Filoteo Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 79543. October 16, 1996.]
JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR. , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Esteban B. Bautista for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT;

DECISION AND FINAL ORDERS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN; APPEALABLE BY
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI ON PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW IN
ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT; EXCEPTIONAL
CASES. — As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606
expressly provides that "(d)ecisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan
shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari
raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court." However, in exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of
questions of fact in order to resolve legal issues, as where there was
palpable error or grave misapprehension of facts by the lower court. Criminal
cases elevated by convicted public officials from the Sandiganbayan deserve
the same thorough treatment by this Court as criminal cases involving
ordinary citizens simply because the constitutional presumption of innocence
must be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In all criminal cases, a
person's life and liberty are at stake. As a petition for review under Rule 45 is
the available remedy, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 would not
prosper. Basic it is that certiorari is invocable only where there is no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy. TSCIEa
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED

DURING INVESTIGATION FOR THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE;
ENUMERATED. — The relevant rights of an accused under Article III, Section
12 of the 1987 Constitution are, inter alia, as follows: "(1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No
torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall
provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
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compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices
and their families." (emphasis supplied.) Obviously, the 1973 Constitution
did not contain the right against an uncounselled waiver of the right to
counsel which is provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, above underscored)
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL WITHOUT THE
BENEFIT OF COUNSEL; WHEN ADMISSIBLE. — By parity of reasoning, the
specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an
accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made
with the assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively or in cases
where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of said
Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial
investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible. Although a
number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973
Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made with the
assistance of counsel, the definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26,
1983 when this Court, through Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538, 554,
issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during custodial
investigation. The Court specifically ruled that "(t)he right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel."
4. ID.; JUDICIAL DECISIONS; PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF "JUDGE-
MADE" LAWS UPHELD BY THE COURT. — The prospective application of
"judge-made" laws was underscored in Co vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA
444, 448-449, October 28, 1993, where the Court ruled thru Chief Justice
Andres R. Narvasa that in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code which
provides that "(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines," and
Article 4 of the same Code which states that "(l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided," the principle of prospectivity of
statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial decisions, which,
although in themselves are not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the
law means.
5. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; DISTINGUISHED FROM PENAL LAWS. — A bill
of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the individual rights and
privileges which the Constitution is designed to protect against violations by
the government, or by individuals or groups of individuals. It is a charter of
liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power of the State. Penal
laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly are those imposing punishment
for an offense committed against the state which the executive of the State
has the power to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes punishment
imposed and enforced by the State for a crime or offense against its law.
6. ID.; ID.; ARREST; IRREGULARITY THERETO IS DEEMED WAIVED BY
VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTING TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. — It is
well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in
the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused
must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived. Besides, this issue is being raised for the first time by appellant. He
did not move for the quashal of the information before the trial court on this
ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was
cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial.
Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free
from error.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL
COURT; BINDING UPON THE SUPREME COURT. — Weighing heavily against
the defense is the well-settled doctrine that findings of facts of the trial
courts — in this case, the Sandiganbayan itself — particularly in the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, is binding upon this Court, absent
any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; BRIGANDAGE; CONSTRUED. — 'The main object
of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The
heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three
armed persons for the purpose indicated in Art. 306. Such formation is
sufficient to constitute a violation of Art. 306. It would not be necessary to
show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band
actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable
by violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of
the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by Art. 306. On the
other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not
primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping,
etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because
robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it
would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish
text of Art. 306, it is required that the band 'sala a los campos para
dedicarse a robar .' A finding of brigandage or highway robbery involves not
just the locus of the crime or the fact that more than three (3) persons
perpetrated it. It is essential to prove that the outlaws were purposely
organized not just for one act of robbery but for several indiscriminate
commissions thereof. In the present case, there had been no evidence
presented that the accused were a band of outlaws organized for the
purpose of "depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another." What was
duly proven in the present case is one isolated hijacking of a postal van.
There was also no evidence of any previous attempts at similar robberies by
the accused to show the "indiscriminate" commission thereof. ECTAHc
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J : p

A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is
constitutionally guaranteed certain rights. One of the most cherished of
these is the right "to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his choice." The 1987 Constitution, unlike its predecessors, expressly
covenants that such guarantee "cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel." In the present case, petitioner claims that such
proscription against an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel is
applicable to him retroactively, even though his custodial investigation took
place in 1983 — long before the effectivity of the new Constitution. He also
alleges that his arrest was illegal, that his extrajudicial confession was
extracted through torture, and that the prosecution's evidence was
insufficient to convict him. Finally, though not raised by petitioner, the
question of what crime — brigandage or robbery — was committed is
likewise motu proprio addressed by the Court in this Decision.
Challenged in the instant amended petition is the Decision 1 of
respondent Sandiganbayan 2 in Criminal Case No. 8496 promulgated on June
19, 1987 convicting petitioner of brigandage, and the Resolution 3
promulgated on July 27, 1987 denying his motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western
Police District in Metro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected
criminals. A recipient of various awards and commendations attesting to his
competence and performance as a police officer, he could not therefore
imagine that one day he would be sitting on the other side of the
investigation table as the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a
postal delivery van.
Along with his co-accused Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt. Bernardo
Relator, Jr. y Retino, CIC Ed Saguindel y Pabinguit, Ex-PC/Sgt. Danilo
Miravalles y Marcelo and civilians Ricardo Perez, Reynaldo Frias, Raul
Mendoza, Angel Liwanag, Severino Castro and Gerardo Escalada, petitioner
Filoteo was charged in the following Information: 4
"That on or about the 3rd day of May, 1982, in the municipality of
Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, two of whom
were armed with guns, conspiring, confederating together and helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent of gain and by means of violence, threat and intimidation,
stop the Postal Delivery Truck of the Bureau of Postal while it was
traveling along the MacArthur Highway of said municipality, at the
point of their guns, and then take, rob and carry away with them the
following, to wit:
1) Postal Delivery Truck
2) Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers

3) Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers
4) Treasury Warrants
5) Several Mail Matters from abroad
in the total amount of P253,728.29 more or less, belonging to US
Government Pensionados, SSS Pensionados, SSS Medicare
Beneficiaries and Private Individuals from Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan,
Zambales and Olongapo City, to the damage and prejudice of the
owners in the aforementioned amount.
Contrary to law."
On separate dates, accused Filoteo, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator and

Miravalles, assisted by their respective counsel, pleaded not guilty. Their co-
accused Perez, Frias, Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and Escalada were never
arrested and remained at large. Accused Mateo escaped from police custody
and was tried in absentia in accordance with Article IV, Section 19 of the
1973 Constitution. Accused Saguindel and Relator failed to appear during the
trial on February 21, 1985 and on March 31, 1986, respectively, and were
thus ordered arrested but remained at large since then. Like in the case of
Mateo, proceedings against them were held in absentia. 5 Only Filoteo filed
this petition, after the respondent Court rendered its assailed Decision and
Resolution.
Before trial commenced and upon the instance of the prosecution for a
stipulation of facts, the defense admitted the following: 6
"The existence of the bound record of Criminal Case No. 50737-
B-82, consisting of 343 pages from the Bulacan CFI (Exhibit A); in 1982
or thereabouts, accused Bernardo Relator was a PC Sergeant at Camp
Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Metro Manila; as such PC Sergeant, accused
Relator was issued a service revolver, Smith & Wesson Revolver, 32
(sic), with Serial No. 11707 (Exhibit B) and holster (Exhibit B-1) with six
(6) live ammo (Exhibit B-2); in 1982 or thereabouts, accused Eddie
Saguindel was a PC Constable First Class; on May 30, 1982, accused
Saguindel, together with accused Relator and Danilo Miravalles, a
former PC Sergeant, was invited for investigation in connection with
the hijacking of a delivery van by the elements of the Special
Operations Group, PC, and the three availed of their right to remain
silent and to have counsel of their choice, as shown by their Joint
Affidavit (Exhibit A-20); and the existence of the sworn statement
executed by accused Martin Mateo (Exhibit A-11) as well as the
Certification dated May 30, 1982, subject to the qualification that said
document was made under duress."
The prosecution sought to prove its case with the testimonies of

Bernardo Bautista, Rodolfo Miranda, Capt. Rosendo Ferrer, M/Sgt. Noel
Alcazar and Capt. Samuel Pagdilao, Jr. 6-a and the submission of Exhibits A
to K. In their defense, accused Filoteo and Miravalles presented their
respective testimonies plus those of Gary Gallardo and Manolo Almogera.
Filoteo also submitted his Exhibits 1-14-Filoteo, but Miravalles filed no
written evidence. Thereafter, the prosecution proffered rebuttal evidence
and rested with the admission of Exhibits A-16-a, A-31 and L.
Evidence for the Prosecution

At about 6:30 in the morning of May 3, 1982, Bureau of Post mail van
no. MVD 02 left San Fernando, Pampanga to pick up and deliver mail matters
to and from Manila. On board the vehicle were Nerito Miranda, the driver,
and two couriers named Bernardo Bautista and Eminiano Tagudar who were
seated beside the driver. They arrived at around 9:40 that morning at the
Airmail Distribution Center of the Manila International Airport where they
were issued waybills 7 for the sacks of mail they collected. They then
proceeded to the Central Post Office where they likewise gathered mail
matters including 737 check letters 8 sent by the United States Embassy. All
the mail matters were placed inside the delivery van, and its door
padlocked.
As they had to deliver mail matters to several towns of Bulacan, they
took the MacArthur Highway on the return trip to Pampanga. When they
reached Kalvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan at about 4:30 in the afternoon, an
old blue Mercedes Benz sedan 9 overtook their van and cut across its path.
The car had five (5) passengers — three seated in front and two at the back.
The car's driver and the passenger beside him were in white shirts; the third
man in front and the person immediately behind him were both clad in
fatigue uniforms, while the fifth man in the back had on a long-sleeved shirt.
10
Two of the car passengers aimed an armalite and a hand gun at driver
Nerito Miranda as someone uttered, "Are you not going to stop this truck?"
11 Frightened, Miranda pulled over and stopped the van's engine. Alighting
from the car, the armed group identified themselves as policemen. 12 They
ordered the postal employees to disembark from the van. As he stepped out
of the van, Miranda took the ignition key with him, but when threatened, he
surrendered it to one of the car passengers. 13 The three postal employees
were then ordered to board the Benz.
As he was about to enter the car, Bautista looked back and saw one of
the malefactors, who turned out to be Reynaldo Frias, going up the van.
Inside the car, the three delivery employees were ordered to lower their
heads. They sat between two of their captors at the back of the car while two
others were in front. Later, Nerito Miranda asked permission to straighten up
as he was feeling dizzy for lack of air. As he stretched, he caught a glimpse
of the pimply face of the man to his left. He also recognized the driver who
had glanced back. These men turned out to be Angel Liwanag and Reynaldo
Frias, respectively. 14
As the car started moving, Bautista complained about feeling "densely
confined." He was allowed to raise his head but with eyes closed. However,
he sneaked a look and recognized the driver of the car as Raul Mendoza and
the fellow beside him who poked a " balisong" at him as Angel Liwanag. The
man in uniform on the front seat was Eddie Saguindel. Earlier, as he was
about to enter the car, Bautista looked back and recognized Frias. 15 These
incidents yielded the pieces of information critical to the subsequent
identification of Mendoza, Liwanag, Saguindel and Frias in the line-up of
suspects at Camp Crame later on.
The car seemed to move around in circles. When it finally came to a
stop, the captured men discovered that they were along Kaimito Road in
Kalookan City. They were made to remove their pants and shoes and then
told to run towards the shrubs with their heads lowered. Upon realizing that
the hijackers had left, they put on their pants and reported the incident to
the Kalookan Police Station.
The Security and Intelligence Unit of the Bureau of Posts recovered the
postal van at the corner of Malindang and Angelo Streets, La Loma, Quezon
City on May 4, 1982. Discovered missing were several mail matters, 16
including checks and warrants, along with the van's battery, tools and fuel.
17
In a letter-request dated May 6, 1982 to then Col. Ramon Montaño,

