CHAPTER THREE: CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH

MITIGATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Definition
­ Mitigating circumstances are those which, if
present in the commission of the crime, do not
entirely free the actor from criminal liability, but
serve only to reduce the penalty. (REYES, The Revised
Penal Code, Book One, 19th ed., 2017, [hereinafter, REYES, Book One],
p. 258)
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Definition
­ Mitigating circumstances show lesser perversity
of the offender and has the effect of lowering
the penalty prescribed for the offense. They are
matters of defense that do not have to be
alleged in the information. (BOADO, supra at 144)
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Definition
­ Mitigating circumstances are personal to an
accused in whose favor they exist and cannot be
enjoyed by his co-accused.
­ Example: RR, being below 18 at the time he
committed the crime, is entitled to the privileged
circumstance of minority notwithstanding that the
penalty imposable if reclusion perpetua. (People v.
Barreta, G.R. No. 120367, October 16, 2000)
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Basis
­ Mitigating circumstances are based on the
diminution of either freedom of action,
intelligence, or intent, or on the lesser perversity
of the offender. (REYES, supra at 259)
CLASSES OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
a. ORDINARY MITIGATING – lowers the penalty to
the minimum period. (BOADO, Notes and Case on the Revised
Penal Code, 2012, [hereinafter, BOADO], p.144)

­ Those mentioned in subsection 1 of Art. 13 are

ordinary mitigating circumstances, if Art. 69, for
instance is not applicable. (REYES, supra at 259)
CLASSES OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
2. PRIVILEGED MITIGATING – lowers the imposable
penalty, whether divisible or indivisible, by one
or more degrees.
3. SPECIFIC MITIGATING – applies to a specific
felony like concealment of dishonor in the case
of abortion by the pregnant woman herself.
These circumstances can either be ordinary or
privileged depending upon the effect on the
penalty. (BOADO, supra at 145)
PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
APPLICABLE ONLY TO PARTICULAR CRIMES
1. Voluntary release of the person illegally detained
within three days without the offender attaining his
purpose and before the institution of criminal action.
(Art. 268, par. 3) The penalty is one degree lower.

2. Abandonment without justification of the spouse who

committed adultery. (Art. 333, par. 3) The penalty is
one degree lower. (REYES, supra at 260)
DISTINCTIONS
1. Ordinary mitigating is susceptible of being offset by any
aggravating circumstance; while privileged mitigating
cannot be offset by any aggravating circumstance.
2. Ordinary mitigating, if not offset by an aggravating
circumstance, produces only the effect of applying the
penalty provided by law for the crime in its minimum
period, in case of divisible penalty; whereas, privileged
mitigating produces the effect of imposing upon the
offender the penalty lower by one or two degrees than
that provided by law for the crime. (REYES, supra at 260)
 ORDINARY MITIGATING PRIVILEGED MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE CIRCUMSTANCE
Can be offset by a generic Cannot be offset by any
aggravating circumstance aggravating circumstance

Penalty is lowered to the Penalty is lowered by one or

minimum period of the penalty two degrees
prescribed
Not considered when what is Always considered whether the
prescribed is single indivisible penalty imposable is divisible or
penalty indivisible
BOADO, supra at 145
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES ONLY REDUCE PENALTY,
BUT DO NOT CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE CRIME
§ If there is a privileged mitigating circumstance, the
penalty for murder will be reduced by one or two
degrees lower.
§ In every case, the accused should be held guilty for
murder. (REYES, supra at 261)
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES ONLY REDUCE PENALTY,
BUT DO NOT CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE CRIME
§ Where the accused is charged with murder, as when
treachery as a qualifying circumstance is alleged in the
information, the fact that there is a generic or privileged
mitigating circumstance does not change the felony to
homicide.
§ If there is an ordinary or generic mitigating circumstance,
not offset by any aggravating circumstance, the accused
should be found guilty of the same crime of murder, but the
penalty to be imposed is reduced to the minimum of the
penalty for murder. (REYES, supra at 261)
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. – The following are
mitigating circumstances:
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the
requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt
from criminal liability in the respective cases are not
attendant.
2. That the offender is under eighteen years of age or
over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with the provisions
of Article 80.
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave
a wrong as that committed.
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. – The following are
mitigating circumstances:
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party immediately preceded the act.
5. That the act was committed in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense to the one committing
the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants,
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or
relatives by affinity within the same degrees.
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produces passion or obfuscation.
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. – The following are
mitigating circumstances:
7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a
person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily
confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation
of evidence for the prosecution.
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind, or otherwise
suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means
of action, defense, or communication with his fellow beings.
9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise
of the willpower of the offender without however depriving
him to consciousness of his act.
10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature
and analogous to those above-mentioned.
PAR. 1 – THOSE MENTIONED IN THE PRECEDING CHAPTER
WHEN ALL THE REQUISITES NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY THE ACT
OR TO EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN THE
RESPECTIVE CASES ARE NOT ATTENDANT.
“Those mentioned in the preceding chapter”
§ This clause has reference to (1) justifying
circumstances, and (2) exempting circumstances
which are covered by Chapter Two of Title One.
(REYES, supra at 263)
WHEN ALL THE REQUISITES NECESSARY TO
JUSTIFY THE ACT ARE NOT ATTENDANT
1. Incomplete self-defense, defense of relatives, and
defense of stranger
§ Note that in these three classes of defense,
unlawful aggression must be present, it being an
indispensable requisite. What is absent is either one
or both or the last two requisites.
§ If there is no unlawful aggression, there could be
no self-defense or defense of a relative, whether
complete or incomplete. (REYES, supra at 264-265)
WHEN ALL THE REQUISITES NECESSARY TO
JUSTIFY THE ACT ARE NOT ATTENDANT
1. Incomplete self-defense, defense of relatives, and
defense of stranger
§ When two of the three requisites mentioned therein
are present (for example, unlawful aggression and
any one of the other two), the case must not be
considered as one in which an ordinary or generic
mitigating is present. Instead, it should be
considered a privileged mitigating circumstances
referred to in Art. 69 of the RPC.
