Science On Trial - The Clash of - Angell, Marcia
Science On Trial - The Clash of - Angell, Marcia
Science On Trial - The Clash of - Angell, Marcia
NOV 13 1996
FEB 13 2003
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AUG 25 2004
FWL 9 1 2006
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SCIENCE ON TRIAL
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Science
on Trial
THE CLASH OF
MEDICAL EVIDENCE
AND THE LAW IN THE
BREAST IMPLANT CASE
LONDON
NEW YORK
The text of this book is composed in ITC New Baskerville with the display
set in Spartan Heavy Classified & ITC New Baskerville
Composition and manufacturing by the Haddon Craftsmen, Inc.
Book design by Beth Tondreau Design
W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10110
http://web.wwnorton.com
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CONTENTS
Preface
Acknowledgments 15
Notes Zit
Index 247
PREFACE
MARCIA ANGELL
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1
THE
BREAST IMPLANT
STORY:
ONCE OVER
LIGHTLY ;
age of implants. If they had done so, they would have had less
trouble. In addition to dissuading many women from consid-
ering implants, such a warning would have disarmed those
who got implants anyway, since they could no longer have
claimed that the manufacturers had misled them. A product
liability suit is less likely to be successful if the buyer (in this
case, the plastic surgeon, who is expected to inform the pa-
tient) has been warned. But the manufacturers steadfastly
maintained that the implants were safe, despite the lack of sci-
entific evidence in either direction. To be sure, there were
many individual stories of connective tissue disease develop-
ing after the placement of breast implants, but these reports
alone (“anecdotes,” in scientific jargon) do not constitute ev-
idence that the implants caused the disease. They could well
have represented pure coincidence. Since connective tissue
disease can develop in women with or without implants, the
only way to demonstrate that implants actually cause the dis-
ease is to show that the risk is significantly higher in women
with breast implants than it is in those without implants. To do
so requires epidemiologic studies—scientific surveys of the
incidence of disease in samples of different groups. But it was
not until a few months after the class-action settlement was an-
nounced that the first such study of breast implants and con-
nective tissue disease was published.'°
How could the law have been so far out in front of the ev-
idence that huge amounts of money were changing hands
and $4.25 billion more was promised? And whose hands were
they? Many of those who welcomed the FDA ban believed that
the law was notin front of the evidence, but that the evidence
had been largely suppressed by rapacious implant manufac-
turers interested only in their profits and by the plastic sur-
geons who made a very good living implanting the devices.
24 @ SCIENCE ON TRIAL
the oily slick off implants before showing them to plastic sur-
geons at trade shows, thereby removing evidence of leakage.
The overriding concern was to win the race against a com-
peting manufacturer.
After the FDA ban, when the manufacturers were clearly
on the ropes, the plaintiffs’ attorneys moved in to capture the
profits of the manufacturers. Since the lawyers are paid on a
contingency basis—that is, a percentage of the plaintiff's
award or out-of-court settlement—they had every interest in
filing as many lawsuits as possible. If they lost most of them, it
didn’t matter. With contingency fees customarily in the range
of 30 to 40 percent, all they needed was to win a few cases from
time to time and settle most of them out of court. The system
resulted in relatively small gains for many women and enor-
mous gains for a few lawyers. The stake of the lawyers in the
breast implant dispute is now so great that some of them have
embarked on a campaign to discredit and harass scientists
who are conducting epidemiologic research on the subject.
Dr. Sherine Gabriel of the Mayo Clinic, author of the first pub-
lished epidemiologic study of implants, was served with sub-
poenas demanding that she produce large numbers of docu-
ments about the women in her study. Authors of two other
epidemiologic studies were served with similar subpoenas.
These researchers say that responding to the subpoenas has
been extremely burdensome and time-consuming. They be-
lieve the harassment might well dissuade other investigators
from conducting epidemiologic studies. The avarice of man-
ufacturers is necessarily restrained to some extent; if they are
too obviously heedless of safety, they will lose their customers
and find themselves in trouble with the law. Plaintiffs’ attor-
neys are not similarly restrained. Their clients gain right along
with them, and they are not only acting within the law, but
using it as an instrument.
The Breast Implant Story: Once Over Lightly # 31
Finally, the sixth theme is the way in which the media pre-
sent medical issues to the public. Until about 1990 the media
had little to say about breast implants, except to report a few
large jury verdicts. But as the time approached for the manu-
facturers to produce evidence of safety, the intermittent media
reports became more frequent, until finally the media cover-
age was nearly incessant. It also grew more sensational and un-
critical with time. On television and in newspapers and mag-
azines, women—some of them celebrities—began to recount
stories of deformity and disease stemming from their implants.
The subject became a staple of talk shows. The tone of the cov-
erage was anything but analytical. Instead, the premise that
breast implants were dangerous seemed to be tacitly accepted.
In addition, it was often strongly implied that the FDA, as well
as the manufacturers, knew the devices were dangerous and
suppressed the fact. The story played to both the American fas-
cination with newly discovered, mass health hazards and the
penchant to assume a cover-up in any disaster. Instead of pre-
senting a complicated health story, the media simply gener-
ated outrage.
Which came first—the media spin or public opinion? As
in all media-intensive stories, it is impossible to say because
public opinion and media reports are so closely intertwined.
What can be said is that the tone of the coverage almost cer-
tainly reflects a predisposition of the public to see it that way.
The public is easily swept up in medical alarms, particularly
when there is an element of wrongdoing involved. The power
of the media and public opinion is immense, and that is by and
large appropriate in a democracy. But not all endeavors are
meant to be ruled by public opinion. Justice, for example,
should not be, nor should science.
In subsequent chapters, I will consider each of the above
themes using the breast implant controversy as a prism. But
32 @ SCIENCE ON TRIAL
Monroe and Jayne Mansfield set a very tough standard for the
female form—as Dolly Parton does now. But despite the ru-
mors, celebrities have in general kept the matter private, as
have most other women. Only in the last decade or so have
women, usually in court, been willing to tell of their efforts to
enlarge and reshape their breasts. One of the first celebrities
to go directly to the public with her breast implant story was
Jenny Jones, the TV talk show host. Jones, who projects a per-
sona of sweet vulnerability, told her story to People magazine,
as well as twice on her talk show. She said she had been
through five sets of implants, each of which caused rock-like
hardening and distortion of her breasts. She had dutifully
kneaded and squeezed her breasts, as advised by her plastic
surgeon, in an attempt to soften and reshape them, despite
the fact that at least some manufacturers warned in the pack-
age inserts that this could cause rupture. Because she had the
polyurethane-coated implants (and over the years a few of her
implants had ruptured), removing them was extremely diffi-
cult. Jones’s highly public revelations came at the time David
Kessler, with much attendant publicity, was trying to decide
whether to ban implants.
Why had Jones put herself through all this? She told Peo-
ple that as a young woman she had suffered because she was
flat-chested. “I would look at sexy nightgowns and lingerie,”
she said, “and think that I could never wear them.” In 1981
she sold nearly everything she owned (she was poorer then)
to pay for breast implants. This was shortly after her divorce,
and the timing was evidently not coincidental. As she ex-
plained, “My husband seldom touched my breasts when we
were intimate. I could only assume that they were not big
enough or attractive enough for him.” She also told of sur-
veying the men on her staff “about what makes a woman sexy,
46 @ SCIENCE ON TRIAL
and the number one thing on almost every sheet was big
boobs—big breasts.” I am skeptical that most men would sub-
scribe to this ranking, but still, it’s generally assumed that men
prefer large breasts. Appearances are very important in the
mating game, and the mating game is very important to most
of us. Jenny Jones showed us just how desperate the whole
thing could get.”
The actress Mariel Hemingway also spoke frankly about
her experience with breast implants. She got silicone-gel-filled
breast implants when she was eighteen years old and had been
chosen to play a Playboy centerfold in the film Star 80. She said
of her decision to get implants, “I didn’t do it for the movie,
I did it for myself. I don’t like to talk about it much, but yeah,
it gave me self-esteem. It made me feel like a girl, and I had
never felt like a girl. I always felt like this tall thing.” After the
FDA ban, she was concerned enough to have her silicone im-
plants removed and replaced by saline implants, which, inci-
dentally, were smaller. A year later, now thirty-two and mar-
ried, she was ready to do without implants altogether. As she
put it, “?'m a woman now. I’m married and have two kids. I
don’t need those things.”*?
