Gu 230

FERM FACILITY PLAN GUIDE LINE
HSE/97/13
FERM Facility Plan Guideline
HSE/97/13
CONTENTS
Front Page
List of Contents
Abbreviations 3
1.0 Introduction 5
2.0 Objectives and Scope 7
3.0 Overview of Fire and Explosion Strategy Options 9
4.0 Role of ERD 88-02 and Examples 11
4.1 General 11
4.2 Worked Examples of Critical Equipment Items 11
5.0 Preparation of a FERM Facility Plan 15
5.1 General 15
5.2 Documents Required 15
5.3 Area Facility Fire and Explosion Strategy Levels and Fire and
Gas Protection Equipment 16
5.4 Fire Scenario Development 17
5.5 Fire Protection Systems Maintenance and Testing 19
5.6 Pre-Fire Plans and Operator Response Sheets 22
5.7 Fire Responder Competencies 23
5.8 Shortfall Listing 23
6.0 Examples 25
6.1 Worksheets 25
6.2 Pre-Fire Plan 51
6.3 Operator Response 54
6.4 Fire Responder Competencies 56
ATTACHMENTS
I Blank Fire Scenario Work Sheet 59

II Blank Pre-Fire Plan Sheet 71
III Blank Fire Responder Competencies Sheet 77
Page 2 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
ABBREVIATIONS
AFFF Aqueous Film Forming Foam

AFO Airport Fire Officer
BA Breathing Apparatus
BLL Barrels
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
BPD Barrels Per Day
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
DCS Digital Control System
EOM Emergency Operations Manual

EP Engineering Practice
ERD Engineering Reference Document
ESD Emergency Shut Down
FCP Field Change Proposal

FERM Fire and Explosion Risk Management
FES Fire and Explosion Strategy
FMECA Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis
HSE Health, Safety and Environment
ICAO International Civil Aviation Authority

IR Infra Red
IT Information Technology
LEBC Local Emergency Base Controller

LEL Lower Explosive Limit
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
lpm litres per minute
MAF Mina Al Fahal
NED National Emergency Director

NGL Natural Gas Liquids
NFPA National Fire Protection Agency
oo out of (eg 2oo3 voting)

ORC Oman Refinery Company
OWS Oily Water Separator
PDO Petroleum Development Oman

PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PS Production Station
QRA Quantitative Risk Asssessment
Page 3 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
RCM Reliability Centered Maintenance

RFF Rescue and Fire Fighting
RFFS Rescue and Fire Fighting Service
RMS Remote Manifold Station
SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus

SIEP Shell International Exploration and Production
UL Underwriters Laboratory
UV Ultra Violet
VESDA Very Early Smoke Detection Apparatus
Page 4 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Pre-fire planning addresses the nature of contribution from human intervention as a

recovery measure.
Pre-fire planning may be described as the advance preparation of documentation and

practical rehearsals based on potential credible fire scenarios, which can assist fire
departments and line management personnel to respond to and control fire events
within company facilities.
Pre-fire planning sets plant control, safeguarding and fire fighting objectives and
strategies so that in the case of a potential incident critical time is saved should
hazardous events come about. It also identifies particular fire and explosion scenario
resource requirements and hazards which may be encountered during an incident.
The appropriate actions to be employed when applying mitigation and recovery
measures are then developed.
Pre-fire plans need to be scenario specific. They should not be overly detailed or
inflexible since it is not possible to predict the precise events or impact which may
occur from any given scenario.
Having identified plausible fire scenarios and relevant control methodologies it is then
possible to identify the role of contributing systems, for example:
 Response times and capability of fire responders including adequate access ways
for the assigned equipment taking wind directions into account.
 Clear communication procedures and systems.
 Availability of suitable quantities of foam, water or hand extinguishers.
 The convenient location of equipment such as hydrants, monitors and fireman’s

equipment.
Page 5 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Page 6 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
2.0 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
The prime objectives are to minimise the risk to life and assets by maximising the
potential for risk mitigation with manual intervention utilising available manpower and
equipment.
Automated systems which have the advantage of rapid response but are limited in
terms of assessment, usually follow a single pre-determined pattern initiated by
condition sensors. Only trained personnel can provide the necessary assessment of a
situation but their performance is very much improved if all of the possibilities for
escalation have been considered and fully understood prior to any occurrence. By
preparing specific action plans for manual response based on identified fire hazards
and scenarios, then simulated response exercises can be tested and practised. The
testing aspect provides information regarding any weaknesses in the systems, or
failures on demand; whilst the practice induces a level of familiarity with tasks which
then become routine, and therefore more reliable. During an emergency, fire
responders rely on their ability to use equipment safely and effectively.
Throughout PDO facilities at the present time there are differences in procedures,
available equipment, manpower and capability. The purpose of this pre-fire planning
document is to provide a consistent approach to identified fire hazards by setting the
necessary standards for the preparation of specific pre-fire planning documents for
each PDO location.
This guideline is intended to ensure that the documents required for pre-fire planning
and FERM facility plans are produced in a consistent manner for both new facilities and
modifications to existing facilities.
It is intended to support ERD-88-02, Specification for Fire and Explosion Risk

Management, and provides examples where applicable.
Page 7 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Page 8 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
3.0 OVERVIEW OF FIRE AND EXPLOSION STRATEGY OPTIONS
There are four fire and explosion strategies:

 Strategy 1 Minor Incident Intervention Only
Response limited to trained personnel using portable extinguishers or other types of
first aid fire fighting equipment (hand held or mobile). In addition, in critical areas,
such as some areas of camps, automatic detection systems may be installed to
provide fast alarm and personnel escape.
 Strategy 2 Dedicated Fixed Fire Protection Systems

Automatic actuation of a self-contained extinguishing system, for a specific facility
from detection systems.
 Strategy 3 Systems/Equipment plus Back-up

Dedicated fixed fire protection systems and a firewater network with backup from
manual intervention by trained personnel using fire fighting equipment.
 Strategy 4 Systems/Equipment plus Fire Brigade

Similar to Strategy 3 with back up from a professional fire brigade.
Typical groups of facilities are given from the FERM strategy risk matrix listed simply as
follows:
Strategy
Incident Listings
Levels
Small Incidents and Camps 1
Pump Seals, Turbine Enclosures, Cone
1 or 2*
Roofed Tanks, Floating Roof Tanks
Pump Seals, Compressors, Turbine
2
Enclosures, Cone Roofed Tanks
Vessels, Floating Roof Tanks 3 or 4
Aircraft 4
* depending on location
Clearly this is a very coarse delineation of required control and recovery systems but
provides a high level overview. The prime objective is to optimise the level of risk
contributed by each type of equipment to meet the FERM requirements.
Page 9 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Page 10 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
4.0 ROLE OF ERD 88-02 AND EXAMPLES

4.1 General
ERD 88-02, Specification for Fire and Explosion Risk Management (Reference 2) lists
the requirements for the various strategy levels described in section 3 above. A
number of the requirements have levels of mitigation measures that can be
implemented and the protection level decisions are a matter for the asset and area
coordinators.
Some of these decisions may be assisted by cost benefit analysis, taking the
production deferment and asset loss potential into account.
The aim of this section of the guideline is to explain the role of ERD 88-02 in pre-fire
planning and to provide some examples of were cost benefit analysis is required.
The specifications cover the requirements for fire and gas detection and protection in
PDO facilities to be applied when making modifications to existing facilities and when
designing new facilities.
The ERD provides users with a standard specification for the level of fire and explosion
mitigation measures, which are tailored to typical PDO facilities in PDO. Where there
is a wide range in size and criticality of equipment and which deviates from the typical,
the ERD describes a simple methodology to assist the engineer in arriving at a
specification for fire and gas detection and protection equipment which is appropriate to
the level of business risk of the facility concerned.
The ERD also explains the methodology for applying the fire and explosion strategies
during the design phase of the project to both green field sites and to modifications to
existing facilities.
4.2 Worked Examples of Critical Equipment Items
The ERD has a methodology for determining the levels of fire and explosion protection
for what are seen as critical items of equipment, ie. cone roofed tanks and shipping
pumps. The approach is based on a detailed QRA (Reference 3) which was
performed, and enables the user to apply a cost benefit analysis in order to justify the
protection level specified. This section provides some worked examples.
4.1.1 Cone Roofed Tanks
Refer to Section 3.2.3.5 of ERD 88-02.
Page 11 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Example 1
Suppose we are installing 2 new oil storage tanks at Marmul, and wish to establish
what levels of fire protection can be justified. The production rate for Marmul is 63000
BPD. Using the pro-forma from page 16 of the ERD:
BASE CASE COST OF DAMAGE CALCULATION PRO-FORMA

System Constant
based on frequency of damage x days lost:
-4
(3.75x10 x 486 =) 0.18225
Cost of Deferred Oil = 2US$ per barrel

1 2
Net Oil Production per pair of tanks in BPD (e.g. for 5 tanks
divide the total production by 2.5) For an installation with a x 63000
single tank multiply the total production by 1.39 (to
compensate for the loss of total production given the loss of a
single tank)
= Base Case Annual Cost of Damage per Tank = $ 22964
x Number of tanks covered by Protection 2
= Base Case Annual Cost of Damage for Installation = $ 45927
x Design Life of the Installation 20
= Undiscounted Design Cost of Damage for Installation = $ 918540
Discount Factor takes into account the design life of the fire
protection facilities together with the average discount rate.
The undiscounted value should be multiplied by the value at
discount rate taken from the following table below.
Value at Discount Rate
Years 5% 8% 10%
10 0.772 0.671 0.617
20 0.621 0.490 0.426
25 0.564 0.427 0.362
30 0.512 0.376 0.313 0.490
Base Case PV of Cost of Damage for Installation $ 450085
The risk reduction by installing heat detection and base foam injection is provided on
the risk histogram (Figure 3.2), and works out as 64% (ie, 100-36). Therefore, 0.64 x
450085 = US$288054 can be spent installing heat detection and base foam. If the
cost of installing the fire protection is less that US$288054, then installation is justified.
4.1.2 Shipping Pumps
Refer to section 3.2.3.6 of ERD 88-02.
Example 1
Page 12 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Suppose we are installing 3 additional centrifugal shipping pumps at Yibal A and wish
to establish the levels of fire protection which can be justified. Assuming that the 3
pumps have a combined capacity of 23000BPD, and using the pro-forma on page 20 of
the ERD:
BASE CASE COST OF DAMAGE CALCULATION PRO-FORMA