then Postmaster General Roilo S. Golez sought the assistance of the Special
Operations Group (SOG) of the Philippine Constabulary in the investigation of
the hijacking incident. 18 Responding to the request, the SOG, which was
tasked to detect, investigate and "neutralize" criminal syndicates in Metro
Manila and adjacent provinces, organized two investigative teams. One
group was led by Capt. Rosendo Ferrer and the other by 1st Lt. Samuel
Pagdilao. Initially, they conducted a "massive intelligence build-up" to
monitor the drop points where the stolen checks could be sold or negotiated.
On May 28, 1982, the SOG received a tip from a civilian informer that
two persons were looking for buyers of stolen checks. Capt. Ferrer requested
the informer to arrange a meeting with them. The meeting materialized at
about 9:00 P.M. of May 29, 1982 at the Bughaw Restaurant in Cubao,
Quezon City. With cash on hand, Capt. Ferrer posed as the buyer. The
informer introduced him to Rey Frias and Rafael Alcantara. Frias in turn
showed Capt. Ferrer a sample Social Security System (SSS) pension check
and told him that the bulk of the checks were in the possession of their
companions in Obrero, Tondo, Manila. After some negotiations, they agreed
to proceed to Tondo. Then as they boarded a car, Capt. Ferrer introduced
himself and his companions as lawmen investigating the hijacking incident.
Shocked and distressed, Frias calmed down only when assured that his
penalty would be mitigated should he cooperate with the authorities. Frias
thus volunteered to help crack the case and lead the SOG team to Ricardo
Perez and Raul Mendoza.
Capt. Ferrer instructed Lt. Pagdilao, his assistant operations officer who
was in another car during the mission, to accompany Frias to Obrero, Tondo
while he escorted Alcantara to their headquarters at Camp Crame. On the
way to the headquarters, Alcantara denied participation in the hijacking
although he admitted living with Martin Mateo who allegedly was in
possession of several checks. Alcantara was turned over to the investigation
section of the SOG for further questioning.
Meanwhile, Lt. Pagdilao's group was able to corner Ricardo Perez in his
house in Tondo. Confronted with the hijacking incident, Perez admitted
participation therein and expressed disappointment over his inability to
dispose of the checks even after a month from the hijacking. He surrendered
the checks in his possession to Lt. Pagdilao. 19

An hour and a half later, Capt. Ferrer received information over their
two-way radio that Ricardo Perez and Raul Mendoza were in Lt. Pagdilao's
custody. Capt. Ferrer ordered that, instead of returning to headquarters, Lt.
Pagdilao and his companions should meet him in Quirino, Novaliches to
apprehend Martin Mateo. They met at the designated place and proceeded
to Gulod, Novaliches arriving there at about 10:30 P.M. of May 29, 1982.
Walking atop a ricefield dike to the house of Mateo, they noticed two
men heading in their direction. Perez identified them as Martin Mateo and
Angel Liwanag. The latter threw something into the ricefield which, when
retrieved, turned out to be bundles of checks wrapped in cellophane inside a
plastic bag. 20 As the two were about to board the SOG teams' car, Mateo
said, "Sir, kung baga sa basketball, talo na kami. Ibibigay ko yong para sa
panalo. Marami pa akong tseke doon sa bahay ko, sir, kunin na natin para di
na natin babalikan." 21 Capt. Ferrer accompanied Mateo to his house where
they retrieved several other checks in another plastic bag.
On the way to the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, Mateo and
Liwanag admitted participation in the postal hijacking. At a confrontation
with Perez and Mendoza, all four of them pointed to petitioner, Jose D.
Filoteo, Jr., as the mastermind of the crime.
Consequently, Capt. Ferrer directed Lt. Pagdilao to accompany Mateo
to the house of petitioner in Tondo, Manila. The lawmen found petitioner at
home. Upon being invited to Camp Crame to shed light on his participation
in the hijacking, petitioner was dumbfounded ("parang nagulat"). Pursuant to
standard operating procedure in arrests, petitioner was informed of his
constitutional rights, 22 whereupon they proceeded to Camp Crame.
However, the group, including petitioner, returned to the latter's place to
recover the loot. It was "in the neighborhood," not in petitioner's house,
where the authorities located the checks. 23
The authorities confronted Filoteo about his participation in the
hijacking, telling him that Frias, Mendoza and Perez had earlier volunteered
the information that petitioner furnished the Benz used in the hijacking.
Thereupon, Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three
other soldiers, namely, Eddie Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack
Miravalles (who turned out to be a discharged soldier), as his confederates.
At 1:45 in the afternoon of May 30, 1982, petitioner executed a sworn
statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P.
Espero which, quoted in full, reads as follows:
"BABALA: — Nais kong ipaalam sa iyo, Patrolman Filoteo, na ang
dahilan ng pagsisiyasat na ito ay tungkol sa isang kasong
Robbery-in-Band/Hi-Jacking na naganap noong ika-3 ng Mayo
1982 doon sa Meycauayan, Bulacan, mga bandang alas-4:00 ng
hapon, humigit-kumulang, kung saan maraming tsekeng US,
tseke ng BIR at iba pang mga personal na tseke ang nabawi mula
sa iyo. Nais ko ang ibigay sa iyo ang babala alinsunod sa mga
isinasaad ng Section 20, Article IV ng Bagong Saligang Batas ng
Republika ng Pilipinas, kagaya ng mga sumusunod:

a. Na ikaw ay may karapatang tumahimik
b. Na ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng isang abugadong
sarili mong pili upang may magpapayo sa iyo habang ikaw
ay sinisiyasat;
c. Na ikaw ay may karapatang huwag sumagot sa mga
katanungang maaring makasira sa iyo sa dahilang
anumang iyong isasalaysay ay maaring gamitin pabor or
laban sa iyo sa kinauukulang hukuman;
d. Na kung ikaw ay walang maibabayad sa isang abugado,
ako mismo ang makipag-ugnayan sa CLAO-IBP upang ikaw
ay magkaroon ng isang abugadong walang bayad.
1. TANONG: — Ang mga bagay-bagay bang akin nang naipaliwanag
sa iyo ay iyong lubos na naiintindihan at nauunawaan?
SAGOT: — Opo.
2. T: — Handa mo bang lagdaan ang ilalim ng katanungan at sagot
na ito bilang katibayan na iyo ngang naiintindihan ang iyong mga
karapatan at gayun na rin sa dahilan ng pagsisiyasat na ito, at
ikaw din ay nakahanda ngang magbigay ng isang malaya at
kusangloob na salaysay, sumagot sa mga katanungan at
sumusumpang lahat ng iyong isasalaysay ay pawang mga
katotohanan lamang?
S: — Opo, pipirma ako Ser.

(Sgd.)
JOSE D. FILOTEO
(Affiant)
MGA SAKSI
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
ROMEO P. ESPERO THERESA L. TOLENTINO
Ssg., PC C1C, WAC (PC)"
3. T: — Maaari bang sabihin mong muli ang iyong buong pangalan,

edad at iba pang bagay-bagay na maaring mapagkakakilalanan
sa iyo?
S: — Jose Filoteo y Diendo, 30-anyos, may-asawa, isang Patrolman ng

Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force na
kasalukuyang nakatalaga sa General Assignment Section,
Investigation Division ng naturang Distrito ng Pulisya at
kasalukuyang nakatira sa No. 810 Cabesas St., Dagupan, Tondo,
Manila.
4. T: — Kailan ka pa na-appoint sa service bilang isang Kabatas?
S: — Noon pong October 1978, hindi ko maalaala ang exactong petsa,

noong ako ay mapasok sa serbisyo.
5. T: — Kailan ka pa naman na-assign sa GAS, WPD, MPF?

S: — Noon lamang pong January 1982.
6. T: — Patrolman Filoteo, ikaw ba ay tubong saan bayan, lungsod
or lalawigan?
S: — Pagkakaalam ko sa tatay ko ay Bulacan samantalang ang aking
ina naman ay Bisaya, pero ako ay ipinanganak na sa Maynila
noon July 17, 1951.
7. T: — Ano naman ang natapos mong kurso sa pag-aaral?

S: — Undergraduate ako ng BS Criminology sa PCCr, dahil hindi ko
natapos ang second semester ng 4th year ko.
8. T: —Ano naman ang iyong specific designation sa GAS, ID, WPD-
MPF?
S: — Sa follow-Up Unit ako.