Over the three decades that silicone breast implants were
freely available, there were marked changes in the pattern of
their use. Initially, like silicone injections, they were a tool of
the trade for showgirls and aspiring actresses. For them, the
bigger the breasts, the better for business. They wanted un-
naturally large implants to please their male audiences. Or-
dinary women were both envious and appalled. They did not
immediately rush to emulate women with breast implants. But
with time, women began to see breast implants as a way to im-
prove their figures, without necessarily seeking to have “casaba
melon size” breasts. Manufacturers responded by producing
Breast Implants: What They Are and Who Has Them #8 47
tor of the Albert Einstein Hospital in New York City, but here
again one full-time job was not enough. He also taught food
and drug law at Columbia Law School, and obtained an ad-
vanced professional certificate from New York University’s
Graduate School of Business Administration. Upon being
appointed commissioner of the FDA, he threw himself into
the job with his customary drive and with a zeal not seen in
earlier commissioners. '
When Kessler arrived in Washington, breast implants had
been on the market for nearly 30 years, but they had been
under the purview of the FDA only since 1976. That year the
Medical Device Amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act extended the FDA’s authority to cover devices, as well as
food, drugs, and cosmetics. Under this amendment, manu-
facturers of new devices could, at the discretion of the FDA,
be required to submit an application for premarketing ap-
proval. The applications were to include data on safety and ef-
fectiveness from animal and human studies. Until FDA ap-
proval was obtained, new devices that required premarketing
approval could not be sold. Since breast implants were al-
ready on the market, they were “grandfathered” (exempted
because they predated the amendment), at least for the time
being. Presumably, given their long track record, they were
reasonably safe. Nevertheless, in 1982 the FDA proposed re-
quiring “premarketing approval,” which meant the manufac-
turers would have to supply evidence of the safety of implants.”
The FDA did nothing more about breast implants until
1988, when it finalized the 1982 proposal. This action came
in the wake of the first few anecdotal reports in medical jour-
nals of cases of connective tissue disease in women who had
undergone breast augmentation. The earliest reports em-
anated from Japan and concerned directly injected paraffin
52 @ SCIENCE ON TRIAL
force that the new, softer gel might tend to leak through the
envelope more than the firmer gel. As it turned out, the data
showed the leakage to be somewhat less, but there was reason
for the concern. The Dow Corning salespeople were finding
that plastic surgeons to whom they showed the new implants
complained that there was an oily coating on the surface of
the envelope. In response, a member of the task force wrote
the following memo to the salespeople:
nal of Medicine, I pointed out that all drugs and devices carry
risks of side effects, sometimes quite serious ones. The FDA
had never demanded that.a drug or device be risk-free, only
that the risks be commensurate with the benefits. The greater
the potential benefits, the greater the acceptable risks. The job
of the FDA, I pointed out, is to gather information on both
benefits and risks, and balance them. If the balance is rea-
sonable (a necessarily imprecise judgment), then the drug or
device should be approved.*” But in the case of breast im-
plants, there were special problems. First, as Kessler empha-
sized, we didn’t know enough about possible risks. He was
careful to say that this didn’t mean that implants were dan-
gerous, only that we did not have sufficient information to
know one way or the other. Our ignorance was not total, of
course. We had, after all, 30 years of experience with breast
implants in 1 million to 2 million women, and this was why
breast implants had been grandfathered in the first place. We
knew that the great majority of women with implants were sat-
isfied with them. As already noted, we also knew that in about
5 percent of women, implants ruptured and had to be re-
placed, and that there was hardening of the breasts in many
more women (although not necessarily enough to make them
dissatisfied). We knew from several research studies that ear-
lier concerns that implants might cause cancer were probably
unfounded. And finally we knew that there were anecdotes
that breast implants caused connective tissue disease, but the
question had not been properly studied. Thirty years’ experi-
ence, however, argued that if there were such a connection,
it was certainly not common. What we had, then, was a pretty
good feeling for an upper bound on the frequency and seri-
ousness of risks.**
Benefits were even more difficult to assess than risks, be-
The FDA Ban on Implants ® 63
cause the procedure maims women. Said Wolf, “It is not co-
incidental that breast surgery is expanding at a time when fe-
male sexuality is such a threat.”“” Women who take some vari-
ant of this view are naturally disposed to accept the theory that
breast implants are dangerous.
I have no tally of how many women are on each side, but
I suspect the great majority who have opinions on the issue be- .
lieve that breast implants are risky, that there is solid evidence
to this effect (some of which the manufacturers have with-
held), and that, if anything, Kessler was too slow in moving to
protect women. Some are sure he would have moved much
faster if men’s health had been at risk.
In 1995 the Republican-dominated Congress initiated ef-
forts to weaken the power of government regulation. It began
by passing legislation that would require federal regulators to
compare the costs of regulations with their benefits. On the
surface, this is a reasonable reform. The problem is that it can
become a cover for a general rollback of the philosophy that
underlies regulation—namely, that citizens need to be pro-
tected from the excesses of an unbridled market. According
to the Republicans, the federal regulatory apparatus has grown
bloated and hinders legitimate private enterprise. It needs to
be curbed for the sake of common sense and efficient gov-
ernment. What they are less likely to emphasize is the fact that
undermining government regulation, particularly standards
to protect the environment, is enormously appealing to big
business. The Democrats, in their typical mode these days, re-
sponded by agreeing that regulatory reform is a good idea,
but not too much of it. They maintain that the Republican
proposals will add to red tape, instead of cutting it, because
they will merely add roadblocks to the current regulations. In
the midst of this debate, Kessler is likely to emerge as an in-
68 #@ SCIENCE ON TRIAL
Big business is powerful and often ruthless, and the safety net
for those who suffer harms of whatever kind is notoriously
threadbare. In particularly, medical care is expensive and by
no means assured for everyone who needs it. Thus, people
who are injured or sick have every interest in blaming the
problem on someone else and trying to coilect damages. A suc-
cessful lawsuit may be the only way to provide for medical ex-
penses and lost income (often called “economic” damages).
Sometimes there are also damages for emotional harm, and
these may be at least as large as the economic damages. Finally,
punitive damages are awarded in some cases. Although puni-
tive damages are rare, they receive a great deal more public-
ity than their frequency warrants, because they may be huge.
For example, in one breast implant case, the plaintiff was
awarded $5 million in economic and emotional damages, and
$20 million in punitive damages.'’ The size of punitive dam-
ages reflects their purpose; they are designed to punish or
deter the defendant. They are therefore based on the defen-
dant’s wealth and must be big enough to be felt. In one breast
implant case, the jury was instructed that the net worth of the
defendant, Dow Corning, was over $948 million, a figure the
jury was to keep in mind when deciding on punitive dam-
ages.'8 Although the great majority of product liability cases
are settled out of court, there are enough multimillion-dollar
jury verdicts to remind manufacturers that settling is usually
better. Losing just one case can generate multiple similar cases
and set the minimum going rate for compensation. The threat
of punitive damages is an added wild card.
American law has a number of unusual, even unique, fea-
tures that contribute to the large and growing number of law-
suits. First, we alone use the contingency fee as the customary
method of payment of plaintiffs’ attorneys in personal injury
74 @& SCIENCE ON TRIAL
both federal and state cases at the same time. Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy entails the financial reorganization of a company, not its
liquidation. As a part of the reorganization, all creditors’ claims
are considered together in a single court—the bankruptcy court.
Asbestos suits against Johns-Manville Corporation must now be
resolved bya claims facility, the Manville Personal Injury Settle-
ment Trust. The damages will be paid only at greatly reduced
rates, if at all. Eventually 17 other companies involved in the
manufacture or use of asbestos also filed for bankruptcy pro-
tection. Similarly, A. H. Robins, the manufacturer of the Dalkon
Shield, filed for bankruptcy protection, leaving the claims of
many women unsettled. They will be resolved by the Dalkon
Shield Claimants’ Trust Facility.” There was very little equity
among the plaintiffs in these cases. Early claimants tended to fare
better than late ones. The large punitive damages early plain-
tiffs received simply increased the likelihood that the companies
went bankrupt before those injured last could file their claims.
The filing of class actions—lawsuits in which the plaintiffs
are alleged to represent a large number of similarly affected
people—is one way to deal with the inequities and inefficien-
cies of mass torts. Class actions have long been used for civil
cases involving injunctions—such as those dealing with school
segregation and job discrimination. What is new since the
1970s is the use of class actions in tort cases. Until the 1970s,
the general rule was one lawyer, one client.*? But with the ex-
plosion in mass tort litigation, it has become increasingly com-
mon for plaintiffs’ attorneys to file class actions. A class needs
to be certified by a federal judge, who must be satisfied that
class-action treatment is the best method for reaching a fair
and efficient resolution of the problem. The judge not only
certifies the class, but also chooses the class representative, in
whose name the lawsuit is filed on behalf of the other mem-
78 @ SCIENCE ON TRIAL
bers of the class. The judge also selects the lead attorneys for
the class and approves their fees.*! Pooling cases raises the
stakes enough to warrant hiring experts and conducting an ex-
haustive pretrial investigation. The plaintiffs’ lawyers in
essence become investors in the process.