WHEN ALL THE REQUISITES NECESSARY TO
JUSTIFY THE ACT ARE NOT ATTENDANT
1. Incomplete self-defense, defense of relatives, and
defense of stranger
§ In other words, when unlawful aggression alone is
proved, such incomplete self-defense is appreciated
as an ordinary mitigating under Art. 13(1). When it
is combined with another element, such incomplete
self-defense becomes privileged mitigating under
Art. 69. (BOADO, supra at 146)
WHEN ALL THE REQUISITES NECESSARY TO
JUSTIFY THE ACT ARE NOT ATTENDANT
§ It is necessary that there be present majority of the
elements of the circumstance for Art. 69 to apply.
When the circumstance requires only two elements, the
presence of one is considered a majority. (BOADO, supra at
146)
WHEN ALL THE REQUISITES NECESSARY TO
JUSTIFY THE ACT ARE NOT ATTENDANT
Example:
§ Thus, if in self-defense there was unlawful aggression
on the part of the deceased, the means employed to
prevent or repel it was reasonable, but the one making
a defense gave sufficient provocation, he is entitled to
a privileged mitigating circumstance, because the
majority of the conditions required to justify the act is
present.
WHEN ALL THE REQUISITES NECESSARY TO
EXEMPT THE ACT ARE NOT ATTENDANT
1. Incomplete exempting circumstance of minority over 15
and under 18 years of age
§ To be exempt from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344,
two conditions must be present: (a) that the offender is over
15 and under 18 years old; and (b) that he does NOT act
with discernment.
§ Therefore, if the minor over 15 and 18 years of age
acted with discernment, he is entitled only to a
mitigating circumstance because not all requisites
necessary to exempt from criminal liability are present.
(REYES, supra at 268)
WHEN ALL THE REQUISITES NECESSARY TO
EXEMPT THE ACT ARE NOT ATTENDANT
2. Incomplete exempting circumstance of accident
§ To be exempt from criminal liability under par. 4,
Art. 12 of the RPC, the following requisites must be
present:
a. A person is performing a lawful act;
b. With due care;
c. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; and
d. Without fault or intention of causing it.
WHEN ALL THE REQUISITES NECESSARY TO
EXEMPT THE ACT ARE NOT ATTENDANT
2. Incomplete exempting circumstance of accident
§ The requisites of lack of due care (b) and lack of
fault (d) are indispensable without which negligence
will be present giving rise to culpable felony or a
violation of Art. 365 of the RPC which punishes a
felony by negligence or imprudence. (BOADO, supra at
146)
§ In effect, there is a mitigating circumstance because
the penalty is lower than that provided for intentional
felony. (REYES, supra at 269)
WHEN ALL THE REQUISITES NECESSARY TO
EXEMPT THE ACT ARE NOT ATTENDANT
2. Incomplete exempting circumstance of accident
§If the requisites of lawful act (a) and lack of intention
of causing the injury (d) are absent, an intentional act
results taking the case out of the benefit of this
mitigating circumstance. (BOADO, supra at 146)
§ In this case, there is not even a mitigating
circumstance. (REYES, supra at 269)
PAR. 2 – THAT THE OFFENDER IS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE
OR OVER SEVENTY YEARS. IN THE CASE OF THE MINOR, HE SHALL
BE PROCEEDED AGAINST IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF ARTICLE 80
§ Par. 2, Art. 123 of the RPC is deemed repealed by the
provision of R.A. No. 9344 declaring a child above 15
years but below 18 years of age shall be exempt from
criminal liability unless he/she has acted with
discernment.
§ If an offender above 15 years but below 18 acted
with discernment, such child in conflict with the law shall
undergo diversion programs provided under Chapter 2
of R.A. No. 9344. (REYES, supra at 272)
MEANING OF DIVERSION AND DIVERSION
PROGRAM UNDER R.A. NO. 9344
§ “Diversion” refers to an alternative, child-appropriate
process of determining the responsibility and treatment
of a child in conflict with the law on the basis of his/her
social, cultural, economic, psychological, or educational
background without resulting to formal court
proceedings. (Sec. 4[j], R.A. No. 9344)
§ “Diversion program” refers to the program that the child
in conflict with the law is required to undergo after
he/she is found responsible for an offense without
resorting to formal court proceedings. (Sec. 4[j], R.A. No. 9344)
THAT THE OFFENDER IS OVER 70 YEARS OF AGE IS
ONLY A GENERIC MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
§ While paragraph 2 of Article 13 covers offenders
under 18 years of age and those over 70 years,
Article 68, providing for privileged mitigating
circumstances, does not include the case of
offenders over 70 years of age. (REYES, supra at 274)
§Hence, when the offender over 70 years of age, he
is only entitled to a generic mitigating
circumstance.
BASIS OF PARAGRAPH 2
§ The mitigating circumstances in paragraph 2 of
Article 13 are based on diminution of intelligence,
a condition of voluntariness. (REYES, supra at 275)
PAR. 3 – THAT THE OFFENDER HAD NO INTENTION TO
COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG AS THAT COMMITTED
Praeter intentionem
§ It is the lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed.
§ This circumstance can be taken into account only
when the facts proven show that there is a notable
and evidence disproportion between the means
employed to execute the criminal act and its
consequences. (U.S. v. Reyes, 36 Phil. 904, 907)
ILLUSTRATIONS:
1. The husband who was quarreling with his wife
punched her in the abdomen, causing the rupture of
her hypertrophied spleen, from which she died.
(People v. Rabao, 67 Phil. 255, 257, 259)
2. The accused confined himself to giving a single blow
with a bolo on the right arm of the victim and did not
repeat the blow. The death of the victim was due to
the neglect and lack of medical treatment, his death
having resulted from hemorrhage. (U.S. v Bertucio, 1 Phil.
47, 49)
INTENTION, BEING AN INTERNAL STATE, MUST BE
JUDGED BY EXTERNAL ACTS
§ The intention, as an internal act, is judged not only by
the proportion of the means employed by him to the evil
produced by his act, but also by the fact that the blow
was or was not aimed at a vital part of the body.
