6. ASTEC vs. ERC, G.R. No.

192117 : September 18, 2012

FACTS:

On 8 December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 or the Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission
Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994 was enacted which imposed a cap on the
recoverable rate of system loss that may be charged by rural electric cooperatives to
their consumers. The IRR of R.A. No. 7832 required every rural electric cooperative to
file with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), on or before 30 September 1995, an
application for approval of an amended Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) Clause
incorporating the cap on the recoverable rate of system loss to be included in its
schedule of rates.

On 8 June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001
(EPIRA) was also enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the ERB, and created the
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). The ERC issued an Order which provides that
rural electric cooperatives should only recover from their members and patrons the
actual cost of power purchased from power suppliers. The ERC also ordered Petitioners
Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BATELEC I), et al. to refund their respective over-
recoveries to end-users. In addition, the ERC also adopted the new "grossed-up factor
mechanism" in the computation of the over-recoveries of the electric cooperatives to
be remitted to their consumers.

Thus, BATELEC I, et al. moved to reconsider the said orders but the ERC denied the
same. On appeal, the CA upheld the validity of the ERC Orders.

Hence, this petition. BATELEC I, et al. aver that these ERC Orders are invalid for
lack of publication, non-submission to the U.P. Law Center, and for their retroactive
application.

 ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed orders are invalid for non-publication, non-
submission to the U.P.
HELD:
Partly Yes. The assailed orders are invalid for non-publication, non-submission
to the U.P. only insofar as the order of refund but the new "grossed-up factor
mechanism" in the computation of the over-recoveries of the electric
cooperatives to be remitted to their consumers, should be published for it is not
interpretative regulation of the ERC.

Procedural due process demands that administrative rules and regulations be published
in order to be effective. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation."
However, several exceptions to the requirement of publication. First, an interpretative
regulation does not require publication in order to be effective. The applicability of an
interpretative regulation "needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no
real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed." It "adds
nothing to the law" and "does not affect the substantial rights of any person." Second, a
regulation that is merely internal in nature does not require publication for its effectivity.
It seeks to regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
general public. Third, a letter of instruction issued by an administrative agency
concerning rules or guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance of
their duties does not require publication in order to be effective.

The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power
suppliers are interpretative regulations. Publication is not necessary for the effectivity of
the policy guidelines. As interpretative regulations, the policy guidelines of the ERC on
the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are also not required to be
filed with the U.P. Law Center in order to be effective.

The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power
suppliers are not retrospective. The policy guidelines did not take away or impair any
vested rights of the rural electric cooperatives. Furthermore, the policy guidelines of
the ERC did not create a new obligation and impose a new duty, nor did it attach a new
disability.

However, the grossed-up factor mechanism amends the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 as it
serves as an additional numerical standard that must be observed and applied by rural
electric cooperatives in the implementation of the PPA. In light of these, the grossed-up
factor mechanism does not merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 or its IRR. It is also not
merely internal in nature. The grossed-up factor mechanism amends the IRR
by providing an additional numerical standard that must be observed and applied in
the implementation of the PPA. The grossed-up factor mechanism is therefore an
administrative rule that should be published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center in
order to be effective.

As previously stated, it does not appear from the records that the grossed-up factor
mechanism was published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center. Thus, it is ineffective
and may not serve as a basis for the computation of over-recoveries. The portions of the
over-recoveries arising from the application of the mechanism are therefore invalid.
Furthermore, the application of the grossed-up factor mechanism to periods of PPA
implementation prior to its publication and disclosure renders the said mechanism
invalid for having been applied retroactively.

Thus, the petition is partly granted.

 7. SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA

Facts:
Teodoro Santiago was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elem. School. He was adjudged 3rd Honors. 3 days
before graduation, Teodoro and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of honor
students. They filed a CERTIORARI case against the principal and teachers who composed the
committee on rating honors.
They contend that the committee acted with grave abuse of official discretion because they
claim that  the 1st and 2nd placers had never been a close rival of Santiago before, except in
Grade 5 only.  That Santiago was a consistent honor student from Grade 1 to 5. That the
1st placer was coached and tutored by grade 6 teachers during the summer (gaining unfair
advantage). The committee was composed only of Grade 6 teachers. That some teachers
gave Santos a 75% with an intention to pull him to a much lower rank. That in the Honors
Certificate in Grade 1,  the word “first place” was erased and replaced with “second place”. That
the Principal and district supervisors merely passed the buck to each other to delay his
grievances.
The respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and that even assuming it
was proper, the question has become academic (because the graduation already proceeded). 
Respondents the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial
functions. (under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial functions)

ISSUE: 
Whether or not judicial function be exercised in this case.
HELD:
No. Judicial function cannot be exercised in this case.
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial
function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action
for certiorari to exist, (TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A TRIBUNAL OR BOARD EXERCISES
JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS) 1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons
brought before a tribunal for hearing and determination; 2) that the tribunal must have the
power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision and ; 3) the tribunal must
pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the not the
legislative nor the executive)
It maybe said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the
legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy. The phrase judicial power is
defined as authority to determine the rights of persons or property. An authority vested in
some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or
the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication. The power exercised by
courts in hearing and determining cases before them. The construction of laws and the
adjudication of legal rights.
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial
bodies in the performance of its assigned task. The judiciary has no power to reverse the award
of the board of judges.
Thus, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar competitions.
 8. ANG TIBAY V. CHR

FACTS:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to an alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of
his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said
lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of
the rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a
company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right to a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The Court granted a new trial. Thus, the Solicitor General, arguing
for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union (respondent) is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:
Yes. The National Labor Union (respondent) is entitled to a new trial.