Although attorneys’ fees for a class action tend to be a
smaller percentage than the standard one-third contingency
fee, they are nevertheless quite large because of the number
of plaintiffs. Filing a class action can therefore be a very lu-
crative proposition, and there is great competition to be cho-
sen to represent the class. Recall that the breast implant set-
tlement explicitly set aside a billion dollars for the lawyers.”
For this reason, class actions are now filed on behalf of all sorts
of dubious groups. Sometimes multiple class actions are filed
against the same manufacturer. For example, there have al-
ready been 46 class actions filed against Wyeth-Ayerst, the
manufacturer of Norplant.*® Here again, there is a lottery as-
pect to the practice. Most class actions are not certified, but
all it takes is one to make an attorney’s career. A class action
may be settled out of court either before or after the class is
certified. When the attorneys for both sides agree on the set-
tlement after a class has been certified, the judge decides
whether it is fundamentally fair, then notifies the members of
the class of a formal hearing in which they can present argu-
ments for and against the settlement. The judge then either
approves or disapproves the settlement.”
Often mass tort litigation involves plaintiffs from multiple
federal districts. In this case, it is necessary to consolidate the
cases within the jurisdiction of one federal court. In 1968,
Congress created the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
This group of judges is authorized to transfer civil actions in-
volving common questions of fact from multiple districts to
The Rush to Court: Litigation and More Litigation ™ 79
retical risks are easily seen in this case. Would any silicone-
associated risks outweigh the many risks and costs of unwanted
pregnancies in women who are frightened away from Nor-
plant and unable to use another contraceptive?
More important than the expansion of litigation to other
silicone-containing products is the indirect threat to all med-
ical devices—whether they contain silicone or not. This threat
arises from a peculiar feature of our product liability laws. Ac-
cording to the law, plaintiffs can make claims against any party
involved in the manufacture of an allegedly harmful product,
even if the involvement is remote.** This means that suppliers
of raw materials can be sued, even if they have nothing to do
with the design and manufacture of the product. Since the sale
of raw materials for medical devices (called biomaterials) is a
small part of the business of most big suppliers, some of them
have calculated that their revenues from this stream would
quickly be dwarfed by the legal liabilities. For example,
DuPont once supplied Teflon to a small company, called
Vitek, that used it to manufacture jaw implants. Several years
ago, when there were problems with the implants, Vitek de-
clared bankruptcy. The aggrieved patients then sued DuPont
instead. Although the courts have ruled fairly consistently in
favor of DuPont, the company estimates it spent about $8 mil-
lion a year over five years defending itself against the suits. This
amounted to far more than the return on the five cents’ worth
of Teflon in each implant.
Ostensibly because of the legal risks, three large suppli-
ers of biomaterials have pulled back from the market. Dow
Corning, a supplier as well as a manufacturer, has drastically
scaled back sales of silicone to other manufacturers of med-
ical devices and may stop selling it altogether. The embargo
will probably affect a wide variety of silicone-containing de-
The Rush to Court: Litigation and More Litigation & 85
caring for the sick or injured, it is left to the tort system. Some
plaintiffs are vastly rewarded; most are not. The connection
between the verdict and the merits of the case is often tenu-
ous. Compassionate people may welcome large verdicts for
plaintiffs (and as jurors, they are happy to provide them).
Some believe that even if the injury was not caused by the de-
fendant, it could have been and, besides, someone should
compensate the victim. But this is a very haphazard and un-
economical way to provide assistance. As a way to deter busi-
nesses from marketing dangerous products, the system also
fails. To be sure, businesses grow more skittish, but the issue
for them becomes not whether a product is actually safe, but
whether the company will be vulnerable. They may shy away
from important innovations just to minimize their liability. Fi-
nally, as a way to redistribute wealth, the system fails utterly.
Since someone must pay for the jury awards, the costs are
merely passed along to ordinary consumers. For example, the
breast implant manufacturers will surely try to recoup their
losses by increasing the prices of their other consumer goods.
(Such price increases are sometimes called a “tort tax.”)
Tort reform, like regulatory reform, has been a recurrent
theme in Washington, but never more than now in the ultra-
conservative Republican Congress. Various reform measures
have been proposed. These include limitations on the size of
punitive and emotional damages, as well as restrictions on
contingency fees and more stringent standards for the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence in court. In addition, there has
been increasing attention to the problems of remote parties,
such as suppliers of biomaterials, drawn into product liability
suits. Product liability suits pit trial lawyers against big business.
Each side has its champions. Republicans and conservatives
tend to support big business. They are therefore eager to re-
88 @ SCIENCE ON TRIAL
in this way. So we’re left with attempts to get at the same in-
formation in less than scientifically ideal ways.
This is where observational epidemiologic studies come
in. In this type of study—an increasingly important way of
studying connections between disease and potential risk fac-
tors—we do not assign people to be exposed to a potential risk.
Instead, we observe what happens in those who choose to be
exposed for their own reasons or who happen to be exposed
inadvertently. Then we compare the incidence of the disease
in these people with the incidence in those who are not ex-
posed. There are several forms of observational epidemio-
logic studies, but only two are of much value in demonstrat-
ing risk factors—cohort studies (“cohort” simply means
group) and case-control studies. A cohort study of the possi-
ble link between breast implants and connective tissue disease
would start with a group of women who have implants and a
group who do not, none of whom has connective tissue dis-
ease. Researchers would then keep track of the two groups
over time to see how many in each group develop connective
tissue disease. If more in the implant group get a connective
tissue disease, it would support (but not prove) the hypothe-
sis that breast implants are a risk factor. In contrast, a case-
control study would start with a group of women who already
had connective tissue disease (cases) and a group who did not
(controls). After the groups were assembled, the researchers
would find out how many women in each group had implants.
If more cases than controls had breast implants, it would sup-
port (but not prove) the hypothesis that breast implants are
a risk factor. In either type of study, the bigger the difference
between the two groups, the more likely it is that implants are
a risk factor. The trickiest part of epidemiologic studies is
making sure that the groups are similar to each other in all
100 @ SCIENCE ON TRIAL
ways except the possible risk factor (in cohort studies) or the
disease (in case-control studies). If they aren’t, differences
may show up because of other factors (termed “confounding
variables”) .°
Cohort and case-control studies each have advantages
and disadvantages, but one or the other is necessary to come
close to answering the question of whether breast implants are
a risk factor for disease. Just finding instances of women with
implants who develop connective tissue disease is not enough
to prove a connection, because we have to know whether such
instances are more common than in women who do not have
implants. After all, connective tissue disease might well occur
in some people with implants simply by coincidence. Nor can
we rely on animal studies, since animals may differ in relevant
ways from people. Other laboratory studies are also unable to
answer the question of whether breast implants cause con-
nective tissue disease. However, these studies can provide an-
cillary evidence that an association seen in epidemiologic stud-
ies really represents cause and effect. In addition, once a link
between a risk factor and a disease is established, laboratory
studies or studies of individual patients may be necessary to
tell us how the connection works. But they cannot establish the
link in the first place. The only way to get at the answer in the
implant case is by comparison of women with and without im-
plants (in a cohort study) or by comparion of women with and
without connective tissue disease (in a case-control study).
Even though the only way to find out whether breast im-
plants are associated with connective tissue disease is through
observational epidemiologic studies, the first reliable one was
not published until June 16, 1994.° As noted before, this was
over two years after breast implants were taken off the market
and two months after a class-action settlement was negotiated.
Scientific Evidence #® 101
The study, done at the Mayo Clinic and published in the New
England Journal of Medicine, was a retrospective cohort study,
which means that it compared women who had received im-
plants years ago with similar women who had not. The group
with implants consisted of all 749 women living in Olmsted
County, Minnesota (the location of the Mayo Clinic), who
had received breast implants between 1964 and 1991. The
group without implants consisted of 1,498 of their neighbors,
matched for age. (This control group was selected to minimize
confounding variables, such as geographic location or type of
medical care. The two groups were similar to each other, ex-
cept for implants.) The researchers found that the implant
group was no more likely to develop connective tissue disease
(or related symptoms and abnormal blood tests) than the
group without implants. This was not the final word, of course.
It was only one study, and it was not large enough to rule out
some increase in risk. But it was highly important, because it
cast doubt on the whole theory of a link between breast im-
plants and connective tissue disease at a time when many peo-
ple assumed the theory had been proven. Plaintiffs’ attorneys
did not like this message, and immediately began a campaign
to discredit the messengers. More about that later.
