Lavides v. CA

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MANOLET O. LAVIDES v HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L.

LUNA PISON, JUDGE PRESIDING OVER BRANCH 107, RTC, QUEZON CITY; AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 129670 | February 1, 2000 | SECOND DIVISION | MENDOZA, J.

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
Manolet Lavides was arrested for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610. His arrest was
made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police.

The parents of Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16
years old, had been contacted by Lavides for an assignation that night at Lavides'
room at a hotel. Apparently, this was not the first time the police received reports of
Lavides' activities. An entrapment operation was therefore set in motion. Based on the
sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers, an was
filed against Lavides in the RTC.

Lavides filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause;
(2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful
Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident,
Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is
Charged.

Nine more informations for child abuse were filed against Lavides by Lorelie San
Miguel and by three other minor children. In all the cases, it was alleged that Lavides
had sexual intercourse with complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution and
given money as payment for the said acts of sexual intercourse."

No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, Lavides filed separate applications for bail in
the nine cases.

The RTC resolved Lavides' Omnibus Motion entitling him to bail in all the cases. He
was granted the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total
of P800,000.00 for all the cases under the following conditions:
a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the
trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings
of these cases;
b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be
automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be
immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;
c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands;
and
d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to
enable this Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;

Lavides was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him
and then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds.
Lavides filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court's
order denying his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth in its
order.

The appellate court invalidated the first 2 conditions imposed in the order for the grant
of bail to Lavides but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of the condition
making arraignment a prerequisite for the approval of Lavides' bail bonds to be moot
and academic. The Court of Appeals thought that the aforesaid conditions in the order
were contrary to Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution which provides that "after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."

ISSUE:
Is the condition that makes arraignment a prerequisite to the approval of bail bonds
valid?

RULING:
In requiring that Lavides be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the RTC
apprehended that if Lavides were released on bail he could, by being absent, prevent
his early arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got tired and
lost interest in their cases. Hence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment, approval
of Lavides' bail bonds should be deferred until he could be arraigned. After that, even
if Lavides does not appear, trial can proceed as long as he is notified of the date of
hearing and his failure to appear is unjustified, since under Art. III, §14(2) of the
Constitution, trial in absentia is authorized. This seems to be the theory of the trial
court in its order conditioning the grant of bail to Lavides on his arraignment.

Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail
is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the
court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the
arraignment is required.

On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment
would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion
to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be
resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to
quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These
scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial
except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and
his right to bail.

It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that "approval of the bail
bonds shall be made only after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should
instead have declared void. The condition imposed in the trial court's order of May 16,
1997 that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be
present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For
another condition of bail under Rule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to
appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman
shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in
the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia."
Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to
be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at
arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt, (b) during trial whenever
necessary for identification purposes, and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless
it is for a light offense, in which case the accused may appear by counsel or
representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot
be waived.

Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignment of Lavides
was also invalid. Contrary to Lavides' contention, the arraignment did not emanate
from the invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the
arraignment." Even without such a condition, the arraignment of Lavides could not be
omitted. In sum, although the condition for the grant of bail to Lavides is invalid, his
arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are valid.

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