§ Thus, it may be deduced from the proven facts that the
accused had no intent to kill the victim, his design being
only to maltreat him, such that when he realized the
fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed the
victim to secure medical treatment. (People v. Ural. No. L-30801)
INTENTION, BEING AN INTERNAL STATE, MUST BE
JUDGED BY EXTERNAL ACTS
§ The weapon used, the part of the body injured, the
injury inflicted, and the manner it is inflicted may show
that the accused intended the wrong committed.
§ Example: When a person stabs another with lethal
weapon such as a fan knife, upon a part of the body, for
example, the head, chest, or stomach, death could
reasonably be anticipated and the accused must be
presumed to have intended the natural consequences of
his wrongful act. (People v. Reyes, 61 Phil. 341, 343)
WHEN CAN PRAETER INTENTIONEM NOT BE INVOKED?
§ Praeter intentionem cannot be invoked if the acts of
the accused are sufficient to bring about the result
intended or when the means employed would
natural result to the felony committed.
§ The Anti-Hazing Law expressly prohibits the
application of this circumstance in favor of the
offender. (BOADO, supra at 148)
LACK OF INTENT TO KILL, NOT MITIGATING IN
PHYSICAL INJURIES
§ In crimes against persons who do not die as a
result of the assault, the absence of the intent to kill
reduces the felony to mere physical injuries, but it
does not constitute a mitigating circumstance
under Article 13, paragraph 3. (People v. Galacgac, C.A.
54 O.G. 1207)
NOT APPLICABLE TO FELONIES BY NEGLIGENCE
§ In the case of infidelity in the custody of prisoners
through negligence (Art. 224), this circumstance was not
considered. (People v. Medina, C.A., 40 O.G. 4196)
§ In felonies through negligence, the offender acts without
intent. The intent in intentional felonies is replaced by
negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, lack of skill in
culpable felonies. Hence, in felonies through negligence,
there is no intent on the part of the offender which
may be considered as diminished. (REYES, supra at 281)
APPLICABLE ONLY TO OFFENSES RESULTING IN
PHYSICAL INJURIES OR MATERIAL HARM
§ Thus, the mitigating circumstance that the offender
did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed was not appreciated in cases of
defamation or slander. (REYES, supra at 282)
BASIS OF PARAGRAPH 3
§ In this circumstance, intent, an element of
voluntariness in intentional felony, is diminished.
(REYES, supra at 283)
PAR. 4 – THAT SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION OR THREAT ON
THE PART OF THE OFFENDED PARTY IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDED THE ACT
§ Provocation – any unjust or improper conduct or act
of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting,
or irritating any one. (REYES, supra at 283)
PAR. 4 – THAT SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION OR THREAT ON
THE PART OF THE OFFENDED PARTY IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDED THE ACT
§ Requisites:
1. That the provocation must be sufficient;
2. That it must originate from the offended party; and
3. That the provocation must be immediate to the act,
i.e. to the commission of the crime by the person who
is provoked. (REYES, supra at 283)
1. THE PROVOCATION MUST BE SUFFICIENT
§ Provocation in order to be mitigating must be sufficient
and immediately preceding the act. (People v. Pagal, No. L-
32040, October 25, 1977)
§ The word “sufficient” means adequate to excite a
person to commit the wrong and must accordingly be
proportionate to its gravity. (People v. Nabora, 73 Phil. 434, 435)
§ As to whether a provocation is sufficient depends upon
the act constituting the provocation, the social standing of
the person provoked, and the place and time when the
provocation is made. (REYES, supra at 283)
EXAMPLES OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION
1. When the deceased abused and ill-treated the
accused by kicking and cursing the latter, the accused
who killed him committed the crime with this mitigating
circumstances. (U.S. v. Firmo, 37 Phil. 133, 135)
2. When in his house, the accused saw an unknown
person jump out of the window and his wife begged
for his pardon on her knees, he killed her. Such
conduct on the part of his wife constitutes sufficient
provocation to the accused. (People v. Marquez, 53 Phil. 260,
262-263)
EXAMPLES OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION
3. The deceased, while intoxicated, found the
accused lying down without having prepared the
evening meal. This angered the deceased and
he abused the accused by kicking and cursing
him. A struggle followed and the accused
stabbed him with a pen-knife. The accused was
entitled to the mitigating circumstance that
sufficient provocation or threat immediately
preceded the act. (U.S. v. Firmo, 37 Phil. 133)
EXAMPLES OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION
4. Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him,
and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are in
our view, sufficient provocation to enrage any man,
or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more so
when the lives of his wife and children are in danger.
Petitioner stabbed the victim as a result of those
provocations, and while petitioner was still in a fit of
rage. There was sufficient provocation and the
circumstance of passion or obfuscation are present.
(Romera v. People, G.R. No. 151978, July 14, 2004)
PROVOCATION HELD NOT SUFFICIENT
a. When the injured party asked the accused for an
explanation for the latter’s derogatory remarks
against certain ladies, the accused cannot
properly claim that he was provoked to kill. (People
v. Laude, 58 Phil. 933)
PROVOCATION HELD NOT SUFFICIENT
b. While the accused was taking a walk at the New
Luneta one evening, the deceased met him and
pointing his finger at the accused asked the latter
what he was doing there and then said: “Don’t you
know we are watching for honeymooners here?” The
accused drew out his knife and stabbed the
deceased who died as a consequence. (People v. Nabora,
73 Phil. 434)
PROVOCATION HELD NOT SUFFICIENT
c. Assuming for the sake of argument that the blowing
of horns, cutting of lanes or overtaking can be
considered as acts of provocation, the same were
not sufficient. The deceased’s act of asking for an
explanation from the accused was not sufficient
provocation for him to claim that he was provoked to
kill or injure the deceased. (People v. Court of Appeals, et. al.,
G.R. No. 103613, February 23, 2001)
2. PROVOCATION MUST ORIGINATE FROM THE
OFFENDED PARTY
§ Where the alleged provocation did not come from he
deceased, but from the latter’s mother, the same may
not be appreciated in favor of the accused. (People v.
Reyes, No. L-33154, February 27, 1976)
§ Example: A and B were together. A hit C on the head
with a piece of stone from his sling-shot and ran away.
