Yau V MBC

10/17/21, 10:09 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 384
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Yau vs. Manila Banking Corporation
*
G.R. No. 126731. July 11, 2002.
ESTEBAN YAU, petitioner, vs. THE MANILA BANKING COR

PORATION, respondent.
*
G.R. No. 128623. July 11, 2002.
THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

ESTEBAN YAU, THE COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTEENTH
DIVISION), and the HON. DELIA H. PANGANIBAN, in her
capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 64, respondents.
Actions; Certiorari; Motions for Reconsideration; Pleadings and

Practice; As a general rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non in order that certiorari shall lie; Exceptions.—At the
outset, this Court notes that, admittedly, Manilabank did not file a motion
for reconsideration of the Orders of RTC Cebu City, which directed Manila
Golf to issue a certificate in Yau’s name, prior to initiating its petition for
certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 37085) in the CA. Thus, the petition before the
appellate court could have been dismissed outright since, as a rule, the CA,
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, will not take cognizance of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, unless the lower court has been given
the opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. This Court has settled that
as a general rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition
sine qua non in order that certiorari shall lie. However, there are settled
exceptions to this Rule, one of which is where the assailed order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction, which is evident in this
case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same.—Other exceptions to the rule are: (a)
where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court; (b) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable; (c) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017c8c087af1535cb1b4000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/14
reconsideration would be useless; (d) where the petitioner was deprived of

due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (e) where, in a
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
341
VOL. 384, JULY 11, 2002 341
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (f) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (g) where the proceedings
was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (h)
where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved. Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan [Third Division], 292 SCRA 452, 457-
458 (1998) citing Tan v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 568, 574, 575 (1997).
Same; Attachments; Garnishment; Courts; A Notice of Garnishment
brings the property affected into the custodia legis of the court issuing the
writ, beyond the interference of all other co-ordinate courts.—The Notice of
Garnishment of the Silverio share upon Manila Golf brought the property
into the custodia legis of the court issuing the writ, that is, the RTC Makati
City Branch 64, beyond the interference of all other co-ordinate courts, such
as the RTC of Cebu, Branch 6. “The garnishment of property operates as an
attachment and fastens upon the property a lien by which the property is
brought under the jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ. It is brought into
custodia legis, under the sole control of such court. A court which has
control of such property, exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the same,
retains all incidents relative to the conduct of such property. No court,
except one having supervisory control or superior jurisdiction in the
premises, has a right to interfere with and change that possession.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Judicial Stability or Non-
interference; The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the
regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, as an accepted axiom in
adjective law, serves as an insurmountable barrier to the competencia of
another co-equal court to entertain a motion, much less issue an order,
relative to a property which is under the custodia legis of another court by
virtue of a prior writ of attachment.—The doctrine of judicial stability or
non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, as
an accepted axiom in adjective law, serves as an insurmountable barrier to
the competencia of the RTC Cebu City to entertain a motion, much less
issue an order, relative to the Silverio share which is under the custodia legis
of RTC Makati City, Branch 64, by virtue of a prior writ of attachment.

