

Ma. Theresa Pangilinan, the respondent in this instant case allegedly issued
9 checks with the aggregate amount of P9,658,692 in favor of Virginia Malolos.
But, upon Malolos' presentment of the said checks, they were dishonored. So, on
Sept. 16, 1997, Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22
against Pangilinan. On December 5, 1997, Pangilinan filed a civil case for
accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of
contract and specific performance against Malolos before the RTC of Valenzuela
City. Later, Pangilinan also filed on December 10, 1997, a "Petition to Suspend
Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question".

            On March 2, 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay

recommended Pangilinan's petition which was approved by the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City. Malolos, then, raised the matter before the DOJ.

Issue:

Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of
BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.
YES.

Ruling: 

Under Section 1 of Act No. 3326 which is the law applicable to B.P. 22
cases, “[v]iolations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in
such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:… after four years for
those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two
years.” Under Section 2 of the same Act, “[t]he prescription shall be interrupted
when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on

16 September 1997.  The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13
February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for
accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of
proceedings on the ground of “prejudicial question”.  The matter was raised before
the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend
proceedings.  It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the
informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon
City.

Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that
caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
Section 2:

Name of People of the Philippines

Francisco Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 177720, February 18, 2009

Facts:

Eliseo R. Francisco is the Acquiring Chargeback Supervisor of Bankard Inc.

Bankard is a credit card company engaged in issuing credit cards and acquiring
credit card receivables from commercial establishments arising from purchases.
The company serves as an intermediary between the credit card holder and a
bank. Petitioner Francisco was tasked to convert the Equicom reports send through
electronic mail from its original ARJ Text Format to the Amipro Format used by
Bankard. Francisco was the only one assigned to perform this task. Bankard found
several discrepancies between the original reports of Equicom with those
converted by Francisco. There was a reversal of charges from 4 different
establishments to Francisco’s account. Upon a closer look, there was no record of
actual transactions or purchases. Since there were no original purchase
transactions charged against Francisco’s credit cards, the reversal of charges and
the crediting of sums of money to Francisco’s credit cards appeared to be fictitious.
Due to this, Bankard was made to pay the same to Solidbank, the actual bank of
Francisco, the amount credited to Francisco’s credit card. Due to these fraudulent
transactions, Bankard filed a criminal case of estaffa against Francisco. The RTC
and the CA all ruled in favor of Bankard.

Issue:
 Whether or not Bankard is the offended party in this case? YES.

Ruling:

Yes and even if not, the complaint would still be valid. Petitioner Francisco
further argues that Bankard had no personality to file the complaint, since the credit
card companies were the ones which really suffered damage in the case at bar.
Thus, argued petitioner Francisco, the third element of estafa under Article 315(a)
was lacking: Stated otherwise, this element speaks of an offended party which
undoubtedly may only refer to Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa simply because
it was these two credit card companies that extended credit facilities to herein
petitioner when the latter used his credit cards.

The Information filed by the prosecutor with the proper court is sufficient. A
crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of
the People of the Philippines. The participation of the private offended party is
not essential to the prosecution of crimes, except in the crimes stated above, or in
the prosecution of the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action.11 A
complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor need not be
filed by the "offended party" but may be filed by any competent person.

Section 3 and 4:

When Complaint or information is Sufficient

Enrile vs. Manalastas, G.R. No. 166414, October 22, 2014

FACTS:

The mauling incident involving neighbors end up with filing of criminal case in
the MTC for frustrated homicide and less serious physical injuries. The MTC
denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration because the grounds of the
motion had already been discussed and passed upon in the resolution sought to be
reconsidered; and because the cases were governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure, which prohibited the motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the
petitioners presented a manifestation with motion to quash and a motion for the
deferment of the arraignment.

The MTC denied the motion to quash, and ruled that the cases for less
serious physical injuries were covered by the rules on ordinary procedure; and
reiterated the arraignment previously scheduled. Unsatisfied, the petitioners
commenced a special civil action for certiorari assailing the order of the MTC in the
RTC. RTC Judge Manalastas dismissed the petition for certiorari. The petitioners
moved for the reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion.

The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition
to nullify the orders issued by the RTC, averring grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They urged the dismissal of the criminal
cases on the same grounds they advanced in the RTC. The CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition for being the wrong remedy.
Issue:

Whether or not the complaint or information was sufficiently charged? YES.

Ruling:

In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaints
sufficiently charged the petitioners with less serious physical injuries. Indeed, the
complaints only needed to aver the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the
details of why and how the illegal acts allegedly amounted to undue injury or
damage, for such matters, being evidentiary, were appropriate for the trial. Hence,
the complaints were not quashable.

Rosaldes vs. People (G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014)

FACTS:

The petitioner FelinaRosaldes, a public schoolteacher, was charged and

found guilty of child abuse punished under RA 7610. It appears from the records
that seven-year-old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil, was hurriedly
entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knew of his teacher,
herein petitioner, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Petitioner asked Michael
to apologize, the latter, however, proceeded instead to his seat. Petitioner then
pinched Michael on his thigh, held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the
floor causing him to hit a desk and, consequently, losing his consciousness.
Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael by his ears and repeatedly slammed him
down on the floor.

Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists that the issues the petitioner
is raising are mainly factual and, therefore, not reviewable under the mode of
appeal chosen; that the affirmance of her conviction by the CA was in accord with
the pertinent law and jurisprudence, and supported by the overwhelming evidence
of the trial; and that the information charging her with child abuse was sufficient in
form and substance.

Issue:

Whether or not the Information or Complaint was sufficiently complied with?

YES.

Ruling:

Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the information is sufficient
if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed.

The information explicitly averred the offense of child abusecharged against

the petitioner in the context of the statutory definition of child abuse found in
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the
requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the Court
should no longer entertain the petitioner’s challenge against the sufficiency of the
information in form and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior
to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the ground
that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not
charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.

People v. Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647

Facts: 

In 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with two (2)
counts of rape and one (1) count of attempted rape. The complaint for attempted
rape stated as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of

Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y
Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt
acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous
desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the complainant's mother.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint or information for attempted rape sufficiently

alleged the specific acts or omissions constituting the offense? NO.

Ruling:

For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the

accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed.

Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned
does not allege specific acts or omission constituting the elements of the crime of
rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of elements for crimes other
than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein that the appellant
'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the complainant does not satisfy the test of
sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the
one who drafted the complaint. This insufficiency therefore prevents this Court from
rendering a judgment of conviction; otherwise we would be violating the right of the
appellant to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
Lasoy v. Zenarosa, 455 SCRA 360

Facts: 

Lasoy and Banisa were charged before the RTC with violation of Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 for transporting and selling 42.41 grams of marijuana fruiting
tops. Both pleaded guilty on arraignment and were later on sentenced to suffer a
jail term of 6 months and 1 day. Both accused applied for probation. Subsequently,
the prosecutor filed two separate motions: (1) to admit amended Information, and
(2) to set aside the arraignment of the accused. The prosecutor intended to amend
the filed information because for some reason, Lasoy and Banisa were charged of
selling 42.41 grams instead of 42.41 kilograms of marijuana.

The motions were granted. Thus the information now states “kilograms”
instead of “grams". Both accused filed a motion to quash.

Judge Zenarosa denied the motion to quash and scheduled the arraignment
of the accused under the amended information. Lasoy and Banisa raises a petition
for certiorari on the ground of double jeopardy. In response, respondent claims that
the trial based on the first information was a sham and that the petitioners
participated in tampering the information.

Issue:

Whether or not the Information or Complaint was sufficiently complied with?

YES.

Held:

An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation

of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.

In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary
intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the
matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It
is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the information. The
information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law.

The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21, mandates that no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In this
case, the accused had been arraigned and convicted. In fact, they were already in
the stage where they were applying for probation. It is too late in the day for the
prosecution to ask for the amendment of the information and seek to try again
accused for the same offense without violating procedural rules and their rights
guaranteed under the Constitution.

People v. Batin, G.R. No. 177223, November 28, 2007

Facts:

We are reviewing herein the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 6
February 2007, in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01396, affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, convicting father and son, Castor and
Neil Batin, of the crime of murder. The conviction was for the killing of one Eugenio
Refugio, who was shot in the afternoon of 21 October 1994, while he was leaning
against a mango tree near his house on St. Peter Street, San Paolo Subdivision,
NagkakaisangNayon, Novaliches, Quezon City. The Information2 against Castor
and Neil Batin was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

Castor Batin prays that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and
set aside and a new one entered acquitting him of the crime charged. In the
alternative, he prays that he be held liable for the crime of homicide only, arguing
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not sufficiently stated in the
Information.

Issue:

Whether or not the Information or Complaint was sufficiently complied with?

YES.

Ruling:

Castor does not refute the above findings of the trial court that treachery was
sufficiently proven during the trial. All that Castor claims before us is that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was not specifically alleged in the Information

Hence, it did not satisfy the test of sufficiency of Information as provided in

Sections 9 of Rule 110 provides:

SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation.—The acts or omissions complained of as

constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used
in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding
to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

We hold that the allegation of treachery in the Information is sufficient.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases wherein we found the allegation of treachery
sufficient without any further explanation as to the circumstances surrounding it

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with

modification the conviction of accused-appellant Castor Batin for murder is
AFFIRMED with FURTHER MODIFICATION as to the amount of the moral
damages, which is hereby reduced to ₱50,000.00. SO ORDERED.
People v. Cachapero, G.R. No. 153008, May 20, 2004

Facts:
 Larry Cachapero y Basilio appeals the January 15, 2002 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68), in Criminal Case No.
98-68 Cam, finding him guilty of Rape.

Contending that time is a material ingredient of rape, appellant argues that

the Information was fatally defective for failing to state the precise hour when the
crime was committed. Such infirmity, he added, jeopardized his right to be properly
informed of the charge against him.

Issue:

Whether or not the Information or Complaint was not sufficiently complied

with alleging that date and hour of the offense is an essential element to be stated?
NO.

Ruling:

We disagree. The time of occurrence is not an essential element of

rape. This being so, its precise date and hour need not be alleged in the complaint
or information. Section 11 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:

"SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense. – It is not necessary to state in

the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed
except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be
alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual
date of its commission."

The Information in this case alleged that the crime was committed "sometime
in March 1998" which, according to private complainant, was more or less at the
closing of the school year. Being reasonably definite and certain, this
approximation sufficiently meets the requirement of the law. After all, Section 6 of
Rule 110of the Rules of Court merely requires that the information must state,
among others, the approximate time of the commission of the offense.

Moreover, objections as to the form of the complaint or information cannot be

made for the first time on appeal. If the present appellant found the Information
insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment either for a bill of
particulars, for him to be properly informed of the exact date of the alleged rape; or
for the quashal of the Information, on the ground that it did not conform with the
prescribed form. Having failed to pursue either remedy, he is deemed to have
waived objection to any formal defect in the Information.

It cannot be said, therefore, that his constitutionally protected right to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him has been violated.
Section 5:

Criminal Actions in General

Ampatuan, Jr. vs. Sec. De Lima, G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013

Facts:
 In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors
charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao
massacre. One Kenny Dalandag, was admitted into the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ and was later on listed as one of the prosecution witness. On
October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel request the inclusion of Dalandag in
the information for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his
participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. Petitioner
reiterated the request twice more on October 22, 2010 and November 2, 2010. But
Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s request.

Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for

mandamus in the RTC in Manila seeking to compel respondents to charge
Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the
QC RTC. The RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference and issued a pre-trial order.
The respondents questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding
for mandamus. Petitioner opposed. On June 27, 2011, the RTC of Manila issued
the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-124777 dismissing the petition for
mandamus. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge

Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao
massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ?
NO.

Ruling:

The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors
committed grave abuse of discretion in identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted
for the Maguindanao massacre. It is notable in this regard that petitioner does not
assail the joint resolution recommending such number of individuals to be charged
with multiple murder, but only seeks to have Dalandag be also investigated and
charged as one of the accused based because of his own admissions in his sworn
declarations. However, his exclusion as an accused from the informations did not
at all amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors
whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which
requires that "the complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons who
appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision,
may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the
commission of a crime becomes a state witness.

Hasegawa vs. Giron, G.R. No. 184536, August 14, 2013

Facts:

Respondent (Giron) filed a Complaint- Affidavit for Kidnapping and Serious

Illegal Detention against petitioner and several John Does. Respondent alleged
that she and her officemate, Leonarda Marcos (Marcos) filed a complaint against
their employer Pacific Consultants International, J.F. Cancio& Associates, Jaime F.
Cancio, TesaTagalo and petitioner for illegal salary deductions, non-payment of
13th month pay, and non-remittance of SSS contributions. Respondent averred that
since the filing of said complaint, they have been subjected to threats and verbal
abuse by petitioner to pressure them to withdraw the complaint. Respondent had
also filed separate complaints for grave threats, grave coercion, slander and unjust
vexation against petitioner. Said cases are pending before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Pasay City.

Issue:

Whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the accused?

Ruling:

It depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor. The decision of Courts

will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations, or reinvestigations,
or in the determination of what constitutes sufficient probable cause for the filing of
the corresponding information against an offender. Courts are not empowered to
substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch. Differently stated, as
the matter of whether to prosecute or not is purely discretionary on his part, courts
cannot compel a public prosecutor to file the corresponding information, upon a
complaint, where he finds the evidence before him insufficient to warrant the filing
of an action in court.

In sum, the prosecutor’s findings on the existence of probable cause are not
subject to review by the courts, unless these are patently shown to have been
made with grave abuse of discretion. We find such reason for judicial review here
present. We sustain the appellate court’s reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of
the DOJ.

Crespo vs. Mogul , G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987

Facts:

Assistant Fiscal Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information for estafa against Mario Crespo. When the case was set for
arraignment, the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that
there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. The
respondent denied the motion. Court of Appeals restrained the judge from
enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the
Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. Then, Usec
of Justice resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal. However, the Judge denied the motion
and set the arraignment stating. A motion and restraining order was filed again in
the CA but was dismissed. Thus, this case.

Issue:

Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by
the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case
was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the
arraignment and trial on the merits?

Ruling:

YES. It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by

complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the
direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution
by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant. It is through the
conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a
prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot
interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. Thus, a
fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has
authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error.

Discretion of Public Prosecutor

Pinote v. Ayco, 477 SCRA 409

Facts:

On August 13 and 20, 2004, Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Branch 26, Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the defense in Criminal Case No.
1771 TB, "People v. Vice Mayor Salvador Ramos, et al.," for violation of Section 3
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, to present evidence consisting of the
testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar B.
Pinote who was prosecuting the case.

State Prosecutor Pinote was on August 13 and 20, 2004 undergoing medical
treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City, hence, his absence during
the proceedings on the said dates.

By way of counter-complaint, respondent charges complainant with

"Contempt of Court" and "Grave Misconduct" and/or "Conduct Unbecoming of a
Member of the Bar and as an Officer of the Court."

Issue:

Whether or not Prosecutor have exercised grave abuse of discretion? YES.

Ruling:

On evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), citing
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure, finds respondent
to have breached said rule and accordingly recommends that he be reprimanded
therefor, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.

Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

 Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All criminal actions
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of the prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule or in the event of
lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by
the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to
prosecute the case subject to the approval of the Court. Once so authorized to
prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the
case up to the end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless
the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.

Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the
control and direction of the public prosecutor.

Bureau of Customs v. Whelan, G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011

Facts:

Mark Sensing Philippines, Inc. (MSPI) caused the importation of 255,

870,000 pieces of finished bet slips and 205, 200 rolls of finished thermal papers
from June 2005 to January 2007. MSPI facilitated the release of the shipment from
the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), where it was brought, to the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) for its lotto operations in Luzon. MSPI did not
pay duties or taxes, prompting the Bureau of Customs (petitioner) to file, under its
Run After The Smugglers (RATS) Program, a criminal complaint before the
Department of Justice against herein respondents MSPI Chairman Peter Sherman,
Managing Director Michael Whelan, Country Manager Atty. Ofelia B. Cajigal and
Finance Manager and Corporate Secretary Teodoro B. Lingan, along with Erick B.
Ariarte and Ricardo J. Ebuna and Eugenio Pasco, licensed customs broker who
acted as agents of MSPI, for violation the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines. The state prosecutor found probable cause against respondents and
accordingly recommended the filing of Information against them.

Issue:

Whether or not the CTA gravely abused its discretion by merely noting
without action petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration? NO.

Ruling:

It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive

department of the government whose principal power and responsibility is to insure
that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute
violators. All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are
prosecuted under the direction and control of public prosecutors. In the prosecution
of special laws, the exigencies of public service sometimes require the designation
of special prosecutors from different government agencies to assist the public
prosecutor. The designation does not, however, detract from the public prosecutor
having control and supervision over the case. By merely noting without action
petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration, the CTA did not gravely abuse its discretion.
For, as stated earlier, a public prosecutor has control and supervision over the
cases. The participation in the case of a private complainant, like petitioner, is
limited to that of a witness, both in the criminal and civil aspect of the case.

Parenthetically, petitioner is not represented by the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG) in instituting the present petition, which contravenes established
doctrine that "the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of lawyers.

IN FINE, as petitioner’s MR of the CTA Resolution did not bear the

imprimatur of the public prosecutor to which the control of the prosecution of the
case belongs, the present petition fails.
Flores v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 188197, August 03, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner Leonardo U. Flores (Flores) filed a complaint-affidavit against

private respondent Eugene Lim (Lim) for estafa before the City Prosecutor of Cebu
City... the City Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution dated January 16,
2005 dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause. Flores filed a petition for
review with the Secretary of Justice questioning the January 16, 2005 and the June
2, 2005 Resolutions. The Secretary of Justice dismissed the petition on the ground
that there was no showing of any reversible error on the part of the handling
prosecutors... the Secretary of Justice reconsidered

Pursuant to the said directive, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City an Information against Lim for
the crime of Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
the Secretary of Justice reconsidered anew and issued another Resolution
Accordingly, on May 3, 2007, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed with the MTCC a
Motion to Withdraw Information. Seeking to nullify the March 22, 2007 Resolution,
Flores filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on May 22, 2007.
Meanwhile, on June 20, 2007, the MTCC issued its Resolution denying the Motion
to Withdraw Information.

Issue:

Whether or not the June 20, 2007 resolution of the municipal trial court,
denying respondent Lim's motion to withdraw information and finding probable
cause, rendered the disposition of the petition before [the] court of appeals
academic? YES.

Ruling:

With respect to the first issue, we rule in the affirmative.  Indeed, as Crespo
declared--

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the

Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by
the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or... appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the
complaint or information has already been filed in Court.  The matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the Court.

Upon filing of the Information, the MTCC acquired jurisdiction over the case. Lim
filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 31, 2006 Resolution of the Secretary
of Justice.  There was nothing procedurally infirm in this course of action inasmuch
as there is nothing in Crespo that bars the Secretary of Justice from reviewing
resolutions of his subordinates in an appeal or petition for review in criminal cases. 
The Secretary of Justice was merely advised in Crespo that, as far as practicable,
he should not take cognizance of an appeal when the complaint or information is
already filed in court.