9. T: — At bilang miyembro ng follow-up unit ng GAS, ano naman
ang iyong mga specific duties?
S: — Kami po ang magsasagawa ng follow-up kung may mga at-large
sa mga suspects namin sa mga kasong hawak ng investigation.
10. T: — Noong ika-3 ng Mayo 1982, mga bandang alas-4:00 ng
hapon humigit-kumulang, saan ka naroroon at ano ang iyong
ginagawa?
S: — Nasa Plaza Lawton ho kami, eh, at inaantay na namin iyong
hinayjack namin na Philippine Mail delivery van.
11. T: — Wika mo'y kami, sinu-sino ang tinutukoy mong mga
kasamahan?
S: — Si Carding Perez, ho; si Junior ho (Affiant pointed to Martin Mateo,
Jr. who was seated in the investigation room and asked the name
and was duly answered: Martin Mateo, Jr.); si Rey Frias; Raul
Mendoza; Angelo Liwanag at ang mga taga LRP ng PC Brigade na
sina Sgt. Ed Saguindel, Sgt. Dan Miravales at isa pang Sergeant
na ang alam ko lang sa kanya ay JUN ang tawag namin. Walo (8)
(corrected and initialled by affiant to read as 'SIYAM [9]') kaming
lahat doon noon at ang mga gamit naman naming kotse noon ay
ang kotse ng kumpare kong si Rudy Miranda na isang Mercedes
Benz na may plakang NMJ-659 kung saan ang driver namin noon
ay si Raul Mendoza (corrected and initialled by affiant to read as
'AKO') at ang mga kasama naman naming sakay ay sina Angelo
Liwanag, Sgt. Ed Saguindel at Sgt. Jun na parehong taga-LRP
(affiant added and initialled this additional fact: 'AT RAUL
MENDOZA'). Ang isang kotse namang gamit namin ay pag-aari
daw ng pinsan ni Carding Perez na kanya na rin mismong
minaneho na isang Lancer na dirty-white ang kulay at ang mga
sakay naman ni Carding Perez ay sina Junior Mateo, Rey Frias at
Sgt. Dan Miravalles ng LRP rin. Pero may kasama pa kaming
contact in Carding Perez na taga-loob ng Post Office na sina Alias
NINOY na isang dispatcher at Alias JERRY, dahil ang mastermind
dito sa trabahong ito ay si Carding PEREZ at kami naman ng mga
sundalong taga-LRP ay kanila lamang inimporta upang umeskort
sa kanila sa pag-hijack ng delivery van.
12. T: — Anong oras naman noong umalis ang delivery van ng Post
Office patungong norte?
S: — Kung hindi ako nagkakamali ay nasa pagitan na noon ng alas-4:00
hanggang alas-5:00 ng hapon.
13. T: — Isalaysay mo nga ng buong-buo kung ano ang mga
naganap noong hapon na iyon?
S: — Noon pong lumakad na ang delivery van ng Central Post Office,
sinundan na namin, una ang van, sumunod ang Lancer at huli
ang Mercedes Benz namin. Pagdating namin sa Malinta,
Valenzuela Metro Manila ay nagpalit kami ng puwesto sa
pagsunod, van naman ngayon, sunod ang Mercedes Benz at huli
na ang Lancer. Noong makapasok na kami ng boundary ng
Meycauayan, Bulacan ay kumuha na kami ng tiyempo at noon
nakatiyempo kami ay kinat namin ang delivery van. Tumigil
naman ito at bumaba kaagad sina Sgt. Ed Saguindel at Sgt. Jun
ng LRP dahil sila noon ang may hawak ng kanilang Armalite Rifle
pero may service pa silang maiksing baril. Pinababa nila ang
tatlong maydala ng delivery van at pinasakay sa Mercedes Benz,
habang nakatutok ang kanilang mga baril sa kanila. Ako naman
ay bumaba na sa aming kotse at sumakay ng delivery van at ako
na mismo ang nagmaneho at sinamahan naman ako nina Junior
Mateo at si Rey Frias, tatlo (3) rin kaming pumalit sa puwesto
noong tatlong (3) taga-Post Office na maydala ng delivery van.
Nag-Utturn (sic) kami ngayon at ibinalik na namin sa Manila ang
van. Iyong Mercedes Benz na minaneho pa rin ni Raul Mendoza
ay dumeretso pa norte samantalang ang Lancer naman ay nag-
U-turn din at sumunod sa amin. Noong makarating na kami sa
Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila ay inunahan na kami ng Lancer
at iyon na nga, parang follow the leader na dahil siya na noon
ang aming guide.
14. T: — Ipagpatuloy mo ang iyong pagsasalaysay?
S: — Dumeretso kami ngayon sa may Obrero, sa bahay mismo nina

Carding Perez, at noong nakarating na kami roon ay iniyatras ko
na ang van sa kanilang garahe at doon ay ibinaba namin lahat
ang mga duffle bag, hindi ko na ho alam kung ilan lahat iyon, na
siyang laman ng delivery van at pagkatapos ay umalis kaming
muli ng mga kasama ko rin sa van papuntang Quezon City kung
saan namin inabandon ang delivery van. Sa Retiro ho yata iyong
lugar na iyon, kung hindi ako nagkakamali.
15. T: — Ano ang mga sumunod na nangyari?
S: — Sumakay kami ngayon ng taksi at bumalik na kami kina Carding

Perez sa may bahay nila sa Obrero, Tondo, Manila at inabutan na
namin sila na nagkakarga na noong mga duffle bag sa (sic),
madilim na ho noon, sa isang kotseng mamula-mula o orange na
Camaro at isa pang Mercedes Benz na brown, dahil ang Lancer
ay isinoli na raw nila sa may ari. Dinala nila ngayon ang mga
duffle bag sa Bocaue, Bulacan, iyon kasi ang usapan namin noon
dahil sumilip lamang ako noon at kasama ko si Carding Perez,
kami naman ngayon ay pumunta sa bahay nina Rudy Miranda sa
San Marcelino, Malate, Manila na sakay ng isang Toyota Corona
na brown na si Carding Perez ang nagmaneho. Pagdating namin
doon sa kina Rudy Miranda ay naroon na rin noon ang Mercedes
Benz na ginamit namin, pero wala na ang crew ng delivery van
dahil ibinaba at iniwanan daw nila sa Caloocan City. Ang
naroroon na lamang noon ay sina Angelo Liwanag, si Raul
Mendoza, si Sgt. Ed Saguindel at si Sgt. Jun na parehong taga-
LRP. Naiwan na noon ang Mercedes Benz namin doon kina Rudy
Miranda at iniwan na rin ang susi doon sa kamag-anak, dahil
hindi nila alam ang trabahong ito. Sumakay na iyong apat
naming kasama sa Toyota Corona na sakay namin at inihatid
namin sina Sgt. Saguindel at Sgt. Jun doon sa tinitirhan nitong
huling nabanggit na sundalo doon sa malapit sa Del Pan Bridge
sa may Recto Avenue sa San Nicolas yata iyon sa Manila. Kami
naman ngayong apat, sina Carding Perez, Angelo Liwanag at si
Raul Mendoza ay tumuloy na sa Bocaue, Bulacan. Dumaan kami
sa North Diversion Road at paglabas namin sa exit papuntang
Bocaue, Bulacan ay hindi na kalayuan doon, hindi ko alam ang
lugar pero alam kong puntahan. Bahay daw yata ng kamag-anak
ni Carding Perez iyon pero hindi ko alam ang pangalan. Naroon
na ngayon ang buong tropa, maliban sa mga dalawang
sundalong naihatid na namin sa may Manila, at may mga
nadagdag pang ibang mukha pero hindi ko ito mga kakilala. Si
JACK o Sgt. Dan Miravalles ay naroon din noon. Kumain kami,
pagkatapos ay nagbukasan na ng mga duffle bag. Iyon na mga,
nakita na namin ang mga tsekeng ito, (Affiant pointed to the
checks he voluntarily surrendered) at aming inihiwalay ngayon
sa mga sulat na naroon na sinunog lahat pagkatapos doon sa
bahay ni Junior Mateo sa Novaliches. Di magdamag ngayon ang
trabaho namin, kinabukasan ay kanya-kanyang uwian na,
pagkatapos ay pahinga. Kinabukasan muli, gabi, inilipat na
namin doon sa bahay ni Junior Mateo ang mga tsekeng ito
(Affiant again referred to said checks). Isinakay namin noon sa
isang cargo truck na pag-aari din daw nina Carding. Iyong mga
tsekeng iyan ngayon ay nakalagay noon doon sa isang sikretong
compartment sa gitna ng truck, doon ba sa may chassis.
Sikretong compartment iyon, na mahirap mahalata.
16. T: — Ikaw ba naman ay mayroong dalang baril noon at kung
ganoon, sabihin mo nga kung anong uring baril iyon?
S: — Wala po akong baril, Ser.

17. T: — Paano naman napunta ang mga tsekeng ito (the checks
recovered from the Affiant was referred to) sa iyo?
S: — E, di ganoon na mga ho, habang tumatagal ay umiinit ang

situwasyon sa aming grupo, dahil iyong partehan sana namin ay
puro pangako ang nangyari. Kaya napagpasyahan namin na
hatiin na lamang iyong mga tseke upang walang onsehan sa
amin. Ito ngayon ay parte namin nina Sgt. Ed Saguindel, Sgt. Dan
Miravalles Alias JACK at ni Sgt. Jun, dahil noong una ay doon
muna sa amin ito nakatago (The checks recovered from the
Affiant was referred to). Pero habang tumatagal ay umiinit at
nalaman namin pati na may alarma na, kaya't inilipat namin
doon sa may Raxa Bago sa may likod ng Alhambra Cigar &
Cigarette Factory sa Tondo, Manila at akin munang ipinatago sa
isang kumare ko doon, pansamantala, pero hindi alam nitong
kumare ko ang laman noon dahil mahigpit kong ipinagbilin na
huwag nilang bubuksan. Doon na rin namin kinuha iyon noong
isurender ko ang mga tsekeng ito kagabi, at hanggang sa kinuha
na namin ang supot na ito (the checks placed in a plastic bag
was again referred to) ay wala pa rin kamalaymalay ang kumare
ko.
18. T: — Iyong sinasabi mong mga kontak nina Carding Perez sa

