International Journal of Educational Development 31 (2011) 532–546

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International Journal of Educational Development

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijedudev

Civil society and control of corruption: Assessing governance of Romanian

public universities
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi a,1, Andra Elena Dusu b,2,*
a
Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, Germany
b
Romanian Academic Society, Romania

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Article history: Romania is perceived as the most corrupt EU member state according to Transparency International
Received 16 October 2009 Corruption Perception Index. In 2008–2009, a grassroots coalition of civil society organizations and
Received in revised form 23 February 2010 education stakeholders created the Coalition for Clean Universities which organized the first assessment
Accepted 28 March 2010
of integrity of the Romanian higher education system, The Coalition evaluated 42 state universities on the
basis of an original methodology, in terms of Administrative Integrity, Academic Integrity, Democratic
Keywords: Governance, Academic Governance and Sound Finance for a time internal of one academic year. The
Higher education
evaluation found systemic problems in the organization and functioning of university life, and attributed
Corruption
them to the failure to build accountability systems at university level following decentralization of higher
Grassroots movement
Eastern Europe education after 1989. The results, in the form of a ranking of universities, were made public and hotly
debated, creating a major incentive for universities to compete for a better public image, and therefore for
reform of their practices.
ß 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction and research questions The percentage of Romanians claiming that public education is
corrupt is among the highest in Europe (see Table 1). A 2007 national
Education is one of the most important sources of public Gallup survey found that 22% of the Romanian students claim that, at
expense, therefore offering considerable opportunity for corrupt least once, someone from the faculty asked for gifts, money or other
practices. A 2007 UNESCO report (Hallak and Poisson, 2007) found favors. Thirteen per cent of students say they answered the requests
that corruption in education is a universal problem, although the at least once. Approximately the same number of interviewed
negative impact is mostly felt in developing countries. In Europe, teachers (23%) say they have been offered money, gifts or favors from
awareness of corruption is on the rise: a 2009 Eurobarometer students, even if only 2% admit having accepted them.3
found higher levels of public agreement compared to 2007 that This article investigates the public perception of corruption in
corruption is a problem for all levels of government, and across a Romanian higher education. It reviews the governance practices of
whole range of professions. In the most concerning cases, at least public universities in Romania through a survey of governance
nine out of ten respondents agree that corruption is a major practices organized by the Romanian Coalition for Clean Universities4
national problem. This is the case of Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, (CCU), an alliance of NGOs, professional associations, student and
Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia, Portugal and Romania. According to teacher unions. CCU systematically monitored and investigated 42
Transparency International, the latter country has become since Romanian state universities during the academic years 2007–2009.5
joining EU in 2007 the most poor and corrupt EU member country The aim of the survey was to assess the Romanian public universities’
(together with Bulgaria).

3
The surveys were conducted by The Gallup Organization Romania, 2007.
Quoted after press release of the Open Society Fund Romania, http://www.osf.ro/ro/
comunicate_detaliu.php?comunicat=36, last accessed January 24, 2010.
4
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +40 746272677. The study was designed and conducted by the Romanian Academic Society on
E-mail addresses: Pippidi@hertie-school.org (A. Mungiu-Pippidi), behalf of the Coalition for Clean Universities. A full list of Coalition members and
andra@sar.org.ro (A.E. Dusu). documents can be downloaded from http://www.sar.org.ro/index.php?page=arti-
1
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi is Professor of Governance and Democracy Studies at col&id=366.
5
Hertie School of Governance in Berlin and the author of the methodology used by Forty-two state universities were evaluated out of a total of 46. Arts, police and
the Coalition for Clean Universities. naval institutes of higher education were excluded from the sample, because the
2
Andra Elena Dusu has an M.Sc. in European Political Economy from the London questionnaire could not be applied in these cases. The project was carried out in two
School of Economics and was the coordinator of this assessment project. stages, a pilot and an extended stage.

0738-0593/$ – see front matter ß 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijedudev.2010.03.016
 A. Mungiu-Pippidi, A.E. Dusu / International Journal of Educational Development 31 (2011) 532–546 533