Criminal Prosecution Cannot be Restrained; Exceptions

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Hon. Hontanosas, G.R. No. 157163, June
25, 2014

Facts:

On May 22, 2001, respondents Spouses Silverio and ZosimaBorbon,

Spouses Xerxes and Erlinda Facultad,and XM Facultad and Development
Corporation commenced Civil Case No. CEB-26468 to seek the declaration of the
nullity of the promissory notes,real estate and chattel mortgages and continuing
surety agreement they had executed in favor of the petitioner. They further sought
damages and attorney’s fees, and applied for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the petitioner from foreclosing on
the mortgages against their properties.

The complaint alleged that the respondents had obtained a loan from the
petitioner, and had executed promissory notes binding themselves, jointly and
severally, to pay the sum borrowed; that as security for the payment of the loan,
they had constituted real estate mortgages on several parcels of land in favor of
the petitioner; and that they had been made to sign a continuing surety agreement
and a chattel mortgage on their Mitsubishi Pajero.

Issue:

Whether or not Criminal Prosecution can be restrained? YES with

exceptions.

Ruling:

As a general rule, the courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction –
whether preliminary or final – in order to enjoin or restrain any criminal
prosecution.48 But there are extreme cases in which exceptions to the general rule
have been recognized, including: (1) when the injunction is necessary to afford
adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when it is
necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice; (4)
when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) when the
prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double
jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) when the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(8) when it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) when the charges
are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there
is clearly no prima faciecase against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied.

However, the respondents did not sufficiently show that Civil Case No. CEB-
26468 came under any of the foregoing exceptions. Hence, the issuance by the
RTC of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from instituting
criminal complaints for violation of BP No. 22 against the respondents was
unwarranted.

Review by the Secretary of Justice

Department of Justice vs. Alaon, G.R. No. 189596, April 23, 2014

Facts:

Private complainant AAA filed a complaint against Alaon charging him with
the crime of rape occurring on three separate but successive occasions.
The Provincial Prosecution Office of Daet, Camarines Norte found probable cause
to indict Alaon for three (3) counts of rape. Acting favorably on Alaon's Motion for
Reconsideration, the Provincial Prosecutor downgraded the offense from rape to
acts of lasciviousness Consequently, an Information against Alaon was filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Labo, Camarines Norte

Apparently confused, Prosecutor Estrellado, on the following day, 12 June

2003, filed a motion to withdraw appearance, insisting that the case remained
pending review by the Secretary of Justice.

Alaon thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing
the Resolution of the DOJ for being issued in grave abuse of discretion. On 25
March 2009, the appellate court granted Alaon's petition and annulled the
Resolution of the DOJ, finding grave abuse of discretion in its issuance.

Issues:

Whether or not the DOJ Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion in its
review? NO.

Ruling:

The Secretary of Justice did not abuse his discretion when he acted on the
letter request of BBB, the mother of the victim, AAA.

There is no quarrel about the Secretary of Justice's power of review over the
actions of his subordinates, specifically public prosecutors. This power of review is
encompassed in the Secretary of Justice's authority of supervision and control over
the bureaus, offices, and agencies under him, subject only to specified guidelines.

Nonetheless, we agree with the appellate court's holding that Alaon was
deprived of his right to procedural due process, as he was not given an opportunity
to be heard on the letter-appeal of private complainant's mother
The conduct of preliminary investigation is subject to the requirements of both
substantive and procedural due process. Preliminary investigation is considered as
a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature
of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer.

Even at the stage of petition for review before the Secretary of Justice, the
requirements for substantive and procedural due process do not abate.

When Private Offended Party May Bring Special Civil Action of Certiorari in
Criminal Proceedings
Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, G.R. No. 126210, March 9, 2000

Facts:

Private respondent Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. owns the Hagonoy Money
Shop which employed petitioner Cristina O. Perez as Officer-In-Charge, Cashier
and Teller, Alberto S. Fabian as Bookkeeper, and Cristina Medina and Milagros
Martin as Solicitors/FieldManagers. From August 3, 1992 up to December 5, 1993,
the Laya, Manabat, Salgado and Company, an independent management,
consultancy and accounting firm, conducted an audit of the financial affairs of the
Hagonoy Money Shop and found anomalies in more or less twenty-eight (28)
savings accounts consisting of withdrawals which were recorded in the subsidiary
ledgers of the money shop but not in the passbooks which were in the possession
of the depositors. The audit also revealed that to cover-up the anomalous
withdrawals, fake deposits were recorded in the money shop's subsidiary ledgers
whenever the remaining balance in a particular savings account went below the
amount of legitimate withdrawals made by depositor. This prompted the private
respondent to file an affidavit-complaint for estafa against the aforementioned
employees of the money shop and two outsiders, Susan Jordan and Brigida
Mangahas. Acting Provincial Prosecutor, Jesus Y. Manarang ( "prosecutor"),
issued a resolution finding prima facie evidence that the petitioner and her co-
employees had committed the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents, and recommending the filing of the information against them with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The charges against Susan
Jordan and Brigida Mangahas were, however dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition
for review with the Secretary of Justice praying for the dismissal of the charges
against her.

Issue:

Whether or not the private respondent, as private complainant, in a criminal

case has the legal personality to question the dismissal by the trial judge of the
criminal charges against herein petitioner upon the motion filed by the prosecutor?
YES.

Ruling:

While it is only the Solicitor General that may bring or defend actions on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in
criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the
private offended party retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in
his own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of law. Rationale In the
case of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals, we held that: "In a special civil action for
certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may
be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State
and the private offended party or complainant.
Prosecutors in Election Cases
Ejercito vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014

Facts:
Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 Elections, a petition for disqualification
was filed by Edgar “Egay” San Luis before the COMELEC against Emilio Ramon
“E.R.” P. Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the
incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna.Petition alleged Ejercito distributed
orange card to influence voters in his favor; and Ejercito exceeds the amount of
expenditures necessary.Ejercito proclaimed Governor.The COMELEC First
Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference. Ejercito prayed for the
dismissal of the petition which was improperly filed because it is in reality a
complaint for election offenses, thus, the case should have been filed before the
COMELEC Law Department, and if with probable cause, file with proper court.

Ejercito filed before the Court GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION against

COMELEC and contends It violated the right of petitioner due process when it
ruled for disqualification of petitioner even it was not prayed for disqualification.
Worse, there is yet no finding of guilt by competent court that he committed
election offense.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion? NO.

Ruling:

An election offense has both criminal and electoral aspects. The electoral
aspect may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa. The
criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines whether there is probable
cause to charge a candidate for an election offense. The prosecutor is the
COMELEC, through its Law Department, which determines whether probable
cause exists. If there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through its Law
Department, files the criminal information before the proper court. Proceedings
before the proper court demand a full-blown hearing and require proof beyond
reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the disqualification
of the offender, which may even include disqualification from holding a future public
office. The conduct of preliminary investigation is not required in the resolution of
the electoral aspect of a disqualification case.

The “exclusive power of the COMELEC to conduct a preliminary

investigation of all casesinvolving criminal infractions of the election laws” stated in
Par. 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 pertains to the criminal aspect of a
disqualification case. Hence, an erring candidate may be disqualified even without
prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation
Complainant in Private Crimes
Lee PueLiong a.k.a. Paul Lee vs. Chua Pue Chin Lee, G.R. No. 181658,
August 7, 2013

Facts:

Petitioner Lee PueLiong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion

Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC
Group) which includes the pioneer company Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC).
The CKC Group is the subject of... intra-corporate disputes between petitioner and
his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a majority
stockholder and Treasurer of CHI. On July 19, 1999, petitioner's siblings including
respondent and some unidentified persons took over and barricaded themselves
inside the premises of a factory owned by CKC. Petitioner and other factory
employees were unable to enter the factory premises. This incident led to... the
filing of Criminal Case Nos. 971-V-99, 55503 to 55505 against Nixon Lee and 972-
V-99 against Nixon Lee, Andy Lee, Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and
respondent, which are now pending in different courts in Valenzuela City. June 14,
1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI (as per the Secretary's Certificate issued by
Virginia Lee on even date) caused the filing of a verified Petition for the Issuance of
an Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate... of Title (TCT) No. 232238[10]
which covers a property owned by CHI. The case was docketed as LRC Record
No. 4004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 4.

Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion

praying, among others, that the September 17, 1999 Order be set aside claiming
that petitioner knew fully well that respondent was in possession of the said
Owner's Duplicate Copy, the latter being the Corporate Treasurer and custodian of
vital documents of CHI. Respondent added that petitioner merely needs to have
another copy of the title because he planned to mortgage the same with the
Planters Development Bank. Respondent even produced the Owner's Duplicate
Copy of TCT No. 232238 in open court. Thus, on November 12, 1999, the RTC
recalled and set aside its September 17, 1999 Order.

Issue:

Whether or not the honorable court of appeals committed a grave error when it
upheld the resolution of the metropolitan trial court that there is a private offended
party in the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest? NO.

Ruling:

Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence

should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered. There was neither a
waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a separate civil
action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to
establish the civil liability arising from the offense committed, and the private
offended party has the right to intervene through the private prosecutors.

Right to be Informed of Nature and Cause of Accusation

People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015

Facts:

Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the

Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all
new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory “Indoctrination
and Orientation Period,” which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on
3 May 2001. PMMA were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as
accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the
Sandiganbayan quashed the Information against them on the basis of the dismissal
of the criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to include in the
Information the material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law.
Consequently, this petition was filed before this Court questioning the
Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the Information.

Issue:

May the dismissal of the criminal case of the principal accused be invoked as
a ground to dismiss the criminal case of the accomplices, some school authorities
herein? NO.

Ruling:

That the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto
dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the
case against the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the
occurrence of the crime has in fact been established. In the case of school
authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act,
they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as
established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school
authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take
preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof. First, the Court
rejects the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an
organization.

Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes –
but is not limited to – groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training
corps, educational institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies,
partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP. Attached to the Department of
Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a government-owned
educational institution established for the primary purpose of producing efficient
and well-trained merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included in the term
organization within the meaning of the law. Nevertheless, the Court finds – albeit
for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash must be granted, as the
Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of
accomplice to hazing. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the
successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as
principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing.

Section 7:
Name of Accused
SuZhi Shan and Alvin Ching So vs. People, G.R. No. 169933, March 9, 2007

Facts:

Two informations for violation of Republic Act (RA) 6425, as amended by RA

7659 (Dangerous Drugs Act), against SuZhi Shan alias Alvin Ching So were filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon.

That on or about March 31, 2000, in Barangay Potrero, Malabon, Metro

Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being authorized to possess or use any regulated drug, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly have in his
possession methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, a
regulated drug with an approximate weight of fifteen thousand seventy six point
one (15,076.1) grams, in violation of the aforecited law.

On being informed on March 20, 2000 by a confidential informant that one SuZhi
Shan alias Alvin Ching So (the accused) was pushing drugs in Manila, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group conducted a 10-day surveillance
in the vicinity of the residence of the accused at 19 Yellowbell, Araneta Village,
Potrero, Malabon, Metro Manila.

Issue:

Whether or not failure to name accused in the information renders the

information void? NO.

Ruling:

Respecting petitioner's disclaimer that he is the SuZhi Shan alias Alvin Ching
So accused in the case, he contends that there is no scintilla of evidence offered to
prove that said accused is the same Su Jing Yue alias So Alvin Cheng that he
is.46 This contention falls in the face of this Court's repeated rulings that the
erroneous designation in the Information of the name of the accused does not
vitiate it if it is clearly proven that the person accused and brought to court is
the person who committed the crime.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the

Court of Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

People vs. Cagadas Jr., G.R. No. 88044, Jan 23, 1991

Facts:
 On June 6, 1973, at around 6:30 in the morning, Rex Ballena and his sister,
Lucia Ballena-Tabo, left their residences to withdraw some money with which to
pay their farm laborers. In order to reach their destination, they had to pass through
Sitio Rizal in Binancian, Municipality of Asuncion, Davao, to take a jeepney ride to
Tagum.

While waiting inside the jeep at the Sitio Rizal Terminal, some members of
the Integrated Civil Home Defense Force (ICHDF), including the accused,
approached them and asked where they were bound for and why. Rex Ballena
naively informed them that they were on their way to Tagum to withdraw money
from the bank with which to pay his farmhands. When asked if they would be
returning to Longganapan that day, Lucia replied that only her brother, Rex, would
do so. One of the ICHDF members who approached them was identified by Lucia
Tabo as Martin Cagadas, Jr. After withdrawing P800 from his Family Savings
Bank,Rex purchased some necessities for his family, reserving P500 for his
workers' wages. Rex was found dead on the following day. The accused was
arrested and convicted by the RTC for the crime of murder.

Appellants' contention that the trial court erred in convicting Roberto Cultura
for he was not one of those indicted in the information but "Jose" Cultura (his
father's name), has no merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused? NO.

Held:

The erroneous designation of his name in the information will not vitiate it, as
it was clearly proven that the accused, Roberto Cultura, was part of the group that
arrested, hogtied and killed the victim. Besides, Cultura did not raise this question
of his identity during the arraignment.

His acquiescence to be tried under the name "Jose" at that stage of the case
is deemed to be a waiver on his part to raise the question of his identity as one of
the accused for the first time on appeal (People vs. Maravilla, 165 SCRA 392;
People vs. Torres, 165 SCRA 702). WHEREFORE, the decision affirmed.

Section 8:

Designation of the Offense

People vs. Feliciano, Jr., G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014

Facts:

On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7)

members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach
House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead
pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them,
Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
 An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla
Juris fraternity and separate informations were also filed against them for the
attempted and frustrated murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members.

RTC found Alvir, Feliciano Jr., Soliva, Medalla and Zingapan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder. Others were acquitted. The
case against Guerrero was ordered archived by the court until his apprehension.
CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellants’ constitutional rights were violated when

the information against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of
masks despite the prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell
off? NO.
 
Ruling:

It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged

must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance,
even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore,
incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstanceof “wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information in order for all the
evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court. In criminal
cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows
the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.

The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not
wearing masks is also not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes
that “the act of one is the act of all.” This would mean all the accused had been one
in their plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove
that some of them might not have done so.

Matrido vs. People, G.R. No. 179061, Juy 13, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner ShealaMatrido is a credit and collection assistant of Empire East

Land Holdings, Inc. (private complainant), petitioner was tasked to collect
payments from buyers of its real estate properties Petitioner received payment
from Amantedela Torre in the amount of P22,470.66 as evidenced by the owner’s
copy of Official Receipt No. 36547, but petitioner remitted only P4,470.66 to private
complainant as reflected in the treasury department’s copy of Official Receipt No.
36547 submitted to private complainant, both copies of which bear the signature of
petitioner and reflect a difference of P18,000.Private complainant then filed an
estafa complaint against Petitioner before the Makati Prosecutor's Office. The
Makati PO dismissed the case for estafa for insufficiency of evidence but found
probable cause to indict petitioner for qualified theft under an Information.The
Makati RTC subsequently found the petitioner guilty for qualified theft. 

Issue:

Whether or not the conviction for qualified theft is valid despite the fact that
the prosecution tried to prove during the trial the crime of estafa thus denying the
petitioner the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
petitioner? YES.

Ruling:

It is the allegations in the Information that determine the nature of the

offense, not the technical name given by the public prosecutor in the preamble of
the Information. As alleged in the Information, petitioner took, intending to gain
therefrom and without the use of force upon things or violence against or
intimidation of persons, a personal property consisting of money in the amount
P18,000 belonging to private complainant, without its knowledge and consent,
thereby gravely abusing the confidence reposed on her as credit and collection
assistant who had access to payments from private complainant’s clients.

Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence
against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal
property of another without the latter’s consent.  If committed with grave abuse of
confidence, the crime of theft becomes qualified.

Effect of Failure to Designate the Offense by the Statute or to Mention Provision

Violated
Licyayo vs. People, G.R. No. 169425, March 4, 2008

Facts:

The victim, Rufino Guay, attended a wedding together with his friends at
Mabbalat, Igufao. The petitioner and his group of friends likewise attended the
same wedding. After the ceremonies, both the group of the victim and the petitioner
went to a store to buy some gin. In the midst of their drinking session, a brawl
occurred between petitioner and the victim. The friends of both petitioner and victim
joined the brawl. Some time after, police assistance arrived to pacify the scene.
The brawl continued notwithstanding the presence of police officers. Licyayo then
approached Guay, who was then wrestling with Paul, Licyayo’s friend, and stabbed
him in different parts of the body. The police officers fired a warning shot and
Licyayo was brought to a nearby police station. Licyayo was charged of Homicide
with the RTC of Lagawe, Ifugao. Although the information accuses him of the crime
of homicide, it does not categorically state that he is being charged with homicide,
as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. According
to him, the information should have been more explicit by stating that he is being
indicted for homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code. He argues that the specification in the information of the law violated
is necessary to enable him to adequately prepare for his defense, and that to
convict him under such defective information would violate his constitutional and
statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.

Issue:

Whether or not the information filed is not sufficient as it did not specifically
charged petitioner for the crime of "homicide" defined and penalized under article
249 of the revised penal code? NO.

Ruling:

Petition DENIED. The fact that the information does not specifically mention
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code as the law, which defines and penalizes
homicide, does not make it defective. There is nothing in the afore-quoted Rules,
which specifically requires that the information must state the particular law under
which the accused is charged in order for it to be considered sufficient and valid.
What the Rules merely require, among other things, is that the information must
designate the offense charged and aver the acts constituting it, which in this case,
were obviously done. It should be stressed that the character of the crime is
determined neither by the caption or preamble of the information nor by the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the
information. The sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or
defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information
but by the narration of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime
and sufficiently apprises the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
People vs. Padit, G.R. No. 202978, February 1 2016

Facts:

In the morning of May 5, 2006, the victim, AAA, went out of their house to
buy bread. But on her way to the store, she was called by accused-appellant,
Victor P. Padit (Padit), who is their neighbor and the uncle of her mother. After
allowing her to play inside his house, Padit then brought her upstairs, caused her to
lie down and removed her short pants while he also removed his and proceeded to
rub his penis against AAA's vagina. AAA felt pain but was rendered helpless and
prevented from making any sound as Padit covered her mouth with his hand. Padit
then threatened to hurt AAA with his knife if she tells anybody about the incident.

Come lunch time, AAA’s mother went looking for her. Padit told her that AAA
is in his house and brought her outside. Back at their house, AAA told her mother
about what Padit did to her. AAA's parents filed a complaint and caused AAA to
undergo physical/medical examination on May 8, 2006 where it was found that the
child's vulva showed a slight hymenal abrasion.
In the Information, the Office of the Public Prosecutor charged Padit of the crime of
Rape penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. After trial ensued, both
the RTC and CA found Padit guilty of consummated rape on which Padit, through
his counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused-appellant is guilty of rape?

Ruling:

The Court rules in the affirmative. At the outset, the Court notes that in the
Information filed, petitioner is specifically charged with rape under Article 335 of the
RPC. Considering that the crime was committed on May 5, 2006, the applicable
law is under the new provisions on rape now found in Articles 266-A to 266-D of
the RPC as amended by RA 8353. Hence, the prosecution as well as the RTC and
the CA committed an error in specifying the provision of law which was violated.
Nonetheless, it is settled that the failure to designate the offense by statute or to
mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of
the law violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly
recite the facts constituting the crime charged.