Central Post Office, mga kakilala mo rin ba ang mga ito?
S: — Iyong araw lamang na iyon ko sila nakita, dahil maghapon ko
noon silang nakikita, itong si Alias NINOY lamang ang dispatcher,
dahil palabas-labas siya noon at nakikipag-usap kina Carding
Perez, Raul Mendoza at saka si Rey Frias. Makikilala ko itong si
Alias NINOY kung makita ko siyang muli.
19. T: — Sino naman ang kumontak sa iyo upang sumama sa
trabahong ito?
S: — Si Junior Mateo po, ipinakilala niya ako kina Carding at sa buong

tropa na namin.
20. T: — Pansamantala ay wala na muna akong itatanong pa sa iyo,
mayroon ka bang nais na idagdag, bawasin o palitan kaya sa
salaysay na ito?
S: — Wala na po.
21. T: — Handa mo bang lagdaan ang iyong salaysay na ito bilang

patotoo sa katotohanan nito nang hindi ka pinilit, sinaktan or
pinangakuan kaya ng anuman upang lumagda lamang?
S: — Opo.
WAKAS NG SALAYSAY . . ./ac
(Sgd.)
JOSE D. FILOTEO
MGA SAKSI SA LAGDA:
(Sgd.)
SSG ROMERO P. ESPERO PC
(Sgd.)
C1C THERESA TOLENTINO WAC (PC)" 24
Petitioner executed two other documents on the same day, May 30,
1982. One was a certification stating that he voluntarily surrendered
"voluminous assorted US checks and vouchers," that because of the "large
number of pieces" of checks, he affixed his signature upon the middle
portion of the back of each check "to serve as identification in the future,
prior to the completion of its proper inventory and listing conducted by
elements of SOG" in his presence, and that he "guided the elements of SOG"
to the residence of Rodolfo C. Miranda, the owner of the sky-blue Mercedes
Benz car which was surrendered to the SOG Headquarters. 25 The other
document was a sworn statement wherein petitioner attested to his waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and the following
facts: (a) that he was apprised of his constitutional rights under Section 20,
Article IV of the (1973) Constitution, that he understood all his rights
thereunder, and that the investigators offered him counsel from the CLAO-
IBP but he refused to avail of the privilege; (b) that he was arrested by SOG
men in his house at around 11:00 p.m. of May 29, 1982 "sa dahilang ako ay
kasangkot sa pagnanakaw ng mga US Treasury Warrants, SSS Pension
Checks and Vouchers at SSS Medicare Checks and Vouchers mula sa
delivery van ng Philippine Mail;" (c) that the SOG men confiscated from him
numerous checks and a Mercedes Benz 200 colored sky-blue; and (d) that he
was not hurt or maltreated nor was anything taken from him which was not
duly receipted for. 26
As certified to by petitioner (in the above described document), he led
the SOG operatives to the house of Rodolfo Miranda in Singalong where the
latter admitted that petitioner was his friend. He denied, however, having
knowledge that his car was used in the hijacking until the authorities came
to his house. According to Miranda, he was made to believe that his car
would be used for surveillance purposes because petitioner's jeep was not
available. The car was not returned until the evening following that when it
was borrowed. 27 After the trip to Miranda's house, petitioner informed the
investigators that some more checks could be recovered from his kumare.
Said checks were retrieved and turned over to headquarters along with the
car surrendered by Miranda who later executed a sworn statement dated
May 31, 1992 at the SOG. 28
Upon learning of the whereabouts of Miravalles, Eddie Saguindel and
Bernardo Relator, the team of Capt. Ferrer proceeded to Taguig, Metro
Manila in the afternoon of May 30, 1982. They met Miravalles along the way
to his house. Informed by Capt. Ferrer that six of his companions were
already under custody and that they implicated him as one of their
confederates, Miravalles reacted by saying, "Sir, ang hihina kasi ng mga loob
niyan, eh." 29
Capt. Ferrer later asked Miravalles to bring him to Eddie Saguindel. At
the barracks of the Long Range Patrol in Bicutan, Metro Manila, Saguindel
voluntarily accepted the invitation to proceed to the SOG headquarters, after
Miravalles initially informed him of the facts obtained during the
investigation. Saguindel was heard saying, "Hindi na kami interesado, sir, sa
mga tsekeng iyan kasi isang buwan na hindi pa nabebenta . " 30 With
Miravalles and Saguindel, Capt. Ferrer and his team moved on to Binondo,
Manila to look for Bernardo Relator. When they found him at home, Relator
excused himself, went upstairs, returned with a .32 caliber revolver with six
bullets 31 and said, "Sir, ito yong baril na nagamit. " 32 The three suspects
were brought to Camp Crame for further investigation. Thereafter, Capt.
Ferrer submitted an after-operations report about their mission and
executed jointly with Lt. Pagdilao an affidavit on the same matter. 33
Aside from petitioner, Liwanag, Mateo and Perez executed sworn
statements. 34 Prior to doing so, they waived their right to counsel. Liwanag
and Mateo admitted their participation and implicated petitioner in the
crime. Perez, on the other hand, denied having driven a Lancer car in the
hijacking and stated that he was implicated in the crime only because in one
drinking spree with petitioner, Mateo and one alias "Buro" during that month
of May, they had a heated altercation. Like petitioner, Liwanag and Mendoza
certified that they voluntarily surrendered vouchers and checks which were
part of their loot in the hijacking; they also executed waivers under Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code. For his part, Relator executed a certification
to the effect that he voluntarily surrendered his .32 caliber Smith & Wesson
service revolver used in the commission of the crime. In spite of the fact that
his father-in-law was a lawyer, petitioner did not manifest that he needed
the assistance of counsel. During the taking of his statement, petitioner was
visited by Jimmy Victorino and another comrade from the General
Assignment Section of the WPD.
For their part, Relator, Saguindel and Miravalles executed a joint
affidavit 35 manifesting their option to avail of their right to remain silent
until such time as they would have retained a counsel of their choice. Frias
and Mendoza executed a similar joint affidavit. 36 Severino Castro, the postal
employee implicated, also chose to remain silent as he wanted to testify in
court. However, he linked to the crime a certain Gerardo Escalada, a former
clerk of the Central Post Office and son of a director of the Bureau of Posts in
Region I. 37
On May 31, 1982, then Postmaster General Golez summoned postal
employees Miranda, Bautista and Tagudar and directed them to proceed to
Camp Crame. At the office of the SOG, they were told to go over some
pictures for identification of the culprits. The three recognized and pointed to
the suspects in a line-up. Tagudar identified and Liwanag. 38 Miranda pointed
at Frias and Liwanag 39 while Bautista identified Frias, Mendoza and
Liwanag. 40 Petitioner himself, when told to identify his alleged cohorts,
pointed to Severino Castro as their contact at the post office. 41 Five of the
suspects who were not identified in the line-up were however implicated by
Liwanag, Mateo and petitioner.
SOG Chief Investigator Jorge C. Mercado filed a complaint for robbery-
in-band (hijacking) before the Municipal Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan
against petitioner and ten (10) others, namely, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator,
Miravalles, Perez, Frias, Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and Escalada (Criminal
Case No. 7885). 42
On August 8, 1983, the Information previously referred to and
aforequoted was filed with the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 8496.
On September 20, 1983, Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Romeo M.
Escareal issued orders for the arrest of the accused 43 and fixed bail at
P13,000.00 each. Saguindel and Relator filed a motion to quash the
Information asserting that under the Articles of War and Section 1 of P.D.
1850, they should be tried by a court martial. 44 The Sandiganbayan denied
the motion on January 3, 1984 45 on the ground that courts martial could no
longer exercise jurisdiction over them by virtue of their separation from
military service.
Evidence for the Defense
Testifying in his own defense, petitioner alleged that as a patrolman
since August 21, 1978 assigned to the Investigation Division or the Detective
Bureau of the WPD to which the General Assignment Section belonged, he
was the recipient of several awards and recognitions starting with ranking
fifth in the Final Order of Merit in the basic course for police officers. 46 He
also claimed to have received a loyalty medal for meritorious service above
the call of duty 47 and several commendations 48 for the distinguished
performance of his duties. On that fateful date of May 3, 1982, he was a
member of the Special Task Force Unit covering the tourist belt area.
Of the ten other accused in this case, petitioner admitted knowing only
Martin Mateo whose name appeared in the initial follow-up operation he
allegedly participated in regarding a P250,000 qualified theft case on May
16, 1980 at the Shemberg Marketing Corporation. 49 Although a suspect,
Mateo was not charged in the information subsequently filed in that case.
Sometime in March 1981, Mateo visited petitioner at the police headquarters
seeking assistance in his bid to lead a new life. Considering Mateo's
familiarity with underworld characters, petitioner readily made him an
informer who was paid from time to time out of the police intelligence fund.
Mateo proved to be an effective informer. In fact, he allegedly supplied vital
information on the identities and whereabouts of suspects in robbery cases
at the La Elegancia Jewelry Store, at the Likha Antique and Crafts, 50 and in
an alleged racket in Aranque Market in Manila involving jewelries.
As such informer, Mateo became accustomed to borrowing petitioner's
owner-type jeep whenever he was given an assignment. In one instance
however, petitioner saw Mateo using his jeep with some male companions.
Because Mateo denied the occurrence of the incident, petitioner from then
on refused to lend his jeep to Mateo. Instead, Mateo was given an allowance
to cover his traveling expenses.
About a month prior to May 3, 1982, petitioner met Mateo and
requested the latter to give him a good project as he was working for his
transfer to the Metrocom Intelligence Security Group (MISG). On May 2,
1982, Mateo urged petitioner to lend him his jeep in order that he could
follow-up a bank robbery case. That same evening, petitioner approached
his kumpare, accused Rodolfo Miranda, to borrow the latter's old Mercedes
Benz since, if the jeep was used, Mateo could be identified as an informer.
Petitioner left his jeep with Miranda and "went around boasting of the
Mercedes Benz." 51
Mateo took the Benz in the morning of May 3, 1982. Petitioner advised
him to return the car between the hours of two and three in the afternoon at
the Lakan Beer House at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Zurbaran Streets in
Sta. Cruz, Manila where petitioner was to meet his friend Manolo Almoguera
who would be celebrating his birthday there. Petitioner met Almoguera and
company at around 3:30 in the afternoon. He waited for Mateo until shortly
before 5:00 in the afternoon when he was constrained to leave without
seeing Mateo because he had to attend a mandatory regular troop formation
at 5:00 P.M. at the police headquarters. From there, petitioner proceeded to
his area of responsibility in the tourist belt. He returned to the beer house at
about 6:00 in the evening hoping to find Mateo and the automobile. A little
before 8:00 o'clock, someone informed him that Mateo had finally arrived.
Petitioner went out and scolded Mateo for being late; the latter apologized
and said that his surveillance bore good results. Petitioner then returned the
car to Miranda, through the latter's cousin.
At around 11:00 in the evening of May 29, 1982, Mateo, escorted by a
group of military men, went to petitioner's house at 810 Cabezas St., Tondo,
Manila. The group refused to give any reason for their visit but arrested him.
Wearing only short pants, petitioner was made to board a car where he was
handcuffed. The men asked him about the Benz and the identities of his
companions in an alleged hijacking incident. Petitioner admitted having
knowledge of the exact location of the car but denied participation in the
crime. Nobody apprised him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to be assisted by counsel. 52
Petitioner was then instructed to accompany Lt. Pagdilao to the
residence of Miranda to get the Benz. They were on board two cars. When
petitioner noticed that they were not heading for Miranda's place, he
clutched the hand of Lt. Pagdilao, pleading for pity and thinking that he was
about to be "salvaged." Lt. Pagdilao however informed him that they would
be dropping by petitioner's house first per the investigator's information that
more checks could be recovered thereat. A warrantless search was then
allegedly conducted in petitioner's house but nothing was found. Suddenly,
someone from the other car came out of a nearby house owned by Mateo
and reported that they had recovered some checks. Thereafter, they
proceeded to the house of Miranda who was also invited for questioning. The
latter surrendered his Benz to the group.
At the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, petitioner was repeatedly
coaxed to admit participation in the hijacking. As he vehemently denied the
accusation against him, someone blindfolded him from behind, led him
outside and loaded him in a car. He was taken to an unidentified place and
made to lie flat on his back. An object was tied to his small finger to
electrocute him. While a wet handkerchief was stuffed in his mouth,
someone mounted his chest and applied the "water cure" ("tinutubig")
through his nose. Because these ordeals were simultaneously carried out,
petitioner felt unbearable pain. He sought permission to get in touch with his
father-in-law, Atty. Felix Rosacia, but his request was denied. They urged
him to cooperate otherwise something terrible would happen to him.
Meanwhile, petitioner's wife reported to the WPD General Assignment
Section her husband's forcible abduction by armed men whom she mistook
for CIS agents. A check with the CIS yielded negative results. Thereafter, Lt.
Reynaldo Dator went to the SOG where he was informed that petitioner was
being investigated but no details were given thereon pending clearance with
superior officers. 53 Consequently, a newspaper carried an item on the SOG's
refusal to allow petitioner's co-police officers to see him in his detention cell.
54
Among his comrades, only Jimmy Victorino, formerly of the WPD who
was transferred to the SOG, was able to visit him. Petitioner revealed to
Victorino the maltreatment done him but the latter expressed helplessness
about it. In fact, Victorino advised him to just cooperate so that the SOG
would not incriminate him ("para hindi ka pag-initan dito"). 55 The advice
came after petitioner was warned that he, like Pat. Serrano of the WPD,
would be liquidated by the SOG, 56 should he refuse to cooperate. Later,
Mateo came to petitioner's cell and confided that he had been similarly
maltreated and forced to implicate petitioner.
After Mateo left, a prepared statement was shown and read to
petitioner. Because its contents were false, petitioner refused to sign it.
Placing his arm around petitioner, a certain Capt. Lagman told petitioner that
he thought they had an understanding already. Petitioner later discovered
that Lagman was not member of the military but an "agent" of the SOG, and
a member of the "Contreras gang." Petitioner was therefore constrained to
sign the statement because of his excruciating experience ("hirap na hirap").
He however admitted having read the document before affixing his signature
thereto and initialing the corrections therein. The waiver under Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code and the certification he executed were allegedly also
obtained by duress. Although he picked out one Severino Castro in a police
line-up, he did not even know Castro. He implicated Castro because he was
threatened by a certain Boy Zapanta.
Petitioner filed a complaint for grave coercion and maltreatment
against Lt. Rosendo Ferrer and several John Does. On August 4, 1982, Asst.
City Fiscal Emelita H. Garayblas recommended its dismissal for petitioner's
failure to appear despite subpoenas and to answer clarificatory questions as
well as to authenticate his statement. 57 However, petitioner swore that he
never received the subpoenas.
Petitioner's alibi was supported by Manolo Almoguera whose birthday
on May 3, 1995 was the reason for the celebration at the Lakan Beer House.
While his baptismal certificate indicated that he was born on May 4, 1956, 58
a joint affidavit 59 also attested that his birth date was actually May 3, 1956.
Gary Gallardo, the owner of the beer house, corroborated Almoguera's
testimony as to petitioner's alleged presence during the birthday celebration.
The Respondent Court's Decision
On June 18, 1987, the Sandiganbayan rendered the herein questioned
51-page Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose
Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo, Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, Bernardo Relator, Jr. y
Retino and Eddie Saguindel y Pabinguit GUILTY as co-principals beyond
reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 2 (e), in relation to Section
3 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 and hereby sentences
each of said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to THIRTEEN (13)
YEARS, ONE (1) MONTH and ELEVEN (11) DAYS as maximum, both of
reclusion temporal, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of
the action. Accused Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo is hereby acquitted,
with costs de oficio, for insufficiency of evidence.
No civil indemnity is hereby awarded due to the complete dearth
of any proof as to the actual damages suffered by the Bureau of Posts
or the owners of the pilfered mail matters and it further appearing that
the mail van which was hijacked had been recovered, as well as most
of the checks and warrants which were surrendered by some of the
accused, without prejudice to the institution of the proper civil action to
recover damages should proof thereof be available.
Consequently, it is hereby ordered that Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2,

