Tating vs. Marcella 519 SCRA 79, March 27, 2007

11/9/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 519
VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007 79

Tating vs. Marcella
*
G.R. No. 155208. March 27, 2007.
**
NENA LAZALITA TATING, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD
TATING MARCELLA, represented by SALVADOR
MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING, and the COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; A contract is simulated if the parties do

not intend to be bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if the
parties conceal their true agreement (relatively simulated).—The
CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between
petitioner and Daniela is simulated. A contract is simulated if the
parties do not intend to be bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if
the parties conceal their true agreement (relatively simulated).
The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a
contract is the intention of the parties. Such intention is
determined from the express terms of their agreement as well as
from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.
Same; Same; The most protuberant index of simulation is the

complete absence on the part of the vendee of any attempt in any
manner to assert his rights of ownership over the disputed
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000166f73c14fe978559c9003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/21
property.—In Suntay v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 430 (1995),

the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is
the complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in
any manner to assert his rights of ownership over the disputed
property. In the present case, however, the evidence clearly shows
that petitioner
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
** Also spelled as Lasalita in other parts of the Rollo.
80
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tating vs. Marcella
declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in

her name. Petitioner has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she
religiously paid the real estate taxes due on the said lot and that
it was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the taxes
thereon. While tax receipts and declarations and receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not, in
themselves, incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over
the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest
desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse
claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also
the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.
Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.
Same; Same; Property; Sales; Ownership; Possession along

with ownership is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the
notarized deed of conveyance.—It is true that Daniela retained
physical possession of the property even after she executed the
subject Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to the property
was transferred in petitioner’s favor. In fact, Daniela continued to
occupy the property in dispute until her death in 1988 while, in
the meantime, petitioner continued to reside in Manila. However,
it is well-established that ownership and possession are two
entirely different legal concepts. Just as possession is not a
definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent
with ownership. The first paragraph of Article 1498 of the Civil
Code states that when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the
deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
Possession, along with ownership, is transferred to the vendee by
virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. Thus, in light of the
circumstances of the present case, it is of no legal consequence
that petitioner did not take actual possession or occupation of the
disputed property after the execution of the deed of sale in her
favor because she was already able to perfect and complete her
ownership of and title over the subject property.
Civil Procedure; Evidence; Affidavits; The admissibility of

evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence; It is settled
that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not
gener-
81
VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007 81
Tating vs. Marcella
ally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be
either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.—There
is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement.
However, the admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its
relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains
to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible,
but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within
the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that
affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not
generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be
either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.
Same; Same; As in all civil cases, the burden is on the

plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his complaint and he
must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness
of the evidence of the defendant.—Private respondents should
have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their
allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of
her property when she executed the subject deed of sale in favor of
petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to
prove the material allegations of his complaint and he must rely
on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
evidence of the defendant. Aside from Daniela’s sworn statement,
private respondents failed to present any other documentary
evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their
witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different
intention when she entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Pamplona, Genito and Valdezco for petitioner.
Guanzon and Guanzon Law Firm for respondents.
82

Tating vs. Marcella
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the Special Civil

1
Action for Certiorari before the
Court are the Decision dated February 22, 2002 and the
Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in 2 CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City,
Negros Occidental, Branch 60.
The present case arose from a controversy involving a
parcel of land denominated as Lot 56 of Subdivision plan
Psd31182, located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros
Occidental. The subject lot, containing an area of 200

square meters, was owned by Daniela Solano Vda. de
Tating (Daniela) as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-4393
3
issued by the Registry of Deeds of
the City of Cadiz.
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property
to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita
Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in a duly
notarized Deed4
of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in
favor of Nena. Subsequently, title over the
5
subject property
was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the
property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real
estate taxes due6
thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to
1986 and 1988. However, the land remained in possession
of Daniela.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn
statement claiming that she had actually no intention of
selling the property; the true agreement between her and
Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property
in favor of
_______________
1 Penned by Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by

Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales (now a member of this Court) and
Sergio L. Pestaño; Rollo, p. 53.
2 Original Records, pp. 318-342.
3 Exhibit “A,” Id., at p. 138.
4 Exhibit “Q”/“1,” Id., at p. 177.
5 Exhibit “3”, Id., at p. 179.
6 Exhibits “8-A” to “8-AA,” Id., at pp. 183-212.
83
VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007 83

Tating vs. Marcella
the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the

subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her
business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not
secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the
title in the name of Nena 7
cancelled and the subject
property reconveyed to her. 8
Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as
her heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and
Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by
herein petitioner.
In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena
that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn
statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a
consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return of
their rightful
9
shares over the subject property as heirs of
Daniela. Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case
amicably proved futile.
Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad,
represented by her son Salvador, filed a complaint with the
RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against Nena
praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the TCT
issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new title
10
and
tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela. The
complaint also prayed for the award of moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses. On March 19, 1993, the plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint with leave of court for the purpose of
excluding Ricardo as a party plaintiff, 11 he having died

intestate and without issue in March 1991. He left Carlos,
Felicidad, Julio, and Nena as his sole heirs.
_______________
7 Exhibit “D,” Id., at p. 142.