As to the guilt of accused-appellant, the Court does not agree with the
contention that the prosecution failed to prove carnal knowledge on the ground that
AAA explicitly stated in her testimony that Padit merely rubbed his penis against
her vagina. AAA, who was then four years old, was not expected to be
knowledgeable about sexual intercourse and every stage thereof. Rape is
committed on the victim's testimony that she felt pain. This kind of pain could not
have been the result of mere superficial rubbing. Furthermore, the testimony of
AAA is corroborated by the findings of the physician who examined her.
Aggravating and Qualifying Circumstances must be alleged in the Information
People vs. Mejia, G.R .No. 185723, August 4, 2009

Facts:

Two (2) informations were filed against Accused Mejia for having carnal
knowledge of his step-daughter AAA twice, morning and afternoon of March 2,
2003, contrary to Art. 266-A of the RPC. The factual antecedents show that
Accused took advantage of the absence of AAA’s mother and used overwhelming
force, with bolo, in order to deflower the minor AAA. The abominable bestial act
impregnated AAA. The trial court (TC) adjudged Accused Mejia guilty of rape for
the morning assault, Crim Case No. SCC-4081, and acts of lasciviousness (Art.
336) only for the afternoon, Crim. Case No. SCC-4080, as the prosecution failed to
prove on that occasion any penetration on AAA. The TC appreciated minority and
relationship as aggravating circumstances, thus, amplifying the penalty to reclusion
perpetua (supposedly death following Art. 266-B, but R.A. No. 8353 has
suspended such penalty). The decision, however, was modified by the Court of
Appeals (CA) by removing minority and relationship and awarding moral damages.

Issue:
 Whether or not the CA was correct in disregarding minority and relationship
as qualifying circumstances due partly to the absence of such allegations on the
informations and partly to the failure of the prosecution to adduce proof on AAA’s
age at the time of the crimes were committed? YES.

Ruling:

The decision appealed from is affirmed, Accused is guilty of simple rape and
acts of lasciviousness, and modified as to the award of moral damages, from PhP
50,000.00 to PhP 30,000.00.

As amended, Secs. 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal

Procedure, provide that aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged
in the information and proven during trial; if absent, they cannot be considered
against the accused. As to proof of age, it cannot consist merely of testimony or
stipulation of the parties with respect to the victim’s age. A duly certified certificate
of live birth, or other competent evidence such as school records must be
submitted to give effect to an allegation of minority (People v. Tabanggay). The
graver penalties of death and exemplary damages attached to qualified rape can
only be meted out when minority and another circumstance are duly proven. In the
instant case only the circumstance of relationship was substantiated, hence, the
crime of simple rape only. By the import of Article 266-B (1), both minority and
relationship should be present to adjudge an accused guilty of qualified rape.

Designation of the Offense (Sec. 8)

MINORITY AND RELATIONSHIP MUST BE ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION
People vs. Ernesto Malibiran, GR 173471

Facts:

The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor hereby accuses

Ernesto Malibiran of the crime of rape committed as follows:
 
That [before Christmas in December 2001; one morning after Christmas in
2001 but before May 13, 2002; and one afternoon after Christmas in 2001 but
before May 13, 2002, respectively] in Dipasaleng, Diniog, Dilasag, Aurora, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his eight (8) year old
granddaughter [AAA]. CONTRARY TO LAW.

Issue:

Whether or not minority and relationship is sufficiently alleged in the

information?

Held:

Yes. Minority and relationship which, in a prosecution for rape,

constitute special qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the
information and proved during trial.In the instant case, the twin aggravating
circumstances of minority of the victim and her blood ties to the offender were
properly appreciated. Ernestos filial ascendancy was properly alleged in the
informations and duly established by the presentation of the birth certificates of
BBB and AAA as well as the marriage certificate of Ernesto.

The birth certificate of BBB as well as the marriage contract of Ernesto and
his wife Edna Caballe proved BBB to be Ernestos daughter. And the birth
certificate of AAA proved that she is the daughter of BBB and, thus, the
granddaughter of Ernesto. Ernesto was duly identified by AAA as her grandfather,
the latter not even impugning the relationship during trial. Likewise, alleged in the
information and duly proved during trial by virtue of her birth certificate was AAAs
minority.

H. Cause of Accusation – Sec. 9

People vs. Umawid, G.R. No. 208719, June 9, 2014

Facts:

On November 26, 2002 at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Vicente Ringor

was staying with his two-year old granddaughter, Maureen Joy Ringor, at the
terrace of their house located at Villanueva, San Manuel, Isabela. Suddenly, Roger
RingorUmawid appeared and started attacking Vicente with a long bolo (panabas)
without any reason. While Vicente was able to escape Umawid's blows, the latter
nevertheless hit Maureen on her abdomen and back, causing her instant death.
Upon seeing Maureen bloodied, Umawid walked away. Thereafter, Umawid went
to a nearby house which was only five meters away from Vicente's house where
his nephew, Jeffrey Mercado, was sleeping. Awaken by the sudden noise, Jeffrey
went outside only to see his uncle rushing to attack him with his panabas. Jeffrey,
along with his sister and cousin, rushed inside the house to seek for safety.
However, Umawid was able to prevent Jeffrey from closing the door and the former
barge into the house. Jeffrey crouched and covered his head with his arms to
shield him from Umawid's impending attacks.

Umawid delivered fatal hacking blows to Jeffrey, causing the mutilation of the
latter's fingers. Umawid only stopped upon seing Jeffrey, who was then pretending
to be dead, leaning on the wall and blood-stained. In court, Umawid set up the
defense of insanity, but did not, however, take the witness stand to attest the same.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is exempted from criminal liablity due to

insanity?

Ruling:

The Court observes that Maureen’s death is a case of aberratio ictus, given

that the fatal blow therefor was only delivered by mistake as it was actually Vicente
who was Umawid’s intended target. Based on the foregoing, Umawid should have
been punished for committing the complex crime of Murder and Attempted Murder,
pursuant to Article 48 in relation to Article 4(1) of the RPC. However, considering
that the information in Criminal Case No. 23-0471 only charged him with the
Murder of Maureen, Umawid cannot be convicted of a complex crime because to
do so would be violative of his right to due process. As held in the case
of Burgos v. Sandiganbayan:
 In criminal cases, where the life and liberty of the accused is at stake, due
process requires that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is
clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other
than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this
constitutional right.

Consigna vs. People, GR No. 175750-51, April 2, 2014

Facts:

Petitioner, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Norte,

obtained as loan from private respondent HermelinaMoleta, the sum of
P320,000.00, to pay for the salary of the employees of the municipality and to
construct the municipal gymnasium as the IRA of the municipality has not yet
arrived. As payment, petitioner issued 3 LBP check signed by Mayor JameRusillon.
Upon several attempts on different occasion, Moleta demanded payment from
petitioner and Rusillon, but to no avail. Hence, Moleta deposited the 3 LBP checks
to her account in Metrobank-Surigao. However, the check had no funds. The
following day, Moleta again deposited the check to her LBP account but were again
returned for the reason, “Signature Not on File.” Upon verification, LBP informed
Moleta that the municipality’s account was already closed and transferred to DBP,
and that petitioner, the municipal treasurer, has been relieved from her position.

Hence, Moleta filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 sets of information against

petitioner and the Mayor Rossillon. The Sandiganbayan found the petitioner
Consigna guilty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Estafa under Article
315 (2) (a) of the RPC but exonerated Rusillon.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Estafa as penalized under Art. 315
(2)(a) of the RPC?

Ruling:

Entrenched in jurisprudence is the dictum that the real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from
the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are
mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or
information, as held in People v. Dimaano.

Petitioner’s argument is as outdated as it is erroneous. The averments in the

two (2) sets of Information against petitioner and Rusillon clearly stated facts and
circumstances constituting the elements of the crime of estafa as to duly inform
them of the nature and cause of the accusation, sufficient to prepare their
respective defenses.

The inevitable conclusion is that petitioner capitalized on her official function

to commit the crimes charged. Without her position, petitioner would not have
induced Moleta to part with her money. In the same vein, petitioner could not have
orchestrated a scheme of issuing postdated checks meddling with the
municipality's coffers and defiling the mayor's signature.

I. Place of Commission – Sec. 10

US. vs. APOLINARIO CUNANAN

Facts:
Apolinario Cunanan was charged with the crime of Desertion. Cunanan,
before the term of his enlistment had expired, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously absent himself for more than ten (10) days, without license from his
superiors, and with the intention not to return, by then and there abandoning said
steamship Rover in said port of Cebu, Philippine Islands and deserting from the
service, in order not to return, in violation of Section 9 (c) of Act No. 1980, enacted
by the Philippine Legislature.

Issue:
Whetherornotthecourt of
Manilahadnojurisdictionoftheperson,Cunananorofthesubjectof theaction? NO.

Ruling:
The complaint in this case alleges that the offense was committed in the
Province of Cebu, but there is no allegation that it was committed within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila. When a complaint shows that
the offense charged was not committed within the jurisdiction of the court, it is
demurrable.

The Court does not feel at the present time to decide whether the offense of
desertion under Act No. 1980 is a continuing offense or not. The Court decides
that, inasmuch as there is no allegation in the complaint alleging that the crime with
which Cunanan is charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila, and that said court is without jurisdiction to try
said offense.

People vs. Judge Pedro Navarro

Facts:
 Respondent Catuday was charged in the Municipal Court of Makati, Rizal,
with the crime of light threat allegedly committed against Henry Dioquino (Criminal
Case No. 12846). Almost a year later, or on February 3, 1969, and while the light
threat case was still pending, he was charged in the same court, with a different
offense, frustrated theft, allegedly committed against the Commonwealth Foods,
Inc. In two separate decisions rendered on September 10, 1969, the Municipal
Court convicted him of the two charges. He appealed both decisions to the Court of
First Instance.

Judge Pedro C. Navarro took over in the two cases. The theft case was then
in the rebuttal stage. On March 20, 1973, rebuttal evidence closed, and upon order
of the court, the parties filed their respective "offer and submission of exhibits", and
submitted the theft case for decision. On July 20, 1973, respondent Judge
rendered one decision, acquitting Catuday of both charges for lack of proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:

Whether or not the determination as to where the crime was committed as to

the commission of Theft is material? NO.

Held:

When accused was asked by his counsel where he was living or residing on
January 31, 1969 when he was arrested for frustrated theft of coffee items, Atty.
Funk again objected to it as being immaterial, and he was sustained by the Court.
Said the Court, It has nothing to do with this case of theft. That may be good if you
file a civil suit, maybe, but in this crime of theft, that is immaterial. Therefore, in the
crime of Theft, the place is immaterial as to how the crime was committed.

J. Date or Time of Commission – Sec. 11

People vs. Delfin

Facts:

On the night of 27 September 2000, one Emilio Enriquez (Emilio)—a 51-

year-old fisherman from Navotas City—was killed after being gunned down at a
store just across his home. On 13 March 2001, the Rael Delfin was formally
charged with the murder of Emilio before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malabon.

In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Delfin assails the validity of the
information under which he was tried and convicted. He specifically points out to
the discrepancy between the date of the commission of the murder as alleged in
the information i.e., "on or about the 27th day of November 2000" and the one
actually established during the trial i.e., 27 September 2000.

Delfin protests that the failure of the information to accurately allege the date
of the commission of the murder violated his right to be properly informed of the
charge against him and consequently impaired his ability to prepare an intelligent
defense thereon.
Issue:
Whether or not the discrepancy on the date of the commission of the murder
would render the Information against Delfin invalid? NO.
Ruling:
In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like
murder, it is not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty
in the information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly
informing an accused, that the date of commission be approximated. Since the
date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the allegation in
an information of a date of commission different from the one eventually
established during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to
prosecution.
In such cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just deemed
supplanted by the evidence presented during the trial or may even be corrected by
a formal amendment of the information. The inaccurate allegation in the information
is simply the product of a mere clerical error. This is obvious from the fact that,
while all its supporting documents point to the murder ashaving been committed on
the 27th of September2000, the information’s mistake is limited only to the month
when the crime was committed. Such an error is evidently not fatal; it is deemed
supplanted by the evidence presented by the prosecution.
The Court sustains the information for murder, under which Delfin was tried
and convicted, as valid.
People v. Balino, GR 194833, July 2, 2014
Facts:
PorferioBalino was charged and convicted for violation of Article 266-A of the
RPC as amended by RA 8353, Statutory Rape. He willfully, unlawfully and
criminally with the use of force and intimidation raped AAA who was 8 years old
during that time. It was when AAA was at the house of Balino watching TV
Show,Balino was able to perfect his criminal intent towards AAA.

The RTC convicted Balino of Statutory Rape. They gave weight to the
positive testimony of AAA considering that the testimonies of rape victims who are
young and of tender age are credible especially if they are without any motive to
falsely testify against the accused. It was also corroborated by the testimony of Dr.
Villapane who examined AAA. Balino’s defense of alibi was rejected since the
physical impossibility to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of the
commission was not given credence.

The CA affirmed RTC Ruling. They adhered to the rule that no woman,
especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration,allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a
public trial, unless she is motivated solely by desire to havethe culprit apprehended
and punished.
Issue:

Whether or not date and time is essential as to the crime of rape? NO.

Ruling:

This Court has likewise repeatedly held that the date of the commission of
rape is not an essential element of the crime.It is not necessary to state the precise
time when the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of
the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential element except to prove that
the victim was a minor below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of
the offense. Therefore, given the victim’s established date of birth on the basis of
the evidence adduced, she was definitely short of 12 years of age when the crime
of rape was committed against her.

Corpuz vs. People, G.R. No. 180016

Facts:
Danilo Tangcoy, private complainant, and LitoCorpuz, petitioner, met at the
Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Tangcoy was then
engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that
Tangcoy had some pieces of jewelry for sale, Corpuz approached him on May 2,
1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on
commission basis. Tangcoy agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to
petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet;
one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of
P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that
petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same
items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the
proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When Tongcoy was able to
meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said
items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

A criminal complaint for estafa was filed against Corpuz. On the prosecution,
it was established that Tongcoy and Corpuz were collecting agents of Antonio
Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base
employees. For every collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied
having transacted any business with Tongcoy. However, he admitted obtaining a
loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a blank
receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as
evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of
jewelry, which he did not even see. RTC and CA – accused is guilty of estafa.

Issue:
Whether or not date of the occurrence of the crime alleged in the information
was materially different from the one testified to by the private complainant? NO.
Ruling:
 The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the
date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime
herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not
render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the
due date within which accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or
returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there
was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now
be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred
against him.

Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 189343. July 10, 2013.

Facts:
Alan Gaviola, EustaquioCesa, BenildaBacasmas and Edna Jaca, public
officers, being then the City Administrator, City Treasurer, Cash Division Chief and
City Accountant, respectively, of the Cebu City Government are accused of
violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 commonly involving willful, intentional, and
conscious acts or omissions when there is a duty to act on the part of the public
official or employee. The Sandiganbayan held that the accused were all guilty of
gross inexcusable negligence. Thus, the Sandiganbayan convicted them and
sentenced them of the penalty of 12 years and 1 month to 15 years.

Issue:
Whether or not stating the exact date is necessary in the said case? NO.

Ruling:

It is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was
committed, except when it is a material ingredient thereof. The offense may be
alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of
its commission. Here, the date is not a material ingredient of the crime, not
having been committed on one day alone, but rather within a period of time ranging
from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998. Hence, stating the exact dates of the
commission of the crime is not only unnecessary, but impossible as well. That the
Information alleged a date and a period during which the crime was committed was
sufficient, because it duly informed petitioners that before and until 5 March 1998,
over nine million pesos had been taken by Gonzales as a result of petitioners’ acts.
These acts caused undue injury to the government and unwarranted benefits to the
said paymaster.
K. Name of Offended Party – Sec. 12
Senador vs. People and Jaime, GR No. 201620, March 6, 2013

Facts:

Petitioner RamoncitaSenador entered into a consignment agreement of

various kinds of jewelry worth over P700k with Rita and Cynthia Jaime. Senador
was given fifteen (15) days to sell the jewelry and remit the money less her
commission. Unsold jewelries shall also be returned by petitioner to respondent
Cynthia.The fifteen-day period lapsed and petitioner failed to sell them or remit the
money. Several demands were not enough for Ramoncita to comply with her
obligations. Cynthia filed a criminal case against petitioner for estafa. In the
information, the private complainant was Cynthia.

Senador asserted that the person named as the offended party in the Information is
not the same person who made the demand and filed the complaint. According to
Senador, the private complainant in the Information went by the name "Cynthia
Jaime," whereas, during trial, the private complainant turned out to be "Rita Jaime."
Further, Cynthia Jaime was never presented as witness.

Issue:

Whether or not failure to name or designate the party in a crime against

property is a ground of dismissal of the information? NO.

Ruling:

In case of an error in the designation of the offended party in crimes

against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the
correction of the information, not its dismissal:

SEC. 12. Name of the offended party.—The complaint or information must state
the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has
been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described
under a fictitious name.

(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is

unknown, the property must be described with such particularity as to
properly identify the offense charged.

(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property
the offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court
must cause such true name to be inserted in the complaint or information
and the record. x xx 

L. Duplicity of Offense – Sec. 13

Soriano vs. People, G.R. Nos. 159517-18, June 30, 2009.
Facts:
Soriano and Ilagan were the President and General Manager, respectively,
of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM). Allegedly, on June 27,
1997 and August 21, 1997, during their incumbency as president and manager of
the bank, petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM. They falsified the loan
applications and other bank records, and made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and
Rogelio Mañaol obtained loans of P15M each, when in fact they did not.
Petitioners moved to quash the informations arguing that the prosecutor
charged more than one offense for a single act. Soriano was charged with violation
of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial document for allegedly
securing fictitious loans. They further argued that the facts as alleged in the
information do not constitute an offense. RTC denied the motion to quash. CA
sustained the denial of petitioners’ separate motions to quash.
Issue:
Whether or not there is duplicity of suits in the instant case? NO.
Ruling:
In Loney v. People, this Court, in upholding the filing of multiple charges
against the accused, held:
―As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single
act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one
offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for ―the same offense.‖ In People v.
Doriquez, we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not
―the same‖—
x xx if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element
which the other does not, x xx. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or
articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no
obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same
facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element
of the other.
In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging
more than one offense, but with more than one information, each charging a
different offense—violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with
estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in separate informations. Thus,
petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the
Informations.

Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag, G.R. 103102.

Facts:
 Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an information for the
crime of frustrated murder. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was
allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before
the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died. Consequently,
private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to
file an amended information and to admit said amended information. The amended
information, filed on October 31, 1991, reads: “x xx thereby inflicting mortal wounds
which directly caused the death of said Maureen Hultman. x xx” Corollary thereto,
petitioner then postulates that since the amended information for murder charges
an entirely different offense, involving as it does a new fact, that is, the fact of death
whose cause has to be established, it is essential that another preliminary
investigation on the new charge be conducted before the new information can be
admitted.
Issue:
Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment,
without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original
information, may legally and validly be admitted? YES.
Ruling:
Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 14.Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads;
and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the
discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights
of the accused.
In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both
the original and the amended information. What is involved here is not a variance
in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of
execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This is
being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice
and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper.
The filing of the amended information without the requisite preliminary
investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and
public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a
public trial. The amended information could not conceivably have come as a
surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that it charges essentially
the same offense as that charged under the original information.

