04 - de Borja V Vda. de Borja
04 - de Borja V Vda. de Borja
04 - de Borja V Vda. de Borja
2. In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator. In 1952, their son, Jose
de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, Jose became the sole
administrator of the testate estate of his mother (Josefa Tangco).
3. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana
Ongsingco (Vda. De Borja). Upon Francisco’s death, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings wherein
she was appointed special administratrix.
4. The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been
plagued with several court suits and counter-suits. To put an end to all these litigations, a
compromise agreement in 1963 was entered by and between Jose (the heir and son of Francisco
de Borja by his first marriage, personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa
Tangco) and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja (the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja
by his second marriage).
5. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Jose agreed and obligated himself to pay Tasiana the
amount of Php800,000.00 as ”full and complete payment and settlement of her hereditary share in
the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa, and to any properties
bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by
Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.”
6. Jose submitted the compromise agreement for Court approval with the CFI of Rizal (probate of
will of first wife - Case No. L-28611) and the CFI of Nueva Ecija (probate of will of Francisco - Case
No. L-28568) but Tasiana opposed in both instances.
7. The genuineness and due execution of the compromise agreement of 12 October 1963 is not
disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the
heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja;
(2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja
and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the compromise agreement entered by Francisco and Tasiana is valid
[YES].
RATIONALE:
In assailing the validity of the agreement, Tasiana relies on this Court’s decision in Guevara v.
Guevara wherein the Court held the view that presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and
that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a
will, is against the law and public policy. However, the doctrine in said case is not applicable to the
case at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or to distribute the estate of Francisco among the
heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the
conveyance by Tasiana of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the
estate of Francisco and Josefa. Since a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of such predecessor in interest, there is no legal
bar to a successor disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the
actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of
course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the
vendor heir.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case
No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are
reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3)
cases.
Notes:
1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; HEREDITARY SHARE IN ESTATE VESTS FROM THE MOMENT OF
DEATH OF DECEDENT; SHARE IMMEDIATELY DISPOSABLE. — The hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is
transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of the causante or predecessor in interest (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Art. 777, [3], and there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity)
disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. The effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what
is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir, but the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the
transaction.
2. ID.; ID.: PRESENTATION OF WILL FOR PROBATE NOT NEEDED IN CONVEYANCE BY HEIR OF HER
SHARE. — The doctrine enunciated in Guevara v. Guevara (74 Phil. 749) which states that the presentation of a will
for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the
decedent left a will is against the law and public policy, is not applicable to the cases at bar where there was no
attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco De Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will,
the clear object of the compromise contract between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja being
merely the conveyance by the latter of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estates
of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPROMISE CONTRACT BINDING ON PARTIES EVEN IF WITHOUT PROBATE COURT
APPROVAL. — Since the compromise contract was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally and as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving
spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja," it is clear that the
transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without
previous authority of the court to enter into the same.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EXTRAJUDICIAL COMPROMISE AND ONE APPROVED BY THE
COURT. — The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the
court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID., EFFECT OF CONTRACT ON PERSON NOT PARTY THERETO, INSTANT CASE. — The
resolutory period of 60 days, allegedly intended to limit the effectiveness of the compromise agreement between
Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja, but which was embodied in another agreement between Ongsingco and the
brothers and sisters of De Borja, does not have any validity as far as De Borja is concerned since De Borja was not a
party to the second agreement.
7. ID.; ID.; HEREDITARY SHARE CAN BE SOLD TO A CO-HEIR. — The owner of the undivided hereditary share
could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever such owner chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided
for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code: "Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale by the vendor." If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir
could not be forbidden.
8. ID.: CONTRACTS; INABILITY TO REACH NOVATORY ACCORD DOES NOT INVALIDATE ORIGINALLY VALID
CONTRACT. — The inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the original compromise agreement
entered into by the parties and justifies the act of one of the parties in finally seeking a court order for its approval and
enforcement.