Table 1 increasingly on former Soviet Union and the Balkans, as these

Perception of corruption in Romania in the European context.
regions present some of the most challenging situations.
Romania in comparison Romania EU average Governance of public education cannot be out of touch with the
Bribing in public education 30 19 general quality of governance in a society. Some understanding of
Corruption national level 89 81 the causes of poor governance in former Communist Europe,
Corruption regional level 89 81 particularly the Balkans and the former Soviet Union seems
Corruption local level 87 83 therefore indicated. The Eastern Balkans (Romania and Bulgaria)
Eurobarometer 72.2a. fall at the bottom of East Central Europe, where they are classified
a
according to the World Bank, though well above the mean of
Eurobarometer 72.2 (2009) Attitudes of Europeans towards Corruption.
former Soviet Union, which records the world’s worst absolute
Conducted by TNS Opinion & Social at the request of Directorate General for
Justice, Freedom and Security, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ performance, with an average World Bank indicator (control of
ebs_325_en.pdf, last accessed January 29, 2010. corruption) below sub-Saharan Africa (Treisman, 2003). In the
2009 Global Competitiveness Report, Romania ranks 124 of 134
governance, evaluating integrity and fairness issues and the ability to countries at government favouritism, 114 at transparency of
control corruption of procedures. The project dealt only with publicly policymaking and 111 at wastefulness of government spending.6
funded universities: the notion of public integrity would have been As the rest of East Europeans, Romanians perceive that corruption
difficult to expand to private ones which are privately funded. The has further risen in this region since the demise of Communism.
methodology of the project will be explained in detail in the second From ‘plan to clan’ or from ‘nomenklatura to kleptokratura’ there is
part of this paper. In the first part, we shall review the meanings, no shortage of catchy phrases depicting various features of this
causes and consequences of corruption and bad governance in the systemic phenomenon, which can be defined best as a specific form
field of education and the particular context of postcommunist of governance resulting in the discretionary distribution of public
Europe. The third section will present the results of the survey and goods by the state to the benefit of particular groups or individuals
some lessons learned. (Hellman, 1998). Even the most advanced postcommunist
Poor governance is credited for systematically destroying the countries embarked in their EU accession with TI-CPI scores below
outcomes of education, resulting in standards and norms for the the lowest level in Western Europe, and their culture was
university or higher education system which are far removed from frequently described as wholly corrupt (Miller et al., 2001;
integrity and merit (Braxton and Bayer, 1999; Hallak and Poisson, Treisman, 2003; Rose-Ackerman and Kornai, 2004).
2007; Heyneman et al., 2007). Corruption in education is defined by But is ‘corruption’ the right term for the generalized poor
Hallak and Poisson (2002) as ‘‘the systematic use of public office for governance that we see in some postcommunist societies, where
private benefit, whose impact is significant on the availability and whole institutions fail to deliver fair service to the public? In this
quality of educational goods and services, and, has a consequence on paper we define ‘good governance’ as the particular governance
access, quality or equity in education’’. Education serves two functions mode by which a state distributes public goods (such as education)
in the labour market, as Heyneman et al. (2007) point out. Corruption equally and fairly to all citizens, ranging from their treatment by
degrades both the private and social returns of higher education, as Courts to ordinary public services. The opposite of good gover-
well as the signalling value of degrees (Heyneman et al., 2007). nance operating on such ethical universalistic principles is poor
A variety of authors have in recent years described a range of governance or systemic corruption, which operates on the basis of
pathologies of education spread on an equally varied geographical particularism. In the former type of society, individuals expect
area. Amundsen (2000) described embezzlement, bribery, fraud, equal treatment from the state. In the latter, their treatment
extortion and favouritism as the main forms of corruption in depends on their status or position in society. The terms are useful
education. Chapman (2002) identifies five informal institutions to establish the societal level of the definition, as opposed to the
which he sees as malpractices: namely illegal bribery or fraud, casual meaning of corruption, which refers to the individual level.
illegal fees to compensate absence or delay or regular income, Western scholarship particularly calls corruption the situation of
bribes to cut red tape, gifts and misallocation of funds. Tanaka individual infringement of an established norm of universalism:
(2001) divides pathologies by areas where the irregular act takes but the phenomenon that good governance and development
place into procurement, administration and classroom. Heyneman activists battle against is an established norm of particularism at
introduced the useful distinction between corruption in the field of the level of the whole society. The UN remarks in its anticorruption
services and academic corruption. He also considered that the textbook that corruption is an abuse of (public) power for private
frequent situations when corruption in education does not seem to gain (direct or indirect) that hampers the public interest’, and further
involve money demand a broader definition of corruption in specifying that ‘corruption entails a confusion of the private with
education as ‘abuse of authority for personal as well as material the public sphere’.7 The frequent ‘wisdom’ that corruption is
gain’ (Heyneman, 2002). Rumyantseva (2005) suggested a universal, that it existed at all times and in every society thus blurs
differentiation between corruption involving students as agents the crucial distinction between corruption as a social organization
and pure administrative corruption. Heyneman et al. (2007) mode, or particularism, and the occasional, individual corruption
further classified corruption by the ‘buyer’ and ‘seller’ ends of the which can indeed be found nearly everywhere, as corrupt
corrupt act. As agents of corruption can also be collective entities individuals are not grounded in one particular society. The ‘clean’
(Ministry, schools, universities), they departed from the tradition countries on top of Transparency International do not differ from
considering corruption in education mostly falls under the term countries on the bottom simply by the numbers of individuals
‘‘professional misconduct.’’ Professional misconduct is behavior engaged in corrupt acts, but by their whole mode of governance;
that breaks the code of conduct normally pertaining to the the countries on top managed to pass the threshold to good
university professoriate (Braxton and Bayer, 1999). But ‘‘corrup- governance sometimes in their history and do differ substantially
tion’’ contains elements beyond individual professional behaviour. from the ones on the bottom (Asmerom and Reis, 1996; North
It may include corruption on the part of institutions which fail to et al., 2009). Policies to redress the situation cannot therefore be
deliver the service they are supposed to while receiving the funds
to execute their tasks (Heyneman et al., 2007). Except the UNESCO 6
See http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Global%20Competitive-
report cited (Hallak and Poisson, 2007) which presents a pool of ness%20Report/index.htm, last accessed January 24, 2010.
cases from around the world, recent literature seems to focus 7
United Nations Manual on Anti-Corruption Policy, Vienna 2001, p 16.
534 A. Mungiu-Pippidi, A.E. Dusu / International Journal of Educational Development 31 (2011) 532–546

adopted from the Western legal arsenal, which are centered on Table 2
Individual strategies to make the administration work under particularism.
individual prosecution, but rather from the historical development
of good governance in advanced societies and the transitional Strategy and N varies across Mechanism Satisfaction
strategies which were employed at the times. Resources countries (%) with Service
Where does postcommunist particularism come from? Connections 20–25 Personalize service Very good
Answers oscillate between the return of market to post-Commu- Regular Greasing 10–20 Increase efficiency Fair
nist Europe and the survival of Communist time organization and of service
Occasional greasing >50 Get some service Low or none
culture of administration (Treisman, 2003). The superimposition of
or abstention
communism on traditional rural societies led to a sort of neo- Mungiu-Pippidi (2005).
traditionalist or status societies governed by unwritten rules more
than formal laws (Jowitt, 1992). Max Weber (1968) originally
defined status societies as societies dominated by status groups system (Heyneman, 2002). More than corruption of any sector in
and ruled by convention rather than law. ‘The firm appropriation of such systemically corrupted environments, corruption in educa-
opportunities, especially of opportunities for domination always tion has dramatic consequences, as it socializes individuals into a
tend to result in the formation of status groups. The formation of culture of particularism and transforms them into contributors,
status groups in turn always turn to result in monopolistic rather than challengers of the system.
appropriation of powers of domination and sources of income’. The On the basis of this empirical model the Romanian Academic
explicit modernizing design of Communism failed due to the Society (SAR), a think-tank in Bucharest has organized starting
essential contradiction between the principle of ethical universal- with 2004 various anticorruption coalitions and campaigns based
ism and the existence of a privileged status group such as on a specific strategy (SAR, 2007, 2009; Romanian Coalition for a
nomenklatura enjoying a power monopoly, which transition Clean Parliament, 2005). The targets were the candidates for
converted in many cases in an economic advantage. A model of parliamentary elections, mayoral elections, and county elections
postcommunist particularism was further developed on the basis on one side and public agencies, including universities on the
of survey research (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006). By cross-tabulating the other. The overall goal is to push actors whose behavior we want to
strategies that citizens employ to obtain a range of public services change to compete for public credit for their performance. The
and the satisfaction they get from the respective services, a original strategy, developed in connection with parliamentary
taxonomy of administrative practices results (see Table 2). As it elections, had four steps. The first step to exit the vicious circle of
turns out, only people who have some personal connection with particularism, is to organize the losers of the status quo against the
the individuals working in the public service receive a satisfactorily status groups and the predatory elites: in other words, to build an
response to their demands. The state works for them alone. Those insurrectional ‘army’. This should not be only an alliance of
who miss such connections, not being related to the right people or idealists, but of groups who stand to lose most by corruption. It
networks, have to bribe to get what they need (generally not a must necessarily contain a civil society that is politically engaged,
privilege, just the normal service) but that leaves them only although non-partisan, and broadly based: media, unions, church
moderately satisfied. And, finally, the large majority fails to either and NGOs of every type. The second step, and here international
personalize service or grease it, and they are quite unsatisfied with assistance can play a role (Romania acceded to NATO and EU in the
what they get.8 It is therefore the personal nature of the service space of a few years from 1999 to 2007, and as such enjoyed
rather than the monetary transaction which is the key pathological important international conditionality), is to create some institu-
feature of such administrations: the bribe appears mostly as a tional weapons that an anticorruption coalition or isolated
correction. The confusion of the private with the public sphere is anticorruption entrepreneurs can use for monitoring. The typical
near permanent and not always illicit. In other words, the general ‘institutional weapons’ are freedom of information acts, but there
norm is particularism, not universalism, despite new legislation are other regulations, such as the transparent and mandatory
adopted during transition years. Licit and illicit acts, classic disclosures of wealth for politicians, civil servants and magistrates
corruption and traditional patronage all mix in a practice where which are helpful. The third step is to set the new norm, which is
public spending does not succeed to operate on the random, fair ethical universalism, not particularism. The coalition should agree
and universal principles of modern bureaucracies. The lack of on some concrete criteria embodying this ideal and spell them out
performance from the part of the state during difficult transitions as a full action program. The targeted actors should then be
leads individuals in the public sector to make rational cost survival monitored by the criteria (the difference between the norm and the
calculations and adjust their behaviour accordingly: systemic actual practice) and the results should be made public. Finally, the
policy failure is thus mirrored by individual abdication from fourth step is to create incentives for the change of behavior. This is
modern administrative behaviour (Ledeneva, 1999). Even in the realized by the creation of a ‘market’ for integrity. Taking
most successful East European transitions after 1989 the stress was advantage of existing competitions is the best: the Romanian
rather on key structural economic adjustments than on social Coalition for a Clean Parliament succeeded in 2004 to make 98 MP
policies like health and education, where were carried out hastily candidates lose office and a government party with 20% lead at the
and without full consideration, resulting in mixed incentives and beginning of the campaign lose elections, due to triggering of a
gaps in oversight (Kornai, 2000; Scott, 2000). competition of integrity among political parties. Once the first
A situation where policy failure of the authorities is ‘corrected’ important political party accepted to cooperate (in exchange for
by massive deviant behaviour from professional norms by being publicly credited as a promoter of integrity) and submitted
individuals would of course be catastrophic in the field of its electoral lists to be screened by the Coalition the rest necessarily
education, precisely the place where future citizens are supposed followed, creating a snowball effect as the media also cooperated in
to be socialized into norms of modernity and rule of law. This can raising the stakes. Disclosure campaigns thus work best when
only hamper the central role of education sector in creating combined with circumstances where a form of market exists and
citizens who respect the laws and trust their democratic political so incentives can be maximized. In the case of universities, the
coalition announced that a integrity (originally was phrased as
8
Based on a EU survey in five Balkan countries. See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi,
‘corruption’) top will be established and the full survey will be
‘‘Deconstructing Balkan Particularism: The Ambiguous Social Capital of Southeast- published so that prospective students can make an informed
ern Europe,’’ Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 5, no. 1 (2005): 49–68. choice when applying to a state university.
 A. Mungiu-Pippidi, A.E. Dusu / International Journal of Educational Development 31 (2011) 532–546 535