System Constant
based on frequency of damage x days lost for 3 pumps:
-4 0.12402
(3.18x10 x 130 x 3 = )
Pump Type for centrifugal/axial or screw pumps use x 1 x 1
for reciprocating pumps use x 10
Number of Pumps in Set for 2 pumps use x 0.6
for 3 pumps use x 1.0 x 1
for 4 pumps use x 1.46
for 5 pumps use x 2.0
Cost of Deferred Oil = 2US$ per barrel

1 2
Net Oil Production for Pump Set in BPD x 23000

= Base Case Annual Cost of Damage per Pump Set = $ 5705
x Design Life of the Pump Set 20
= Undiscounted Design Cost of Damage for Pump Set = $ 114098
Discount Factor takes into account the design life of the fire
protection facilities together with the average discount rate.
The undiscounted value should be multiplied by the value at
discount rate taken from the following table below.
Value at Discount Rate
Years 5% 8% 10%
10 0.772 0.671 0.617
20 0.621 0.490 0.426
25 0.564 0.427 0.362
30 0.512 0.376 0.313 0.490
Base Case PV of Cost of Damage for Installation $ 55908
The risk reduction by installing fire detection is provided on the risk histogram (figure
3.3) and works out as 67% (ie. 100-33). Therefore, 0.67 x 55908 = US$37459 can be
spent installing fire detection. If the cost of installing the fire protection is less than
US$ 37459, then installation is justified.
Page 13 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Page 14 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
5.0 PREPARATION OF A FERM FACILITY PLAN

5.1.................................................................................................................................... General
This section provides guidance on how to prepare a FERM Facility Plan, and provides
a list of documents for a typical plan. In establishing facility plans it is necessary to
prepare a list of company facilities, then list the processes, plants, operation, structures
and personnel within the facilities. From this list the numbers and types of potential
(moderate, serious and major fire) incident scenarios should be further listed. It is
anticipated that minor or incipient fires would be dealt with by company personnel in
the vicinity and therefore such incidents should not be used for pre-plans.
After confirming the credibility of the draft fire scenarios with line management
supervisors actions to prepare for the event can be developed in the line with emphasis
on impact upon operations, facility, plant and equipment, to ensure accuracy of
planning.
A final list of scenarios should then be converted into fully prepared pre-fire plans with
further investigative work on impact on the environment and the public.
Establishing a pre-fire plan for every single potential fire incident in all company
facilities serves little useful purpose since it would take many years to exercise the
response to these incidents. Operators pre-plans should be prepared as well as those
for fire fighters and co-ordinated on a scenario basis.
5.2 Documents Required
The following documents are required in order to complete a FERM Facility Plan:
 Facility FES and Description of Fire Protection Equipment, for reference, information
and possible inclusion in the safety case.
 Fire protection systems maintenance, for inclusion in the site EPMARS.
 Pre-fire plans, for inclusion in the Site Emergency Procedures, Part III. Copies to
control room and fire stations.
 Fire responder capabilities, for inclusion in the Operator Competency Assurance
Scheme and/or the Fire Brigade Training Programme.
 Shortfall Listings, for inclusion in the EOM, Staff Training Plan and FCP as required.
Guidance on the contents and some examples are provided below. Examples are
shown is italics.
Page 15 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
5.3 Area Facility Fire and Explosion Strategy Levels and Fire and Gas
Protection Equipment
This should be in accordance with the PDO FERM and FES levels assigned to the
facilities. Include a description of each main area of the site being examined and list
the strategy which is assigned. An example might be:
Strategy Level 1 (Minor Incident Intervention Only)

Remote manifolds 1 to n
Gathering station X
Camps and offices
Level description
Fire response is limited to trained personnel using portable extinguishers or
other types of first aid fire fighting equipment. In addition, in critical areas, such
as some areas of camps, automatic detection systems may be installed to
provide fast alarm and personnel escape.
Strategy Level 2 (Dedicated Fixed Fire Protection Systems)

Power station
Level Description
Automatic actuation of a self contained extinguishing system, for a specific
facility from detection systems.
Strategy Level 3 (Fixed Fire Protection Systems Plus Back Up)

Production Station
Level Description
Dedicated fixed fire protection systems and a fire water network with back up
from manual intervention by trained personnel using fire fighting equipment.
Strategy Level 4 (Fixed Fire Protection Systems Plus Fire Brigade)

Airstrip
Level Description
Similar to strategy 3 with back up from a professional fire brigade.
For the fire detection and protection equipment section, each area identified above
needs to have a description of the fire detection and protection equipment installed,
together with a conclusion as to the adequacy, and applicability of the strategy level
assigned. An example might be:
Page 16 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Remote Manifold Stations – Strategy Level 1
The remote manifolds have the following fire protection equipment in place:
0 1 x 60kg dry powder trolley extinguisher

1 4 x 12kg dry powder extinguishers
2 2 x CO2 extinguishers
The extinguisher type and number are appropriate to the facilities. There are no fixed
fire systems at any RMS in accordance with strategy level 1.
The following fire and gas detection is in place:
RMS 1 to 4 and 6 to 10 RMS 5

H2S gas detection (DCS building) Break glass units (external) only
Smoke detection (DCS building)
Break glass units (external)
Actuation of any of these devices will alarm in the control room and ESD the respective
RMS.
Conclusion: Strategy level 1 is applicable to the Remote Manifold Stations.
5.4 Fire Scenario Development
This section needs to list the major fire scenarios identified after reviewing the facilities.
Those scenarios of a minor nature need not be listed individually if for these strategy
level 1 types the existing resources have been reviewed and are considered adequate.
Minor fire scenarios are those which can reasonably be expected to be dealt with by
operators or staff using available fire equipment. The equipment would not normally
exceed 1 or 2 extinguishers or a trolley extinguisher. Such minor fires may be a
limited hydrocarbon spill fire, refuse container fire, small office fire, refuse container fire
or relatively small, contained fires. Minor fire scenarios are equated to a FERM
strategy level 1.
Serious and major fire scenarios are those involving critical production equipment that
present potentially serious consequences and require specific protection or response
resources. Serious or major scenarios can be equated to a FERM strategy level 2, 3
or 4. The following procedure should be followed when filling out the work sheet.
3 Identify the consequences from each

4 Identify the existing FERM measures in place
5 Compare existing and required FERM measures for each scenario
6 Establish the fire response and training for fire response
7 Identify shortfalls in resources and training for fire response
The fire scenarios identified should then be listed. Section 6 of this guideline provides
examples of typical major fire scenarios. Guidance is provided below on how to
complete the resource levels for scenarios.
Page 17 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Resource Levels for Scenarios
The scenario worksheets contain quantities of resources identified for the particular fire
event described. The quantities should be based on:
Foam Concentrate
Calculations to be based on NFPA minimum application rates plus foam blanket
maintenance (top up) where required and considering foam capacity of foam monitors
or foam branches.
Fire Hose
Review the nearest hydrants which may be used, number of hose inlets in a portable
water monitor or portable foam monitor or foam branch.
Monitors
Judgemental based on practical fire ground experience and/or surface area or number
of exposure hazards to be cooled if for water monitors, or foam solution capacity if for
foam monitors.
Man Power
Based on the number of monitors or handlines to be deployed or SCBA to be used.
Typically, three men are needed for deploying a single monitor and fire hose to the
monitor, maintaining the flow direction of the water stream or for maintaining the foam
supply and direction of the foam stream. Where obviously practical, man power for
monitors are also used to supply foam concentrate to foam hand lines if they are also
in use.
For foam hand lines, typically, a minimum of 2 fire responders are needed for each
hand line excluding foam re-supply.
Vehicles
Generally, there is only one fire truck listed although a foam tanker may also be used.
Specialist Equipment
Mainly SCBA sets. Based on one set per person for scenarios where personnel may
be exposed to smoke conditions or atmospheres.
Serious and Major Fire Scenario Work Sheets
Serious and major fire scenarios are those involving critical production equipment that
present potentially serious consequences and require specific protection or response
resources. Serious or major scenarios can be equated to FERM strategy level 2, 3 or
4. The following lists the fire scenarios to be developed using an accepted scenario
work sheet format in order to:
8 Identify the consequences from each

9 Identify the existing FERM measures in place
10 Compare existing and required FERM measures for each scenario
11 Identify shortfalls in resources and training for fire response
A blank work sheet example showing the format and information requirement is shown
in Attachment I. Specific examples are shown in section 6.0
Page 18 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
5.5 Fire Protection Systems Maintenance and Testing
This section needs to identify the weekly, monthly, 3 monthly, 6 monthly and
annual maintenance requirements for each of the fire protection systems at the
site under consideration. It is intended for reference against the facility
EPMARS to ensure testing of systems hardware is carried out.
An example follows:
1. Fixed Semi-Sub Surface Foam Injection System (SSSFIS)
The following maintenance, inspections and tests and frequency applies to the
SSSFIS hardware either in addition to the existing maintenance requirements or
to enhance the requirements. The following considers the operating
environment, water supply and materials in use for the SSSFIS.
The fire and gas detection testing frequency and methods have been checked
and were generally found satisfactory:
1.1 Weekly
 Check all valves on the foam system and ensure they are all in the correct stand-by
positions;
 Inspect firewater supply system to ensure pressure and flow required for the
SSSFIS;
 Align valves to circulate foam concentrate back to tank, ensure foam discharge to
surge tank is fully isolated and run foam pump and verify the duplex gauge foam
pressure indicator is working;
 Check foam tank and fittings for leakage;
 Check storage temperature of foam concentrate to ensure it is within manufacturers
limits.
1.2 Monthly
 Inspect full system for physical wear and tear or damage;