which are the .32 Cal. Revolver, Smith and Wesson, Serial No. 11707,
its holster and six (6) live ammunition respectively, which were
surrendered by accused Relator, and Exhibits J, J-1 to J-5, consisting of
187, 222, 215, 197, 194 and 22 pieces, respectively, of Social Security
System and Medicare checks and vouchers, be returned to the Firearm
and Explosives Unit (FEU), PC, Camp Crame, Quezon City and the
Social Security System, respectively, upon proper receipts.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Postmaster-General,

Central Post Office, Liwasang Bonifacio, Metro Manila and the
Commanding General and Chief, PC-INP, Camp Crame, Quezon City for
their information and guidance with respect to the other accused who
are still at-large.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said Decision was denied by

the Sandiganbayan in its challenged Resolution of July 27, 1987. Hence, the
instant alternative petition for certiorari and/or review on certiorari charging
the Sandiganbayan with having gravely abused its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and with reversible error in arriving at said
Decision.
The Issues
The amended petition raises the following:
"Assignments of Error and/or Excess of Jurisdiction/Grave Abuse of Discretion
xxx xxx xxx
First
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction when it made its determination of the
alleged guilt of petitioner on the basis of mere preponderance of
evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Second
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that petitioner's having
borrowed the Mercedes Benz car utilized by the other accused in the
hijacking of the mail van indubitably established his direct participation
and/or indispensable cooperation in the said hijacking, the same being
in gross disregard of basic Rules of Law.
Third
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the voluminous SSS
Medicare and Pension Checks were confiscated from and surrendered
by petitioner and three of the other accused and in finding the
testimonies and investigation reports relative thereto. 'credible and
unrefuted,' said findings being, insofar as petitioner is concerned,
absolutely without any basis in the evidence and in fact contrary to the
prosecution's only evidence that has some measure of competency
and admissibility.
Fourth
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion in
finding that dorsal portions of the checks and warrants allegedly taken
from petitioner were signed by him to indicate his admission of
accountability therefor and that his signatures thereon confirm the
confiscation from and/or surrender by him of said checks, said findings
being absolutely without any support in the evidence.
Fifth
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in admitting and considering against
petitioner his alleged extra judicial confession, despite petitioner's
uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof that he was made to
give or sign the same through torture, maltreatment, physical
compulsion, threats and intimidation and without the presence and
assistance of counsel, his request for which was refused, in gross
violation of Constitutional Provisions and the prevailing jurisprudence.
Sixth
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that petitioner's participation
in the hijacking of the mail van is indubitably established 'by the
manner by which the SOG operatives succeeded in ferreting out the
members of the hijacking syndicate one by one through patient
sleuthing' and in finding that they did so 'without resorting to extra-
legal measures' and that 'no evidence having been adduced to show
that they were actuated by improper motives to testify falsely against
the herein accused, then their testimonies should be accorded full
credence.'
Seventh
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that 'even setting aside the
inter-locking confessional statements of Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag, . .
. substantial and sufficient evidence exist which indubitably prove the
guilt of Filoteo' (Petitioner).
Eighth
Insofar as petitioner is concerned, the respondent court erred
and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in
finding that 'accused Filoteo's (petitioner's) and Mateo's [alleged]
unexplained possession of the stolen checks raised the presumption
that 'they were responsible for the robbery in question,' petitioner's
alleged possession not being borne out but disputed by the
prosecution's own evidence.
Ninth
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that 'accused Filoteo's
denials and alibi cannot be entertained for being quite weak and
implausible.' The truth of the matter being that they should have been
sustained since petitioner was not identified by the direct victims-
eyewitnesses as among those who participated in or were present at
the hijack and none of the checks and treasury warrants were found in
his possession or retrieved from him.
Tenth
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the participation of
petitioner in the criminal conspiracy has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the evidence of record and that said evidence
'not only confirms the conspiracy between [him and the other accused]
as easily discernible from their conduct before, during and after the
commission of the offense, but also their participation therein as co-
principals by direct participation and/or indispensable cooperation.'
Eleventh
The respondent Court erred and gravely abused its discretion as
well as exceeded its jurisdiction in cavalierly rejecting, through the use
of pejorative words, and without stating the legal basis of such
rejection, the various vital factual points raised by petitioner, in gross
violation of the express mandate of the 1987 Constitution."
The Court believes that the above "errors" may be condensed into four:
(1) Are the written statements, particularly the extrajudicial
confession executed by the accused without the presence of his lawyer,
admissible in evidence against him?
(2) Were said statements obtained through torture, duress,
maltreatment and intimidation and therefore illegal and inadmissible?
(3) Was petitioner's warrantless arrest valid and proper?
(4) Is the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
The Court's Ruling
Preliminary Issue: Rule 45 or Rule 65?
Before ruling on the foregoing issues, it is necessary to dwell on the
procedural aspects of the case. Petitioner, a "segurista," opted to file an
(amended) "alternative petition" for certiorari under Rule 65 and for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We however hold that the
instant petition must be considered as one for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. In Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 60 this Court clearly ruled:
"Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended by P.D. No. 1606,
which created the Sandiganbayan, specified that decisions and final
orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be subject to review on certiorari by
this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. And Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court provides, in Section 2, that only
questions of law may be raised in the Petition for Review and these
must be distinctly set forth. Thus, in principle, findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are not to be reviewed by this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari. There are, of course, certain exceptions to this
general principle. Here, reading petitioner's Petition for Review and
Memorandum in the most favorable possible light, petitioner may be
seen to be in effect asserting that the Sandiganbayan misapprehended
certain (f)acts in arriving at its factual conclusions."
As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606