People vs. Fernandez, G.R. 62116.

Facts:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1982, at 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, at barangay Taloy, municipality of Malasiqui, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned offended
party Rebecca M. Soriano, a virgin and 15 years old, by means of force and
intimidation and against the will of the latter.
Issue:
Whether or not the Lower Court was correct in sentencing the accused-
appellants to suffer two penalties of Death? YES.
Ruling:

The original death sentence was correctly imposed pursuant to the

provisions of the Revised Penal Code, namely, Article 335 which states that when
the crime of rape is committed by two (2) or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death, and Article 63, which provides that when the
penalty prescribed is composed of two (2) indivisible penalties (as in this case) and
the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall
be applied.

However, since the original death penalties imposed by the trial court are no
longer imposable under the present Constitution and are reduced to reclusion
perpetua, the sentence on appellant Federico Conrado has to be reduced to two
(2) penalties of reclusion perpetua. But the indemnity he has to pay to the victim
must be increased to P20,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.

People vs. Quemaggan, G.R. 178205

Facts:
Four men, Quemeggen and De Luna were arrested for allegedly robbing the
passengers of a jeepney. However, Quemeggen was able to escape which
prompted the other police officers to run after Quemeggen .The three suspects
were left under the care of a police officer, Suing, while the other police officers
pursued Quemeggen. Taking advantage of the situation, the three suspects
ganged up on Suing; de Luna held his hand, while the other suspect known as
Weng-Weng shot him on the head. The suspects escaped. Although Suingwas
brought to the hospital, he eventually died .An information was filed against
appellants charging them of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. The RTC found
them guilty. The CA however modified the decision of the trial court and convicted
Quemeggen of Robbery, and de Luna of the separate crimes of Robbery and
Homicide. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the CA’s convictions against Quemeggen and de Luna are

erroneous? NO.

Ruling:
 No. Though appellants were charged with Robbery with Homicide,
Quemeggen is guilty of robbery, and de Luna of two separate crimes of robbery
and homicide. Controlling in an information should not be the title of the complaint
or the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violated, these being, by and large, mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited.
There should also be no problem in convicting an accused of two or
more crimes erroneously charged in one information or complaint, but later
proven to being dependent crimes, as if they were made the subject of separate
complaints or informations. As worded, the Information sufficiently alleged all the
elements of both felonies.

M. Amendment or Substitution of Complaint or Information – Sec. 14

Dr. Mendez vs. People, G.R. No. 179962

Facts:
Dr. Joel Mendez was the sole proprietor of 6 different businesses. Petitioner
failed to file an income tax return on those businesses during the taxable years
2001 to 2013. When a complaint was filed against him by the BIR for failure to file
an income tax return, petitioner admitted that he has been operating as a single
proprietor under these trade names in Quezon City, Makati, Dagupan and San
Fernando. But he countered that these businesses were registered only in 2003,
and thus were not yet in existence.
An information was filed against him in the Court of Tax Appeals for violation
of Art. 255 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 to which he plead not guilty. After his
arraignment, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the information. Petitioner
failed to file a comment on the motion. The motion was granted. Petitioner now
assails the validity of the amended information.

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution’s amendments made after the petitioner’s
arraignment are substantial in nature and must perforce be denied? NO.

Ruling:

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure governs
the matter of amending the information:

Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended,

in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only
be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to
the rights of the accused.
 In short, amendments that do not charge another offense different from that
charged in the original one; or do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so
as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume are considered merely as formal amendments.

In the present case, the amendments sought by the prosecution pertains to

(i) the alleged change in the date in the commission of the crime from 2001 to
2002; (ii) the addition of the phrase "doing business under the name and style of
Mendez Medical Group;" (iii) the change and/or addition of the branches of
petitioner’s operation; and (iv) the addition of the phrase "for income earned." We
cannot see how these amendments would adversely affect any substantial right of
the petitioner as accused.

Leviste vs. Alameda, G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010.

Facts:

Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) was, by Information, charged with homicide for
the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City. Petitioner was placed under police custody while
confined at the Makati Medical Center. After petitioner posted a bond which the trial
court approved,he was released from detention, and his arraignment was set. The
private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the
proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or
to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. Petitioner also separately
moved for the inhibition of Judge Alameda with prayer to defer action on the admission of the Amended
Information.

Issue:

Whether or not the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
admitted the prosecutor’s amended information? NO.

Held:

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is

whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available
after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have
would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An
amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime
alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been
held to be one of form and not of substance.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the
fact that what was conducted in the present case was a reinvestigation does not
invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no substantial
distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are
conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether
there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial

Buhat vs CA, 265 SCRA 701

Facts:
On March 25, 1993, an information for HOMICIDE was filed in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) against petitioner Danny Buhat, "John Doe" and "Richard Doe".
Even before petitioner could be arraigned, the prosecution moved for the
deferment of the arraignment on the ground that the private complainant in the
case, one Betty Yu, moved for the reconsideration of the resolution of the City
Prosecutor which ordered the filing of the aforementioned information for homicide.
On February 3, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, finding Betty
Yu's appeal meritorious, ordered the City Prosecutor of Roxas City "to amend the
information by upgrading the offense charged to MURDER and implead therein
additional accused Herminia Altavas, OsmeñaAltavas and Renato Buhat."
Issue:
Whether or not the additional allegation or conspiracy is a substantial
amendment? NO.
Ruling:
The additional allegation of conspiracy is only a formal amendment, petitioner's
participation as principal not having been affected by such amendment. General
rule: the allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents accused, which
was not previously included in the original information, is x xx a substantial
amendment saddling the respondents with the need of a new defense in order to
meet a different situation in the trial court(people vs Montenegro). Exception: where
an amendment after plea resulting in the inclusion of an allegation of conspiracy
and in the indictment of some other persons in addition to the original accused,
constitutes a mere formal amendment permissible even after arraignment(people
vs. Zulueta)
Such amendment to insert in the information the real name of the accused
involves merely a matter of form as it does not, in any way, deprive any of the
accused of a fair opportunity to present a defense; neither is the nature of the
offense charged affected or altered since the revelation of accused's real name
does not change the theory of the prosecution nor does it introduce any new and
material fact.19 In fact, it is to he expected that the information has to be amended
as the unknown participants in the crime became known to the public prosecutor

Pacoy vs. Cajigal, G.R. 157472.

Facts:

On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in

the RTC against petitioner. Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by a counsel de
parte pleaded not guilty to homicide. Pretrial and trial was set by the judge.
However, on the same day after arraignment, the judge issued another order
directing the trial prosecutor to amend the information to murder, in view of the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the information, which
public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. The
prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word homicide and instead
wrote the word murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the
Information.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the
charge from Homicide to Murder? NO.

Ruling:

The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon
the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense as contemplated under
the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

         Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the
offense charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused
cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged in the information
even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a
substitution of a new information charging the proper offense.  Section 14 does not
apply to a second information, which involves the same offense or an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In this
connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the   essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
 
         Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent
judge merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of
the original Information.  To repeat, it was the same original information that was
amended by merely crossing out the word “Homicide” and writing the word
“Murder,” instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.

Saludaga and Genio vs Sandiganbayan, GR No. 184537

Facts:

Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of

Barangay Day Care Centers without conducting a competitive public bidding as
required by law, which caused damage and prejudice to the government. An
information was filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by causing undue injury
to the Government. The information was quashed for failure to prove the actual
damage, hence a new information was filed, now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA
3019 by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person. The accused moved for a
new preliminary investigation to be conducted on the ground that there is
substitution and/or substantial amendment of the first information.

Issue:

Whether or not there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the

information that would warrant an new preliminary investigation.

Ruling:

No, there is no substitution and/or substantial amendment.

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

x xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,

or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

That there are two (2) different modes of committing the offense: either by
causing undue injury or by giving private person unwarranted benefit. That accused
may be charged under either mode or under both. Hence a new preliminary
investigation is unnecessary.

Cabo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 169509

Facts:

On June 26, 2004, an information for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against petitioner and her co-
accused Bonifacio C. Balahay. The information alleged:

That on or about 08 August 2000 in the Municipality of Barobo, Surigao del

Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, BONIFACIO C. BALAHAY, then Mayor of the Municipality of
Barobo, Surigao del Sur, a high ranking public official, with the use of his influence
as such public official, committing the offense in relation to his office, together with
JOCELYN CABO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive
and accept the amount of ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SIXTY TWO PESOS AND 31/100 (P104,162.31) from said JOCELYN CABO,
Business Manager of Orient Integrated Development Consultancy, Inc. (OIDCI), a
consultancy group charged with conducting a feasibility study for the Community-
Based Resource Management Project of the Municipality of Barobo, with accused
Cabo giving and granting the said amount to accused Balahay in consideration of
the said accused having officially intervened in the undertaking by the OIDCI of
such contract for consultancy services with the Municipality of Barobo.

On February 7, 2005, the prosecution filed an amended information which

incorporated all the essential elements of the crime charged. Consequently,
Balahay was sent a notice for his arraignment on the amended information.
Petitioner was likewise notified of her re-arraignment which was set on April 14,
2005.17 However, on April 11, 2005, petitioner filed a Motion to Cancel Second
Arraignment18 on the ground that the amended information pertained to Balahay
alone. Petitioner claimed that she could no longer be re-arraigned on the amended
information since substantial amendment of an information is not allowed after a
plea had already been made thereon.

Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred inamending said information?

Ruling:

Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the
re-arraignment of petitioner on the amended information. Double jeopardy did not
attach by virtue of petitioner’s "conditional arraignment" on the first information. It is
well-settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites
must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before
a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the
charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise
dismissed or terminated without his express consent.29 The first and fourth
requisites are not present in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

FILING OF INFORMATION IF THERE IS PENDING MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION
Ramiscal vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 140576-99. December 13, 2004

Facts:

Jose S. Ramiscal Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and
Jesus Garcia were charged with Malversation through Falsification of Public
Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The Information alleged that Ramiscal, et.
al. misappropriated and converted the amount of P250,318,200.00 for their
personal use from the funds of AFP-RSBS. Ramiscal filed with the Sandiganbayan
an “Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of Information and to Defer Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest.” He argued, that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the
case because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The said Urgent Motion was later
adopted by Alzaga and Satuito. The Urgent Motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. Ramiscal, et. al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a
Resolution issued, the Sandiganbayan sustained Ramiscal, et. al.’s contention that
the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence, it reconsidered its earlier Resolution and
ordered the dismissal of their criminal case. Upon denial of its Motion for
Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the present special civil action for certiorari
with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Did the Sandiganbayan err in denying petitioner’s motion to set aside his
arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against?

Ruling:

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, sanction the

immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable
cause, even during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001, sanction the immediate filing of an
information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the
pendency of a motion for reconsideration.
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable
cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar
the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure
logically follows the filing of the information.

PRESCRIPTION
Panaguiton, Jr. vs. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571

Facts:

In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from Panaguiton amounting to P1,979,459.In

1993, Cawili with his ‘business associate’ Tongson issued 3 checks as
paymentSignificantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and
Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were
dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account.During
preliminary investigation, Tongson claimed that he was not Cawili’s business
associate.On Dec. 6 1995 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable
cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson.Petitioner
then appeal before DOJ and in 1997 DOJ found that it was indeed possible for
Tongson to co-signed the checks. It then directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the
questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)Assistant City
Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint
against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State
Prosecutor’s resolution. ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed
pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by
B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.Moreover, ACPSampaga stated that
the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no
longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating
prosecutor.

Issue:

Whether or not the rule on prescription as provided for in Act No. 3326
applies to offenses under B.P. 22? YES.

Ruling:

We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An
offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty
(30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the
offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof.
Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court
can toll the running of the prescriptive period.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December
1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of
the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, “institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment,”[39] and the prevailing rule at the time was that
once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation,
the prescription of the offense is halted.

People vs. Romuladez, G.R. 166510

Facts:

Private respondent Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez was charged with

violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
committed “on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986”.
However, the subject criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan only on 5
November 2001, following a preliminary investigation that commenced only on 4
June 2001. The Information alleged that from 1976 to February 1986, Romualdez,
then the Provincial Governor of the Province of Leyte, using his influence with his
brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had himself appointed and/or
assigned as Ambassador to foreign countries, particularly the People's Republic of
China (Peking), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Jeddah), and United States of America
(Washington D.C.), knowing fully well that such appointment and/or assignment is
in violation of the existing laws as the Office of the Ambassador or Chief of Mission
is incompatible with his position as Governor of the Province of Leyte, thereby
enabling himself to collect dual compensation from both the Department of Foreign
Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte to the damage and prejudice of the
Government in the amount of P5,806,709.50.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by
prescription?

Ruling:
The time span that elapsed from the alleged commission of the offense up to
the filing of the subject cases is clearly beyond the fifteen (15) year prescriptive
period provided under Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 3019.
The initial filing of the complaint in 1989 or the preliminary investigation by
the PCGG that preceded it could not have interrupted the fifteen (15)-year
prescription period under Rep. Act No. 3019. As held in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, the investigatory power of the PCGG extended only to alleged ill-
gotten wealth cases, absent previous authority from the President for the PCGG to
investigate such graft and corruption cases involving the Marcos cronies.
Accordingly, the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG leading to the
filing of the first information is void ab initio, and thus could not be considered as
having tolled the fifteen (15)-year prescriptive period, notwithstanding the general
rule that the commencement of preliminary investigation tolls the prescriptive
period. After all, a void ab initio proceeding such as the first preliminary
investigation by the PCGG could not be accorded any legal effect by this Court.
The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the prescriptive
period is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or
otherwise initiates its investigation. As such preliminary investigation was
commenced more than fifteen (15) years after the imputed acts were committed,
the offense had already prescribed as of such time.
TEST OF PREJUDICE BY AMENDMENT
Dr. Mendez vs. People, G.R. No. 179962

Facts:
Dr. Joel Mendez was the sole proprietor of 6 different businesses. Petitioner
failed to file an income tax return on those businesses during the taxable years
2001 to 2013. When a complaint was filed against him by the BIR for failure to file
an income tax return, petitioner admitted that he has been operating as a single
proprietor under these trade names in Quezon City, Makati, Dagupan and San
Fernando. But he countered that these businesses were registered only in 2003,
and thus were not yet in existence.
An information was filed against him in the Court of Tax Appeals for violation
of Art. 255 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 to which he plead not guilty. After his
arraignment, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the information. Petitioner
failed to file a comment on the motion. The motion was granted. Petitioner now
assails the validity of the amended information.

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution’s amendments made after the petitioner’s
arraignment are substantial in nature and must perforce be denied? NO.
Ruling:

To be sure, the jurisprudential test on whether a defendant is prejudiced by

the amendment of an information pertains to the availability of the same defense
and evidence that the accused previously had under the original information. This
test, however, must be read together with the characteristic thread of formal
amendments, which is to maintain the nature of the crime or the essence of the
offense charged.

In the present case, this thread remained consistently under the amended
information, alleging the petitioner’s failure to file his return and consequently to
pay the correct amount of taxes. Accordingly, the petitioner could not have been
surprised at all.

AMENDMENT OR SUBSTITUTION OF INFORMATION

Pacoy vs. Cajigal, G.R. 157472.

Facts:

On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in

the RTC against petitioner. Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by a counsel de
parte pleaded not guilty to homicide. Pretrial and trial was set by the judge.
However, on the same day after arraignment, the judge issued another order
directing the trial prosecutor to amend the information to murder, in view of the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the information, which
public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. The
prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word homicide and instead
wrote the word murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the
Information.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the
charge from Homicide to Murder? NO.

Ruling:

The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon
the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense as contemplated under
the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

         Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the
offense charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused
cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged in the information
even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a
substitution of a new information charging the proper offense.  Section 14 does not
apply to a second information, which involves the same offense or an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In this
connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the   essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
 
         Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent
judge merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of
the original Information.  To repeat, it was the same original information that was
amended by merely crossing out the word “Homicide” and writing the word
“Murder,” instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.

N. Venue – Sec. 15
VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES IS JURISDICTIONAL
Navaja vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 180969*, September 11, 2017

Facts:

The instant case is an offshoot of a preliminary investigation proceeding

initiated by DKT Philippines, Inc. (DKT) before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bohol (OPP-Bohol) in Tagbilaran City, charging its then-Regional
Sales Manager for Visayas, Ana Lou B. Navaja (Ana Navaja), of the crime of
falsification of a Private Document. MCTC-Jagna denied petitioner's Motion to
Quash. It held that petitioner had no right to invoke the processes of the court,
since at the time he filed said motion, the MCTC-Jagna has yet to acquire
jurisdiction over his person.

Issue:

Whether or not the case may be filed either in Jagna or Tagbilaran? Either.

Ruling:

Applying the principle of delitocontinuado, petitioner should only be charged

with one (1) count of violation of PD 1829 which may be filed either in Jagna, Bohol
where Ms. Magsigay was allegedly prevented from appearing and testifying in I.S.
Case No. 04-1238, or in Tagbilaran City, Bohol where petitioner allegedly
presented a false affidavit in the same case. However, since he was already
charged - and in fact, convicted in a Judgmentdated July 3, 2007 - in the MTCC-
Tagbilaran, the case in MCTC-Jagna should be dismissed as the events that
transpired in Jagna, Bohol should only be deemed as a partial execution of
petitioner's single criminal design.

Union Bank vs. People, G.R. No. 192565. February 28, 2012.

Facts:
 Desi Tomas was charged in court for perjury when she falsely declared
under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping. Tomas filed a motion to
quash citing that the Makati MTC has no jurisdiction as the document was
submitted and used in Pasay and that there was no crime committed as not all of
the elements of perjury was present. The lower courts denied the motion saying
that Makati has jurisdiction as it was notarized there and ruled that she was
sufficiently charged with perjury.

Issue:

Whether, in a crime of perjury, the proper venue is where it was notarized or

where it was used? The SC ruled that Makati was the right venue.

Ruling:

The SC cites Rule 110, Sec. 15 of the Rules of Court where it was stated
that criminal action shall be instituted where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential elements occurred. 

The SC, one-by-one stated the elements of perjury and provided that Tomas
did all things in Makati, thus making Makati the right venue for the case.

ESTAFA BY POSTDATING OR ISSUING A BAD CHECK IS A TRANSITORY OR

CONTINUING OFFENSE (EXCEPTIONS)
People vs. Yabut, G.R. No.L-42847. April 29, 1977
 
Facts:

Accused Cecilia Que Yabut as treasurer and her husband GeminianoYabut,

Jr. as president of the Yabut Transit Line were charged with estafa for issuing
several checks payable to the Free Tires Supply and Free Caltex Station owned
and operated by Alicia P. Andan. The complaint alleged that the accused by means
of false pretenses and pretending to have sufficient funds in the Merchants
Banking Corporation and Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company in Caloocan
City prepared, issued and made out several checks despite full knowledge that at
the time there was no or insufficient funds in said bank, that upon presentation of
the said checks, the checks were dishonored and inspite of repeated demands by
Freeway to deposit the necessary funds to cover the checks within the
reglementary period enjoined by law, the accused failed and refused to do so, to
the damage and prejudice of Andan. Respondents instead of entering a plea
respectively filed their motions for the quashal of the information citing as one of
their reasons that the venue was improperly laid in Malolos, Bulacan, because the
postdated checks were issued and delivered to, and received by the complainant in
Caloocan.
 