 Remove, clean, inspect and reassemble foam concentrate line and sensing line
strainers;
 Check foam generators air inlet screens and clean if necessary;
 Align valves to circulate foam concentrate back to tank and ensure foam discharge
to surge tank is fully isolated then run foam pump and check for leakage, excessive
noise, vibration or overheating in the pump or driver motor;
 Ensure foam tank is isolated and water supply is isolated and cycle valves from the
control room fire and gas control panel or by manual override at valves;
 Inspect foam tank pressure/vacuum vent to ensure free movement and that screens
are clean.
1.3 3 Monthly
 Override solenoid switch for deluge valve operation

 Remove solenoid, inspect, clean and test operation
 Reassemble solenoid
 Reinstate actuation system to stand-by mode
1.4 6 Monthly
Page 19 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
 Check complete system, all valves, fittings and connections for leakage
 Check flange bolts for tightness
 Isolate and remove hose container from tank and inspect hose condition, and return
to service.
 Check system for any external damage to paint surfaces.
 Check supervision of control circuit and check air supply. Check low air supply alarm
and check for leakage/passing valve seats.
 Remove, clean, test and reassemble the pressure vacuum vent on the tank.
 Remove, clean, test and recalibrate the duplex foam/water gauge.
 Check that proper control system indicators are present, check supervision of all
circuits, check alarm operation, check system operation and check that all indicators
illuminate.
 Isolate duplex foam/water gauge and clean water and foam lines to gauge. Flush
and pressure test gauge for water and foam indications
1.5 Annually
 Carry out annual discharge test, ensuring discharge to surge tanks is fully isolated
and check foam solution proportioning, foam expansion and drainage in accordance
with NFPA 11.
 Check foam pump alignment in accordance with the manufacturers instructions
 Check that proper voltage is available at pump motor.
 Check motor for proper rotation and rotate pump by hand to ensure free movement.
 Check that foam pump can supply adequate pressure for the foam supply system by
observing the duplex water/foam gauge. The foam needle indicator (red) should be
approximately 1 barg higher than the water pressure.
 Remove water filter from line and clean, inspect for damage and reassemble.
 Strip, clean, test and reinstall the system deluge valves in accordance with
manufacturers instructions.
 Check foam pump relief valve setting for proper operation.
 Take sample of foam concentrate and submit for analysis on sedimentation,
corrosion, dilution or contamination to an approved foam supplier.
Page 20 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
2. Water Deluge System
 Following maintenance, inspections and tests and frequency applies to the water
deluge system either in addition to the existing maintenance requirements or to
enhance the requirements. The following considers the operating environment,
water supply and materials in use for the deluge system..
 The fire and gas detection frequency and methods have been checked and
generally found satisfactory:
2.1 Weekly
 Check all valves to ensure they are in the normal stand-by mode;
 Inspect firewater supply to ensure water supply will be operational if required;
 Check water supply and air supply valves for leakage;
 Check deluge valve pressure gauges to ensure pressure differential is maintained at
the required settings.
2.2 Monthly
 Check for system hardware wear and tear or physical damage;

 Check for corrosion at drain/weep holes on discharge piping;
 Check low air supply alarm for deluge valve;
2.3 3 Monthly
 Override or isolate executive actions on the fire detection and alarm panel;
 Override Solenoid switch for deluge valve operation
 Remove solenoid, inspect, clean and test operation
 Reassemble solenoid
 Test solenoid actuator on deluge valve;
 Actuate the system (from different detection or manual device each time) to check
each nozzle water pattern;
 Remove and clean any blocked water nozzle;
 Flush the discharge piping and nozzles;
 Remove terminal nozzles from the discharge piping array;
 Run deluge system for minimum 2 minutes with terminal nozzles and any blocked
nozzles removed for flushing purposes;
 Close water discharge valve;
 Reassemble all removed nozzles;
 Reset the deluge valve;
 Reinstate the fire detection system to normal operation;
 Ensure discharge piping drain/weep hole is functioning correctly.
2.4 6 Monthly
 Remove and clean water screen/filter and reassemble.
2.5 Annually
 Strip, clean, test and reinstall the deluge valve in accordance with manufacturers
instructions;
Page 21 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
3. Turbine Enclosure CO2 System
The following maintenance, inspections and tests and frequency applies to the CO2
system for the power station either in addition to the existing maintenance
requirements or to enhance the requirements..
3.1 Weekly
 Check all CO2 status lights are indicating outside the turbine enclosures
 Check system is on automatic release at F & G panel and at enclosures
 Check CO2 cylinders are in position and are securely fastened.
 Check slave cylinder is in position
 Check manual isolation device is available in the cylinder room
 Check there are no fault signals on the fire and gas panel for the generators
 Test automatic/manual switch at enclosure and ensure this indicates at F & G panel.
Return switch to automatic.
3.2 Monthly
 Check general condition of heat detectors,flame detectors and gas detectors in the
enclosures.
 Check enclosure doors are properly closed and door seal is in good condition.
3.3 6 Monthly
 Check cylinders CO2 content either by non intrusive level detection or by weighing
cylinders. Any cylinder showing a net loss of 10% or more should be refilled or
replaced.
 Check all piping and flexible hoses for wear and tear or damage.
 Ensure system is isolated if weighing cylinders
 Return system to service on completion of cylinder content checks.
 Check flame detectors positioning and ensure they are aimed in accordance with
design intent.
 Isolate or override flame detectors executive actions and test using UV test lighting
device.
 Reinstate UV executive alarms.
3.4 5 yearly
All high pressure hoses should be removed and tested by hydrotest to a

pressure of 175 barg. Pressure to be maintained for one minute. Any hose
and/or coupling developing a leak during this time should be replaced.
5.6 Pre-Fire Plans and Operator Response Sheets
This section of the FERM facility plan should contain pre-fire plans for each of
the scenarios identified in the fire scenario development section. In addition,
an operator response sheet is also required for each scenario developed.
Blank sheets for these are shown in Attachment II. Specific examples are
provided in section 6.
5.7 Fire Responder Competencies
Page 22 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
The fire responder competencies should be identified through the use of the
scenario work sheets in terms of the fire fighting or fire control strategy and
tactics which fire responders will have to apply and also in terms of the
hardware they may or will have to utilise as part of the tactics. Fire responder
competencies should be developed for each fire scenario identified. A blank
form for this is provided in Attachment III. Specific examples are provided in
section 6.
5.7.1 Fire Responder Fitness
To be analysed against the requirements laid down in EP 95-0351, Fire Control

and Recovery.
5.8 Shortfall Listing
This section should list all shortfalls identified during the preparation of the pre-
fire plan in comparison to the FERM ERD 88-02 requirements. The listing
should include statements regarding whether or not the shortfall is acceptable
and that a waiver from the ERD should be obtained. In those shortfalls which
are not acceptable, then a priority shall be assigned, together with personnel
designated for action.
Page 23 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Page 24 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
6.0 EXAMPLES
Some examples of work sheets, pre-fire plans, operator response sheets and
fire responder competencies are provided in this section.
6.1 Worksheets
Example worksheets are provided for the following typical fire scenarios:
 Full surface fire - coned roof tank.

 Rim seal fire - floating roof tank.
 Gas compressor.
Page 25 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
SCENARIO WORKSHEET
REFERENCE: XXX-1
FACILITY Crude Oil Dewatering
FERM STRATEGY LEVEL 3
PLANT/EQUIPMENT Tank T-XXX. One of two surge tanks. No sparing.

Tank is 27.5m diameter and 11.5m height. Tank
maximum capacity is 6830 m3.
FUNCTION Surge/Dewatering Duty Tank.

Normal duty is between 55% level and 80% level
at approximately 45oC. Both tanks serve as buffer
storage for approximately 5 hours.
SCENARIO Full surface “open can” fire occurs due to either

internal explosion or overfilling of tank. Tank roof
is either partly or wholly separated from tank shell.
Adjacent dewatering tank T-2613 roof affected by
radiant heat. Tank is full at time of fire event.
CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life safety Personnel not normally on the tank roof. If internal

explosion occurs, roof may totally separate
resulting in spiralling heavy object. Personnel in
the general area may be at risk from this event.
Radiant heat at grade level should not present a
life threatening condition from the full surface fire.
Environment Initially, smoke pollution only. Some crude may

have spilled into bund on roof separation but this
will be retained in bund.
Business interruption Immediate shutdown.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Involved tank damaged due to loss of roof and
burning surface. Immediate production deferment,
will be approximately 14,000 m3.
Escalation Route and Time Estimates
Adjacent surge/dewatering tank roof would be subjected to moderate radiant heat

which may result in roof damage or failure in the order of 50/60 minutes if no cooling
actions were taken. Radiant heat effects may increase if wind direction and speed
causes flame to tilt toward adjacent tank and therefore time to failure may be much less
than the above.
Page 26 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
If fire is not extinguished within first 1 or 2 hours, boilover will result some time after
this. Crude boilover may overflow tank bunds and then would involve adjacent surge
tank and possibly some of the bulk and/or test separators outside the tank bund.
Post Escalation
Life safety Fire responders may be fatally or seriously injured

if caught in the vicinity of a crude boilover.
Environment Ground pollution will occur if crude overflowed

bunds. Continued smoke pollution.
Business interruption Prolonged Station shutdown.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Loss of both surge tanks due to escalation.