The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which
they attached to their petition with the Supreme Court, were evidence so inaccessible to them
at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to
have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect
that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang
Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing.
The Supreme Court also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly
bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply with the requirements of
due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with such as; The right to
a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof; Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented; Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion; The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; The
administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision; The administrative body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

Therefore, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire
record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that
it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove.

9. CASIMIRO VS. TANDOG

Facts:

Petitioner Casimiro as assessment clerk in the Office of the Treasurer of San Jose, Romblon was
appointed as Municipal Assessor. Based on an investigation conducted, it found out that
Casimero conducted irregularities having an anomalous cancellation of one Tax Declaration in
the name of T. Matillano and the issuance of a new one in the name of petitioner's brother
Ulysses Cawaling and 2 Tax Declaration in the name of Noraida and the issuance of new ones in
favor of petitioner's brother-in-law M. Molina.
After the investigation report, respondent Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order placing
the petitioner under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days. On its letter, petitioner denied
the allegation. Respondent Mayor directed petitioner to answer in writing the affidavit-
complaint of Noraida and T. Matillano alleged that the 2 Tax Declarations covering parcels of
land owned by her parents were transferred in the name of a certain M. Molina, petitioner's
brother-in-law, without the necessary documents. Noraida further claimed that M. Molina had
not yet paid the full purchase price of the said land. T. Matillano claimed that he never executed
a deed of absolute sale over the parcel of land in favor of Ulysses Cawaling, petitioner's brother.
On its answer, petitioner denied the allegation.
Not satisfied, respondent Mayor created a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter.
After a series of hearings, the committee submitted its report recommending petitioner's
separation from service finding petitioner guilty of Dishonesty and Malperformance of duty as
Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon.
Petitioner appealed to the CSC, which affirmed respondent Mayor's order of dismissal. He filed
motion for reconsideration and later elevated the case to CA. CA affirmed CSC Resolution
affirming the Decision of Municipal Mayor Filipino Tandog of San Jose, Romblon, finding
petitioner Haydee Casimiro guilty of dishonesty and ordering her dismissal 3from the service.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was afforded procedural and substantive due process when
she was terminated from her employment as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon.
Held:
No. The petitioner was afforded procedural and substantive due process when she was
terminated from her employment as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon.

The essence of due process in the administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. "To be
heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings.
The due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.
In the case at bar, petitioner was accorded every opportunity to present her side. She filed her
answer to the formal charge against her.
As to the substantive due process, it is obvious to us that what petitioner means is that the
assailed decision was not supported by competent and credible evidence.
The law requires that the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative
cases is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the
employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct
and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his
position.
In the case at bar, there is substantial evidence to prove petitioner's dismissal. Two alleged
irregularities provided the dismissal from service of herein petitioner. The cancellation of
complainant’s tax declaration and the issuance of a new one in favor of another. Dishonesty is
considered as a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense.
Thus, petitioner is guilty of acts of dishonesty and should be dismissed from service. Her acts of
cancelling the tax declarations of the complainants in favor of her close relatives without
complying with the requirements set under the law constitute grave acts of dishonesty. The
petition is DENIED.

10.BRILLANTES VS. CASTRO

Facts:
The plaintiff Brillantes filed a complaint  against the   defendant Castro before  the  Wage 
Administration Service  for  the  recovery of  alleged unpaid salary  and overtime pay. The
parties entered into an arbitration agreement whereby  they  agreed  "1. That  they  submit 
their case to the WAS for investigation"; and "2. That they bind themselves to abide by
whatever decision this Office may render on the case and that they recognize said decision to
be final and conclusive"; that in accordance with the said agreement, the parties, assisted by
their respective counsel, adduced evidence before the WAS.
WAS rendered a decision in which the claim for overtime and underpayment is hereby
dismissed but the respondent is adjudged to pay to the claimant P50.88 corresponding to his
salary for services rendered in the month of November.
No appeal was taken from the said decision, and that on November 10, 1954, the plaintiff filed a
complaint against the defendant to the court over the same subject-matter and cause of action
litigated between them before, and decided by, the WAS.
The trial dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action is barred by prior judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff can still file a case to court over the same subject-matter and
cause of action litigated between them before, and decided by, the WAS.

HELD:

No. The plaintiff cannot file a case to court over the same subject-matter and cause of
action litigated between them before, and decided by, the WAS.