Issue:
 Where was the Estafa in Post Dated Checks is a continuing offense? YES.

Ruling:

Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the
Revised Penal Code may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its basic elements
of deceit and damage may independently arise in separate places. In the event of
such occurrence, the institution of the criminal action in either place is legally
allowed. Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the Court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place." The theory is that a person indicted with a
transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in
part committed. However, if all the acts material and essential to the crime and
requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or province, the court of
that municipality or province has the sole jurisdiction to try the case.The estafa
charged in the two informations involved in the case before Us appears to be
transitory or continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in Malolos, Bulacan, while
the damage in Caloocan City, where the checks were dishonored by the drawee
banks there. Jurisdiction can, therefore, be entertained by either the Malolos court
or the Caloocan court. While the subject checks were written, signed, or dated in
Caloocan City, they were not completely made or drawn there, but in Malolos,
Bulacan, where they were uttered and delivered. That is the place of business and
residence of the payee. The place where the bills were written, signed, or dated
does not necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is
of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the
final act essential to its consummation as an obligation.

People vs. Grospe, G.R. L-74053-54

Facts:
Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale dealer of San Miguel Corp
(SMC). He was charged with BP 22 at the RTC for issuing a dishonored check in
1983 in favor of SMC (for insufficiency of funds) and, in spite of repeated demands,
failed and refused to make good said check to the damage of SMC. He was also
charged with Estafa for issuing another check for payment of the beer he
purchased and refused to redeem said check despite repeated demands. Trial
court of Pampanga dismissed the case because it said, that deceit and damage,
the elements of the crimes did not occur in Pampanga, therefore, this court has no
jurisdiction. The checks were made in Guiguinto, Bulacan, and delivered to SMC
also in Bulacan.  Were deposited in Planter’s Bank (drawee bank) at Santa Maria,
Bulacan and was received by BPI at San Fernando, Pampanga for clearing
purposes. Sol Gen points that 2 checks are involved. That Parulan issued PDB’s
check (Bulacan) and was received by SMC at Bulacan. Then it was forwarded to
SMC San Fernando, Pampanga where it was received by te Finance Officer and
deposited with BPI San Fernando Branch then the SMC depository bank received
a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from the drawee bank, the PDB, in
Santa Maria, Bulacan. This check was the subject of Estafa. For Violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of deceit and damage are
not essential nor required. An essential element of that offense is knowledge on the
part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, it being
mala prohibitum.
Issue:
Wheether or not the venue (RTC Pampanga) was proper ?YES.

Ruling: 
Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure: (a) In all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place.
In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried
in any municipality or province where the offense was in part committed. However,
if the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation
occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of that municipality or territory
has the sole jurisdiction to try the case Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check,
may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage
may arise independently in separate places. In this case, deceit took place in San
Fernando, Pampanga, while the damage was inflicted in Bulacan where the cheek
was dishonored by the drawee bank in that place. Jurisdiction may, therefore, be
entertained by either the Bulacan Court or the Pampanga Court.
What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the
instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation.
VIOLATION OF BP 22 IS A CONTINUING OFFENSE
Yalong vs. People, G.R. 187174

Facts:

Stemming from a complaint filed by respondent Lucila C. Ylagan (Ylagan),

an Information was filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Batangas City,
Branch 1 (MTCC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 45414, charging Yalong for the
crime of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).

In her defense, Yalong averred that she already paid her loan but did not
require Ylagan to issue a receipt or acknowledge the same. Likewise, she claimed
that the subject check belonged to her husband and that while she knew that the
said check was not covered by sufficient funds, it was already signed by her
husband when she handed it to Ylagan.

Issue:

Whether or not BP 22 is a continuing offense? YES.

Ruling:

BP 22 is a continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and

essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another.
Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have
been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the
first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a
person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying these
principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places
where any of its elements occurred – in particular, the place where the check is
drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored. Library

In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was drawn, issued,
and delivered in Manila, records reveal that Ylagan presented the same for deposit
and encashment at the LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned of its
dishonor.38 As such, the MTCC correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No.
45414 as it had the territorial jurisdiction to try and resolve the same. In this light,
the denial of the present petition remains warranted.

As the Court finds the above-stated reasons already sufficient to deny the
present petition, it is unnecessary to delve on the other ancillary issues in this case.

Rigor vs. People, G.R. No. 144887

Facts:
Alfredo Rigor applied for a P500k commercial loan from Rural Bank (RB)
San Juan on Nov 16 1989. Rigor signed a Promissory Note (PN) stating a 24%
interest per year. The loan was approved by RB San Juan Manager de Guzman
and Controller AgapitoUy. A cashiers check with P487k net proceeds of loan was
issued to Rigor. Rigor endorsed and encashed the check with the RB San Juan
teller Cruz who stamped the word “Paid”. Rigor issued an undated Associated
Bank (AB) Tarlac Branch check in the amount of P500k payable to RB San Juan.
The application, approval and receipt of proceeds were all in one day because
Rigor is the kumpare of RB San Juan President and he is well-known to directors
because they all come from Tarlac. Rigor failed to pay the loan upon maturity of the
loan on Dec 16 1989. Rigor personally asked a 2 month extension but still failed to
pay so asked for another 2 month extension. Rigor failed to pay and asked for a 30
day extension on Apr 16 1990 but was now denied by de Guzman. De Guzman
sent a formal demand letter on Apr 25 1990.
Issue:
Wheether or not the Trial Court of Pasig had jurisdiction to try and decide
case for violation of BP 22? YES.
Ruling:
A person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Violations of BP
22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes because some acts material
and essential to the crimes and requisite to their consummation occur in one
municipality or territory and some in another. Either court has jurisdiction to try
cases given that the 1st court taking the case excludes other courts.

LIBEL
Bonifacio vs. RTC of Makati, G.R. 184800
Facts:
Private respondent Jessie John Gimenez (Gimenez) filed, on behalf of the
Yuchengco family and of the Malayan Insurance Co. a criminal complaint before
the RTC of Makati for 13 counts of libel under Art 355 in relation to 353 of the RPC
against herein petitioners who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition,
Inc (PEPCI). Pepci is a large group of disgruntled plan holders of Pacific Plans, Inc
(PPI) who had previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but
were unable to collect thereon due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate
rehabilitation with prayer of suspension of payments before the Makati RTC.
Petitioner then filed before the Makati RTC a Motion to Quash the information on
the ground that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC. Citing Macasaet v
people, petitioners maintained that the information failed to allege a particular place
within the trial court’s jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first
published or that the offended party resided in Makati at the time the alleged
defamatory material was printed and first published. The RTC of Makati, despite
finding probable cause, quashed the information, but upon motion for
reconsideration, allowed the prosecution to amend the information and the latter
moved to have the amended information admitted. Petitioners once more moved to
have the amended information quashed on the same ground but the RTC ruled
that the information was sufficient in form.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC of Makati acted with grave abuse of discretion in
admitting the amended information despite the failure to allege that the libelous
articles were printed and first published by the accused in Makati? YES.
Ruling:
The venue of the action seeks to prevent undue harassment on the part of
the publisher by the complainant who, if the amended information would be
allowed, can file in all other locations where the pep coalition website is likewise
accessed or capable of being accessed. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions
such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue
of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. It is clear that the
venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only
two places. 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense, and 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed
and first published. The old rule allows the filing of an action for libel in any
jurisdiction where the libellous article was published or circulated. Clearly, the evil
sought to be prevented by the amendment was the indiscriminate or arbitrary
laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to
accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. To credit
Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on
petitioner’s website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the
very ills that the amendment to Art 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and
prevent. For the Court to hold that the amended information sufficiently vested
jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was
accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other
locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being
accessed.
WRITTEN DEFAMATION
Foz, Jr. vs. People, G.R. 167764
Facts:

In an Information filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz,
Jr., and Danny G.Fajardo, columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay
News were charged with the crime of libel. They wrote and publish in the reular
issue of the Panay news a certain article maliciously injuring and exposing one Dr.
Edgar Portigo, a company physician of San Miguel Corporation office, SMC, as
anincompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at the expense of
the poor.The RTC rendered its Decision finding petitioners guilty as charged.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filedan appeal with the CA which rendered its assailed
Decision affirming in toto the RTC decision. Hence, thispresent petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the off
ense of libel ascharged in the Information dated October 17, 1994? NO.

Held:

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court hel
d in Macasaet v. People:“ xxx the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is
so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. Xxx”

Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a
libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no
jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime
of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with
the court of competent jurisdiction.

People v. Marlene Olermo, G.R. 127848

Facts:
In separate informations filed before the RTC of
Valenzuela, Marlene Olermo was accused of crimes, one of which was illegal
recruitment in l arge scal e. Ol ermo contends that the RTC of Valenzuela
has no jurisdiction since the complainant's affidavit provides that he first met
O l e r m o i n Q C a n d t h a t i t w a s o n l y d u r i n g t r i a l t h a t complainant
said that he actually first met Olermoin ValenzuelaCity.n separate informations
filed before the RTC of Valenzuela, Marlene Olermo was accused of crimes, one of
which was illegal recruitment in large scale. Olermo contends that the RTC of
Valenzuela has no jurisdiction since the complainant's affidavit provides that he first
met Olermo in QC and that it was only during trial that complainant said that he
actually first met Olermo in Valenzuela city.Issue: Does the RTC of Valenzula have
jurisdiction? Yes. In the case at bar, the prosecution proved that the element of
offering, promising and advertising overseas employment took place in Olermo's
office in Valenzuela. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be tried in the
territory wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients
thereof took place.
Issue:
 Does the RTC of Valenzula have jurisdiction? YES.
Ruing:
In the case at bar, the prosecution proved that the element of offering,
promising and advertising overseas employment took place in Olermo's office in
Valenzuela. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be tried in the territory
wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took
place.
ABDUCTION IS A CONTINUING OFFENSE
People vs. Feliciano Gorospe (G.R. No. L-51513)

Facts:

In a verified complaint filed on October 8, 1974, with the Municipal Court of

Pulilan, Bulacan, ANASTACIA DE JESUS accused GERARDO FAJARDO,
RUFINO BULANADI and FELICIANO GOROSPE of the crime of forcible abduction
with rape. (Expediente, p. 1.) The crime was said to have been committed on
September 30, 1974, starting in Plaridel, Bulacan, thru Pulilan, and thence to
Talavera, Nueva Ecija.Municipal Judge Alfredo V. Granados of the Municipal Court
of Pulilan received the complaint and conducted a preliminary investigation, first
stage.On October 25, 1974, the Complaint was amended. Rufino Bulanadi and
Feliciano Gorospe were again named but Gerardo Fajardo was dropped and
OSCAR ALVARAN was named instead. The date when the crime was said to have
been committed was changed from September 30, 1974, to September 25, 1974.

Issue:

Whether or not Abduction is a continuing offense? YES.

Ruling:

The above questions are easily answered. Abduction is a persistent and

continuing offense. (U.S. vs. Bernabe, 23 Phil. 154 [1912].) Hence it may be "tried
in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or
any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place." (Rules of Court, Rule 110,
Sec. 14[a].) The Municipal Court of Pulilan had jurisdiction because the abductors
and their captive passed Pulilan on their way from Plaridel to Talavera. And the CFI
of Bulacan (as well as the CFI of Nueva Ecija) had jurisdiction because essential
elements of the offense took place in Bulacan (and also in Nueva Ecija).

KIDNAPPING IS A CONTINUING OFFENSE

People vs. Suriaga, G.R. 123779

Facts:

Edwin Ramos was cleaning the car of his older brother, Johnny who was
taking care of his 2-year old daughter, Nicole, playing inside the car. Suriaga, a
cousin of the Ramos brothers, arrived. He was accompanied by his live-in-partner
Rosita. Suriaga requested Edwin if he could drive the car, butte latter declined,
saying he did not have the keys. Meanwhile, Johnny returned to his house because
a visitor arrived. At this instance, Rosita held Nicole and cajoled her. Rosita asked
Edwin if she could take Nicole with her to buy barbeque. Having been acquainted
with Rosita for a long time and because he trusted her, Edwin acceded. When
Rosita and the child left, Suriaga joined them. More than an one hour has passed
but the two failed to return with Nicole. Edwin, Johnny and his wife, Mercedita, then
began searching but they could not find their daughter and Rosita. Nicole’s
grandfather then receive a call from Suriaga asking for ransom in the amount of
P100,000.00. Johnny immediately reported the call to the PACC Task Force. The
next day, Suriaga called Mercedita, introduced himself and asked her if she and
her husband would give the amount to which the latter responded in the positive.
Suriaga instructed Mercidita as to the how the money should be delivered to him
with a warning that if she will not deliver the money ,her daughter would be placed
in a plastic bag or thrown in a garbage can. Thereafter, with the cash money, and
while being tailed by PACC agents, Mercida proceeded to deliver the money to
Suriaga. The PACC agents arrested Suriaga and his companion Isidera after
Mercida gave the money to them. Prior thereto, Nicole was rescued in a shanty
where Rosita’s sister lived.

Issue:
Whether or not Kidnapping is continuing offense? YES.
Ruling:
The chain of events as narrated by the prosecution’s witnesses could only
lead to the conclusion that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping for ransom, a continuing crime, defined and penalized under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659.

ESTOPPEL TO QUESTION JURISDICTION

Figueroa vs. People, G.R. 147406

Facts:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. The RTC found him guilty. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner, for
the first time, questioned RTCs jurisdiction on the case. The CA in affirming the
decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of estoppel by laches has already
precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial went
on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever
raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack
of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for
the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of
laches will not be applicable. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the
trial of this case, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in
petitioner’s appeal to the Court of Appeals? NO.
Ruling:
Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a general
rule, the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches may be
invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual
milieu is analogous to that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
Laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be
applicable, that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to
warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or
declined to assert it. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so
only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been
elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence
of laches.
In the case at bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not
present. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals
resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for
Reconsideration assailing the said court’s jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity
in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate court’s directive to show
cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of
pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in the
judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy.
Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to
dire consequences that impelled her to comply.

Austria vs. People, G.R. No. 83530

Facts:

Petitioner Austria was charged of murder before the Circuit Criminal Court
(CCC) of the 7th Judicial District for shooting Roberto Miranda inside the San
Miguel Magnolia Poultry farm compound in Alfonso, Cavite. The accused denied
having shot the deceased and claimed that they were grappling for the possession
of shotgun that is why it was accidentally fired. The case was filed by the Provincial
Fiscal of Cavite in the defunct of the Circuit Criminal Court sitting in Pasig, presided
by Judge Pena. However due to the death of said judge and the reorganization of
the courts (Aug. 14, 1981) creating the RTC and abolishing the CCC, the same
was referred to Pasig presided by Judge Migrino and subsequently upon the
appointment of Judge Caguioa to her sala.

Petitioner assails jurisdiction of Caguioa court that upon the abolition of the
CCC, the case should have been assumed by RTC Cavite which was the venue of
the crime .

Issue:

Whether or not Pasig Court has jurisdiction over the case? NO.

Ruling:
 Moreover, the records show that the petitioner had pursued vigorously the
case before the lower court, on the supposition that it had jurisdiction, and had
asked it to render a judgment of acquittal, as he in fact requests this Court to set
aside its decision (as well as the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals). It is
a behavior that forces him to accept the jurisdiction of the Pasig court; because if
the latter lacked jurisdiction, it cannot act, much less render a decision, whether of
a conviction or acquittal. Surely, he cannot rightfully maintain an attack on the trial
court's competence after having accepted — and invoked — it.  Estoppel is an
impediment against any attack.

CHANGE OF VENUE
People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393

Facts: 

CFI issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased

bodies of 7 persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his
hacienda in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. Armed with the above warrant, the
Philippine Constabulary proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a
canefield yielded two common graves containing the 7 bodies. Seven (7) separate
complaints for murder were thus filed against Pablo Sola and 18 other persons
before CFI of Kabankalan. The trial court ordered their arrest. However, without
giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail. Pablo Sola and two
others have since been released from detention. The witnesses in the murder
cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the CFI
Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be
jeopardized. At least 2 of the accused are official with power and influence in
Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused
remained at large. There had also been reports made to police authorities of
threats made on the families of the witnesses. Prosecution petitioned for a) change
of venue for trial and b) cancellation of the bail bonds.

Issue:

Whether or not change of venue is proper? YES.

Ruling:

The Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change
of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." The exercise by this
Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate.
The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be
killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because
of fear, they may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to save their lives. It
may be added that there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to
some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect
it has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the
Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in
favor of a change of venue.
O. Intervention by Offended Party – Sec. 16
Lee PueLiong vs. Chua Pue Chin Lee, GR181658

Facts:
Petitioner Lee PueLiong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion
Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC
Group) which includes the pioneer company Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC).
The CKC Group is the subject of... intra-corporate disputes between petitioner and
his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a majority
stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
Presence and intervention of the private prosecutor in the perjury cases are
not prohibited by the rules, stressing that she is, in fact, an aggrieved party, being a
stockholder, an officer and the treasurer of CHI and the private complainant.
Issue:
Whether or not the honorable court of appeals committed a grave error when
it upheld the resolution of the metropolitan trial court that there is a private offended
party in the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest? NO.
Ruling:
Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence
should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered. There was neither a
waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a separate civil
action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to
establish the civil liability arising from the offense committed, and the private
offended party has the right to intervene through the private prosecutors. Such right
to intervene exists even when no civil liability is involved." she submits that
pursuant to our ruling in Lim Tek Goan she has the right to intervene even if no civil
liability exists in this case.
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right
to institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the
offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the
trial of the criminal action.

RULE 111: PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

A .Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions – Sec. 1
Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, G.R. No. L-139465
Facts:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The Department of Justice received a request from the Department of
Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The
Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents
for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include:
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US, Attempt to evade or defeat tax,
Fraud by wire, radio, or television, False statement or entries, and Election
contribution in name of another.

Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC
presiding Judge Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue
a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. Thus,
this petition is now at bar.

Issue:

Whether or not extradition proceeding is subject to the Rules of Court? YES.

Ruling:

The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition
proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1],
Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the
provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the
summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of
the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon
application by the Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the
proceedings.

People vs. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102207, September 2, 1994

Facts:

Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 4, 1992

due to cardio respiratory arrest. The Solicitor General then submitted a comment
stating that the death of the accused does not excuse him from his civil liability
(supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs Sendaydiego). On the
other hand, the counsel of the accused claimed that in the Supreme Court’s
decision in People vs Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die
before the final judgement is rendered.

Issue:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of

his conviction extinguish his civil liability? YES.

Ruling:

The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and
Sendaydiego. In the Castillo case, the Court said that civil liability is extinguished
only when death of the accused occurred before the final judgement. Judge
Kapunan further stated that civil liability is extinguished because there will be “no
party defendant” in the case. There will be no civil liability
if criminal liability does not exist. Further, the Court stated “it is, thus, evident that…
the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether
the same can be predicated on the sources of obligations other than delict.

In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where
it states that civil liability will only survive if death came after the final judgement of
the CFI of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the Civil Code could not possibly
lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by
the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. The Court also gave a
summary on which cases should civil liability be extinguished, to wit:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes

his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Therefore,
Bayotas’s death extinguished his criminal and civil liability based solely on the act
complained of.