Production deferment would be approximately
14,000 m3/day.
Page 27 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process Tank low and high level alarms. High level trips
tank inlet and outlet and causes hydrocarbon
ESD.
Fire Event Fusible plug heat detection ring on tank roof rim
with 3 pressure switches voting 2 out of 3 to
cause tank ESD, hydrocarbon ESD, site fire siren,
foam pump start and foam system valve to tank
opened.
Gas Event Not applicable for this event.
Mitigation
Process Controls Tank inlet/outlet valves, hydrocarbon ESD, Station

ESD.
Containment Tank acts as containment. Tank walls will fold

inward during fire event. Bund acts as
containment for oil spillage/release.
Drainage Bund drains provided and normally closed.
Passive Fire Control Single bund and intermediate bund between

tanks.
Active Fire Control Fixed automatic semi sub-surface injection foam

system serving both tanks. Quantity of foam
concentrate required in foam storage tank is not
precisely indicated but appears to be in the order
of 8,500 litres. (See section 2.2.5). Firewater
system taken from water injection header but it is
not known if the water pressure and supply can
be increased under fire/emergency conditions.
Fire hydrants in the general area of the tanks. No
fixed water monitors. 12 x fire boxes with typical
contents as 6 fire hose, 120 litres 3% fluoroprotein
foam concentrate, 1 x 225 lpm foam branch and
inductor and 1 x 450 lpm water branch.
Page 28 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Effectiveness of Fixed Fire Systems
Applicability of Type
Applicable for the type of tank and tank duty although a base injection system is the
preferred foam system for such tanks. Use of a Universal foam concentrate is
unnecessary as a standard approved fluoroprotein concentrate would be just as
effective.
System/Hardware Suitability
The firewater supply is pressure governed and during a test with a water monitor only 3
barg was achieved. It was stated that the pressure would rise after a short time but on
a later foam discharge test the pressure was again low. The foam discharged appeared
to be weak although visual indications cannot prove inaccurate proportioning. It is
therefore necessary to carry out tests as soon as practically possible to ensure correct
proportioning across a range of pressures. The foam concentrate storage tank has had
leaks and the tank level is difficult to read.
There is no clear level gauge and there is no information available as to the minimum
operating foam concentrate quantity which should be maintained in the tank. There are
3 high back pressure foam generators (HBPG) but one of these is normally valve
locked closed, acting as a stand-by for maintenance. Generally, the hardware is
suitable but there are shortfalls as noted.
Reliability
System has actuated in 1996 although cause was a spurious fire alarm. The design of
the foam hose deployment inside the tank is unknown, i.e. is it vertical, horizontal or
inclined ? Sludge build-up in the tank over the course of 5 years may prevent foam
hose deployment and thus prevent foam application on the tank fire. The foam inlet is
less than 1 metre from the tank base.
During a discharge test, the foam/water duplex gauge did not function, indicating
blocked water and foam lines. The drain valves for the gauge did not work, indicating
lack of effective maintenance.
Operability
System is automatic from heat detection or remote at control room or locally by

pneumatic switch actuation. System actuated during test when pressure was reduced
in the fusible plug line. There are no instructions posted at the foam station for manual
operation of the system or which valve to open for which tank. Also, the tank numbers
cannot be seen from the foam station.
There are questions over the pressures available from the water injection supply
header. The pressure regulators appear to be set at a maximum of 10 barg but on
testing it was obvious that the pressure was much lower than this.
This scenario envisages use of water monitors and a foam monitor that will result in an
obvious pressure drop. It is not clear if this will impact on the foam system and it is also
not clear if the control valves on the water supply header can be altered to meet water
demand under emergency conditions.
Page 29 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Survivability (in incident)
Foam inlets are at lower tank area. Roof separation would not affect foam system
operation unless roof blow-off descends and impacts on foam inlets or inlet piping.
FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Heat detection and alarm - Tank inlet/outlet ESD and hydrocarbon ESD - Operator
confirms fire event - Actuation of fixed foam system to affected tank - Fire brigade
response - Fire brigade deploy cooling water monitors on adjacent tank roof - Foam
application until extinguishment and thereafter until a secure foam blanket is achieved -
Fire brigade deploys foam monitor in case foam system requires supplementary
application - Fire brigade stand-by until incident declared over.
FIREFIGHTING TACTICS
Stage 1 Heat detector alarms in control room. Operators confirm fire event and
ensure tank ESD has initiated and foam system has actuated. Control
room selects relevant pre-fire plan and ensures site alarm has activated
and alerts fire brigade.
Stage 2 Fire brigade selects relevant pre-fire plan and responds to incident.
Stage 3 Control rooms alerts LEBC who designates OSC for the incident and
requests call out of emergency team.
Stage 4 Fire brigade deploys and actuates cooling water monitors on adjacent
tank roof to prevent potential fire escalation.
Stage 5 Fire brigade deploys foam monitor in event additional foam application is
required.
Stage 6 OSC monitors fire size and severity for foam system control impact and
ensures water streams are not affecting foam application.
Stage 7 Foam system application continued until extinguishment and thereafter

to ensure a secure foam blanket is achieved on the liquid surface.
Stage 8 Fire brigade actuate portable foam monitor if fire is controlled by foam
system but not fully extinguished due to fire trap areas of folded tank
shell maintaining minor fire pockets.
Stage 9 Fire brigade checks to ensure fire is totally extinguished and a secure
foam blanket is achieved.
Stage 10 Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over and stand-down is
announced.
Page 30 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Resources for Other than Fire Response Group
Detection
Process As Existing FERM measures
Fire Event As Existing FERM measures
Gas Event Not applicable.
Alarm system
For Operator Tank level alarms, Heat detection alarm and Site
Alarm
For Fire Brigade Emergency Team Pager Call Out
Process Control As existing FERM measures
Passive Fire Protection As existing FERM measures
Active Fire Protection As existing FERM measures plus:-

Method and procedures for additional firewater
supply/pressure under emergency conditions.
Instructions on manual operation of foam system.
Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow 3457 lpm for affected tank from fixed foam
system.
3500 lpm for propane accumulator water deluge
system which will actuate on surge tank heat
detection.
Total = 6,957 lpm
Resources for Fire Brigade
Procedures Pre-fire plans

Emergency response procedures
Hose 12 x 70mm x 20m fire hose for water monitors.

12 x 70mm x 20m fire hose for foam monitor.
Total of 24 x 70mm x 20 delivery fire hose.
Monitors 2 x 3000 lpm water monitor

1 x 3400 lpm foam monitor
Foam Concentrate 5880 litres 3% AFFF for T-2623
Page 31 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
3060 litres 3% FP for foam monitor (if used)
Total = 5,880 litres 3% AFFF

3,060 litres 3% FP.
Specialist Equipment None
Manpower 6 fire responders for portable water monitors

3 fire responders for foam monitor
Total of 9 fire responders
Vehicles 1 x fire truck

1 x 9000 litre 3% flouroprotein foam tanker
Port. Equip. Water Flow 6000 lpm for water monitors

3400 lpm for foam monitor (if used)
Total = 9,400 lpm
Fixed and Port. Total Flow 3,457 lpm for fixed foam system
3,500 lpm for water deluge system
6,000 lpm for water monitors
3,400 lpm for foam monitor (if used)
Total = 16,357 lpm.
Total Water Quantity 190 m3 for fixed foam system (55 minutes)
(fixed & portable) 105 m3 for water deluge system (30 minutes)
360 m3 for portable water monitors (60 minutes)
99 m3 for foam monitor (30 minutes - supporting
the foam system if necessary).
Total = 754 m3.
Page 32 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
SHORTFALLS IN EXISTING FERM & STRATEGY LEVEL
The following are listed as shortfalls in either procedures, hardware or resources when
compared to the facility FES Strategy Level or the FERM ERD 88-02 as noted during
the development of this scenario worksheet.
i) The operators do not have the necessary fire training to act as back-up for the
fixed systems or to assist the fire brigade. Reliance for back-up rests solely with
the fire brigade who may be on stand-by at the airstrip when this scenario
develops.
ii) Fire cabinets and equipment within intended for operator use but operators are
not trained to use equipment in boxes. (FES Strategy Level 3 Issue)
iii) A total of 9 fire responders are required for this scenario. There are only 5 fire
brigade personnel to respond and the operators cannot back-up the fire brigade
due to lack of training in use of monitors and hose handling etc.
iv) Firewater supply taken from water injection system. Pressure is controlled via
pressure control valves (3 of) but there are no fire pumps. This is a deviation
but may be acceptable provided pressure and flow can be maintained under
emergency conditions.
v) The maximum firewater demand for this scenario is 16,357 lpm but the design
firewater supply is listed as 12,000 lpm (720 m3/h) @ 10 barg. There is no
known procedure or method for increasing firewater pressure/supply under
emergency conditions where additional water is required. Although not listed in
the ERD, this would be part of a requirement for fire water pumps. (ERD
4.5.1.4.)
vi) There are no instructions on the operation of the fixed foam system at the foam
station. These should be provided. (ERD 4.6.3.2)
vii) No labelling of main valve functions on the foam system. (ERD 4.6.3.2)
viii) No sight glass on foam concentrate tank (ERD - 4.6.3.2)
ix) It is understood that there is a sludge build up in the tanks over the course of 5
years. It is possible, given the low location of the foam injection system inlets,
that depending on the design of the foam inlet within the tank (vertical bend or
straight pipe inlet) sludge will prevent or obstruct the deployment of the foam
hose in the tank. It is necessary to check the inside of a tank to ensure the foam
hose can be deployed.
x) The foam system flexible hose inspection quoted as every 5 years when tank is
down for maintenance but it is possible to remove the hose container and
visually inspect the hose as there is a tank isolation valve downstream of hose
unit and this should be done. (ERD 4.6.)
xi) An annual foam discharge is carried out but the necessary proportioning,
expansion or drainage tests are not being carried out. (ERD 4.6.4.1)
Page 33 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
xii) There is no foam test kit for proportioning, expansion and drainage testing
(ERD 4.6.4.1)
xiii) The minimum foam concentrate quantity to be maintained in the foam system
tank is unknown. There appears to be approximately 8,500 litres but this is not
confirmed and the design quantity is not listed in the foam system installation
manual. Calculations (See below) illustrate that a minimum of 5880 litres should
be in the tank and as per NFPA there should also be 100% of this quantity
available within 24 hours. (See also Section 2.2.5) There is no exact heading
for this in the ERD but generally this is covered under 4.6., Foam Systems.
xiv) Spare foam concentrate is located in drums at the foam station but there is no
identification of the concentrate type or expiry date or UL approvals normally
associated with approved foam concentrate supplies. The source of the foam
concentrate is unknown. It appears to be a polymer AFFF (Universal type) but
this cannot be confirmed without detailed analysis. It is possible that this
concentrate is decanted from the original manufacturers drums but this is not
confirmed.
The original concentrate in the system was a Universal 3 & 6% AFFF foam for
use at 3% on hydrocarbon fires and 6% for polar solvent fuels. This is a
polymer based concentrate. It is unclear if the spare drums concentrate is the
same type and if it has UL approvals etc.
Page 34 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
SCENARIO XXX-1
CRUDE SURGE/DEWATERING TANK FULL SURFACE FIRE

FOAM/WATER CALCULATIONS SHEET
USING FIXED FOAM SYSTEM AND PORTABLE FOAM MONITOR
Fire Area (Tank Dia. 27.5m) 594 m2
Foam Concentrate 3% AFFF
System Design Application Rate 6 lpm/m2 (Taken from Installation Manual)
Total Application Rate 594 x 6 = 3564 lpm/m2.
Foam Application Time 55 minutes
Total Concentrate Required 3564 x 0.03 x 55 = 5,880 litres
Total Water Required 3564 - 107 (3%) x 55 = 190 m3
Portable Foam Monitor Application
Foam Monitor Capacity 3,400 lpm
Application Time 30 minutes
Total Concentrate Required 3,400 x 0.03 x 30 = 3,060 litres
Total Water Required 3400 - 102 (3%) x 30 minutes = 99 m3
Page 35 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
SCENARIO WORKSHEET
REFERENCE: XXX-2
FACILITY Crude Oil Dehydration
PLANT/EQUIPMENT Tank T-XXXX. One of six floating roof tanks. No

sparing. Tank is 29.2m diameter and 14.6m
height. Tank maximum capacity is 8586 m3.
FUNCTION Crude Oil Dehydration Tank.

Normal duty is between 55% level and 60% level
at approximately 40oC. One of six dehydration
tanks.
SCENARIO Rim seal fire occurs on tank T-XXXX. Tank is 60%

(5140 m3) full at time of fire event. Overfilling of
tank. Adjacent dehydration tanks are all almost full
under normal operating conditions.
CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life Safety Personnel not normally on the tank floating roof.

Immediate life safety risk is considered low.
Environment Smoke pollution only. Fire is contained in the tank

rim seal area.
Business interruption Immediate shutdown on detection of rim seal fire,

plus all incoming oil MOV/ESDV from all areas will
close-in.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Involved tank seal damaged due to fire.

Production deferments from all gathering stations
when surge tanks and storage tank high levels
are reached.
Rim seal fires have burned for several hours without escalation and in at least two
known cases, for more than 24 hours without escalation. However, this was due to the
high standard of effective maintenance of the tanks involved and it should not be
assumed that these time frames would apply to every floating roof tank rim seal fire.
The main concern is that if the fire is unchecked it will continue around the full seal
circumference and thereafter the flame impingement would affect the tank shell and
roof. It is therefore prudent to expect escalation within a few hours if no fire control or
extinguishing actions are taken. Escalation would occur if the roof tilted/jammed or
sank, creating a full surface fire event.
Page 36 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Post Escalation
Life Safety Fire responders on the gaugers platform may be

injured by burns if they are at the tank top when
the roof jams or tilts. Such an event should be
noticeable and therefore the risk to responders is
considered low.
Environment Continued smoke pollution. Fire would still be

contained.
Business interruption Prolonged shutdown.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Loss of affected dehydration tank due to

escalation. Production deferment for all areas will
be approximately 70,000 m3/day.
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process Tank low, high and high-high level alarms. High-

high level trips tank inlets and all incoming oil lines
and causes Station ESD.
Fire Event Halon fusible plug detection.

New fusible plug heat detection ring provided
around tank rim seal area with 3 pressure
switches voting 2 out of 3 to cause total ESD. This
new detection system is installed but not yet
commissioned.
Gas Event Not applicable for this event.
Mitigation
Process Controls Tank inlet/outlet valves, Station ESD remote from

control room and automatic on rim seal point heat
detection.
Containment Tank acts as containment for rim seal fire.
Drainage Bund drains provided and normally closed.
Passive Fire Control The primary seal and secondary seal material
specification could not be confirmed during the
study. It is doubtful if the material is fire retardant.
Active Fire Control Fixed automatic halon system provided for the rim
seal area. Fixed manually operated rim seal foam
pourer system using balanced pressure
proportioning. Foam system concentrate tank
holds 1370 litres of 3% fluoroprotein.
Page 37 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Firewater system supplied from dedicated

firewater tank.
Fire hydrants in the general area of the.
6 x fire boxes strategically located throughout the
facility. Each box typically contains
1 x 250 lpm foam branch, 3 x 20 litre fluoroprotein
3% foam concentrate drums, 1 x 450 lpm water
branch, 4 x 70mm x 20m delivery fire hose.
Halon is being phased out and the rim seal foam system is designed to replace the
halon system.
Foam system is applicable for the type of tank and rim seal. An automatic system
would be more appropriate considering the low manning levels and the absence of fire
crews (airstrip stand-by) during daylight hours.
Foam system hardware is suitable for a fixed manually operated system but better
weather protection of the system is necessary to prevent foam concentrate
deterioration and overall hardware wear and tear, especially valve identification and
instructions.
Reliability
Foam system has been commissioned in May 1998. With this type of system it is
necessary to either regularly flush the foam pump with clean water (weekly) and
maintain a dry foam pump or if pump permanenelty flooded with concentrate then
regularly turn the pump over and cycle the foam concentrate back to foam tank. Given
the operating environment, it is important that a high frequency of foam pump flushing
or circulation running is provided, otherwise this system will become very unreliable.
Operability
Foam system is manual only and requires operators or firefighters to actuate during a
fire event. There are no instructions on how to operate the system and there are no
foam tank valve and system valve identification labels. The original labels have been
damaged or the combination of sand and heat has erased them.
Foam system pourers are above the rim seal and therefore above the fire area. If the
tank roof is high and the rim seal fire is high the pourers may be subjected to radiant
heat and damage. Therefore it is important that the foam system is actuated as quickly
as possible to extinguish the fire.
Page 38 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Heat detection and alarm and halon discharge - Tank inlet/outlet ESD, Station ESD -
Operator confirms fire event - Actuation of fixed foam system to affected tank - Fire
brigade response - Fire responders check if rim seal fire is extinguished and a secure
foam blanket is achieved in the rim seal area - Portable foam application into rim seal
to support fixed system application if required - Fire brigade stand-by until incident
declared over.
Stage 1 Rim seal heat detection alarms in control room. Operators confirm fire
event and halon discharge and ensure tank ESD and Station ESD has
initiated. Control room selects relevant pre-fire plan and ensures site
alarm has activated and alerts fire responders.
Stage 2 Fire responders select relevant pre-fire plan and responds to incident.
Stage 3 Control rooms alerts LEBC who designates OSC for the incident and
requests call out of emergency team.
Stage 4 Operator actuates the rim seal foam system for the affected tank.
Stage 5 Fire responders don SCBA and ascend tank and check to ensure rim
seal fire is extinguished and foam application covers all the foam dam
area.
Stage 6 Fire responders in SCBA run a foam handline to the tank top and apply
foam into the rim seal to support the rim seal system if necessary. (This
may require responders to move on to the roof as there is no wind girder
(walkway) around the tanks)
Stage 7 OSC verifies fire is extinguished and a secure foam blanket is achieved
in the rim seal foam dam area.
Stage 8 Rim seal foam dam blanket is topped up to ensure foam blankert is
maintained effectively, acting as a vapour suppression blanket.
Stage 9 Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over and stand-down is
announced.
Detection
Process As Existing FERM measures
Fire Event As Existing FERM measures
Gas Event Not applicable.
Page 39 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Alarm system
For Operator Tank high and high-high level alarms, Heat

detection alarm.
Site Alarm
Process Control As Existing FERM measures
Passive Fire Protection As Existing FERM measures
Active Fire Protection As Existing FERM measures and also removal of

halon system for the tanks.
Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow 700 lpm for affected tank from fixed foam system.
Total = 700 lpm
Page 40 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13

Emergency response procedures
Hose 8 x 70mm x 20m fire hose for foam handline.
Total of 8 x 70mm x 20m delivery fire hose.
Monitors None.
Foam Concentrate 420 litres 3% fluoroprotein for rim seal.

270 litres 3% fluoroprotein for handlines.
Total = 690 litres.
Specialist Equipment Minimum 4 x SCBA sets
Manpower 2 fire responders for foam handline

2 fire responders for support/stand-by
1 fire responder for foam concentrate supply
Total of 5 fire responders
Vehicles 1 x fire truck

1 x 6300 litre 3% flouroprotein foam tanker
Port. Equip. Water Flow 450 lpm for foam handline.
Total = 450 lpm
Fixed and Port. Total Flow 700 lpm for fixed foam system
450 lpm for foam handline
Total = 1,150 lpm.
Total Water Quantity 14 m3 for fixed foam system (20 minutes)

(fixed & portable) 9 m3 for foam handline (20 minutes)
9 m3 for foam blanket top-up
Total = 32 m3.
Page 41 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
i) The operators do not have the necessary fire training to act as back-up for the
fixed foam system or to assist the fire brigade. Reliance for back-up rests solely
with the fire brigade who stand-by for most of the daylight hours at the airstrip,
about 17 km distant and may be there when this scenario develops. (Strategy
Level 3 Issue)
ii) Fire cabinets and equipment within are intended for operator use but operators
are not trained to use equipment in boxes. (FES Strategy Level 3 Issue)
iii) There are no instructions on the operation of the fixed foam system at the foam
station and no valve labels or descriptions. These should be provided. (ERD
4.6.3.2)
iv) Fire crews are not trained in the use of the fixed foam system.
v) Fire crews are not trained to use foam handlines on a rim seal fire or for moving
on to a floating roof tank.
vi) The foam system is not fully protected against direct sunlight and sand erosion.
This is leading to poor system condition.
vii) The temperature varations are causing water condensation on the tank inside
cover which is affecting the foam concentrate. This is due to inadequate
weather protection.
viii) It is understood that the commissioning tests for the fixed foam system did not
include a foam proportioning, expansion or drainage test. This could not be
confirmed during the study period. (ERD 4.6.4.1)
ix) It is understood that there is no foam test kit for proportioning, expansion and
drainage testing (ERD 4.6.4.1)
x) Foam was discharged from the valve manifold connection during a brief flow
test (not to the tanks) and although there was no method of checking the quality
or proportioning of the foam the visual observations raised doubts over the
produced foam effectiveness for firefighting, mainly due to the firewater
contamination.
xi) There is no clear responsibility for the maintenance of the hardware/mechanical

components of fixed foam system.
Page 42 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
SCENARIO XXX-2
DEHYDRATION TANK RIM SEAL FIRE

USING FIXED FOAM SYSTEM AND PORTABLE FOAM HANDLINE
Tank Dia. 29.2 m
Tank Circumference 95 m
Foam Dam Distance 0.6 m
Foam Dam Area 95 x 0.6 = 57 m2
Foam Concentrate 3% Fluoroprotein
System Design Application Rate 12.2 lpm/m2 (NFPA)
Total Application Rate 57 x 12.2 = 700 lpm.
Foam Application Time 20 minutes
Total Concentrate Required 700 x 0.03 x 20 = 420 litres
Total Water Required 700 - 21 (3%) x 20 = 13.5 m3
Portable Foam Handline Application
Foam Branch Capacity 450 lpm
Application Time 20 minutes
Total Concentrate Required 450 x 0.03 x 20 = 270 litres
Total Water Required 450 - 14 (3%) x 20 minutes = 8.7m3
Page 43 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
SCENARIO WORKSHEET
REFERENCE: XXX-3
FACILITY Gas Conditioning Unit
PLANT/EQUIPMENT Propane Compressor K-XXX. Single compressor.