Indeed, the policy of peaceful co-existence among courts of the same
judicial plane, so to speak, was aptly described in Parco v. Court of Appeals,
thus: . . . [J]urisdiction is vested in the court not in any particular branch or
judge, and as a corollary rule, the various branches of the Court of First
Instance of a judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal courts one
branch stands on the same level as the other. Undue interference by one on
the proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law. In
342
the language of this Court, the various branches of the Court of First
Instance of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal
authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction
should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective
cases, much less with their orders or judgments. It cannot be gainsaid that
adherence to a different rule would sow confusion and wreak havoc on the
orderly administration of justice, and in the ensuing melee, hapless litigants
will be at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause.
Same; Forum Shopping; Words and Phrases; A party is guilty of forum
shopping when he repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issue either pending in, or already resolved
adversely, by some other court.—It is furthermore evident from the records
that Yau is guilty of forum shopping in seeking relief before Branch 6 of
RTC Cebu City, despite being allowed to intervene in Civil Case No. CG-
271 before Branch 64 of RTC Makati City to protect his interests in the
Silverio share. A party is guilty of forum shopping when he repetitively
avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issue either pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other
court. And what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum
shopping exists is the vexation caused the courts and the litigants by a party
who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant
the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the
possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon
the same issues. Since Yau recognized the jurisdiction of RTC Makati City,
Branch 64 to protect his interest in the Silverio share, he should have
desisted from pursuing a similar remedy or relief before RTC Cebu City
inasmuch as the assailed Orders issued by the latter RTC had the effect of
pre-empting the authority of RTC Makati City, Branch 64, to act and decide
upon the intervention of Yau in Civil Case No. 90-271.
Same; Intervention; Attachment; It is recognized that a judgment
creditor who has reduced his claim to judgment may be allowed to intervene
and a purchaser who acquires an interest in property upon which an
attachment has been levied may intervene in the underlying action in which
the writ of attachment was issued for the purpose of challenging the
attachment.—The contention of Manilabank that Yau has no legal interest in
the matter in litigation lacks buoyancy. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the
343
VOL. 384, JULY 11, 2002 343
Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant
case was decided by the trial court and the appellate court, “a person may,
before or during trial, be permitted by the Court in its discretion to intervene
in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.” Yau falls under
the last instance. It is recognized that a judgment creditor who has reduced
his claim to judgment may be allowed to intervene and a purchaser who
acquires an interest in property upon which an attachment has been levied
may intervene in the underlying action in which the writ of attachment was
issued for the purpose of challenging the attachment.
Same; Same; The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention
shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of
discretion in permitting or disallowing the same—the rule on intervention
was evidently intended to expedite and economize in litigation by permitting
parties interested in the subject matter, or anything related therein, to adjust
the matter in one instead of several suits.—On the matter of allowing the
intervention after trial, suffice it to state that the rules now allow
intervention “before rendition of judgment by the trial court.” After trial and
decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted. The permissive
tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to
give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing
the same. The rule on intervention was evidently intended to expedite and
economize in litigation by permitting parties interested in the subject matter,
or anything related therein, to adjust the matter in one instead of several
suits.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Puyat, Jacinto & Santos for Manila Banking Corporation.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Angeles for
Esteban Yau.
344

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The twin petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court seek to set aside the Decisions of the Court of
1 2
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 32405 and 37085.
Esteban Yau is the judgment
3
creditor of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr.
by virtue of a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 6 dated March 27, 1991 in Civil Case No. CEB-2058,
entitled “Esteban Yau v. Philippine Underwriters Finance
Corporation, et al.,” which included Silverio as one of the
defendants. The decision became final and executory and,
accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on September 17, 1992.
Despite service of the writ and demand by the sheriff for the
satisfaction of the judgment, the defendants therein, including
Silverio, failed to pay said judgment. The only asset of Silverio that
could be found for the satisfaction of the judgment was his
proprietary membership share in the Manila Golf and Country Club,
Inc. (Manila Golf). Accordingly, the sheriff levied upon the Silverio
share on December 7, 1992. At the public auction sale on December
29, 1992, Yau emerged as the highest and only bidder of said
Silverio share at P2 Million
4
and the corresponding Certificate of
Sale issued in his name.
However, at the time of the execution sale on December 29,
1992, the Silverio share was already subject to a prior levy pursuant
to separate writs of preliminary attachment dated March 27,
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and concurred in by Associate

Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Omar U. Amin, Seventeenth Division, Rollo in
G.R. No. 128623, pp. 58-64.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales and concurred in by then
Presiding Justice Nathanael P. De Paño, Jr. and Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin,
Jr., First Division, Rollo in G.R. No. 126731, pp. 22-31.
3 Penned by Judge Ramon AM. Torres, Rollo in G.R. No. 128623, pp. 133-140.
4 Rollo in G.R. No. 128623, p. 141.
345
VOL. 384, JULY 11, 2002 345