2. Methodology of coalition for clean universities growing number of private universities, also subjected to ARACIS
evaluation. As only public universities receive public funds and are
The Coalition for Clean Universities was created in 2006, in the subjected to regulations related to such funds the decision was
aftermath of major media scandals concerning fraudulent taken in the end to monitor them alone.
degrees. Even a Health Minister and professor at the Medical The 2007 UNESCO study by Hallak and Poisson found that
School (Mircea Beuran) was forced to resign his public office when systemic corruption in education is due to a combination of
it was proven that his major book had actually been plagiarized. internal and external factors. The internal factors quoted were
His university did not sanction him, however, as the practice of monopoly and discretionary power of management, low salaries
copying new textbooks ad literam from old ones was widespread and lack of incentives for quality teaching, absence of professional
in Romanian medical schools. By mid-2000s several online sellers norms, low management capacity, weak accounting and poor
developed of undergraduate dissertations. On www.licenta.ro, for public information. The external factors identified were lack of
instance, dissertations on all fields are offered for an average price access to information, lack of external audit and poor judicial
of 150–200 Euros. A professor (Vasile Docea) who intercepted an capacity, poor generalized administrative practices with fragile
email from a colleague offering a Master’s dissertation to a student budgets and low salaries (Hallak and Poisson, 2007). As Romania
was sanctioned by the Western University Timisoara Senate in was engaged in the ambitious process of EU accession, new
2007 for making the case public. The student passed the national legislation introducing better governance had been
examination despite being completely ignorant, and the professor recently passed or was under way. The questionnaire was designed
who had sold it resigned at his own initiative, blaming poor pay. to take advantage of recent legislation on freedom of information
Following public outrage, it took two years to the university to and procurement. A Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was passed
elect a new Senate with professor Docea in it and the prosecutors in 2001: three rounds of surveys on monitoring its implementation
to start investigating the former Rector. The case showed the risk at the national level had already been carried out by SAR. A new,
that corruption becomes the norm in an autonomous university, EU-endorsed procurement law was passed in 2005 when Romania
where the Ministry of Education had lost all control levers from signed the EU Treaty of Accession. Furthermore, in 2003 a
Communist times. It was particularly problematic that the comprehensive anticorruption package was passed introducing
whistleblower was at some point threatened to be fired, while for the first time some regulations against conflict of interest. One
the culprit did not encounter significant problems with the of the important causes of systemic corruption signalled in the
university’s management. UNESCO report, poor laws and regulations was thus addressed by
In this circumstance, the need to take more systematic action 2007: the gap seemed to be rather between the practice in each
was deeply felt by SAR. The government passed a law on the quality university and this general legal framework.
of education in 2005 (Government Emergency Ordinance no. 75/ Seventy-five per cent of the items in the questionnaire covered
2005), establishing a supervisory body (the Romanian Agency for issues of university management and administration, and twenty-
Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ARACIS)) with responsi- five covered the governance of academic issues. Each evaluation of
bility for accrediting programmes and evaluating universities. This a university was therefore predominantly an evaluation of
body took over that responsibility from the National Council on university central management, as the Rector alone is in charge
Academic Evaluation and Accreditation (part of the Ministry of legally and financially and together with the Senate which elects
Education), which had granted accreditation (sometimes highly and can dismiss him he is the holder of nearly all power. To assess
controversially) since 1993. 54 private universities function in academic practice, a department was randomly selected for
Romania, having received state accreditation or some provisory investigation from within each university at a public meeting of
functioning authorization. The ARACIS board has to be approved by the Coalition. The passage from Communist authoritarianism to
Parliament and as such reflects the political majority in Parlia- rule by faculty has never been completed in Romania and
ment: members are all informally supported by some political universities have gained autonomy (Education Law no. 84 (r2)
party. No substantial conflict of interest regulations exist, so that from 24/07/1995, Art. 13), but mostly on behalf of management.
the board includes people from top university management who The faculty has no decision rights except to elect Councils who then
do not have to give up their positions at their original universities elect the Dean. The Deans are automatically members of the
while evaluating others. The first appointment of this body proved Senate. The Education, Research and Innovation Ministry’s main
a lengthy process and only few universities had been evaluated for responsibilities are reduced to approving the national strategy of
quality by 2007. education, to allocate education funding according to the law and
It was against this backdrop that SAR built a coalition to to confirm the appointment of rectors elected by the Senates (Art.
integrate all the stakeholders in the higher education system: 141 from Law no. 84 (r2) of 24/07/1995).
representatives of students, unions and professional associations The target population of the CCU survey was all public
or academic watchdog groups. A cooperation agreement was Romanian universities (46): Arts, police and naval institutes were
signed by partners such as the National Association of Romanian excluded, leaving 42 in total. While universities vary in size and
Student Organizations (ANOSR), the Group for Reform in number of departments (see Appendix A), the governance
Universities (GRU), the Romanian Academic Society (SAR), the practices do not vary greatly across one university, as most of
EduCer Association (EduCer), the Ad-Astra Association (Ad Astra), the decision lies with management and rules are adopted at
the FAR Association (FAR), and the Alma Mater Federation (the university, not department level (for instance the internal
largest teachers’ union). Ad Astra had previously computed the regulations, the ethical code, etc.). The department randomly
level of academic achievement of universities based on their ISI- selected was therefore simply the location within one university
Thomson contributions. EduCer, FAR and GRU had all fought locally where the survey inquired on academic practices in order to avoid
to denounce various abuses. The Coalition members decided to join surveying all departments unnecessarily.
forces in a programme which would monitor all state universities The evaluation team was composed of a senior academic (Ph.D.
for two years with the main goal of promoting integrity norms level) and a student. Evaluators were generally selected from
versus generalized bad practices. For this purpose SAR developed another university town and from a discipline different from that
an evaluation questionnaire meant to investigate the governance of the department and university they were evaluating, thereby
practices in a given university. The coalition debated if only public eliminating any potential conflict of interest. Seeing that very
universities should be monitored, as Romania has a large and special universities (such as Arts) were excluded, there was no
536 A. Mungiu-Pippidi, A.E. Dusu / International Journal of Educational Development 31 (2011) 532–546