expressly provides that "(d)ecisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan
shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari
raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court." However, in exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of
questions of fact in order to resolve legal issues, as where there was
palpable error or grave misapprehension of facts by the lower court. Criminal
cases elevated by convicted public officials from the Sandiganbayan deserve
the same thorough treatment by this Court as criminal cases involving
ordinary citizens simply because the constitutional presumption of innocence
must be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In all criminal cases, a
person's life and liberty are at stake. 61
As a petition for review under Rule 45 is the available remedy, a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 would not prosper. Basic it is that
certiorari is invocable only where there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy. For waffling on procedural matters, petitioner could have lost this
battle through a summary dismissal of his "alternative" petition. But in view
of the importance of the issues raised, the Court decided to take cognizance
of the matter.
First Issue: Uncounselled Waiver
On the merits of the petition, we find that the pivotal issue here is the
admissibility of petitioner's extrajudicial confession which lays out in detail
his complicity in the crime.
Petitioner contends that respondent Court erred in admitting his
extrajudicial confession notwithstanding uncontradicted testimony and
documentary proof that he was made to sign the same through torture,
maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation and without the
presence and assistance of counsel. He also claims that in executing the
extrajudicial confession, he was denied the right to counsel in the same way
that his waiver of the said right was likewise without the benefit of counsel.
Petitioner therefore questions the respondent Court's admission in evidence
of his extrajudicial confession on the strength of cases 62 upholding the
admissibility of extrajudicial confessions notwithstanding the absence of
counsel "especially where the statements are replete with details and
circumstances which are indicative of voluntariness." We shall first tackle
the issue of his uncounselled waiver of his right to counsel.
The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973
Constitution read as follows:
"No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of
such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused under Article III,

Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution are, inter alia, as follows:
"(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation
of victims of torture or similar practices and their families." (emphasis
supplied. Obviously, the 1973 Constitution did not contain the right
against an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel which is
provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, above italicized.)
In the landmark case of Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 the Court

categorically held that the aforequoted provisions of the 1973 Constitution
(which were not included in the 1935 Charter) must be prospectively
applied. This Court said:

"We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate
has and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect.
Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation
for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his
right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same
had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on
January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in
evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before
the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January
17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel,
since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that
date."
By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution

requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial
investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may not be
applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was
made prior to the effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the
right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel
during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such
argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of cases held that
extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and
effect, should have been made with the assistance of counsel, 64 the
definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court,
through Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 65 issued the guidelines to be observed by law
enforcers during custodial investigation. The Court specifically ruled that "
(t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel." 66 Thereafter, in People vs. Luvendino,
67 the Court through Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano vigorously taught:
". . .. The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to

counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made one
and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and
reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People vs. Galit. . ..
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of

Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort
to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions outlined in
Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers
made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation of Morales ."
Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of
t h e Morales and Galit rulings because he executed his extrajudicial
confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on May 30, 1982, or before
April 26, 1983. The prospective application of "judge-made" laws was
underscored in Co vs. Court of Appeals 68 where the Court ruled thru Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa that in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code
which provides that "(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines," and
Article 4 of the same Code which states that "(l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided," the principle of prospectivity of
statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial decisions, which,
although in themselves are not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the
law means. 69
Petitioner's contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution should be given retroactive effect for being favorable to him as
an accused, cannot be sustained. While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that "(p)enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal," what is
being construed here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in
the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal statute. A bill of rights is a
declaration and enumeration of the individual rights and privileges which the
Constitution is designed to protect against violations by the government, or
by individuals or groups of individuals. It is a charter of liberties for the
individual and a limitation upon the power of the state. 70 Penal laws, on the
other hand, strictly and properly are those imposing punishment for an
offense committed against the state which the executive of the state has the
power to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes punishment imposed
and enforced by the state for a crime or offense against its law. 71
Hence, petitioner's vigorous reliance on People vs. Sison 72 to make his
extrajudicial confession inadmissible is misplaced. In that case, the
extrajudicial confession was executed on May 19, 1983, clearly after the
promulgation of Morales on April 26, 1983.
The admissibility of petitioner's uncounselled waiver of the right to
counsel notwithstanding, the Court has still to determine whether such
waiver was made voluntarily and intelligently. 73 The waiver must also be
categorical and definitive, 74 and must rest on clear evidence. 75
In his affidavit of May 30, 1982 waiving the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, 76 petitioner stated that:
". . . matapos akong mapagpaliwanagan ng mga imbestigador ng
Special Operations Group, PC/INP Central Anti-Organized Crime Task
Force, Camp Crame, Quezon City ng aking mga karapatan alinsunod sa
mga isinasaad ng Section 20, Article IV ng Bagong Saligang Batas ng
Republika ng Pilipinas ay malaya at kusang-loob na nagsasalaysay ng
mga sumusunod kahit na walang abugadong magpapayo sa akin sa
pagsasagawa nito sa dahilang alam at nauunawaan ko ang aking
ginagawa at wala naman akong isasalaysay kung hindi mga
katotohanan lamang, bagama't ako ay inalok ng mga imbestigador na
ikuha ng isang abugadong walang bayad mula sa CLAO-IBP na akin
namang tinanggihan:
xxx xxx xxx;
Na ako ay hindi sinaktan o minaltrato gayunding walang kinuha
mula sa akin na hindi niresibohan;
xxx xxx xxx."
Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he apprised

petitioner of his right to counsel even in waiving the same right 77 but
petitioner did not even inform him that his father-in-law was a lawyer.
Although allowed to talk for thirty minutes with Jimmy Victorino, who was his
comrade at the WPD General Assignment Section, 78 still, petitioner did not
invoke his right to counsel.
It should be emphasized that petitioner could not have been ignorant
of his rights as an accused. He was a fourth year criminology student and a
topnotch student in the police basic course. 79 Having been in the police
force since 1978, with stints at the investigation division or the detective
bureau, he knew the tactics used by investigators to incriminate criminal
suspects. 80 In other words, he was knowledgeable on the matter of
extrajudicial confessions.
The Second Issue: Confession Extracted Through Torture?
Petitioner's claim that he was tortured into signing the confession
appears incredible, or at least susceptible to serious doubts. The allegation
of torture was negated by the medical report 81 showing no evidence of
physical injuries upon his person. As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, there is no reason to maltreat him in particular when the record
shows that the investigating team respected the right of the other suspects
to remain silent. When he was presented before Judge Mariano Mendieta of
the municipal court in Meycauayan, petitioner even waived his right to
present evidence 82 instead of impugning his confession on account of the
torture allegedly inflicted upon him. If indeed he had been tortured, he would
have revived the case he filed against his alleged torturers upon learning of
its dismissal.
Furthermore, an examination of his signatures in the different
documents on record bearing the same discloses an evenness of lines and
strokes in his penmanship which is markedly consistent in his certification,
extrajudicial confession and waiver of detention. Human experience has
proven that the lines and strokes of a person's handwriting reflect his
disposition at a certain given time. In the present case, no handwriting
expert is needed to declare that petitioner's signatures were written
voluntarily and not under compulsion of fear immediately after he had been
subjected to maltreatment. In view of the foregoing, his extrajudicial
confession is presumed to have been voluntarily made, in the absence of
conclusive evidence showing that petitioner's consent in executing the same
had been vitiated. 83
Besides, the question of whether petitioner was indeed subjected to
torture or maltreatment is a factual question addressed primarily to trial
courts, the findings of which are binding on this Court whose function, as
afore-discussed, is principally to review only of questions of law. Moreover,
we have pored over the assailed Decision and we are satisfied that
respondent Court performed its duty in evaluating the evidence. More on
this later.
The Third Issue: Illegal Arrest?
Petitioner questions the manner of his arrest, stating that the arresting
officers "invited" him without a warrant of arrest and brought him to Camp
Crame where he was allegedly subjected to torture almost a month after the
commission of the crime. 84 Petitioner's claim is belatedly made. He should
have questioned the validity of his arrest before he entered his plea in the
trial court. On this point, this Court explained in People vs. Lopez, Jr.: 85
"Finally, it is much too late for appellant to raise the question of
his arrest without a warrant. When accused-appellant was arrested and
a case was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment,
participated in the trial and presented his evidence. Appellant is thus
estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. It is well-settled
that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused
must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is
deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being raised for the first time by
appellant. He did not move for the quashal of the information before
the trial court on this ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant
to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and
by participating in the trial. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is
not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after trial free from error."
The only move petitioner made in regard to his arrest was to file a
complaint for "grave coercion, grave threat & maltreatment" which was
docketed as I.S. No. 82-12684 before the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City. 86
The complaint was an offshoot of his alleged maltreatment in the hands of
the SOG upon his arrest. However, as stated above, he did not lift a finger to
revive it upon its dismissal.
The Fourth Issue: Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence
Contrary to petitioner's claim, his culpability has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. He borrowed a car to use in the hijacking knowing fully
well that his owner-type jeep would give away his identity. He could not be
identified by the postal employees in the postal van simply because after
overtaking said vehicle and forcing its driver to pull over, he gave up driving
the Mercedes Benz where the postal employees were made to ride, and
commandeered the van. That the checks were not found in his own home is
of no moment. Before the arrest and upon learning that the authorities had
begun to nail down the identities of the malefactors, he had entrusted them
to his "kumare." It was petitioner himself who led the team of Lt. Pagdilao
back to his place after he had admitted to Sgt. Arsenio Carlos that his share
of the checks were in the possession of his "kumare" in the neighborhood. 87
In view of these facts, it is beyond dispute that petitioner was a direct
participant in the commission of the crime. His alibi has been correctly
considered by the Sandiganbayan to be weak and implausible. The distance
between Kalvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan and downtown Manila where
petitioner claimed to have been at the crucial time was between fifteen (15)
to twenty (20) kilometers, which, through first-class roads, could be
negotiated during that time in approximately thirty (30) minutes. It could not
therefore have been physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene
or its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. 88
Having already ruled on the admissibility of petitioner's confession, this
Court holds that the full force of the totality of the prosecution's evidence
proves his guilt well beyond reasonable doubt. Weighing heavily against the
defense is the well-settled doctrine that findings of facts of the trial courts —
in this case, the Sandiganbayan itself — particularly in the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, is binding upon this Court, absent any arbitrariness,
abuse or palpable error.
" . . . It is well-settled that this Court will not interfere with the
judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility of the
witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misapprehended or misinterpreted. The
reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial." 89
"The doctrine is firmly settled that the trial court's conclusion on