8 Exhibit “I,” Id., at p. 149.
9 Exhibit “E,” Id., at p. 143.
10 Id., at p. 1.
11 Id., at p. 55.
84

Tating vs. Marcella
In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or

misrepresentation attended the execution of the subject
Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the
letter of her uncle, Carlos. She prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint, and in her counterclaim, she asked the trial
court for the award of actual, exemplary and moral 12
damages as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the RTC rendered
judgment with the following dispositive portion:
“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, and
hereby declaring the document of sale dated October 14, 1969
(Exh. “Q”) executed between Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating and
Nena Lazalita Tating as NULL and VOID and further ordering:
1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No.

5975 and in lieu thereof to issue a new title in the names
of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (1/4)
portion of the property; Felicidad Tating Marcella, Pro-
indiviso owner of one-fourth (1/4) portion; Julio Tating,
Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (1/4) portion and Nena
Lazalita Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (1/4)
portion, all of lot 56 after payment of the prescribed fees;
2. The City Assessor of the City of Cadiz to cancel Tax
Declaration No. 143-00672 and in lieu thereof issue a new
Tax Declaration in the names of Carlos Tating, 1/4 Pro-
indiviso portion; Felicidad Tating Marcella, 1/4 Pro-
indiviso portion; Julio Tating, 1/4 Pro-indiviso portion;
and Nena Lazalita Tating, 1/4 Pro-indiviso portion, all of
lot 56 as well as the house standing thereon be likewise
declared in the names of the persons mentioned in the
same proportions as above-stated after payment of the
prescribed fees;
3. The defendant is furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs the
sum of P20,000.00 by way of moral damages, P10,000.00
by way of exemplary damages, P5,000.00 by way of
attorney’s fees and P3,000.00 by way of litigation
expenses; and to
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 23-25.
85
VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007 85

Tating vs. Marcella
4. Pay the costs of suit.

13
SO ORDERED.”
Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002,

the CA14
rendered its Decision affirming the judgment of the
RTC.
Nena’s Motion for Reconsideration was 15
denied by the CA
in its Resolution dated August 22, 2002.
Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the
ground that the CA “has decided the instant case without
due regard to and in violation of the applicable laws and
Decisions of this Honorable Court and also because the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which it has affirmed,
is not supported
16
by and is even against the evidence on
record.”
At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the
instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is inappropriate. Considering that the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the CA finally disposed of the
case, the proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court notes that while the instant petition is
denominated as a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand,
the petition actually avers errors of judgment, rather than
of jurisdiction, which are the proper subjects of a petition
for review on certiorari. Hence, in accordance with the
liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the
interest of justice, the Court decided to treat the present
petition for certiorari as having been filed
_______________
13 Id., at p. 342.
14 CA Rollo, p. 86.
15 Id., at p. 103.
16 Rollo, p. 5.
86

Tating vs. Marcella
under Rule 45, especially considering that it was 17

filed
within the reglementary period for filing the same.
As to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that the
case for the private respondents rests on the proposition
that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 14, 1969 is
simulated because Daniela’s actual intention was not to
dispose of her property but simply to help petitioner by
providing her with a collateral. Petitioner asserts that the
sole evidence which persuaded both the RTC and the CA in
holding that the subject deed was simulated was the Sworn
Statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. However,
petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should have
been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that
Daniela has long been dead when the document was offered
in evidence, thereby denying petitioner the right to cross-
examine her.
Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was
executed on October 14, 1969, the Sworn Statement was
purportedly executed only on December 28, 1977 and was 18
discovered only after the death of Daniela in 1994.
Petitioner argues that if the deed of sale is indeed

simulated, Daniela would have taken action against the
petitioner during her lifetime. However, the fact remains
that up to the time of her death or almost 20 years after
the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, she never uttered
a word of complaint against petitioner.
Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA
erred in departing from the doctrine held time and again by
the Supreme Court that clear, strong and convincing
evidence beyond mere preponderance is required to show
the falsity or nullity of a notarial document. Petitioner also
argues that the RTC and the CA erred in its
pronouncement that the transac-
_______________
17 Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1066,