need that evaluators have specific academic competencies in a responsiveness in providing it.9 The evaluators’ team approached
given departmental field in order to carry on a governance survey the universities in two steps, first by checking the website, and
based on a strictly procedural evaluation. Quite to the contrary, second by applying for information not available on the website
potential conflict of interest and even threats to evaluators had and rating the treatment that their request received as well as the
they come from within the field would have been serious quality of information. One university hired initially a legal firm to
problems. Evaluators started by testing the questionnaire in a protect its information in the pilot phase, claiming that public
pilot project and harmonizing their approach. universities are not subject to FOIA: after SAR sent a letter detailing
The questionnaire was designed to allow for checking of formal the legal procedures of FOIA, the university gave up the claim and
rules and informal practices and to measure the distance between granted full access.
the two. Section one, transparency and responsiveness was meant The documents thus received became the basis for the rest of
to evaluate the practices of university bureaucracy: the score for the evaluation, together with information from the universities’
this section (S1) was assigned a weight of 30% of the total score. The websites, meetings with management and local stakeholders,
general benchmark of transparency legislation (FOIAs) is that media and official reports from the Audit Court. The CCU has also
general information should be available ex-officio, without set up a website for unsolicited information. Evaluators publicly
applicants having to solicit it. A reasonable amount of information announced their presence at a university, so that every interested
should also be available so that students and faculty members, as party could contact them and provide additional relevant
well as members of the informed public (for instance journalists) information.
can check on the universities standards, chief activities and The second part of the questionnaire rated academic integrity,
practices. Ideally, all the relevant information should be posted on and here the data was collected at both university and department
the website of the university. Where there are material impedi- level to assign a second score, with a 20% weight (S2). As the
ments, key information should be posted in other forms, but it principles of merit and merit recognition are fundamental to
should be available without payment, either formal or informal. academic life and activities, this section of the evaluation checked
Such information should include (without being exhaustive): all therefore the existence of a regulatory framework enabling this
charters and internal regulations and guidelines; the budget and principle, but also the practice itself. The methodology developed
financing sources (including from private donations) of a public looks first at the regulatory framework, and then suggests a few
university; all competitions and their rules; composition of simple indicators to check on the practice. Under regulatory
committees who decide over public funds or appointments; framework, we need to check if:
summaries of students evaluations; formal decisions of disciplin-
ary committees; the yearly research, academic and financial - Guidelines for academic integrity exist in a concrete enough form
report; the list of faculty with their resumes, the curriculum and to provide behavioural standards;
syllabi. Aside the information which should be posted on the - They are properly advertised (for instance students have to
website, it is vital that easy access is provided for claimants, commit by signing when they enter the university);
journalists and civil society watchdogs to another type of - Rules and codes of conduct exist to reporting fraud and to
information, such as a typical contract form, copies of procurement establish procedures for addressing wrongful conduct;
decisions of over 10,000 Euros, a chart of teaching employment - Such regulations also provide voice for claimants and whistle-
allowing to evaluate actual teaching loads and remuneration, the blowers and establish that they will be heard by a different
statements of assets and conflicts of interest of the management, a authority than the one they complain against.
transcript of the budget debate and approval by the board (or
Senate), and all other elements adapted to the legal context which Under the practice category, we need to check if:
would allow to check on the principle of non-discriminatory access Such rules are enforced; proper committees meet regularly;
to information, the existence of procedures and standards of good improper behavior is reported (if no case of plagiarism has ever
governance, compliance to more general legislation, eventual been found, it is more likely there is no enforcement rather that
abuses of management to increase its personal profit (by favouring nobody has ever attempted it); instances reported as problematic
certain service providers, cumulating several fictional teaching are followed through and solved; the results are advertised so to
loads, allowing monetary premiums to themselves or favourites, discourage further bad practice; regular controls exist to provide
etc). Under FOIA (law 544/2001), disclosure is mandatory of any against systemic problems (students’ papers checked for plagia-
documents which are not classified in 30 days from the moment rism regularly, library checks if new dissertations do not copy old
the request is made. There are administrative and legal ways of dissertations, etc.); students complaints in their evaluations of
attack if a request is denied. professors are followed and the results reported back to them. The
The most sensitive issues were the most recent statements of teams inquired as to the existence of rules and procedures to
assets of the members of the university’s management board (Law combat plagiarism; they checked whether any cases of academic
144/2007 requires such statements to be posted on the Internet at malpractice had ever been discussed and exposed; they examined
the beginning and end of any new term of public office), and the the correlation between output in terms of number of publications
minutes of the most recent meeting of the university’s ethics and academic rank and salary; and they verified the presence in
committee (the 2005 law on the quality of education made such a class of both faculty and students, as absenteeism is massive at
committee mandatory, but very few such committees were even Romanian universities.
created, let alone met). Each university was evaluated according to The third category evaluates practices governing employment,
their response to the requests: the more documents they provided careers and decision making. The benchmarks used for assessing
or posted on the website as statutorily required, the more points good governance were the Romanian faculty statutes, as well as
they accumulated. A greater weight was granted (5 points) for the the general benchmarks for public sector employees. It generates a
presence/absence of statement of assets and interests of manage- third score, S3, assigned a weight of 35% from the final score. The
ment on the website. These are regulated by a special law (78/
9
2003) and their accuracy is controlled by a state agency created in This methodology was used before by SAR to test transparency and
responsiveness of the public sector agencies. Originally it was inspired by Robert
2008, Agency for National Integrity, which was under organization Putnam’s questionnaire used to rate the Italian regional governments, described in
at the date of this project. The final rating reflected the range of Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti Making Democracy
information available, its quality (updated, correct) and the Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
 A. Mungiu-Pippidi, A.E. Dusu / International Journal of Educational Development 31 (2011) 532–546 537