No sparing, no stand-by.
FUNCTION Propane compressor for refrigerant gas

sweetening facilities. Normal discharge pressure
is approximately 20 barg at 5oC. Loss of
compressor would result in heavy flaring
requirement and probable shut down in the long
term but oil production could continue in the short
term.
SCENARIO Propane release from the compressor or

associated vessels/equipment on discharge side
and ignition results in a jet fire in the order of 25
metres in length. Jet flame diffuses against
compressor suction and interstage scrubber
vessels. Heat detection on compressor activates
compressor ESD, gas conditioning ESD and
water deluge system for propane accumulator. No
hydrocarbon ESD. A hole size of 25mm on the
high pressure side would release in the order of 3
kg/second.
CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life safety Personnel not normally in the gas conditioning

area. Personnel in the general area may be at risk
from radiant heat on ignition. Compressor is on
upper level but two escape routes provided.
Grade level Pumps area is open on all sides. Life
safety risk is considered low.
Environment Smoke pollution only.
Business interruption Immediate propane compressor and gas

conditioning ESD. No hydrocarbon ESD but
operators would probably shut down the station
for such an incident.
Page 44 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Damage to insulation and instrument fittings and

cabling on compressor and associated equipment.
Would shutdown immediately with resultant initial
production deferment of approximately 14,000
m3/day.
Escalation would be caused by a prolonged jet fire or diffused gas fire impinging on
adjacent gas containing piping or scrubber vessels or the propane accumulator vessel.
For gas jet fires, time to failure of other equipment would typically be in the order of 10
minutes or less for piping and vessels if no cooling or control actions are taken. Gas jet
flame impingement would involve radiant heat levels of up to 300 kW/m2. It should be
noted that cooling must be effective where the flame impingement occurs rather than
having a light water screen for radiant heat general protection.
Post Escalation
Life safety Fire responders will be at serious risk if flame

impingment occurs on gas containing piping or
equipment and no cooling takes place. All non-fire
responders should have evacuated the station.
Environment Smoke pollution only.
Business interruption Total station oil and gas shutdown due to hazards
presented by potential explosions and BLEVE’s.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Loss of propane compressor, vessels and piping

would result in several months shutdown.
Production may be permitted for several days or
more without gas sweeting facility but wet gas
export and heavy flaring would eventually impact
on equipment and enviroment. Therefore,
production would be halted. Production deferment
for gas conditioning down time would be
approximately 14,000 m3/day.
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process Compressor has seal gas leak detection alarm,

vibration monitor alarm, high temperature alarm,
low pressure suction and high pressure discharge
alarms as well as suction low flow alarms.
Fire Event Single heat detector located over compressor will

cause a compressor ESD and gas conditioning
ESD, will activate the propane accumulator water
deluge valve and site fire siren.
Page 45 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Gas Event No gas detection provided.
Mitigation
Process Controls Compressor has seal gas leak detection trip,

vibration monitor trip, high temperature trip, low
pressure suction trip/high pressure discharge trip
and suction low flow trip.
Containment Not applicable.
Drainage No spill drainage. Compressor base slab drains

away from centres out to open ground areas.
Passive Five Control Adjacent propane accumulator has fireproofing of

vessel saddles/support. No passive protection on
vessel or compressor associated vessels.
Active Fire Control Firewater system taken from water injection

header but it is unknown if the water supply can
be increased under fire/emergency conditions.
Fire hydrants in the general area of the export
pumps. No fixed water monitors. 12 x fire boxes
with typical contents as 6 fire hose, 120 litres 3%
fluoroprotein foam concentrate, 1 x 225 lpm foam
branch and inductor and 1 x 450 lpm water
branch.
Effectiveness of Fixed Fire System (for Propane Accumulator Vessel)
Applicability of type
Water deluge system is applicable for cooling gas vessels and protecting from radiant
heat where no gas jet impingement is anticipated. Gas jet fires, being pressurised, can
penetrate a water screen and cause vessel failure. The most effective method of
protection where gas jet fires may impinge is passive fire protective coatings.
However, the location of the propane accumulator to the high pressure propane
compressor is such that gas jet fire impingment is not likely. Any gas jet fire would
diffuse on the suction and interstage scrubber vessels in between the compressor and
the accumulator. These vessels will depressurise/blowdown but they should still be
cooled if this scenario occurs.
The fixed system hardware consists of open ended deluge nozzles with system kept
normally dry. There are no terminal flushing connections on the branch lines to ensure
solids are flushed out.
Reliability
The system failed to operate from a heat detector during a test requested by the study
team. The control room fire and gas panel indicated the system was activated and this
Page 46 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
led the operators to believe the system was working since the panel was indicating this
was the case.
The manual pneumatic valve had to be actuated at the deluge valve station to make
the system work. The pneumatic valve release solenoid switch was defective. In
addition to this defect, 10 of the 35 deluge nozzles failed to operate due to nozzle
blockage by either corrosion particles or other solids. It is necessary to provide screw
plugs or valves at the terminals of the deluge pipe branches to permit flushing after
use. This will reduce, though not eliminate nozzle blockage.
Operability
Automatic, remote manual and local manual operation all by pneumatic release.
However, from known jet fire potential, the manual actuation at the deluge valve station
is within radiant heat levels of 37kW/m2 and above from a jet fire event on the propane
accomulator vessel or associated equipment. The maximum radiant heat level allowed
at a deluge station is 5 kW/m2 and therefore radiation protective screening is
considered necessary.
If a jet fire impinges on the system piping or valving for <5 minutes without water flow
then system may fail.
An additional concern is that if a large propane liquid release occurs on the

accumulator this may quickly migrate toward the deluge valve controls because the
vessel slab slopes toward the water deluge valve. Calculations should be made to
check if pool migration to the valve assembly is possible.
Heat detection and alarm - Compressor and gas conditioning ESD - Operator confirms
fire event - Actuation of fixed water deluge for propane accumulator - Fire brigade
response - Fire brigade deploy portable water monitor to cool any heat affected
exposures - Cooling maintained until depressurisation - Fire brigade stand-by until
incident is declared over.
Stage 1 Heat detector alarms in control room. Operators

confirm fire event and ensure compressor and gas
conditioning unit ESD. Control room selects
relevant pre-fire plan and ensures site alarm has
actuated and alerts fire brigade.
Stage 2 Fire brigade selects relevant pre-fire plan and

responds to incident.
Stage 3 Control room alerts LEBC who designates OSC

for the incident and requests call out of
emergency team.
Page 47 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Stage 4 Fire brigade arrive and ensure propane

accumulator vessel water deluge is activated.
Stage 5 Fire brigade deploy and actuate portable water

monitors to cool heat/fire affected vessels and
piping.
Stage 6 Fire brigade evacuates to a safe distance to await

gas depressurisation.
Stage 7 Cooling operations maintained until

depressurisation of gas fire. Any residual minor
gas flame extinguished by dry powder
extinguisher if considered safe to do so.
Stage 8 Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared

over and stand-down announced.
Page 48 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Detection
Process As Existing FERM measures.
Fire Event As Existing FERM measures.
Gas Event Point flammable gas detection for propane

compressor.
Alarm system
For Operator Low flow alarms, high pressure alarms, vibration

alarms, high temperature alarms on compressor.
Heat detection alarm.
Site Alarm.
Process Control As Existing FERM measures.
Passive Fire Protection As Existing FERM.
Active Fire Protection As Existing FERM measures plus:

Method and procedures for additional firewater
supply and pressure under emergency conditions.
Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow Estimated at approximately 3,500 lpm based on a

total of 35 spray nozzles @ 100 lpm.