1075; 268 SCRA 597, 605 (1997).
18 Based on the certification issued by the Civil Registry of Cadiz City,
Daniela S. Tating died on July 29, 1988.
87
VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007 87

Tating vs. Marcella
tion between Daniela and petitioner created a trust

relationship between them because of the settled rule that
where the terms of a contract are clear, it should be given
full effect.
In their Comment and Memorandum, private
respondents contend that petitioner failed to show that the
CA or the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in

arriving at their assailed judgments; that Daniela’s Sworn
Statement is sufficient evidence to prove that the contract
of sale by and between her and petitioner was merely
simulated; and that, in effect, the agreement between
petitioner and Daniela created a trust relationship between
them.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale
between petitioner and Daniela is simulated. A contract is
simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at all
(absolutely simulated) or if the parties19 conceal their true
agreement (relatively simulated). The primary
consideration in determining the true 20
nature of a contract
is the intention of the parties. Such intention is
determined from the express terms of their agreement 21 as
well as from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.
In the present case, the main evidence presented by
private respondents in proving their allegation that the
subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the
parties thereto is the sworn statement of Daniela dated
December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said sworn
statement as part of private respondents’ evidence and
gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative
weight to this document.
There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject
sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence
should not
_______________
19 People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 357

Phil. 850, 869-870; 297 SCRA 170, 189 (1998).
20 Ramos v. Heirs of Honorio Ramos, Sr., 431 Phil. 337, 345; 381 SCRA
594, 601 (2002).
21 Id., at p. 345.
88

Tating vs. Marcella
22
be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of
evidence depends on its relevance and competence while
the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already 23
admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.
Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but
its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation 24
within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It
is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence
since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s
statements, which may thus be either 25
omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived
26
of the opportunity to cross-
examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants
themselves
27
are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon. The Court finds that both the trial court and the
CA committed error in giving the sworn statement
probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to
take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and
the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela’s
sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract
of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that,
as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between

them.
Private respondents should have presented other
evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation that Daniela,
in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when
she executed
_______________
22 Ayala Land, Inc. v. Tagle, G.R. No. 153667, August 11, 2005, 466
SCRA 521, 532.
23 Id., at p. 532.
24 Heirs of Lourdes Sabanpan v. Comorposa, 456 Phil. 161, 172; 408
SCRA 692, 700 (2003).
25 Lim v. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil. 60, 78; 323 SCRA 102, 119 (2000)
citing People’s Bank and Trust Company v. Leonidas, G.R. No. 47815,
March 11, 1992, 207 SCRA 164; D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 249, 260-261.
26 D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Id., at pp. 260-261.
27 Id., at pp. 260-261.
89
VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007 89

Tating vs. Marcella
the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil

cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material
allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the
strength of his evidence and 28
not on the weakness of the
evidence of the defendant. Aside from Daniela’s sworn
statement, private respondents failed to present any other

documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the
testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that
Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a
contract of sale with petitioner. 29
In Suntay v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the
most protuberant index of simulation is the complete
absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any
manner to 30
assert his rights of ownership over the disputed
property. In the present case, however, the evidence
clearly shows that petitioner declared the property for
taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name. Petitioner
has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid the
real estate taxes due on the said lot and that it was only in
1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the taxes thereon.
While tax receipts and declarations and receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not, in
themselves, incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
constitute at least31proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the intention to
contribute
_______________
28 Dungaran v. Koshnicke, G.R. No. 161048, August 31, 2005, 468

SCRA 676, 685.
29 321 Phil. 809, 831-832; 251 SCRA 430, 450 (1995).
30 Ramos v. Heirs of Honorio Ramos, Sr., supra note 20, at pp. 348-349;
p. 604.
31 Heirs of Miguel Franco v. Court of Appeals, 463 Phil. 417, 433; 418
SCRA 60, 72 (2003).
90

Tating vs. Marcella
32
needed revenues to the Government. Such an act
strengthens33 one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership. On the other hand, private respondents failed
to present even a single tax receipt or declaration showing
that Daniela paid taxes due on the disputed lot as proof
that she claims ownership thereof. The only Tax
Declaration in the name of Daniela, which private
respondents presented in evidence, refers
34
only to the house
standing on the lot in controversy. Even the said Tax
Declaration contains a notation that herein petitioner owns
the lot (Lot 56) upon which said house was built.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the
subject Deed of Absolute Sale did not really reflect the real
intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained silent
until her death; she never told any of her relatives
regarding her actual purpose in executing the subject deed;
she simply chose to make known her true intentions
through the sworn statement she executed on December
28, 1977, the existence of which she kept secret from her
relatives; and despite her declaration therein that she is
appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she
never took any concrete step to recover the subject property

from petitioner until her death more than ten years later.
It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of
the property even after she executed the subject Absolute
Deed of Sale and even after title to the property was
transferred in petitioner’s favor. In fact, Daniela continued
to occupy the property in dispute until her death in 1988
while, in the meantime, petitioner continued to reside in
Manila. However, it is well-established that ownership 35
and
possession are two entirely different legal concepts. Just
as possession is not a
_______________
32 Calicdan v. Cendaña, G.R. No. 155080, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA

272, 280.
33 Id., at p. 280.
34 Exhibit “B,” OR, 139.
35 Spouses Sabio v. The International Corporate Bank, Inc., 416 Phil.
785, 820; 364 SCRA 385, 416 (2001).
91
VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007 91

Tating vs. Marcella
definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession

inconsistent with ownership. The first paragraph of Article
1498 of the Civil Code states that when the sale is made
through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of
the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear
or cannot clearly be inferred. Possession, along with

ownership, is transferred to the36 vendee by virtue of the
notarized deed of conveyance. Thus, in light of the
circumstances of the present case, it is of no legal
consequence that petitioner did not take actual possession
or occupation of the disputed property after the execution
of the deed of sale in her favor because she was already
able to perfect and complete her ownership of and title over
the subject property.
As to Daniela’s affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted
by petitioner, which confirmed the validity of the sale of the
disputed lot in her favor, the same has no probative value,
as the sworn statement earlier adverted to, for being
hearsay. Naturally, private respondents were not able to
cross-examine the deceased-affiant on her declarations
contained in the said affidavit.
However, even if Daniela’s affidavit of June 9, 1983 is
disregarded, the fact remains that private respondents
failed to prove by clear, strong and convincing
37
evidence
beyond mere preponderance of evidence that the contract
of sale between Daniela and petitioner was simulated. The
legal presumption is in favor of the validity of contracts
and the party who impugns
38
its regularity has the burden of
proving its simulation. Since private respondents failed to
discharge the bur-
_______________
36 Id., at p. 820; Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 113472-

73, December 20, 1994, 239 SCRA 341, 347.
37 Mendezona v. Ozamiz, 426 Phil. 888, 904; 376 SCRA 482, 496 (2002).
38 People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

supra note 19, at p. 870; p. 189; Ramos v. Heirs of Honorio Ramos, Sr.,
supra note 20, at p. 346; p. 602.
92

Tating vs. Marcella
den of proving their allegation that the contract of sale

between petitioner and Daniela was simulated, the
presumption of regularity and validity of the October 14,
1969 Deed of Absolute Sale stands.
Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of
sale between petitioner and Daniela to be valid and not
fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss
the issue as to whether or not a trust relationship was
created between them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 64122, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Civil
Case No. 278-C, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Callejo, Sr., Chico-

Nazario and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, assailed decision and resolution

reversed and set aside. Complaint dismissed.
Note.—Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for

taxation purposes are strong evidence of ownership.
(Alonso vs. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 375 SCRA 390 [2002])
——o0o——
93
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11/9/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 519

VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007 79

Civil Law; Contracts; A contract is simulated if the parties do

Same; Same; The most protuberant index of simulation is the

property.—In Suntay v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 430 (1995),

** Also spelled as Lasalita in other parts of the Rollo.

80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Tating vs. Marcella

declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in

Same; Same; Property; Sales; Ownership; Possession along

Civil Procedure; Evidence; Affidavits; The admissibility of

VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007 81

Tating vs. Marcella

Same; Same; As in all civil cases, the burden is on the

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Assailed in the Special Civil

Occidental. The subject lot, containing an area of 200

1 Penned by Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by

VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007 83

the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the

excluding Ricardo as a party plaintiff, 11 he having died

7 Exhibit “D,” Id., at p. 142.

84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby

1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No.

12 Id., at pp. 23-25.

VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007 85

4. Pay the costs of suit.

Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002,

86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

under Rule 45, especially considering that it was 17

Petitioner argues that if the deed of sale is indeed

17 Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1066,

VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007 87

tion between Daniela and petitioner created a trust

CA or the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in

19 People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 357

88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between

VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007 89

the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil

statement, private respondents failed to present any other

28 Dungaran v. Koshnicke, G.R. No. 161048, August 31, 2005, 468

90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

never took any concrete step to recover the subject property

32 Calicdan v. Cendaña, G.R. No. 155080, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA

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definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession

or cannot clearly be inferred. Possession, along with

36 Id., at p. 820; Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 113472-

38 People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

den of proving their allegation that the contract of sale

Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Callejo, Sr., Chico-

Petition granted, assailed decision and resolution