At the time the Mayo Clinic study was published, several
other epidemiologic studies were under way. Two were huge,
and targeted all connective tissue diseases and avariety of
other complaints. The largest was a retrospective cohort study
of roughly 400,000 American women in the health profes-
sions, about 11,000 of whom had breast implants. This study,
called the Women’s Health Cohort Study, was published in
early 1996 in the Journal of the American Medical Association.” It
found aslight increase in reports of connective tissue disease
among women with breast implants. Unfortunately, the au-
102 @ SCIENCE ON TRIAL
country.) The disorders did not fall into the usual categories
of connective tissue disease, and so the authors of this paper
termed them “human adjuvant disease,” because they thought
the symptoms resembled a disorder of rats injected with a for-
eign protein combined with an adjuvant (an adjuvant is a sub-
stance that enhances an immune response to something else).
Later, similar cases were reported in American scientific jour-
nals, but these, too, involved direct injections of paraffin or
silicone, not the new gel-filled prostheses.’ It was not until the
1982 Australian publication, mentioned in Chapter 3, that
connective tissue disease was reported in women who had
silicone-gel-filled breast implants.'*
Although some still use the term “human adjuvant dis-
ease,” it has fallen into disrepute, in large part because of the
vagueness and variability of the reported signs and symptoms.
The problem of vague or shifting definitions of disease con-
tinues to plague the study of breast implants. When a study
fails to find an increased risk of certain diseases or symptoms
in women with implants, adherents of the theory that implants
cause disease are quick to suggest that the diseases in question
are different. It is impossible to study whether something
causes illness, however, unless the illness is clearly described.
Otherwise, it cannot be consistently diagnosed and its relation
to breast implants cannot be examined. This sort of situation
is what Karl Popper, the philosopher of science, had in mind
when he said that a scientific hypothesis had to be “falsifiable”
to be meaningful. The hypothesis that breast implants cause
an undefined set of symptoms is neither provable nor falsifi-
able—it is simply an assertion.
The idea that breast augmentation caused connective tis-
sue disease had a superficial plausibility. Since local scarring
is inevitable in women with breast augmentation, particularly
in those who had direct injections, and scarring is also a fea-
Scientific Evidence @ 105
plaintiff has been clearly ill. (In the Stern case, because the
records were sealed as a part of an out-of-court settlement
after the verdict, it is difficult to be certain about the nature
of her medical problems.) The major job of the plaintiff's at-
torney, therefore, has not been to show that the plaintiff is ill,
but to show that the illness was caused by the implants. To do
so requires convincing the jury by a “preponderance of the
evidence.” This is a more relaxed standard than the require-
ment in a criminal case that the verdict be “beyond a reason-
able doubt.” But aside from its relative liberality, the phrase
“preponderance of the evidence” tells us less than it might
seem. It suggests confusingly that there are two kinds of med-
ical evidence—evidence for and evidence against a causal re-
lationship. In practice, this is highly unlikely: either there is
evidence for a relationship or there isn’t. In the absence of
such evidence, the default position must be that there is no
link. The burden of proof is on those who assert the rela-
tionship.
Sometimes the phrase “preponderance of the evidence”
is translated to mean that the jury finds the disease more
likely than not to be caused by the breast implants. Or some-
times the same concept is expressed by saying that the breast
implants contributed more than 50 percent to the causation
of the disease—that is, but for the implants, the disease would
not have developed.” While neither of these alternative for-
mulations is entirely satisfying, they are an improvement over
the vague term “preponderance of the evidence.” Further-
more, they can be translated into epidemiologic terms. If
connective tissue disease in a typical woman with implants is
that
more likely than not to be caused by implants, it follows
in a large population of women, the majority of cases of con-
nective tissue disease would be due to breast implants. In
114 @ SCIENCE ON TRIAL
other words, this cause would have to outweigh all other con-
tributing causes put together. To outweigh all other causes
means that women with implants would have to be at least
twice as likely to develop the disease as women without im-
plants. (As we saw in the preceding chapter, there is no evi-
dence that they do.)
Notice that what is at issue here is not how certain we are
of the effect of implants, but how big the effect is. The degree
of certainty is an entirely different matter. I mention the dis-
tinction, because some legal scholars confuse the concepts of
the size of the effect (as, for example, when it is said that im-
plants contribute more than 50 percent to the disease) with
the degree of confidence we can have that it is true. For a sci-
entific finding to be accepted, it is customary to require a 95
percent probability that it is not due to chance alone (I am
here giving a shorthand version of a much more complicated
statistical concept). Comparing the size of an effect with the
probability that a given finding isn’t due to chance is com-
paring apples and oranges. It would be possible to find a huge
effect with a low degree of certainty, or a tiny effect with a high
degree of certainty. The distinction between the size of an ef-
fect and the probability that a particular finding is not due to
chance is important in debates about science in the court-
room. It is sometimes said that the reason plaintiffs in court
may be awarded damages without good scientific evidence is
that the legal standard is more liberal than the scientific stan-
dard. According to this argument, all the plaintiff has to do is
show preponderance of the evidence, whereas science re-
quires 95 percent confidence about a finding. Not only does
this argument confuse size with certainty, but it also confuses
the whole with the part. The degree of certainty scientists re-
quire refers to the results of a given study, not to a limitless
Science in the Courtroom: Opinions without Evidence ® 115
gestive of it, most of whom felt better after the implants were
removed. In medical practice, it is not unusual for a specialist
who attracts patients with a certain type of problem to gain er-
roneous impressions about its frequency or its association with
other conditions. Without controls and appropriate popula-
tion sampling techniques, it is easy to draw conclusions that
will not stand up to later, more careful epidemiologic analy-
sis. Even a large clinical experience, while possibly suggestive,
cannot substitute for a cohort or case-control study in getting
at whether implants cause disease. The history of medicine is
replete with examples of mistaken “clinical impressions” based
on uncontrolled and often undocumented personal experi-
ence. One of the major advances in modern medicine is the
realization that to be reliable, personal experience must be
supported by rigorous research.
None of Bolton’s witnesses was an epidemiologist. Yet this
is the only kind of specialist who could authoritatively speak
to the issue of a possible link between breast implants and con-
nective tissue disease.
Perhaps the most startling testimony on the other side was
that of Hopkins’s own rheumatologist, Stephen Gospe. Gospe
had definitively diagnosed Hopkins’s mixed connective tissue
disease in 1979, but he believed her symptoms began even be-
fore she received her first set of implants in 1976. Indeed, be-
cause of suggestive symptoms, her internist, Dr. Louis Pelfini,
had in 1975 ordered a test for autoimmune disease, which at
the time was inconclusive. Because her symptoms persisted,
Pelfini sent her to Gospe in 1979. Gospe’s testimony that her
symptoms had begun before her first implants were placed in
1976 might have been expected to undermine the plaintiff's
case. But evidently it didn’t trouble the jurors. On December
13, 1991, the jury awarded Hopkins $7.34 million. Dow Corn-
Science in the Courtroom: Opinions without Evidence @& 123
ing was found guilty of fraud and malice in marketing the im-
plants.'* The evidence included the Dow Corning memo in-
structing salespeople to wash off demonstration implants so
that plastic surgeons would not notice the oiliness of the en-
velope. The Hopkins case reached its climax just as David
Kessler was deciding whether to permit implants to stay on the
market. This timing, nearly everyone agrees, greatly influ-
enced the FDA’s ultimate decision.
Dow Corning (which went out of the implant business a
few months after the Hopkins decision)'*appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Signaling the signifi-
cance of the case, two renowned lawyers joined the fray in the
appeal. Harvard Law School professor Laurence Tribe headed
the Hopkins-Bolton team. Shirley Hufstedler, Jimmy Carter’s
former secretary of education and a former judge of the Ninth
Circuit, joined Frank Woodside III for Dow Corning’s defense.
The defense’s appeal was based on two arguments. The first
concerned the statute of limitations, a technical argument of
interest to lawyers but probably no one else. The second ar-
gument was whether the testimony had established that it was
more probable than not that there was a causal connection be-
tween Hopkins’s breast implants and her mixed connective tis-
sue disease—the second necessary condition for a product li-
ability judgment. The first condition had clearly been met: no
one doubted that Hopkins was sick. But the other two condi-
tions were in contention, and the satisfaction of the third (that
Dow Corning had been negligent or wanton) was contingent
on proving the second (that the implants most likely caused
the mixed connective tissue disease). The appellate court was
asked to consider whether the lower court had adequate evi-
dence for this finding. And in particular, was it correct in re-
lying on the expert testimony Bolton had assembled?
124 @ SCIENCE ON TRIAL
men [sic] have said upon such matters, or in respect to the gen-
eral teachings of science thereon, or to permit books of sci-
ence to be offered in evidence.” The message, then, was not
to delve into something as arcane as scientific evidence. What-
ever a qualified witness said was okay.