5 6
1990 and October 17, 1990 obtained by the Manila Banking
Corporation (Manilabank) from Branches 62 and 64 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City before which complaints for sums of
7 8
money, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 90-513 and 90-271,
respectively, were pending, in which Silverio is also one of the
defendants.
9
On February 11, 1993, Yau filed separate motions to intervene in
both cases pending10before Branches 62 and 64 of the RTC of Makati
City. In an Order dated March 29, 1993, Branch 62 denied the
motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 90-513 on the ground that the
motion was filed after the parties have rested their respective cases
and the same will only unduly delay the disposition of the case.
Branch 64, on the other hand, granted Yau’s motion to11 intervene in
Civil Case No. 90-27112in an Order dated July 1, 1993. Manilabank 13
sought reconsideration but Branch 64 denied the same in an Order
dated August
14
30, 1993. Hence, Manilabank interposed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 32405.
_______________
5 Notice of Garnishment dated March 27, 1990, Rollo in G.R. No. 126731, p. 118.
6 Notice of Garnishment dated October 19, 1990, Rollo in G.R. No. 126731, p.
119.
7 Entitled “The Manila Banking Corporation v. Delta Motors Corporation and
Ricardo C. Silverio.”
8 Entitled “The Manila Banking Corporation v. Environmental Integrated Services
Corporation and Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr.”
9 Rollo in G.R. No. 126731, pp. 120-123; Rollo in G.R. No. 128623, pp. 129-132.
10 Penned by Judge Roberto C. Diokno, Rollo in G.R. No. 126731, p. 200.
11 Penned by Judge Delia H. Panganiban, Rollo in G.R. No. 126731, p. 157; Rollo
in G.R. No. 128623, p. 105.
12 Rollo in G.R. No. 126731, pp. 157A-172.
13 Rollo in G.R. No. 128623, p. 106
14 Rollo in G.R. No. 128623, pp. 65-103.
346

15
Meanwhile, in a letter dated September 20, 1993, Yau formally
requested Manila Golf, through its transfer agent, Far East Bank and
Trust Company (FEBTC), to cancel the certificate in the name of
Silverio and issue a new certificate in his name by virtue of the

Certificate of Sale dated December 29, 1992 issued in his favor. Yau
expressly agreed in the letter that the certificate to be issued in his
name shall be subject to the preliminary attachments issued in other
cases. Manila Golf, however, refused to accede to Yau’s request,
expressing the apprehension that it could be cited for contempt in
view of the fact that notices of garnishment against the Silverio
share directed the club “not to remove, transfer or otherwise dispose
of” said share.
Thereupon, Yau filed in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 before the
RTC Cebu City, (Branch 6) a motion for order directing Manila Golf
16
to issue a certificate in his name. Acting upon the motion, the said
17
court issued an Order dated March 6, 1995, which was
18
subsequently amended on March 30, 1995, directing Manila Golf
and/or its transfer agent, FEBTC, to cancel the certificate of
proprietary membership share in the name of Silverio, and in lieu
thereof to issue a new one in Yau’s name, subject to the preliminary
attachments in favor of Manilabank.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Manilabank filed on
19
May 2, 1995 a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 37085, assailing issuance of the Order of RTC
Cebu City dated March 6, 1995, and amended on March 30, 1995.
20
On April 29, 1996, the CA rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
37085 nullifying the Orders of RTC Cebu City. The appellate court
found and declared that when the RTC Cebu City ordered the
cancellation of the Silverio share which was in custodia legis of
RTC Makati City, Branch 64, it interfered with or invaded the
jurisdic-
_______________
15 Rollo in G.R. No. 126731, pp. 217-218.

16 Rollo in G.R. No. 126731, pp. 210-215.
17 Penned by Judge L.D. De La Victoria, Rollo in G.R. No. 126731, pp. 61-63.
18 Rollo in G.R. No. 126731, p. 64.
19 Rollo in G.R. No. 126731, pp. 34-60.
20 See Note No. 2, supra.
347
VOL. 384, JULY 11, 2002 347