evaluators assessed the openness of recruitment competitions relied on official Audit Court reports (which are seldom followed
(Romania inherited a hierarchical faculty system from communist up due to unclear legislation even when they recommend
times, with universal tenure). Are recruitment competitions, at prosecution), procurement documents and eventual disclosures
least at entrance level, advertised properly, and open to every- by informants which could be been checked.
body? Are jobs and fellowships properly advertised? Are A total of 100 points was awarded to all these four categories.
examinations fair and do they offer equal treatment to candidates? They can be weighted equally or given different weights, according
Are such competitions truly competitive? Evaluators also checked to the importance of problems depending on country. In the
the existence of cases of nepotism (management or influential Romanian case, the weights were decided according to the impact
faculty members hiring their own relatives). Are salaries or of the area on goals of education (therefore procurement was
bonuses correlated to merit or management uses its discretion to ‘discounted’), but also according to the number of items checked at
reward cronies? To evaluate whether advancement was based on each category (the full questionnaire is included in Appendix C).
merit, the evaluators were instructed to check the correlation Furthermore, from the total score 10 point penalties were
between faculty rank and number of international publications, as deducted for situations of an exceptional gravity (with a maximum
Romanian law requires associate professors and professors to have set at 40). Under penalties (P) evaluators checked if the university
the highest number of peer-reviewed publications. Bad regulations was repeatedly sued for malpractice or abuse by its employees or
also exist which raise red flags. For instance, not all professors, students and lost; if faculty members (more than one) were
even the top ranked ones, enjoy the right to advise doctoral sentenced for corruption, discrimination, academic misconduct or
students: a special committee at the ministerial level grants this sexual harassment over the past five years or if the university was
right. Professors legally empowered form ‘doctoral schools’ within disclosed for the practice of ‘selling’ diplomas or examinations.
their universities or departments. Evaluators calculated how many Two important state universities had been the canter stage of such
ISI quoted papers exist per doctoral school. Some doctoral schools scandals in recent years.
have the reputation of not having one international peer-reviewed A university evaluation score can be obtained by dividing the
publication for all faculty members: however, one can find such final score to 10 after deducting the penalties. The formula is:
publications at other faculty members not included in the doctoral
S1 þ S2 þ S3 þ S4  Pð1; 2 . . . nÞ
school. This is clear indication that merit is not the criterion used ¼ individual integrity score
when organizing such schools. 10
Finally, this section checked on issues of democratic gover- The final score awarded to a university, as well as the final
nance. Is the university managed on the basis of deliberation and ranking, was checked by a team of independent reviewers in
participation from both faculty and students? What is the order to prevent differences across evaluators, and approved by
discretion of management? Are students’ evaluations taken the whole Coalition board. After generating the scores, universi-
seriously and do they matter for the evaluation of faculty? ties were grouped in 5 ranks according to final scores. Only ranks,
Finally, the fourth section (S4, weight 15%) checked the and not scores, were published together with sets of recom-
financial management practices. The management of a university mendations per individual university. The ranking of a forth-
should be free of fraud and corruption. Those include obtaining an coming second time evaluation will thus only follow the extent
unauthorized benefit for themselves or others by unethical means. to which recommendations were implemented, taking the first
Examples include but are not limited to such actions as year score as a baseline. The instrument thus becomes cheap to
embezzlement or other financial irregularities, forgery, falsifica- use even for an individual student association monitoring their
tion, or alteration of documents, authorizing or receiving payments own university.
for hours/time not worked, violation of the procurement legisla-
tion, accepting or offering bribes, kickbacks, or rebates. 3. Results and lessons learned
The evaluators were instructed to check particularly for ‘red
flags’: ‘situations or occurrences within a programme or an activity A synthesis of the results is presented in Table 3, with the more
that indicate susceptibility to corruption’ (Hallak and Poisson, extensive results presented in Appendix B. On the whole, the
2007). They needed to check whether financial documents are survey returned massive evidence of particularism as the chief
accessible; if procurement rules are respected; if the same governance mode. Many Romanian public universities have a
‘favorite’ companies repeatedly win bids for services; if funds closed system of governance with strict control and appropriation
are spent according to their approved destination or are regularly of opportunities by status groups (they are colloquially called
changed to different budget category at the end of year; if state ‘university cliques’) resulting in disproportionate influence and
auditors or civil claimants have challenged the practices of the financial benefit. Most faculty and students have no real voice.
university repeatedly. They should also check if the income and life Entry and advancement are strictly controlled. In the instances
style of management is not out of line with their official income, if when financial benefits could have been checked it resulted that
they do not directly or indirectly profit from conflict of interest. claims of huge differences and abuses were founded. It is a
Well governed universities would have a clear list of incompati- common practice that rectors, deans, department heads and their
bilities and conflicts of interest situations which should be cliques earn 3-4 salaries at professorial level (4–10,000 Euros)
regularly checked by the ethics committee or equivalent. However, claiming several teaching loads taught, while assistant professors
since evaluators were neither expert auditors nor policemen, they earn 3–400 Euros per month at the best. Many people are asked to

Table 3
Final assessment of governance practices brief results.

CCU questionnaire categories Category weight Mean score No. universities No. universities
(maximum score) (%) (Standard deviation) above average below average

Transparency and Responsiveness 30 20 (6.08) 24 18

Academic Integrity 20 12 (3.73) 20 22
Good Governance 35 10 (5.00) 18 24
Financial Management 15 8.8 (3.80) 25 15
538 A. Mungiu-Pippidi, A.E. Dusu / International Journal of Educational Development 31 (2011) 532–546