This decision pretty much settled the issue until a federal
trials court in 1923 reached the polar opposite conclusion in
Frye v. United States. In Frye, the issue in contention was whether
a “lie detector test” (which in those days was simply a blood
pressure reading) would be admitted as evidence. The court
refused to admit it, on the grounds that there was not yeta sci-
entific consensus about the validity of this new method. Far
from agreeing with the Supreme Court that experts needn’t
take into account the work of other scientists, the Frye court
said that testimony must speak to the work of others—that is,
it was admissible only if it incorporated principles and meth-
ods generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.
The Court of Appeals agreed. Thus was born the “general ac-
ceptance” standard for expert testimony, a subject of intense
legal debate for the next 70 years. This standard had the ef-
fect of excluding a good deal of what has become known as
“junk science”—patently absurd testimony by zealots, incom-
petents, or opportunists. But the Frye standard was by no
means accepted in all courts. Its opponents claimed, some-
what improbably, that it would tend to exclude novel, far-
sighted testimony by modern-day Galileos.'* There is no
record of this happening once, let alone often. Furthermore,
even if a modern-day Galileo did not make it into court at first,
that fact would not stop him from prevailing in the scientific
community. Courts do not determine scientific acceptance, as
implied by the argument that we need to keep our courts
open to the hidden Galileos in our midst.
Science in the Courtroom: Opinions without Evidence ® 127
case was passed back to the appeals court to hear again under
those rules. The Supreme Court made no attempt to decide
whether Bendectin caused birth defects, only what the stan-
dards for the admissibility of expert evidence should be. But
the Court also devoted considerable attention to elucidating
the meaning of those standards and how they were to be ap-
plied, thus finally dealing with the issue of what constitutes
good science. A large number of interested individuals and or-
ganizations, including the New England Journal of Medicine,
were aware of the enormous impact the Daubert decision might
have. The Court was therefore flooded with amici briefs on
both sides. These revealed interesting schisms within the sci-
entific community. Many favored the Frye standard (as did
we), because they felt it would reduce the amount of junk sci-
ence finding its way to the courts. We argued that testimony
should be based on research that had been duly published in
peer-reviewed journals. But equally reputable scientists came
down on the other side, because they felt the “general accep-
tance” criterion was too restrictive and elitist. And many
lawyers also opposed the Frye standard because they believed
it would preempt the responsibility of juries to decide the
facts. :
In the end both sides in the Daubert case claimed victory—
or defeat, depending on whether one is inclined to see the
glass as half full or half empty. The Supreme Court said that
while the Federal Rules applied, this did not mean that all ex-
pert testimony would be admissible. Far from it. Federal judges
are now required to undertake “a preliminary assessment of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testi-
mony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the fact in issue.”
Thus, judges are to be the gatekeepers who decide whether
130 @ SCIENCE ON TRIAL
could make the most from the least. His tactic was to glide over
the issue of whether Johnson was sick, and concentrate instead
on her concern that she might get sick. He also seized every
opportunity to shift the jury’s focus from Johnson to all the
other women with breast implants. He suggested that Johnson
was somehow a proxy for these other women, all of whom
shared fears engendered by the implants—certainly a self-
fulfilling prophecy, if ever there was one.
Johnson had breast implants for augmentation in 1976,
the year implants came under the purview of the FDA. At the
time she was twenty-nine years old. The implants were made
by Medical Engineering Corporation (MEC), later a sub-
sidiary of Bristol-Myers Squibb. Johnson was apparently fine
until 13 years later, when her breasts became hard. She went
to see her plastic surgeon, Philip Rothenberg, who performed
a closed capsulotomy to break up the scar tissue—despite the
fact that the package inserts had for six years (during which
Rothenberg performed many implantations) warned that this
procedure was known to carry a high risk of rupture. Within
a few days, her left breast was swollen and painful. Rothenberg
operated, and found, not surprisingly, that her left implant
had ruptured. According to the testimony in the trial, Rothen-
berg found it so difficult to clean out the spilled silicone gel
that he had to do a partial mastectomy. He then put in an-
other set of implants, also made by MEC. Unhappy with the
appearance of her breasts, Johnson consulted another plas-
tic surgeon, Fabian Worthing, who replaced her implants with
a pair made by another manufacturer. Three years later, in
1992 (the year of the FDA ban), she returned to Worthing
complaining of fatigue and other vague symptoms that she
said doctors had attributed to the implants. Worthing re-
moved them.
O’Quinn had a weak case. Everything depended on cre-
136 @ SCIENCE ON TRIAL
pointed out that the Mayo Clinic research was partially funded
by the American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Sur-
geons’ Educational Foundation, which in turn received funds
from Dow Corning and other breast implant manufacturers.
According to the plaintiffs’ attorneys, this automatically dis-
qualified the study from serious consideration.
A few plaintiffs’ attorneys went so far as to imply that I had
for some reason colluded with the implant manufacturers to
delay publication of the Mayo Clinic study until precisely the
opt-out week.'* The ostensible purpose was to dissuade women
from opting out of the class-action settlement and hiring their
own attorneys. According to this reasoning, if there was evi-
dence casting doubt on a link between implants and connec-
tive tissue disease, women might not do as well in court as they
expected. They might decide it was better just to stay in the
class settlement. When Ifirst heard this accusation, I was puz-
zled. Assuming for the moment I was captive to the breast im-
plant manufacturers, why would I wait until the last minute to
publish the Mayo Clinic study? Wouldn’t I want to publish it
as soon as possible so that even fewer women would opt out?
The answer, according to reporters who had spoken with
plaintiffs’ attorneys; was that by waiting I would sow confusion
in the minds of undecided women, but do so when they no
longer had time to check with their attorneys (who presum-
ably would have straightened them out by assuring them the
Mayo Clinic study was invalid). Aside from the irrationality of
the theory, it ignored the fact that Dr. Sherine Gabriel, first
author of the study, had already presented her findings at a
meeting the previous fall.'° It also overlooked the fact that the
alleged plot would have required the collusion of the other
editors at the New England Journal of Medicine, including the
editor-in-chief. What was clear was that the plaintiffs’ attorneys
144 @8 SCIENCE ON TRIAL
the most deadly diseases. If readers will only follow the au-
thor’s regimen, which usually has to do with exercising the au-
thority of the mind over the body, they are assured of a long,
healthy life. Some authors, of course, proudly claim that their
regimens are resisted or suppressed by the “medical estab-
lishment,” thereby tapping into the cynicism that is so im-
portant in promoting these books. In addition, of course, the
whole notion that each of us can somehow ward off disease
and death more or less indefinitely is enormously appealing
to our wish for more control in our lives.*
The breast implant story contains all the elements guar-
anteed to generate public ferment and misunderstanding.
Big business is accused of selling a dangerous product to its
customers and covering up proof of the danger. The FDA in-
explicably sits on its hands for 16 years. The diseases caused
by implants are deadly, but very subtle. There is no sure test
for them. The disorders may be different from classic con-
nective tissue disease, but then again they may not be. Only
certain people can diagnose the diseases for sure. The med-
ical profession is suppressing the truth, but gallant individu-
als—plaintiffs’ attorneys, consumer advocates, and a few may-
erick scientists—are forcing it out. Adding to the mix is a
strong anti-science mood among many Americans.* Perhaps
the mood is a reaction to the exalted intellectual status scien-
tists enjoyed for several decades after World War II. Whatever
the reason, a growing number of Americans view scientists as
Just one more group of elitists and the scientific establishment
as no more to be trusted than any other establishment. This
view is particularly pronounced among a small segment of
the feminist movement.
Given all the social forces at work in the breast implant
controversy—the desperate competition within the media for
Americans and Health News: The Alarm of the Day #® 161
may lower the chances of getting the disease, but not elimi-
nate the risk altogether. There is plenty of evidence that many
chronic diseases are influenced by environmental as well as ge-
netic factors. For example, heart disease is far more common
in the United States than it is in Japan. At first glance, this fact
may seem to suggest a genetic cause. But Hawaiians of Japa-
nese descent have a risk intermediate between that of the
Japanese and that of white Americans. Furthermore, the risk
in the United States is declining at a rate too fast to ascribe to
genetic changes.’ The inescapable conclusion is that there
are features of the two cultures—not genes—that underlie
much of the differences in incidence. Clearly, the way we live
and the things we eat, drink, and breathe matter.
Americans want very much to know what the risk factors
are for heart disease and cancer and Alzheimer’s disease and
birth defects, and all the other more or less mysterious dis-
eases that threaten our health. We are particularly avid for
news of medical research that focuses on diet and lifestyle.