tion of the latter coordinate and co-equal court, hence, said order
21
isnull and void. With his 22 motion for reconsideration thereto
deniedon October 14, 1996, Yau filed the petition for review
subject ofG.R. No. 126731.
23
23
Subsequently, on January 9, 1997, the CA rendered a Decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 32405 sustaining the Order of RTC Makati City
(Branch 64) dated July 1, 1993, which allowed the intervention of
24
Yau in Civil Case No. 90-271. A Motion for Reconsideration of the
25
said Decision was denied by the CA on March 13, 1997. Hence,
Manilabank interposed the petition for review subject of G.R. No.
128623.
26
On motion of Manilabank, G R. Nos. 126731 and 128623 were
27
consolidated.
In G.R. No. 126731, Yau assails the reversal of the Orders of
RTC Cebu City, directing the issuance of a new certificate of title in
his name. Yau firstly condemns the Court of Appeals for not
dismissing outright the petition of Manilabank in CA-G.R. SP No.
37805 for its failure to seek reconsideration before RTC Cebu City,
of the latter’s assailed orders prior to filing the petition for certiorari
with the CA. He then contends that he is entitled to the issuance of a
new certificate in his name after he had purchased the same in an
execution sale, despite the Silverio share being subject to a
preliminary attachment in favor of Manilabank. Thus, he submits
that in issuing the questioned orders, the RTC, Cebu City, did not
interfere with or invade the jurisdiction of RTC Makati City, Branch
64, which issued the writ of preliminary attachment pursuant to
which the Silverio share was attached.
In G.R. No. 128623, the issue revolves on the legality of the
intervention of Yau in Civil Case No. 90-271 before RTC Makati
City
_______________
21 See Note No. 1, supra.

22 Rollo, G.R. No. 128623, pp. 301-329.
23 Rollo in G.R. No. 128623, p. 56.
24 Rollo in G.R. No. 128623, pp. 332-348.
25 Rollo in G.R. No. 128623, p. 376.
26 Rollo in G.R. No. 128623, pp. 332-348.
27 Rollo in G.R. No. 128623, p. 376.
348

(Branch 64). Manilabank argues that Yau has no legal interest to

justify intervention in Civil Case No. 90-271 before RTC Makati
City, Branch 64 nor does he have standing and legal basis to assail
the Writ of Attachment dated September 27, 1990. Manilabank
submits that whatever rights Yau may have in the subject property
can be fully protected, as in fact they are already protected, in a
separate proceeding. Besides, the intervention of Yau will unduly

delay and prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties in Civil Case No. 90-271 before RTC Makati City, Branch
64. Finally, Manilabank contends that allowing intervention after
trial had already been concluded is in violation of the rule that
intervention may only be allowed before or during trial.
At the outset, this Court notes that, admittedly, Manilabank did
not file a motion for reconsideration of the Orders of RTC Cebu
City, which directed Manila Golf to issue a certificate in Yau’s name,
prior to initiating its petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 37085)
in the CA. Thus, the petition before the appellate court could have
been dismissed outright since, as a rule, the CA, in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, will not take cognizance of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, unless the lower court has been given the
opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. This Court has settled
that as a general rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non in order that certiorari shall lie. However,
there are settled exceptions to this Rule, one of which is where the
assailed order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
28
jurisdiction, which is evident in this case.
_______________
28 Other exceptions to the rule are: (a) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same
as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (b) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (c) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless; (d) where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (e) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent
and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (f) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (g) where the
proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(h) where the issue raised is
349
VOL. 384, JULY 11, 2002 349