Emergency response procedures.
Hose 12 x 70mm x 20m fire hose for water monitor.
Total = 12 x 70mm delivery fire hose.
Monitors 2 x 3000 lpm portable water monitors.
Foam Concentrate Not applicable for this scenario.
Specialist equipment Not applicable for this scenario.
Manpower 6 fire responders for setting up two water

monitors.
Total of 6 fire responders.
Page 49 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Vehicles 1 x fire truck.
Port. Equip. Water Flow 6000 lpm for water monitors.
Total = 6,000 lpm
Fixed and Port. Total Flow 3500 lpm for fixed water deluge system
6000 lpm for water monitors
Total = 9,500 lpm
Total Water Quality 105 m3 for water deluge system (30 minutes)
180 m3 for water monitors (30 minutes)
Total = 285 m3.
a) Existing fire response personnel limited to 5 only. A minimum 6 responders are

required for this scenario.
b) The operators do not have the necessary fire training to act as back-up for the fixed
systems. Reliance for back-up rests solely with the fire brigade who may be on
stand-by or out on maintenance work or at the airstrip when this scenario develops.
c) Radiant heat potential from a gas jet fire on the propane accumulator in the direction
of the water deluge valve will exceed the limit of 5 kW/m2. (ERD 4.5.2.2) there is no
protection for personnel who may have to manually operate the deluge system.
d) 10 of the 35 water deluge nozzles for the propane accumulator were blocked during
a functional test of the system. The reduced water coverage was inadequate to
provide protection under fire conditons. (Fire Equipment Maintenance).
e) No point combustible gas detectors at the propane compressor (ERD Appendix D,
page 57). Criticality of compressor and associated equipment for production is such
that earliest possible gas release alarm should be considered.
f) The water deluge valves on the discharge piping are correctly wire padlocked in the
open position but the valve can actually be closed with this wire and padlock in
place.
g) Fire cabinets and equipment within are intended for operator use but operators are
not trained to use equipment in boxes.
h) No known procedure or method for increasing firewater pressure/supply under
emergency conditions.
i) No reference to gas detection in ERD for propane vessels (propane accumulator).
j) The propane accumulator vessel slab slopes to allow drainage of a propane liquid
release but the slope is toward the deluge supply piping and valve assembly and
Page 50 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
disable the system. The ERD does not have reference to the provision of sloping
drainage under LPG vessels but this is an acceptable practice provided the slope is
not directed to protective systems or potential escalation areas. This should be
mentioned in the ERD.
6.2 Pre-Fire Plan
An example of a pre-fire plan for a surge tank or full surface fire follows:
Page 51 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
PRE-FIRE PLAN FOR SURGE TANKS T-XXXX OR TXXX FULL SURFACE FIRE
FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY : Operator confirms fire in tank - Tanks inlet/outlet ESD and hydrocarbon ESD - Actuation of fixed foam system - Fire brigade response - Fire brigade
deploy portable water monitors for cooling adjacent tank roof - Fixed system foam application until extinguishment and thereafter until a secure foam blanket is achieved - Fire brigade
deploys foam monitor in case foam system requires supplementary application - Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over.
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE ACTIONS RESOURCES REQUIRED
[ ] Control Room Operator Request fire alarm fire confirmation Outside operator to confirm fire event.
[ ] Control Room Operator Verify or activate site fire siren Use control room fire siren switch if necessary.
[ ] Control Room Operator Alert fire brigade to respond to incident Radio, telephone or pager call out.
[ ] Control Room Operator Alert LEBC and advise nature of incident Telephone, radio or pager call out.
[ ] LEBC Request emergency team response Emergency pager call out button in control room or individual telephone
[ ] Control Room Operator Check fixed foam system valves have activated numbers.
[ ] Control Room Operator Check ESD is initiated for tanks and station and inform LEBC Control room fire and gas panel
of status of shutdown Radio or telephone.
[ ] LEBC Designate an OSC
Radio contact or control room telephone.
1st RESPONSE ACTIONS RESOURCES REQUIRED
[ ] OSC or designated person Check personnel evacuation status for missing persons Personnel Log Book in control room
[ ] OSC or designated person Verify fire size/severity and any obvious immediate hazards Radio in vehicle with external loudspeaker
and advise LEBC
[ ] OSC or designated person Ensure fixed foam system is operating correctly Fixed semi-sub surface foam system pump and valves. Manual pneumatic
valves can be actuated at the foam skid if required. Foam system tank requires
[ ] OSC or designated person a minimum of 5880 litres foam concentrate for injection into one tank. 100%
quantity should be available for refilling within 24 hours.
Ensure both tank bund drains are closed. Tank bund drains.
2nd RESPONSE ACTIONS RESOURCES REQUIRED
[ ] Fire Brigade Deploy/actuate cooling water monitors on next tank roof. 2 x 3000 lpm water monitors, 24 x 70mm x 20m delivery fire hose.
[ ] OSC Check foam system effectiveness in reducing and controlling Visual assessment of fire size reduction. Foam system to be run for a minimum
tank fire and advise LEBC. of 55 minutes. Should be signs of fire control after approximately 30 minutes.
If no visible fire reduction after 55 minutes then foam system obviously not
[ ] OSC Ensure cooling water does not drift into tank being foamed. effective.
[ ] Fire Brigade Deploy foam monitor in readiness to support foam system
application in case some “fire traps” remain under tank shell1 x 3400 lpm portable foam monitor, 12 x 70mm x 20 m delivery fire hose and
folds which the foam system cannot fully extinguish. minimum 2040 litres 3% foam concentrate for 20 minutes supply foam
monitor.
OTHER ACTIONS/CONCERNS: Cooling of adjacent unaffected tank is necessary to prevent tank roof damage and protect tank integrity. To check if cooling is required, play a water
stream on to the roof and if steaming occurs, the roof needs to be cooled. If foam system does not achieve extinguishment after 55 minutes then all personnel should evacuate the
LPS and await boilover event. Crude oil and water pumpout from affected tank should be commenced as soon as it is obvious that foam extinguishment has failed. Pump out will not
prevent a boilover but may reduce the fireball and fire spread extent.
ONGOING POTENTIAL HAZARDS : Crude oil boilover will occur if tank fire extinguishment is unsuccessful. Boilover event may overflow bund walls.
Fireball may achieve heights of 100m with resultant high radiant heat levels dangerous to fire responders and observers.
Probable escalation involving adjacent tank or separators once a boilover occurs. More than one boilover is possible . Personnel should not re-enter LPS after a first or second
boilover. The fire incident will only be safe once the tank fire, or fires, are burned out.
Page 52 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
6.3 Operator Response
An example of an operator resoponse sheet for a surge tank or full surface fire
follows:
Page 54 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
OPERATOR RESPONSE FOR LPS SURGE TANKS T-XXXX OR T-XXXX FULL SURFACE FIRE
FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY
Operator confirms fire in tank - Tanks inlet/outlet ESD and hydrocarbon ESD - Operator confirms fire event - Actuation of fixed foam system - Fire brigade response
- Fixed system foam application until extinguishment and thereafter until a secure foam blanket is achieved - Fire brigade deploys foam monitor in case foam
system requires supplementary application - Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over.
CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR RESPONSE ACTIONS
1 Request outside operator to confirm fire in tank
2 Verify siren has activated or activate if necessary
3 Alert fire brigade to respond to incident
4 Alert LEBC and advise nature of incident
5 Alert Emergency Team if advised by
6 Check tanks foam system valves have actuated and advise LEBC
7 Check ESD operated for tanks and station - confirm to LEBC shutdown status.
8 Await further instructions from LEBC and act accordingly.
Page 55 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
6.4 Fire Responders Competencies
An example of a fire responders competencies for a surge tank or full surface

fire follows:
Page 56 of79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
FIRE RESPONDERS COMPETENCIES FOR: SURGE TANKS T-XXXX and T-XXXX FULL SURFACE FIRE
KEY ELEMENTS REQUIRED:
Knowledge of operations emergency plan, emergency team composition, chain of command.
Knowledge of firewater supply system for station .
Understanding of the need and use of personal protective equipment (PPE) for firefighting and emergency incident response.
Location of surge tanks within station, tanks construction and function and concept of pump out under emergency conditions.
Knowledge of location and manual operation of surge tanks foam system, minimum duration of foam system application on a surge tank and reasons for this.
Use of portable water and foam monitors, fire hose, fire hydrants and foam tanker for foam monitor concentrate supply.
Use of water for cooling heat affected plant and equipment, correct foam application rates for foam monitor application and application methods.
Knowledge of mechanisms of crude boilover and potential fire escalation by crude oil boilover and associated hazards
COMPETENCIES
RESPONDER KNOWS:
 Area emergency plan, emergency team members and team call out system, emergency incident command structure and fire responder responsibilities.
 Station firewater system normal flowrate and pressures, the location of firewater system isolation valves, how to use a fire hydrant safely and how to avoid water hammer.
 Function of surge tanks and basic tank design including roof-to-seam design and main gas and oil piping connections.
 Types of portable water monitor and foam monitor in use at the station in particular and the area in general.
 Types of delivery fire hose and connections in use at the station and the area.
 Types of fire hydrants and number of hydrant outlets on hydrants at the LPS.
 Types of foam in use at the station in the surge tank foam system and in the station fire cabinets and their correct proportioning ratio.
 Types of portable foam inductors and foam branches in use in the station and the station area and their respective flowrates and pressures.
 Hazards associated with crude oil boilover events.
RESPONDER IS ABLE TO:
 Identify fire response personal protective equipment.
 Describe surge tank pump out under emergency conditions and how this may affect boilover damage.
 Identify all valves on fixed foam system to operate system manually at the foam station.
 Explain what is meant by the terms “boilover and pump-out”.
 Identify time before a 20 litre foam concentrate drum is empty using a given a portable foam branch.
 Deploy and actuate water and foam monitors in use at the station in a safe and stable manner as part of a two man team and as one man.
 Describe the objectives of cooling a fixed roof tank and explain where water streams should be directed to achieve maximum cooling protection.
RESPONDER DEMONSTRATES:
 Method of wearing PPE for fire response.
 Method of delivery fire hose running, hose connection, disconnection, advancing/retiring a length of fire hose, connecting branches to fire hose and how to make up fire hose.
 Method of supplying foam concentrate to portable foam monitors from a foam tanker.
 Method of setting up and stabilising portable water monitors using fire hydrants and fire hose as part of a two man team and as one man.
 Method of handling a charged hoseline with branch as part of a two man team and as one man.
 Method of setting up portable foam making equipment to produce foam from a foam branch as part of a two man hoseline team.
 At least two methods of gentle foam application from a portable foam branch.
Page 57 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
ATTACHMENT I
BLANK FIRE SCENARIO WORK SHEET

Note: The first worksheet contains guidance notes (5 pages).
The second work sheet is blank for copying for use (5 pages).
Page 59 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
SCENARIO WORKSHEET
REFERENCE:
FACILITY Operation or process
FERM STRATEGY LEVEL For the overall station or facility
PLANT/EQUIPMENT Particular item or vessels or tank
FUNCTION Process performed, it’s criticality etc.
SCENARIO Credible description of a major or serious fire

event and if any ESD will occur
CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life safety Any immediate impact on personnel
Environment On enviroment
Business interruption By ESD for fire event
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Immediate effects of fire
If any escalation, the method/route that this may take and the rough time frames in
which the escalation may occur.
Post Escalation
Life safety Impact after escalation
Environment As above
Business interruption As above
Asset Loss/Production Deferment As above
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process Means of detecting a leak or release through

process alarms
Fire Event The type of detection provided
Gas Event The type of detection provided
Page 60 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Page 61 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Mitigation
Process Controls For mitigation (ESD, manual isolation, trips etc.)
Containment Once spill/release occurs, any physical

containment (bunds etc.)
Drainage Process drains or OWS etc.
Passive Fire Control If any for vessel supports, structures etc.
Active Fire Control All fire systems and equipment, other than
portable fire extinguishers.
Applicability of Type For the hazard
System/Hardware Suitability For the environment, operating conditions, type of

system etc.
Reliability Any previous spurious alarms or discharges.