After all, we can do something about that. If something we
eat or do is a threat or a benefit, we want to know so that we
can change our lives accordingly. This emphasis has become
so extreme that for many Americans good health is largely a
matter of living right. No one gets sick anymore just because
of bad luck or factors beyond our control. Instead, we feel we
can ward off many if not most diseases and illnesses simply by
knowing what foods to eat, what supplements to consume,
and what leisure activities to pursue. This belief is fed by the
new emphasis on preventive medicine as a solution to rising
costs in health care. We are responsible for our own health.
Millions now eat low-fat, high-fiber diets, take antioxidant vi-
tamin supplements, drink alcohol only in moderation, stay
slim, and exercise regularly. And in some respects the efforts
Americans and Health News: The Alarm of the Day #® 163
strong. If you drink wine, you could wreck your liver but lower
your bad cholesterol.” There is no answer for this lament. Na-
ture simply did not set out to make things uniformly good or
uniformly bad for us. They are what they are. But the situation
underscores another important problem in reporting health
news. Media stories about a research study that focused on jog-
ging and osteoporosis (Goodman’s “brittle bones”) too often
reported the results in isolation. In reality, almost any food or
activity that affects health in one way also affects it in others. It
is a disservice to the public not to try to put stories about single
research studies in their larger context. People feel whipsawed
by science. when they are really being whipsawed by the media.
As the recent epidemiologic studies of breast implants
and the diseases they are said to cause have been reported in
the scientific literature, how have the media responded? By
and large, very well. Since the studies have been so consistent,
there has been little necessity to deal with contradictions. The
limitations in the strength of the findings caused by the size
of the studies have been appropriately mentioned, as were the
flaws in the one study that found alink. Failure to find a dif-
ference between women with and without implants does not
mean that there is no difference. The smaller the study, the
more likely that a real difference will be missed. This fact is
usually expressed by a “confidence interval,” that is, a range
of possible risks that is compatible with the evidence. In the
Mayo Clinic study, for example, the relative risk for the dis-
eases studied in women with breast implants was 1.0. This
meant that compared with women without breast implants,
those with implants were no more or less likely to develop the
diseases in question. But because there were only 749 women
with breast implants in the study, it was 95 percent possible
that the relative risk was anywhere from 0.5 to 3.0. The closer
Americans and Health News: The Alarm of the Day #® 175
in the body, and many women who have implants get sick.
When scientific data are put up against their own “ways of
knowing,” some women ignore the science. Add to this anti-
science bias the view of many women that breast implants are
a manifestation of a discredited, masculine attitude that judges
women primarily by their looks, and it is no wonder that some
feminists believe breast implants cause disease. They want to
believe it.
Note that the various elements of the anti-science move-
ment have somewhat distinct grievances. Some, such as the
radical environmentalists, are reacting primarily against the
uses to which science is put. Others, like the academic hu-
manists, are reacting against what they see as the exaggerated
status of science. And many, like the anti-science feminists
and the multiculturalists, are rejecting the scientific method.
indeed, indulge our fascination with the mystical and the oc-
cult? In my view, the disdain for science has enormous impli-
cations that reverberate far beyond the answer to any one of
these questions. Throwing over science means throwing over
an attachment to evidence. Viewing science as just one possi-
ble “way of knowing,” amounting to little more than the cus-
toms of a white men’s club, has the same result. The scientific
method was not put together and then applied to questions
of nature, or, as Harding would have it, forced on nature. It
evolved painfully over many years, through trial and error, be-
cause it was the only method that worked. It had to be what it
is. Contrary to Harding, nature forced itself on those who
would study it, not the reverse. Science is the only way to reach
conclusions about the physical world, including the human
body. Try predicting the time and place of the next solar
eclipse without it, or the sex of a baby before it is born. As
Robert Park, professor of physics at the University of Maryland,
said, “Science is the only means we have to sort out the truth
from ideology or fraud or mere foolishness.”'’ It is therefore
dismaying to scientists to find that many Americans not only
do not understand science, but they don’t want to understand
it and they don’t think it’s necessary that they do.
Anti-science feminism is particularly difficult for me, as a
feminist, to accept. After years of women fighting for entry to
the world of science, it is ironic that some of them would turn
away now. Women should not permit themselves to be ex-
cluded from science, much less abandon the field. We should
instead work to bring women into science at the main point
of exclusion—the earliest years of grade school and even be-
fore. Girls receive strong social messages that science and
math are boy subjects; English and the social sciences are girl
subjects. As a woman who herself bucked this attitude (I re-
Breast Implants and the Rejection of Science @ 189
AND WHAT ABOUT the scientific evidence? So far, several good epi-
demiologic studies have failed to show an association between
196 @ SCIENCE ON TRIAL
disease. For any one woman among the 12, then, we could not
say that but for the implants, she would not have developed
the disease. Further, we would have to say that some other fac-
tor or group of factors was the dominant cause.
Now let’s assume that the relative risk turns out to be 2.1
instead of 1.2 (although the present epidemiologic evidence
indicates this level of risk would be extremely unlikely). What
would that mean? For every 10 women without implants who
develop connective tissue disease, 21 women with implants
will develop it. Implants would therefore be more important
than all other causes put together, since the relative risk would
be more than double the background level. As in the exam-
ple of a relative risk of 1.2, with a relative risk of 2.1 we would
have no way of knowing the precise contribution of implants
to connective tissue disease in each particular woman. They
could be the sole cause in 11 and play no role in 10, or they
could play a varying role in all of them. But we would know
that, on average, they were the dominant cause, and so for any
one woman, we could say that she would probably not have
developed the disease if she had not received implants.
In fact, however, the epidemiologic studies to date have
not found a relative.risk of 2.1 and only one study—the largest,
but likely to be biased because it was based on what women
with implants said about their health after the FDA ban—has
found a risk as high as 1.2. The best evidence now isa relative
risk of 1.0, indicating no contribution of implants to disease.
I assumed relative risks of 1.2 and 2.1 to illustrate a point—
that is, that moving from a focus on the average results in a
group of women to a focus on a particular woman is difficult.
Nevertheless, unless we know something about individual sus-
ceptibilities, using the average as a proxy for the particular is
the best we can do. And, from ascientific and logical per-
198 @ SCIENCE ON TRIAL
shift was pervasive, and it made the job of the plaintiffs’ at-
torneys much easier.
Another shift taking place was in the nature of the harms
being attributed to breast implants. I have already discussed
the change in concerns from cancer to autoimmune or con-
nective tissue disease, and then to “non-classic” disease.!* As
the diseases became vaguer and harder to define, it became
increasingly difficult to study their association with implants.
Doctors who make their living diagnosing implant-related dis-
eases and the lawyers who pay them have every reason to pos-
tulate increasingly obscure syndromes, as the well-defined
ones come under scientific scrutiny. To them, the best diseases
are those that can’t be defined, because they can’t be studied
systematically. A more reasonable shift was taking place at the
FDA. The agency was changing its major focus from systemic
diseases to local complications of implants. Kessler told Con-
gress in August 1995, “We now have, for the first time, a rea-
sonable assurance that silicone-gel implants do not cause a
large increase in traditional connective-tissue disease in
women.”!? He was now concerned primarily with the local
complications—contractures, leakage, rupture, and problems
with mammography. In justifying the continuation of the ban,
he rightly pointed out that just as we didn’t know the risk of
systemic complications, we also didn’t know the incidence of
local ones. Fortunately, this was an easier matter to study than
an ever-shifting constellation of nonspecific symptoms.
And who should do the research? When the FDA banned
breast implants, it was because the manufacturers had not ful-
filled their obligation to produce evidence of safety. One way
for a company to do this is to fund research done by scientists
in established research institutions. In the case of breast im-
plants, in particular, outside research is necessary, since
200 # SCIENCE ON TRIAL
least, they should be much smaller than they are and perhaps
restricted to clients who cannot afforda set fee.
The use of juries for tort cases is also problematic. Deci-
sions by judges would almost certainly be sounder than those
made by juries, because judges are educated to be dispas-
sionate and to evaluate evidence. Many tort cases involve ex-
pert witnesses, who speak to fairly technical matters. To eval-
uate whether a product has caused a disease is difficult for
nearly anyone. For a jury it is especially difficult, because its
members usually have no competence in the area. They are
often left to make judgments largely on the basis of the emo-
tional appeals of the lawyers and their expert witnesses. Judges,
too, may have no competence in the technical area, but they
are much more resistant to lawyers’ emotional appeals than
juries usually are, and they can learn how to approach scien-
tific questions—as, indeed, they are required to do by the
Supreme Court in the Daubert decision (discussed in Chapter
6). The growing size of jury awards, especially punitive dam-
ages, also is problematic. Although judges often reduce the
size of the damages after the verdict, large awards still create
strong inflationary pressures. Other countries do not have
jury trials for civil cases, and we should consider eliminating
them for tort cases.