The Notice of Garnishment of the Silverio share upon Manila Golf

brought the property into the custodia legis of the court issuing the
writ, that is, the RTC Makati City Branch 64, beyond the
interference of all other co-ordinate courts, such as the RTC of Cebu,
Branch 6. “The garnishment of property operates as an attachment
and fastens upon the property a lien by which the property is brought
under the jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ. It is brought into
custodia legis, under the sole control of such court. A court which
has control of such property, exercises exclusive jurisdiction over
the same, retains all incidents relative to the conduct of such
property. No court, except one having supervisory control or
superior jurisdiction in the
29
premises, has a right to interfere with and
change that possession.”
30
Thus, the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the
regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, as an accepted
axiom in adjective law, serves as an insurmountable barrier to the
competencia of the RTC Cebu City to entertain a motion, much less
issue an order, relative to the Silverio share which is under the
custodia legis of RTC Makati City, Branch 64, by virtue of a prior
writ of attachment. Indeed, the policy of peaceful co-existence
among courts of the same judicial plane, so to speak, was aptly
31
described in Parco v. Court of Appeals, thus:
_______________
one purely of law or where public interest is involved. Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan
[Third Division], 292 SCRA 452, 457-458 (1998) citing Tan v. Court of Appeals, 275
SCRA 568, 574, 575 (1997).
29 De Leon v. Salvador, 36 SCRA 567, 574 (1970) citing National Power
Corporation v. De Veyra, 3 SCRA 646 (1961) and Luciano v. Provincial Governor, 28
SCRA 517 (1969); Hacbang v. The Leyte Autobus Co., Inc., 8 SCRA 103, 108 (1963).
30 PDCP Development Bank v. Vestil, 264 SCRA 467, 470 (1996); Prudential
Bank v. Gapultos, 181 SCRA 159, 171 (1990); Investors’ Finance Corporation v.
Ebarle, 163 SCRA 60, 70 (1988); Republic v. Reyes, 155 SCRA 313, 325 (1987); See
also Sterling Investment Corporation v. Ruiz, 30 SCRA 318, 322 (1969); J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. v. Torres, 21 SCRA 1169, 1172 (1967); Mas v. Dumara-og, 12 SCRA 34,
37 (1964); Philippine National Bank v. Javellana, 92 Phil. 525, 527 (1953); Hubahib
v. Insular Drug Co., Inc., 64 Phil. 119 (1937); Cabigao and Izquierdo v. Del Rosario
and Lim, 44 Phil. 182, 184 (1922).
31 111 SCRA 262, 277-278 (1982).
350

. . . [J]urisdiction is vested in the court not in any particular branch or judge,

and as a corollary rule, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of
a judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal courts one branch stands on
the same level as the other. Undue interference by one on the proceedings
and processes of another is prohibited by law. In the language of this Court,
the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a province or city,
having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do
concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction should not, cannot, and are not
permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders
or judgments.
It cannot be gainsaid that adherence to a different rule would sow

confusion and wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice,
and in the ensuing melee, hapless litigants will be at a loss as to
where to appear and plead their cause.
It is furthermore evident from the records that Yau is guilty of
forum shopping in seeking relief before Branch 6 of RTC Cebu City,
despite being allowed to intervene in Civil Case No. CG-271 before
Branch 64 of RTC Makati City to protect his interests in the Silverio
share. A party is guilty of forum shopping when he repetitively
avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously
or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issue either pending in, or already resolved
adversely, by some other court. And what is truly important to
consider in determining whether forum shopping exists is the
vexation caused the courts and the litigants by a party who asks
different courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the
same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the
possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different
32
fora upon the same issues. Since Yau recognized the jurisdiction of
RTC Makati City, Branch 64 to protect his interest in the Silverio
share, he should have desisted from pursuing a similar remedy or
relief before RTC Cebu City inasmuch as the assailed Orders issued
by the latter RTC had the effect of pre-empting the authority of RTC
Makati City, Branch 64,
_______________
32 Ramonito Tantoy, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 141427, April 20,
2001, p. 5, 357 SCRA 329, citing Gatmaytan v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 487
(1997), Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 493 (1997).
351
VOL. 384, JULY 11, 2002 351

to act and decide upon the intervention of Yau in Civil Case No. 90-
33
271.
Moreover, the contention of Manilabank that Yau has no legal
interest in the matter in litigation lacks buoyancy. Under Section 2,
34
Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing
law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and the
appellate court, “a person may, before or during trial, be permitted
by the Court in its discretion to intervene in an action, if he has legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the

parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.” Yau falls under
the last instance. It is recognized that a judgment creditor who has
35
reduced his claim to judgment may be allowed to intervene and a
purchaser who acquires an interest in property upon which an
attachment has been levied may intervene in the underlying action in
which the writ of attachment was issued for the purpose of
36
challenging the attachment.
_______________
33 See Chua v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 85, 89-90 (1993); Ona v. Cuevas, 83
SCRA 388, 391 (1978) citing Montesa, etc., et al. v. Manila Cordage Co., 92 Phil. 25
(1952).
34 Now under Section 1, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
reads:
Section 1. Who may intervene.—A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of the property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.
The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may
be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
35 Am Jur 2d, Parties § 150, p. 623 citing Smith v. Palmer, 268 Ala 686, 110 So.
2d, 287; Liston v. Butler, 4 Ariz App 460, 421 P2d 542.
36 6 Am Jur 2d, Attachment and Garnishment, § 593, p. 856, citing Matson Nav.
Co. v. F.D.I.C., 81 Haw. 270, 916 P. 2d 680 (Haw. 1996), Rubis v. Barasch, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 835, 80 Cal. Rptr. 337 (2d Dist. 1969); Bankers’ Mortg. Co. v. Sohland, 33
Del. 331, 138 A. 361 (Super. Ct. 1927);
352