B. When Separate Civil Action is Suspended –Sec. 2

Manantan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107125, January 29, 2001

Facts:

In the evening of September 25, 1982, at the National Highway of Malvar,

Santiago, Isabela, George Manantan was driving a Toyota car going home. At that
time, he was with Fiscal Ambrocio, Miguel Tabangin and Ruben Nicolas. Suddenly,
a jeepney, coming from the opposite direction hit the driver side of the car, driven
by Manantan. Consequently, Manantan, Ambrocio and Tabangin were injured
while Nicolas died. Trial followed.

The lower court acquitted the accused of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide. The respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil
aspect of the lower court’s judgment. Even if the accused was acquitted from his
criminal liability, the Appellate Court held him civilly liable and ordered him to
indemnify the aggrieved party for the death of Nicolas.

Issue:

Whether or not the acquittal of petitioner extinguished his civil liability?

Ruling:

The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
Article 29 of the Civil Code provides that a civil liability is not extinguished
in criminal cases. Therefore, the accused cannot be exempted from paying civil
damages which may only be proven by preponderance of evidence.
 Manantan claimed that he was placed on double jeopardy but the courts did
not give merit to this contention. The following elements must be present
for doublejeopardy to exist: (1) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second; (2) The first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the third jeopardy
must be for the same offense as the first.

In the case at bar, the initially put into jeopardy but he it was terminated by his
discharge. When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the issue was
about the civil aspect of the criminal case. Thus, there could be
no double jeopardy.

F. Suspension by Reason of a Prejudicial Question – Sec. 6

Dreamworkvs. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, through its president and VP, filed a
complaint for violation of BP 22 against private respondent Janiola with the Office
of City Prosecutor. Janiola then instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for
damages. Notably, the checks that were subject of the criminal cases before the
MTC were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
Janiola filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the criminal case, alleging
that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately
related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, Janiola
claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal
cases.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a prejudicial question in this case? NO
Ruling:
Sec. 6 Rule 111: Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition
for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in
court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at
any time before the prosecution rests.
SEC. 7 Rule 111: Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action,
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
It is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial
question (resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the
criminal action may proceed) is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial
question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable in this case.
RULE 112: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
A .Preliminary Investgation defined; when required – Sec. 1
Sales vs. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 293
Facts:

Reynolan Sales, the incumbent mayor of Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte, fatally shot
his political rival, Atty. Benemerito in an alleged shootout in a barangay of said
municipality. After said shooting, Sales surrendered and placed himself under the
custody of the police and then asked that he be brought to the Provincial PNP
Headquarters. Chief Insp. Agno and the wife of the deceased filed a criminal
complaint for Murder against petitioner at MCTC Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
Presiding judge, Hon. Calvan, conducted a preliminary examination of the
witnesses, found probable cause, and thereafter issued an order for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest with no bail recommended.
Petitioner belatedly received a copy of the foregoing Resolution of the graft
investigation officer only on June 21, 2000, and because he was thus effectively
prevented from seeking a reconsideration thereof, he then filed a Motion To Defer
Issuance Of Warrant Of Arrest pending determination of probable cause dated
June 22, 2000.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman followed proper procedure in conducting a
Preliminary Investigation? NO.
Whether or not petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard and to
submit controverting evidence? NO.

Ruling:

The records show that the supposed preliminary investigation was conducted in
installments by at least three (3) different investigating officers, none of
whom completed the preliminary investigation. There was not one continuous
proceeding but rather a case of passing the buck, so to speak, the last one being
the Ombudsman hurriedly throwing the buck to the Sandiganbayan.

The charge against herein petitioner is Murder, a non-bailable offense. The

gravity of the offense alone, not to mention the fact that the principal accused is an
incumbent mayor whose imprisonment during the pendency of the case would
deprive his constituents of their duly-elected municipal executive, should have
merited a deeper and more thorough preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman,
however, did nothing of the sort and instead swallowed hook, line and sinker the
resolution and recommendation of Graft Investigation Officer II Cynthia V. Vivar,
among them the finding that, aside from the averment of respondent that the victim
fired at him and he was only forced to fire back, no other evidence was adduced to
indicate that such was what happened.

Baytan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 153945 February 4, 2003

Facts:
 Petitioners, ReynatoBaytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytanwere on
their way to register for the May 1998 elections when they met the newly elected
Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City, who led
them to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18. Upon realizing that their
residence is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28 not Barangay 18,
petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered anew.

Issue:

Whether or not the criminal cases should be dismissed on the ground of lack
of inten

t and substantial compliance with the requirement of cancellation of previous

registration? NO.

Ruling:

Petitioners lose sight of the fact that the assailed resolutions were issued in
the preliminary investigation stage. A preliminary investigation is essentially
inquisitorial and is only the means to discover who may be charged with a crime, its
function being merely to determine probable cause. All that is required in the
preliminary investigation is the determination of probable cause to justify the
holding of petitioners for trial. The established rule is that a preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof.
The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for
the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence. It is for the presentation of
such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has
been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof.

Paderanga vs. Drilon, 196 SCRA 86

CASE DIGEST
Facts:
On 16 October 1986, an information for multiple murder was filed in the
Regional Trial Court for the deaths on 1 May 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife
MelchoraBucag, and theirson Renato Bucag II. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and
found guilty as charged. The rest of the accused remained at large. Felipe
Galarion, however, escaped from detention and has not been apprehended since
then. In an amended information filed on 6 October 1988, FelizardoRoxas, alias
"Ely Roxas," "FelyRoxas" and "LolongRoxas," was included as a co-accused.
Roxas retained Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga as his counsel.
In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit,
FelizardoRoxas implicated Atty. Paderanga in the commission of the crime
charged. The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from further
conducting the preliminary investigation against Paderanga at the instance of the
latter's counsel, per his resolution dated 7 July 1989.
Issue:
What is the quantum of evidence needed for probable in preliminary
investigation?
Ruling:
General Rule: The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court. Hence, the general rule is
that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution.
Exception: (Citing the case of Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile)
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions;
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied.

In this case, the circumstances of the case do not fall in any of the
exceptions.

Go vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 101837

Facts:
Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost
had a collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the
driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to
take down petitioner’s plate number and reported the same to the police, who
subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner
presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police
detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner
posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and
commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the
petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted
and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully,
falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to
situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails
such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.
Issue/s:
Whether or not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful?
 Whether or not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary
investigation?
Ruling:
The general rule on arrest provides that the same is legitimate if effected
with a valid warrant. However, there are instances specifically enumerated under
the law when a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful. Despite that, the
warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of
said rule. The police were not present at the time of the commission of the offense,
neither do they have personal knowledge on the crime to be committed or has
been committed not to mention the fact that petitioner was not a prisoner who has
escaped from the penal institution. In this connection, petitioner has all the right to
ask for a preliminary investigation to determine whether is probable cause that a
crime has been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as
to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought by a criminal
proceeding. This reason of the accused is substantial, which he should not be
deprived of.On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right to have a
preliminary investigation contrary to the prosecutor's claim. The right to preliminary
investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the
time of entering a plea at arraignment.
The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary
investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering
questions before the court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary
investigation. For the above reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of
the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court however,
contrary to petitioner's allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to
preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the
latter of the crime of murder.
Doroma vs. Sandiganbayan. G.R. 85468
Facts:
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as
president and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC)
which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical,
automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth
Council (or NMYC). An information was then filed by the “Tanod bayan” against
Doromal for the said violation and a preliminary investigation was conducted.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it
was invalid since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new
information that was filed against him. The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan
claiming that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because both old
and new informations involve the same subject matter.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the
Constitution? YES.
 Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both
informations involve the same subject matter? YES.
Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the
absence of preliminary investigation? NO.
Ruling:
(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as
part of the application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having
participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "the President, Vice-President, the
members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their)
tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any business.
(2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial
one." Its denial over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the
accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" provided
by the Constitution. Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary
investigation conducted at that time shall also be considered as void. Due to that
fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted.
(3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's
jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and
the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their
absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conduct such
investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court
so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.
Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652

Facts:

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with
the Department of Justice a letter- complaint charging petitioners Hubert
Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six other persons with the
crime of Rape with Homicide for the rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of
Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde and her sister
Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons St., BF Homes,
Parañaque, Metro Manila.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely

abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them? NO.

Ruling:

The DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing
warrants of arrest against the petitioners. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply
provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may
issue a warrant for the arrest of theaccused.

In arrest cases, there must be probable cause that a crime has been
committed and that the person to be arrested committedit.Before issuing
warrants of arrest, the judges merely determine personally the probability,
not the certainty of guilt, of anaccused.

Allado vs. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 (1994)

Facts:
Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the College
of Law, University of the Philippines, are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga,
Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an
alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard, they have been accused of the
heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without bail by respondent judge.
Petitioners, in their 335-page petition, inclusive of annexes, principally contend that
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction
in "whimsically holding that there is probable cause against petitioners without
determining the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners and without even
stating the basis of his findings," 20 and in "relying on the Resolution of the Panel
and their certification that probable cause exists when the certification is
flawed." 21 Petitioners maintain that the records of the preliminary investigation
which respondent judge solely relied upon failed to establish probable cause
against them to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Petitioners likewise
assail the prosecutors' "clear sign of bias and impartiality

Issue:

WON there was sufficient finding of probable cause?

Held:

NO. Respondent judge did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for
the complainant and its witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead,
he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed.

Petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The warrant of arrest issued
against petitioner is set aside and the respondent judge is enjoined from
proceeding any further against petitioner.

Officers Authorized to conduct preliminary investigation

Velasco vs. Casaclang, 294 SCRA 396 (1998)

Facts: By virtue of Assignment Order No. 89-846 dated June 5, 1989 of the
Commission on Audit, COA Audit Examiners Priscilla G. Cruz and Virginia G.
Pantoja conducted a special audit of selected transactions of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) Logistics Command, covering the period from January 1988
to May 1989.
In their Memorandum Report 4, dated March 13, 1990, to the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, the said COA audit examiners reported their findings relative
to the doubtful validity of several procurement transactions.
On May 6, 1993, the same audit examiners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
a Joint Affidavit-Complaint deploring the aforesaid transactions dubbed as
anomalous and highly irregular.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the authority to conduct preliminary
investigation over the complaint.

Ruling:

Yes.Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman
Act", provides:

The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office, or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has a primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.

In light of the aforequoted provisions of law in point, it is beyond cavil that the
Ombudsman and his Deputies are, within legal contemplation, "other officers
authorized by law" to conduct preliminary investigation.

Balgos vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 85590 August 10, 1989

Facts:
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, as amended, in an
information that was filed with the Sandiganbayan on April 18, 1986 by the Special
Prosecutor which was approved by the Deputy Tanodbayan, after a preliminary
investigation.
On March 18,1987, Antonio Uy Lim, the plaintiff and prevailing party in Civil Case
No. 4047 filed a complaint for rescission of the sale of the car by Juanito Ang to
private respondent Leticia Acosta-Ang for being allegedly in fraud of creditors. On
the same day, petitioners filed a motion for reinvestigation in the Tanodbayan. The
same was granted on May 18,1987.
On April 22, 1988 the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
withdraw the information against petitioners. This was denied on June 29, 1988.
On September 1, 1988, petitioners filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the
criminal case against them on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question
in Civil Case No. 5307. This was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan on
October 24,1988.
Issue: WON Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the aforestated motions.

Ruling:
No. In the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, 3 this Court ruled that while the public
prosecutor has the sole direction and control in the prosecution of offenses, once
the complaint or information is filed in court, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the case and all subsequent actions that may be taken by the public
prosecutor in relation to the disposition of the case must be subject to the approval
of the said court. It is the court that has now the final say on any subsequent
disposition or action once the case is brought before it.

In denying said motion the public respondent Sandiganbayan stated in its

resolution dated June 29, 1988 that the issue in the criminal case was not so much
whether the car was owned by Juanita Ang or Leticia Ang but whether it was rightly
seized, that is, whether or not it was attended with partiality as to extend
unwarranted benefits to the judgment creditor, quoting the resolution of the
Tanodbayan after a preliminary investigation for the filing of the information.
Although at the reinvestigation, the Tanodbayan was persuaded that in fact the
sale of the car to Leticia Ang was fraudulent, this did not necessarily clear
petitioners of the aforesaid Anti-Graft charge against them. Still the burden is on
the petitioners to establish that they acted in good faith in proceeding with the
execution on the car even they were presented evidence tending to show it did not
belong to Juanito Ang anymore.

In this case, as correctly held by public respondent, the pending civil case for the
annulment of the sale of the car to Leticia Ang (Civil Case No. 5307) is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners for the acts allegedly
committed by them in seizing the car. Even if in the civil action it is ultimately
resolved that the sale was null and void, it does not necessarily follow that the
seizure of the car was rightfully undertaken. The car was registered in the name of
Leticia Ang six (6) months before the seizure. Until the nullity of the sale is declared
by the courts, the same is presumptively valid. Thus, petitioners must demonstrate
that the seizure was not attended by manifest bad faith in order to clear themselves
of the charge in the criminal action.

Alonzo vs. Concepcion, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1879, Jan. 17, 2005

Facts:
At a wedding party, SPO4 Alonzo, Rances, Salamat and Santos were drinking
together in the same table. While waiting to be seated, Pedrito Alonzo was
introduced by SPO4 Alonzo to Rances as his nephew and as the son of ex-Captain
Alonzo. SPO4 Alonzo then introduced him to Salamat. Pedrito and his companions
took their seats and started drinking at the table across SPO4 Alonzo's table. After
some time, Pedrito stood up to urinate at the back of the house. Santos passed a
bag to Salamat, and they followed Pedrito. Rances likewise followed them. A shot
rang out. Salamat was seen placing a gun inside the bag as he hurriedly left. The
wedding guests ran after Salamat. They saw him and Rances board a vehicle
being driven by Santos. Pedrito's uncle, Jose Alonzo, sought the help of SPO4
Alonzo to chase the culprits. He refused and even disavowed any knowledge as to
their identity.

Jose Alonzo filed a complaint for murder against Salamat, Rances, Santos, SPO4
Alonzo and a certain Isidro Atienza.

Pursuant to the preliminary investigation conducted, it was recommended that

Salamat be charged with murder as principal, and Santos and Rances as
accessories. With regard to SPO4 Alonzo and Isidro Atienza, the prosecutor found
that no sufficient evidence was adduced to establish their conspiracy with Salamat.
Thereafter, an Information was prepared, charging Salamat as principal, and
Rances and Santos as accessories, for the murder of Pedrito. No bail was
recommended.

Judge Concepcion issued an order finding conspiracy among SPO4 Alonzo

(mastermind), Rances (back-up of Salamat), Salamat (hired killer) and Santos
(provider of gun) and directing the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to
amend the information, so as to include all the aforenamed persons as accused in
this case, all as principals, within five (5) days from notice hereof.

Issue: WON Judge Concepcion is liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge

Held: Judge Concepcion is liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge and is

reprimanded. Jude Concepcion overlooked the fact that there is a remedy where a
prosecutor errs in not charging a person in an Information. The recourse is to
appeal to the Secretary of Justice.By ordering the prosecutor to include
complainant, Rances and Santos as principals in the Information, respondent
arrogated unto himself the executive power of supervision and control over public
prosecutors. His conduct is not only unbecoming of a judge; more importantly, it
transgresses our Constitution.

As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor's discretion and

control of the criminal prosecution. The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecution by private persons.However, while prosecuting officers
have the authority to prosecute persons shown to be guilty of a crime, they have
equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation, the evidence
adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Judges should not
unduly interfere with the exercise of the power to prosecute on the part of
fiscals.

Rodil vs. Garcia

104 SCRA 362

Facts: It was the insistence of counsel for petitioner Reynaldo Rodil, against whom
a warrant of arrest had been issued the charge against him being that of murder, to
recall witnesses for the prosecution to enable such counsel to cross-examine them,
on, to quote his words, "clarificatory and amplificatory matters" and the denial
thereof by respondent Municipal Judge Segundo M. Garcia of Sta. Cruz,
Marinduque that led to this proceeding for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction. What is prayed for is not only that such order denying counsel's request
to recall government witnesses be set aside and nullified, but also that bail be
granted petitioner, a petition to that effect having been denied with a subsequent
motion for reconsideration still undecided. Respondents were required to comment
and the Court likewise issued a temporary restraining order. Such a comment was
submitted on behalf of respondent by the Solicitor General seeking the dismissal of
the petition on the ground that the right to cross-examine in a preliminary
investigation is not a right granted an accused and that the exercise of discretion
by respondent Judge considering the evidence of record sufficed to justify denial of
the application for bail. The case was then considered submitted for decision.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Garcia committed grave abuse of discretion in his
refusal to allow counsel for petitioner during the stage of preliminary investigation
proper to recall prosecution witnesses.

Held: No, as set forth earlier, the accused is not by law entitled to such a right. The
leading case is still Abrera v. Muoz and Flordeliza, a 1960 decision, with Justice
J.B.L. Reyes as ponente. While the specific question differs, the principle
announced is applicable. In that certiorari proceeding, it was alleged that there was
a grave abuse of discretion by respondent Justice of the Peace for permitting the
cross-examination by the prosecution of the accused and her witnesses during the
preliminary investigation. This Court held: "At the outset, it should be stated that the
refusal of the Justice of the Peace to allow the defense to cross-examine the
prosecution's witnesses presented prior to petitioner's arrest, cannot be utilized as
argument for the contention that the prosecution should not have been allowed to
cross-examine the defense witnesses. An accused is not entitled to cross-examine
the witnesses presented against him in the preliminary investigation before his
arrest, this being a matter that depends on the sound discretion of the Judge or
investigating officer concerned. Petitioner-appellant's attempt to draw a parallel
between the refusal of the judge to allow her to cross-examine prosecution's
witnesses, with the permission granted to the latter as against the defense
witnesses, assumes the existence of a vested right of which petitioner-appellant
had been deprived. In being denied confrontation of the prosecution witnesses, she
was not deprived of any right but was merely refused the exercise of a privilege.
With the ruling on the question for bail, counsel for petitioner, as above intimated,
would be able to attain the objective which was denied him when he was not
allowed to recall the prosecution witnesses. To follow the language of Abrera,
petitioner as the accused "was not deprived of any right but was merely
refused the exercise of a privilege."

Conquilla vs. MTC Judge Bernardo, AM No. MTJ-09-1737, Feb. 9, 2011

FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint for usurpation of authority, grave misconduct,
and gross ignorance of the law filed by Lydelle L. Conquilla (complainant) against
Judge Lauro G. Bernardo (respondent judge), Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Bocaue, Bulacan.
Complainant alleged that on 4 July 2008, a criminal complaint for direct assault
was filed against her before the MTC of Bocaue, Bulacan.
On 8 July 2008, respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation and found
probable cause to hold the complainant for trial for the crime of direct assault.
Respondent judge then issued a warrant of arrest dated 8 July 2008, with bail.
Complainant then filed an administrative complaint, alleging that under A.M. No.
05-08-[2]6-SC, first level court judges no longer have the authority to conduct
preliminary investigations. Thus, complainant avers that respondent judge
committed an illegal act constituting gross ignorance of the law and procedure
when he conducted the preliminary investigation and issued the warrant of arrest.
Complainant claims that the hasty issuance of the warrant of arrest was without
legal basis and unjustly prejudiced complainant and deprived her of her liberty.
Complainant submits that respondent judge usurped the power of the prosecutor,
who was not even given the chance to comment on complainant’s Motion to
Reduce Bail. Furthermore, complainant alleges that when she learned about the
warrant of arrest, she called respondent judge’s wife, who said "she would help in
having the bail reduced to ₱6,000.00 and would have the case for direct assault
against herein complainant dismissed provided herein complainant cancel the
wife’s debt of ₱35,000.00 and provided that herein complainant loan the wife an
additional amount of ₱50,000.00."1

ISSUE: WON the MTC judge has authority to conduct preliminary investigation?