Other needed legal reforms should include some atten-
tion to the growing abuse of class actions as windfalls for at-
torneys. In addition, we should probably review the laws that
permit suppliers of biomaterials to be sued for damages
caused by products they had no part in designing or testing.
Addressing these problems is important. But even more im-
portant, in my judgment, is to reform the way science is han-
dled in the courtroom. If it were not for the nearly total lack
of scientific standards in the breast implant cases, even a badly
Where We Stand...and for How Long #® 205
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NOTES
10. The first epidemiologic study of the possible link between breast
implants and connective tissue disease was S. E. Gabriel et al., “Risk
of Connective-Tissue Diseases and Other Disorders after Breast Im-
plantation,” New England Journal of Medicine, 330 (1994):1697-1702.
2: Breast Implants
5. See N. Wolf, The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty Are Used against
Women (New York: William Morrow, 1991).
5. The Stern verdict went out on the UPI wire on November 5, 1984,
but was not widely reported in the general press. The case was re-
visited in 1992 by U. Thomas, “Woman’s Breast Implant Suit Started
the Dominoes,” Idaho Statesman, March 14, 1992.
218 @& Notes
6. Dan Bolton’s trip to Midland, Michigan, and the details about how
and why the Dow Corning documents were sealed are recounted in
A. Frankel, “From Pioneers to Profits,” American Lawyer, June 1992:82.
7. Anderson first met Bolton at the November 1988 hearings, which
Anderson chaired and where Bolton testified. See A. Frankel, “From
Pioneers to Profits,” American Lawyer, June 1992:82. See also P. Hilts,
“Breast Implant Maker Accused on Data,” New York Times, Decem-
ber'21, 19910 pS:
17. See W. Carlsen, “Jury Awards $7.3 Million in Implant Case,” San
Francisco Chronicle, December 14, 1991, p. A13.
20. Anderson and Bolton both tried to pressure the FDA to remove
implants from the market. Their efforts are noted in A. Frankel,
“From Pioneers to Profits,” American Lawyer, June 1992:82; also in M.
Gordon, “FDA Said to Have Reversed Policy after Seeing Secret Doc-
uments,” AP, April 20, 1994.
24. See Dow Corning’s package insert for the Silastic MSI mammary
implant, p. 8 (1991).
25. The 800 pages of documents are available, for a fee, from Dow
Corning.
26. See T. M. Burton, “Dow Corning Employees Falsified Data on
Breast Implants, Counsel Concludes,” Wall Street Journal, November
3, 1992, p. A3. Also B. Rensberger, “Breast Implant Records Were
‘Faked.’ ” Washington Post, November 3, 1992, p. A3.
27. Dow Corning pulled out of the implant business in March 1992.
See E. Neuffer, “Maker Quits Implant Market,” Boston Globe, March
March 1992, p. 1.
28. Mentor began its controlled study of implants in 1992. See
“Silicone-Gel Breast Implants Resume with Restrictions,” Boston Globe,
November 4, 1992. Also U.S. Food and Drug Administration, “Breast
Implants: An Information Update,” June 1994 (rev. October 1994),
Rockville, Md., p. 14.
29. The FDA announced the requirements for saline-filled implant
PMAs in the Federal Register, January 8, 1993:3436-43. The regulatory
Notes @ 221
39. See Jenny Jones transcript, March 30, 1992, available from Bur-
relle’s Information Services.
40. See N. Wolf, The Beauty Myth: How Images ofBeauty Are Used against
Women (New York: William Morrow, 1991), p. 245.
Launches Aggressive Drive for Clients,” New Jersey Law Journal, April
13, 1992:1;
10. For information about the number of tort cases, see Facts and
Trends (a publication of the RAND Institute for Civil Justice), 3,
no. 3 (spring 1995).
11. This modest growth, according to RAND (see note 10), is about
3 percent ayear for state courts. In the federal courts, civil filings de-
clined from 1985 to 1992, but began to increase once again in 1992.
12. See Facts and Trends, 3, no. 3 (spring 1995). Also E. C. Bassett,
“The Litigation Explosion,” Journal of the Massachusetis Academy of
Tnal Attorneys, 2, no. 4 (1995):16. Also D.J. Murphy, “When State
Judges Are Elected,” Investor’s Business Daily, November 7, 1994,
p. Al.
13. The increase in mass personal injury claims since 1980 is docu-
mented in D. Hensler and M. Peterson, “Understanding Mass Per-
sonal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis,” Brooklyn Law Review,
59, no. 3 (1993):961—1063.
14. For more on trends in the use of punitive damage awards, see
“Punitive Damages,” Facts and Trends, 3, no. 3 (spring 1995).
15. Estimates of the increased total costs of the tort system between
1980 and 1990 come from D. J. Murphy, “When State Judges Are
Elected,” Investor’s Business Daily, November 7, 1994, p. Al. The
source cited by Murphy is Tillinghast, the insurance consulting unit
of Towers Perrin.
224 | Notes
16. The number of lawyers in the United States comes from the
American Bar Association (personal communication). The 1980
(542,205) and 1991 (805,872) statistics are from The Lawyer Statis-
tical Report: The U.S. Legal Profession in the 1990s, published by the
American Bar Foundation. This source projected the lawyer pop-
ulation in 1995 to be 896,172. The ABA derived its own 1995 esti-
mate of 896,140 from reports of licensing authorities in the 50
states.
17. See “Record $25 Million Awarded in Silicone Gel Implants Case,”
New York Times, December 24, 1992, p. A13.
18. The jury was informed of Dow Corning’s value ($948 million)
and instructed to keep it in mind when awarding punitive damages
in the Hopkins case, according to Dow Corning’s Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari (note 4 on pp. 7-8).
19. See P. Brimelow and L. Spencer, “The Plaintiff Attorneys’ Great
Honey Rush,” Forbes, October 16, 1989:197.
20. For more information about how the U.S. tort system differs
from other countries’ systems, see M. A. Glendon, A Nation under
Lawyers (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1994), p. 54.
23. For information about the history of DES in the courts, see
D. Hensler and M. Peterson, “Understanding Mass Personal
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis,” Brooklyn Law Review, 59, no. 3
(1993) :961-1063 [981-82].
Notes @ 225
28. See M. Purdy, “New York Girding for Surge in Suits over Lead
Damage,” New York Times, August 14, 1995, p. Al.
29. The effect of bankruptcy on litigation involving corporations
like Johns-Manville and A. H. Robins received new attention after
Dow Corning filed for bankruptcy. See S. Walsh, “Plaintiffs May Have
Years to Wait in Implant Cases,” Washington Post, May 16, 1995, p. A6;
also S. Labaton, “Don’t Sue, They Say. We Went Bankrupt,” New
York Times, May 21, 1995, p. E16. For more information about this,
see D. Hensler and M. Peterson, “Understanding Mass Personal
Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis,” Brooklyn Law Review, 59,
no. 3 (1993) :961—1063.
30. The increase in the use of class actions asa litigation tool start-
ing in the 1970s is detailed in D. Hensler and M. Peterson, “Under-
standing Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis,”
Brooklyn Law Review, 59, no. 3 (1993):961-1063. Also recapped in
RAND Institute for Civil Justice Research Brief, January 1995.
226 @ Notes
34. See The Manual for Complex Litigation, 3rd ed. (St. Paul, Minn.:
Federal Judicial Center/West Publications, 1995).
36. For more on Chesley and the genesis of the breast implant set-
tlement, see H. Weinstein, “When Law, Tragedy Intersect,” Los An-
geles Times, March 26, 1994, p. Al. See also B. Wiser, “Feud in Implant
Settlement Stirs Debate over Tactics,” Washington Post, May 11, 1994,
p- D1; A. Frankel, “Et tu, Stan?” American Lawyer, January/February
1994:68; and A. Blum, “Questions Raised on Class Action; Breast Im-
plants,” National Law Journal, March 30, 1992: 3.
38. For complete details of the original settlement, see the “Settle-
ment Notice,” which Judge Sam Pointer’s office sent with registra-
tion information to women with breast implants (“Proposed Breast
Implant Litigation Settlement,” U.S. District Court, Northern District
of Alabama).
Notes ® 227
41. Bolton is quoted in “California Class Action Filed over Penile Im-
plants,” Liability Week, 22, no. 9 (May 31, 1994).
44. The feature of American law that allows people to make claims
against any party involved in an allegedly harmful product is dis-
cussed by R. F. Service, “Liability Concerns Threaten Verdict in Im-
plant Research,” Science, 266, no. 5186 (1994) :726-27.
5: Scientific Evidence
1. For more information about the design and analysis of studies, see
C. H. Hennekens, J. E. Buring, and S. L. Mayrent (eds.), Epidemiol-
ogy in Medicine (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 244—46.