teach one class for less than 200 Euros as associate temporary the whistleblower who was nearly fired, the management seemed
professors, to avoid declaring vacancies and employing full time more afraid of creating such a precedent than interested in the
professors. Patronage and nepotism reign: even existing rules are academic integrity of their establishment.11 Evaluators found a
poorly or not at all implemented. total lack of enforcement of any basic rules on plagiarism at 70% of
Of the 42 universities approached with requests for informa- the universities. More recently, special software has started being
tion, only 16 responded (of which only two without having to be purchased and more systematic checks introduced, albeit still in a
approached a second time), 23 replied only when evaluators minority of universities.
arrived at the respective university, and three completely refused The quality of governance in universities was found to be poor,
to respond, even though they were statutorily required to do so. with a mean score of ten points out of a total possible score of 35.
Thus, only 38% of state universities were completely transparent Sixty per cent of the universities were at or below the mean. Not even
and responsive. However, except for three universities, they all the top three universities in the final ranking scored more than 25
ultimately cooperated with the evaluators and submitted the points. Despite the fact that most universities did observe statutory
required documents, albeit in some cases after the statutory ten- requirements concerning the publication of vacancies, in the
day term. overwhelming majority of cases only one candidate applied. The
Article 10 (e) of Law 144/2007 requires public institutions to job openings are effectively earmarked for specific individuals, a
publish and update the assets and interests statements of their practice that discourages other potential candidates. Evaluators
management bards on their website. Of the 42 universities, 16 had could find no evidence of recruitment competitions being lost by
published and updated all assets statements, 13 had published ‘‘designated’’ candidates. This was true not only for cases of
them in an incomplete form, while 13 had refused to make them promotion, where, due to universal tenure, one might expect to
public, despite being required to do so by law and despite risking a find such a situation, but also to first entry junior levels—assistant
fine. The National Integrity Agency (NIA), the institution empow- professors or researchers: only a handful of departments organize
ered with enforcing this law, which was just under organization open competitions for those positions. In a case of the Tehnical
during this project was functional enough by summer 2009 to University of Iasi, a candidate with good publication record was
issue a warning to all the rectors and the university management simply not allowed to apply to an associate professor position, on the
to stop breeching the law. It also started investigations on the basis pretext that her baccalaureate diploma from another country was
of CCU reports in some individual cases. Most of these investiga- not valid: but she was already a lecturer at the same university on
tions are still under way. In the only one finalised and highly the basis of the same diploma, having already won a competition.
publicized the former rector of the Iasi University was asked to Evaluators also found cases of professors passed the age of
return nearly 70,000 Euros that NIA considered could not have retirement who had accumulated several teaching loads, while
been justified from his official income. faculty staff with over 20 years of experience were still in assistant
An immediate consequence of the rankings provided by the CCU professor positions. Merit-based salary supplements were frequent-
and its public disclosure was the dramatic improvement in ly awarded not on the basis of transparent criteria relating to
university websites. Even during the process, many universities academic performance. Three-quarters of the universities investi-
rushed to post public documents they were legally required to gated could furnish neither those criteria nor lists of academics
publish (and which had not been made public before) on their awarded such supplements. This was not only the fault of rectors: in
websites. Following the press conference when the rankings were many places Senates or Councils divided such bonuses among
announced, those universities that had not yet published the assets themselves. Only in 2010 and partly due to CCU disclosures the Labor
disclosure statements eventually decided to do so. A second Ministry proposed that the system of ‘merit’ bonuses be abolished
evaluation, taking place in 2009-2010, will concentrate on the fully, as its allocation was mostly discretionary.
follow-up of recommendations made by evaluators to all In 95% of the universities, a great number of families were
universities. In this way the methodology will be improved, identified among faculty and administrative staff. For instance, one
allowing the performance of universities to be compared against department with an academic staff of 45 was found to have eight
each other, but also over time. pairs of related faculty members—three husband-and-wife pairs,
With regard to academic integrity, evaluators discovered that and five father-and-son pairs. Frequently, a family member with a
universities do not have the necessary tools to control plagiarism, managerial position helps in the promotion of other family
even though it is a frequent phenomenon encountered among both members, a phenomenon which raises questions about the
students and faculty members. Students plagiarize from the older objectivity of promotions and peer reviews. Only one university,
papers of their colleagues, or from available sources on the web, ‘‘Alexandru Ioan Cuza’’ University of Iaşi, which is also Romania’s
and teachers plagiarize by translating articles from foreign journals oldest university, introduced, also following scandal, a systematic
and signing them. The case of the health minister Mircea Beuran is policy to avoid conflict of interest. Nepotism affects all categories
one example of the latter. His book was almost identical to a French of evaluation: a rector was found to buy supplies from his wife’s
treatise published earlier. He defended himself by saying that most company; another created an English language test and entrusted
books at the medical school were written in a similar way. it to his wife’s company without even simulating a competitive bid.
Although he was forced to resign from the government, he In a couple of other situations a rector who had ended his legal
remained a professor and a member of the University Senate. In the mandate, which by Romanian law are limited only to tried to pass
University of Bucharest also, at Faculty of Political science a the power on to somebody in the family (son-in-law in the quoted
textbook of Political Psychology of Lavinia Betea has used pages of case). But many rectors solved this particular situation by having
other books without quoting them. The case, denounced by Senates create the position of university President on top of rector
colleagues and sentenced by the Council had no serious follow up and becoming their own successors.
at university level, with the accused professor preserving her Evaluators found no real involvement of students in the
academic position.10 Her defenders argued that the practice was so decision-making process, even though, legally, students represent
widespread that singling her out was unfair: she pointed to other 25% of the members of the Senates and departmental councils of
colleagues as well. As in the case of Professor Docea of Timisoara, the universities. Student evaluations of courses and teachers either
serve a purely formal purpose or are completely ignored. Of the 42
10
See Catalin Avramescu, Lavinia Betea: un caz de plagiat. http://www.roma-
11
niaculturala.ro/articol.php?cod=8468 , last accessed December 9, 2009. http://www.infonews.ro/node/43480.
 A. Mungiu-Pippidi, A.E. Dusu / International Journal of Educational Development 31 (2011) 532–546 539

universities examined, only 20% complied with the requirements Table 4

Determinants of integrity performance.
relating to the participation of student representatives in the
decision-making process, and mostly formally. Evaluators found Predictors Final score
no proof of a decision modified due to student opposition, despite (coefficients)
high discontent in the student body with management at most Number of years since the university was founded 0.880 (0.37)
universities. Total university revenue in the past fiscal year (RON) 6.709*** (0.00)
For the final part of the evaluation, the teams verified the Number of ISI papers in past five years, including 2009, 3.698*** (0.06)
from the ISI web of knowledge search engine
allocation of expenditure. Frequently, the Ministry’s subsidies are
Size of faculty per university 4.463*** (0.04)
transferred from one category to another, one closer to the Number of students at the university 2.542 (0.00)
managers’ interests. For instance, construction work offers better
Entries are standardized coefficients (betas), with standard deviation in parenthe-
opportunities to extract personal benefits or bribes when sis. N (number of universities) = 42. **Significant at 0.01 level. *Significant at 0.05
companies bid, while the scholarship fund brings no personal level.
***
gains to university managers. The evaluators reported that 38% of Significant at 0.001 level.
universities either refused to provide them with the necessary
financial documents or provided incomplete documentation. This
lack of transparency and the incomplete financial records raise behaved in the least transparent manner, were unsurprisingly
serious doubts about managerial integrity. In many cases, those which had been surrounded by most scandals, like UASVM.
evaluators found reports by the Audit Court claiming unlawful The results of the assessment were presented in the form of a
financial management. Compliance with public procurement public ranking of universities, accompanied by more detailed
laws was also checked at random. Evaluators found evidence of reports on each institution. The CCU employed this ‘‘naming and
frequent direct contracting, without any bids being invited, the shaming’’ procedure to stimulate competition. The rectors of
direct awarding of contracts to a favoured company, particularly universities with four stars received awards at a public ceremony,
when large sums were involved, and bids with only one and their best practices were popularized.
competitor. The Romanian procurement legislation demands Using the final scores of this assessment exercise as a
that at least three bidders are solicited for expenses over 10,000, dependent variable measuring integrity, the research team tested
and an open tender process is organized for expenses over 35,000 for causes explaining variation across universities. We found a
Euros. For instance, according to the data published in the positive association between integrity and the income of the
Electronic System for Public Procurement, between January 1, university and between the integrity and the academic quality of
2008 and January 19, 2009, the University of Agricultural Sciences the university as measured by the number of published papers
and Veterinary Medicine, Bucharest (UASVM) Bucharest granted quoted by ISI. This proves a serious correlation exists between
85 public procurement contracts. According to the same data, 43 quality at international level and integrity: it also validates the
out of the 85 contracts, making approximately 50% of procure- integrity scale. We found no connection between the foundation
ment contracts were negotiated with a single bidder without a date of the university and integrity. The number of faculty
prior public procurement request for alternative offers. This is members and students negatively influence integrity: the larger
legally allowed only in case of an emergency, where the need for the university, the less likely it is to perform well. Small, well-
the service is too pressing to allow for the organization of a endowed universities with quality professors seem to perform best
bidding process, or if the nature of the product or service is so (see Table 4). It was impossible to correlate the scores with the
special that there may be only one supplier. However, the object of quality assessments carried out by ARACIS, as in the summer of
most of these contracts did not match to the justificatory notes. 2009 ARACIS had published only just over half of its university
For example, a contract for buying kitchen furniture for one of the quality assessment reports. ARACIS at first invited CCU to
university dormitories was granted directly invoking emergency. collaborate to develop their own methodology: later they stepped
Also, the procurement of desks for classrooms and offices through back and publicly attacked the results of CCU, claiming evaluators
this procedure used as motivation point d) of article 122 of should have been from the same field as those evaluated (but as
procurement law: [the procedure may be used] ‘‘when the CCU attempted an integrity evaluation, not a quality one, this
products that are to be procured are extremely specific products would have only opened the door to conflict of interest). Quite a
used in scientific and experimental research, for technological few ARACIS members are in fact managers at zero stars universities
development and research, and only if they are not produced for and they were gravely offended by the results. The control body of
profit and do not aim at the amortization of costs’’. In addition, the Ministry, whose powers are almost nil, fully cooperated with
only a small number of firms were the preferred suppliers for this CCU. The Audit Court was also quite cooperative. Both these
type of contracts. UASVM had already been made famous for institutions are frustrated with their ability to follow up on their
letting for fifty years their 230 ha farm at Baneasa in north findings and complain of their low enforcement powers.
Bucharest, which had been left to them as a royal endowment, to a The main cause of such behaviour is the total lack of
private developer for just 82,000 Euros, a case under criminal accountability of Rectors and Senates, who use the university
investigation. autonomy to their personal advantage, justifying the definition of a
After the final scores had been computed, the universities fell ‘corrupt’ system. As many of them are also members of ARACIS, it is
into six rough categories clustering around a median score. rather difficult to see to whom they can become seriously
Categories were attributed a ranking, ranging from five stars to accountable. A notorious case is that of Vasile Burlui, the rector
zero. No university scored full marks on all the integrity criteria, of the University of Medicine and Pharmacy of Iasi. In association
and so no university received five stars. Three were awarded four with a private university, the Stomatology Faculty where Mr.
stars, 18 received three stars, ten universities were awarded two Burlui was Dean organized the final exam for Italian students of a
stars, five universities one, and six universities received no stars on private Romanian university, who paid for their degrees and
account of their total lack of transparency and integrity (in fact, received them without even coming to Romania. Despite being
they had so many penalties that their original low score fell below under criminal investigation after this degree mill was exposed, Mr
zero). Universities were offered the possibility to contest results Burlui was at first elected as Rector. Later, the Senate dismissed
and present evidence in their support. However, none was able to him. He sued and a Romanian Court reinstated him as rector
contest findings substantially. The zero ranked universities, who against the will of the Senate. The Education Minister could not
540 A. Mungiu-Pippidi, A.E. Dusu / International Journal of Educational Development 31 (2011) 532–546

intervene much in this conflict neither when he was elected, not thinner. Neither professors, nor students have any incentive to
when the Senate refused to enforce a final sentence of a Court and achieve better results. Tuition fees at the tenths of accredited
accept Mr. Burlui back as Rector.12 Meanwhile he was indicted on Romanian private universities are so low in some cases,13 and
several counts. But law suits take many years to complete in education standards so poorly enforced, that practically anyone
Romania and Courts are notoriously unreliable as well, so resorting can afford a degree. Students frequently seek the degree certificate
to Courts does not help much where self-regulation of the rather than the education. Reforming the Romanian education
profession does not work. Perhaps the most concerning thing – system means challenging this status quo.
but also the easier to address – is the absence of any external To address some of the problems encountered, Romanian
stakeholders from university management. Would the Senates civil society decided to organize a second round of evaluation,
include representatives of the local community alongside profes- where universities can improve their scores if implementing the
sors they could not become closed cliques pursuing solely their individual recommendations received in a private communica-
own interest. tion from CCU. CCU also organized an Ombudsman of education
The findings of the CCU survey both reflect and explain the with the support of Central and East European Civil Society Trust
failure of the education policies of the post-1989 governments. (CEET). The Ombudsman acts as mediator in the situations
Poor financing alone can no longer explain these governance where individual rights are infringed, contacting the Rector on
practices, as funding has improved in recent years: university behalf of the claimant and organizing strategic Court litigation
professorships have become the best remunerated positions in the when needed. All rectors announced they would cooperate with
public sector (Miroiu et al., 1998; Marga, 2000). In 2007, the total the Ombudsman and six months into the program eight cases
public-sector expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP was have already been mediated successfully without resorting to
5.5%, and in 2008 it reached 6%. Romania has an index of 45.8 GDP Courts.
per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (EU-27 = 100) (Eurostat, However, since Romania has become a member of the
2008). The higher education budget is divided between 45 European Union there has been some pressure to compete and
universities in total, enrolling yearly around 650,000 students. perform in the common European higher education market.
Seventeen per cent of the faculty and about 20% of university Ending many years of discrimination, European diplomas are
professors manage to publish internationally (Florian, 2006). The finally recognised: as late as 1997, a Romanian Oxford graduate
poor research output shows especially in the field of innovation. needed to translate her dissertation and have it reviewed in
Roughly 57.734 Europeans in a million get a patent acknowledged Romania to have her degree recognized. Mobility of students has
yearly, compared to just 0.206 Romanians in a million. From 1998 also increased, many of them leaving directly after high school.
to 2007, Romania was granted only 20 patents by the European This pressure might provide the needed incentives for education
Patent Office (2009). reform in Romania. With the opening of national borders, students
The autonomy of universities and the decentralization of funds, may study abroad at affordable prices and get better education
seen as great political gains after 1989, have also generated than the national system can provide, with top-quality human
undesirable effects. Granting autonomy to universities without resources being thus further drained from the national labour
ensuring that an accountability mechanism is put into place only market. Romania already ranks 104 from 134 in Global
fed particularism. Pro-integrity policies are difficult because of Competitiveness Report 2009 at the category brain drain. Talent
poor incentives for stakeholders to improve. As the higher leaves massively, and the economic growth of recent years has
education system is financed on the basis of the number of come to an abrupt halt. This situation should motivate the
students, universities try to attract as many students as possible, Romanian policymakers to cooperate with civil society in
regardless of the fact that this makes them spread quality even redressing the higher education system.