As he could not overtake A, C faced B and assaulted
the latter. In this case, C is not entitled to this mitigating
circumstance, because B never gave provocation. (REYES,
supra at 286)
2. PROVOCATION MUST ORIGINATE FROM THE
OFFENDED PARTY
§ If during the fight between the accused and another
person who provoked the affair, the deceased merely
approached to separated them and did not give the
accused any reason for attacking him, and in attacking
the other person the accused killed the deceased, the
provocation given by the other person cannot be taken
as a mitigating circumstance. (U.S. v. Malabanan, 9 Phil. 262,
264)
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION AS
REQUISITE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AND AS A
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
§ As an element of self-defense, it pertains to its
absence on the part of the person defending himself;
while as mitigating circumstance, it pertains to its
presence on the part of the person of the offended
party. (People v. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 103613, February 23,
2001)
3. PROVOCATION MUST BE IMMEDIATE TO THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
§ Between the provocation by the offended party and
the commission of the crime by the person provoked,
there should not be any interval of time.
§ Reason: when there is an interval of time between the
provocation and the commission of the crime, the
conduct of the offended party could not have excited
the accused to the commission of the crime, he having
had time to regain his reason and to exercise self-
control. (REYES, supra at 287)
3. PROVOCATION MUST BE IMMEDIATE TO THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
§ Provocation given by an adversary at the
commencement and during the first stage of a fight
cannot be considered as mitigating where the accused
pursued and killed the former while fleeing, and the
deceased, from the moment he had fled after the first
stage of the fight to the moment he died, did not give
any provocation for the accused to pursue, much less
further attack him. (People v. Tan, No. L-22697, October 5, 1976)
THREAT IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE ACT
§ The victim’s mere utterance, “If you do not agree,
beware,” without further proof that he has bent upon
translating his vague threats into immediate action, is
not sufficient.
§ But where the victims shouted at the accused, “Follow
us if you dare and we will kill you,” there is sufficient
threat. (REYES, supra at 288)
BASIS OF PARAGRAPH 4
§ The mitigating circumstance in paragraph 4 of
Article 13 is based on the diminution of
intelligence and intent. (REYES, supra at 288)
PAR. 5 – THAT THE ACT WAS COMMITTED IN THE
IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE
§ Requisites:
1. That there be a grave offense done to the one
committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers
or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same
degrees;
2. That the felony committed in vindication of such grave
offense. A lapse of time is allowed between the
vindication and the doing of the grave offense. (REYES,
supra at 283)
ILLUSTRATIONS:
1. Being accused by the victim that the accused stole
the former’s rooster which made the latter feel
deeply embarrassed, and the encounter took place
in about half an hour’s time. (People v. Pongol, C.A., 66 O.G.
567)
2. Stabbing to death the son of the accused which most
naturally and logically must have enraged and
obfuscated him that, seized by that feeling of hatred
and rancour, he stabbed indiscriminately the people
around. (People v. Doniego, No. L-17321, November 29, 1963)
APPLIES TO GRAVE OFFENSE COMMITTED AGAINST
SURVIVING SPOUSE OF DECEASED RELATIVE
§ The relationship by affinity created between the
surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the
deceased spouse survives the death of either party to
the marriage which created the affinity.
§ Thus, if A (the surviving husband of B) was killed by C,
B’s brother would be entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of vindication of grave offense if they
cause serious physical injuries to C immediately after
learning of A’s death. (REYES, supra at 290-291)
A LAPSE OF TIME IS ALLOWED BETWEEN GRAVE
OFFENSE AND THE VINDICATION
§ The word immediate used in the English text is not the
correct translation. The Spanish text uses “proxima”. The fact
the the accused was slapped by the deceased in the
presence of many persons a few hours before the former
killed the latter, was considered a mitigating circumstance
that the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a
grave offense. Although the grave offense (slapping of the
accused by the deceased), which endangered perturbation
of mind, was not so immediate, it was held that the influence
thereof, by reason of its gravity and the circumstances under
which it was inflicted, lasted until the moment the crime was
committed. (People v. Parana, 64 Phil. 331, 337)
A LAPSE OF TIME IS ALLOWED BETWEEN GRAVE
OFFENSE AND THE VINDICATION
§ In the case of People v. Palaan, G.R. No. 34976,
August 15, 1931, the killing of the paramour by the
offended husband one day after the adultery was
considered still proximate.
§ In the case of People v. Diokno, 63 Phil. 601, the lapse
of time between the grave offense (abducting the
daughter of the accused by the deceased) and the
vindication (killing of the deceased) was two or three
days.
INTERVAL OF TIME NEGATING VINDICATION
1. Approximately nine months before the killing, the
deceased boxed the accused several times in the
face resulting in the conviction of the deceased for
less serious physical injuries. He appealed, pending
which the accused killed him. It cannot be said that
the second incident was an immediate or a
proximate vindication of the first. (People v. Lumayag,
No. L-19142, March 31, 1965)
INTERVAL OF TIME NEGATING VINDICATION
2. The deceased uttered the following remark at
11:00 in the morning in the presence of the accused
and his officemates: “Nag-iistambay pala dito ang
magnanakaw” or “Hindi ko alam na itong Civil
Service pala ay istambayan ng magnanakaw.” At
5:00 in the afternoon of the same day, the accused
killed the deceased. The mitigating circumstance of
vindication of a grave offense does not avail.
(People v. Benito, No. L-32042, December 17, 1976)
INTERVAL OF TIME NEGATING VINDICATION
3. Where the accused heard the deceased say that the
accused’s daughter is a flirt, and the accused stabbed
the victim two months later, the mitigating circumstance
of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be
considered in favor of accused because he had sufficient
time to recover his serenity. The supposed vindication did
not immediately or proximately follow the alleged
insulting and provocative remarks. (People v. Lopez, G.R. No.
136861, November 15, 2000)
DISTINGUISH PROVOCATION FROM VINDICATION
1. In the case of provocation, it is made directly only
to the person committing the felony; in vindication,
the grave offense may be committed also against
the offender’s relatives mentioned by the law.
2. In vindication, the offended party must have done a
grave offense to the offender or his relatives
mentioned in the law; in provocation, the cause that
brought about the provocation need not be a grave
offense.
DISTINGUISH PROVOCATION FROM VINDICATION
3. In provocation, it is necessary that the provocation
or threat immediately preceded the act, i.e. that
there be no interval of time between the provocation
and the commission of the crime; while in
vindication, the vindication of the grave offense
may be proximate, which admits of an interval of
time between the grave offense done by the
offended party and the commission of the crime by
the accused. (REYES, supra at 291-292)
REASON FOR THE DIFFERENCE
§ This greater leniency in the case of vindication is due
undoubtedly to the fact that it concerns the honor of a
person, an offense which is more worthy of
consideration than mere spite against the one giving
the provocation or threat. (REYES, supra at 292)
BASIS TO DETERMINE THE GRAVITY OF OFFENSE IN
VINDICATION
§ The question whether a certain personal offense is grave
must be decided by the court, having in mind the social
standing of the person, the place, and the time when the
insult was made. (People v. Ruiz, 93 SCRA 739)
§ Example: During a fiesta, an old man 70 years of age
asked the deceased for some roast pig. In the presence of
many guests, the deceased insulted the only man saying,
“There is no more. Come here and I will make roast pig out
of you.” A little later, while the deceased was squatting…
BASIS TO DETERMINE THE GRAVITY OF OFFENSE IN
VINDICATION
§… down, the old man came up behind him and struck him on
the head with an axe.
§ HELD: While it may be mere trifle to an average person, it
evidently was a serious matter to an old man, to be made
the butt of a joke in the presence of so many guests. The
accused was given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance
of vindication of a grave offense. (U.S. v. Ampar, 37 Phil. 201)
§ In that case, the age of the accused and the place were
considered in determining the gravity of the offense.
ILLUSTRATIONS OF GRAVE OFFENSE:
1. Remark of the injured party before the guests that
accused lived at the expense of his wife. (People v. Rosel,
66 Phil. 323) The place was taken into consideration.
2. If a person kills another for having found him in the
act of committing an attempt against his (accused’s)
wife, he is entitled to the benefits of this
circumstances of having acted in vindication of a
grave offense against his and his wife’s honor. (U.S. v.
Alcasid, 1 Phil. 86)
ILLUSTRATIONS OF GRAVE OFFENSE:
3. Where the injured party had insulted the father of
the accused by contemptuously telling him: “Phse,
ichura mong lalake” (Pshaw, you are but a shrimp),
the accused who attacked the injured party acted in
vindication of a grave offense to his father. (People v.
David, 60 Phil. 93, 97, 103)
THE PROVOCATION SHOULD BE PROPORTIONATE TO THE
DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE ACT AND ADEQUATE TO STIR ONE
TO ITS COMMISSION
§ Aside from the fact that the provocation should
immediately precede the commission of the offense,
it should also be proportionate to the damage
caused by the act and adequate to stir one to its
commission. The remark attributed to the deceased
that the daughter of the accused is a flirt does not
warrant and justify the act of accused in slaying the
victim. (People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 136861, November 15, 2000)
GRAVE OFFENSE MUST BE DIRECTED TO THE
ACCUSED
§ In People v. Benito, 62 SCRA 351, the remark supposedly made
by the victim was general in nature and not specifically directed
to the accused. If the accused felt alluded to by a remark which
he personally considered insulting to him, that was his own
individual reaction thereto. Other people in the vicinity who
might have heard the remark could not have possibly known that
the victim was insulting the accused unless they were aware of
the background of the criminal and administrative charges
pending against the accused. The remark cannot be considered a
grave offense against the accused.
VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE
INCOMPATIBLE WITH PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
§ Vindication of a grave offense and passion and
obfuscation cannot be counted separately and
independently. (People v. Dagatan, 106 Phil. 88, 98)
BASIS OF PARAGRAPH 5
§ The mitigating circumstance in paragraph 5 of
Article 13 is based on the diminution of the
conditions of voluntariness. (REYES, supra at 294)
PAR. 6 – THAT OF HAVING ACTED UPON AN IMPULSE SO
POWERFUL AS NATURALLY TO HAVE PRODUCED PASSION OR
OBFUSCATION
§ Requisites:
1. The accused acted upon an impulse;
2. The impulse must be so powerful that it naturally
produced passion or obfuscation in him. (REYES, supra
at 294)
WHY PASSION OR OBFUSCATION IS MITIGATING
§ When there are causes naturally producing in a
person powerful excitement, he loses his reason and
self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his
will power. (U.S. v. Salandanan, 1 Phil. 464, 465)
RULE FOR THE APPLICATION OF PAR. 6
§ Passion or obfuscation may constitute a mitigating
circumstance only when the same arose from lawful
sentiments.
§ For this reason, even if there is actually passion or
obfuscation on the part of the offender, there is no
mitigating circumstance, when:
a. The act is committed in a spirit of lawlessness; or
b. The act is committed in a spirit of revenge (REYES,
supra at 295)
THE ACT OF THE OFFENDED PARTY MUST BE
UNLAWFUL OR UNJUST
§ The crime committed by the accused must be provoked
by prior unjust or improper acts of the injured party.
§ Example: A common-law wife, who, having left the
common home, refused to go home with the accused, was
acting within her rights, and the accused (common-law
husband) had no legitimate right to compel her to go
with him. The act of the deceased in refusing to go home
with the accused, while provocative, nevertheless was
insufficient to produce the passion and obfuscation that
the law contemplates. (People v. Quijano, C.A., 50 O.G. 5819)
THE ACT OF THE OFFENDED PARTY MUST BE
UNLAWFUL OR UNJUST
§ But where the accused killed his wife on the
occasion when she visited her aunt’s husband, this
mitigating circumstance was held to be applicable,
having in mind the jealousy of the accused and her
refusal to return to his house until after the arrival of
her uncle. (U.S. v. Ortencio, 38 Phil. 341, 344-345)
THE ACT MUST BE SUFFICIENT TO PRODUCE SUCH
A CONDITION OF MIND
§ If the cause of the loss of self-control was trivial
and slight, as when the victim failed to work on the
hacienda of which the accused was the overseer, or
where the accused saw the injured party picking
fruits from the tree claimed by the former, the
obfuscation is not mitigating. (People v. Bakil, C.A., 44 O.G.
102)
NO PASSION OR OBFUSCATION AFTER 24 HOURS,
OR SEVERAL HOURS OR HALF AN HOUR
§ Example: Hence, although the fact that accused was
subjected by the deceased to a treatment (being
slapped and asked to kneel down) offensive to his
dignity could not give rise to the feeling of passion
or obfuscation, the same cannot be treated as a
mitigating circumstance where the killing took place
one month and five days later. (People v. Mojica, No. L-
30742, April 30, 1976)
NO PASSION OR OBFUSCATION AFTER 24 HOURS,
OR SEVERAL HOURS OR HALF AN HOUR
§ The reason for these rulings is that the act producing
the obfuscation must not be far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the accused might have recovered
his normal equanimity. (People v. Layson, 30 SCRA 92, 95-96)
§ The defense must prove that the act which produced
passion or obfuscation took place at a time not far
removed from the commission of the crime. (REYES,
supra at 298)
NO PASSION OR OBFUSCATION AFTER 24 HOURS,
OR SEVERAL HOURS OR HALF AN HOUR
§ The crime committed must be the result of a sudden
impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury.
§ Obfuscation cannot be mitigating in a crime which
was planned and calmly meditated or if the impulse
upon which the accused acted was deliberately
fomented by him for a consideration period of time.
(People v. Daos, 60 Phil. 143, 155)
PASSION OR OBFUSCATION MAY BUILD UP AND
STRENGTHEN OVER TIME
§ Passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance
need not be felt only in the seconds before the
commission of the crime. It may build up and strengthen
over time until it can no longer be repressed and will
ultimately motivate the commission of the crime.
§ Example: Where the victim not only threatened to
molest accused’s daughter but also accused him in
public of having incestuous relations with his mother,
and insulting him, passion may linger and build up over
time. (People v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159, March 18, 2015)
PASSION OR OBFUSCATION MUST ARISE FROM
LAWFUL SENTIMENTS
§ The passion or obfuscation must arise from accused’s lawful
sentiments. The offended party must have done an act
unlawful and sufficient to excite passion or obfuscation.
(People v. Tiongco, September 1994)
§ Example: A person who maintains an illicit relationship with
the wife of another is courting the passion and obfuscation
of the husband because his act of having an affair with the
wife is unjust and sufficient to make the passion of the
husband arise. As the relationship of the husband and the
wife is legitimate, the passion or obfuscation of the husband
would result from lawful sentiment. (BOADO, supra at 150)
NOT MITIGATING IF THE ACCUSED ACTED IN THE
SPIRIT OF LAWLESSNESS
§ Example: The accused who raped a woman is not
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of “having
acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to
have produced passion” just because he finds
himself in a secluded place with that young
ravishing woman, almost naked, and therefore,
“liable to succumb to the uncontrollable passion of
his bestial instinct”. (People v. Sanico, C.A., 46 O.G. 98)
NOT MITIGATING IF THE ACCUSED ACTED IN THE
SPIRIT OF REVENGE
§ FACTS: A woman taking care of a nine-month-old child,
poisoned the child with acid. She did it, because
sometime before the killing of the child, the mother of
the child, having surprised her (accused) with a man on
the bed of the master, had scolded her. She invoked the
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation
resulting from the scolding by the mother of the child.
§ HELD: She cannot be credited with such mitigating
circumstance. She was actuated more by spirit of
lawlessness and revenge than by any sudden impulse of
natural and uncontrollable fury. (People v. Caliso, 58 Phil. 283,
295)
INJURY RESULTING FROM A QUARREL DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE PASSION AND OBFUSCATION
§ Excitement is the natural feeling of all persons
engaged in a fight, especially those who had
received a beating, and the impulse in that state is
not considered in law so powerful as to produce
obfuscation sufficient to mitigate liability. (People v. De
Guia, C.A., 36 O.G. 1151)
OBFUSCATION – WHEN RELATIONSHIP IS
ILLEGITIMATE – NOT MITIGATING
§ The relations of the accused with Rosario Rianzales
were illegitimate. The injured party made indecent
propositions to her which provoked the accused. The
accused attacked the injured party. The obfuscation
of the accused is not mitigating, because his
relations with Rosario Rianzales were illegitimate.
(People v. Olgado, et. al. G.R. No. L-4406, March 31, 1952)
BASIS OF PARAGRAPH 6
§ Passion or obfuscation is a mitigating circumstance
because the offender who acts with passion or
obfuscation suffers a diminution of his intelligence
and intent. (REYES, supra at 306)
PASSION OR OBFUSCATION DISTINGUISHED FROM
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
PASSION OR OBFUSCATION IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
Mitigating circumstance Exempting circumstance

Cannot give rise to an Requires physical force

irresistible force
Passion or obfuscation is in the Irresistible force must come from
offender himself a third person
Must arise from lawful Irresistible force is unlawful
sentiments
PASSION OR OBFUSCATION DISTINGUISHED FROM
PROVOCATION
PROVOCATION PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
Comes from the injured Produced by an impulse which may be
party caused by provocation
Must immediately The offense which engenders
precede the commission perturbation of mind need not be
of the crime immediate; it is only required that the
influence thereof lasts until the moment
the crime is committed
In both, the effect is the loss of reason and self-control on the part of
the offender
PAR. 7 – THAT THE OFFENDER HAD VOLUNTARILY
SURRENDERED HIMSELF TO A PERSON IN AUTHORITY OR
HIS AGENTS, OR THAT HE HAD VOLUNTARILY CONFESSED
HIS GUILT BEFORE THE COURT PRIOR TO THE
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
§ Two mitigating circumstances are provided:
1. Voluntary surrender to a person in authority or his
agents.
2. Voluntary confession of guilt before the court prior
to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.
(REYES, supra at 308)
PAR. 7 – THAT THE OFFENDER HAD VOLUNTARILY
SURRENDERED HIMSELF TO A PERSON IN AUTHORITY OR
HIS AGENTS, OR THAT HE HAD VOLUNTARILY CONFESSED
HIS GUILT BEFORE THE COURT PRIOR TO THE
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
§ Although theses circumstances are considered
mitigating in the same subsection of Art. 12, when
both are present, they should have the effect of
mitigating as two independent circumstances.
(People v. Fontabla, 61 Phil. 589, 590)
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
§ Requisites of voluntary surrender:
a. That the offender had not been actually arrested.
b. That the offender surrendered himself to a person
in authority or to the latter’s agent.
c. That the surrender was voluntary. (Estacio v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 75362)
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
§ Requisites of voluntariness – for voluntary
surrender to be appreciated, the same must be
spontaneous in such a manner that it shows the
interest of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he
acknowledged his guilt or because he wishes to save
them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred
in his search and capture. (People v. Gervacio, No. L-21965,
August 30, 1968)
CASES NOT CONSTITUTING VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER
1. The warrant of arrest showed that the accused was
in fact arrested.
2. The accused surrendered only after the warrant of
arrest was served upon him.
3. Where the accused was actually arrested by his own
admission or that he yielded because of the warrant
of arrest, there is no voluntary surrender.
4. The accused went into hiding and surrendered only
when they realized that the forces of the law…
CASES NOT CONSTITUTING VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER
4. … were closing in on them.
5. Where the search for the accused had lasted for
years, which belies the spontaneity of the surrender.
6. Where the accused went to the PC headquarters not
to surrender but merely to report the incident which
does not evince any desire to own the responsibility
for the killing of the deceased. (REYES, supra at 311-312)
NOT MITIGATING WHEN DEFENDANT WAS IN FACT
ARRESTED
§ There was no voluntary surrender if the warrant of
arrest showed that the defendant was in fact arrested.
(People v. Conwi, 71 Phil. 595)
§ But where a person, after committing the offense and
having opportunity to escape, voluntarily waited for
the agents of the authorities and voluntarily gave
himself up, he is entitled to the benefit of the
circumstance. (People v. Parana, 64 Phil. 331)
WHEN THE WARRANT OF ARREST HAD NOT BEEN
SERVED OR NOT RETURNED UNSERVED BECAUSE THE
ACCUSED CANNOT BE LOCATED, THE SURRENDER IS
MITIGATING
§ In the case of People v. Brana, 30 SCRA 308, there is
nothing in the record to show that the warrant had actually
been served on the accused, or that is had been returned
unserved for failure of the server to locate said accused.
Upon the other hand, there is direct evidence that the
accused voluntarily presented himself to the police on March
31, 1967. The fact that it was effected sometime after the
warrant had been issued does not in the least detract from
the voluntary surrender of the accused.
THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE
SURRENDER BE PRIOR TO THE ORDER OF ARREST
§ The mere filing of an information and/or issuance of
a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the
surrender “involuntary.”
§ If it is clear that notwithstanding the pendency of the
warrant for his arrest, the accused may still be entitled
to the mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders,
depending on the actual facts surrounding the very act
of giving himself up. (De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, April 7,
2009)
VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED HIMSELF
§ Surrender of weapons cannot be equated with
voluntary surrender.
§ The fact that the accused did not escape or go into
hiding after the commission of the murder and in fact
he accompanied the chief of police to the scene of the
crime without however surrendering to him and
admitting complicity in the killing did not amount to
voluntary surrender. (People v. Canoy, 90 Phil. 633)
SURRENDER MUST BE MADE TO A PERSON IN
AUTHORITY OR HIS AGENT
§ A person in authority – one directly vested with
jurisdiction, that is, a public officer who has the power
to govern and execute the laws whether as an
individual or as a member of some court or
governmental corporation, board or commission. A
barrio captain and a barangay chairman are also
persons in authority. (Art. 152, RPC as amended by PD No. 299)
SURRENDER MUST BE MADE TO A PERSON IN
AUTHORITY OR HIS AGENT
§ An agent of a person in authority – a person, who,
by direct provision of the law, or by election or by
appointment by competent authority, is charged with
the maintenance of public order and the protection and
security of life and property and any person who
comes to the aid of persons in authority. (Art. 152, RPC as
amended by PD No. 299)
SURRENDER THROUGH AN INTERMEDIARY
§ The accused surrendered through the mediation of his
father before any warrant of arrest had been issued.
His surrender was appreciated as mitigating. (People v. De
la Cruz, No. L-45485, September 19, 1978, 85 SCRA 285, 292)
WHEN IS SURRENDER VOLUNTARY?
§ A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing
the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to
the authorities, either (1) because he acknowledged his guilt,
or (2) because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses
necessarily incurred in his search and capture.
§ If none of these two reasons impelled the accused to
surrender, because his surrender was obviously motivated
more by an intention to insure his safety, his arrest being
inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and therefore
not voluntary. (People v. Laurel, C.A., 59 O.G. 7618)
SURRENDER MUST BE SPONTANEOUS
§ The word “spontaneous” emphasizes the idea of an
inner impulse, acting without external stimulus. The
conduct of the accused, not his intention alone, after the
commission of the crime, determines the spontaneity of
the surrender.
§ The circumstance that the accused did not resist arrest
or struggle to free himself after he was taken to
custody by the authorities cannot amount to voluntary
surrender. (People v. Siojo, 61 Phil. 307, 318)
SURRENDER MUST BE SPONTANEOUS
§ Intention to surrender, without actually surrendering, is
not mitigating.
§ There is spontaneity even if the surrender is induced
by fear of retaliation by the victim’s relatives.
§ When the offender imposed a condition or acted with
external stimulus, his surrender is not voluntary (i.e.
negotiations, etc.) (REYES, supra at 321 to 322)
VOLUNTARY PLEA OF GUILT
§ Requisites of voluntary plea of guilt:
a. That the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt;
b. That the confession of guilt was made in open court,
that is, before the competent court that is to try the
case; and
c. That the confession of guilt was made prior to the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution. (People v.
Crisostomo, No. L-32243, April 15, 1988)
VOLUNTARY PLEA OF GUILT
§ The plea must be before trial begins.
§ Plea of guilty on appeal is not mitigating.