15. The dog studies described here were the subject of wide-
spread speculation when Dow Corning released 800 pages of
internal documents in 1992. For example, see the transcript of
ABC’s Primetime Live for February 13, 1992, available from Nexis.
See also A. Frankel, “From Pioneers to Profits,” American Lawyer,
June 1992:82.
16. See N. Kossovsky, “Immunology of Silicone Breast Implants,”
Journal of Biomaterials Applications, 8 (1994):237-46. Also N.
Kossovsky, “Surface Dependent Antigens Identified by High
Binding Avidity of Serum Antibodies in a Subpopulation of
Patients with Breast Implants,” Journal of Applied Biomaterials,
4 (1993) :281-88.
17. See M. Lappé, “Silicone-Reactive Disorder: A New Autoimmune
Disease Caused by Immunostimulation and Superantigens,” Medical
Hypotheses, 41 (1993) :348-52.
9. See M. Lappé, Chemical Deception: The Toxic Threat to Health and the
Environment (San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1991).
12. For Vasey’s position, see his book, F. B. Vasey and J. Feldstein,
The Silicone Breast Implant Controversy: What Women Need to Know (Free-
dom, Calif.: Crossing Press, 1993).
14. Dow Corning announced it was pulling out of the breast implant
market in March 1992. See E. Neuffer, “Maker Quits Implant Mar-
ket,” Boston Globe, March 20, 1992, p. 1.
15. See the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
9th Circuit, August 26, 1994 (Mariann Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp.
33F.3d 1116 1994).
Notes @ 233
16. The U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal to review the Hopkins case re-
ceived widespread attention. See, for example, R. Carelli, “Justices
Uphold Breast Implant Award,” Boston Globe, January 10, 1995, p. 6.
17. For an account of the history of science in the courtroom, in-
cluding Fryeand the Federal Rules of Evidence, see L. Loevinger, “Sci-
ence as Evidence,” Jurimetrics Journal, winter 1995:153-90.
18. For more on the debate, see S. Begley, “The Meaning of Junk,”
Newsweek, March 22, 1993, and D. Freedman, “Who’s to Judge? New
Guidelines for Scientific Evidence,” Discover, 15, no. 1 (1994):78.
19. Details of the Daubert case come primarily from the Supreme
Court’s decision (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, No. 92-102,
June 28, 1993, 113 S Ct 2768 1993) and “Brief of the New England
Journal of Medicine, Journal of the American Medical Association,
and Annals of Internal Medicine of Amicus Curiae in Support of Re-
spondent” (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, No. 92-102), Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler (New York), January 19, 1993.
21. The 9th Circuit’s decision in the Bendectin appeal was written
by Judge Alex Kozinski. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, No.
90-55397, January 4, 1995. The decision received widespread atten-
tion in the popular and scientific press. See, for example, “Birth-
Defect Lawsuit that Set Science Standard Is Dismissed,” New York
Times, January 8, 1995, p. 19, and M. Barinaga, “Bendectin Case Dis-
missed,” Science, 267 (January 13, 1995):167.
1. The going rate for expert witnesses is $300-$600 per hour, ac-
cording to “Breast Implant Expert Witnesses Can Find Themselves
234 @ Notes
5. O’Quinn himself talked about the tactic of suing the doctor and
then dropping the suit in “State the Case Simply by Starting with Voir
Dire,” National Law Journal, February 8, 1993:S10. The tactic is also
discussed in T. Moran, “Battle Scars: For Plastic Surgeons, Psycho-
logical Effects Linger from Silicone Breast Implant Controversy,”
Texas Medicine, 91, no. 1 (1995):30-34.
12. O’Quinn’s 2,000-plus breast implant clients are often cited in the
media. See G. Kolata, “Legal System and Science Come to Differing
Conclusions on Silicone,” New York Times, May 16, 1995, p. D6. See
also M. McKee, “Deadline Looms for Implant Makers,” The Recorder,
September 9, 1994, p. 1, and C. Palmeri, “A Texas Gunslinger,”
Forbes, July 3, 1995:42—45.
13. See O’Quinn’s comments in C. Palmeri, “A Texas Gunslinger,”
Forbes, July 3, 1995:42—45.
14. Information from Richard Laminack about the number of cases
settled out of court (500) and the percentage referred by other
lawyers (70 percent) comes from C. Palmeri, “A Texas Gunslinger,”
Forbes, July 3, 1995:42-45.
15. O’Quinn’s average out-of-court settlement is noted in J. Nocera,
“Fatal Litigation” (Part 2), Fortune, October 23, 1995:138.
17. “State the Case Simply by Starting with Voir Dire,” National Law
Journal, February 8, 1993:S-10.
21. See “About 14,700 Women Leave Implant Deal,” Wall Street Jowr-
nal, July 25, 1994, p. B4. See also B. Sapino, “Houston Threatens
$4.25B Implant Deal,” Texas Lawyer, August 1, 1994, p. 1.
27. For more on physicians’ roles, see G. Kolata and B. Meier, “Im-
plant Lawsuits Create a Medical Rush to Cash In,” New York Times,
September 18, 1995, p. Al.
Notes @ 237
29. For more on Lewy’s practice and income, see G. Kolata and B.
Meier, “Implant Lawsuits Create a Medical Rush to Cash In,” New York
Times, September 18, 1995, p. Al.
31. This CNN report, Fire and Fury, Part 4: “The Merchants of Fear,”
was broadcast on October 16, 1994.
32. See “Breast Implant Witnesses Can Find Themselves Facing Con-
flicts of Interest,” Medical-Legal Aspects of Breast Implants, 3, no. 5
(April 1995):8.
33. For details about Nir Kossovsky’s company, SBI Laboratories, see
G. Taubes, “Silicone in the System,” Discover, December 1995:65-75.
17. See “Diet Roulette,” New York Times, May 20, 1994, p. A26.
25. The original group of authors revisited and revised their findings
in 1986. See C.-C. Hsieh et al., “Coffee and Pancreatic Cancer (Chap-
ter 2),” New England Journal ofMedicine, 315 (1986):587-89. This cor-
rection was not as widely reported as the 1981 study. Typical treat-
Notes @ 241
29. Rates for 10-year risk of death from cardiovascular disease come
fromJ. Pekkanen et al., “Ten-Year Mortality from Cardiovascular Dis-
ease in Relation to Cholesterol Level among Men with and without
Preexisting Cardiovascular Disease,” New England Journal ofMedicine,
322 (1990):1700-7.
30. For general arguments about risk see R. L. Keeney, “Decisions
about Life-Threatening Risks,” New England Journal of Medicine, 331
(1994) :193-96. Also P. E. Ross, “Lies, Damned Lies and Medical Sta-
tistics,” Forbes, August 14, 1995:130-35.
14. For a discussion of daytime talk shows and the paranormal, see
C. E. Emery, “Tales from the TV Talk Shows,” Skeptical Inquirer, 19,
no. 3 (May/June 1995) :12-13.
13. See Dr. Kessler’s August 1, 1995, testimony before the Subcom-
mittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight of the U.S. House
of Representatives.
Notes @ 245
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(continued from front flap)
to show that there is no significant link
between breast implants and disease.
Why were the courts and the public
so certain that breast implants were
dangerous when medical researchers
were not? The answer to this question
reveals important differences in the
way science, the law, and the public
regard evidence—and not just in the
breast-implant controversy. As our
society becomes ever more dependent,
at all levels, on science and technology,
misconceptions about scientific evi-
dence become an increasing danger to
the public good—with consequences
that extend far beyond the question
of whether silicone gel-filled breast
implants are safe.
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ad
“Marcia Angell’s outstanding book explains clearly and fairly the combination of
greed, fear, ignorance, junk science, and media hype that created this national
litigation nightmare. Everyone interested in the tort system, science, and medi-
cine should heed the lessons that Dr. Angell teaches.”
—Shirley M. Hufstedler, former U.S. Secretary of Education and
former judge in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit
“The breast implant case is short on heroes and long on overweening greed.
Science on Trial dishes out stinging criticism to the legal, medical, and journalis-
tic professions. Above all, it makes a forceful case for adhering to the standard of
science in judging questions about the material world, a plea whose importance
extends far beyond the case of breast implants. With so much emotion and
money at stake in the breast implant controversy, the book will surely enrage
some readers. Many more will be enlightened by it.”
—Harvey V. Fineberg, M.D., Ph.D., dean of Harvard School of Public Health
“Part scientific detective story, part cultural commentary, Marcia Angell’s Science
on Trial follows the evidence about breast implants’ risks to women’s health to a
surprising and searing conclusion: the legal system supported massive settle-
ments against manufacturers despite the absence of reliable scientific evidence
of harm. This is a cautionary tale for anyone concerned about the relationship
between truth and justice.” — Martha Minow, professor, Harvard Law School
Paw :