The Hearing Officer of the Wage Administration Service was  pursuant to" the authority granted

to the Secretary of Labor to "delegate any or all  of his powers in the  administration  or
enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law to  the Chief of the WAS, who may act personally  or
through  duly authorized  representative"  Republic Act No.  602.
The jurisdiction  of the  Wage Administration Service to render  the aforesaid decision, as well 
as the remedy  of the aggrieved party against such a decision,  is impliedly recognized by the
Supreme  Court. In view of the failure of the  herein plaintiff to avail himself of the remedy
marked out by said Section 7 of  Republic  Act No.  602 within the  time  therein specified, the
aforesaid decision  of the Wage1 Administration Service became final  and  conclusive, not only
by clear  implication but also by express agreement  of the  parties "That they bind themselves
to  abide  by whatever decision  this Office (WAS)  may render  on the  case, and that they
recognize  said decision to be  final and conclusive".
The complaint filed by plaintiff-appellant  with the  WAS may be regarded as a suit by one party
against another to enforce a right;  that  the WAS  in  entertaining said suit,  hearing the parties
and deciding the case acted as a quasi-judicial body and the proceedings before it were quasi-
judicial proceedings, and conducted  in accordance with law, and so was the decision
rendered.  
The rule is often stated in general terms that a judgment  is conclusive  not only upon the 
questions  actually  contested  and determined, but  upon all  matters  which might have been
litgated and  decided  in  that suit;  and  this  is  undoubtedly true of  all matters properly
belonging  to  the subject of the controversy and within the scope of the  issues.
Res adjucata refer to decisions rendered by  the courts but they are also applicable to decisions
of a quasi-judicial body like the Wage Administration Service (WAS).

16. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. v. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, GR No.

191427, 2011-05-30
Facts:
Universal Robina Corp. (petitioner) is engaged in, among other things, the manufacture of
animal feeds at its plant in Bagong Ilog, Pasig City.
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, through its Pollution Control Division -
Monitoring and Enforcement Section, after conducting on March 14, 2000 a laboratory analysis
of petitioner's corn oil refinery plant's wastewater, found that it failed to comply with...
government standards provided under Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990.
LLDA later issued on May 30, 2000 an Ex-Parte Order requiring petitioner to explain why no
order should be issued for the cessation of its operations due to its discharge of pollutive
effluents into the Pasig River and why it was operating without a clearance/permit from the
LLDA.
Still later, the LLDA, after receiving a phone-in complaint conducted on August 31, 2000,
another analysis of petitioner's wastewater, which showed its continued failure to conform to its
effluent standard in terms of Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand
(BOD), Color and Oil/Grease.
Despite subsequent compliance monitoring and inspections conducted by the LLDA, petitioner's
wastewater failed to conform to the parameters set by the aforementioned DAOs.
Petitioner soon requested for a reduction of penalties, by Manifestation and Motion[3] filed on
August 24, 2007 to which it attached copies of its Daily Operation Reports and Certifications[4]
to show that accrued daily penalties... should only cover a period of 560 days.
After conducting hearings, the LLDA issued its Order to Pay[5] (OP) dated January 21, 2008
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby ordered to pay within fifteen (15)
days from receipt hereof the accumulated daily penalties amounting to a total of Pesos: One
Million Two Hundred Forty-Seven (Thousand) Pesos Only (PHP 1,247,000.00) prior to dismissal
of the... case and without prejudice of filing another case for its subsequent violations.
Petitioner moved to reconsider, praying that it be ordered to pay only accumulated daily
penalties in the sum of Five Hundred Sixty Thousand (P560,000) Pesos[7] on grounds that the
LLDA erred in first, adopting a straight computation of the periods... of violation - based on the
flawed assumption that petitioner was operating on a daily basis − without excluding, among
others, the period during which the LLDA Laboratory underwent rehabilitation work from
December 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 (covering 212 days); and... second,  in disregarding the
Daily Operation Reports and Certifications which petitioner submitted to attest to the actual
number of its operating days, i.e., 560 days.
Petitioner challenged by certiorari the twin orders before the Court of Appeals, attributing to
LLDA grave abuse of discretion in disregarding its documentary evidence, and maintaining that
the lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy from the enforcement of LLDA's order...
justified such recourse as an exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies prior to judicial action.
By Decision of October 27, 2009 the appellate court affirmed both LLDA orders, which it found
to be amply supported by substantial evidence, the computation of the accumulated daily
penalties being in accord with prevailing DENR guidelines.
Issues:
Petitioner cites deprivation of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as
grounds which exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
Ruling:
The petition fails.
EO 192 also created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary
which took over the powers and functions of the National
Pollution Control Commission with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases, including the
latter's role as arbitrator for determining reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses
resulting from pollution.[13]
Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary.
It is noted that during the hearing on June 19, 2007, the LLDA gave petitioner the opportunity "to
submit within fifteen (15) days....any valid documents to show proof of its non-operating dates
that would be necessary for the possible reduction of the accumulated daily... penalties,"[16] but
petitioner failed to comply therewith.
Without belaboring petitioner's assertions, it must be underscored that the protection of the
environment, including bodies of water, is no less urgent or vital than the pressing concerns of
private enterprises, big or small. Everyone must do their share to conserve the national...
patrimony's meager resources for the benefit of not only this generation, but of those to follow.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 27, 2009 Decision and the February 23,
2010 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 107449, are AFFIRMED.
Principles: