Minggu 8 - Monopoli
Minggu 8 - Monopoli
Minggu 8 - Monopoli
Ekonomi
Monopoli
Slides prepared by
Chandra Utama
What is monopoli?
What is monopoli?
6
Legal Barriers to Entry
7
Creation of Barriers to Entry
8
Profit Maximization
Profit Maximization
11
Profit Maximization
Price MC The monopolist will maximize
profits where MR = MC
AC
P* The firm will charge a price
of P*
C
15
Price Price
MC MC
AC
AC
P* P*=AC
D D
MR MR
Q* Quantity Q* Quantity
Positive profits Zero profit 16
No Monopoly Supply Curve
With a fixed market demand curve, the supply “curve” for a
monopolist will only be one point
the price-output combination where MR = MC
If the demand curve shifts, the marginal revenue curve shifts
and a new profit-maximizing output will be chosen
17
Monopoly with linear demand
18
Monopoly with linear demand
Thus, MR = MC where
100 - Q/10 = 0.01Q
Q* = 500 P* = 75
Q P 75
eQ,P 20 3
P Q 500
22
Monopoly with linear demand
P MC 1 1
P eQ,P 3
23
Monopoly and Resource Allocation
Monopoly and Resource Allocation
25
Monopoly and Resource Allocation
Price
If this market was competitive, output would
be Q* and price would be P*
P* MC=AC
D
MR
Q** Q* Quantity 26
Monopoly and Resource Allocation
Price Consumer surplus would fall
Q** Q* 27
Quantity
Welfare Losses and Elasticity
28
Welfare Losses and Elasticity
The competitive price in this market will be
Pc = c
c
Pm
1
1
e
29
Welfare Losses and Elasticity
CS Q(P )dP P e dP
P0 P0
P e 1
P0e 1
CS
e 1P e 1 30
0
Welfare Losses and Elasticity
c e 1
Therefore, under perfect competition CSc
e 1
e 1
c
and under monopoly
1 1
CSm e
e 1 31
Welfare Losses and Elasticity
Taking the ratio of these two surplus measures yields
e 1
CSm 1
CSc 1 1
e
If e = -2, this ratio is ½
– consumer surplus under monopoly is half
what it is under perfect competition 32
Welfare Losses and Elasticity
● Monopoly profits are given by
c
m PmQm cQm c Qm
1 1
e
e e 1
c
c c 1
m e
1 1 1 1 1 1 e
e e e 33
Welfare Losses and Elasticity
● To find the transfer from consumer surplus into monopoly profits we can
divide monopoly profits by the competitive consumer surplus
e 1
m e 1 1
e
e
CS c e 1 1
1 e
e
37
Monopoly and Product quality
● First-order conditions for a maximum are
P
P (Q, X ) Q CQ 0
Q Q
MR = MC for output decisions
P
Q CX 0
X X
Marginal revenue from increasing quality by one unit is
equal to the marginal cost of making such an increase 38
Monopoly and Product quality
● The level of product quality that will be opted for under
competitive conditions is the one that maximizes net
social welfare
Q*
SW 0
P (Q, X )dQ C (Q, X )
SW Q*
X
0
PX (Q, X )dQ C X 0
39
Monopoly and Product quality
40
Monopoly and Product quality
41
Price Discrimination
Price Discrimination
43
Price Discrimination
44
Under perfect price discrimination, the monopolist
Price charges a different price to each buyer
The first buyer pays P1 for Q1 units
P1
P2 The second buyer pays P2 for Q2-Q1 units
MC
The monopolist will
continue this way until the
marginal buyer is no
D longer willing to pay the
good’s marginal cost
45
Quantity
Q1 Q2
Perfect Price Discrimination
46
Perfect Price Discrimination
● Therefore,
P = 100 - Q/20 = MC = 0.1Q
Q* = 666
● Total revenue and total costs will be
666
2
Q* Q
R
0
P (Q )dQ 100Q
40
55,511
0
1 1
Pi (1 ) Pj (1 )
ei ej
49
Market Seperation
● This implies that
1
(1 )
Pi ej
Pj (1 1 )
ei
• The profit-maximizing price will be higher in markets
where demand is less elastic
50
If two markets are separate, maximum profits occur by
setting different prices in the two markets
Price
The market with the less
P1 elastic demand will be
charged the higher price
P2
MC MC
D D
MR MR
● Suppose that the demand curves in two separated markets are given
by
Q1 = 24 – P1
Q2 = 24 – 2P2
● Suppose that MC = 6
● Profit maximization requires that
MR1 = 24 – 2Q1 = 6 = MR2 = 12 – Q2
52
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
53
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
55
Two-Part Tariffs
● Because the average price paid by any demander is
p’ = T/q = a/q + p
56
Two-Part Tariffs
● One feasible approach for profit maximization would be for
the firm to set p = MC and then set a equal to the
consumer surplus of the least eager buyer
57
Two-Part Tariffs
● Suppose there are two different buyers with the demand
functions
q1 = 24 - p1
q2 = 24 - 2p2
q1 = 18 q2 = 12
58
Two-Part Tariffs
● With this marginal price, demander 2 obtains consumer
surplus of 36
64
Regulation of monopoly
pf ( k , l ) w l
s
k
65
Regulation of monopoly
66
Regulation of monopoly
L = (s0 – v)k
L
pfl w (w pfl ) 0
l
L
pfk v (s0 pfk ) 0
k
L
w l s0 pf ( k , l ) 0
68
Regulation of monopoly
● Because s0>v and <1, this means that
pfk < v
● The firm will hire more capital than it would under unregulated
conditions
69
Dynamic Views of Monopoly
Dynamic Views of Monopoly
● Some economists have stressed the beneficial role that
monopoly profits can play in the process of economic
development