Availability, additional maintenance, complexity of
operation etc.
Operability Auto, remote, local functions and transparancy of

operation.
Survivability (in incident) If required to survive the scenario immediate

impact or scenario duration, can it survive.
Headings on what should occur and from what equipment or systems, and the fire
fighting strategy necessary to effectively contain, control and if necessary, extinguish
the fire event.
Stage 1 Logical staged actions from the moment the alarm is raised or received.
Stage 2
Stage 3 etc.
What hardware, systems and/or equipment is required for operations or other non fire
brigade personnel to deal with the incident in accordance with the chosen strategy. To
Page 62 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
meet the strategy the requirements may be more than the existing FERM but should
still be listed below. The short falls are itemised as part of the facility plan.
Page 63 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Detection
Process Either as existing FERM measures or the specific

requirements over and above the existing.
Fire Event Either as existing FERM measures or the specific

Gas Event Either as existing FERM measures or the specific

Alarm system
For Operator Any specific alarms (process or fire) for the

operators.
For Fire Brigade Any specific alarms (process or fire) for the fire
brigade.
Process Control
Passive Fire Protection Either as existing FERM measurements or the

specific requirements over and above the existing.
Active Fire Protection Either as existing FERM measurements or the

specific requirements over and above the existing.
Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow Lpm for fire systems (water based systems only)
These heading apply only to the fire brigade (or fire responders) resources to combat
the fire event.
Procedures What procedures or plans they should have for

the response.
Hose Quantity and sizes.
Monitors Type, quantity and capacity.
Foam Concentrate Type and quantity.
Specialist Equipment Type and quantity.
Manpower Total for all actions required.
Vehicles Limited to the type available only.
Port. Equip. Water Flow Monitors, water or foam hand lines etc.
Page 64 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Page 65 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Fixed and Port. Total Flow Total including any fixed system flow plus the
portable equipment flow.
Total Water Quantity Self explanatory.

(fixed & portable)
Some of these will be identified from the resources required to meet the strategy level
but some may also be noted as short falls in maintenance or location of equipment or
other deficiency during the development of the scenario. As far as possible, where a
short fall item is listed,reference should be made to why, either by use of the FERM 88-
02 or DEP or ICAO requirements.
Page 66 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
SCENARIO REFERENCE:
Fire Area m2
Foam Concentrate Type and ratio
Design Application Rate lpm/m2
Total Application Rate lpm/m2
Foam Application Time minutes
Total Concentrate Required litres
Total Water Required m3
Page 67 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
SCENARIO WORKSHEET
REFERENCE:
FACILITY
FERM STRATEGY LEVEL
PLANT/EQUIPMENT
FUNCTION
SCENARIO
CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life safety
Environment
Business interruption
Asset Loss/Production Deferment
Post Escalation
Life safety
Environment
Business interruption
Asset Loss/Production Deferment
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process
Fire Event
Gas Event
Page 68 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Mitigation
Process Controls
Containment
Drainage
Passive Fire Control
Active Fire Control
Reliability
Operability
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3 etc.
Page 69 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Detection
Process
Fire Event
Gas Event
Alarm system
For Operator
For Fire Brigade
Process Control
Passive Fire Protection
Active Fire Protection
Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow
Procedures
Hose
Monitors
Foam Concentrate
Specialist Equipment
Manpower
Vehicles
Port. Equip. Water Flow
Page 70 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
Fixed and Port. Total Flow
Total Water Quantity

(fixed & portable)
Page 71 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
SCENARIO REFERENCE:
Fire Area
Foam Concentrate
Design Application Rate
Total Application Rate
Foam Application Time
Total Concentrate Required
Total Water Required
Page 72 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
ATTACHMENT II
BLANK PRE-FIRE PLAN SHEET

Note: The first pre-fire plan sheet contains guidance notes (2 pages).
The second pre-fire plan sheet is a blank for use (2 pages).
Page 73 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
PRE-FIRE PLAN FOR

FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY :
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS RESOURCES REQUIRED

RESPONSE
Typically, immediate actions Operator actions in terms of reaction and procedures The obvious hardware resources necessary to carry out the actions.
will be for operations. and call out etc.

Typically this will involce the What fire control or fire event related actions should be As above
OSC or persons designated by taken on arrival by the OSC or his designated
the OSC. personnel

Typically, this will involve the Normally, the fire containment or fire control or These resources here should match the fire equipment, foam
fire brigade or OSC or other extinguishing actions required for the fire event. concentrate etc. listed in the scenarios.
identified person.
OTHER ACTIONS/CONCERNS:
Any actions which could assist in the control of the incident of which the responders should be aware. Any concerns which may impact on the course of actions to
control the incident.
ONGOING POTENTIAL HAZARDS :
Hazards which may endanger fire responders or non fire personnel, or the environment etc.
Page 75 of79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
OPERATOR RESPONSE FOR

A description of the strategy to be adopted for the fire, including the operator responses and fire brigade actions.
Page 76 of79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
PRE-FIRE PLAN FOR

FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY :
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS RESOURCES REQUIRED

RESPONSE
OTHER ACTIONS/CONCERNS:
ONGOING POTENTIAL HAZARDS :
Page 77 of79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
OPERATOR RESPONSE FOR

Page 78 of79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
ATTACHMENT III
BLANK FIRE RESPONDER COMPETENCIES

Note: The first fire responder competencies sheet contains guidance
(1 page). The second sheet is a blank for use (1 page).
Page 79 of 79
July 1998
ERM Facility Plan Guideline
SE/97/13
IRE RESPONDERS COMPETENCIES FOR:

EY ELEMENTS REQUIRED:
his should list the knowledge required by the fire responder for dealing with the particular scenario, including the emergency plan, team composition, chain of
ommond and specifics including knowledge of the equipment and locations.
COMPETENCIES
ESPONDER KNOWS:
escribe what the responder knows.
ESPONDER IS ABLE TO:

What are the fire responders capabilities ?
ESPONDER DEMONSTRATES:
o list what the responder can demonstrate, eg. wearing of PPE, method of running hoses etc.
Page 80 of 79
July 1998
HSE/97/13
FIRE RESPONDERS COMPETENCIES FOR:

KEY ELEMENTS REQUIRED:
COMPETENCIES
RESPONDER KNOWS:
RESPONDER IS ABLE TO:
RESPONDER DEMONSTRATES:
Page 81 of 79
July 1998

Gu 230

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Gu 230

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Gu 230

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

FERM FACILITY PLAN GUIDE LINE

2.0 Objectives and Scope 7

3.0 Overview of Fire and Explosion Strategy Options 9

4.0 Role of ERD 88-02 and Examples 11

5.0 Preparation of a FERM Facility Plan 15

I Blank Fire Scenario Work Sheet 59

AFFF Aqueous Film Forming Foam

CAA Civil Aviation Authority

DCS Digital Control System

EOM Emergency Operations Manual

FCP Field Change Proposal

HSE Health, Safety and Environment

ICAO International Civil Aviation Authority

LEBC Local Emergency Base Controller

MAF Mina Al Fahal

NED National Emergency Director

oo out of (eg 2oo3 voting)

PDO Petroleum Development Oman

QRA Quantitative Risk Asssessment

RCM Reliability Centered Maintenance

SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus

VESDA Very Early Smoke Detection Apparatus

Pre-fire planning addresses the nature of contribution from human intervention as a

Pre-fire planning may be described as the advance preparation of documentation and

 Clear communication procedures and systems.

 Availability of suitable quantities of foam, water or hand extinguishers.

 The convenient location of equipment such as hydrants, monitors and fireman’s

2.0 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

It is intended to support ERD-88-02, Specification for Fire and Explosion Risk

3.0 OVERVIEW OF FIRE AND EXPLOSION STRATEGY OPTIONS

There are four fire and explosion strategies:

 Strategy 2 Dedicated Fixed Fire Protection Systems

 Strategy 3 Systems/Equipment plus Back-up

 Strategy 4 Systems/Equipment plus Fire Brigade

4.0 ROLE OF ERD 88-02 AND EXAMPLES

4.2 Worked Examples of Critical Equipment Items

4.1.1 Cone Roofed Tanks

Refer to Section 3.2.3.5 of ERD 88-02.

BASE CASE COST OF DAMAGE CALCULATION PRO-FORMA

Cost of Deferred Oil = 2US$ per barrel

Base Case PV of Cost of Damage for Installation $ 450085

4.1.2 Shipping Pumps

Refer to section 3.2.3.6 of ERD 88-02.

BASE CASE COST OF DAMAGE CALCULATION PRO-FORMA

Cost of Deferred Oil = 2US$ per barrel

Net Oil Production for Pump Set in BPD x 23000

Base Case PV of Cost of Damage for Installation $ 55908

5.0 PREPARATION OF A FERM FACILITY PLAN

5.2 Documents Required

Strategy Level 1 (Minor Incident Intervention Only)

Strategy Level 2 (Dedicated Fixed Fire Protection Systems)

Strategy Level 3 (Fixed Fire Protection Systems Plus Back Up)

Strategy Level 4 (Fixed Fire Protection Systems Plus Fire Brigade)

Remote Manifold Stations – Strategy Level 1

0 1 x 60kg dry powder trolley extinguisher

The following fire and gas detection is in place:

RMS 1 to 4 and 6 to 10 RMS 5

Conclusion: Strategy level 1 is applicable to the Remote Manifold Stations.

5.4 Fire Scenario Development