§ Plea of guilty at the preliminary investigation is no
plea at all.
§ The confession must be made in open court
§The extrajudicial confessions made by the accused
is not voluntary confession because it was made
outside of the court. (People v. Pardo, et. al., 79 Phil. 568)
WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA OF NOT GUILTY AND PLEADING
GUILTY BEFORE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY
PROSECUTION IS STILL MITIGATING
§ All that the law requires is voluntary plea of guilty
prior to the presentation of evidence by the Prosecution.
Thus, even if during the arraignment, the accused
pleaded not guilty, he is entitled to this mitigating
circumstance as long as he withdraws his plea of not
guilty and thereafter pleads guilty to the charge
before the prosecutor could present his evidence. (REYES,
supra at 324)
PLEA OF GUILTY TO LESSER OFFENSE THAN THAT
CHARGED, NOT MITIGATING
§ Plea of guilty to a lesser offense is not a mitigating
circumstance because to be voluntary, the plea of
guilty must be to the offense charged. (People v. Noble,
77 Phil. 93)
§ For voluntary confession to be appreciate, the same
must not only be made unconditionally, but the accused
must admit to the offense charged. Hence, if voluntary
confession is conditional or qualified, it is not mitigating.
(People v. Gano, et. al., G.R. No. 134373, February 28, 2001)
REASON WHY PLEA OF GUILTY IS MITIGATING
§ It is an act of repentance and respect for the law;
it indicates a moral disposition in the accused,
favorable to his reform. (People v. De la Cruz, 63 Phil. 874,
876)
BASIS OF PARAGRAPH 7
§ The basis of the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and plea of guilty is the lesser
perversity of the offender. (REYES, supra at 328)
PLEA OF GUILTY IS NOT MITIGATING IN CULPABLE
FELONIES AND IN CRIMES PUNISHED BY SPECIAL LAWS
§ Art. 365, par. 5 of the RPC which prescribes the
penalties for culpable felonies, provided that “in the
imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise
their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Art. 64.” This last mentioned article
states, among other rules, that when there is a
mitigating circumstance without any aggravating
circumstance, the penalty to be impose is the minimum
period of the divisible penalty. (People v. Agito, 103 Phil. 526,
529)
PLEA OF GUILTY IS NOT MITIGATING IN CULPABLE
FELONIES AND IN CRIMES PUNISHED BY SPECIAL LAWS
§ When the crime is punished by a special law, the court
shall also exercise its sound discretion, as Art. 64 is not
applicable. The penalty prescribed by special laws is
usually not divisible into three periods. Art. 64 is
applicable only when the penalty has three periods.
(REYES, supra at 328)
PAR. 8 – THAT THE OFFENDER IS DEAF AND DUMB, BLIND
OR OTHERWISE SUFFERING FROM SOME PHYSICAL DEFECT
WHICH THUS RESTRICTS HIS MEANS OF ACTION, DEFENSE,
OR COMMUNICATION WITH HIS FELLOW BEINGS
§ The offender’s being deaf and dumb or blind or
otherwise suffering from some physical defect must
relate to the offense because the law requires that the
defect has the effect of restricting his means of action,
defense or communication to his fellow beings. The
illness or defect is the contributory cause that moved
him to commit the felony. (BOADO, supra at 155)
PAR. 8 – THAT THE OFFENDER IS DEAF AND DUMB, BLIND
OR OTHERWISE SUFFERING FROM SOME PHYSICAL DEFECT
WHICH THUS RESTRICTS HIS MEANS OF ACTION, DEFENSE,
OR COMMUNICATION WITH HIS FELLOW BEINGS
§ Example: Thus, rape committed by a deaf and
dumb on the girl of his dreams to whom he cannot
convey his feelings will mitigate his liability unless
the circumstances justify the imposition of a single
indivisible penalty where modifying circumstances
have no effect. (BOADO, supra at 155)
PAR. 8 – THAT THE OFFENDER IS DEAF AND DUMB, BLIND
OR OTHERWISE SUFFERING FROM SOME PHYSICAL DEFECT
WHICH THUS RESTRICTS HIS MEANS OF ACTION, DEFENSE,
OR COMMUNICATION WITH HIS FELLOW BEINGS
§ Defect cannot be appreciated where appellant’s
physical condition clearly did not limit his means of
action, defense or communication, nor affect his free
will. Despite his handicap, appellant managed to
attack, overcome and fatally stab his victim. (People v.
Deopante, G.R. No. 102772, October 30, 1996)
BASIS OF PARAGRAPH 8
§ Paragraph 8 of Art. 13 considers the fact that one
suffering from physical defect, which restricts one’s
means of action, defense, or communication with
one’s fellow beings, does not have complete
freedom of action and, therefore, there is a
diminution of that element of voluntariness. (REYES,
supra at 329)
PAR. 9 – SUCH ILLNESS OF THE OFFENDER AS WOULD
DIMINISH THE EXERCISE OF THE WILLPOWER OF THE
OFFENDER WITHOUT HOWEVER DEPRIVING HIM OF
CONSCIOUSNESS OF HIS ACTS
§ Requisites:
a. That the illness of the offender must diminish the
exercise of his will-power.
b. That such illness should not deprive the offender
of consciousness of his acts.
DOES THIS CIRCUMSTANCE INCLUDE ILLNESS OF
THE MIND?
§ It is said that the foregoing legal provision refers
only to diseases of pathological state that trouble the
conscience or will.
§ The illness must only diminish and not deprive
the offender of the consciousness of his acts;
otherwise, he will be exempt from criminal liability.
BASIS OF PARAGRAPH 9
§ The circumstance in paragraph 9 of Art. 13 is
mitigating because there is diminution of
intelligence and intent. (REYES, supra at 331)
PAR. 10 – AND, FINALLY, ANY OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES
OF A SIMILAR NATURE AND ANALOGOUS TO THOSE
ABOVEMENTIONED
§ Example: The fact that the defendant was over 60
years old and with failing sight, is analogous to
circumstances no. 2 of Art. 13, as similar to the case
of one over 70 years of age. (People v. Reantillo and Ruiz,
C.A., G.R. No. 301, July 27, 1938)