13
The Romanian-American University, a private university, has annual tuition
12
http://www.ziaruldeiasi.ro/local/iasi/burlui-strins-cu-menghina-de-inspec- fees of 500 euros, while the Academy of Economic Studies, a state university,
torii-menni1hu5. charges 1000 euros per annum.
 A. Mungiu-Pippidi, A.E. Dusu / International Journal of Educational Development 31 (2011) 532–546 541

Appendix A. Universities basic data

No. University name Years since Number of Number of Rank Total revenues Number of ISI
founding students departments (0–5) of university articles (Ad Astra
(millions) methodology, 2007)

1 University of Alba Iulia 18 5600 4 3 N/A 1

2 University ‘‘Aurel Vlaicu’’, Arad 19 15394 8 0 63.62 14
3 University of Bacau 19 9134 5 1 57.75 9
4 Northern University of Baia Mare 18 N/A 4 3 30.71
5 University ‘‘Transilvania’’, Brasov 38 23000 16 2 199.04 27
6 The Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies 96 45889 10 3 7
7 National Academy of Physical Education and Sports 87 4739 2 3 8.03 0
8 National School of Political Studies and Public 18 14373 0 90.81
Administration
9 Politehnica University of Bucharest 89 25791 13 3 131.56 311
10 University of Bucharest 145 30000 19 3 100.92 314
11 University of Agricultural Sciences and Veterinary 157 N/A 7 0 N/A N/A
Medicine, Bucharest
12 ‘‘Ion Mincu’’ University of Architecture and Urbanism 117 3115 3 16.77 N/A
13 ‘‘Carol Davila’’ University of Medicine and Pharmacy, 152 7900 4 0 N/A 32
Bucharest
14 Unversity of Technical Constructions, Bucharest 191 8000 7 3 129.28 20
15 ‘‘Babes-Bolyai’’ University of Cluj 50 50000 21 3 387.37 32
16 University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Cluj 90 10431 4 312.74 27
17 University of Agricultural Sciences and Veterinary 140 6900 4 2 106.53 N/A
Medicine, Cluj
18 Technical University of Cluj 62 13244 9 249.38 55
19 ‘‘Ovidius’’ University of Constanta 19 N/A 16 1 120.17 36
20 Maritime University, Constanta 19 4300 2 3 32.30 N/A
21 University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Craiova 39 3313 4 3 75.48 2
22 University of Craiova 43 27516 16 1 271.81 66
23 ‘‘Dunarea de Jos’’ University of Galati 35 16000 14 157.92 43
24 ‘‘Alexandru Ioan Cuza’’ University of Iasi 149 38140 15 4 220.46 275
25 University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Iasi 130 8670 4 2 130.46 36
26 University of Agricultural Sciences and Veterinary 97 2533 4 2 53.30 10
Medicine, Iasi
27 ‘‘Gheorghe Asachi’’ Technical University, Iasi 149 17497 11 3 301.42 112
28 University of Oradea 19 23500 18 1 150.04 44
29 University of Petrosani 19 6800 2 30.47 N/A
30 University of Pitesti 47 19820 10 2 114.84 16
31 Petroleum-Gas University of Ploiesti 61 12956 3 126.38 16
32 University of Resita 19 N/A 2 0 N/A N/A
33 University of Sibiu 19 20000 11 1 65.68 11
34 ‘‘Stefan cel Mare’’ University of Suceava 46 12900 9 3 73.34 4
35 ‘‘Valahia’’ University of Targoviste 17 8596 8 2 74.80 33
36 University of Targu Jiu 17 6239 5 0 38.56 7
37 ‘‘Petru Maior’’ University of Targu Mures 49 5915 3 N/A1 1
38 University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Targu Mures 64 4000 4 111.29 8
39 Politehnica University, Timisoara 89 15000 10 2 341.51 84
40 University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Timisoara 64 N/A 3 3 57.01 32
41 University of Agricultural Sciences and Veterinary 64 7000 6 3 93.91 10
Medicine, Timisoara
42 WestUniversity, Timisoara 65 19,000 11 183.09 81
542 A. Mungiu-Pippidi, A.E. Dusu / International Journal of Educational Development 31 (2011) 532–546

Appendix B Questionnaire evaluation results

No. University name Transparency Academic quality management Penalties Total

fairness (20 points) (35 points) practices (max. 40) (max. 100)
(30 points) (15 points)

1 University of Alba Iulia 18.5 12 16 S 0 54.5

2 University ‘‘Aurel Vlaicu’’, Arad 26 10 10 5 30 21
3 University of Bacau 10 11 12 10 32
4 Northern University of Baia Mare IS 8.5 9.5 13 8 49
6 TheBucharest Academy of Economic Studies 26.5 13 18 14 10 61.5
7 Natioal Academy of Physical Education and Sports 2 6.5 10 11 9.505 0 57
8 Natioal School of Political Studies and Public 14 9.5 4 2 10 19.5
Administration
9 Politehnica University of Bucharest 22 13 17 0 59
10 University of Bucharest 22 13.5 15 4 0 54.5
11 University of Agricultural Sciences and Veterinary 1 0 0 0 20 -19
Mediciine, Bucharest
12 ‘‘Ion Mincu’’ University of Architecture and Urbansm 17 18.5 12.5 5 0 53
13 ‘‘Carol Davila’’ University of Medicine and Pharmacy, 5.5 11 8 0 20 4.5
Bucharest
14 Unvesity of Technical Constructions, Bucharest 22.5 11 6 0 48.5
15 ‘‘Babes-Bolyai’’ University of Cluj 14 12 9 10 48
16 University of Medicine and Pharmacy, C luj 21.5 19 19 12.5 0
17 University of Agricultural Sciences and Veterinary 24.5 7 5.5 8.55 5 40.5
Mediciine, Cluj
18 Technical University of Cluj 23.5 13.5 7.515 7.515 15 37
19 ‘‘Ovidus’’ University of Constanta 17.5 12 4 7.5 10 31
20 Maritime University, Constanta 26 11 10 12.5 0 59.5
21 University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Craiova 26.5 12 7.5 0 55
22 University of Craiova 16 13 9 10 31
23 ‘‘Dunarerea de Jos’’ University of Galati 15 17 16 11 15 44
24 ‘‘Alexandru Ioan Cuza’’ University of Iasi 19 20 20 9 0 68
25 University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Iasi 25.5 13 11 9.515 15 44
26 University of Agricultural Sciences and Veterinary 23 5 11 10 38
Mediciine, Iasi
27 ‘‘Gheorghe Asachi’’ Technical University, Iasi 22 16 9 10 0 57
28 University of Oradea 28 12.5 9.5 9 30 29
29 University of Petrosani 20 12 6 6 0 44
30 University of Pitesti 21 10 10 6 10
31 Petroeum-Gas University of Ploiesti 24 9 11 15 0 59
32 University of Resita 6.5 1 2 0 12.5
33 University of Sibiu 20 15 8 8 20 31
34 ‘‘Stefancen cel Mare’’ University of Suceava 25.5 11 10 12 8 58.5
36 University of Targu Jiu 22 13 11 11 30 27
37 ‘‘Petru Maior’’ University of Targu Mures 19.5 9.5 11.5 0 47.5
38 University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Targu Mures 28 14.5 23.5 14 0 80
39 Politehnica University, Timisoara 22 12 11 14 15 44
40 University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Timisoara 16 13.5 13 12 0 54.5
41 42 University of Agricultural Sciences and Veterinar 24 12 11.5 15 0 49.5
WestUniversity, Timisoaray Medicine, Timisoara
 A. Mungiu-Pippidi, A.E. Dusu / International Journal of Educational Development 31 (2011) 532–546 543

Appendix C
544 A. Mungiu-Pippidi, A.E. Dusu / International Journal of Educational Development 31 (2011) 532–546
A. Mungiu-Pippidi, A.E. Dusu / International Journal of Educational Development 31 (2011) 532–546 545
546 A. Mungiu-Pippidi, A.E. Dusu / International Journal of Educational Development 31 (2011) 532–546

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