issues of credibility is accorded with highest respect by the appellate
courts (People v. Dominguez , 217 SCRA 170). Appellate courts will
generally respect the findings of trial courts on the credibility of
witnesses since trial courts are in a better position to weigh conflicting
testimonies. They heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying. . .." 90
So overwhelming is the prosecution's evidence that respondent Court

opined that even without the "inter-locking confessions of Filoteo, Mateo and
Liwanag" the remaining evidence would still be sufficient for conviction. 91
Said the respondent tribunal:
"However, even setting aside the inter-locking confessional
statements of Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag, we are of the considered
opinion that substantial and sufficient evidence exist which indubitably
prove the guilt of Filoteo, Relator, Mateo and Saguindel who had
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court. As above-stated,
Filoteo was responsible for securing the use of the Mercedes Benz car
used by the co-conspirators in the hi-jacking. Together with Mateo,
Liwanag and Mendoza, he surrendered voluminous assorted checks
which were part of the loot. Relator admitted that his service firearm
was used by him in the hi-jacking, which firearm was identified by
prosecution witnesses Miranda and Bautista. Saguindel was identified
in line-ups at the SOG office as the suspect clad in fatigue uniform and
carrying an Armalite rifle by prosecution witnesses Tagudar and
Bautista. All three (3) accused, namely, Mateo, Relator and Saguindel
also jumped bail during the trial and did not offer any evidence to
refute the evidence presented by the prosecution against them. Such
flight to evade prosecution constitutes an implied admission of guilt.
Moreover, accused Filoteo's and Mateo's unexplained possession
of the stolen checks raises the presumption that they were responsible
for the robbery in question. It is a rule established by an abundance of
jurisprudence that when stolen property is found in the possession of
one, not the owner, without a satisfactory explanation of his
possession, he will be presumed the thief. This rule is in accordance
with the disputable presumption "that a person found in possession of
a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer
of the whole act." In the instant case, said accused has not given such
satisfactory explanation, much more so when their possession had
been positively established by the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Capt. Ferrer and Sgt. Carlos and by accused's own signatures at the
back of said checks.
Furthermore, accused Filoteo's denials and alibi cannot be
entertained for being quite weak and implausible. His claim that he
merely borrowed the Mercedes Benz car from Rodolfo Miranda to help
out his co-accused Mateo, who had been utilized by the police as an
"informer and was following up tips in certain unsolved cases, appears
to be incredible and fantastic. He also claimed that he could not have
participated in the hi-jack because after giving the car to Mateo in the
morning of May 2, 1982, he waited at the corner of Zurbaran St. and
Avenida Rizal between 2-3:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day and then
went to the WPD headquarters to attend the police formation at around
5:00 o'clock p.m. when Mateo failed to show up. Thereafter, he tried to
show through his witnesses Gary Gallardo and Manolo Almogera that
he was with them between 3:00 o'clock to 4:45 o'clock p.m., then from
6:00 o'clock to 8:30 o'clock p.m. and, finally, from 10:45 o'clock p.m. to
11:00 o'clock of the same date. It was through said witnesses that he
tried to establish his whereabouts between 4:30 o'clock to 7:30 o'clock
p.m. of May 2, 1982, the period from the time the mail van was hi-
jacked up to when postal employees Bautista, Miranda and Tagudar
were brought to Caloocan City and freed by their captors. Such alibi,
however, fails to show that it was physically impossible for him to be
present at the scene of the hi-jacking. We take judicial notice that the
distance between the crime scene and downtown Manila is some 15-20
kilometers and negotiable over first-class roads in some thirty (30)
minutes."
We are likewise convinced that there is sufficient evidence of

conspiracy as convincing as the evidence of the participation of each of the
accused. As ratiocinated in the assailed Decision: 92
"The participation of accused Filoteo, Mateo, Relator and
Saguindel in the criminal conspiracy have (sic) been proved beyond
reasonable doubt by the evidence on record and which evidence not
only confirms the existence of the conspiracy between them as easily
discernible from their conduct before, during and after the commission
of the offense, but also their participation therein as co-principals by
direct participation and/or indispensable cooperation. Their concerted
efforts were performed with closeness and coordination indicating their
common purpose. Hence, there being collective criminal responsibility,
the act of one is the act of all, and each of the participants are
responsible for what the others did in all the stages of execution of the
offense."
Final Questions: Brigandage or Robbery

The Court believes that, though not raised as an issue and though not
argued by the parties in their pleadings, the question of which law was
violated by the accused should be discussed and passed upon. In fact,
petitioner should have brought up such question as it may benefit him with a
reduced penalty.
The respondent Court convicted the accused of brigandage punishable
under Presidential Decree No. 532. 93
Justifying the above disposition, the assailed Decision ratiocinates:
"Accused herein are charged with the violation of Presidential
Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974. Under said decree, with respect to the highway
robbery aspect, the offense is committed on a "Philippine Highway"
which under Section 2 (c) thereof has been defined as "any road,
street, passage, highway and bridges or any part thereof, or railway or
railroad within the Philippines, used by persons or vehicles, or
locomotives or trains for the movement or circulation of persons or
transportation of goods, articles or property or both," while under
Section 2 (e) thereof "Highway Robbery/Brigandage" has been defined
as the "the seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other
unlawful purposes or the taking away of property of another by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things or
other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine
Highway." (Emphasis supplied)
The offense described in the information and established by the
evidence presented by the prosecution properly falls within the ambit
of the aforesaid special law. Therein, it was conclusively proven that a
postal van containing mail matters, including checks and warrants, was
hi-jacked along the national highway in Bulacan by the accused, with
the attendant use of force, violence and intimidation against the three
(3) postal employees who were occupants thereof, resulting in the
unlawful taking and asportation of the entire van and its contents
consisting of mail matters. Also the evidence further showed that the
crime was committed by the accused who were PC soldiers, policeman
(sic) and private individuals in conspiracy with their co-accused Castro
and Escalada who were postal employees and who participated in the
planning of the crime. Accordingly, all the essential requisites to
constitute a consummated offense under the law in point are present."
(Emphasis in the original text.)
Obviously, the Court a quo labored under the belief that because the
taking or robbery was perpetrated on a national highway (McArthur
Highway), ergo, Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, must have been the statute
violated. Such reasoning has already been debunked by this Court in the
case of People vs. Isabelo Puno, 94 where it was ruled in unmistakable
language that it takes more than the situs of the robbery to bring it within
the ambit of PD 532. Said the Court through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado:
"The following salient distinctions between brigandage and
robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject and are of
continuing validity:
'The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the

formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists
in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for
the purpose indicated in Art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to
constitute a violation of Art. 306. It would not be necessary to
show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of
the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other
purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when
the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such
as are contemplated by Art. 306. On the other hand, if robbery is
committed by a band, whose members were not primarily
organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping,
etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery.
Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more than
three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed
by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of Art. 306, it is
required that the band 'sala a los campos para dedicarse a
robar.' (Emphasis ours.)
In fine, the purpose of brigandage, is inter alia, indiscriminate
highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime
is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed
participants. The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating
Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein,
could not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to
have adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary. This
conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction,
since it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances under
which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous
exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law.
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway

robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways
as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a
predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the preambular
clauses thereof, to wit:
"WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal

that lawless elements are still committing acts of depredation
upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby
disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and
stunting the economic and social progress of the people:
"WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . .
highway robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms
of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries:
"WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be
discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredations by
imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of
eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people; (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery
against a particular person chosen by the accused as their specific
victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and
which single act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the
economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered
"among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal
statutes of all countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle
"to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the
people," such that said isolated act would constitute the highway
robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished is said decree. This
would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous."
From the above, it is clear that a finding of brigandage or highway

robbery involves not just the locus of the crime or the fact that more than
three (3) persons perpetrated it. It is essential to prove that the outlaws were
purposely organized not just for one act of robbery but for several
indiscriminate commissions thereof. In the present case, there had been no
evidence presented that the accused were a band of outlaws organized for
the purpose of "depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another." What was
duly proven in the present case is one isolated hijacking of a postal van.
There was also no evidence of any previous attempts at similar robberies by
the accused to show the "indiscriminate" commission thereof. 95
Upon the other hand, the Information did not specifically mention P.D.
532. 96 The facts alleged therein and proven by the evidence constitute the
offense of robbery defined in Art. 293 in relation to Art. 295 and punished by
Art. 294, par. 5, all of the Revised Penal Code. 97 From the facts, it was duly
proven that:
* personal property (treasury warrants, checks, mail, van, tools,

etc.)
* belonging to another were
* unlawfully taken by the accused
* with intent to gain (animo lucrandi)

* with intimidation against three persons (Art. 293)
* in an uninhabited place, or
* by an band, or
* by attacking a moving motor vehicle
* on a highway; and
* the intimidation was made with the use of firearms (Art. 295)
Hence, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the

penalty provided under paragraph 5 of Art. 294, which is, "prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period."
Effectively, the penalty imposed by the Court a quo should be
lightened. However, such lighter penalty shall benefit only herein petitioner
and not his co-accused who did not contest or appeal the Sandiganbayan's
Decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, but the first paragraph of the
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is partially MODIFIED to read as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose
Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal in
the crime of robbery as defined in Arts. 293 and 295 and penalized
under Art. 294, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code IMPOSING on
him an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as
maximum, and to pay his proportionate share of the costs of the
action."
All other parts of the disposition are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ ., concur.
Mendoza and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., took no part.
Footnotes
1. Rollo , pp. 17-67.
2. Second Division, composed of J. Romeo M. Escareal, ponente, and JJ. Regino C.
Hermosisima, Jr. and Augusto M. Amores, concurring.
3. Rollo , pp. 69-70.

4. Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 2-3; Rollo , pp. 18-19.
6. Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 5; Rollo , p. 21.

6-a. At the time of the incident. Pagdilao was a lieutenant, but when he testified at
the trial, he had already been promoted to captain.
7. Exhs. E, E-1 and E-2.
8. Exh. E-3.
9. Exhs. G, G-1, G-2 and G-3.