Ruling:
The conduct of preliminary investigation by respondent judge was in direct
contravention of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which took effect on 3 October 2005,
amending Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by
removing the conduct of preliminary investigation from judges of the first level
courts. Thus, under Section 2 of Rule 112, only the following officers are authorized
to conduct preliminary investigations: (a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their
assistants; (b) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (c) Other officers as
may be authorized by law. Furthermore, Section 5 of Rule 112 provides:
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. ‒
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. ‒ Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of
the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on records clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
order when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of
this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge
may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days
from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the complaint or information.
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. ‒ When required pursuant to the second
paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the preliminary investigation of
cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court SHALL be conducted by the prosecutor. The
procedure for the issuance of a warrant of arrest by the judge shall be
governed by paragraph (a) of this section. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, MTC judges are no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation.

Antonio vs. Alameda

G.R. No. 182677,August 3, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner was, by Information3 of January 16, 2007, charged with homicide for the
death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City. Branch 150 to which the case was raffled, presided by Judge
Elmo Alameda, forthwith issued a commitment order4 against petitioner who was
placed under police custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center.5
After petitioner posted a ₱40,000 cash bond which the trial court approved, 6 he
was released from detention, and his arraignment was set on January 24, 2007.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion7 praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the
proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or
to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.

ISSUE: WON in cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, the remedy
of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused.

Ruling:
Yes. Section 6,27 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads:
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which
requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been
conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an
inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace
officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended
party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the
presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

For obvious reasons, this remedy is not available to the private complainant since
he cannot waive what he does not have. The benefit of the provisions of Article
125, which requires the filing of a complaint or information with the proper judicial
authorities within the applicable period,32 belongs to the arrested person.
The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its summary nature and the attendant
risk of running against Article 125, ends with either the prompt filing of information
in court or the immediate release of the arrested person.

Notably, the rules on inquest do not provide for a motion for reconsideration.34
Contrary to petitioner’s position that private complainant should have appealed to
the DOJ Secretary, such remedy is not immediately available in cases subject of
inquest.

In cases subject of inquest, the private party should first avail of a preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation, if any, before elevating the matter to the DOJ
Secretary.

Dimatulac v Villon

FACTS:
 
SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San Nicolas,
Masantol, Pampanga. A complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut,
ServillanoYabut, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti David, Francisco Yambao,
Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda,
SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, AnianoMagnaye, Vladimir Yumul, a certain “Danny,”
and a certain “Koyang/Arding.” 

Judge David conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause,

issued warrants for the arrest of the accused. Only David, Mandap, Magat and
Yambao were arrested; while only Yambao submitted his counter affidavit.

After the prelim investigation, the judge found reasonable ground to believe that
Murder has been committed and the accused are probably the perpetrators
thereof. He recommended the issuance of warrants of arrests and provided no
bail

Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation.

It is not clear from the record whether she conducted the same motu proprio or
upon motion of private respondents.
 The offense committed was only homicide (NOT murder) and all Yabuts were
in conspiracy with one another. The 2 requisites of murder qualified by
treachery were absent. She also recommended bail of 20k each. (note: the
Yabuts were not under the custody of the law)

Before the information for Homicide was filed, the heirs of Dimatulacfiled an
appeal on the resolution of Ass. Prov. Pros. Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary
of  Justice (SOJ) alleging mainly that Alfonso-Flores erred in lowering the crime
from Murder as originally filed to Homicidedespite the glaring presence of
treachery, evident  premeditation, etc. (Take note of Rule 70- NPS Rules on Appeal
in Syllabus

 Notice of the appeal was furnished to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Alfonso-Flores ignored this and proceeded to file the information for
Homicide which the Prov. Prosecutor (Manarang) approved and certified
 Private prosecutor (counsel for private complainants) filed a motion to defer
proceedings (i.e. arraignment) before the RTC in view of his client’s pending
appeal with the SOJ
 YABUTs opposed motion to defer proceedings/arraignment arguing that the
pendency of the appeal before the SOJ was not a ground to defer
arraignment and they had a right to a speedy trial [invoked the case of
Crespo v. Mogul. 

RTC judge denied motion to defer arraignment.RTC Judge set the

arraignment. Private prosecutor moved to inhibit the judge, and filed a petition for
prohibition to enjoin the judge from proceeding with the arraignment. RTC Judge
voluntarily inhibited himself and then the case was transferred to herein respondent
Judge Villion.
 
Petitioners filed manifestation informing Judge Villlon him of the cases pending
before the SOJ and the prohibition case before the CA. Judge ignored this and
set the arraignment. Yabuts entered their plea of not guilty. Petitioners moved to
set aside arraignment but to no avail. SOJ Guingona FINALLY came up with a
resolution of the appeal. He directed the Provincial Prosec. To amend the info
against the accused from homicide to murder. But he wrote to Provincial Prosec.
Again and SET ASIDE his order to amend the info from homicide to murder,
considering the appeal was moot and academic by the arraignment of the accused
but Mallari must be included.

 
ISSUES: WON SOJ erred in reversing himself and his order to amend the
information from Homicide to Murder

HELD: Yes. The orders denying the Motion toDefer Proceeding/Arraignment and
denying the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment are declared VOID and SET ASIDE.
Thearraignment of private respondents is likewise declared VOIDand SET ASIDE.
Furthermore, the order of SOJ is SET ASIDE andhis initial order REINSTATED.
The Office of the ProvincialProsecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED to file with the
RTC theamended information for Murder.

DOJ relinquished its power of control and supervision over the Provincial
Prosecutor and the Asst. Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga; and meekly
surrendered to the latter's inappropriate conduct even hostile attitude, which
amounted to neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.

The DOJ could have joined cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment and, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers over its personnel, the DOJ could have
directed the public prosecutors concerned to show cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against them for neglect  of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.

Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 (1987)

FACTS:

Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of
Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion to
defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed
with the Secretary of Justice. However, Justice Mogul denied the motion, but the
arraignment was deferred in a much later date to afford time for the petitioner to
elevate the matter to the appellate court. 
The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
preliminary writ of injunction to the CA. The CA ordered the trial court to refrain
from proceeding with the arraignment until further orders of the Court.
Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. CatalinoMacaraig Jr., resolved the petition for
review reversed the resolution of the office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the
Fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the
accused.  Judge Mogul denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the
arraignment. The accused then filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or
temporary restraining order in the CA. The CA dismissed the order and lifted the
restraining order.

Issue: Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the
Fiscal under orders from the Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and
trial on the merits.

HELD:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or
by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.
The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal.
The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of
the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. It
cannot be controlled by the complainant. 

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or
control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the
chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it may be elevated for review to the
Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or
opinion of the fiscal. Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may direct that a
motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be
filed in Court.

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The

Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and
determine the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the
proper court.

Roberts vs. CA, 254 SCRA 307 (1996) GR113930

Facts: Pepsi Cola Products Phils., had a Number Fever Promotion where all
holders of crowns and/or caps of Pepsi Products bearing the winning three (3) -
digit number will win the prize printed on the crown/cap. On May 25, 1992, it was
announced that the winning number for the next days was 349. Several thousands
of holders of 349 then went to Pepsi to redeem but Pepsi refused to pay. These
holders filed a case of Estafa against the officers of Pepsi.

After several procedural maneuvers by petitioner’s counsel (including a petition for

review with the Secretary of Justice on the finding of probable cause by the
Prosecutor), respondent judge denied the motion to suspend proceedings and hold
in abeyance the issuance of warrant of arrest and the motion to defer arraignment,
and directed the issuance of the warrant of arrest and setting the arraignment.

Petitioners filed a motion for certiorari with the CA with application of TRO against
the judge Asuncion, alleging Gross Abuse of Discretion. CA granted the TRO.
However, with the issuance of the decision of the Secretary of Justice dismissing
the petition of review, the CA dismissed the case and declared it as moot. The
motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, petitioners filed this instant petition accusing judge Asuncion as having
committed grave abuse of discretion for ordering the issuance of warrant of arrest
without examining the records of the preliminary investigation.

Issue: WON Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion for ordering
the issuance of warrant of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary
investigation.

Held:Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution provides that no search

warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

As to the first, a warrant can issue only if the judge is satisfied after an examination
in writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses, in the form of
searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a
necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice.
As to the second, this Court held in Soliven vs. Makasiar 63 that the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and the witnesses, but, following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof; issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May
1993 directing, among other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only
the information, amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He
did not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of
probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no specific finding of probable
cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest "after June 21, 1993."
It may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes a finding of probable
cause. But then compliance with a constitutional requirement for the protection of
individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing
logic.

Dungog vs. CA, 159 SCRA 145 (1988)

Facts: On October 9,1985, First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Bohol Angel S. Ucat,
Jr. issued a resolution finding a prima facie case for the filing of an information for
estafa against Pantaleon del Rosario; 1 that the case stemmed from an alleged
misappropriation by the private respondent, with grave abuse of confidence, of the
proceeds of the sale of 24 heads of Heifer cattle, under a contract of agency; that
the same resolution was approved by the respondent Provincial Fiscal of Bohol,
Enrique B. Inting; 2 that on October 15, 1985, an information charging the private
respondent with estafa was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 4319; entitled, "The People of the Philippines
versus Capt. Pantaleon V. del Rosario;" 3 that, again, the information was approved
by the respondent Provincial Fiscal; 4 that on the last week of October 1985, and
after the information had already been filed in court, the private respondent filed a
Motion For Reinvestigation with the public respondent Provincial Fiscal; 5 and that
the petitioner submitted Ms Opposition And/Or Comment to private respondent's
Motion For Reinvestigation. 6

On November 9, 1985, acting on the said Motion for Reinvestigation, the

respondent Provincial Fiscal, reversing himself and his First Assistant Fiscal this
time found no prima facie case against the same private respondent; 7 that on the
same date, the respondent Provincial Fiscal filed an Omnibus Motion For
Postponement Of Arraignment And To Allow Withdrawal Of Information in the
above-mentioned Criminal Case No. 4319; 8 that the petitioner, the private
respondent, and the respondent Provincial Fiscal filed their respective Comments,
Manifestations, and Rejoinders; that on December 4,1985, the Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol resolved to deny the respondent Provincial
Fiscal's Motion to Withdraw Information; 9 and that from the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration, 10two petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction were filed by the respondent Provincial Fiscal and the private respondent
before the respondent Court of Appeals. 11

Issue: Whether or not the contention is meritorious.

Held: Yes. The rule is now well-settled that once a complaint or information is filed
in court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal
of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court. 13 Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the
case is already in court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. 14 For while
it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not
a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case had already been brought to
court, whatever disposition the fiscal may deem proper thereafter should be
addressed to the court for its consideration and approval.

Velasquez vs. Undersecretary of Justice, 182 SCRA 388 (1990)

Facts: Felix Velasquez, Executive VP of Techtrade, filed a complaint for Estafa

against Avila in the Manila City Fiscal’s Office. Asst Fiscal Romulo Lopez
dismissed the complaint. However, upon review by the Chief Investigation Division
of the City Fiscal’s Office, the latter set aside Fiscal Lopez’ resolution and ordered
the filing of an information for estafa against Avila in the RTC.

Before arraignment, Avila filed a petition for review with the DOJ which Velazquez
opposed. On February 15, 1988, Justice Undersecretary Silvestre Bello III denied
the petition for review. A motion for reconsideration of the denial did not prosper.
On October 14, 1988, Avila filed a second motion for reconsideration which the
Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Artemio Tuquero granted on January 4, 1989. He
directed the city fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation of the case to afford respondent
to properly present evidence that he was duly authorized to pay the subject
creditors and for complainants to rebut the same with controverting evidence, and
thereafter to resolve the case anew on the basis of all the evidences adduced.

Issue: WON the Undersecretary of Justice has the authority in ordering the
reinvestigation of the case?

Held:No, the undersecretary gravely abused his discretion in ordering the same.
This case is governed by the decision in Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, where
we ruled that once the information is filed in court, the court acquires complete
jurisdiction over it. A motion for reinvestigation should, after the court had acquired
jurisdiction over the case, be addressed to the trial judge and to him alone. Neither
the Secretary of Justice, the State Prosecutor, nor the Fiscal may interfere with the
judge's disposition of the case, much less impose upon the court their opinion
regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused, for the court is the sole judge of
that.
In order therefor[e] to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial
court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the
complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the Court
The Undersecretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in ordering the re-
investigation of the criminal case against Avila after it had been filed in court. The
avowed purpose of the reinvestigation "to give an opportunity to the private
respondent to present an authentic copy of the board resolution of the offended
party (Techtrade Management International Corporation) which [allegedly] had
authorized him to deal and otherwise dispose of the funds of the corporation" (p.
72, Rollo), can also be achieved at the trial in the lower court where that piece of
evidence may be presented by the accused as part of his defense.

People vs. Beriales

70 SCRA 361

Facts: Beriales was charged for the murder of Saturnina on Sept. 13, 1974. During
the hearing on Nov. 26, 1974, upon motion of the defense the Court ordered the re-
investigation of the case pending submission of the Fiscal of its reports. Couple of
postponements was made until Dec. 13, 1974 hearing when the Court proceeded
with the arraignment and trial in the absence of the City Fiscal and its report on re-
investigation, and over the disagreement of the defense. The CFI of Leyte relied on
the private prosecutor being authorized by the City Fiscal to present evidence and
the defense presumed to have waived its right over its disagreement. Trial then
proceeded and the 3 found guilty of the offense. Thus, this appeal on the
constitutional requirement of due process.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court’s order to let the private prosecutor present the
evidence against the accused was proper.
Held: No. Under the Rules of Court, "All criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
the fiscal." In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to
appeal for the government. As stated by this Court, "once a public prosecutor has
been entrusted with the investigation of a case and has acted thereon by filing the
necessary information in court he is by law in duty bound to take charge thereof
until its finally termination, for under the law he assumes full responsibility for his
failure or success since he is the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to its
termination." While there is nothing in the rule of practice and procedure in criminal
cases which denies the right of the fiscal, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to
turn over the active conduct of the trial to a private prosecutor, nevertheless, his
duty to direct and control the prosecution of criminal cases requires that he must be
present during the proceedings. Thus, in the case of People vs. Munar this Court
upheld the right of the private prosecutor therein to conduct the examination of the
witnesses because the government prosecutors were present at the hearing;
hence, the prosecution of the case remained under their direct supervision and
control.

As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, "to permit such prosecution of a

criminal case by the private prosecutor with the fiscal in absentia can set an
obnoxious precedent that can be taken advantage of by some indolent members of
the prosecuting arm of the government as well as those who are oblivious of their
bounden duty to see to it not only that the guilty should be convicted, but that the
innocent should be acquitted — a duty that can only be effectively and sincerely
performed if they actively participate in the conduct of the case, especially in the
examination of the witnesses and the presentation of documentary evidence for
both parties."

Go vs. CA, 206 SCRA 138 (1992)

FACTS :Aninformation was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Gofor murder
before the Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila. Petitioner voluntarily presented
himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon obtaining knowledge of
being hunted by the latter. However, he was immediately detained and denied his
right of a preliminaryinvestigation unless he executes and sings a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon omnibus motion for
immediate release on recognizance or on bail and proper preliminaryinvestigation
on the ground that his warrantless arrest was unlawful and no
preliminaryinvestigation was conducted before the information was filed, which is
violative of his rights, the same was granted but later on reversed by the lower
court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court in sustaining the
decision of the lower court held that petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid in view
of the fact that the offense was committed, the petitioner was clearly identified and
there exists valid informationfor murder filed against petitioner

Hence, the petitioner filed this present petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:

Whether or not petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation.

RULING: No. Petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation
contrary to the prosecutor's claim. The right to preliminary investigation is deemed
waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea
at arraignment. The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to
preliminary investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied
answering questions before the court unless they were afforded the proper
preliminary investigation. For the above reasons, the petition was granted and
the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court
however, contrary to petitioner's allegation, declared that failure to accord the right
to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging
the latter of the crime of murder.

Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773 (1996)

Facts:

Petitioner who is the incumbent governor of Palawan, was first elected governor of

the said province in 1968 and was again reelected in both the 1971 and 1980
elections, until he was replaced by private complainant Victoriano Rodriguez as
Officer-In-Charge Governor after the EDSA Revolution in February 1986.
Subsequently, both petitioner and Rodriguez ran for governor in the 1988 elections
where the latter emerged victorious. In the 1992 synchronized national and local
elections, the two again contested the gubernatorial post; and this time, it was
petitioner who won.
At the time Rodriguez was still the OIC Governor of the province, the Provincial
Government of Palawan, as represented by Rodriguez and the Provincial Board
Members of Palawan, filed before the Office of the Tanodbayan two (2) complaints.
The first complaint charged petitioner with violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the
second charged petitioner, together with several other provincial officers, with
violation of Section 3(a) and (g) of the same law.

On December 23, 1994, respondent court, without ruling on petitioners motion to

include co-principals, issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to
suspend pendente liteand ordering the suspension of petitioner as Provincial
Governor of Palawan for a period of ninety (90) days from notice.

Issue:WON petitioners preventive suspension is legal and valid.

Ruling:Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides that:

SEC. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. - Any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under
Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.

This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a
public officer is mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a
pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing is
conducted to determine basically the validity of the information, from which the
court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on
the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismiss the
case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. That hearing
may be treated in the same manner as a challenge to the validity of the information
by way of a motion to quash.
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the court
must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts
about it. This is because a preventive suspension is not a penalty. It is not imposed
as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension. In view of this latter provision, the accused elective
public officer does not stand to be prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the
suspension order in the event that the information is subsequently declared null
and void on appeal and the case dismissed as against him. Taking into
consideration the public policy involved in preventively suspending a public officer
charged under a valid information, the protection of public interest will definitely
have to prevail over the private interest of the accused.

PRIMICIAS vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA, PANGASINAN

G.R. No. L-26702 October 18, 1979

Facts: On February 8, 1965, Juan Augusta B. Primacias plaintiff appellee, was

driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta's
Municipal Police asked him to stop. He was told, upon stopping, that he had
violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, "and more particularly, for
overtaking a truck." The policeman then asked for plaintiff's license which he
surrendered, and a temporary operator's permit was issued to him. This incident
took place about 200 meters away from a school building, at Barrio Nancamaliran,
Urdaneta.

Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta

against Primicias for violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964. Due to the
institution of the criminal case, plaintiff Primicias initiated an action for the
annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction
for the purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Urdaneta, Mayor Perez,
Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman Andrada from enforcing the
ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge Soriano was enjoined from further
proceeding in the criminal case.
After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered the questioned decision holding that
the ordinance was null and void and had been repealed by Republic Act No. 4136,
otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Now, defendants,
appellants herein, appealed. 

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in issuing ex-parte a writ of injunction to restrain the
proceedings in criminal case no. 3140?

Held: No. On the issue of whether a writ of injunction can restrain the proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 3140, the general rule is that "ordinarily, criminal prosecution
may not be blocked by court prohibition or injunction." 

Exceptions however are allowed in the following instances:

1. for the orderly administration of justice;
2. to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner;
3. to avoid multiplicity of actions;
4. to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights;
5. in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional
or was held invalid. 
The local statute or ordinance at bar being invalid, the exception just cited obtains
in this case. Hence, the lower court did not err in issuing the writ of injunction
against defendants. Moreover, considering that "our law on municipal corporations
is in principle patterned after that of the United States, " 19 it would not be amiss for
Us to adopt in this instance the ruling that to enjoin the enforcement of a void
ordinance, "injunction has frequently been sustained in order to prevent a
multiplicity of prosecutions under it." 

Guingona, Jr. vs. City Fiscal, 137 SCRA 597 (1985)

Facts:
Private respondent Clement David invested with the National Savings and Loan
Association (NSLA) placed on 9 deposits through the inducement of an Australian
national who was allegedly a close associate of petitioners herein. NSLA was then
placed under receivership by the Central Bank. David filed claims for his and his
sister’s investments and received a report that only a portion of the investments
they claim were entered in the records of NSLA. David alleged that there was
misappropriation of funds and violation of Central Bank circulars, hence charged
petitioners herein with estafa. Petitioners moved to dismiss the charges on the
ground that David’s claims comprised a purely civil obligation which was itself
novated.

On March 31, 1982, by virtue of a court resolution issued by this Court on the same
date, a temporary restraining order was duly issued ordering the respondents, their
officers, agents, representatives and/or person or persons acting upon their
(respondents') orders or in their place or stead to refrain from proceeding with the
preliminary investigation in Case No. 8131938 of the Office of the City Fiscal of
Manila. On January 24, 1983, private respondent Clement David filed a motion to
lift restraining order which was denied in the resolution of this Court dated May 18,
1983.

Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of writ of injunction is proper?

Ruling: Yes. While as a rule, the prosecution in a criminal offense cannot be the

subject of prohibition and injunction, this court has recognized the resort to the
extraordinary writs of prohibition and injunction in extreme cases, thus:

On the issue of whether a writ of injunction can restrain the

proceedings in Criminal Case No. 3140, the general rule is that
"ordinarily, criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court
prohibition or injunction." Exceptions, however, are allowed in the
following instances:têñ.£îhqwâ£
"1. for the orderly administration of justice;
"2. to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner;
"3. to avoid multiplicity of actions;
"4. to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights;
"5. in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is
unconstitutional or was held invalid" ( Primicias vs.
Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, 93 SCRA 462, 469-
470 [1979]; citing Ramos vs. Torres, 25 SCRA 557 [1968];
and Hernandez vs. Albano, 19 SCRA 95, 96 [1967]).
The writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, are in the
ultimate analysis, intended to annul void proceedings; to prevent the unlawful and
oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly
administration of justice. Thus, in Yu Kong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, We took
cognizance of a petition for certiorari and prohibition although the accused in the
case could have appealed in due time from the order complained of, our action in
the premises being based on the public welfare policy the advancement of public
policy. In Dimayuga vs. Fajardo, 43 Phil. 304, We also admitted a petition to
restrain the prosecution of certain chiropractors although, if convicted, they could
have appealed. We gave due course to their petition for the orderly administration
of justice and to avoid possible oppression by the strong arm of the law. And
in Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno, 63 Phil. 627, the petition for certiorari challenging the
trial court's action admitting an amended information was sustained despite the
availability of appeal at the proper time.

People vs. Grey, 625 SCRA 523

Facts: 
Joseph Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar, his son, Francis Grey, and two
others were charge of the crime of murder for the death of Rolando Diocton. Judge
Bandal denied the motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. She directed the
prosecution to present, within five days, additional evidence but later, she inhibited.
Judge Navidad continued the proceedings of the case.
After finding that probable cause was supported by the evidence on record, he
issued warrants of arrest against respondents.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Navidad fail to personally determine the existence of
probable cause.

Held:No. The duty of the judge to determine probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest is mandated by Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution. In Soliven
v. Makasiar, the Court explained that this constitutional provision does not
mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her
witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. 

What the law requires as personal determination on the part of a judge is that he
should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. This means that
the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but
also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit
of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes
taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the
investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.

The Court has also ruled that the personal examination of the complainant and his
witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there
is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause.
Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor,
provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.

Contrary to respondents claim, Judge Navidad did not gravely abuse his discretion
in issuing the same. Judge Navidads Order reads:

In this separate, independent constitutionally-mandated Inquiry conducted for the

purpose of determining the sufficiency of the evidence constituting probable cause
to justify the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest, the Court perforce, made a very
careful and meticulous and (sic) review not only of the records but also the
evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the sworn statements/affidavits
of Mario Abella, UriendoMoloboco and Edgar Pellina. 

It was only through a review of the proceedings before the prosecutor that could
have led Judge Navidad to determine that the accused were given the widest
latitude and ample opportunity to challenge the charge of Murder which resulted,
among others, (in) a filing of a counter-charge of Perjury. Likewise, his personal
determination revealed no improper motive on the part of the prosecution and no
circumstance which would overwhelm the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions. Thus, he concluded that the previous Order,
denying the motion for the issuance of warrants of arrest, was not correct. These
statements sufficiently establish the fact that Judge Navidad complied with the
constitutional mandate for personal determination of probable cause before issuing
the warrants of arrest.

Brocka vs. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183 (1990)

Facts: This petition was originally filed on February 13, 1985 to secure the release
of petitioners on habeas corpus and to permanently enjoin the City Fiscal of
Quezon City from investigating charges of "Inciting to Sedition" against petitioners
Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos, (hereafter
Brocka, et al.). On learning that the corresponding information for this offense has
been filed by the City Fiscal against them on February 11, 1985, a supplemental
petition was filed on February 19, 1985 (p. 51, Rollo) to implead the Presiding
Judge, 1 and to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024
and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo) and the issuance of warrants for their arrests,
including their arraignment. Since then President Ferdinand E. Marcos had ordered
the provisional release of Brocka, et al., the issue on habeas corpus has become
moot and academic (p. 396, Rollo). We shall thus focus on the question of whether
or not the prosecution of the criminal cases for Inciting to Sedition may lawfully be
enjoined.:-cralaw
Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern Police
District following the forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration held in
sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport
Organization (ACTO). Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal Assembly in
Criminal Cases Nos. 37783, 37787 and 37788 with Branch 108, Regional Trial
Court, NCJR, Quezon City. 2
Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal
Assembly and for whom no bail was recommended, the other petitioners were
released on bail of P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was
ordered only upon an urgent petition for bail for which daily hearings from February
1-7, 1985 were held.
However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985, Brocka, et
al. remained in detention, respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention
Action (PDA) allegedly issued against them on January 28, 1985 (p. 6, Rollo).
Neither the original, duplicate original nor certified true copy of the PDA was ever
shown to them (p. 367, Rollo).
Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February 11, 1985 with Inciting to
Sedition, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p.
349, Rollo), without prior notice to their counsel (p. 7, Rollo). The original
informations filed recommended no bail (p. 349, Rollo). The circumstances
surrounding the hasty filing of this second offense are cited by Brocka, et al.
(quoting from a separate petition filed on their behalf in G.R. Nos. 69848-50 entitled
"Sedfrey A. Ordoñez vs.  Col. Julian Arzaga, et al."), as follows:
"x  x  x
"6. The sham' character of the inquest examination concocted by all respondents is
starkly bizarre when we consider that as early as 10:30 A.M. today, February 11,
1985, Benjamin Cervantes was able to contact undersigned petitioner by phone
informing counsel that said Benjamin Cervantes and the 4 other persons who are
the subjects of this petition will be brought before the Quezon City Fiscal at 2:30 for
undisclosed reasons: subsequently, another phone call was received by petitioning
counsel informing him that the appearance of Benjamin Cervantes et al. was to be
at 2:00 P.M. When petitioning counsel arrived in the office of Assistant City Fiscal
Arturo Tugonon, the complainants' affidavits had not yet been received by any of
the panel of three assistant city fiscals, although the five persons under detention
were already in the office of said assistant fiscal as early as 2:00 P.M. It was only
at 3:00 when a representative of the military arrived bringing with him alleged
statements of complainants against Lino Broka (sic) et al. for alleged inciting to
sedition, whereupon undersigned counsel asked respondent Colonel Agapito Abad
'who ordered the detained persons to be brought to the office of Assistant Fiscal
Arturo Tugonon since there were no charges on file;' and said Colonel Agapito
Abad said aloud: 'I only received a telephone call from Colonel Arzaga about 11:00
A.M. to bring the detained persons today — I am only the custodian.' At 3:15,
petitioning counsel inquired from the Records Custodian when the charges against
Lino Broka (sic) had been officially received and he was informed that the said
charges were never coursed through the Records Office.

"7. Under the facts narrated above, respondents have conspired to use the strong
arm of the law and hatched the nefarious scheme to deprive Lino Broka (sic) et al.
the right to bail because the utterances allegedly constituting inciting to sedition
under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code are, except for varying nuances,
almost verbatim the same utterances which are the subject of Criminal Cases No.
37783, 37787 and 37788 and for which said detained persons are entitled to be
released on bail as a matter of constitutional right. Among the utterances allegedly
made by the accused and which the respondents claimed to be violative of Article
142 of the Revised Penal Code are: 'Makiisasamga drivers,
"Makiisasaaminglayunin, "Digmaang bayan ang sagotsakahirapan,' Itigil ang
pakikialam ng imperyalismosaPilipinas,' 'Rollback ng presyo ng langissa 95
Centavos.

"8. That when petitioning counsel and other members of the defense panel
requested that they be given 7 days within which said counsel may confer with their
clients — the detained persons named above, the panel of assistant fiscals
demanded that said detained persons should sign a 'waiver' of their rights under
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for the grant of said request,
which is a harassing requirement considering that Lino Broka (sic) et al. were
already under the detention, albeit illegally, and they could not have waived the
right under Rule 125 which they did not enjoy at the time the ruling was made by
the panel of assistant city fiscals." (pp. 4-6, Rollo in G.R. 69848-50).

Issue: Whether or not the criminal prosecution of the case if legal.

Held: Yes. Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be
restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are however
exceptions, among which are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
(Hernandez vs.  Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs.  Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304;
Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs.  Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981,
104 SCRA 607);
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon
vs.  Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
 d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas
vs.  Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation
(Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs.  Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs.  People and
Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs.  City
Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia
vs.  Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance (Recto vs.  Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Rañoa vs.  Alvendia, CA-
G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf, Guingona, et al vs.  City Fiscal, L-60033,
April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs.  Paño, et al., L-
59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent
the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs.  Castelo, L-6374,
August 1, 1958)." (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988
Ed.)

In the petition before Us, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that
the criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, having been
undertaken by state officials in bad faith.
: nad
Respondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et al.'s
release from detention (before their release on orders of then Pres. Marcos). This
PDA was, however, issued on January 28, 1985, but was invoked only on February
9, 1985 (upon receipt of the trial court's order of release). Under the guidelines
issued, PDAs shall be invoked within 24 hours (in Metro Manila) or 48 hours
(outside Metro Manila). (Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 28, 1985, 139
SCRA 349). Noteworthy also is Brocka, et al.'s claim that, despite subpoenas for its
production, the prosecution merely presented a purported xerox copy of the
invoked PDA. The foregoing circumstances were not disputed by the Solicitor
General's office. In fact they found petitioner's plight "deplorable" (par. 51,
Manifestation, p. 396, Rollo).
The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and inoperational
PDA, certainly betrays respondent's bad faith and malicious intent to pursue
criminal charges against Brocka, et al.

Ty vs. NBI Supervising Agent De Jemil

G.R. No. 182147 | December 15, 2010 |

Facts:

Petitioners are stockholders of Omni Gas Corporation ("Omni"). They are being
suspected of engaging in illegal trading of petroleum products and underfilling of
branded LPG cylinders in violation of B.P. 33, as amended by P.D. 1865. NBI
Agents Marvin De Jemil and Edgardo Kawada conducted surveillance operations
on Omni. On 15 April 2004, the NBI Agents carried out a test-buy. Using eight
branded LPG cylinders from Shell, Petron and Total, they went to Omni for refilling.
Omni refilled the cylinders. The NBI agents paid more than P1500. LPG Inspector
Noel Navio found that the LPG cylinders were without LPG valve seals and one of
the cylinders was actually underfilled.

On 28 April 2004, Agent De Jemil obtained a search warrant from Pasig RTC
branch 167. The NBI seized several items from Omni's premises. Subsequently,
Agent De Jemil filed his Complaint-Affidavit before the DOJ. The Assistant City
Prosecutor of Pasig found probable cause for violation of BP 33. This was later
approved by Chief State Prosecutor JovencitoZuno.

Petitioners appealed the decision to the Secretary of Justice, who later reversed
the decision of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor. NBI Agent De Jemil moved
for reconsideration. Denied. He thus filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with
the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of Secretary of Justice. It later reversed
itself and reinstated the Resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor.

Issues:
(1) Whether the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals was proper even if
Agent De Jemil did not appeal to the Office of the President?
(2) Whether probable cause exists against petitioners for violations of Sec. 2 (a)
and (c) of BP 33, as amended?
(3) Whether petitioners can be held liable therefor?

Held:
(1) YES. The determination of probable cause by the public prosecutor, and, later
on, by the Secretary of Justice, is subject to judicial review where it is established
that grave abuse of discretion tainted the determination. The aggrieved party need
not resort to the Office of the President before availing of judicial remedies because
the Secretary of Justice is an alter ego of the President who may opt to exercise or
not to exercise his or her power of review over the former’s determination in
criminal investigation cases. Also, under the doctrine of qualified political agency,
the determination of probable cause by the Secretary of Justice is presumably that
of the Chief Executive unless disapproved or reprobated by the latter.

(2) YES. The test-buy conducted on 15 April 2004 tends to show that Omni illegally
refilled the eight branded cylinders. Such act is a clear violation of Sec. 2 (a), in
relation to Secs. 3 (c) and 4 of BP 33, as amended.

Omni has no authority to refill LPG cylinders as shown by the certifications

provided by Shell, Petron and Total. The seized items also show that Omni has no
authority to refill the cylinders. It shows that Omni really refilled branded cylinders
without authorization. Omni’s unauthorized refilling of branded LPG cylinders,
contrary to Sec. 2 (a) in relation to Sec. 3 (c) of BP 33, as amended.

Granting arguendo that the customers already owned the LPG cylinders, such fact
does give Omni authority to refill the cylinders without authorization from the brand
owners. Only the duly authorized dealers and refillers of the brand owners may
refill the branded LPG cylinders. The offense of refilling a branded LPG cylinder
without the written consent of the brand owner constitutes the offense regardless of
the buyer or possessor of the branded LPG cylinder.

Petitioner's contention that they are not liable because the underfilling that took
place during the test-buy is an isolated event is UNTENABLE. A single underfilling
under BP 33 is already a criminal act.

(3) Only Arnel Ty, as President of Omni, is liable. The other petitioners, who are
members of Omni's Board of Directors, are not liable. Sec. 4 of BP 33 enumerates
the persons who may be held liable, viz: (1) the president, (2) general manager, (3)
managing partner, (4) such other officer charged with the management of the
business affairs of the corporation or juridical entity, or (5) the employee
responsible for such violation. The Board of Directors is primarily a policy-making
body of the Corporation who doesn't concern itself with day-to-day operations

Go vs. CA, 206 SCRA 138 (1992)

ROLITO GO V. CA
Facts:

A witness identified Rolito Go as the person who had shot Eldon Maguan after a
near vehicular collision at the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Six days after the police launched a manhunt for Go, petitioner, accompanied by
two (2) lawyers, presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify
news reports that he was being hunted by the police. The police detained him then
and filed a complaint against him for frustrated homicide, which was later modified
to murder, since the victim Maguan died of his gunshot wound.

 Counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate
release and proper preliminary investigation,4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of
petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted
before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on
recognizance or on bail

Issue:

Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan
Police in respect of petitioner?

Whether or not Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity
attending his arrest?

Ruling:

Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The
"arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a),
at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected
six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the
shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b).
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner
within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule
112 is also not applicable.
Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police
Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal
of the police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all
probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon
Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a
complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have
immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was
probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan.
Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition
that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out
a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to
a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without
any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a
warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing
at the preliminary investigation.

Larranaga vs. CA, 287 SCRA 581 (1998)

Facts: It appears that on September 15, 1997, some PNP CIG authorities went to
the Center for Culinary Arts located at 287 Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights,
Quezon City to arrest Francisco Juan Larranaga. Larranaga, thru his lawyer, Atty.
Raymundo Armovit remonstrated against the warrantless arrest. The police did not
carry out the arrest on the assurance that Larranaga would be brought to Cebu City
by his lawyer on September 17, 1997 for preliminary investigation.

On September 17, 1997, Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary investigation

conducted by the Office of the City State Prosecutor of Cebu. Forthwith, he moved
that his client be given a regular preliminary investigation. The motion was denied
by the city prosecutor on the ground that Larranaga should be treated as a
detention prisoner, hence entitled only to an inquest investigation. Atty. Armovit
was ordered to present Larranaga in person. He was warned that his failure would
be treated as waiver of his client's right to a preliminary investigation and he would
be proceeded against pursuant to section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Atty.
Armovit's verbal motion for reconsideration was denied by the city prosecutor.

On September 19, 1997, Larranaga, thru counsel, rushed to the Court of Appeals
assailing the actuations of the Cebu prosecutors thru a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. 3 However, Larranaga's effort to stop the filing of a
criminal information against him failed. It turned out that on September 17, 1997
the said prosecutors had filed an information with the RTC of Cebu charging
Larranaga with kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The prosecutors
recommended no bail. On September 22, 1997, counsel filed a Supplemental
Petition with the Court of Appeals impleading the RTC of Cebu City to prevent
petitioner's arrest. The move again proved fruitless as Larranaga was arrested on
the night of September 22, 1997 by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the
Executive Judge of the RTC of Cebu City, the Honorable Priscila Agana. A second
Supplemental Petition was filed by Larranaga's counsel in the Court of Appeals
bringing to its attention the arrest of Larranaga. On September 25, 1997 the Court
of Appeals' dismissed Larranaga's petitions, hence, the case at bar.

Issue: Whether or not Larranga is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation

Held: Yes. Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest investigation but to a regular
preliminary investigation. Section 7 of Rule 112 cannot be invoked to justify
petitioner's inquest investigation. Said section clearly provides that "when a person
is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court, the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace
officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on
the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person."

The records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully arrested." For one the
petitioner was not arrested on September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the
arresting officers that he would instead be presented in the preliminary
investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on September 17, 1997. For another,
the arresting officers had no legal authority to make a warrantless arrest of the
petitioner for a crime committed some two (2) months before.