Clearly, Yau, being the judgment creditor of Silverio in Civil Case

No. CEB-2058 and the purchaser at the public auction sale of the
Silverio share, would be adversely affected by the disposition of the
Silverio share, subject of the writ of attachment issued by Branch 64
of RTC Makati City, should a decision be rendered in favor of
Manilabank and, as such, has standing to intervene to protect his
interest. Besides, no purpose will be served by not allowing Yau to
protect his interests before Branch 64 where the Silverio share is
under custodia legis. If we follow the contention of Manilabank, this
would result in a violation of the aforementioned principle of

judicial stability or non-interference.
Lastly, on the matter of allowing the intervention after trial,
suffice it to state that the rules now 37 allow intervention “before
rendition of judgment by the trial court.” After trial and decision in
38
a case, intervention can no longer be permitted. The permissive
tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the
Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting
39
or disallowing the same. The rule on intervention was evidently
intended to expedite and economize in litigation by permitting
parties interested in the subject matter, or anything related therein, to
adjust the matter in one instead of several suits.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in its assailed Decisions in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 32405 and 37085.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DENIED.
The assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
32405 and 37085 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan and Ynares-

Santiago, JJ., concur.
_______________
Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Runkel, 16 Idaho 192, 101 P. 396 (1090); Case v. Miller,
68 N.C. App. 729, 315 S.E. 2d 737 (1984); Miller v. White, 46 W. Va. 67, 33 S.E. 332
(1899).
37 Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
38 Trazo v. Manila Pencil Co., Inc., 1 SCRA 403, 406 (1961).
39 Mago v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 600, 608 (1999).
353
VOL. 384, JULY 11, 2002 353

Frilles vs. Yambao
Petition denied, judgments affirmed.
Notes.—Garnishment is considered as a species of attachment

for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor owing to him
from a stranger to the litigation. (De la Victoria vs. Burgos, 245
SCRA 374 [1995])
The garnishment of a property to satisfy a writ of execution
operates as an attachment and fastens upon the property a lien by
which the property is brought under the control of the court issuing
the writ. (Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 246 SCRA 33 [1995])
——o0o——
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10/17/21, 10:09 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 384

340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ESTEBAN YAU, petitioner, vs. THE MANILA BANKING COR

THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

Actions; Certiorari; Motions for Reconsideration; Pleadings and

reconsideration would be useless; (d) where the petitioner was deprived of

VOL. 384, JULY 11, 2002 341

Yau vs. Manila Banking Corporation

of RTC Makati City, Branch 64, by virtue of a prior writ of attachment.

342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Yau vs. Manila Banking Corporation

VOL. 384, JULY 11, 2002 343

Yau vs. Manila Banking Corporation

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The twin petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

1 Penned by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and concurred in by Associate

VOL. 384, JULY 11, 2002 345

346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Silverio and issue a new certificate in his name by virtue of the

15 Rollo in G.R. No. 126731, pp. 217-218.

VOL. 384, JULY 11, 2002 347

21 See Note No. 1, supra.

348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

(Branch 64). Manilabank argues that Yau has no legal interest to

separate proceeding. Besides, the intervention of Yau will unduly

VOL. 384, JULY 11, 2002 349

The Notice of Garnishment of the Silverio share upon Manila Golf

350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

. . . [J]urisdiction is vested in the court not in any particular branch or judge,

It cannot be gainsaid that adherence to a different rule would sow

VOL. 384, JULY 11, 2002 351

interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the

352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Clearly, Yau, being the judgment creditor of Silverio in Civil Case

would result in a violation of the aforementioned principle of

Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan and Ynares-

VOL. 384, JULY 11, 2002 353

Petition denied, judgments affirmed.

Notes.—Garnishment is considered as a species of attachment

© Copyright 2021 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

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