10. TSN, June 21, 1984, p. 19.
11. TSN, August 29, 1985, p. 13.
12. TSN, June 21, 1984, p. 19.

13. TSN, August 29, 1985, 13.
14. TSN, August 29, 1985, p. 20.
15. TSN, June 21, 1984, p. 22.

16. Exhs. G to G-3.
17. Exhs. D to D-4.
18. Exh. A-3.

19. TSN, July 30, 1986, p. 30.
20. Exh. A-29-a.
21. TSN, August 6, 1984, p. 12.

22. TSN, July 30, 1986, p. 36.
23. Ibid., pp. 33 & 35.
24. Exh. A-16.

25. Exh. A-17.
26. Exh. A-18.
27. TSN, June 22, 1984, pp. 18-19.
28. Exh. A-9-a.

29. TSN, August 6, 1984, p. 15.
30. TSN, August 6, 1984, p. 16.
31. Exhs. B, B-1 and B-2.

32. TSN, August 6, 1984, p. 17.
33. Exh. A-10.
34. Exhs. A-12, A-11 and A-24a.

35. Exh. A-20.
36. Exh. A-22.
37. Exh. A-19.
38. Exhs. A-5b & A-5c.

39. Exhs. A-4b & A-4c.
40. Exhs. A-6b, A-6c & A-6d.
41. Exh. A-27a.

42. Record, Vol. I, p. 1.
43. Sandiganbayan Records, Vol. I; pp. 11-12.
44. Ibid., pp. 29-39.

45. Ibid., pp. 71-77.
46. Exh. 11-A for Filoteo.
47. Exh. 11-B for Filoteo.
48. Exhs. 11-C, 11-D, 11-E, 11-F & 11-G for Filoteo.
49. Exhs. 1, 1-A, 1-B, 1-D, 1-F & 1-G for Filoteo.
50. Exh. 4 for Filoteo.
51. TSN, September 11, 1986, p. 29.
52. Ibid., p. 44.

55. TSN, September 12, 1986, p. 6.

57. Exhs. 12-B & 12-C for Filoteo.
59. Exh. 13-A for Filoteo

60. 188 SCRA 475, 482-483, August 13, 1990.
61. Worth quoting is the concurring and dissenting opinion of then Associate Justice
Felix V. Makasiar in Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, (111 SCRA 433, January 30,
1982) where the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1606 was raised and where the
majority opinion stated that the law could stand improvement ("It is true that
other Sections of the Decree could have been worded to avoid any
constitutional objection"). Justice Makasiar said:
"3. Limiting the power of review by the Supreme Court of convictions by the
Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion,
likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused,
which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt
(Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).
Even if in certiorari proceedings, the Supreme Court, to determine whether
the trial court gravely abused its discretion, can inquire into whether the
judgment of the Sandiganbayan is supported by the substantial evidence, the
presumption of innocence is still violated; because proof beyond reasonable
doubt cannot be equated with substantial evidence. Because the Supreme
Court under P.D. No. 1606 is precluded from reviewing questions of fact and
the evidence submitted before the Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court is
thereby deprived of the constitutional power to determine whether the guilt
of the accused has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt — by
proof generating moral certainty as to his culpability — and therefore
subverts the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor which is
enjoyed by all other defendants in other criminal cases, including defendants
accused of only light felonies, which are less serious than graft and
corruption." (Ibid., p. 460).
62. Respondent Court cited the cases of People vs. Nillos, 127 SCRA 207, January
30, 1984; People vs. Villanueva, 128 SCRA 488, April 2, 1984; People vs.
Urgel, 134 SCRA 483, February 25, 1985; People vs. Toledo , 140 SCRA 259,
November 22, 1985; People vs. Ochavido, 142 SCRA 193, May 30, 1986;
People vs. Banaan , 142 SCRA 410, July 2, 1986; People vs. Jumadiao, 143
SCRA 371, August 12, 1986; People vs Aguirre , 143 SCRA 572, August 19,
1986 and People vs. Pia, 145 SCRA 581, November 14, 1986. (Decision, p.
36).
63. 63 SCRA 4, 12, March 3, 1975.

64. Some of these cases are: People vs. Ampo-an, 187 SCRA 173, 188, July 4, 1990;
People vs. Decierdo , 149 SCRA 496, May 7, 1987; People vs. Jara, 144 SCRA
516, September 30, 1986; People vs. Poyos, 143 SCRA 542, August 19, 1986
and People vs. Duero , 191 Phil. 679 [1981].
65. 121 SCRA 538, 554, April 26, 1983.
66. In regard to custodial investigations, Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile states:
"7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could
be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but
the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence."
67. 211 SCRA 36, 49-50, July 3, 1992.
68. 227 SCRA 444, 448-449, October 28, 1993.
69. In the same case, the Court cited People vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 612,
February 27, 1974 where it was held that when a doctrine is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof, especially in the
construction and application of criminal laws where it is necessary that the
punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
The Court also cited Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 515, January
27, 1992, where it was held that while our decisions form part of the law of
the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides
that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided or,
as expressed in the familiar legal maxim, lex prospicit, non respicit.
70. De Leon, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., p. 137, citing 1 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., pp. 534-535 and 3 Black, Constitutional
Law, 3rd ed., 9-10.

71. Dissent of Malcolm, J. in People vs. Moran, 44 Phil. 387, 429 (1923).
72. 142 SCRA 219, May 30, 1986.
73. People vs. Luvendino, supra, at p. 53.

74. People vs. Poyos, supra, at p. 549
75. People vs. Decierdo, supra.
76. Exh. A-18.

77. TSN, October 14, 1985, p. 12.
78. Ibid., p. 14.
79. He later finished the course in law and is now waiting to be allowed to take the
Bar Exams. (Rollo , p. 303).
80. TSN, September 12, 1986, p. 25.

81. Exh. A-30.
82. Exh. A-31.
83. People vs. Nimo , 227 SCRA 69, 84, October 5, 1993, citing People vs.
Luvendino, supra.
84. Amended Petition, p. 25.
85. 245 SCRA 95, 105-106, June 16, 1995.
86. Exh. 12
87. TSN, October 14, 1985, pp. 28-30; TSN, July 30, 1986, p. 33.
88. People vs. Lopez, 249 SCRA 610, 621, October 30, 1995; People vs. Lazaro, 249
SCRA 234, October 12, 1995.
89. People vs. Dismuke, 234 SCRA 51, 58, July 11, 1994.
90. People vs. Padre-e , 249 SCRA 422, 431, October 24, 1995.
92. Page 47; Rollo , p. 63.
93. See assailed Decision pp. 49-51; Rollo , pp. 65-67.

94. 219 SCRA 85, 96-98, February 17, 1993.
95. People vs. Romeo Mendoza, G.R. No. 104401, February 23, 1996.
96. This is not to say that in interpreting informations the designation is
controlling. In fact, it is the description of the offense charged, not the
designation, that controls. See People vs. Aczon, 225 SCRA 327, August 10,
1993; Odon Pecho vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 111399, September
27, 1996.
97. Arts. 293, 294 and 295 of the Revised Penal Code read as follows:
Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. — Any person who, with intent to gain,
shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, shall be
guilty of robbery.
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons —
Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or
intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of from reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed;
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua, when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of
the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been
inflicted; Provided, however, That when the robbery accompanied with rape
is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. (As amended by P.D. No. 767,
August 15, 1975)
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the

robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted,
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal
in its medium period, if the violence or intimidation employed in the
commission of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly
unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or when in the course of its
execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible
for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and
4 of said article 263,
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period in other cases. (As amended by Republic Act No. 18)
Art. 295. Robbery with Physical Injuries, committed in an uninhabited place
and by a band, or with the use of firearms on a street, road or alley. — If the
offenses mentioned in subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of the next preceding article
shall have been committed in an uninhabited place or by a band or by
attacking a moving train, streetcar, motor vehicle or airship, or by entering
the passengers' compartments in a train or, in any manner, taking the
passengers thereof by surprise in the respective conveyances, or on a street,
road, highway or alley, and the intimidation is made with the use of a firearm,
the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the proper
penalties. (As amended by Republic Act No. 12, Sec. 2, and Republic Act No.
373)"

Filoteo Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 79543. October 16, 1996.]

JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR. , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and

Esteban B. Bautista for petitioner.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT;

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED

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2) Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers

On separate dates, accused Filoteo, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator and

The prosecution sought to prove its case with the testimonies of

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In a letter-request dated May 6, 1982 to then Col. Ramon Montaño,

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S: — Opo, pipirma ako Ser.

3. T: — Maaari bang sabihin mong muli ang iyong buong pangalan,

S: — Jose Filoteo y Diendo, 30-anyos, may-asawa, isang Patrolman ng

S: — Noon pong October 1978, hindi ko maalaala ang exactong petsa,

5. T: — Kailan ka pa naman na-assign sa GAS, WPD, MPF?

7. T: — Ano naman ang natapos mong kurso sa pag-aaral?

S: — Sa follow-Up Unit ako.

14. T: — Ipagpatuloy mo ang iyong pagsasalaysay?

S: — Dumeretso kami ngayon sa may Obrero, sa bahay mismo nina

S: — Sumakay kami ngayon ng taksi at bumalik na kami kina Carding

S: — Wala po akong baril, Ser.

S: — E, di ganoon na mga ho, habang tumatagal ay umiinit ang

18. T: — Iyong sinasabi mong mga kontak nina Carding Perez sa

S: — Si Junior Mateo po, ipinakilala niya ako kina Carding at sa buong

21. T: — Handa mo bang lagdaan ang iyong salaysay na ito bilang

WAKAS NG SALAYSAY . . ./ac

MGA SAKSI SA LAGDA:

C1C THERESA TOLENTINO WAC (PC)" 24

Consequently, it is hereby ordered that Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2,

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Postmaster-General,

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said Decision was denied by

As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606

In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused under Article III,

In the landmark case of Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 the Court

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By parity of reasoning, the speciﬁc provision of the 1987 Constitution

". . .. The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to

While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of

Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating oﬃcer, testiﬁed that he apprised

"The doctrine is ﬁrmly settled that the trial court's conclusion on

So overwhelming is the prosecution's evidence that respondent Court

We are likewise convinced that there is suﬃcient evidence of

Final Questions: Brigandage or Robbery

'The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway

"WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal

From the above, it is clear that a ﬁnding of brigandage or highway

* personal property (treasury warrants, checks, mail, van, tools,

* belonging to another were

* unlawfully taken by the accused

* with intent to gain (animo lucrandi)

* by attacking a moving motor vehicle

Hence, the oﬀender shall be punished by the maximum period of the

All other parts of the disposition are hereby AFFIRMED.

3. Rollo , pp. 69-70.

6. Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 5; Rollo , p. 21.